ML12332A110

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Final Operating Exam (Sections a, B, and C) (Folder 3)
ML12332A110
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/01/2012
From: Geckle M
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
To: Peter Presby
Operations Branch I
Jackson D
Shared Package
ML12137A368 List:
References
TAC U01857
Download: ML12332A110 (433)


Text

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 344-001-03-01 Perform Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.)

Task Title: Perform OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N RA-1 KIA

Reference:

2.1.37 (4.3/4.6) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.
  • Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU
  • Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
  • Current BAST temperature is 165°F
  • Current RWST temperature is 65°F
  • Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Task Standard:
  • Perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute.

Required Materials:

  • Computer with PCNDR and PPCS
  • OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001
  • Calculator
  • Pencil General

References:

OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Handouts: OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

  • Using the data from the Initial Conditions, perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute.

Validation Time: 30 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Have a clean copy of OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ...J)

Start Time: _ _ __

Step 3.1 Procedure Note: Plant should be approximately 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium Xenon to perform this guideline.

Performance Step: 1 Determine burnup from PPCS point ID "8URNUP".

Standard: Examinee enters 13764 MWD/MTU, based on Initial Conditions.

EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of OPG REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Comment:

Step 3.2 Performance Step: 2 Use the following burnup values to determine appropriate curve for time in Core life:

80L-6139 MWD/MTU ---* Use 80L curves 6140 -12279 MWD/MTU ---* Use MOL curves 12280 - EOL MWD/MTU ---* Use EOL curves Standard: None EXAMINER Note: This step impacts the performance of the procedure if the operator will be using the Cycle Book to perform the calculation (different sets of curves). In this case the operator will be using PCNDR, so the result of this determination has no impact on the calculation.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.2.1 Performance Step: 3 Use PCNDR (or Cycle Book) and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth.

Standard:

  • Uses PCNDR and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth.

EXAMINER NOTE: The Cycle 36 PCNDR program is initialized by:

  • Clicking on PCNDR Cycle 36 Beta icon on desktop
  • In response to "Security Warning - Macros Have Been Disabled" message, click on "Options"
  • When Security Alert Menu popup appears, click on the 2nd bullet "Enable This Content" and "OK" to start program EXAMINER NOTE: The examinee must determine the correct values at this point; however, the values aren't documented until Attachment 3 is filled out.

Comment:

Step 3.2.2 Performance Step: 4 Use Xenon Predict report from PPCS, if available, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium.

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: The examinee must determine the correct values at this point; however, the values aren't documented until Attachment 3 is filled out.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.3

--J Performance Step: 5 Record the following:

  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg)
  • Current Core Burnup
  • Differential Boron Worth Standard:
  • Records values from Initial Conditions, and step 3.2.1:

o Current RCS Boron Concentration;:; 517 ppm o Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg);:; 16,100 ppm o Current RWST Boron Concentration;:; 2910 ppm o Current Core Burnup;:; 13,764 o

Comment:

Steps 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 Performance Step: 6 Perform Attachment 1, 2, and 4 Standard:

  • Recognizes these are not required for this task.
  • N/A's these three steps Comment:

Step 3.6 Performance Step: 7 Perform Attachment 3, 50% PWR CHANGE AT 1% PER MINUTE Standard:

  • Goes to Attachment 3 (Page 6)

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Power Defect (El:

Procedure Note: Values obtained for items B, C, 0, F, G, G1, G2 and I are always negative.

Procedure Note: Delta Xe and Sm is calculated from the time power decrease starts until completed.

Performance Step: 8 100% Total Power Defect 50% Total Power Defect

_ _ _ _ PCM (D) - _-_ _ _ PCM (C) =

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Delta Rod Reactivity (Fl: (Use 170 steps on Bk D for Final Rod Position)

Performance Step: 9 Initial Integral Rod worth on Bk 0 Final Integral Rod worth on Bk D

_ _ _ _ PCM (F1) - _ _ _ PCM (F2) =

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Xe and Sm (G):

Performance Step: 10 Initial Xe and Sm Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change

_ _ _ _ PCM (G2) - _-_ _ _ PCM (G1) =

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Total Reactivity (H):

Performance Step: 11 Delta Power Defect + Delta Rod Reactivity + Delta Xe and 8m =

Total Reactivity Change

_ _ _ (E) + _-_ _ _ (F) + _-_ _ _ (G) =

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION RCS Boron Offset Value (I):

Performance Step: 12

_ _----'-P.=C=..:..:.M (H)/_-_ _ PCM/PPM (B) = - PPM (I)

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Required RCS Boron Concentration (J):

Performance Step: 13 Current RCS Boron Conc (A) - PPM change (I) =Required RCS Boron Conc (J)

_ _ _---'-P..:...P=..:..:.M (A) - _-_ _ _ (I) = _+_ _ _ PPM (J)

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Gallons of Boric Acid needed:

Performance Step: 14 (Use PPCS or VBD Book to calculate the number of gallons required from BASTs and the RWST).

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 9 of 11 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Initial Boration Rate for Rapid shutdown Performance Step: 15 1%/min gals BAST (K)_/ 50 minutes = _ GPM BA flow 3%/min gals BAST (K)_/16.67 minutes = _ GPM BA flow 5%/min gals BAST (K)_/1 0 minutes = _ GPM BA flow Standard:

  • Divides the gallons of boric acid required from the BASTs by the time required to result in the desired shutdown rate to determine the boric acid flow rate required for that particular load reduction rate.(6.2 gpm, 18.7 gpm, 31.2 gpm)

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ _,

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM N-RA-1 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.
  • Current "BURNUP" is 13,764 MWD/MTU
  • Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
  • Current BAST temperature is 165°F
  • Current RWST temperature is 65°F
  • Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D INITIATING CUE:
  • Using the data from the Initial Conditions, perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute.

20121LT NRC "IPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Ginna Task No.: 344-001-04-02 Perform Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.)

Task Title: Determine Maximum Allowable RV JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N Head Venting Time RA-2 KIA

Reference:

2.1.25 (3.9/4.2) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The crew is performing FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel
  • RCS pressure is stable at 650 psig
  • Containment temperature is stable at 180°F Task Standard:
  • Correctly calculate the maximum allowable venting time.

Required Materials:

  • Calculator
  • Clear ruler General

References:

  • FR-I.3. Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision02400
  • ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time. Revision 4

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Handouts:

  • FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision02400
  • ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4
  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform FR-1.3, Step 21

- Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time.

Validation Time: 10 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a clean copy of the following available to provide to the Examinee:

  • FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision 02400
  • ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4

Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ _ _.

FR-1.3, Step 21 Performance Step: 1 Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time:

a. CNMT hydrogen concentration - LESS THAN 3%
b. Determine maximum venting time (Refer to ATT-20.0, ATTACHMENT VENT TIME)

Standard:

  • Determines that CNMT hydrogen concentration is less than 3%, based on Initial Conditions
  • Refers to ATT-20.0, ATTACHMENT VENT TIME EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of:
  • FR-I.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision02400,
  • A TT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4 Comment:

ATT 20, Step 1 Performance Step: 2 Record H2 Concentration and RCS pressure.

Standard: Records 1.1 % and 650 psig, respectively.

EXAMINER NOTE: This information would have been recorded in FR-1.3, step 18, but, for the purpose of this JPM, the information has been provided in the Initial Conditions.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION A TT-20.0, Step 2 Performance Step: 3 Determine Containment Volume at standard conditions (V).

Standard:

  • Uses 180 OF in the equation 2a

=

  • Determines that V (step 2b) 796,875 cu ft.

EXAMINER NOTE: Since all students are provided the same calculator, there is no defined tolerance needed for step 2b. Any minor rounding or scientific notation differences will be reflected within the readability margins of Fig. 12.0 (Performance Step 5).

Comment:

ATT -20.0, Step 3 Performance Step: 4 Determine the maximum H2 volume that can be vented (H).

Standard:

  • Uses 1.1 % in equation 3a
  • EXAMINER NOTE:
  • The tolerance allows for minor variation in rounding calculated value up or down to the nearest whole number.
  • Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION ATT-20.0, Step 4

~" Performance Step: 5

  • Determine H2 flow rate (F) from curve on Figure CNMT HYDROGEN and RCS pressure recorded in step 1b.

Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: (When requested by Examinee)

Provide a clean copy of Figure-12.0.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • The tolerance allows for a minor variation in graph reading since the graph divisions are small.
  • Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity.

Comment:

ATT -20.0, Step 5 Performance Step: 6 Calculate the maximum venting time (T).

Standard:

  • Divides H, from step 3, by F, from step 4
  • {~I'I.jl~J_~,ai"'~

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • Lower end of tolerance allows for using low end of Fig 12.0 readability (1125 SCFM). Upper end of tolerance allows for using upper end of Fig 12.0 readability (1175 SCFM).
  • Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns AIT-20.0 and Fig 12.0 to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion:

"Evaluation on this JPM is complete."

Stop time: _ __

2012 ILT NRC ..IPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-2 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:

20121LT NRC ..IPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Form JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The crew is performing FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel
  • RCS pressure is stable at 650 psig
  • Containment temperature is stable at 180°F INITIATING CUE:
  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform FR-1.3, Step 21 - Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time.

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form Worksheet qFacility: Ginna Task No.: 351-012-01-05 Perform 11M Plots And Calculations Task Title: Perform 11M Plot per 0-1.2.1 JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N RA-3 KIA

Reference:

2.2.1 (4.5/4.4) Alternate Path Yes No.]S Time Critical Yes No.]S Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14.
  • 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed:

o The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D.

o The + 500 PCM bank position is _Bk D @ 52 steps o The - 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps

  • The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn.
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0.

Task Standard: Perform a 11M plot and correctly interpret the plot. Determine if criticality is projected within the next pull, or if the projected critical position falls outside either the +1- 500 pcm position or below the 0% power RIL.

Required Materials:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • Calculator

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet General

References:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Revision 19602
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits Handouts:
  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2
  • A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0,
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet
  • Calculator
  • Clear ruler Initiating Cue:
  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, steps 6.0 through 6.4.8.
  • Disregard any Independent Verification requirements.
  • On the JPM CUE SHEET, answer the following questions based on the 11M plot that you have constructed:
1. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL?
2. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and - 500 pcm bank positions?
  • Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM.

QUESTIONS:

  • Based on the 11M plot that you have just completed:
1. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL?

DYES 0 NO

2. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and - 500 pcm bank positions?

DYES 0 NO Validation Time: 30 Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Form Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2,
  • A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0,
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits,
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet,
  • Calculator, and

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CLIE SHEET (Denote Critical Steps with a .,j)

Start Time: _ __

Step 6.1 Procedure Notes:

  • Per 0-1.2, 11M is determined at 50 step intervals OR as specified by SM.
  • Data is recorded on Attachment 1.

A 11M plot is completed each time an approach to criticality is desired.

'. Performance Step: 1

  • MARK the following rod bank positions on 11M graph:
  • + 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation
  • - 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation
  • Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power as determined from TS 3.1.6 (using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits)

Standard:

  • Identifies the +500 PCM bank position and - 500 PCM bank position from the Initial Conditions
  • Determines that the Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits is 181 steps

-1M' ~."""'**~b!~;~..1.~.~a....:~

.", ... ~\1_: \'ili,,*~*~:pa_.'..n.v'~~.~

EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with:

  • A marked up copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet
  • A calculator
  • A ruler EXAMINER NOTE: +500 pcm position = 0 @ 52 steps

-500 pcm position = 0 @ 186 steps Bank B RIL for 0% = B @ 181 steps Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1

.JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.2 and 6.3 Procedure Note: DO NOT obtain base counts for control banks until shutdown bank is fully withdrawn and counts have stabilized.

Performance Step: 2 6.2 RECORD initial baseline counts from the following:

  • NI-31 Source Range meter
  • NI-32 Source Range meter 6.3 RECORD initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot.

Standard:

  • Identifies baseline counts on the JPM Data Sheet
  • Records initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank).

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.4.1 through 6.4.4 Procedure Notes: Control Rod withdrawal is performed as directed per 0-1.2, Reactor Startup Section.

  • 11M =CR base I CRfinal Procedure Cautions:
  • WHEN either Source Range reaches 1 x 104 cps, THEN rate of rise should be adjusted so it is rising very slowly.
  • IF either Source Range reaches 5 x 104 cps AND IR Power is NOT above the P-6 defeat permissive, THEN the HCO should be directed tom stabilize OR reduce power.
  • DO NOT exceed 105 cps Source Range to prevent a Reactor Trip (1/2 105 cps).

Performance Step: 3 6.4 AFTER Control Rods are withdrawn AND count rate has stabilized, THEN CREATE 11M plot as follows:

6.4.1 RECORD time AND rod position.

6.4.2 RECORD RCS loop average temperatures.

6.4.3 RECORD count rate.

6.4.4 CALCULATE 11M values AND RECORD on Attachment 1, 11M Plot.

Standard:

  • Transfers time, rod position, RCS loop average temperatures, and count rate data from the JPM Data Sheet to the appropriate position on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank)

[See Answer Key]

  • Comment:

2012 ILT NRC ~IPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.4.5 through 6.4.7 Performance Step: 4 6.4.5 INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY calculations.

6.4.6 MARK 11M values on graph.

6.4.7 DRAW a line connecting last pOint to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position.

Standard:

  • Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue.
  • ..J Marks 11M va~ongraph.
  • ..J Draws a line connecting fast point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to cteterminesjprojected critical position.

Comment:

Step 6.4.8 Performance Step: 5 6.4.8 WHILE REVIEWING SUBSEQUENT STEPS CONCERNING CRITICALITY, repeat Steps 6.4.1 thru 6.4.7 for each rod pull.

Standard:

  • Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue.

EXAMINER NOTE: After the examinee completes marking 11M values and drawing lines for all data provided, he should answer the two questions asked in the Initiating Cue:

1. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% Rll?

Answer: Yes

2. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and - 500 pcm bank positions?

Answer: No Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiners discretion:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14.
  • 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed:

o The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D.

o The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps o The - 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps

  • The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn.
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0.

INITIATING CUE:

  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, steps 6.0 through 6.4.8.
  • Disregard any Independent Verification requirements.
  • Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM.

QUESTIONS:

  • Based on the 11M plot that you have just completed:
1. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL?

DYES D NO

2. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and - 500 pcm bank positions?

DYES D NO 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 119-011-03-03 Determine stay time and exit requirements for working in a High Radiation Area.

Task Title: Determine stay time for local valve JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N operation in the RCA. RA-4 KIA

Reference:

2.3.4 (3.2/3.7) Alternate Path Yes No X Time Critical Yes No ~

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.
  • The first step in the plan is that V-358, (RWST Makeup AOV Bypass Valve to Charging Pump Suction) must be checked fully closed.

Task Standard: Determine stay time for local valve operation in the RCA.

Required Materials:

  • A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200
  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map (modified)
  • Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Procedures Cart General

References:

  • A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Handouts:

  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Access to procedures cart Initiating Cue:
  • Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time = _______
  • Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358.

Validation Time: 17 Minutes (1 RO)

SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Access to procedures cart containing A-procedures book (for A-1) 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ __

A*1 Step 3.5 Performance Step: 1 Examinee determines Regulatory Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Standard:

  • Determines A-1 Procedure should be referenced, locates same on procedures cart
  • Determines applicable annual dose limits from Table (Regulatory! Station Admin/Site):

EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with:

  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Access to procedures cart Comment:

Determine expected dose rate Performance Step: 2 Examinee refers to the Charging Pump Room Survey Map and determines his expected dose rate while operating V-358.

Standard: mlG1~',\t.;35eiS (80 mRlhr general area dose)

  • '" Determines that the radiation rat~ Will be 80mRthr Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determine current exposure Performance Step: 3 Examinee reviews his exposure record and determines current TEDE.

Standard: \lTeD~(Gin~ Admin J!im!lJ~ QRt;t,.9FR,I;,~~lS m~J;n. +,1~0 mrem .(Girinca) *+2825mrem+53(}ffirem.{CalVertjf~3~60*mrem

--J TEpE (Site Lioiit) = Site DOE + Site CeDe = ~7~ror~r>>+1~O .

mrem = 505 mrem . . . Ii* *.* ,

Instructor NOTE:

  • Ginna ADMIN limit applies to ALL dose received at ALL nuclear facilities (A-1, section 3.5.5.a NOTE) = 4 rem/yr TEDE
  • Ginna SITE limit is only dose received at Ginna this year

= 1 rem/yr TEDE

  • He is closest to the ADMIN limit as most limiting (only 140 mRem remain to limit of 4 rem/yr.

Comment:

Determine remaining exposure available and determines most limiting Performance Step: 4 Subtracts current exposure from applicable limit Standard: .--J AClffiintimitTEDE

~~"",'" ,,,,,' ~",;",' i':,,'

~4()OO

,<~~~,~'

mrem

' '

-3860

">-;:":::~':

mrem::'

,<,": 0 14()'rrit~m

,+(Y:<,""'r:,y<,,:>,:,t'?>/:'H~;;::~,",

--JSi,eJ.iroi.t1I;Di:=190P fllre'U ~ 505 mr~m = 495~rem

--JDetermines ADM 1f;Jlirrl.iUs m~stlimitir)g. ~i~h 1~ mrent .

remaining ....

Comment:

Determines Stay Time Performance Step: 5 Stay time =Remaining exposure available I Expected radiation rate Standard: --JStaYTime =140rriremr&()f!lt~rn/hr = 1..75hror( 105 minutes Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion:

"Evaluation on this JPM is complete."

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Stop time: _ _ _,

Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.
  • The first step in the plan is that V-358, (RWST Makeup AOV Bypass Valve to Charging Pump Suction) must be checked fully closed.

INITIATING CUE:

  • Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time =_______
  • Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358.

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET N-RA-4 Your Exposure for the Current Year Ginna Calvert Cliffs 375 mrem 2825 mrem 35 mrem 25 mrem 130 mrem 530 mrem 45 mrem 10 mrem 25 mrem 15 mrem 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 344-001-03-03 Direct Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.)

Task Title: Verify OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC ..IPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC ..IPM N SA-1 KIA

Reference:

2.1.37 (4.3/4.6) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.
  • Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU
  • Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
  • Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Task Standard:
  • Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO, and identify any errors.

Required Materials:

  • Computer with PCNDR and PPCS
  • OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001
  • Calculator
  • Pencil General

References:

OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Handouts: OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Initiating Cue:

  • Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO .
  • List any errors identified on the JPM CUE SHEET.

Validation Time: 34 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP

  • Reset to IC-24, 100% steady state. EOl
  • Override BURNUP value in PPCS to those in Initial Conditions of this JPM INSTRUCTOR AC"nONS
  • Have a clean copy of OPG-REACTIVITY-CAlC, Revision 01001 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121lT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ __

Step 3.1 Procedure Note: Plant should be approximately 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium Xenon to perform this guideline.

Performance Step: 1 Determine burnup from PPCS point ID "BURNUP".

Standard: Verifies that the RO entered 13764 MWD/MTU, based on Initial Conditions.

EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with a marked up copy of OPG REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Comment:

Step 3.2 Performance Step: 2 Use the following burnup values to determine appropriate curve for time in Core life:

BOl -6139 MWD/MTU ----7 Use BOl curves 6140 - 12279 MWD/MTU ----7 Use MOL curves 12280 - EOl MWD/MTU ----7 Use EOl curves Standard: None EXAMINER NOTE: This step impacts the performance of the procedure if the operator will be using the Cycle Book to perform the calculation (different curve sets). In this case the operator will be using PCNDR, so the result of this determination has no impact on the calculation.

Comment:

2012 IlT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.2.1 Performance Step: 3 Use PCNDR (or Cycle Book) and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth.

Standard:

  • Uses PCNDR and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth.

EXAMINER NOTE: The Cycle 36 PCNDR program is initialized by:

  • Clicking on PCNDR Cycle 36 Beta icon on desktop
  • In response to "Security Warning - Macros Have Been Disabled" message, click on "Options"
  • When Security Alert Menu popup appears, click on the 2nd bullet "Enable This Content" and "OK" to start program Comment:

Step 3.2.2 Performance Step: 4 Use Xenon Predict report from PPCS, if available, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium.

Standard:

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.3

" Performance Step: 5 Record the following:
  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg)
  • Current Core Burnup
  • Differential Boron Worth Standard:
  • Verifies that the RO recorded the correct values from Initial Conditions, and step 3.2.1
  • .tnat the wrong value for'Oifferential ....~Worth recorded.

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

EXAMINER NOTE: Incorrect values were obtained using Startup Parameters tab in PCNDR. This produces values for Hot Zero Power.

Examinee would obtain the values in the marked up copy of OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC if this mistake were made.

Comment:

Steps 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 Performance Step: 6 Perform Attachment 1, 2, and 4 Standard:

  • Recognizes these are not required for this task.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 6 of 12 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.6 Performance Step: 7 Perform Attachment 3, 50% PWR CHANGE AT 1% PER MINUTE Standard:

  • Goes to Attachment 3 (Page 6)

Comment:

Delta Power Defect (E):

Procedure Note: Values obtained for items S, C, D, F, G, G1, G2 and I are always negative.

Procedure Note: Delta Xe and Sm is calculated from the time power decrease starts until completed.

Performance Step: 8 100% Total Power Defect 50% Total Power Defect

_ _ _ _ PCM (D) - _-_ _ _ PCM (C) =

Standard:

  • Uses PCNDR to verify that the RO determined the correct values for 100% and 50% values for Total Power Defect.
  • Verifies that the RO subtracted the 100% value from the 50%

value correctly EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Rod Reactivity (F): (Use 170 steps on Bk D for Final Rod Position)

V Performance Step: 9 Initial Integral Rod worth on Bk D Final Integral Rod worth on Bk D

_ _ _ _ PCM (F1) - _ _ _ PCM (F2) =

Standard:

  • Uses PCNDR to verify that the RO correctly determined values for initial and final Integral Rod worth on Bk D.
  • V
  • Verifies that the RO subtracted the Final value from the Initial value correctly.

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Delta Xe and Sm (G):

Performance Step: 10 Initial Xe and Sm Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change

_ _ _ _ PCM (G2) -_-_ _ _ PCM (G1) =

Standard:

  • Uses Xenon Predict report from PPCS to verify that the RO correctly determined values for "Initial Xe and Sm", and "Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change"
  • Verifies that the RO subtracted the "Initial Xe and Sm" value from the "Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change" value correctly EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 8 of 12 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Total Reactivity (H):

...J Performance Step: 11 Delta Power Defect + Delta Rod Reactivity + Delta Xe and Sm=

Total Reactivity Change

_ _ _ (E) + _-_ _ _ (F) + _-_ _ _ (G) =

Standard:

  • Verifies that the RO added Delta Power Defect, Delta Rod Reactivity, and Delta Xe and Sm to obtain Total Reactivity Change correctly.
  • ...J R_.._litb EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

RCS Boron Offset Value (I):

Performance Step: 12

_ _--!-P=C~M (H)/_-_ _ PCM/PPM (B) = - PPM (I)

Standard:

  • Verifies that the RO correctly divided Total Reactivity Change by Differential Boron Worth to obtain the RCS Boron Offset Value
  • =rllnd .v=f~I~L EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 9 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Required RCS Boron Concentration (J):

Performance Step: 13 Current RCS Boron Conc (A) - PPM change (I) =Required RCS Boron Conc (J)

_ _ _--'-P-'-P.:.:.:,M (A) - _-_ _ _ (I) = _+_ _ _ PPM (J)

Standard:

  • Verifies that the RO correctly subtracted the RCS Boron Offset Value from the Current RCS Boron Concentration to obtain the required RCS Boron concentration.

...J .

and ~

..~.~ for

.* afto i~.

fl,".taemg used; EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Gallons of Boric Acid needed:

. :'J Performance Step: 14 (Use PPCS or VBD Book to calculate the number of gallons required from BASTs and the RWSn.

Standard:

  • Verifies that the RO correctly used PPCS to calculate the number of gallons required from BASTs and the RWST.
  • ..J.. .... '.these values are i~t (Baiit".iRe taUftyvakie' EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Initial Boration Rate for Rapid shutdown Performance Step: 15 1%/min gals BAST (K)_I 50 minutes =_ GPM BA flow 3%/min gals BAST (K)_/16.67 minutes =_ GPM BA flow 5%/min gals BAST (K)_I 10 minutes = _ GPM BA flow Standard:

  • Verifies that the RO correctly divided the gallons of boric acid required from the BASTs by the time required to result in the desired shutdown rate to determine the boric acid flow rate required for that particular load reduction rate.

EXAMINER NOTE: See Exam Key for acceptable answers.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-1 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.
  • Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU
  • Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
  • Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
  • Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D INITIATING CUE:
  • Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO.
  • List any errors identified on this JPM CUE SHEET.

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 119-006-03-01A Determine the Allowable Hours an Operator Can Work TasklJPM Title: Determine The Allowable Hours An JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N Operator Can Work SA-2 KIA

Reference:

2.1.5 (2.9*/3.9) Alternate Path Yes No~

Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as Time Critical Yes No~

minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant

---

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at full power at MOL
  • You are the SM
  • It is Sunday of your Day shift tour (0600 Sunday - 1800 Sunday)
  • The oncoming HCO has called in sick for the next shift (1800 Sunday

- 0600 Monday)

  • You must find a replacement HCO Task Standard: Correctly determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of CNG-SE-1.01 1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS.

Required Materials: Calculator General

References:

  • CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Rev 00600 Handouts:
  • CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Rev 00600

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

  • Determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS.
  • For each possible replacement, explain on the JPM CUE SHEET:
1. If he can or cannot work as HCO
2. What work hour limit prevents him from working, if applicable?

Validation Time: 16 Minutes EXAMINER NOTE: Ensure the following materials are available:

  • CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Revision 00600, the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION START TIME:

..J =CRITICAL STEP Step S.2.A.1.a.

Performance Step: 1 The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status:

a. No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period Standard:
  • Reviews the procedure and locates the work hours limits
  • Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 16 work hours in any 24-hour period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2
  • Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator EXAMINER CUE: Hand the examinee a copy of CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Revision 00600, the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet, and a calculator.

Comment:

Step S.2.A.1.b Performance Step: 2 The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status:

b. No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period Standard:
  • Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 26 work hours in any 48-hour period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2
  • Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator Comment:

2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Step 5.2.A.1.c Performance Step: 3 The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status:

c. No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day period Standard:
  • Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 72 work hours in any 7-day period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or erator #2
  • -V.* Det~lffilrt~'ffi~( *.\YiIJ*ieli~~~';limiti
  • Determines Operator #2 will NOT exceed the limit EXAMINER NOTE: Operator #1 will exceed the 72-hour limit Comment:

Step 5.2.A.2.a Performance Step: 4 The following work hour breaks apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status:

a. At least a 1O-hour break between successive work periods or an 8-hour break when a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts.

Standard:

  • Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> or 8-hour break between successive work periods limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2
  • Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator Comment:

2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 50f9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Step 5.2.A.2.b Performance Step: 5 The following work hour breaks apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status:

b. A 34-hour break in any 9-day period.

Standard:

  • Reviews the ...IPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any 9-day period limit will be exceeded for
  1. 1 and/or #2
  • Determines Operator #1 will NOT exceed the limit EXAMINER NOTE: Operator #2 will exceed the 34-hour break limit Comment:

Step 5.2.6.1. Table 5.2-1 Performance Step: 6 In addition to the above work hour limits, individual workers shall meet the Minimum Days Off (MDO) requirements in the tables:

Table 5.2-1 Outage Minimum Days Off Requirements Standard: Recognizes that the outage MDO requirements are not applicable.

Comment:

Step 5.2.C Performance Step: 7 The averaging period is the duration over which the 54-hour per week average is calculated and may be consistent with standard shift schedules but not be greater than 6 weeks.

Standard:

  • Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 54 Hour Week Average will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2
  • Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator Comment:

2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM CUE SHEET and the his copy of CNG*SE-1.01*1002 to the EXAMINER: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-2 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at full power at MOL
  • You are the SM
  • It is Sunday of your Day shift tour (0600 Sunday - 1800 Sunday)
  • The oncoming HCO has called in sick for the next shift (1800 Sunday

- 0600 Monday)

  • You must find a replacement HCO Initiating Cue:
  • Determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of CNG-SE-1.01-1 002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS.
  • For each possible replacement, explain on the JPM CUE SHEET:
1. If he can or cannot work as HCO
2. What work hour limit prevents him from working, if applicable?

(Circle ONE for each operator) Justification for Decision Operator #1 : CAN or CANNOT work as HCO Operator #2: CAN or CANNOT work as HCO 2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET 2012 ILT JPM N-SA-2 Data Sheet OPERATOR #1 M-26 ,.:':27T w~- . T-29'--F:*jO ***5-315-1 fIiI:':2 .... t-3TW-4 T-5 F-6 5-7 S-8 M-9 T w T*12 F-13 S~14 S-15 28 11 SHIFT N D D 0 0 T9 T9 T9 T9 N N N N HOURS 12 12 12 12 12 9 9 9 9 12 12 12 12 WORKED M-16 T-17 W-18 *T~19 F-20 5~21 5-22 M-23 T:':24 W-25 T-26 F-27 S-28 S-29 M-30 0 D D 0 0 0 N N N N 12 12 12 , 12 12 12  ? 12 12 ~~ .....

OPERATOR #2

_ ............ _

M-26 T-27 w T-29 F-30

...

S-31 S-1 M-2

...

T-3

~ ...

W-4 T-5 F-6 S-7 S-8 M-9 T-10 W T-12

..

F-13 T-*;':

S-15 28 11 SHIFT 0 0 D N N N N D 0 0 D HOURS 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 WORKED M-16 T-17 W-18 T-19 F-20 S-21 S-22 M-23 T-24 W-25 T-26 F-27 S-28 S-29 M-30 T9 T9 T9 T9 0 N N N N N D 9 9 9 9 1L ,  ?. 12 12 12 12 12

---

2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 351-012-01-05 Perform 11M Plots And Calculations Task Title: Evaluate 11M Plot per 0-1.2.1and JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N 0-1.2 SA-3 KIA

Reference:

2.2.1 (4.5/4.4) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14.
  • 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed:

o The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D.

o The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps o The - 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps

  • The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn.
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0.

Task Standard: Perform a 11M plot and correctly evaluate the plot. Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s), based on the results of the 11M plot.

Required Materials:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • Calculator
  • Clear ruler 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet General

References:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Revision 19602
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits Handouts:
  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2
  • A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0,
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet
  • Calculator,
  • A ruler Initiating Cue:
  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, starting at step 6.0.
  • Disregard any Independent Verification requirements.
  • Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s),

based on the results of the 11M plot, if applicable. Document any required actions on this JPM CUE SHEET.

  • Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM.

Validation Time: 35 Minutes 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP NIA INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2, marked up to Step 6.2.20
  • A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0,
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits,
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet,
  • Calculator
  • Clear-ruler 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: - - -

0-1.2.1, Step 6.1 Procedure Notes:

  • Per 0-1.2, 11M is determined at 50 step intervals OR as specified by SM.
  • Data is recorded on Attachment 1.

A 11M plot is completed each time an approach to criticality is desired.

"". Performance Step: 1

  • MARK the following rod bank positions on 11M graph:
  • + 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation
  • - 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation
  • Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power as determined from TS 3.1.6 (using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits)

Standard:

  • Identifies the +500 PCM bank position and - 500 PCM bank position from the Initial Conditions
  • =:~IM~POSitiOR,...~5OQ;.~.;~,;],
  • Determines that the Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits is 181 steps
  • ...j Marks theBaAkB*Rodln$artionl-imit on tt.11M graph EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with:
  • A marked up copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES
  • Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits
  • A copy of the JPM Data Sheet
  • A calculator
  • A ruler EXAMINER NOTE: +500 pcm position = D @ 52 steps

-500 pcm position = D @ 186 steps

=

Bank B RIL for 0% B @ 181 steps Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 5 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.2 and 6.3 Procedure Note: DO NOT obtain base counts for control banks until shutdown bank is fully withdrawn and counts have stabilized.

Performance Step: 2 6.2 RECORD initial baseline counts from the following:

  • NI-31 Source Range meter
  • NI-32 Source Range meter 6.3 RECORD initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot.

Standard:

  • Identifies baseline counts on the JPM Data Sheet
  • Records initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank).

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.1 through 6.4.4 Procedure Notes: Control Rod withdrawal is performed as directed per 0-1.2, Reactor Startup Section.

  • 11M =CR base I CRfinal Procedure Cautions:
  • WHEN either Source Range reaches 1 x 104 cps, THEN rate of rise should be adjusted so it is rising very slowly.
  • IF either Source Range reaches 5 x 104 cps AND IR Power is NOT above the P-6 defeat permissive, THEN the HCO should be directed tom stabilize OR reduce power.
  • DO NOT exceed 105 cps Source Range to prevent a Reactor Trip (1/2 105 cps).

Performance Step: 3 6.4 AFTER Control Rods are withdrawn AND count rate has stabilized, THEN CREATE 11M plot as follows:

6.4.1 RECORD time AND rod position.

6.4.2 RECORD RCS loop average temperatures.

6.4.3 RECORD count rate.

6.4.4 CALCULATE 11M values AND RECORD on Attachment 1, 11M Plot.

Standard:

  • Transfers time, rod position, RCS loop average temperatures, and count rate data from the JPM Data Sheet to the appropriate position on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank)

[See Answer Key]

  • -J ~:1IU;** . * **:tm*AttChment1'_.>~e loCatIm rs.~

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.5 through 6.4.7 Performance Step: 4 6.4.5 INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY calculations.

6.4.6 MARK 11M values on graph.

6.4.7 DRAW a line connecting last point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position.

Standard:

  • Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue .
  • <i~\4Mvatueson graph,:
  • Draws a line connecting last point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position.

Comment:

Step 6.4.8 Performance Step: 5 6.4.8 WHILE REVIEWING SUBSEQUENT STEPS CONCERNING CRITICALITY, repeat Steps 6.4.1 thru 6.4.7 for each rod pull.

Standard:

  • Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue.
  • "'Ma_
    • '"and OraWtt extrapolates to X-axis to determine a projected critical position for each rod pull.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.9 Performance Step: 6 6.4.9 PRIOR to de-energizing Source Range Detectors, RECORD baseline counts from the following:

  • NI-35 Intermediate Range meter
  • NI-36 Intermediate Range meter Standard:
  • Determines step is not applicable.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Steps 6.5 through 6.7

...J Performance Step: 7 6.5 IF criticality is projected by all of the following conditions being met, THEN DO NOT PULL Control Rods the full interval, PULL Control Rods to criticality:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

  • Projected critical position falls within the +1- 500 pcm bank position
  • Projected critical position falls above RIL
  • Projected critical position indicates criticality within the next desired interval 6.6 IF criticality is NOT projected within the next rod pull interval, THEN CONTINUE withdrawal sequence AND 11M evaluation.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

6.7 IF either of the following conditions are met (MARK conditions met) THEN STOP pulling Control Rods AND REFER to 0-1.2 for further guidance:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

  • Projected critical position falls outside the +1- 500 pcm bank position
  • Projected critical position falls below the 0% power RIL Standard:

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION 0-1.2, Step 6.2.31

1t Performance Step: 8 IF during the final approach to criticality, there are indications that ACTUAL critical rod position will differ from ESTIMATED critical rod position by an amount equal to 0.5% DELTA KlK (500 pcm) reactivity OR Reactor will go CRITICAL below Rod Insertion Limits, then perform the following:

1. Stop Control Rod withdrawal
2. Perform the following under the supervision of the SM and with Reactor Engineer assistance:
a. Check ECP calculation for errors
b. Check curves for errors in interpolation
c. Request Chemistry perform another [8] sample ...

Standard:

  • Documents the determination on the ..IPM CUE SHEET.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC ~IPM N-SA-3 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1

,JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14.
  • 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed:

o The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D.

o The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps o The - 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps

  • The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn.
  • 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0.

INITIATING CUE:

  • The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, starting at step 6.0.
  • Disregard any Independent Verification requirements.
  • Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s), based on the results of the 11M plot, if applicable.

Document any required actions on this ~IPM CUE SHEET.

  • Hand in the ~IPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM.

20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 119-011-03-03 Determine stay time and exit requirements for working in a High Radiation Area.

Task Title: Determine Worker Availability ~IPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM N Based on Radiation Exposure SA-4 Limits.

KIA

Reference:

2.3.4 (3.2/3.7) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator ---

Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.
  • The repair job is expected to take 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

Task Standard: Determine stay time for local valve operation in the RCA.

Required Materials:

  • A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200
  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Worker Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Procedures Cart General

References:

  • A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job ....O.TI""*'M Form Handouts:

  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Worker's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Access to procedures cart Initiating Cue:
  • Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time =_______
  • Determine which dose limit(s) will be most limiting for this work:
  • Determine any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job, if applicable.
  • Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358 Validation Time: 19 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS
  • Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

o Charging Pump Room Survey Map o Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record o Calculator o Access to procedures cart containing A-procedures book (for A-1) 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ _ _ _'

A-1 Step 3.5 Performance Step: 1 Examinee determines Regulatory Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Standard:

  • Determines A-1 Procedure should be referenced, locates same on procedures cart
  • Determines applicable annual dose limits from Table (Regulatory/ Station Admin/Site):
  • ..J 5remt":iim;I~1 ~(Te9E)

EXAMINER CUE: Provide the Examinee with:

  • Charging Pump Room Survey Map
  • Worker's Radiation Exposure Record
  • Calculator
  • Access to procedures cart Comment:

Determine expected radiation dose rate

'" Performance Step: 2 Examinee refers to the Charging Pump Room Survey Map and determines the worker's expected dose rate while working on V 286.

Standard:

  • area dose)
  • vDetermines'thatthe ,* .fiatiOlr"',... d.c.mRlhr Comment:

20121LT NRC .JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determines the worker's Expected Dose for the job

"'. Performance Step: 3 Expected Dose::: Expected radiation rate x 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Standard:

Comment:

Determine current exposure Performance Step: 4 Examinee reviews the worker's exposure record and determines his limit(s) of concern.

Standard:

  • Comment:

Determines Stay Time to nearest limit

'" Performance Step: 5 Stay time =Remaining exposure available I Expected radiation rate Standard:

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 5 9 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determine the worker's expected post job exposure

~ Performance Step: 5 Add the expected dose for the job to the worker's current exposure Standard:

Comment:

Determines the worker's availability Performance Step: 6 Compare the worker's expected post job exposure to the Dose Limits for Adults Standard:

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM N-SA4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determines any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job.

,..,1 Performance Step: 7 Refers to A-1, step 3.5.5 a.1. Ginna Administrative (Admin)

Limits Control Limits for Occupational Radiation Exposure

2. Ginna Admin limit SHALL be 4.0 rem per year TEDE.

b) If an individual's Annual TEDE is expected to exceed 4.0 rem, they may submit a request to increase the limit to greater than 4.0 rem.

  • An individual may be authorized up to 4.5 rem TEDE with complete record dose for the current year and approvals by the GS Radiation Protection, Plant GM and Vice President, or their designees.

Standard:

Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiners discretion:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


20121LT NRC ~IPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.
  • The repair job is expected to take 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

INITIATING CUE:

  • Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time = _ _ _ _ _ __
  • Determine which dose limit(s) will be most limiting for this work:
  • Determine any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job, if applicable.
  • Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Form JPM CUE SHEET N-SA-4 Worker Exposure for the Current Year Ginna Calvert Cliffs Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) 375 mrem 2825 mrem Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE) 35 mrem 25 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) 130 mrem 530 mrem Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) 45 mrem 10 mrem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) 25 mrem 15 mrem 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 1 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Facility: Ginna Task No.: 340-001-05-02 Perform Site Emergency Plan Duties TasklJPM Title: Determine PAR and complete EPIP JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N 1-5, Attachment 3a SA-5 KIA

Reference:

2.4.44 (2.4/4.4) Alternate Path Yes No X Time Critical Yes ~ No Knowledge of Emergency Plan protective action recommendations.

Examinee must complete the JPM in

< 15 minutes.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • 30 minutes ago, the plant was operating at full power when a cold leg LOCA occurred.
  • The SM/EC has just declared a General Emergency based on EAL 2.3.3 of EPIP 1-0 (Containment Radiation Monitor R-29/30 reading>

1000 R/HR).

  • Skies are partly cloudy with a light breeze and zero precipitation.
  • Wind speed is 5 mph at elevation 33'
  • Wind direction is from 285° at elevation 33'
  • Meteorological temperatures are 71°F at elevation 250' and 69°F at elevation 33' Task Standard: Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPIP 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS within 15 minutes.

Required Materials: Pencil or pen General

References:

  • EPIP 1-5, NOTIFICATIONS, Revision 09200
  • EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Handouts:

  • EPIP 1-5, NOTIFICATIONS, Rev 09200
  • EPIP 1-5 Attachment 3a (with Step 2 circled as an "Exercise")
  • EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800
  • P-9, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev 09810 Initiating Cue:
  • Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPI P 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS, beginning at Step 3
  • The electronic version of Attachment 3a is not available
  • This is a time-critical JPM.

Validation Time: Z Minutes (when only Step 6 was being performed, PAR) 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION START TIME:

-.J =CRITICAL STEP EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 3

-.J Performance Step: 1 3. Classification:

A. UNUSUAL EVENT B. ALERT C. SITE AREA EMERGENCY D. GENERAL EMERGENCY E. EMERGENCY TERMINATED F. RECOVERY Standard: .i~~~~

_" ," '. - - .,"" .Y5,__ . _ , _

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box EXAMINER CUE: Provide student with the 3 EPIP handouts as soon as he has read the Initiating Cue.

Comment:

EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 4

-.J Performance Step: 2 Classification Time:

..

Emergency Classification declared at: Date_ _ Time _ __

Standard: ,.." ,"'" .~

  • ......

l1li

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 5

" Performance Step: 3 Release of Radioactive Materials due to the Classification Event:

A. No release B. Release BELOW federal limits 0 to atmosphere 0 to water C. Release BELOW federal limits 0 to atmosphere 0 to water D. Unmonitored release Standard:

  • Reads Instructions (Att.3) for Block 5 on p22
  • Reviews Tables in Block 5 for ntial release
  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box EXAMINER NOTE:
  • With no cues to indicate otherwise, all CI and CVI actions have occurred as expected (must be assumed).
  • P9 is referenced in Block 5, but provides only the warning and high alarm setpoints (have on hand if asked to provide)

EXAMINER CUE: If asked about the status of CNMT radiation monitors, respond:

  • R2, R5, R7, R11, and R12 are in alarm
  • R11 and R12 read 1E6 cpm Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5 Attachment 3, Block 6 Instructions Procedure Note: PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ONLY REQUIRED AT A GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.

Performance Step: 4 Check the appropriate PAR. The Shift Manager, TSC Director, or the EOF Recovery Manager will use EPIP 2-1, Protective Action Recommendations. PARs only reflect Ginna's recommendations, NOT THE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY OFFSITE COUNTY OFFICIALS.

Standard:

  • Locates block 6 of EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a
  • References Instructions for Block 6 in Att.3
  • Goes to EPIP 2-1 EXAMINER CUE: Hand the examinee copies of:
  • EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800 Comment:

EPIP 2-1 Steps 5.3 A & B Performance Step: 5 A. Protective Action Recommendations shall be issued with the initial declaration of a General Emergency.

B. Any changes to the initial PAR shall be communicated within 15 minutes of the decision by the Emergency Coordinator, to change the PARs using EPIP 1-5.

Standard:

  • Reads steps 5.3 A and B Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 2-1 Steps 5.3 C

  • Performance Step: 6 C. Use the flowchart below to determine Protective Action Recommendations Standard:

Comment:

EPIP 2-1 Flowchart

~ Performance Step: 7 General Emergency Declared Standard: *

  • Continues to the next box Comment:

EPIP 2-1 Flowchart

~ Performance Step: 8 Has procedure ER-SC.1 "Adverse Weather Plan" been entered?

Standard: *

  • Follows the NO arrow Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 2-1 Flowchart t Performance Step: 9 Is a procedurally controlled, short duration (less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> total) release in progress or anticipated within the next 15 minutes?

Standard: *

  • Follows the NO arrow Comment:

EPIP 2-1 Flowchart

, Performance Step: 10 Is an unanticipated release isolable from the main control board in less than 15 minutes?

Standard: *

  • Follows the NO arrow Comment:

EPIP 2-1 Flowchart

', .. ,

. -< Performance Step: 11 Recommend Protective Actions using Attachment 1 (Evacuation) and the current wind direction.

Standard:

  • Goes to Attachment 1, EVACUATION AREAS BY ERPA
  • Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 6

" Performance Step: 12 Protective Actions RECOMMENDATIONS: (Refer to EPIP 2-1) check box if information has changed Standard:

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 7

" Performance Step: 13 EAL Number Standard: *

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 8

" Performance Step: 14 Reactor Status Standard:

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 9

'" Performance Step: 15 Wind Speed:

Standard: *

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 10

'" Performance Step: 16 Wind Direction:

Standard: *

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 11

'" Performance Step: 17 Stability Class:

Standard:

  • Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment:

Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a to the EXAMINER: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5 Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Initial Conditions:

  • 30 minutes ago, the plant was operating at full power when a cold leg LOCA occurred.
  • The SM/EC has just declared a General Emergency based on EAL 2.3.3 of EPIP 1-0 (Containment Radiation Monitor R-29/30 reading>

1000 RlHR).

  • Skies are partly cloudy with a light breeze and zero precipitation.
  • Wind speed is 5 mph at elevation 33'
  • Wind direction is from 2850 at elevation 33'
  • Meteorological temperatures are 71°F at elevation 250' and 69°F at elevation 33' Initiating Cue:
  • Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPIP 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS, beginning at Step 3
  • The electronic version of Attachment 3a is not available
  • This is a time-critical JPM.

2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Protective Action Recommendations EPlP-2-1 Revision 02800 Page 6 of 18 C. Use the flowchart below to detennine Protective Action Recommendations General Emeroencv Declared

+

Has procedure ER-SC.1 "Adverse Weather Plan-been entered?

I I I YES I NO

..

Due to the adverse weather, have Ginna Emergency Response Facilities have been I I staffed as a precaution?

I YES I I NO I Recommend Protective Actions using

+ Attachment 2 Is a procedurally controlled, short duration (less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> total) release in progress or anticipated

-1 YES ~

lShelteri~in-Placel and the current wind direction.

within the next 15 minutes?

I NO I

+

Is an unanticipated release isolable from the main control board in less than 15 minutes?

1 YES

~-.~.-,.--~-..-,--~-~,.,

I NO I

.

Recommend Protective Actions using:

J Attachment 1 (Evacuation) *1 Continually reassess PARs I

and the rurrent wind direction.

D. Record in EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a (RECS form), Item 6, the Protective Actions Recommended and conmunicatewithin 15 minutes of the PAR decision.

Protective Action Reconvnendations EPlP-2-1 Revision 02800 Pase9of18 Page 1 of2 ATTACHMENT 1. EVACUATION AREAS BY ERPA Wind From (Degrees) Initial Protective Action Recommendations (Evacuation based on 2 mile radius & 5 miles downwind)

N 349 to 11 I ~acuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI ptan I'lIII'Ilaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System}

NNE 12 to 33 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptementKI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

NE 34 to 56 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptement KI plan (alll'lIII'Ilaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

ENE 57 to 78 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and implement KI plan (all remainina ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

E 19 to 101 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptement KI plan

{all remainina ERPA's to manitor me emergencY Alert System}

ESE 102 to 124 Evacuate: W (1) M (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimng ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

SE 125 to 146 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI ptan (all remaimng ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

SSE 147 to 1El8 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA'sto manitorme Emergency Alert System)

S 16910 191 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

SSW 192 to 213 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

SW 21410 236 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me emergencY Alert System}

WSW 237 to 258 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

W 25910281 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System)

WNW 26210 303 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan (all remainina ERPA's to manitor the Emergency Alert System)

NW 30410 326 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan

{all remaining ERPA's to monitor me Emergency Alert System}

NNW 32710 348 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan (all remaimllg ERPA's to manitor the Emergency Alert Svsteml

NOTIFICATIONS EPIP-1-5:28 Rev. 09200 Attachment 3a Page 1 of 1 NEW YORK STATE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DATA FORM (PART I)

RECS message number _ _ __

"This is Ginn.a Station. PleBe sbnd by for roll call. "N_ York Sfatlt" D "Monroe County" D "Wayne County'" D

1. IIIsAge lRmMilfild ill:: 2. This is:

Dabt Time Via: A. An Actual E'II!IIt B. An Elcere1H A. RE~ Ii. 0Iher

3. CIas5iIicIiItiD:

[J check box if infarmation bas changad A. UNUSUAL EVENT C. SITE AREA EMERGENCY E. EMERGENCY lERMINAlED ELALERT D. GENERAl. EMERGENCY F. RECOVERY

... CIiIssitiNtiDn T_:

[J check box if infarmation bas changad This CIauification dedInId at 0_ TODAY nme Current

5. IWHse ofRadioaative IIatI!riIIs due.tIIe Clanified Event: (RefertoP.g.)

[J check box if infarmation bas changed A. No Release EL Release BB.OW iIder.IIlimilf. [J to acmosph_ [J to waller C. ReIe_ ABOVE fecI9qIlimits [J III atmosphent [J ID wa1I!r' D. Unmoniknd release A!quiring -'uation

6. PfOtectiwAationsREeOMMEtmATJONS: (Refer to EPlP-2*1)

[J check box if infarmation bas changad EL EVA.CUAlE and impIemert_KI plan for lie =:"'5 A. No need for Pratecti_ AcIions oul5ide the sitJll! bouncay (aIIl1I!imaining ERPA's to rnoniIar \he Emergency AIen )

W1 W2 W3 WI W5 WtI W1 Ml M2 M3 1M M5 Me M7 Me MO C. SI£lTER-IN-PLACE and inPement the KI plan for the folawing ERPA.'s Call nemaining ERPA's to rnoniIar \he Emergency Alert System}

WI W2 W3 WI W5 WtI W1 Ml M2 M3 1M M5 Me M7 Me MO

~. ~......a.er. Brief Event DHcripticII1 and O1hersignificant i'II'orm.l&ion

[J check box if infarmation bas changed IEAL Number I 2.3.3

a. RHctDr Sbdus:
  • _ _ wf T-30 A. B. ShuIidarIm Dale TO DA. Y Tme {subcrilicall
9. Wind SPHd:

[J check box if inbmation bas changed A. 5 MiIesIhoII'

  • elevalion 33 feel to. Wind Dftctian:

[J check box if . bascNnaed From 285 .* eIevation 33 . feel

11. Stlblity Clan: UNST NEUTRAl. STMLE

[J check box if AT Wormation 71 ---- 69 '" ~

--1--1--1 I Bravo 1Charlie 1 Delta 1 I

Echo I 1

Foadrut tGolf I-basChanaea 2S1 t II!mp 33ftll!mp -2.11 -1.15 -1.7' ..a15 +1.74 +2.0 +4.77 by.:

Name: Area Code N1nber "PIe_ stIInd by for roll CIII: " - York S .... copy?"C '"Mo_ County copy?"C "Wayne County copy?"C FOR GlNNA USE ONLY:

Time Prepared: Time Approved: Comp.....d form sent flo EP Dinlctor Prepared By: AppI'CMld By:

WAYNE COUNTY USE ONLY:

Routing: _ALL _Dose Assess Calculator _ROO _Ginna Tech Rep _FltIld Team Coord. _Plclt<<

NYS Rlid Health Cps Ofticer NYS HeaIIt1 (Cps 1'OCIfII) DiR!!CIDr PIO

MONROE COUNTY USE ONLY:

Distribution: 1. Command Room (OEP Administrator} 2. EOC (Op!ratjons Desk)

3. Assessment Area (Rad Ofticer. HHIth. Fi!l!ld Tum ~oordinatDr. ComRIlter Oaerationl!. Tech Reo) 4. EvaluatlDr 5. FH

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 001-004-04-01 Respond to an immovable and/or stuck control rod.

Task Title: Borate for one rod not fully inserted JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM A per ES-0.1 and ER-CVCS.1 KIA

Reference:

004 A4.07 (3.9/3.7) Alternate Path Yes ~ No Time Critical Yes No ~

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Boration/dilution.

Use ER-CVCS.1 because normal boration flow can't be established.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Task Standard: RCS boration flow established.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • ER-CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL MALFUNCTION, Revision 00801 Handouts:

Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS directs you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1.
  • Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with assigned task.

Validation Time: 8 Minutes 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • From protected IC-19 (100% MOL)

The following fails the Makeup Mode Select Switch

  • Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBA, [False], Borate Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch
  • Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBB, [False], Auto Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch
  • Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBC, [False], Dilute Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch
  • Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBD, [False], Alt Dilute Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch
  • Insert MALF ROD03-D4, Untrippable (Stuck Rod D4-Control Bank C), only one rod to use step 4 RNO procedure flowpath to clearly go to ER-CVCS.1
  • Insert OVR-D.I.-CVC34D, [False], MOV-350 fails to open-prevents 4 RNO being a success path if procedure use is incorrect.
  • Trip the reactor
  • Perform E-O to transition to ES-0.1, and then perform ES-0.1 up to (but NOT including) step 4.
  • FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 170 .

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Ensure PPCS Variable Boration Dilution screen is clear.
  • Placekeep the Control Room copy of ES-0.1 up to (but NOT including) step 4, and place it on the HCO's desk.

2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J>

Start Time: _ _ _ _'

ES-O.1 Step 4

" Performance Step: 1 Verify MRPI Indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: Point out marked up copy of ES-O.1 at HCO's desk.

Comment: Chooses correct RNO with only ONE rod not fully inserted.

Step 4 RNOa Performance Step: 2 IF one Control Rod is NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the following:

a. Place RMW mode selector switch to BORATE.

Standard: Place RMW mode selector switch to BORATE.

Comment:

Step 4 RNO b Performance Step: 3 b. Adjust boric acid integrator flow control valve, FCV-110A, for desired flowrate.

Standard: Adjusts boric acid integrator flow control valve, FCV-11 OA to desired flowrate.

EXAMINER CUE: If questioned "What is the desired flowrate?" respond with "SM has directed you to borate at the maximum rate." (a setting of ">9 gpm" on the FCV-110A controller)

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4 RNO c Performance Step: 4 c. Set boric acid integrator to desired amount (650 gallons for each control rod not fully inserted).

Standard: Sets boric acid integrator to 650 gallons.

To set the BA COUNTER:

  • Push 'SEL' Button to move the number column to be adjusted.
  • Raise or Lower the column vaule by depressing the U+" or

""

  • Depress the 'ENT' Button to enter (Lock-in) the selected amount to be added.

NOTE:

- 'C' Line is a running total for BA additions.

-There is a decimal point between the last two (2) zeroes.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION I EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP EXAMINER CUE: (After the Examinee determines the need for ER-CVCS.1)

Provide the Examinee a clean copy of ER-CVCS.1.

Step 4 RNO d Performance Step: 5 d. Place RMW control to start and verify flow. IF flow can NOT be established, THEN refer to ER-CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL MALFUNCTION.

Standard:

  • Places RMW control to start (Red light lit, Green light off) o No flow indicated on the BA FLOW chart recorder o Boric Acid Counter, YI C-11 0 not counting o Boric Acid Audible Device not "clicking"
  • It"'*IW_,

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION ER-CVCS.1 PRECAUTIONS Procedure The charging pump suction automatically switches to the RWST PRECAUTION: (LCV 112B Open, LCV 112C Closed) when VCT level lowers to 5%.

Procedure The use of MOV-350 for normal boration at power should be PRECAUTION: avoided as the valve must stroke fully open before it may be reclosed, making it difficult to control the amount of boric acid being added.

Procedure IF boric acid filter DIP exceeds 20 psid, THEN the filter should be PRECAUTION: bypassed and a MWRlTR should be submitted.

Performance Step: 6 Examinee reviews PRECAUTIONS.

Standard: Reviews PRECAUTIONS.

EXAMINER CUE: IF field operator is asked for boric acid filter DIP reading in response to the PRECAUTION above, respond that "Local boric acid filter DIP is _ psid." (8 if 1 BA pump running or 12 psid If 2 BA pumps are running)

Comment:

ER-CVCS.1 Step 4.1.1.1 Performance Step: 7 INITIATE Normal Boration as follows:

4.1.1.1 PLACE RMW Mode selector switch to BORATE Standard: Places RMW mode selector switch to BORATE.

EXAMINER NOTE: Examinee may recognize that step 4.1.1, Normal Boration, was already attempted unsuccessfully in ES-O.1, and continue with the next alternative - step 4.1.2.

Comment: Instructor silence MCB alarms not associated with task.

20121LT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1.1.2 Performance Step: 8 ADJUST boric acid flow control valve, HCV-110A to desired flowrate in AUTO.

Standard: Adjusts HCV-110A to desired flowrate.

EXAMINER NOTE: Should have been done previously.

Comment:

Step 4.1.1.3 Performance Step: 9 Set boric acid integrator to desired amount.

Standard: Sets boric acid integrator to 650 gallons.

EXAMINER NOTE: Should have been set to 650 gallons previously.

Comment:

Step 4.1.1.4 Performance Step: 10 PLACE RMW Control switch to START.

Standard: Places RMW Control switch to START EXAMINER NOTE: Should have been done previously.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 8 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1.1.5 Performance Step: 11 Verify RMW control - ARMED. (Red light lit above RMW Control switch)

Standard: Identifies Red light lit and Green light off.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • Should have been verified previously
  • May go behind the MCB to read BA Pump Discharge pressure on PI-108 Comment:

Step 4.1.2.1 Performance Step: 12 4.1.2 IF makeup system does NOT operate properly in BORATE, THEN perform the following:

4.1.2.1 OPEN blender outlet to charging pump suction AOV-110B.

Standard:

  • Recognizes that the makeup system does NOT operate properly in BORATE
  • Comment:

Step 4.1.2.2 Performance Step: 13 Start at least one boric acid pump.

Standard:

  • Red light lit, Green light off Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1.2.3 Performance Step: 14 PLACE boric acid flow control valve, HCV-110A, to MANUAL and open to establish desired flow.

Standard:

o Checks indicated on the SA FLOW chart recorder o Boric Acid Counter, YIC-110 counting o Boric Acid Audible Device "clicking"

  • Continues to monitor flow rate and amount added till required amount added.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After BA flow is verified: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete. "

Stop time: _ _ __

20121LT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM A Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 11 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIATING CUE:

  • The CRS directs you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1.
  • Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with assigned task.

20121LT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 344-002-05-01 Perform Emergency Operations Task Title: Secure SI Pumps as part of JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM B Terminating RCS Bleed and Feed KIA

Reference:

006 A2.02 (3.9/4.3) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to (a) predict the impact of the following operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to control the consequences of those operations: Loss of flow path.

Requires multiple RNO actions.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant

--

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the Objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant experienced a loss of secondary heat sink.
  • 'A' SI pump is unavailable.
  • The crew established RCS Bleed and Feed per FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.
  • AFW has been restored, and the adequacy of the Secondary Heat Sink has been verified per Step 29 of FR-H.1
  • The crew is in the process of terminating ReS Bleed and Feed.
  • All three charging pumps are available.

Task Standard: Secure the running SI pump per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33 Required Materials: None General

References:

  • FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Revision 04000
  • FIG-1.0, Min Subcooling, Rev 00100 Handouts:
  • FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, placekept per Simulator Setup instructions up to Step 33
  • FIG-1.0, Min Subcooling, Rev 00100 2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to secure the running SI pumps per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33.

Validation Time: ~ Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • From protected 1C-19 (100% MOL)
  • Pull-Stop both MDAFW pumps, and the TDAFW pump (initially)
  • Pull-Stop 'A' SI pump and hang CAUTION tag
  • Insert MALF STM09A, [100, on Trigger 1] (Main Steam Safety Failure: Vlv 3508)
  • Insert MALF STM09B, [100, on Trigger 1] (Main Steam Safety Failure: Vlv 3509)
  • Stop both MFPs and all Condensate pumps
  • Insert Trigger 1
  • Perform E-O with transition to FR-H.1.
  • Perform I placekeep FR-H.1 assuming that no feed sources are available.
  • As soon as both SG WR levels are < 120 inches, clear the STM09A & B malfunctions, return to step 2 and continue to establish Bleed & Feed. At step 27, start both MDAFW pumps and restore level in at least one SG to >25%; and then continue FR-H.1 with step 28.
  • Ensure PRZR level> 20%
  • Ensure AFW flow is secured to any SG >25%
  • Run simulator until RCS pressure is stable (-520 psig) and CETs are -300°F (this will ensure 120°F subcooling exists)
  • When step 32 is reached, placekeep the step and stop.
  • FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 171 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS
  • Have a place-kept copy of FR-H.1 and FIG-1.0, RCS Subcooling, ready to provide to the examinee.

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET (Denote Critical Steps with a ")

Start Time: _ _ __

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide Examinee a marked copy of FR-H.1 and FIG-1.0 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently two SI pumps running and both PORVs open Step 33 Performance Step: 1 Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

a. Three SI pumps - RUNNING
b. Per RNa: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Standard:
  • Confirms that only two SI pumps are running per initial conditions:

o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

  • Goes to Step 34 Comment:

Step 34 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently two 51 pumps running and both PORVs open Performance Step: 2 Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

a. Two SI pumps - RUNNING
b. Determine required RCS subcooling from table:

Standard:

  • Observes that two SI pumps are running o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
  • Determines (from the table) that 120°F of subcooling required Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 34 c Performance Step: 3 c. RCS subcooling based on CETs GREATER THAN VALUE FROM TABLE ABOVE USING FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING Standard:

  • Obtains a copy of FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING
  • Determines that subcooling IS > 120°F
  • Goes to step 34d EXAMINER NOTE: Subcooling -130°F, required is [120°F]

Comment:

Step 34 d Performance Step: 4 d. PRZR level- GREATER THAN 20% [40%]

Standard:

  • Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426 - 428), or
  • Refers to PPCS PRZR level indication
  • Determines that PZR level is >100%
  • Goes to step 34e EXAMINER NOTE: PRZR level will be offscale HI due to BOTH PORV's open for bleed and feed.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 20 Form E8-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 34e EXAMINER NOTE: Currently two SI pumps running and both PORVs are open

...; Performance Step: 5 Stop one 81 pump Standard:

  • Observes that two SI pumps are running o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o 81 flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
  • ~?!~~~t:ltfjijr:lllr~~llptllip
  • Goes to Step 35 Comment:

Step 35 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs are open Performance Step: 6 Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped:

a. One SI pump - RUNNING
b. Check the following:

oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT]

Standard:

  • Observes that one 81 pump is running o Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off o SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator (FI 924 or FI-925)
  • Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than OOF subcooling exists, HOWEVER
  • Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI 420A), or PPC8 RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is < 1650 psig
  • Does NOT stop the running SI pump
  • Goes to Step 35b RNO (Go to Step 36)

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 36 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs open Procedure Note: NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps.

Performance Step: 7 Check PRZR PORVs And Associated Block Valves - ANY BLEED PATH OPEN Standard:

  • Checks PRZR PORV indication (MCB center section)
  • Identifies that PORV-430 and PORV-431C are open
  • Goes to step 37 EXAMINER NOTE: Per the WOG ERG Background document, the criteria for stopping the next SI pump is based upon steady-state conditions, and RCS pressure should be stable or rising Comment:

Step 37 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs open Procedure CAUTION: IF RCS is solid, closure of PORVs will result in rapid RCS pressure rise unless RCS temperature and RCS inflow are carefully controlled.

Performance Step: 8 Isolate PRZR Bleed Paths:

a. PRZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN Standard:
  • Identifies that PORV-430 and PORV-431 C are open and goes to step 37b.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37b EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORV's open Performance Step: 9 b. Close one open PRZR PORV and place in AUTO:

Standard:

  • Once PORV is closed, Goes to Step 37c.

Comment:

Step 37c.

EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Performance Step: 10 c. Returns to Step 33.

Standard:

  • Returns back to step 33 Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 33 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Performance Step: 11 Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

a. Three SI pumps - RUNNING o Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Standard:
  • Confirms that only one SI pumps are running per initial conditions:

o B or C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

  • Goes to Step 34 Comment:

Step 34 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Performance Step: 12 Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

a. Two SI pumps - RUNNING Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 35 Standard:
  • Observes that one SI pump is running o B or C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
  • Goes to Step 35 Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 35 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Performance Step: 13 Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped:

a. One SI pump - RUNNING
b. Check the following:

oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.D, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT]

b. RNO Goes to Step 36 Standard:
  • Observes that one SI pump is running o Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off o SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator (FI 924 or FI-925)
  • Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than O°F subcooling exists
  • Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI 420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is< 1650 psig.
  • Per 35b RNO goes to step 36 Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 36 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Procedure Note: NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps.

Performance Step: 14 Check PRZR PORVs And Associated Block Valves - ANY BLEED PATH OPEN Standard:

  • Checks PRZR PORV indication (MCB center section)
  • Identifies that PORV-430 or PORV-431C is open
  • Goes to step 37 Comment:

Step 37a EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Procedure CAUTION: IF RCS is solid, closure of PORVs will result in rapid RCS pressure rise unless RCS temperature and RCS inflow are carefully controlled.

Performance Step: 15 Isolate PRZR Bleed Paths:

a. PRZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN Standard:
  • Identifies that PORV-430 or PORV-431C is open and goes to step 37a RNO Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37a RNO

'" Performance Step: 16 a. Perform the following:

1) Stop all but one charging pump.

EXAMINER NOTE: Step 25 has previously established maximum charging flow Comment:

Step 37a RNO a.2 Performance Step: 17 2) Control charging flow to maintain RCS pressure and PRZR level.

Standard:

  • Observes RCS pressure and PRZR level o Refers to MCB RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI-420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication o Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426, LI-427 ,

and LI-428), or PPCS PRZR level indication

  • If pressure and level are lowering, raises charging pump speed
  • If pressure and level are rising, reduces charging pump speed
  • If pressure and level are stable, makes no adjustment to charging pump speed EXAMINER NOTE: With a PORV open and one SI pump running it is likely that the PRZR will indicate full, and therefore, the examinee will likely reduce charging pump speed.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37a RNO a.3 Performance Step: 18 3) Establish excess letdown as follows:

a) Place AOV-312 to NORMAL Standard:

  • Ensures AOV-312 in NORMAL EXAMINER NOTE: AOV-312 should already be in NORMAL at this time.

Comment:

Step 37 RNO a.3 b - d Performance Step: 19 b) Reset both trains of XY relays for AOV-310 and AOV 745.

c) Manually open CCW from excess letdown Hx (AOV 745).

d) Ensure excess letdown flow control valve, HCV-123 is closed, demand at o.

Standard:

  • Ensures HCV-123 demand at zero o Controller (MCB left section) - 0 is fully to the left EXAMINERS NOTE: AOV-745 switch will already be in the open position and AOV-745 will open as soon as the XY relays are reset.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37 RNa a.3 e & f Performance Step: 20 e) Reset both trains of XY relays for MOV-313.

f) Open MOV-313.

Standard:

Comment:

Step 37 RNa a.3 9 & h Performance Step: 21 g) Open excess letdown isolation valve AOV-310.

h) Slowly open HCV-123.

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: For current plant conditions, the response on TI-122 and PI 121 will be minimal.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 14 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37 RNO a.3 i Performance Step: 22 i) Adjust Charging Pump speed as necessary Standard:

  • Observes RCS pressure and PRZR level o Refers to MCB RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI-420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication o Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426, LI-427, and LI-428), or PPCS PRZR level indication
  • If pressure and level are lowering, raises charging pump speed
  • If pressure and level are rising, reduces charging pump speed
  • If pressure and level are stable, makes no adjustment to charging pump speed Comment:

Step 37 b & c EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open

'" Performance Step: 23 b. Close one open PRZR PORV and place in AUTO

c. Return to step 33 Standard: * ~Clo~$jhe.open PORV~80or'PORV-431~rKI Pta~s itto AUTO>** '.

o Turns the PORV switch to the CLOSE position and then returns it to the AUTO position o Verifies green light lit and red light off o Returns back to Step 33 EXAMINER NOTE: With both PORVs closed, injection flow from the SI pump and charging pumps will cause RCS pressure to rise. The only removal of RCS mass at this time is excess letdown flow, which ranges from a few gpm at low pressure to - 20 gpm at NOP. When RCS pressure rises to SI pump shutoff head, RCS pressure will continue to rise due to the mismatch between charging flow and excess letdown flow.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 15 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 33 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs Closed Performance Step: 24 Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

c. Three SI pumps - RUNNING
d. Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Standard:
  • Confirms that only two SI pumps are running per initial conditions:

o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

  • Goes to Step 34 Comment:

Step 34 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs Closed Performance Step: 25 Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

c. Two SI pumps - RUNNING
d. Determine required RCS subcooling from table:

Standard:

  • Observes that two SI pumps are running o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
  • Determines (from the table) that 120°F of subcooling required Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 16 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 35 EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs are closed.

Performance Step: 26 Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped:

a. One 51 pump - RUNNING
b. Check the following:

oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN 5UBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 pSig [1650 psig adverse CNMT]

Standard:

  • Observes that one SI pump is running o Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off o SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator (FI 924 or FI-925)
  • Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than O°F subcooling exists, HOWEVER
  • Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI 420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is < 1650 psig
  • Does NOT stop the running SI pump
  • Goes to Step 35b RNO
  • When directed to go to step 36 observes Note prior to step 36.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 17 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 35b (RNO)

EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one 51 pump running and both PORVs are closed.

Performance Step: 27 Procedure Note: NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps.

EXAMINER NOTE: PORV's are closed, one 51 pump is running and RCS pressure is rising slowly. During validations it takes 8-10 minutes for RCS pressure >1650 psig.

EXAMINER NOTE: The examinee should recognize per the Note that it will take some time for RCS pressure to rise >1650 psig and wait to meet the 51 termination criteria of FR-H.1 Standard:

o EXAMINER NOTE: The following are acceptable choices to complete task:

1. Waits for RCS pressure to rise above 1650 psig and secures the last 51 pump per step 35.
2. Candidate may vocalize that they understand and the need to wait for RCS pressure to rise> 1650 psig to allow securing of the last 51 pump.

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 18 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Terminating Cue: Secures the last SI pump after RCS pressure rises to greater than 1650 pSig OR Candidate may vocalize that they understand and the need to wait for RCS pressure to rise> 1650 psig to allow securing the last SI pump.

Stop time: _ _ __

20121LT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 19 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM B Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:

2012 ILT NRC ~IPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant experienced a loss of secondary heat sink.
  • 'A' SI pump is unavailable.
  • The crew established RCS Bleed and Feed per FR-H.1 ,

RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

  • AFW has been restored, and the adequacy of the Secondary Heat Sink has been verified per Step 29 of FR-H.1
  • The crew is in the process of terminating RCS Bleed and Feed.
  • All three charging pumps are available.

INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to secure the running SI pumps per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33.

2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 006-018-05-01 Transfer SI to High Head Recirc Task Title: Align SI and RHR Systems For High JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM C Head Recirculation KIA

Reference:

002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6) Alternate Path Yes No ~

Time Critical Yes ~ No Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based Per A-601.1 0, Event 6 (LOCAs),

on those predictions use procedures to correct, control RHR pump swap to CNMT Sump or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or alignment required to be completed operations: Loss of heat sinks. in ~ 10 minutes Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred.
  • The Crew has transitioned to ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

Task Standard: Complete the alignment of SI pump suction to the RHR pump discharge, and initiate SI flow within 10 minutes of stopping the last SI pump taking suction from the RWST.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Revision 04600
  • A-601.10, Time Critical Action Management Program, Rev 00003 Handouts:
  • Control Room copy of ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, place-kept up to step 9.
  • FIG-19.0, High Head SI Required, Rev 002 20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue: As the HCO, you have been tasked to continue with ES-1.3 starting at step 9.

This is a time-critical JPM.

An Examiner will act as a second board operator and respond to all alarms and conditions NOT related to your task.

Validation Time: 10 Minutes (for the entire JPM)(5-9 min for time critical actions)

Time Critical Basis: Per A-601.1 0, TIME CRITICAL ACTION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, If RCS pressure is above RHR pump shutoff head, High head alignment and SI pump restart must be completed within 10 minutes. Completion within this time limit will maintain core inventory.

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • From protected IC-19 (100% MOL)
  • Insert MALF RCS02D, [10,000 gpm] (RCS Leak Into CNMT: Loop B Cold Leg) until RWST level <28%, then reduce leak size to 4000 gpm
  • Do NOT initiate cooldown in ES-1.2
  • Ensure both spray pumps are running to deplete RWST
  • When 28% is reached in the RWST perform ES-1.3 up to step 9.
  • FREEZE when the RWST level reaches 15%.

If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to Ie _ _

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Placekeep the Control Room copy of ES-1.3 up to (but NOT including) step 9, and place it and FIG-19.0 on the HCO's desk.
  • Ensure MCB key is present and clearly visible in the Simulator key drawer.
  • Due to being a time critical ..IPM, do not pre-brief the student (e.g., in the classroom) with task or procedure prior to the start of the JPM.
  • Go to RUN when Operator takes watch.

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ _ __

EXAMINER NOTE: Point out marked up copy of ES-1.3 on HCO's desk.

ES-1.3, Step 9 Procedure Caution: Sump recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times, except during alignment for high head recirculation.

Procedure Note: The TSC should be requested to establish periodic monitoring of the Aux Bldg sub-basement, as radiological conditions permit, to monitor RHR pump operation.

Performance Step: 1 Check RWST Level - LESS THAN 15%

Standard:

  • Reads the Caution and Note
  • Observes MCB RWST level indicators - LI-920 and LI 921 less than 15%

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 a Procedure Note: Cold leg injection should be reinitiated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> - 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after stopping SI pumps.

Stop All Pumps Supplied From RWST:

a. Stop operating CNMT spray pump and place in PULL STOP Standard:
  • Identifies the running spray pump o Red light lit and green light off
  • . i~therunning SprayPUfTlll1ftMl*St<Pl~.,~~,\';,::.';;~!

o Turns pistol-grip switch counter clockwise and withdraws the switch to the PULL Stop position o Verifies green light and red light off o Observes that Spray Additive flow, FI-930, (MCB left section) lowers to zero gpm Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 b & c Performance Step: 3 b. Check CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG

c. Reset CNMT spray if necessary Standard:

+ 2/3 > 28 PSI, extinguished EXAMINER NOTE: Annunciator A-28 alarms when either 213 front MCB left section (PI-945, 947, or 949) OR 213 back MCB left section (PI-946, 948, or 950) are> 28 psig (43 psia for back of MCB).

Annunciator A-27 alarms when both 2/3 front MCB left section (PI-945, 947, or 949) AND 2/3 back MCB left section (PI-946, 948, or 950) are> 28 psig (43 psia for back of MCB).

The back of the MCB indication can also be utilized for indication, but because it is out of the way and reads out in PSIA rather than psig, it is usually not utilized for this task.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 7 of 15 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 d Performance Step: 4 d. Close CNMT spray pump discharge valves

-MOV-860A

-MOV-860B

-MOV-860C

-MOV-860D Standard: Closes any open CNMT spray pump discharge valves o Turns switch counter clockwise to CLOSE and allows the switch to spring return to the AUTO position o Verifies green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: At this point in the procedure one spray pump should already have been secured and its associated discharge valves closed.

Comment:

Step 10 e

e. Stop all charging pumps.

Standard: - Reduces charging pump speed to minimum using the controller

- Verifies green flag showing

- Verifies green light lit and red light off

- Verifies Charging Line Flow indication (FI-128C) lowers to zero GPM (MCB center section), after last pump stopped EXAMINER NOTE: Charging Line Flow indication, FI-1288 (MCB left section) also provides the same indication. However, due to its location, normally FI-128C is utilized rather than FI-1288.

A and C Charging pump are running.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 f

f. Stop all SI pumps and place in PULL STOP Standard:
  • Verifies green flag showing
  • Verifies red light and green light off
  • Verifies SI Line Flow indication (FI-924 and FI-925) lowers to zero GPM (MCB left section), after last pump stopped.

Comment:

Start 10 Min Time Critical Clock: _ _ __

(Starts when the last SI pump is stopped.)

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 11 a Procedure Caution: Cooldown and depressurization will raise cold leg injection flow which may result in an adverse condition in the F-OA, INTEGRITY status tree. If RCS subcooling based on CETs is less than OaF using Fig-1.0, FIGURE MIN SU8COOLlNG, then cooldown to initiate RHR injection should be completed before transition to either FR-P INTEGRITY procedure.

" Performance Step: 7 Align SI And CNMT Spray For Sump Recirculation:

a. Close RWST outlet valves to SI and CNMT spray pumps (turn on DC power key switches)
  • MOV-896A
  • MOV-8968 Standard:
  • Retrieves MC8 key from Simulator Key Drawer
  • Observes MOV-896A stroking closed - both red and green lights lit
  • Observes MOV-8968 stroking closed - both red and green lights lit
  • Observes both MOV-896 A and 8 closed - green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: MOV-896A and MOV*896B each have a stroke time of -15 seconds. Once action is initiated to close the first valve, it is NOT necessary to wait for that valve to fully close before continuing with the next action {the next valve}. The valves may be done in any order.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 10 of 15 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 11 b

b. Close 81 pump RECIRC valves

-MOV-898

-MOV-897 Standard:

  • Observes MOV-898 stroking closed - both red and green lights lit
  • Observes MOV-897 stroking closed - both red and green lights lit
  • Observes both MOV-898 and MOV-897 closed - green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: MOV-898 and MOV-897 each have a stroke time of - 10 seconds. Once action is initiated to close the first valve, it is NOT necessary to wait for that valve to fully close before continuing with the next action (the next valve). The valves may be done in any order. After the second valve has started closing it is acceptable to continue with the next step of the procedure (step 12).

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 a Verify Adequate RCS Makeup Flow:

a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 250 psjg [300 psig adverse CNMT]

Standard:

  • Observes RCS pressure on:

o RX CLNT LOOP LO RNG PRESS, PI-420 (MCB left section), or oRCS PRESSURE indicators, PI-420-2, and PI-420A (MCB center section), or o PPCS

  • EXAMINER NOTE: To use PI-420, the Examinee will have to place ReS LOW RNG PRESS DEFEAT PI-420 switch to ON, if it is not already in the ON position.

Comment:

Step 12 b

b. RHR injection flow adequate:

o CETs - LESS THAN requirements of FIG-19.0, High Head SI Required o Check RVLlS level (no RCPs) - GREATER THAN 52% [55% ADVERSE]

IF either condition NOT met, THEN go to Step 12d.

Standard:

  • Uses the RCS pressure just observed in step 12a Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 d

d. Align operating RHR pump flow path(s) to SI and CNMT spray o IF RHR Pump A operating, THEN open MOV-857A and MOV-857C o IF RHR Pump 8 operating, THEN open MOV-8578 Standard:
  • Determines which RHR pump is running o Red flag visible o Red light lit and green light off
  • V o (For MOV-8578) Turns switch clock-wise to the OPEN position and then allows it to spring return to the center position o Verifies red light lit and green light off EXAMINER NOTE: RHR Pump 'B' was started previously in Step S.d Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 e

e. Start 2 SI Pumps Standard:

o Observes that the red flag is visible o Observes that the red light is lit and green light is off o Observes flow on FI-924 and FI-925 Comment:

Stop 10 Min Time Critical Clock: _ _ __

(Stopped when the first SI pump is started.)

Terminating Cue: When Examinee starts SI pumps: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete."

Stop time: _ _ __

Time Critical Duration (TC Stop Time - TC Start Time): _ _ _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC ~IPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM C Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:

2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred.
  • The Crew has transitioned to ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

INITIATING CUE: As the HCO, you have been tasked to continue with ES-1.3 starting at step 9.

This is a time-critical . .IPM.

An Examiner will act as a second board operator and respond to all alarms and conditions NOT related to your task.

20121LT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 45-016-01-01 Synchronize the turbine generator with grid.

Task Title: Synchronize Generator On-Line with ~IPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM D improper load pickup KIA

Reference:

045 A2.17 (2.7*/2.9*) Alternate Path Yes ~ No Time Critical Yes No ~

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the MTIG system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Malfunction of electrohydraulic control.

Generator load pickup is inadequate.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The generator is being started following a refueling outage.
  • The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up.
  • The generator output voltage is 19 KV.

Task Standard: Generator synchronized on-line with gross load between 40 to 60 MW.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Rev 19602 Handouts:
  • 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, placekept up to step 6.13. (Pages 1-11,55, and 66-74)
  • 0-1.2, ATT-2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, Rev 19602
  • FIG-13.0, Back Pressure, Rev 0 2012 ILT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

  • The SM directs you to synchronize the generator on-line per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.10.
  • The HCO will control the primary plant.

Validation Time: 15 Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • Reset to IC-8 (Turbine 1800 rpm)
  • Withdraw control rods to ensure reactor power> 15% but < 20%.
  • Ensure FRVs in Auto.
  • Ensure generator output voltage at 19 KV.
  • Insert MALF TUR18 [0] (Failure of Turbine Auto Load Pickup)
  • Ensure Grid voltage [E-MIS10] is low enough to allow the examinee to adjust incoming voltage to slightly greater than system voltage, while maintaining generator voltage <

19.5 KV (Step 6.13.4)

  • Set REM EDS017 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 1G13A73)
  • Set REM EDS016 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 9X13A71)
  • FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 173 .

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Placekeep a copy of 0-1.2 up to (but NOT including) step 6.13.
  • Ensure page 55 is included (CAUTION at beginning of Subsection 6.9).
  • Ensure Attachment 2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, is included with handout materials.
  • Ensure FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure, is available.

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J)

Start Time: _ _ __

Step 6.13.1 Performance Step: 1 PLACE synchroscope switch handle in CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

Standard: Places synchroscope switch handle in CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

EXAMINER NOTE: There is a single switch handle that may be placed in either CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE, or CIRCUIT BKR 9X 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

EXAMINER CUE: Provide marked up copy of 0-1.2 to Examinee.

Comment:

Step 6.13.2 Procedure Note: WHEN next step is performed, THEN MCB Alarm J-5, #11 OR

  1. 12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will cycle in and out of alarm as the Generator phases in and out of sync with the grid.

Performance Step: 2 a. PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON.

Standard: Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch clockwise to the ON position.

EXAMINER NOTE: Alarm J-5 may cycle in and out of alarm per the note.

EXAMINER CUE: (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): "The CRS gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash."

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.3 Procedure Note: Synchroscope should be rotating slowly in the FAST (clockwise) direction in the next step. IF Turbine Generator frequency is slightly higher than system frequency, THEN synchroscope should be rotating in the FAST (clockwise) direction. IF rotating counter clockwise, THEN a raise in speed will be required.

Performance Step: 3 IF Turbine Generator speed adjustment must be made, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step NfA.

1. ADJUST SETTER up OR down 1 rpm. (Turbine EH Control Panel)
2. DEPRESS GO pushbutton. (Turbine EH Control Panel)
3. REPEAT Steps 6.13.3.1 AND 6.13.3.2 UNTIL synchroscope is rotating slow in the FAST (clockwise) direction.

Standard:

  • Observes the SYNCHROSCOPE (MCB right section)

.,

o Up or down arrow push buttons depressed to raise flower the setter o GO pushbutton depressed to cause the turbine speed to change until the REFERENCE matches the SETTER EXAMINER NOTE:

  • Up, down, and GO pushbuttons are located on EH control panel
  • Digital REFERENCE and SETTER indication is located above the EH control panel Comment:

2012 ILT NRC ..IPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.4.1 Performance Step: 4 WHEN Turbine is at synchronous speed, THEN REPEAT the following as necessary to ensure generator INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage:

1. CHECK voltage on all three phases.

Standard: Rotates the GENERATOR VOLTMETER switch to each phase position and compares:

  • INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage to the
  • RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage o A-8 phase o 8-C phase o C-A phase EXAMINER NOTE:
  • INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) is located to the left of the SYNCHROSCOPE.
  • RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) is located to the right of the SYNCHROSCOPE.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 16 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.4.2 Performance Step: 5 2. WHILE maintaining voltage within the acceptable operating region of Attachment 2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, TRY to adjust BASE ADJUSTER to make INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage.

Standard:

  • Refers to Attachment 2
  • Adjusts BASE ADJUSTER (IF necessary) to make INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage.
  • Does NOT allow GENERATOR voltage to exceed 19.5 KV (per Attachment 2)

EXAMINER NOTE: Initial IC setup may make the performance of this step unnecessary (removed previous CT status)

EXAMINER NOTE: Voltage will remain within the acceptable operating region of Attachment 2 as long as the Examinee keeps the GENERATOR voltage < 19.5 KV.

Comment:

Step 6.13.4.3 Performance Step: 6 3. IF INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT be made slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

a. REQUEST RG&E Energy Control Center to adjust system voltage.
b. REPEAT Steps 6.13.4.1 through 6.13.4.3 as necessary.

Standard: Marks step N/A Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.5 Performance Step: 7 PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF.

Standard: Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch counter clockwise to OFF.

Comment:

Step 6.13.6 Performance Step: 8 WHEN disconnects are closed at 13A, THEN OBSERVE the following (red) CLOSED lights ILLUMINATED:

  • GENERATOR DISCONNECT 1G13A71
  • GENERATOR DISCONNECT 9X13A73 Standard: Observes that the disconnects are closed: red lights lit Comment:

Step 6.13.7 Performance Step: 9 ENSURE Reactor power is between 15% to 20%.

Standard:

  • Observes Power Range channels NI-41C, NI-42C, NI 43C, and NI-44C between 15% and 20%, or
  • Observes Reactor power indication on PPCS between 15% and 20%, or
  • Directs the HCO to report power level EXAMINER CUE: (If asked to report power level): "Power level is _ {current (as HCO) power level)".

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.8 Performance Step: 10 REVIEW CAUTION at beginning of Subsection 6.9.

Standard: Reviews CAUTION.

Comment:

Step 6.13.9 Performance Step: 11 PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON.

Standard: Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch clockwise to ON.

EXAMINER CUE: (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): "The CRS gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash."

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.1 Procedure CAUTION: At low MWe output, Turbine loading requirements SHALL be observed PER EOP, FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure

  • Operation in the Avoid Region SHOULD be minimized.
  • Operation in the DO NOT OPERATE region SHALL be limited to 5 minutes.

Performance Step: 12 PERFORM the following to CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 115KV:

1. WITH RG&E Energy Control Center concurrence, TRY to adjust BASE ADJUSTER so generator INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage as indicated on all three phases.

Standard:

  • Contacts RG&E ECC by direct telephone line as necessary
  • Rotates the GENERATOR VOLTMETER switch to each phase position and compares:
  • INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage to the
  • RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage o A-B phase o B-C phase o C-A phase
  • Adjusts BASE ADJUSTER as necessary so INCOMING voltage is slightly higher than SYSTEM voltage on all phases EXAMINER NOTE: Completed previously. Further adjustment should not be required.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC ..IPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.2 Performance Step: 13 IF INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT

__ be adjusted slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard: Marks 6.13.10.2. a and b N/A.

Comment:

Step 6.13.10.3 Performance Step: 14 REVIEW Steps 6.13.10.4 thru 6.13.10.6 prior to closing CIRCUIT

__ BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 115KV to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse power.

Standard: Reviews Steps 6.13.10.4 thru 6.13.10.6 Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

1 of 16 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.4 Procedure Note: MCB Alarm J-S, #11 or #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will stay EXTINGUISHED during performance of next step.

.y; Performance Step: 15 WHEN synchroscope rotating slow in the FAST (clockwise) direction AND approaching 12 o'clock position, THEN CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 11SKV so breaker closes at the approximate point of synchronism (12 o'clock).

a. RECORD time of closure Standard:
  • Observes synchroscope
  • Observes 1G 13A72 red lights lit
  • Records time of closure EXAMINER NOTE: Examinee may not record breaker closure time until after automatic load pickup is verified. This is acceptable to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse power.

Comment:

I EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP Step 6.13.10.5 Procedure Note: Load is to be maintained between 40 to 60 MW UNTIL hold time in Step 6.14.S.2 is completed.

-.J

";i"{"*

Performance Step: 16 VERIFY Automatic load pickup occurs within approximately 10 seconds.

Standard:

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.6 Performance Step: 17 IF automatic load pickup does NOT occur within approximately 10 seconds, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

a. DEPRESS TURB. MANUAL pushbutton. (Turbine EH Control Panel)
b. INTERMITTENTLY DEPRESS the following push buttons as necessary to adjust generator gross load between 40 to 60 MW:
  • MANUAL CONTROL VALVE LOWER
  • MANUAL CONTROL VALVE RAISE Standard:

o Observes OPER PAN light off and TURB MANUAL light lit

  • Observes digital Generator Gross MW indication
  • Comment:

Step 6.13.10.7 Performance Step: 18 PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF.

Standard: Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch counter clockwise to the OFF position.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 14 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.8 Performance Step: 19 REMOVE synchroscope switch handle from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

Standard: Removes synchroscope switch handle from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After synchroscope switch handle is removed from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 15 of 16 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC ~IPM D Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Form JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The generator is being started following a refueling outage.
  • The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up.
  • The generator output voltage is 19 KV.

INITIATING CUE:

  • The SM directs you to synchronize the generator on-line per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.10.
  • The HCO will control the primary plant.

20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 1 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 015-001-01-01 Verify proper operation of the Nuclear Instrumentation System.

Task Title: Perform STP-O-6.1 on Source JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM E Range N-31 KIA

Reference:

015 A4.02 (3.9/3.9) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: NIS indicators.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is shutdown.
  • Both Source Range Channels are operable.
  • The HCO has declared N-31 I NOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing per A-52.4, Attachment IV.
  • Containment is locked.
  • Core Alterations are NOT in progress.
  • STP-O-6.1 Prerequisites, step 5.0, has been completed.

Task Standard: STP-O-6.1 performed correctly for N-31 up to step 6.1.9.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, Revision 00102 Handouts:
  • STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, Revision 00102 20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 2 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS directs you to perform STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, for N-31, steps 6.1 through (and including) 6.1.8.
  • Wherever verification is required, place a check mark in the initial block and assume that the verification has been completed.

Validation Time: 25 Minutes 2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • Reset to IC-21 (HSD - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> trip from IC-12)
  • Set REM N IS098 to 400
  • Set REM N IS099 to 400 If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 174 .

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Mark-up STP-O-6.1 up to step 6.1.
  • Have a marked-up copy of STP-O-6.1 ready to provide to the Examinee.
  • Ensure START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR selected to N-31 , on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER.
  • Ensure AUDIO COUNT RATE can be heard in Main Control Room:

o Depress the STOP, then RESET, then START pushbuttons o Adjust the Level Adjust threshold slowly CCW until the display reads a value (divided by the number of seconds being counted) and the audio CR signal can be heard.

2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 4 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet (Denote Critical Steps with a ~)

Start Time: _ _ _ _ _'

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • Provide marked-up copy of STP-O-6.1 to Examinee.
  • AUDIO COUNT RATE CHANNEL is on the column of panels all the way to the right.

Step 6.1.1.1 to 6.1.1.3 Procedure Note: Due to electrical interlock between TRIP BYPASS switch and OPERATION SELECTOR switch the Main Control Board SR High Flux level trip annunciator cannot be checked with the test signal.

Performance Step: 1 PERFORM the following to prepare for Surveillance Testing of N-31:

1. ENSURE N-32 is OPERABLE, prior to removing N-31 from service. (N/A this Step if N-32 is not required to be OPERABLE)
2. REQUEST HCO to declare N-31 INOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing PER A-52.4, Attachment IV.
3. PLACE CHANNEL SELECTOR to N-32, on AUDIO COUNT Rate Channel.

Standard:

  • Reads the note.
  • Initials step 6.1.1.1 based on Initial Conditions.
  • Initials step 6.1.1.2 based on Initial Conditions.
  • Ensures CHANNEL SELECTOR switch is selected to N-32, on AUDIO COUNT Rate Channel.
  • Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.1.4 to 6.1.1.7 Performance Step: 2 4. IF AUDIO COUNT RATE cannot be heard in Main Control Room, CHECK AUDIO COUNT RATE panel.

5. PLACE START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR to N 32, on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER.
6. VERIFY HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 is in BLOCK position on Source Range N-31.
7. VERIFY annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN CNMT AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is ILLUMINATED.

Standard:

  • Recognizes that the AUDIO COUNT RATE can be heard in Main Control.
  • Places START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR to N-32, on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER.
  • Verifies HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 is in BLOCK position on Source Range N-31.
  • Verifies annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN CNMT AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is ILLUMINATED.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER is on the column of panels all the way to the right.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.2 Procedure Note: The PPCS SHOULD be used to monitor N-31 response, utilizing PPCS Point N31, during the performance of surveillance testing, if available.

Procedure Note: The following step will cause MCB Annunciator E-7, NIS TRIP BYPASS, to annunciate.

Performance Step: 3 6.1.2 PERFORM the following to defeat the Reactor Trip input from N-31:

1. PLACE LEVEL TRIP switch for N-31 to BYPASS position.
2. VERIFY local light, LEVEL TRIP BYPASS, is ILLUMINATED.
3. VERIFY bypass status panel light, SOURCE RANGE-1 TRIP BYPASS, ILLUMINATED.
4. VERIFY annunciator E-7, NIS TRIP BYPASS, annunciates. (N/A if already in alarm from another NIS channel)

Standard:

  • Rotates the N-31 LEVEL TRIP switch clockwise to the BYPASS position
  • Verifies local light, LEVEL TRIP BYPASS, is ILLUMINATED.
  • Verifies bypass status panel light, SOURCE RANGE-1 TRIP BYPASS, ILLUMINATED.
  • Silences and acknowledges E-7 alarm.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 7 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.3 Performance Step: 4 PERFORM the following to record initial data for N-31:

1. RECORD N-31 CPS on local indicator.
2. RECORD N-31 CPS to the Background Reading blank below the table on Attachment 1, for N-31.

Standard:

  • Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.3.1 .
  • Records local value for N-31 in the Background Reading blank below the table on Attachment 1, for N-31.

EXAMINER NOTE: Background value will be between 1S0-200 CPS Comment:

Step 6.1.4 Performance Step: 5 PERFORM Attachment 1, for N-31 to verify N-31 indications respond to test signals.

1. CHANGE the OPERATION SELECTOR switch sequentially through the various CPS positions and VERIFY correct response from channel indicators and recorder. The indicators and recorder will show injected test signal level plus background reading.

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: - For 60CPS position: 240-250 CPS (50-75 > BKGD)

- For 103 position: SOO -1200 CPS

- For 105 position: Sx104 -1.2x105 CPS

- NOTE: Reference values from Attachment 1 EXAMINER CUE: (After values have been verified and recorded for the 60CPS, 103 CPS, and 105 CPS SEL Switch Settings): "Assume the rest of the table is completed with all values satisfactory, and continue with the procedure."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.5 to 6.1.7 Performance Step: 6 6.1.5 RETURN Operation Selector Switch to 60 CPS position.

6.1.6 VERIFY local light, CHANNEL ON TEST, ILLUMINATED.

6.1.7 VERIFY Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates.

Standard:

  • Returns Operation Selector Switch to 60 CPS position.
  • Verifies local light, CHANNEL ON TEST, illuminated.
  • Verifies Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates.
  • Acknowledges the E-1 alarm.

EXAMINER NOTE: E-1 will already be in alarm and acknowledged from the previous step.

Comment:

Step 6.1.8.1 Performance Step: 7 PERFORM the following, to test High Flux at Shutdown Alarm.

1. TURN LEVEL ADJUST potentiometer fully COUNTER CLOCKWISE.

Standard:

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.2 Procedure Note: The following step will cause MCB Annunciator, E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, to annunciate.

Performance Step: 8 PLACE OPERATION SELECTOR switch to LEVEL ADJUST position.

Standard:

  • Verifies Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates.
  • Acknowledges the E-1 alarm.

Comment:

Step 6.1.8.3 Performance Step: 9 NOTIFY personnel in containment that Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm will be tested by making announcement over plant page. (N/A this step if containment is locked)

Standard:

  • Marks step N/A Comment:

Step 6.1.8.4 Performance Step: 10 PLACE HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to NORMAL position.

Standard:

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.5 Procedure Note: The following step will cause MCB Annunciator, E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, to annunciate.

Performance Step: 11 ADJUST Level Adjust Potentiometer slowly CLOCKWISE until HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN local light is ILLUMINATED.

Standard:

Comment:

Step 6.1.8.6 Procedure Note: Bistable trip point should be approximately 2 X counts at shutdown.

Performance Step: 12 PERFORM the following:

a. RECORD local meter indication at which bistable tripped.
b. VERIFY Annunciator E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, annunciates.

Standard:

  • Reads the note .
  • Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.8.6a
  • Silences and acknowledges E-29 alarm.

EXAMINER NOTE: E-29 should alarm at -400 CPS Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.7 Performance Step: 13 ADJUST LEVEL ADJUST potentiometer slowly COUNTER CLOCKWISE until HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN local light is NOT ILLUMINATED.

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: Bistable RESET setpoint should be -200 CPS Comment:

Step 6.1.8.6 Performance Step: 14 PERFORM the following:

  • RECORD local meter indication at which bistable tripped.
  • VERIFY Annunciator E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT ILLUMINATED.
  • VERIFY local light, HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT ILLUMINATED.

Standard:

  • Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.8.8a
  • Verifies E-29 is not illuminated.
  • Verifies local light, HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT illuminated.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.9 Procedure Note: Bistable width should be 45% to 55%.

Performance Step: 15 PERFORM the following to determine bistable loop width:

=

%LW CPS at Bistable Reset ( CPS)

CPS at Bistable Trip ( CPS) X 100 =  %

Standard:

  • Calculates %LW
  • Determines that %LW is between 45% and 55%

EXAMINER NOTE: Calculated loop width value should be -50%

Comment:

Step 6.1.8.10 - 6.1.8.12 Performance Step: 16 10. PLACE HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to BLOCK position.

11. VERIFY Annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN CNMT AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is ILLUMINATED.
12. NOTIFY personnel in containment that Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm test is complete by making announcement over plant page. (N/A this step if containment is locked)

Standard:

  • Places HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to the BLOCK position.
  • N/As step 6.1.8.12 Comment:

Terminating Cue: After step 6.1.8.12 is marked N/A: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete."

Stop time: _ _ _ _'

2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 4 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM E Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1

~IPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is shutdown.
  • Both Source Range Channels are operable.
  • The HCO has declared N-31 INOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing per A-52.4, Attachment IV.
  • Containment is locked.
  • Core Alterations are NOT in progress.
  • STP-O-6.1 Prerequisites, step 5.0, has been completed.

INITIATING CUE:

  • The CRS directs you to perform STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, for N-31, steps 6.1 through (and including) 6.1.8.
  • Wherever verification is required, place a check mark in the initial block and assume that the verification has been completed.

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 1 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 064-007-01-01 Unload the Diesel Generator.

Task Title: Shutdown the "A" Emergency Diesel JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM F Generator KIA

Reference:

064 A4.06 (3.9/3.9) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Manual start, loading, and stopping of the ED/G.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom --

Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • You are an extra RO.
  • A plant startup is in progress with the turbine being synchronized to the grid.
  • The "A" EDG is running for the monthly surveillance per STP-O-12.1 through Step 6.2.46.
  • The Diesel has run for 65 minutes.
  • All readings have been taken and evaluated as satisfactory.
  • There is an AO available at the A DIG.
  • The AO has the data sheets.

Task Standard: "An D/G shutdown per STP-O-12.1 steps 6.3 through 6.3.21.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • Blank copies of ATT-3, As Found/As Left Voltage and Frequency, and ATT-14, Auto Voltage Control Rheostat After Start - As Left Initiating Cue:
  • The CRS directs you to shutdown the "An D/G per STP-O-12.1, steps 6.3 through 6.3.21.

20121LT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 2 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Validation Time: 18 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL or operating at power)
  • "A" DIG running at between 2025 and 2050 KW per STP-O-12.1, Rev. 01301 step 6.2.42
  • Ensure "A" SWP running and "C" SWP stopped.
  • Ensure "A" SWP selected on Safeguard Selector Switch.
  • Complete and mark up STP-O-12.1 through Step 6.2.48.
  • Insert Manual Triggers 1 and 2 to reset DG1A ELCP Annunciator Panel, when requested in performance step 24.

o Trigger 1: REM-GEN11 (Reset) o Trigger 2: REM-GEN23 (Acknowledge)

If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 175 .

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Have a marked up copy of STP-O-12.1 ready to provide to the Examinee.
  • Have clean copies of ATT-3 and ATT-14 ready to provide to the Examinee.

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet (Denote Critical Steps with a ")

Start Time: _ _ __

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide the Examinee a marked-up copy of STP-O-12.1.

Step 6.3.1 & 6.3.1.1 Procedure Note: IF performing Vendor Engine Analysis OR full load firing pressures, the acquisition of data may have to be aborted IF 115 minute run time limit is approached. This will prevent exceeding the two hour limit of operation with the DIG vital bus supply breaker closed.

Performance Step: 1 6.3.1 WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A has operated between 2025 and 2050 KW for a period of greater than 60 minutes, but less than or equal to 115 minutes, THEN UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A as follows:

1. RECORD time unloading begins.

Standard:

  • Records time unloading begins _ __

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.1.2 Performance Step: 2 If the DIG A LOAD LIMIT on mechanical governor is NOT in the MAX FUEL position, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard:

  • Calls the AO to determine if LOAD LIMIT setting is at MAX FUEL.
  • Marks step NIA EXAMINER CUE: "Load Limit setting is at MAX FUEL position."

EXAMINER NOTE: Candidate should N/A this step based upon MAX FUEL position Comment:

Step 6.3.1.3 Procedure Note: Step 6.3.1.3 will verify normal response for Emergency Diesel Generator A electronic governor following manipulation of LOAD LIMIT (max fuel) dial. IF 2016 KW is obtained, Emergency Diesel Generator A remains operable.

Performance Step: 3 IF the Mechanical Governor was adjusted to lock the load, THEN ADJUST Emergency Diesel Generator A load to between 2150 and 2175 KW using A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard:

  • Calls the AO to determine if Mechanical Governor was NOT adjusted to lock the load.
  • Marks step NIA EXAMINER CUE: "Mechanical Governor was NOT adjusted to lock the load."

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.1.4 Procedure Note: Emergency Diesel Generator A, unloading rate is approximately 500KW every 30 seconds.

Performance Step: 4 UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A, to 400KW by intermittently turning A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch in the lower direction, AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary.

Standard:

  • Reads note.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • This has been an approved "two-handed operation."
  • If unloading unnecessary slow, ask operator why.

Comment:

Step 6.3.2 Performance Step: 5 IF Bi-Annual selected Service Water Pump starts are required, THEN PERFORM Attachment 13, Bi-Annual Service Water Pump Starts.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step AND Attachment 13 N/A.

Standard: Marks Step 6.3.2 AND Attachment 13 N/A.

EXAMINER CUE: "Bi-Annual selected SW pump starts" are NOT required."

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.3 Performance Step: 6 WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A load has been reduced to 400 twV, THEN TRIP one Emergency Diesel Generator A supply breaker.

Standard: .;lw~~nDr .~tD';~ KW, trip$~~r01G AstJBP~~:

. . breake:rfor .q~~~O/G Asupply'bteat~r.for bU$>1S. '.

  • Verifies associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: If the DIG trips on Reverse Power due to operator error, the step will be evaluated as UNSAT.

Comment:

Step 6.3.4

I Performance Step
7 UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A, to 200 twV by intermittently turning A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch in the lower direction, AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary.

Standard:

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.5

--J Performance Step: 8 WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A load has been reduced to approximately 200 KW AND Power Factor is 0.9 (lag), THEN TRIP the remaining closed Emergency Diesel Generator A supply breaker.

Standard:

  • *t~~r~**g.~G(~~j,~ei~~*1~=~~~~tm~~~gl~~~"~pW&~~:fr***
  • Verifies associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: If the DIG trips on Reverse Power due to operator error, the step will be evaluated as Unsat.

Comment:

Step 6.3.6 Performance Step: 9 RECORD time breaker was opened.

Standard:

  • Records time breaker was opened.

Comment:

Step 6.3.7 Performance Step: 10 IF Attachment 13, Bi-Annual Service Water Pump Starts, was performed, THEN ENSURE Service Water Pumps AND Selector Switches are aligned to the desired configuration.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard:

  • Marks step N/A EXAMINER NOTE: Be-annual SW Pump starts was NOT performed.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.8 Performance Step: 11 PLACE D/G A UNIT/PARALLEL OPERATION SELECTOR switch to UNIT position.

Standard:

  • Places D/G A UNIT/PARALLEL OPERATION SELECTOR switch to UNIT position.

Comment:

Step 6.3.9 Performance Step: 12 PLACE D/G A SYNCHROSCOPE switch in the BUS 14 or BUS 18 position.

Standard:

  • Places D/G A SYNCHROSCOPE switch in the BUS 14 or BUS 18 position.

Comment:

Step 6.3.10 Performance Step: 13 If Emergency Diesel Generator A frequency is high, THEN OPERATE D/G A GOVERNOR switch to return to a setting of between 60 and 60.1 Hertz (revolving slowly in the clockwise direction) AND TRANSFER frequency setting data to Attachment 3, As Found/As Left Voltage and Frequency.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard: Marks step N/A Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.11 Performance Step: 14 PLACE DIG A SYNCHROSCOPE switch to the OFF position.

Standard:

  • Places DIG A SYNCHROSCOPE switch to OFF.

Comment:

Step 6.3.12 Performance Step: 15 MEASURE the Emergency Diesel Generator A speed using a photo-tachometer, AND RECORD speed data on Attachment 3, As FoundlAs Left Voltage and Frequency.

Standard:

  • Directs AO to measure the DIG speed using a photo-tachometer.
  • Records the speed data on Attachment 3.

EXAMINER CUE: "DIG speed has been measured and recorded."

Comment:

Step 6.3.13 Performance Step: 16 ADJUST DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish Emergency Diesel Generator A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts.

Standard:

  • Adjusts DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish DIG A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts.

EXAMINER NOTE: During preparation and validation, no adjustment was required.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.14 Performance Step: 17 IF this procedure is being performed for monthly surveillance in June or December, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Standard:

  • Marks 6.3.14.1 through 6.3.14.20 N/A.

EXAMINER CUE: If asked, the current month is today's date {October 2012}

Comment:

Step 6.3.15 Performance Step: 18 ADJUST DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish Emergency Diesel Generator A output voltage between 480 and 490 Volts (adjust as close to 480 volts as possible) AND RECORD voltage data on Attachment 3, As FoundlAs Left Voltage and Frequency.

Standard:

  • Adjusts DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish DIG A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts, but as close to 480 volts as possible.
  • Records voltage data on Attachment 3.

Comment:

Step 6.3.16 Performance Step: 19 RECORD the as left DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT position on Attachment 14, Auto Voltage Control Rheostat After Start - As Left, by sketching in the dial setting.

Standard:

  • Sketches in the DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT dial setting on Attachment 14.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.17 Performance Step: 20 PERFORM the following to SECURE DIG A:

1. REMOVE plastic cover from DIG A Control Switch.
2. TURN DIG A CONTROL switch to the STOP position.

Standard:

  • Removes plastic cover from DIG A control switch
  • Comment:

Step 6.3.18

...J Performance Step: 21 PUSH AND HOLD the DIG A VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN button (Black button) for a few seconds immediately after stopping DIG A.

Standard :;.:"~"#'~u~h~s andholdsth~ D/GAVOL"r~G~,SHVTOOWN button

'";,fdratewse¢drids.immediat~ty after stopping DIG A.

EXAMINER NOTE: This action will result in J-24, Emergency Diesel Gen 1A Panel, alarm EXAMINER NOTE: Failure to push and hold the Voltage Shutdown button in a timely manner could damage the voltage control circuitry as it tries to maintain voltage while the diesel's speed lowers.

Comment:

Step 6.3.19 Performance Step: 22 REPLACE plastic cover on DIG A control switch.

Standard:

  • Replaces plastic cover on DIG A control switch.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.20

"', Performance Step: 23 PERFORM the following to RESET Emergency Diesel Generator A:

1. VERIFY Emergency Diesel Generator A has stopped rolling.
2. PUSH the following buttons:
  • DIG A RESET
  • DIG A FIELD RESET Standard:
  • Asks AO to verify that DIG A has stopped rolling .
  • s4PuSbth~<elGARE

.~PusHthe(e/GA~itSte; EXAMINER CUE: (Ensure the Start Relay blue lights have been lit for - 5 seconds and then report as AO): "A DIG has stopped rolling."

EXAMINER NOTE: Failure to push the reset pushbuttons would disable subsequent automatic start.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.21 Performance Step: 24 WHEN the Emergency Diesel Generator A is reset, THEN VERIFY the following indicating lamps are illuminated (MCB Rear):

  • AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 1 POWER AVAILABLE
  • AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 2 POWER AVAILABLE
  • START RELAY 1 POWER AVAILABLE
  • START RELAY 2 POWER AVAILABLE Standard:
  • VERIFY the following indicating lamps are illuminated:

o AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 1 POWER AVAILABLE o AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 2 POWER AVAILABLE o START RELAY 1 POWER AVAILABLE o START RELAY 2 POWER AVAILABLE EXAMINER NOTE: The four (4) blue indicating lamps should be illuminated Comment:

Terminating Cue: After step 6.3.21 is completed: "Evaluation on this ..IPM is complete. "

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM F Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • You are an extra RO.
  • A plant startup is in progress with the turbine being synchronized to the grid.
  • The "A" EDG is running for the monthly surveillance per STP 0-12.1 through Step 6.2.46.
  • The Diesel has run for 65 minutes.
  • All readings have been taken and evaluated as satisfactory.
  • There is an AO available at the A DIG.
  • The AO has the data sheets.

INITIATING CUE:

  • The CRS directs you to shutdown the "A" DIG per STP-O 12.1, steps 6.3 through 6.3.21.

2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 029-006-04-01 Recover From Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) Signal.

Task Title: Respond to a Spurious CVI While at JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM G Full Power KIA

Reference:

012 A2.01 (3.1/3.6) Alternate Path Yes No ~

Time Critical Yes No ~

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Faulty bistable operation.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life.

Task Standard: Respond to a spurious CVI while at full power.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • AR-A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION, Rev 01200
  • E-20, CNMT or PLANT VENT RAD MON PUMP TRIP, Rev 00500 Handouts: None Initiating Cue: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function.

Validation Time: ~ Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL)
  • Insert MALF RPS09 [Both], Trigger 1 (Inadvertent CVI)

If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 176 .

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Approximately 15 seconds after the ~IPM begins, initiate Trigger 1
  • Approximately 15 seconds after Trigger 1 was initiated, clear MALF RPS09 20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ")

Start Time: _ _ __

Alarm A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION received Performance Step: 1 Responds to alarm A-25 Standard:

  • Silences audible alarm by depressing SILENCE pushbutton
  • Acknowledges flashing alarm by depressing ACKNOWLEDGE pushbutton
  • Refers to appropriate Alarm Response procedure: AR-A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION EXAMINER NOTE: The Examinee should also acknowledge alarm E-20.

However, based on the indications available, he should recognize that CVI caused trip of the R-1 OAl11112 CNMT Vent Sample Pump, and should give AR-A-25 a higher priority than AR-E-20.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION AR-A-25 Step 4.1 V Performance Step: 2 4.1 ENSURE CVI has occurred.

Verifies CVI has occurred properly by verifying the automatic actions of step 3.0:

  • The following valves CLOSE:

o R10A R11 R12 SUCTION, AOV-1597 o R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1598 o R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1599 o MINI PURGE EXH, AOV-7971 o MINI PURGE EXH, AOV-7970 o CNMT MINI PURGE SPLY VLV OUTSIDE, AOV-7445 o CNMT MINI PURGE SUPPLY, AOV-7478 o CNMT PURGE EXH, AOV-5879 o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY, AOV-5869 Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: AOV-1597, 1598 AND 1599 located on MCB left section front.

All of the rest are located on MCB left section back.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 5 of 10 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1 (continued)

Performance Step: 3

  • The following fans TRIP:

o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN A o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN B o CNMT PURGE EXHAUST FAN A o CNMT PURGE EXHAUST FAN B

  • R10NR11/R12 Pump TRIPS Standard:
  • Verifies the above fans tripped by green light lit and red light off.
  • ~"I_ _ _ ~"'\:ON~*d;de-EXAMINER NOTE:
  • CNMT Purge Supply and Exhaust Fans are not in service when the plant is at power.
  • Fans located on MCB left section back.
  • R10AlR11/R12 Pump indication on Radiation Monitoring panel.

EXAMINER NOTE: The pump trip will be annunciated by E-20, CNMT or PLANT VENT RAD MaN PUMP TRIP Comment:

Step 4.2 Performance Step: 4 IF performing Core Alterations OR movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, THEN ENSURE requirements of LCO 3.9.3 are met.

Standard:

  • Determines that the step is not applicable.

EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee asks if core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment is in progress):

"The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life.

You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.3 Performance Step: 5 MONITOR the following Area Radiation Monitors:

  • R-2, CONTAINMENT
  • R-7, INCORE DETECTOR AREA Standard:
  • Observes that both R-2 and R-7 have normal readings.
  • Observes that there has been no variation of R-2 or R-7 values on the Yokogawa Recorder.

Comment:

Step 4.4

~: Performance Step: 6 RESET CVI when conditions warrant.

Standard:

  • Determines that conditions warrant resetting CVI.

EXAMINER CUE: (After Examinee reads step 4.4): "Troubleshooting has been completed. The cause of the CVI has been determined and repaired. Continue with the procedure."

Comment:

Step 4.5 & 4.5.1 Performance Step: 7 PURGE R-11 and R-12 as follows:

4.5.1 RESET X-V Relays for the following on CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL TRAIN A:

  • RAD MON AOV1597
  • RAD MON AOV1598 Standard:
  • Verifies associated back-lit white light energizes.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.5.2 Performance Step: 8 RESET X-Y Relays for the following on CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL TRAIN B:

  • RAD MON AOV1597
  • RAD MON AOV1599 Standard:
  • Verifies associated back-lit white light energizes.

Comment:

Step 4.5.3 Performance Step: 9 VERIFY on MCB the following valves OPEN:

  • R10A R11 R12 SUCTION, AOV-1597
  • R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1598
  • R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1599 Standard:
  • Verifies AOV-1597, 1598 and 1599 bright-dim status lights - dim, and/or
  • Verifies lights associated with AOV-1597, 1598, and 1599 2-position switches - red light lit and green light off Comment:

Step 4.5.4 Performance Step: 10 PLACE R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch to START.

Standard:

  • Verifies the "on" light is lit EXAMINER NOTE: E-20 alarm will CLEAR after pump is started Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.5.5 Performance Step: 11 DEPRESS PURGE pushbutton above R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch.

Standard:

  • Depresses the PURGE pushbutton above R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch.

EXAMINER NOTE: There is no change in indications available in the Control Room when the PURGE pushbutton is pushed.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After step 4.5.5 is completed: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ _ _'

2012 ILT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM G Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life.

INITIATING CUE: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function.

2012 ILT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Ginna Task No.: 008-002-04-01 Respond To A Loss Of Component Cooling Water.

Task Title: Respond to a Rapidly Lowering JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM H CCW Surge Tank Level KIA

Reference:

008 A2.02 (3.2/3.5) Alternate Path Yes ~ No Time Critical Yes No ~

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the CCWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low surge tank level.

Alternate path because RNO directed E-O immediate actions will be required in addition to AP-CCW.2 actions.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life.

Task Standard: Respond to a rapidly lowering CCW Surge Tank level during power operation.

Required Materials: None General

References:

  • AR-A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2%, Revision 11
  • AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION, Revision 02201
  • ATT-1.0, AT-POWER CCWALIGNMENT, Rev 3 Handouts: None Initiating Cue: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function.

Validation Time: I Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

  • Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL)
  • Insert MALF CLG05 [100], Trigger 1 (CCW Supply Line Break) until A-13 alarm
  • Insert MALF CLG05 [10], Trigger 2 (CCW Supply Line Break) until directed by Lead Examiner at step 6b.
  • Insert MALF CLG05 [300], Trigger 3 (CCW Supply Line Break)

If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 177 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Approximately 15 seconds after the JPM begins, initiate Trigger 1
  • NOTE that the leak rate has 3 different values during this scenario, with the intent that:

- The initial value prompts the occurrence of A-13 alarm and entry into AP-CCW.2

- The initial value is reduced (to -100 gpm) immediately after A-13 is received to allow the candidate to take actions to recover surge tank level

- After A-13 clears due to makeup flow, at Step 6 of AP-CCW.2, the value is again modified to drive the candidate back to Step 2 RNO column and the AP actions required (300 gpm)

  • When the A-13 alarm is received, reduce MALF CLG05 to [10 gpm]
  • When the candidate has begun the actions of Step 6 of AP-CCW.2 AND annunciator A 13 is clear, raise MALF CLG05 to [300 gpm]
  • Ensure clean copies of ATT-1.0 are available to provide candidate 20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 5 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ~)

Start Time: _ _ __

Sim Driver: Trigger 1 As soon as the candidate takes the watch, insert Trigger 1 (100 ADm leak)

Alarm A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2% received Performance Step: 1 Responds to alarm A-13 Standard:

  • Silences audible alarm by depressing SILENCE pushbutton
  • Acknowledges flashing alarm by depressing ACKNOWLEDGE pushbutton
  • Refers to appropriate Alarm Response procedure: AR-A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2%

Sim Driver: Trigger 2 As soon as the candidate picks up the AR procedure for A 13, insert Trigger 2, reduce the leak rate ( 10 Apm)

EXAMINER NOTE: Leak rate reduction at this point will allow the candidate to take the RNO actions of Step 2 in AP-CCW.2 and begin to recover CCW surge tank level while continuing in the procedure Comment:

AR-A-13 Step 1 Performance Step: 2 For an UNEXPECTED alarm perform the following:

1. GO TO the applicable AP-CCW procedure:

o AP-CCW.2 (LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION) o AP-CCW.3 (LOSS OF CCW - PLANT SHUTDOWN)

Standard: Goes to AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 4 of 15 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION AP-CCW.2 Step 1 Procedure Caution: If CCW flow to a RCP is interrupted for greater than 2 minutes or if either RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F. Then trip the affected RCP.

Procedure Caution: If CCW is lost, then seal injection should be maintained to the RCP(s) until RCS temperature I less than 150°F, or until CCW is restored.

Performance Step: 3 1. Check CCW Pump Status:

o Both CCW pump breakers white lights - EXTINGUISHED o Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP EXTINGUISHED Standard:

  • Verifies Both CCW pump breakers white lights extinguished
  • Verifies A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP extinguished Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 Procedure Note: MCB CCW surge tank level indication should be verified locally in the AUX BLDG, if possible.

Procedure Note: If it is suspected that CCW Fluid will enter the WHUT, Notify the Chemistry Technician.

Performance Step: 4

  • 2 Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - APPROXIMATELY 50%

AND STABLE (PPCS Point L0618)

Standard:

  • Directs the Primary AO to report local CCW surge tank level indication .
  • -+$-.~

EXAMINER NOTE: Step 2 is a CAS and will drive subsequent AP actions EXAMINER CUE: If called for local surge tank level, "Local level indication corresponds to MCB indications. II Comment:

Step 2 RNa a Performance Step: 5 Perform the following:

a. Open RMW to CCW surge tank, MOV-823.

Standard:

  • Verifies associated red light lit and green light off Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNa b Performance Step: 6 b. Start RMW pump(s).

Standard:

  • Verifies associated red flag visible.
  • Verifies associated red light lit and green light off EXAMINER NOTE: Given the initial rate of surge tank level drop, the Examinee may start both RMW pumps.

Comment:

Step 2 RNa c 1 Performance Step: 7 c. IF surge tank level stable or rising, THEN control level at approximately 50% while continuing with step 3.

Standard:

  • Determines that CCW surge tank level is now rising in response to initiation of RMW flow.

EXAMINER NOTE: The reduction in leak severity will allow RMW flow to begin raising CCW surge tank level Comment:

Step

  • 3 Performance Step: 8 Monitor CCW Hx Outlet Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID T0621)
a. CCW Hx Outlet temperature - LESS THAN 120°F Standard:
  • CCW Hx Outlet temperature is <120°F Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step

  • 4 Performance Step: 9 Monitor RCP Indications:
  • RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Displays RCPS or RCP temperature monitor RK-30A recorder)

~ 200°F Standard:

  • Determines that no indications of high temperature CCW conditions exist Comment:

Step

  • 5 Performance Step: 10 Monitor If Letdown Should Be Isolated:
a. Check annunciator A-12, NRHX Letdown Out HI Temp 145°F - EXTINGUISHED Standard: Confirms A-12 is NOT lit Comment:

Step

  • 5 Performance Step: 11 Monitor If Letdown Should Be Isolated:
b. Check excess letdown temperature - LESS THAN 195°F Standard:
  • Determines Excess Letdown is NOT in service Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6 Performance Step: 12 Check CCW Valve Alignment NORMAL:

a. Check MCB CCW valves (Refer to ATT-1.0, At-Power CCW Alignment)

Standard:

  • Begins using ATT-1.0 to confirm proper CCW valve alignment Sim Driver: When the candidate begins implementing ATT-1.0 , insert Trigger 3, to, raise the leak rate (300 apm)

EXAMINER NOTE: Examinee should return to Step 2, RNO Step c.1 (CAS) when alarm A-13 re-annunciates.

Comment:

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT ST Step 2 RNO c 1 Performance Step: 13 c. IF CCW surge tank level can NOT be maintained greater than 10%, THEN perform the following:

1) Close letdown isol, AOV-427.

Standard:

  • Verifies associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER NOTE: AOV-427 is located on MCB center section (left side)

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNa c 2 Performance Step: 14 2) Close excess letdown, HCV-123.

Standard:

  • Verifies HCV-123 closed - OUTPUT at 0% demand
  • (If HCV-123 is NOT closed) Rotates controller knob clockwise to the 0% demand position and verifies OUTPUT at 0%

demand EXAMINER NOTE: Normally excess letdown is NOT in service and therefore, HCV-123 is already closed.

Comment:

Step 2 RNa c 3 Performance Step: 15 3) Trip the reactor.

Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: There are two reactor trip pushbuttons - one on the MCB left section, and one on the MCB center section. The Examinee may depress either pushbutton.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNO c 4 I E-O Step 1 "y' Performance Step: 16 a. WHEN all E-O Immediate Actions done, THEN trip BOTH RCPs.

E-O, Step 1 Verify Reactor Trip:

o At least one train of reactor trip breakers - OPEN o Neutron flux - LOWERING o MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM Standard:

  • Announces "Reactor is tripped" EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee attempts to refer to E-O to perform immediate actions) "Perform the immediate actions from memory."

EXAMINER NOTE: Normally by the time the operator gets to verifying that neutron flux is lowering, the Power Ranges are already pegged low, therefore the operator will utilize the Intermediate Ranges.

EXAMINER NOTE: The Examinee may verify all control and shutdown rods on bottom by reading the message at the bottom of the ROD POSITION page, or he may look at the individual rod indications and swap pages to verify the status of the shutdown rods.

EXAMINER NOTE: Per A-50l.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, initial verification of EOP immediate actions from memory requires only communication of the high level action being verified.

Broadcasting of these high level actions is acceptable.

However, in a JPM setting, the Examinee may choose to verbalize more than the high level actions in order to better demonstrate his knowledge of the immediate actions.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION E-O Step 2 Performance Step: 17 E-O, Step 2 Verify Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED Standard:

  • Announces "turbine is tripped" or equivalent wording EXAMINER NOTE: Indication is on the EHC Panel right side under EH VALVE STATUS.

Comment:

E-O Step 3 Performance Step: 18 E-O, Step 3 Verify Both Trains Of AC Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:

o Bus 14 and Bus 18 o Bus 16 and Bus 17 Standard:

  • Announces "Safeguard Buses are energized to at least 440 volts" or equivalent wording EXAMINER NOTE: 480V Bus meters are on the vertical section of the MCB, right section Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 12 15 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION E-O Step 4 a Performance Step: 19 E-O 4 Check if SI is Actuated:

a. Any SI Annunciator - LIT Standard:
  • Goes to Step 4 a RNO Comment:

E-O Step 4 a RNO Performance Step: 20 E-O 4 RNO IF any of the following conditions are met, THEN manually actuate SI and CI:

o PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig, OR o Steamline pressure less than 514 psig, OR o CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig, OR o SI sequencing started, OR o Operator determines SI required IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

Standard:

  • Announces "SI is not actuated and not required, and E-O immediate actions are complete", or equivalent wording.
  • Returns to AP-CCW.2 Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION AP-CCW.2 Step 2 RNO c 4 (continued)

Performance Step: 21 4) WHEN all E-O Immediate Actions done, THEN trip BOTH RCPs.

Standard:

  • Verifies associated green flag visible
  • Verifies associated green light lit and red light off Comment:

AP-CCW.2 Step 2 RNO c 4 (continued)

Performance Step: 22 5) PLACE both CCW pumps in pull stop.

Standard:

  • Verifies associated green flag visible.
  • Verifies associated red and green lights off.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After CCW pumps are in pull stop: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete."

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC ..IPM H Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life.

INITIATING CUE: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function.

20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Ginna Task No.: 006-003-01-04 Perform Lineups For Filling The SI Accumulators.

Task Title: Makeup to "A" SI Accumulator Using JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM 1 the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump KIA

Reference:

006 A 1.13 (3.5/3.7) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration).

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator - - - Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions
  • The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7

Required Materials: Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, Gloves, and Dosimetry.

General

References:

S-16.13, RWSTWATER MAKEUP TO ACCUMULATORS, Revision 03600 Handouts: S-16.13 (Marked up to Step 6.1. 7)

S-16.13 Attachment 1, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP OPERATION S-16.13 Attachment 2, RESTORATION ACTIONS FOR SI OR CI S-16.13 Attachment 3, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP CONFIGURATION DRAWING 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

  • The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions
  • The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7
  • The CRS has submitted an A-52.4 for tracking on Penetration 101 Validation Time: 19 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS
  • Have a marked-up copy (to step 6.1.7) of S-16.3
  • Have a clean copy of S-16.13, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ,J)

Start Time: _ _ __

Step 1.0 Procedure Note: Attachment 3 is a drawing of the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump configuration that is provided for informational purposes.

Procedure Caution:

  • Containment Isolation Boundary SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C, AND SI Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves are opened during this Attachment. A dedicated Operator SHALL be stationed in the vicinity of these valves, in direct communication with Control Room, to ensure prompt closure should it be required.
  • Discharge pressure of the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump SHALL NOT exceed 1000 psig as indicated on calibrated test gauge, PI-928B.
  • SI Accumulator level of 75% SHALL NOT be exceeded during filling.

Performance Step: 1 ENSURE a dedicated Operator in direct communication with the Control Room, is stationed in the vicinity of SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C, AND SI Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves, to ensure prompt closure should it be required.

Standard: Reads step and recognizes that he is the dedicated Operator.

EXAMINER CUE: Provide Examinee a clean copy of S-16.13, Attachments 1,2, and 3.

Comment:

Step 2.0 Performance Step: 2 PERFORM Attachment 2, Restoration Actions for SI OR CI, if SI OR CI signal occurs while performing this attachment.

Standard: Reads step.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.0 Performance Step: 3 SUBMIT A-52.4, Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment, for tracking on Penetration 101.

Standard: Reads step, and recognizes that the CRS has already done this (based on Initial Conditions).

Comment:

Step 4.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817.

Standard:

  • Locates V-2817
  • EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

Step 5.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION ISOL VALVE, V 2817A.

Standard:

  • Locates V-2817A
  • EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817A) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOL VALVE, V-2810.

Standard:

Examiner NOTE: V-2810 is inboard of SI Pump 'B' EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2810) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

Step 7.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C.

Standard:

  • Locates V-2817C

. ~:. "(¥~".:~~')"~-ftaIy Examiner NOTE: V-2817C is inboard of SI Pump 'B' EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817C) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 8.0 Procedure Note: The following steps will add water to the Aux Bldg Sump.

Performance Step: 8 NOTIFY Control Room of possible A. B. Sump Pump actuation.

Standard: Simulates notifying Control Room of possible A. B. Sump Pump actuation.

EXAMINER CUE: (When Examinee simulates calling the Control Room)

"Control Room Supervisor" (After message) Repeat back message

[Expected to be similar to "Possibility of an Aux Bldg sump pump actuation."]

Comment:

Step 9.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE DUMP VALVE, V-2817E. (On Pump Skid)

Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817E) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE, V 2817F. (On Pump Skid)

Standard:

  • Locates V-2817F
  • ,J/awi,j~~,\$"'.ti&~""~,

,.,,'~*~~.~:;M0hc,.W """0'""  :", .~ ..~', ' ' " , ' .,:%~

open.

EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817F) "Valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

Step 11.0 START SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP, PSI01D.

Standard:

  • Examiner NOTE: The label for the pump start controller is NOT labeled - only the skid itself has a label (PSI010) for the pump EXAMINER CUE: When Examinee simulates calling the Control Room:

"Control Room Supervisor" (After message) Repeat back message

[Expected to be similar to "I'm starting SI Accumulator Makeup pump".]

EXAMINER CUE: (After Examinee simulates starting pump) "Normal noises associated with the pump start."

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12.0 THROTTLE SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE DUMP VALVE, V-2817E, as necessary to maintain pump discharge pressure greater than 800 psig and less than 1000 psig as indicated on PI-928B AND RECORD indicated pressure.

Standard:

  • Locates PI-928B
  • Records final PI-928B indicated pressure Examiner NOTE: Examinee should stop throttling when he is provided a pressure reading> 800 psig and < 1000 psig (see CUES)

EXAMINER CUE: * (After examinee locates PI-928B) "Indicates 400 psig"

  • As examinee throttles V-2817E closed, provide higher pressure readings such as: "Indicates 500 psig",

"Indicates 700 psig", "Indicates 900 pSig".

  • If examinee attempts to OPEN V-2817E further (it was opened fully in Step 9.0), "No change in pressure indication."

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After PI-928B pressure is recorded: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM I Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:

-

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions
  • The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7
  • The CRS has submitted an A-52.4 for tracking on Penetration 101 INITIATING CUE:
  • You will be the dedicated operator in direct communication with the Control Room, stationed in the vicinity of the SI accumulator Makeup Pump discharge isolation valve V-2817C, and the Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves.
  • Perform S-16.13 Attachment 1, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP OPERATION.

20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.: 071-007-01-04 Conduct Gas Decay Tank Release Task Title: Release the "Au Gas Decay Tank JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM J KIA

Reference:

071 A4.2"7 (3.0*/2.7*) Alternate Path Yes 1 No Time Critical Yes No 1 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Opening and closing of the decay tank discharge control valve.

Alternate path because R-14 alarms during release and the release must be manually secured.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator ---

Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The "Au GDT is full and approved for release.
  • The previous crew has started S-4.2.5.
  • Gaseous Tank Release Form (CH-703) has been completed and authorized by the SM.
  • The GDT does NOT contain VCT gas.
  • There is an eSOMS CAUTION tag hanging on PCV-1036A, Inlet to 'A' GDT.
  • The Extra Auxiliary Operator has removed the eSOMS DANGER tag from V-1617, GDT 'A' manual outlet valve.
  • The Pre-Job Brief has been completed Task Standard: Lineup and release the "Au GDT in accordance with the procedure and secure the release.

Required Materials: Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, and Dosimetry.

General

References:

S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, Revision 01901 20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Handouts:

  • S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, Revision 01901
  • Marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form Initiating Cue:
  • You are the Primary AO and the Control Room Supervisor has directed you to release the "Au GDT per S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, starting at step 4.8.

Validation Time: 26 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Have a copy of S-4.2.5 completed up to (but not including) step 4.8.
  • Ensure S-4.2.5 steps 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 are marked N/A (based on step 2.1).
  • Have a marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 3 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a .J)

Start Time: _ _ _ _'

Step 4.8 Performance Step: 1 VERIFY one Auxiliary Building Main Exhaust Fan is in service.

Standard: Verifies one Auxiliary Building Main Exhaust Fan is in service at the Aux Bldg Ventilation Panel.

EXAMINER CUE: Provide Examinee:

  • A copy of S-4.2.5 completed up to step 4.8,
  • A marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form.

EXAMINER NOTE: The Aux Bldg Ventilation Panel is located in the Intermediate Bldg Hot side (to the right just after entering the RCA).

Comment:

Step 4.9 Performance Step: 2 VERIFY Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation is OPERABLE per ODCM Table 3.2-1. R-14A CANNOT be used for release if R-13 and R-14 are INOPERABLE.

Standard: Initials step based on Initial conditions.

Examiner NOTE: Candidate may base operability decision on the circled monitors on the CH-703 form.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Steps 5.1 through 5.5 Performance Step: 3 Precautions and Limitations Standard: Reviews precautions and limitations.

Comment:

Step 6.1.1 Procedure Caution: Only one gas decay tank may be released at one time.

Performance Step: 4 IF GDT A contains VCT gas, THEN REQUEST Shift Manager authorize removal of Operator Aid Tag.

OTHERWISE, MARK this step N/A.

Standard: Observes that there is no Operator Aid Tag and marks step N/A.

EXAMINER CUE: (If asked if GOT A contains VCT gas, or if there is an Operator Aid Tag)

"GOT A does not contain VCT gas. There is no Operator Aid Tag for GOT A" Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.2 Performance Step: 5 CLOSE INLET AOV TO GAS DECAY TANK A, PCV-1036A.

Standard:

  • Locates PCV-1036A switch.
  • Ensures PCV-1036A is closed.

o Associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER CUE: "A Caution Tag is installed on the switch."

EXAMINER CUE: (After the switch is located)

"Green light is lit and red light is off."

EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee calls the Control Room and requests permission to operate Caution Tagged valves)

"You have permission to operate Caution Tagged valves associated with the release."

EXAMINER NOTE: PCV-1036A Switch is on the Waste Disposal Panel.

Comment:

Step 6.1.3 Performance Step: 6 CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK A REUSE CONTROL AOV, AOV 1629.

Standard:

  • Locates AOV-1629 switch.
  • Ensures AOV-1629 is closed.

o Associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER CUE: (After the switch is located)

"Green light is lit and red light is off."

EXAMINER NOTE: AOV-1629 Switch is on the Waste Disposal Panel.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.4 Performance Step: 7 CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK A OUTLET AOV TO GAS ANALYZER, PCV-1036B.

Standard:

  • Locates PCV-1036B switch.
  • Ensures PCV-1036B is closed.
  • Associated green light lit and red light off EXAMINER CUE: (After the switch is located)

"Green light is lit and red light is off."

EXAMINER NOTE: PCV-1036B Switch is on the Waste Disposal Panel.

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.5 Performance Step: 8 LOCK CLOSED GDT manual outlet valves on all tanks.

  • GAS DECAY TANKA MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1617
  • GAS DECAY TANK B MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1618
  • GAS DECAY TANK C MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1619
  • GAS DECAY TANK D MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1620 Standard:
  • Locates and ensures locked closed:

o GAS DECAY TANKA MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1617 o GAS DECAY TANK B MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1618 o GAS DECAY TANK C MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1619 o GAS DECAY TANK D MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1620 EXAMINER NOTE: To ensure a valve is locked closed, the Examinee will attempt to rotate the valve in the clockwise direction, and check that the locking device is locked.

EXAMINER CUE: (For each valve)

"The valve does not move in that direction. The lock is locked."

EXAMINER CUE: (If the Examinee contacts the Control Room to determine the eSOMS location for the valves)

"These valves are located in the Aux Bldg Intermediate level GOT alley 5ft elevation (Y-1617 and Y-1618) and 1 ft elevation (Y-1619 and Y-1620)."

Comment:

2012 ILT NRC ..IPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.6 Performance Step: 9 CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE AOV TO PLANT VENT VIA CHARCOAL FILTER, RCV-014.

Standard:

  • Locates RCV-014
  • Simulates rotating the RCV-014 controller knob counter clockwise until it won't turn any further
  • Observes associated green light lit and red light off
  • Observes that air pressure reads 0 psig on the RCV-014 air pressure gauge.

EXAMINER CUE: (IF examinee simulates rotating RCV-014 knob)

"Knob no longer moves in that direction."

EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee asks)

"green light is lit and red light is off" EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee asks)

"Air pressure reads 0 psig on the RCV-014 air pressure gauge."

Comment:

Step 6.1.7 Performance Step: 10 REMOVE eSOMS Tag from V-1617.

Standard: Verifies the Tag on V-1617 is removed.

EXAMINER CUE: "The Extra AO has removed the Tag and completed the necessary paperwork. fI Comment:

2012 ILT NRC ..IPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.8 UNLOCK AND OPEN GAS DECAY TANK A MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1617.

Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: (After Examinee simulates lock removal)

"The lock is removed."

(After Examinee simulates rotating valve)

"The valve no longer moves in that direction."

Comment:

Step 6.1.9 Performance Step: 12 Procedure Caution: WHEN moving water or gas in the Waste Handling Systems with elevated activity present, THEN COORDINATE with RP to monitor local radiation levels. [G0168]

Procedure Caution: WHEN releasing gas from tanks with elevated activity, THEN INITIATE the release slowly and allow time for the Rad monitor to stabilize. Increase the release rate, if necessary, in small increments, realizing that it may take several minutes for Rad Monitor to react to the increased activity level being released.

[G0168]

Procedure Caution: SECURE gas decay tank from release when approximately 5 psig, to prevent vacuum on the NSA Gas Analyzed (when the GDT is placed in service).

Standard: Reads procedural CAUTIONS prior to performing 6.1.9 Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 6.1.9

  • Performance Step: 13 PERFORM the following to begin release:
1. RECORD the following:
  • GOT A Initial Pressure
  • Time GOT A release initiated
2. THROTTLE OPEN (may be full open) GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE AOV TO PLANT VENT VIA CHARCOAL FILTER, RCV-014, to desired release rate.
3. NOTIFY Control Room of time GOT A release was initiated and the initial pressure.

Standard:

  • Records GOT "A" initial pressure from PI-1036 located on Waste Disposal Panel
  • Records current time for GOT "An release initiation.
  • 4,~"ng-knobi~'_.~~*

o Observes red and green lights lit o Observes air pressure rising on RCV-014 air pressure gauge.

o Calls control room to confirm R-14 counts rising

  • Notifies Control Room of the time GOT "A" release was initiated and the initial pressure.

EXAMINER CUE: "Initial GOT 'A' pressure is 90 psig."

EXAMINER CUE: As Examinee simulates opening RCV-014)

"Air pressure is rising. Both the red and green lights are lit" (When RCV-014I fully open)

"Red light is lit and green light is off. R-14 indicates rising counts."

"Control room confirms that R-14 counts are rising."

(Should be some delay between this report and CUE below)

EXAMINER ClIE: (When Examinee notifies Control Room)

Repeat back the GOT A release initiation time and the initial pressure.

(After the initial Control Room communication is completed)

ALT PATH starts here ---* "Control Room reports that R-14 indicates 2x10 5 counts per minute."

ONLY if asked "is R-14 in alarm?: "YES, R-14 in Alarm" Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 5.2 ENSURE RCV-014 closes if high alarm occurs on R-14 Standard:

  • Reviews step 5.2, Precautions and Limitations; or recalls from the Gaseous Waste Release Form that R-14 alarm is set at 1.2 x 105 or R-14 reading is much> the estimated R

~.;:.

.

13 reading on CH-703 sheet.

.~".If~

Observes green light lit and red light off

  • Observes air pressure lowering on the RCV-014 air pressure gauge EXAMINER CUE: (If Examinee asks for position of RCV-014)

"Red light lit, green light off."

EXAMINER CUE: (As Examinee simulates rotating RCV-014 knob) :

"Knob no longer moves in that direction."

"Associated green light is lit and red light is off."

"Air pressure is lowering."

After reporting that the release has been terminated:

Control room reports that "R-14 indicates lowering counts."

EXAMINER CUE: If asked, final GOT pressure after closing RCV-014 is "70 psig" EXAMINER NOTE: Normally RCV-014 would close automatically when R-14 reaches the high alarm setpoint.

Comment:

Terminating Cue: After RCV-014 is closed: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete. "

Stop time: _ _ __

2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC ..IPM J Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The "A" GOT is full and approved for release.
  • The previous crew has started S-4.2.5.
  • Gaseous Tank Release Form (CH-703) has been completed and authorized by the SM.
  • The GOT does NOT contain VCT gas.
  • There is an eSOMS CAUTION tag hanging on PCV-1036A, Inlet to 'A' GOT.
  • The Extra Auxiliary Operator has removed the eSOMS DANGER tag from V-1617, GOT 'A' manual outlet valve.
  • The Pre-Job Brief has been completed INITIATING CUE:
  • You are the Primary AO and the Control Room Supervisor has directed you to release the "A" GOT per S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, starting at step 4.8.

20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Ginna Task No.: 103-007-05-04 Perform Attachment CI/CVI.

Task Title: Perform Attachment CI/CVI for JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM K Valves in the Intermediate Building Clean Side KIA

Reference:

103 A2.03 (3.5*/3.8*) Alternate Path Yes No~

Time Critical Yes No~

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Phase A and B isolation.

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator - - - Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

  • The plant has experienced a Safety Injection .
  • While performing E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, it was found that some Containment Isolation Valves were not properly aligned.

Task Standard:

  • Given ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI, isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738, and AOV-5737 using the alternate isolation valves.

Required Materials: Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, (Double) Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, Gloves, Locked valve key.

General

References:

ATT-3,,0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 Handouts: ATT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 Initiating Cue:

  • You are in the field and have been directed by the Control Room to isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738, and AOV-5737 in accordance with ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI, using the alternate isolation valves Validation Time: 17 Minutes (average of 7 + 26) 20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

  • Have a clean copy of ATT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ")

Start Time: _ _ __

Isolate AOV-5392 Performance Step: 1 Close the following valves: (lB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

  • V-5397
  • V-541 0 Standard:
  • Locates V-5397 and V-541 0
  • .fiadt vaIWr;~:"'th$**"',iS EXAMINER CUE: When Applicant demonstrates how to obtain an approved copy of the current procedure (preferred method is to log on to FCMS and print one out; if FCMS is down, obtain a hard copy from the Control Room):

Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of ATT -3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 Examiner CUE: If examinee pOints to the "Double Hearing Protection" warning sign upon entering, "Assume you have double hearing protection available."

EXAMINER NOTE: All valves that are to be isolated may be isolated in any order.

EXAMINER CUE: (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve)

"The valve no longer turns in that direction."

EXAMINER CUE: If the Examinee attempts to contact the Control Room to determine the eSOMS locations for valves 5397 and 5410f, inform him that he must demonstrate the ability to locate this information himself.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • eSOMS location for V-5397 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 4 FT.
  • eSOMS location for V-541 0 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 3 FT.

Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Isolate AOV-1597 Performance Step: 2 Close V-1S96 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

Standard:

  • Locates V-1S96
  • ~rotatino*")~~\vaIve

.~. . ....... . . is EXAMINER CUE: (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve)

"The valve no longer turns in that direction."

EXAMINER NOTE: eSOMS location for V-1596 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 6 FT Comment:

Isolate AOV-5738

.4 Performance Step: 3 Close V-S701 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

Standard:

  • Locates V-S701
  • EXAMINER CUE: (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve)

"The valve no longer turns in that direction."

EXAMINER NOTE: eSOMS location for V-5701 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 1 FT Comment:

20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Isolate AOV-5737

,,~.. Performance Step: 4 Close V-5702 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

Standard:

  • Locates V-5702
  • EXAMINER CUE: (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve)

"The valve no longer turns in that direction."

EXAMINER CUE: eSOMS location for V-5702 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 1 FT Comment:

Terminating Cue: After all valves have been isolated: "Evaluation on this ..IPM is complete. "

Stop time: _ _ __

20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM K Examinee's Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Question:

Response

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date:


2012 ILT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1

~IPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant has experienced a Safety Injection.
  • While performing E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, it was found that some Containment Isolation Valves were not properly aligned.

INITIATING CUE:

  • You are in the field and have been directed by the Control Room to isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738. and AOV 5737 in accordance with AIT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, using the alternate isolation valves 2012 ILT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9. Supplement 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 7S% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to SO% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-S.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, and Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OBOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.B.1. B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 and 3.B.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.B.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N/A N-BOP Start Condensate Booster Pump per 0-S.2, Step 6.2.32.

N-SRO 2 OVR-D.O. (TS)-SRO Green indicating light for 'A'CS pump deenergized and the SIS02A, [Off] Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no fire, from breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable.

ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.B.1.B.2 3 RCS20 (630) C-RO Average-Tavg fails high ROD12 C-SRO Rod Stop Failure (A+M) C-BOP 4 ROD02-D4 R*HO Dropped rod D-4 and power load reduction (STA) R-BOP R (TS)-SRO S RCSOSA C-RO 'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully ROD03-K7 C-80P inserted and FRV's remain open ROD03-K9 C-SRO ROD03-LB (Untrippable) 6 EDS01A M-BOP Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T EDS01B M*RO Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 GEN04A M-SRO (All conditions) 'A' EDG fails to start 7 RPS07M C-BOP 3S04A fails to open in Auto RPS07N C-SRO 3S0SA fails to open in Auto

- 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 8 RPS070 C-BOP 'A' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS07Q C-SRO

'C' SW pump Auto failure to start

  • (N)ormal, {R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

-2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Ginna 2012 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 0 1.2.

After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable.

ITS-3.6.6.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.8.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIRE.O should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell.

After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Average Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion.

After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will drop.

Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 (QPTR).

When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip.

The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure.

Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-0.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open.

- 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of S/Gs and RCS cooldown has been initiated), the AO will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The crew should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 SW pump per step 7, then, go to Step 28 (per the CAUTION prior to Step 8), recognize that only one SW pump is required, and manually perform SW isolation per Step 29.

The scenario will end after SW lineup has been verified in Step 29 or when the correct transition to ECA-0.2 is determined in Step 31 (examiner's discretion).

-4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks:

ECA-0.0--8 Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to <

120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMT] .

Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-O.O and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-O.O is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the S/Gs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the S/G inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or S/G dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-O.O is based, complicating the mitigation actions.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists
2. Less than 200 GPM of AFW flow
3. The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started
4. S/G NR levels are less than 5%

Scenario Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, '8' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails)
2. 80th MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened
3. Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available
4. Normal post-trip S/G level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%.

- 5

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ECA-O.O--F Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity."

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG.
2. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is re energized by the EDG.
3. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the MCR.
4. The other EDG is inoperable.

Scenario Conditions:

1. AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG.
2. Auto start of lA' and 'C' SWPs is failed.
3. Start of either 'A' or 'C' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG
4. 'B' EDG is OOS.

-6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ECA-O.O--H Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the red-path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization).

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus.
2. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of all AC existed. 'A' EDG has started and is providing power to one emergency train (buses 14 and 18).
2. The 'A' EDG will not be reported as available until Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after SIG depressurization and RCS cooldown has been initiated). RCP seal injection and thermal barriers are isolated, if the crew correctly applies the procedure}. With no seal injection flow, RCP #1 seal outlet temperatures will rise to >235°F.

-7

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. Based upon the current plant risk assessment, the crew is waiting for completion of B EDG repair before entering Mode 1.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due repairs on the governor. Expected return to service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 was completed successfully 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago; all other EDG surveillances are current. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above S % Reactor Power till notified.

Event Malt. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 FDW14C N-BOP Transition from AFW to MFW per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.S.

(0) N (TS)-SRO MD AFW Pump 1B Discharge VLV (MOV-4008) will not re-open during the realignment.

2 RCS11F I-RO Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (6S0) I-BOP I(TS)-SRO RCS01B C-RO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier leak (S) C-SRO 4 SIS01 M-BOP Spurious SI ("N Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA Outside CNMT EDS1A M-RO EDS1B M-SRO RCS19C Fire alarms in Aux Bldg Basement RHR pump area (1S00)

OVR-D.O.

FCP01BQ,

[on, 30 delay]

S RPSOSA C-RO Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual available)

RPSOSB C-SRO (man avail) 6 GENOa C-RO "A" DG fails to start automatically (manual start available)

(ADG) C-SRO

- 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) 7 RPS11-A-2 C-RO AOV-371 (LID Isolation to NRHX) fails to close automatically (Isolation C-SRO signal only) 8 RPS07K C-80P "AI! MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically C-SRO

  1. =will be initiated by the Spurious SI event
  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

-2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Ginna 2010 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. The plant is in a normal 50/50 electric plant lineup. Per Chemistry direction, the 60 gpm letdown orifice is in service.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical linkage issue with the governor. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A 52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 (offsite power availability and breaker alignment) was completed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified.

After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment. During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on 'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time.

Next a channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
  • AR-F-16, Avg Tavg - Tref Dev +1- 5°F
  • AR-F-24, RCS AVG I:1T DEV 3°F ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.

The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the failed channel per ER-INST.1. The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per:

  • AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or
  • F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or
  • A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8%

The crew may first enter AP-RCP . 1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS in leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B. Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B - the alternate isolation method.)

Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A"

- 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD f10wpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath. Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the UN MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary.

The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi - not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.)

Instrument air to containment will be re-established at step 9 of E-1. This will be the team's earliest opportunity to re-isolate the CCW system leak. (Unable to close MOV-749B and 759B due to bus 16 de-energized.) The team will transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 step 17.

At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment.

(The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The team should realize this.)

Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1.

Additional Information:

When the Aux Bldg sump reaches 15,000 gallons the RHR pumps, Aux Bldg sump pumps, and RCDT pumps will fail due to submergence (2 to 4 minute time delay after submergence).

-4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Critical Tasks:

E-O--C Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of E-O.

Safety Significance:

Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power capacity, needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No emergency bus energized.
3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip.
2. Offsite power is lost, "B" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.
3. "A" DG can be started manually.

ECA-1.2--A Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of ECA-1.2.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing radioactive release.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

- 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50%

due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%.

RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 - 0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-PROTECTEO-EQUIPMENT. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

0 FOW1'IB 'B' MOAFW trip on overcurrent on start FOW15B SAFW Pump "0" fails to start 1 NA N-BOP Swap to 100/0 electrical lineup on Circuit 767 per 0-6.9.2, N-SRO Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power To Bus 12A / 12B 2 PZR020 I-BOP Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails HIGH (ITS 3.3.1: Trip (2500) I-RO channel within 6 hrs, TRM: TR 3.4.3 Immediately declare ATWS I(ITS)-SRO mitigating capability inoperable - was applicable until channel 429 INO-was selected as the controlling channel in the PLP)

RPS07BK (off)

TC408C Bistable status light failed 3 PZR05B C-RO Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage> "PORV INOPERABLE"

[7.4] C(TS)-SRO condition (-21 gpm)

OVR PZR03B (OFF) 4 REM- R-BOP Loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be CN050 R-RO ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when (0.04) meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region R-SRO criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) Turbine Trip causes a Reactor Trip.

5 OVR-OI- C-BOP EH "Go" pushbutton does not work TUR05BO C-SRO

- 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) 6 STM09A M-BOP "B" SG Safety Valve 3508 and 3510 failed open (close when Bleed (100) M-RO and Feed criteria met)

STM09C M-SRO (100)

STM11A Steam break on "A" SG inside CNMT (2E06)

EDS08 4KV Auto Bus Transfer fails to occur automatically (Both)

EDS04A Loss of Bus 14 (conditional on reactor trip)

FDW12 TDAFW Pump speed control failed to 0 (0) 7 SIS02A C-RO SI fails to actuate automatically SIS02B C-CRS (man avail)

.. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M}ajor

-2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Ginna 2012 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the uB" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the uB" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 - 0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG Protected Equipment. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action.

Shortly after taking the watch the team will swap to 10010 electrical lineup per 0-6.9.2.

Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or
  • AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi;
  • AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and
  • ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition. The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly IIC to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact IIC directly, and sometimes he will request that the wce contact I/C. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable).

While the PT-449 defeat is in progress, a 21 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431 C. The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
  • AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure

-3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

The crew will attempt to close PORV-431C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-515, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage). Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >10gpm must also be declared inoperable per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions."

After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS 1 TRM requirements associated with the PT-449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur.

(The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

  • AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
  • AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
  • AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure. When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock.

Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur.

Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, RCS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "C" SBAFP has no power.

Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed, or attempt to align and start "D" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per Attachment 22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "D" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160J inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs.

-4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the wee that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow per the guidance of step 3.

Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is established.

-5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Critical Tasks:

E-O--O Manually actuate at least one train of SI before transition to FR-H.1.

Safety Significance:

The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.
2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of Condenser vacuum causes a forced crew trip of the turbine, once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met or a trip on low vacuum will occur. crew to trip the turbine trip which causes a reactor trip (P-9 present).

Upon reactor trip, steam flow through the SG safeties will be sufficient to cause a valid SI signal prior to the team completing E-O step 4.

2. Manual SI is available.

FR-H.1--F Initiate RCS Bleed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed (SI injection) to occur.

Safety Significance:

Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No AFW available.
3. Secondary heat sink required.
4. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint.

- 6

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12)

Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of Condenser vacuum will require a manual trip when meeting the 5 minute DO NOT OPERATE region trip requirement.
2. Failure of 4KV Auto Bus Transfer de-energizes the condensate pumps and MFPs. "B" Containment Spray Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. Loss of Bus 14 de-energizes "An MDAFP. The TDAFP speed controller is failed to zero.

SBAFW is not available eC' SBAFW pump has no power, '0' SBAFW pump will trip on start.)

3. Decay heat is adequate to require a heat sink.
4. The team must follow the guidance of FR-H.1 to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed while RCS pressure is below PRZR PORV setpoint.

-7

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial License Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1

REFERENCES:

1. 0-S.2, Load Ascension
2. CNG-OP-S.01, Water Hammer Prevention and Mitigation Program, (Section 6.2.C)
3. Tech Spec LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray (CS), Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems
4. AR-F-1S, RCS TAVG DEV 4* F, or S. AR-F-16, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION +/- S"F
6. AP-RCC.1, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal/Insertion
7. AR-C-14, Rod Bottom B. AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery
9. ER-RCC.1 ,Retrieval of a Dropped RCC
10. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
11. TRM 3.4.3, ATWS Mitigation
12. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection
13. ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response
14. ATT-27.0, Automatic Action Verification 1S. ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power
16. ATT-11.2, Attachment Diesel Air Compressor
17. ATT-B.3, Attachment Nonvital 1B. ATT-21.0, Attachment RCS Isolation
19. ATT-S.2, Attachment Alternate Cooling to TDAFW Pump
20. ATT-B.2, Attachment Gen Degas
21. ATT-B.O, Attachment DC Loads
22. ECA-O.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required
23. ECA-O.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery without SI Required Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor Facility Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power {MOL}. Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50%

due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Place Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OBOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 and 3.8.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.8.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension.

Event Malt. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 NA N-B~~Coodensate Booster Pump per 0-5.2, Step 6.2.32.

N-SR 2 OVR-D.O.- {TS)-SRO Green indicating light for 'A' CS pump deenergized and the SIS02A, [Off] Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no fire, from breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable.

ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.8.1.B.2 3 RCS20 (630) C-RO Average-Tavg fails high ROD12 C-SRO Rod Stop Failure (A+M) C-BOP 4 ROD02-D4 R-RO Dropped rod D-4 and power load reduction (STA) R-BOP R (TS)

SRO 5 RCS05A C-RO 'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully ROD03-K7 C-BOP inserted and FRV's remain open ROD03-K9 C-SRO ROD03-L8 (Untrippable) 6 EDS01A M-BOP Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T EDS01B M-RO Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 GEN04A M-SRO (All 'A' EDG fails to start conditions) 7 RPS07M C-BOP 3504A fails to open in Auto 3505A fails to open in Auto RPS07N C-SRO

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 8 RPS070 C-BOP 'A' SW pump Auto failure to start

'C' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS07Q C-SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, ( I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Overview of Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 0-1.2.

After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable. ITS-3.6.6.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.8.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIREO should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell.

After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Average-Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion.

After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will drop. Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 (QPTR). When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip.

The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure. Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-0.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of SIGs and RCS cooldown has been initiated),

the AD will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The crew should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 SW pump per step 7, then, go to Step 28 (per the CAUTION prior to Step 8), recognize that only one SW pump is required, and manually perform SW isolation per Step 29.

The scenario will end after SW lineup has been verified in Step 29 or when the correct transition to either ECA-0.2 is determined in Step 31 (examiner's discretion).

Scenario Event Description 2D12 NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks:

ECA-O.O--B Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to < 120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMl1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-D.D and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-D.D is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the S/Gs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the S/G inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or S/G dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-D.D is based, complicating the mitigation actions.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists
2. Less than 2DD GPM of AFW flow
3. The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started
4. S/G NR levels are less than 5%

Scenario Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, 'B' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails)
2. Both MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened
3. Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available
4. Normal post-trip S/G level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 ECA-O.O--F Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity."

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG.
2. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is re energized by the EDG.
3. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the MCR.
4. The other EDG is inoperable.

Scenario Conditions:

1. AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG.
2. Auto start of 'A' and 'C' SWPs is failed.
3. Start of either 'A' or 'C' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG
4. '8' EDG is OOS.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 ECA*O.O**H Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier - specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the red path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization).

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus.
2. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F.

Scenario Conditions:

1, Loss of all AC existed. 'A' EDG has started and is providing power to one emergency train (buses 14 and 18).

2. The 'A' EDG will not be reported as available until Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after SIG depressurization and RCS cooldown has been initiated). RCP seal injection and thermal barriers are isolated, if the crew correctly applies the procedure). With no seal injection flow, RCP #1 seal outlet temperatures will rise to >235°F.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS o Reset to IC-27 (Temp I/C-NRC-)

75% power MOL Note: If only a 70% MOL IC available, must raise power and stabilize, to be closer to starting a CBP per 0-5.2.

At T=O, insert:

  • MALF ROD03-K7, [Untrippable], Stuck rod K7
  • MALF ROD03-K9, [Untrippable], Stuck rod Kg
  • MALF ROD03-L8, [Untrippable], Stuck rod La
  • MALF RPS07M, Auto Fail: TDAFW S1M SUP MOV-3504A
  • MALF RPS07N, Auto Fail: TDAFW STM SUP MOV-3S0SA
  • MALF RPS070, Auto Fail: A SW Pump
  • MALF RPS07Q, Auto Fait: C SW Pump To take 'B' EDG OOS:
  • Pull stop the 'B' EDG Control Stop/Start Switch and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 16 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 17 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Place CAUTION tag on DIG 'B' start pushbutton
  • Place PROTECT tags per OPG-Protected Equipment and black dot J-32.

Insert the following:

  • OVR-D.0.-SIS02A, [Off], on T-2, 'A' CS Pump red light indication
  • MALF RCS20 [630], on T-3 (Faiture of Average Tavg Channel)
  • MALF ROD12 [Auto & Manual], on T-3 (Rod Stop Failure)
  • ROD02D-D4, [Stationary],on T-4 (Dropped rod D-4)
  • MALF RCS05A on T-5, (A RCP Trip)
  • MALF GEN04A, [All Conditions], on T-7 (A DIG fails to start) o Prior to Crew Briefing RUN
  • Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Equipment
  • Ensure Rods are in AUTO.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1

  • Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
  • Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
  • Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-6.9.2, Section 6.4 marked up as follows:

o All steps in Sections 6.4.1 are marked NA o All steps in Sections 6.4.3 are marked NA T-O Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Event 1 Start Condensate Booster Pump examiner 0 At direction of Event 2 reen indicating light for 'A' CS pump deenergized and examiner the Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no OVR-D.O-SIS02A, [Off] fire, from breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable.

ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.8.1.B.2 At direction of Event 3 fails high 0 examiner Rod Stop Failure Trigger#3 RCS20 [630]

ROD12 [Auto and Manual]

0 At direction of Event 4 Dropped Rod D-4 examiner Trigger#4 ROD02-D4 [Stationary]

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 o examiner

'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully inserted and FRY's remain open Trigger #5 RCS05A Multiple (3) rods not fully inserted MALF ROD03-K7,

[Untrippable], NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T =O.

MALF ROD03-K9,

[Untrippable],

MALF ROD03-L8,

[Untrippable],

0 Continued Event 6 from Event 5 MALF EDS01A Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T MALF EDS01B Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 MALF GEN04A, [All "A" EDG fails fails to start Conditions]

0 Continued Event 7 TDAFW Steam Supply Auto Failure from Event 5 MALF RPS07M NOTE: *rhis Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T =O.

MALF RPS07N 0 Continued Event 8 from Event 5 MALF RPS070 'A' SW pump failure to start MALF RPS07Q

'C' SW pump failure to start NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O.

o Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _ _ _ _ _ Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

Start a condensate booster pump Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 0 1.2 Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0-5.2, Load Ascension NOTE: EHC adjustments are being made per Step 6.2.24.

Steps 6.2.26 thru 6.2.32 are completed.

CRS (Step 6.2.32) WHEN trim valves are closed AND MFW Pump suction pressure approaches 200 PSIG, THEN PLACE Condensate Booster Pumps in service as follows:

BOP (Step 6.2.32.1) ADJUST TRIM VLV CONTROL, AOV-950BD AOV-950BG, controller output in AUTO UNTIL the first Trim Valve starts to open.

BOP 6.2.32.2) PLACE HOTWELL LEVEL 07, Controller in the MAN position.

BOP (Step 6.2.32.3) PLACE the standby NOTE: The CO will place one Condensate Pump control switch in the Condensate Pump in Pull PULL STOP position AND INDICATE which Stop. AR-J-17, Non pump was placed in PULL STOP. Safeguards Equipment Locked Off, will be received.

CRS Note: Refer to CNG-OP-S.01, Water Note: Plant announcement of Hammer Prevention and Mitigation starting CBP and turbine Program, (Section 6.2.C) building evacuation should be made.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _1.;......_ _ _ _ Page 14 of _5;:;,;6;....... 1 Event

Description:

Start a condensate booster pump (Step 6.2.32.4) PLACE one Condensate NOTE: The CO will place a Booster Pump switch to the RUN position Condensate Booster Pump to AND INDICATE which pump was placed in run.

RUN.

BOP (Step 6.2.32.5) IF the Condensate Booster NOTE: The CO will depress Pump low suction pressure trip in NOT reset, the RESET pushbutton if THEN DEPRESS CNST BSTR PMPS required.

START/RESET green RESET pushbutton.

BOP (Step 6.2.32.6) VERIFY CONDENSATE NOTE: The Condensate BOOSTER PUMP selected to RUN started. Booster Pump will start in AUTO.

BOP (Step 6.2.32.7) IF the CONDENSATE Note: CRS marks this step BOOSTER PUMP selected to RUN in the N/A on normal start.

previous step did NOT start automatically start, THEN DEPRESS CNDST BSTR PMPS START/RESET yellow START pushbutton.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # ....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 15 of Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in "A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable.

ITS-3.B.B.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.B.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s} supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s} is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIRE.O should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell.

Booth Operator Instructions:

  • Trigger 2
  • Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for rA' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot.

Indications Available:

  • None SIM Driver: Trigger 2 and then make report as Primary A 0 that a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump.

Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot.

HCO Notes that the green indication light for 'A' CS Pump is off CRS Direct the HCO to pull stop the 'N CS Pump HCO Pull stops 'A' CS Pump CRS Declares A CS Pump inoperable and refers to ITS 3.6.6.A and 3.8.1.B.2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ....;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 16 of _5;;.;6~-I1 i Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker CRS Notify the following: NOTE: The CRS may notify o SM the WCC or request STAISM perform notifications.

o I&C Booth Instructor: as WCCS, o WCC acknowledge.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6 Containment Spray (CS), Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler and NaOH _'"A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _2;;....._ _ _ _ Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker 3.6.6 Containment Spray (CS). Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC). and NaOH Systems LCO 3.6.6 Two CS trains, four CRFC units, and the NaOH system shall be OPERABLE.

- NOTE-In MODE 4, both CS pumps may be in pull-stop for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the performance of Inter10ck and valve testing of motor operated valVes (MOVs) 857A, 857B. and 857C. Power may also be restored to MOVs 896A and 896B. and the valves placed in the closed position. for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the purpose of each test.

.-------------------------------------------

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One CS train inoperable. A.1 Restore CS train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

B. NaOH system Inoperable. B.1 Restore NaOH System to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be In MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> aSSociated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND nolmet.

C.2 Be In MODE 5. 84 hOurs D. One or two CRFC units 0.1 Restore CRFC unites) to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be In MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition D not AND met.

E.2 Be In MODE 5. 36 hOurs TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 AC-Sources-Modes 1, 2. 3 and 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario #

- 1 Event # ...;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 18 of _5;;.;6~-I1 Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker 3.8.1 AC Sources MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

<<

lCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualifted independent offsHe power circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and each of the onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Subsystems

<< MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4"; and

b. Two emergency diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying their respective onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

<<NOTE lCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Offsite power to one or A.1 Declare required feature(s) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from more 480 V safeguards inoperable When its discovery of bus(es) inoperable. redundant required Condition A feature(s) is inoperable. conculTent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND A.2 Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

B. One DG Inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> offsite circuit.

flli.ll Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _2~_____________ Page 19 of _5;;,;6;"""-11 Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker AC Sources - MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4 3.8.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.2 Declare required feature(s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from supported by the inoperable discovery of DG inoperable when its Condition B required redundant concurrent with feature(s) is inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Is not inoperable due to common cause failure .

.QR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE DG.

.ANQ B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE 7 days status.

C. Offsite power to one or ------------------

- NOTE-more 480 V safeguards Enter applicable Conditions bus(es) inoperable. and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution

.ANQ Systems - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4," when Condition C Is One DG Inoperable. entered with no AC power source to one distribution train.


C.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> circuit to OPERABLE status.

QR C.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _3~ _ _ _ _ Page Event

Description:

Average-Tavg fails high After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Average-Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion.

Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 3 Indications Available:

  • F-15, RCS TAVG DEV AR-F-15, ReS TAVG DEV HCO 1. Place Rods in manual (Auto rod motion NOTE: The HCO will place the will be blocked). Rods in MANUAL. May enter AP-RCC.1 directly.
2. Check RCS Tavg channels and Tavg chart Note: Determines no channel recorder. failed and AVG-Tavg failed
3. IF a turbine runback is occurring, THEN go NOTE: a turbine run back is to AP-TURB.2. NOT occurring.
4. IF a Tavg channel has failed, THEN go to Note: No channel failure and ER-INST.1. should not enter ER-INST.1 at this paint.
5. IF average Tavg has failed, THEN perform Note: Places Steam dump the following: mode selector switch to
a. Place steam dump mode selector to manual.

MANUAL.

b. Place charging in MANUAL and control PRZR level at ram.

CRS Directs HCO to take Steam Dump Mode Note: Will receive MCB alarm, HCO select Switch to manual G-1S. Should discuss this as a expected alarm prior to taking to manual.

CRSt Directs taking charging to manual assigns a PRZR level control band.

HCO CRS Enter ER-INST.1. Note: NtA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # _3_ _ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of "';;';;""--11 56 Event

Description:

Average-Tavg fails high AP-RCC.1, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal/Insertion HCO (Step 1) Evaluate Rod Control System Operability:

a. Check turbine load -STABLE.
b. Place Rods in manual.
c. Verify control rod motion stops.

CRS Ensures valid indications are used to control Tavg and Tref.

HCO (Step 2*) Monitor Tavg:

  • Tavg-GREATER THAN 545 F 0
  • Tavg-LESS THAN 579 F
  • H P 3) Check Tavg-TRENDING to Tref f----+-

HCO (Step 4) Check RCS Tavg Channel Indications" o All 4 channels indicate approximately the same value All 4 channels are responding to the power change CRS (Step 4 RNO) IF any of the Tavg channel Note: No Tavg Channel failure malfunction is indicated, THEN refer to ER and should not enter ER INST.1. INST.1 Note: May refer to AP-RCS.1 indication of RCS leak.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4.;.....-_ _ _ _ Page 22 of _5;;;.;6;....-.~1 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will drop.

Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 (QPTR).

Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 4 Indications Available:

  • Control Rod D-4 on MRPI screen, indicates dropped HCO Acknowledges MCB alarm C-14 HCOI Note change RCS pressures and BOP temperatures BOP Notes turbine load status AR-C-14, Rod Bottom HCO (Step 4.1) If Reactor is critical, THEN PERFORM the followin :

(Step 4.1.1) Verify Rod on the bottom 4.1.2) GO TO AP-RCC.3 Dropped Rod CRS Enters AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery HCO (Step 1) Verify only one rod has dropped. Note: Rod D-4 , Bank C dropped.

HCO (Step 2) Places rods in manual. Note: Rods in manual per alarm response.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 23 of ...,;5;.;;.6--11 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod CRSI (Step 3*) Check Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Tavg will be lowering HCO PROGRAM due to the dropped rod.

CRS! (Step 3 RNO) If Tavg is low, THEN perform HCO the following:

BOP a. Place EH control in manual Note: Coordinates with HCO.

Informs RG&E ECC of changing output to grid.

BOP b. Manually lower turbine load to match Tavg and Tref BOP (Step 4) Verify Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 4 RNO) IF steam dump required but Note: Not required not operating THEN perform the following BOP (Step 5) Check Main Generator Load GREATER THAN 15 MW HCO (Step 6) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:

  • Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF Note: Match Tavg to Tref
  • PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO
  • PZRZ level - TRENDING TO Note: Charging in manual and PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL adjusting speed to restore PRZR level due to failed AVG-Tavg Failure.

BOP

  • MFW Regulating Valves - RESTORING SIG LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO HCOI (Step 7) Check QPTR LESS THAN 1.02 NOTE: QPTR will be > 1.02 CRS [-1.09 during validations).

Obtain from PPCS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4~_ _ _ _ Page 24 of _5.;..;6~-I1 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod CRS (Step 7 RNO) Refer to ITS section 3.2.4. NOTE: The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

ITS 3.2.4, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2

_4.;...._ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario #

- 1 Event # 25 of _5;;..;6::"'--11 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)

I LCO 3.2.4 APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER> 50% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. QPTR not within limit A.1 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after each I AND POWER ~ 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR > 1.00.

QPTR determination I A.2 Determine QPTR Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ANI.l A.3 Perform SR 3.2. ,. 1, SR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after 3.2.1.2 and SR 3.2.2.1. achieving equilibrium conditions from a THERMAL POWER reduction per Required Action A.1 Mill Once per 7 days thereafter AND A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses Prior to increasing and confirm resultS remain THERMAL POWER valid for the duration of above the limit of operation under this Required Action A.1 condition.

ANI.l

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4~_________ Page 26 of _5;;,;6;""-'-11 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod QPTR 3.2.4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.5


- NOTE

1. Perform Required Action A.5 only after ReqUired Action A.4 is completed.
2. Required Action A.6 shall be completed whenever Required Action A.5 is performed

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

Normalize excore detectors Prior to increasing I AND to restore QPTR to within limit.

THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 A.6


- NOTE-Perform Required Action I .

A.6 only after Required Action A.5 is completed .

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.2.1.2, and SR 3.2.2.1. after achieving equilibtium conditions at RTP not to exceed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 I B. Required Action and B.l Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> aSSOCiated completion to S; 50% RTP.

Time of Condition A not met.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 4 Page 27 of 56 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod CRS (Step 8) Evaluate Control Rod Operability:

  • Verify MRPI indicates rod on bottom
  • Direct I&C to locally investigate rod NOTE: The CRS may notify failure the WCC/I&C.

Booth Instructor: as WCCS/I&C, acknowledge.

  • Refer to ER-RCC.1, RETRIEVAL OF A DROPPED RCC CRS
  • Rod failure identified and corrected NOTE: The cause of the DROPPED ROD REPAIRED dropped rod is still being investigated.

CRS (Step 8d RNO) Perform the following:

CRS (Step 8d.1 RNO) Consult Reactor Engineer NOTE: The CRS may notify and ITS section 3.1.4 for operational the RE.

concerns. Booth Instructor: as RE, acknowledge.

Note: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits CRS Will refer to ITS 3.4.1 due to AR-F-1 0, PRZR LO PRESS 2205 PSI earlier during the plant transient.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

_4~_ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # 28 of _5.;;..;6~~1 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Note: Per Lead Examiner direction, call from OPS Management and Reactor Engineer, directs the crew to perform a load reduction to less than 50% at 1%/min per AP-TURB.5, in anticipation of retrieving the dropped rod.

AP-TURB.5 Rapid Load Reduction CRS Perform a load reduction brief per A-503.1 HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction rify rods in AUTO OP b. Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:

  • Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.
  • Select desired rate on thumbwheel Note: 1%/min
  • Reduce the setter to the desired load
  • Depress the GO button HCO c. Initiate boration at the rate determined in Note: Determines amount of OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC boration required to reduce power to <50%, discussed at PJB.
d. Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor ReS Tavg
  • Tavg - GREATER THAN 545°F
  • Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 29 of _5;;,;6;.......,

Event

Description:

Dropped Rod HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Note: Determines amount of Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY boration required to reduce CALC): power to <50%, discussed at PJB.

e Maintain rods above the insertion limit Sets boric acid integrator to c----t----t------------------j desired amount. (-125 gal) r--_ _+-_ _+-e_M_at_c_h_T_a_vg_an_d_T_r_e_f- - - - - - - - - 1 To set the BA COUNTER:

e Compensate for Xenon e Push 'SEL' Button to move the number column to be adjusted.

e Raise or Lower the column value by depressing the "+" or e Depress the 'ENT' Button to enter (Lock in) the selected amount to be added.

HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO BOP (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL BOP (Step 7) Check IA available to CNMT o IA pressure-GREATER THAN 60 PSIG o Instr Air to CNMT Isol Valve, AOV 5392-0PEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # _4-=--_ _ _ _ Page 30 of _56=---i1 1 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod BOP (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status:

o Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED-LIT o Steam dump operating properly in AUTO BOP (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level:

o Hotwell level controller in AUTO o Controller demand LESS THAN 60%

o Hotwell level at setpoint (Step 9 RNO)

If controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens). THEN place controller in manual and control level BOP (Step 10) Check if Condensate Booster pumps can be secured:

a. Condensate booster pumps-2 PUMPS Running
b. Verify the following:
  • Trim valve controller set at 400 PSIG
  • Trim valve, AOV-9508G- GREATER THAN 80% open
  • PI-4017 greater than 410 PSIG
b. (RNO) Go to Step 18
c. Place the auto condensate booster pump to the trip position
d. Stop one condensate booster pump.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4~_________ Page 31 of 56

......;..;~-II Event

Description:

Dropped Rod ITS 3.4.1, ReS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)

Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in the COLR.


- NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to:

a. THERMAL POWER ramp> 5% RTP per minute; or
b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters not within parameter(s) to within limit.

limits.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 32 of 56

......;;..;~-II Event

Description:

Dropped Rod I I I ITS 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODE 2 with Kelf ;:: 1.0.

ACTIONS CONDmON REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more rod( s) A.1.1 Verify SOM is within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> untrippable. limits specified in the COLR.

A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SDM to within limit.

AND A.2 Be in MODE 2 with Kelf 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

< 1.0.

B. One rod not within B.l.1 Verify SDM is within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> alignment limits. limits specified in the COLR.

OR B.l.2 Initiate boration to restore 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SDM to within limit.

ANP B.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to :s:75%RTP.

AND At the discretion of the Lead Examiner during the down power, proceed to Event #5 I I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 33 of 56


Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip.

The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure.

Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-O.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open.

Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 5 Indications Available: Delta Panel alarms CRS Directs HCO and CO to perform Immediate Actions of E-O HCOI Perform Immediate Actions Note: 3 rods did not trip. HCO BOP should inform CRS.

CRS Enters E-O E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS Upon report from the HCO that immediate actions are completed, starts E-O.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip:

-OPEN

  • Neutron flux - LOWERING
  • IVIRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND Note: 3 rods did not trip. HCO SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM should inform CRS.

BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Emergency Buses

  • Bus 14 and Bus 18
  • Bus 16 and Bus 17 HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:

BOP a) Any SI Annunciator - LIT Note: None are lit and HCO/CRS verify SI not required with step RNO.

Note:

Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (51 due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to E5-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Note to Examiner: If 51, continue with E-O on page 38.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 35 of N12-1


Event

Description:

'A' Rep trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped o PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig Note: 51 not required.

o 5teamline pressure leass than 514 psig o CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig o SI sequencing started o Operator determines SI required CRS Transition to ES-O.1 Note: May request a peer check with STAISM.

ES-O.1 Reactor Trip Response CRS Directs STAl5M to monitor Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

CRS Reviews foldout pages with HCO/CO.

H tep 1*) Monitor RCS Tavg-STABLE AT OR Note: RCS temp is lowering ENDING TO 54TF. due to AFW/FW (Step1 RNO)

BOP

a. Stop dumping steam
b. Ensure S/G blowdown and sample valves BOP are closed
c. Ensure reheater steam supply valves are sed.
d. IF MDAFW pumps are supplying greater Note: CO pull stop steam BOP than 200 gpm, THEN ensure TDAFW pump supply valves supply valves in Pli LL STOP
e. If cooldown continues, THEN control total Note: CO secures all AFW feed flow greater than 200 gpm until narrow flow if >5%.

range level greater than 5% in at least one BOP S/G. WHEN S/G level h=greater than 5% in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain S/G level.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 36 of 56


Event

Description:

'A' Rep trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped BOP (Step1 RNO)

f. IF cooldown continues below 540°F, THEN perform the following:

1)Close both MSIVs.

2) Adjust SIG ARV controller in auto to control temperature at 547'F.

HCO

e. Check PRZR heaters-ENERGIZED o PRZR proportional heaters o PRZR heater backup group BOP (STEP 3) Check SIG Feed Flow Status
a. Check RCS Tavg -LESS THAN 554°F
b. Verify MFW flow control valves-CLOSED Note: COfCRS may have shut o MFW regulating valves them earlier on reactor trip.

o MFW bypass valves

b. (RNO) Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for A and B MFW regulating valves and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0% demand
c. Verify total AFW flow-GREATER THAN Note: Controlling AFW if 200 GPM greater than 5% in at least 1 S/G.
d. Close MFW pump discharge valves o MOV-3977, A MFW pump o MOV-3976, B MFW pump
e. Stop MFW pumps and place in PULL STOP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 37 of 56


Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped BOP f. WHEN both MFP pumps are stopped. Note: COfCRS may have shut Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for A and B them earlier on reactor trip.

MFW regulating valves and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0% demand HCO (Step 4) Verify MRPllndicates -ALL Note: 3 rods are untrippable.

CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM (STEP 4 RNO)

IF two or more Control Rods are NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the following:

a. Start both BA Transfer Pumps.
b. Open Emergency Boration Valve MOV-350
c. Borate a minimum of 650 gallons for each Note: 1950 gallons required.

control rod not fully inserted. HCO and CRS should calculate time required at obtained flowrate. (-52 minutes)

Note:

If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-O.1, the Loss of ALL AC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power Note to Examiner:

If Loss of ALL AC Power occurred during ES-O.1 I then go to ECA-O.O on page 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 38 of 56


Event

Description:

"A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:

BOP a) Any SI Annunciator - LIT b) SI sequencing-BOTH TRAI NS CRS Foldout pages given to MCB operators HCO (Step 5*) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

o Annunciator A-27 , CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUSHED o CNMT pressure-LESS THAN 28 PSIG CRS Direct HCO to perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION Note: If in E-O, initiate Loss of ALL AC Power

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ...,;6;...;a;;;,;.n;.;;;.d...;.,7___ Page 39 of ....;5;,,;.6--/

Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start The Loss of ALL AC event will occur at Step 4 of ES-O.1, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted OR at step 7 of E-O.

In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger # 6, Event 7 entered at T=O Indications Available:

  • Numerous MCB Alarms
  • Loss of Bus 14 and Bus 16 ECA-O.O Loss of ALL AC Power HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Note: The crew will attempt t start A DIG.

-OPEN

  • Neutron flux - LOWERING
  • MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND Note: 3 rods are untrippable.

SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM BOP (Step 2) Verify turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (*Step 3) Adjust SIG ARVs to Control Tavg at Approximately 547 HCO (Step 4) Stop Both RCPs Note: Tripped on LOPP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _6;;..;;;an~d;;..;7;....-_ _ Page 40 of _5;;.,;6;""--11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start HCO (Step 5) Check If RCS Is Isolated:

  • Verify RCS isolation valves closed:
  • Verify RCS isolation valves closed:
  • Place letdown orifice valve switches to CLOSE
  • AOV-200A
  • AOV-200B
  • AOV-202
  • Place letdown isolation valve switches to CLOSE
  • AOV-371
  • AOV-427
  • Place excess letdown isolation valve switch to CLOSE (AOV-31 0)

BOP (Step 6) Verify Adequate TDAFW Flow:

  • Verify TDAFW pump - RUNNING NOTE: Fails to Auto start
  • (Step 6a RNO) Perform the following: Note: S/G water levels are high due to failure of FRV's to close on trip.
  • Verify governor valve, V-3652, latched.
  • Manually or locally open at least one TDAFW pump steam supply valve.
  • MOV-3505A
  • MOV-3504A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ..,;6;.,;a;;;.;,n;.;;,d..;,.7___ Page 41 of ...,;:5;.:.6__

1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start ECA-0.0--8 Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to <

120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMT] .

Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-O.O and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-O.O is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the SIGs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the SIG inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or SIG dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-O.O is based, complicating the mitigation actions.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists
2. Less than 200 GPM of AFW flow
3. The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started
4. SIG NR levels are less than 5%

Scenario Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, 'B' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails)
2. Both MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened
3. Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available
4. Normal post-trip SIG level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No,: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _6;,.;8:;;,n.;,;;d...;.7_ _ _ Page 42 of _5;;.,;6;"""-11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start BOP * (Step 6 Continued) Verify TDAFW pump flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

  • (Step 6 Continued) Verify flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM HCOI (Step 7) Try To Restore Power to any Train BOP of AC Emergency Busses:
  • Verify emergency DIG aligned for unit operation
  • Mode switch in UNIT
  • Voltage control selector in AUTO
  • Check emergency DIGs - BOTH DIG NOTE: Neither DIG is running, RUNNING
  • (Step 7 RNa) WHEN non-running DIG NOTE: This step will be available for starting, THEN perform the performed later when the B following: DIG is restored, IF no emergency DIG available, THEN perform the following:
  • Direct AO to attempt to restore NOTE: The CRS will dispatch emergency DIG (Refer to ER-D/G,1, anAO, RESTORING DIG) SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge, CRS
  • Go to Step 8, HCOI (Step 8) Establish the Following Equipment BOP Alignment:
  • Pull stop AC emergency bus loads

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _6.;...a~n;.;;.d_7_ _ _ Page 43 of ...,;5;.;;,6---"1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • CCWpumps
  • Charging pumps FWpumps
  • CREATS Fans
  • Evaluate non-vital loads (Refer to ATI-S.3, ATTACHMENT NONVITAL)

NOTE: The CRS will hand this off to the HCO or the CO.

Examiner following operator performing ATT-S.3 continue below.

Examiners following other operators continue on next page.

ATT-B.3, ATTACHMENT NONVITAL HCOI (Step 1) Lockout the following equipment BOP from the control board by placing the respective switches in PULL STOP or OFF as necessary:

  • EH pumps
  • Hi Press seal oil backup pump
  • Condensate pumps
  • PRZR heaters

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 44 of 56

~~~----- -~~I Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • RMW pumps
  • Air compressors
  • Containment sump pumps (Step 2) Consideration should be given to locking out the following loads locally, ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-8.3 continue HERE HCOI * (Step 8.Continued) Place non-running BOP SW pump switches to STOP, then return to AUTO
  • Momentarily place switch for MOV-313, RCP seal return isolation valve, to CLOSE
  • Momentarily place to CLOSE switches for RCP CCW return valves
  • MOV-749A
  • MOV-749B
  • MOV-759A
  • MOV-759B HCOI (Step 9) Try To Restore Offsite Power:

BOP

  • Consult RG&E Energy Control Center to NOTE: The CO will notify the determine if either normal offsite power RG&E ECC.

supply - AVAILABLE SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that offsite power is NOT readily available.

  • 12B transformer via breaker 76702 OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _6.;;...;;;an;.;,;d;;,.7;...._ _ Page 45 of Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • 12A transformer via breaker 7T1352
  • (Step 9a RNO) IF normal offsite power supply NOT readily available, THEN perform the following:
  • Restore IA system using the Diesel Air SIM DRIVER: Set REM Compressor (Refer to A TT-11.2, MIS42, OPEN, to establish IA ATTACHMENT DIESEL AIR using diesel air compressor.

COMPRESSOR).

  • Evaluate Main transformer backfeed for long term concerns (Refer to ER-ELEC.3, EMERGENCY OFFSITE BACKFEED VIA MAIN & UNIT TRANSFORMER).
  • Go to Step 10.

HCOI (Step 10) Initiate Local Action to Isolate RCS BOP And To Provide Cooling To Vital Areas And Equipment

  • Open all Reactor Protection and Control System rack doors in the Control Room.

CRS

  • Direct Security personnel to open the NOTE: The CRS will contact following vital area doors to enhance Security.

cooling: SIM DRIVER: as Security, acknowledge.

  • Control Room Door S51 F
  • Intermediate Bldg Door S37F (AFW pump area)
  • Intermediate Bldg Door F36F (Automatic fire door, Rod Drive MG set area)
  • Intermediate Bldg Door S44F (Steam Header area)
  • Intermediate Bldg Top Floor Overhead Door S55

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 46 of 56

~~~---- ~~I Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • Dispatch AO To Locally Isolate RCP Seals (Refer to ATT-21.0, ATTACHMENT RCS ISOLATION)

Critical Task:

ECA-O.O--H Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier - specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the red-path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization).

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus.
2. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _6;...a~n;.;;.d..;.7_ _ _ Page 47 of ...,;5;.;;,6__

1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • Dispatch AO to align backup cooling NOTE: The CRS will dispatch water to TDAFW Pump (Refer to anAO.

A TT -5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE SIM DRIVER: as AO, COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP) acknowledge, and use REM FDW66, ON to establish backup cooling to TDAFW pump.

BOP (Step 11) Isolate Makeup And Reject From Hotwell To CST By Placing Hotwell Level Controller (LC-107) In Manual AT 50%

BOP (Step 12) Isolate S/G:

  • Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for the A and B S/G MFW regulating and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0%

demand

  • S/G A, HCV-466 and HCV-480
  • S/G B, HCV-476 and HCV-481
  • Place MCB master switch for S/G blowdown and sample valves to CLOSE BOP (Step 13) Check if S/G Secondary Side is intact:

o Pressure in both S/Gs -STABLE OR RISING o Pressure in both S/Gs-GREATER THAN 110 PSIG HCO (Step 14) Control PRZR Level:

a. Charging pumps-ANY RUNNING (a. RNO) Go to Step 15.

CRS (Step 15) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # _6;;..,a;;;;,n,;.;;;d..:.,7___ Page 48 of Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start BOP r Intact S/G Levels:

a. Narrow range level- GREATER THAN 7%

[25% adverse CNMT]

b. Control AFW flow by throttling flow control valves:
  • S/G A, AOV-4297
  • S/G B, AOV-4298
c. Control AFW flow to maintain narror range level between 17% [25% adverse CNMT]

and 50%.

BOP (Step 17) Check DC Loads:

a. Place control witches foe MFW pump AC oil pumps to OFF (allows timer to stop DC oil pumps)
b. Stop all large non-essential DC loads.

1)Evaluate DC loads (Refere to ATT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS) 2)WHEN turbine is stopped, THEN perform the following:

a) Locally close Turbine backup seal oil reg outlet valve V-5475J.

b) Pull Stop Turbine DC lube oil pump (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)

CRS c. Direct electricians to locally monitor DC power supply.

ATT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS.

BOP A) The A and MFP DC oil pumps should be automatically shed with 12 minutes to reduce battery load

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 49 of 56

~~~---- ~~~I Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start BOP B) The following DC loads could be shed Note: BOP will direct AO's.

from A and B DC busses, if necessary (obtain DC panel key from SS):

MAIN DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL A (DCPDPCB03A) (A Battery room):

o Rod drive MG set control panel, position 4

o Iso phase control, position 5 o Exciter equipment panel, position 6 MAIN DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL B (DCPDPCB03B) (B Battery room):

o Rod drive MG set control panel, position 3

AUX BLDG DC DIST PANEL 1B (DCPDPAB01 B) (south end bus 16 on column near SI pump recuirc valves):

o Aux Bldg Heat & Vent cont panel, position 1 ATT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS (conti)

SCREEN HOUSE DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL B (DCPDSH01 B) (screenhouse near MCCG):

o Traveling screen control, position 1 TURB BLDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL B (DCPDTB01 B) (TURB BLDG basement near fire water storage tank):

o Hydrogen panel, position 3 }after degas ificatio n) o MCC F, position 5 o Water treatment panel, position 6 ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER HCO (Step 18) Verify Source Range Detectors ENERGIZED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 and 7 Page 50 of 56

~~~---- ~~I Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start CRS (Step 18 RNO) Dispatch personnel with relay Note: AO or STA performs rack key to turn off 125 VDC power switches task.

in REACTOR PROTECTION racks RLTR-1 and RLTR-2 to deenergize source range SIM DRIVER: REM NIS 097, block relays.

[Switch Off].

BOP (Step 19) Monitor CST level-GREATER THAN 5 FEET BOP (Step 20) Initiate Depressurization of intact SIGs to 260 PSIG:

a. Check SIG narrow range levels GREATER THAN 17% [25%adverse CNMT]

IN AT LEAST ONE SIG

b. lVIanually dump steam from intact SIGs Note: Opens ARVs and using SIG ARVs to maintain cooldown rate in controls cooldown rates.

RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100The.

Note:

At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of SIGs and RCS cooldown has been initiated), the AO will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The crew should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 SW pump per step 7.

HCOI * (Step 7.b RNO) WHEN non-running DIG 81M DRIVER: Delete MALF BOP available for starting, THEN perform the GEN04A.

following:

  • Depress DIG FIELD RESET pushbutton
  • Depress DIG RESET pushbutton
  • Start DIG
  • IF DIG starts, THEN go to Step 7c. NOTE: The A DIG will start.

HCOI * (Step 7c) Check DIG voltage and BOP frequency

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _6;;..a;;;n.;.;d;..;7~_ _ Page 51 of _5;,;6;""'-11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • Frequency - APPROXIMATELY 60 Hz
  • Verify adequate DIG cooling
  • Bus 17 andlor Bus 18 ENERGIZED
  • One SW Pump running for each NOTE: The A SW Pump will running DIG fail to start automatically, and the CO will need to start the A SW Pump manually.
  • (Step 7.d.RNO) Manually energize busses and start SW Pumps.

IF adequate cooling can NOT be NOTE: Once the A SW Pump supplied to a running DIG is started, adequate cooling for the DIG will exist.

BOP * (Step 7.e ) Verify at least one train emergency busses - ENERGIZED

  • Bus 14 and Bus 18
  • Bus 16 and Bus 17 (Step 7e RNO) Manually energize AC Emergency busses

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _6;;,.a;;.;,n;,;;d..;,.7_ _ _ Page 52 of ...,;5....

6---11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start ECA-O.O--F Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity."

Required Plant Conditions:

5. Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG.

S. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is re energized by the EDG.

7. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the MCR.

8 The other EDG is inoperable Scenario Conditions:

5. AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG.

S. Auto start of 'A' and 'c' SWPs is failed.

7. Start of either 'A' or 'c' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG

'B' EDG is OOS Note: Once AC Emergency busses are energized, eRS should go directly to Step 28.

BOP (Step 28) Manually Control S/G ARVs To Stabilize S/G Pressures BOP (Step 29) Verify SW System Operation:

  • Check Bus 17 and Bus 18 - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 OpTest No.: N12*1 Scenario # 1 Event # ...,;6;;..,;a;;;,n;.;;;,d..;.,7_ _ _ Page 53 of ....lliL.~1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start (Step 29b RNO) IF normal power available, THEN establish to SW pumps running.

IF normal power NOT available, THEN establish one SW pump running for each operating DIG.

IF only one SW pump running, THEN perform the following:

1. Manually perform SW isolation
2. Refer to AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water BOP (Step 30) Verify Following Equipment Loaded On Available AC Emergency Busses:
  • 480 volt MCCs - ENERGIZED
  • MCC D from Bus 16
  • Verify Instrument busses - ENERGIZED
  • Bus A from MCC C
  • Bus B from MCC C
  • Bus C from MCC D
  • Dispatch personnel to verify proper NOTE: The CRS will dispatch operation of battery chargers anAO.

SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge.

HCO (Step 31) Select Recovery Procedure:

  • Check RCS subcooling based on core exit TICs - GREATER THAN OaF USING FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING
  • Check PRZR level - GREATER THAN 10% [30% adverse CNMT]

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _6...a-.n_d....7_ _ _ Page 54 of _56

_____

1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start

  • Check SI and RHR Pumps - NONE RUNNING CRS
  • Go to ECA-O.2, LOSS OF ALL AC NOTE: The CRS should go to POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI ECA-O.2.

REQUIRED, Step 1.

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #1 UNIT STATUS:

Power Level: 75% RCS [B] 1075 ppm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm


Power History: The Plant is at 70% power (MOL), Core Burnup: 10000 MWD/MTU for four days.

INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

  • The plant is at 75% power (MOL).
  • The plant power was reduced to 50% several days ago due to a malfunction on the B Main Feedwater Pump.
  • Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service.
  • Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 40 gpm.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

  • The 'B' EDG has been DOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OSOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.S.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.S.1.1 and 3.S.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.S.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension.

The crew has been directed to continue in 0-5.2, step 6.2.32 and start Condensate Booster Pumps.

A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion DatefTime BEDG J..!12 0800 Fuel racks will ITS 3.8.1 0800 yesterday. ITS 3.8.1 not reset Enter Condition B Enter Condition G Required Action: Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 B.1: Perform SR 3.8.11 for the in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit.-Perform every 8 AND hours, [Due in 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s] Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 AND in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> B.2. Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR 8.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.

AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. [7 days]

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial license Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N 12-2

REFERENCES:

1. 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown to Full Load
2. AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV 4' F, or
3. AR-F-16, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION +/- 5'F
4. ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure
5. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
6. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation
7. T-14F.1, SIG Blowdown System Operation
8. OPG-BRIEF, Operations Briefing Guidance
9. AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling
10. AP-RCP.1, RCP Seal Malfunction
11. AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop
12. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection
13. ATT-27.0, Automatic Action Verification
14. ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI
15. E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
16. ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor FacUity Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "AI! Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. Based upon the current plant risk assessment, the crew is waiting for completion of B EDG repair before entering Mode 1.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due repairs on the governor. Expected return to service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 was completed successfully 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago; all other EDG surveillances are current. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified.

Event Malt. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 FDW14C N-BOP Transition from AFW to MFW per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5.

(O) N (TS)-SRO MD AFW Pump 1B Discharge VLV (MOV-400B) will not re-open during the realignment.

2 RCS11F I-RO Th RTD {Channel 4) fails high (650) I-BOP I{TS)-SRO 3 RCS01B C-RO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier leak (5 ramp for C-SRO 120 sec) 4 SIS01 M-BOP Spurious SI ("A" Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA Outside CNMT EDS1A M-RO EDS1B M-SRO RCS19C Fire alarms in Aux Bldg Basement RHR pump area (1500)

OVR-D.O.

FCP01BQ,

[on, 30 delay]

5 RPS05A C-RO Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual available)

  • RPS05B C-SRO (man avail) I 6 GENOa C-RO "AU DG fails to start automatically (manual start available)

(A DG) C-SRO 7 RPS11-A-2 C-RO AOV-371 (LID Isolation to NRHX) fails to close automatically (Isolation C-SRO signal only)

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 8 RPS07K C-80P uA" MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically C-SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, ( I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Overview of Scenario # 2 The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. The plant is in a normal 50/50 electric plant lineup. Per Chemistry direction, the 60 gpm letdown orifice is in service.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical linkage issue with the governor. ITS entry for 3.8.1. B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 (offsite power availability and breaker alignment) was completed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified.

After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment.

During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on 'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time.

Next a channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
  • AR-F-16, Avg Tavg - Tref Dev +/- 5°F
  • AR-F-24, RCS AVG ~T DEV 3°F ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.

The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the failed channel per ER INST.1. The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per:

  • AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or
  • F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or
  • A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8%

The crew may first enter AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS in-leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B. Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B - the alternate isolation method.)

Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A" train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD flowpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath.

Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the "An MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary.

The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi - not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.)

Instrument air to containment will be re-established at step 9 of E-1. This will re-isolate the CCW system leak. (Unable to close MOV-749B and 759B due to bus 16 de-energized.) The team will transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 step 17.

At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment. (The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The team should realize this.)

Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1.

Additional Information:

When the Aux Bldg sump reaches 15,000 gallons the RHR pumps, Aux Bldg sump pumps, and RCDT pumps will fail due to submergence (2 to 4 minute time delay after submergence).

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Critical Tasks:

E-O--C Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of E-O.

Safety Significance:

Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power capacity, needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No emergency bus energized.
3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip.
2. Offsite power is lost, "8" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.
3. "An DG can be started manually.

ECA-1.2--A Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of ECA-1.2.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing radioactive release.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 o Reset to IC-41 (Temp I/C-NRC-)

-2% power BOL Note: If only a IC-41 IC available, must start A MFP and stabilize main condenser vacuum. Simulator support can generate an IC with secondary plant stable. IC should have controlling S/G water levels using A and B MDAFW pump bypass valves, V-4480 and V-4481 (MOV-4007 and MOV-4008 closed).

Ensure:

  • EHC valve limiter set 10% higher than setter.
  • Ensure 60 GPM orifice is on service At T=O, insert:
  • MALF FDW14C, [0], AFW Feed Control Valves Failure: 4008
  • MALF GEN08, [A DIG], Diesel Generator Auto Start Failure
  • MALF RPS11-A2. [Isolation signal Only1. CI Failure -AOV-371
  • MALF RPS07K, Auto Failure: A MDAFW Pump To take 'B' EDG OOS:
  • Pull stop the 'B' EDG Control Stop/Start SWitch and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 16 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 17 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
  • Place CAUTION tag on DIG 'B' start pushbutton
  • Place PROTECT tags per OPG-Protected Equipment and black dot J-32.

Insert the following:

  • MALF RCS11F [650], on T-2 (RTD FAILURE: LP B HOT TE-404A (IT-404)
  • MALF RCS01B [5 gpm ramp 120sec], on T-3 (B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak)
  • MALF SIS01, [Train A),on T -4 (Spurious SI 'A' Train)
  • MALF EDS1A, on T -4, (Loss of Off-Site Power:

CKT 7T)

  • MALF EDS1 B, on T-4, (Loss of Off-Site Power:

CKT 767)

  • MALF RCS19C, [1900], on T -4 (RHR Header Leak, Valve 853A)

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 o Prior to Crew Briefing RUN

  • Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Equipment
  • Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciator J-32 o Crew Briefing
  • Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
  • Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
  • Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-1.2, marked up to section 6.7.

0 T-O 0 At direction of Event 1 Shift from AFW to MFP per 0-1.2, section 6.7 examiner 0 At direction of Event 2 RTD Thot failure examiner Trigger#2 MALF RCS11 F [650],

on T-2 At direction of Event 3 B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak 0 examiner Trigger#3 MALF RCS01 B [5 gpm ramp for 120 sec]

o At direction of examiner Event 4 Spurious SI (liN' Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA MALF SIS01, [Train A] Outside CNMT Loss of Off-Site Power' CKT 7T MALF EOS1A MALF EDS1B Loss of Off-Site Power; CKT 767 MALF RCS19C, [1900]

RHR Header Leak, Valve 853A

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 D At direction of Event 5 Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual examiner available)

MALF RPS05A,

[Manual Available] NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = o.

MALF RPS05B,

[Manual Available]

D Continued EventS "A" DG fails to start automatically (manual start available) from Event 5 MALF GEN08, [A DIG]

NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O.

D Continued Event 7 AOV-371 (UD Isolation to NRHX) fails to close from Event 5 automatically MALF RPS11-A2,

[Isolation Signal Only]

NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O.

D Continued Event 8 "A" MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically from Event 5 MALF RPS07K NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O.

D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -......;..._ _ _ _ Page Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment. During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on

'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time.

Booth Operator Instructions: NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = 0 Indications Available: NA 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD CRS Reviews note at step 6.7.1 and G-22, ADFCS System Trouble may actuate.

AR-G-22, ADFCS SYSTEM TROUBLE AR-G-22 Rev 01100 ADFCS SYSTEM TROUBLE Page 1 of 3 Approval Authority-Manager - Operations I Continuous Use/Safety Related 1.0 JALARM SETPOINTS

  • Numerous alarms generated by ADFCS (check printer or EMMI monitor>>

2.0 SOURCE(S)

  • ADFCS 3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 3.1. None 4.0 PERFORMANCE 4.1. CHECK ADFACS EMMI monitor (Relay Room) for the cause of the failure by performing the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ......;..._ _ _ _ Page 11 55 of ....;..;..----t Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 BOP (Step 6.7.1) VERIFY operation of MFW regulating AND bypass valves by cycling each of the following valves SLOWLY OPEN UNTIL flow indication is observed AND THEN returning the valve to CLOSED:

  • S/G A FW REG VLV, HCV-466
  • S/G B FW REG VLV, HCV-476
1. PLACE FW FLOW LOOP A BYPASS VLV HCV-480 controller in AUTO.
2. PLACE FW FLOW LOOP B BYPASS VLV HCV-481 controller in AUTO.
3. IF desired, Note: BOP will ask CRS.

THEN PLACE S/G A FW REG VLV, HCV-466, controller in AUTO.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

4. IF desired, THEN PLACE S/G B FW REG VLV, HCV-476, controller in AUTO.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -.;..._ _ _ _ Page 12 of ....,;5;..;;;,5-1 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 BOP (Step 6.7.3) REMOVE running AFW Note: Both AFW pumps are Pumps from service as follows: running

1. IF AFW Pump A is RUNNING, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWIS MARK this N/A.

a. CLOSE MD AFW PUMP 1A DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-4007
b. CLOSE AFW BYPASS VLV A, AOV-4480
c. STOP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPA
d. ENSURE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP control switch is in AUTO BOP (Step 6.7.3) REMOVE running AFW Pumps from service as follows:
2. IF AFW Pump B is RUNNING, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTH MARK this N/A.

a. CLOSE MD AFW PUMP 1B DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-4008
b. CLOSE AFW BYPASS VLV A, AOV-4481
c. STOP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPB
d. ENSURE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP B control switch is in AUTO BOP (Step 6.7.4) IF Blowdown is desired, Note: Not desired.

THEN THROTTLE OPEN Blowdown SIM DRIVER: If CRS ask Flow Control valves to desired flow rate Chem Tech, Blowdown permit PER applicable sections of T-14F .1, S/G being currently being Blowdown System Operation. generated by Chemistry and OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. then will inform Control when completed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -.:..._ _ _ _ Page 13 of ...,:5::.:::,5--11 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 connect valves:

2. ENSURE OPEN the following Auxiliary Note: MOV-4008 will not Feedwater Pump Discharge valves: open. BOP should inform

DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-3996

  • MD AFW PUMP 1A DISCHARGE Note: CRS may dispatch VLV, MOV-4007 Primary AO to look at breaker
  • MD AFW PUMP 1B DISCHARGE for MOV-4008.

VLV, MOV-4008 Note: Taking out MOV-4007 would complicate both trains out with 'B' EDG OOS (72 hr LCO now)

3. OPEN both Turbine Driven Auxiliary Note: Valves currently open.

Feedwater Pump flow control valves:

  • AFWTO S/G 1A CONTROL VLV, AOV-4297
  • AFW TO S/G 1B CONTROL VLV AOV-4298 CRS Should refer to ITS requirement, Aux Feedwater System, 3.7.5. and have BOP continue with 0-1.2.

BOP (Step 6.7.5)

4. PLACE both AFW Bypass Pump switches to NORM:
  • AFW BYPASS PUMP 1A
  • AFW BYPASS PUMP 18

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # --:;..._ _ _ _ Page 14 of .....;5=5~

Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2

5. VERIFY CLOSED MD AFW PUMP 1A RECIRC VLV AOV-4304.
6. VERIFY CLOSED MO AFW PUMP 1B RECIRC VLV AOV-4310.

BOP (Step 6.7.6) ADJUST manual loader to Note: Dispatches AO to provide CLOSE signal for MAIN FW PUMP perform step 6.7.6 CLEANUP RECIRC AND RECIRC DUMP AOV TO MAIN CONDENSER, AOV-4262

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ~__________ Page 15 of 55

""";";'---11 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 3I5 Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Two motor driven AFW (MDAFW) trains, one turbine driven AFW (TDAFW) train, and two standby AFW (SAFW) trains shall be OPERABlE_

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A- One TDAFW train A-1 Restore IDAFW train 7 days f10wpath inoperable. flowpath to OPERABLE status.

B- One MDAFW train B-1 Restore MDAFW train to Jdays inoperable. OPERABLE status.

C. TDAFW train inoperable. C.1

  • ~~~~~if~E~~~~~~~*

OR LCO 3.0A.b is not Two MDAFW trains applicable.

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

inoperable.

Restore one MDAFW train 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR or TDAFW train f10wpath to OPERABLE status.

One TDAFW train f10wpath and one MDAFW train inoperable to opposite steam generators (SGs).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ....;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 16 of "'

Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high I Next a Channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per.

  • AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
  • AR-F-16, Avg Tavg - Tref Dev +/- 5°F I
  • AR-F-24, RCS AVG llT DEV 3"F I ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.

I The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the failed channel per ER-INST.1. The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Booth Operator Instructions:

  • Trigger#2
  • Acknowledge as WCC and OPS Management Indications Available:
  • AR-F-16, Avg Tavg - Tref Dev +/- 5°F
  • AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
  • AR-F-24, RCS AVG llT DEVIATION 3"F
  • TI-404, Loop B Tavg
  • TI-408B, Loop B 1B-2 DT Temp
  • AR-F-15, ReS TAVG DEV 4°F HCO (Step 1) Place Rods in Manual (Auto rod NOTE: The rods are already in motion will be blocked) manual due to power less than P-12.

HCO (Step 2) Check RCS Tavg channels and Tavg chart recorder.

BOP turbine runback is occurring NOTE: a turbine run back is NOT occurring.

CRS (Step 4) IF a Tavg channel has failed, THEN go to ER-INST.1 CRS (Step 5) IF average Tavg has failed, THEN. NOTE: average Tavg has NOT failed.

NOTE: The CRS will go to ER INST.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ~2~________ Page 17 of 55

~~-I Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high HCO Places charging in manual AR-F-24, ReS AVG flT DEVIATION 3°F HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check.

CRS (Step 2) Go to the appropriate procedure:

  • ER-INST.1 for Failed Instrument Channel NOTE: The CRS will go to ER INST.1.

ER-INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE HCOI (Step 6.1.1) Identify the failed instrument BOP channel by observation of the bistable status light board, MCB annunciators, and the MCB metering indication.

HCOI (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed instrument loop NOTE: The CRS will identify BOP andlor channel has been identified, THEN an RCS Tavg or t.T Failure, refer to the appropriate section of this and go to Section 6.2.

procedure listed below:

HCO (Step 6.2.1) IF annunciator F-15, RCS TAVG DEV 4°F, is lit, THEN AUTOMATIC Rod control will be blocked and MANUAL rod control will be required.

BOP (Step 6.2.2) An RTD failure will affect Steam NOTE: unwarranted Steam Dump response if in AUTOMATIC TAVG Dump is NOT occurring.

control. IF unwarranted Steam Dump is occurring, THEN ....

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 18 of ...,;;5;,;;.5--1!

Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (Step 6.2.3) An RTD (Tavg) failure will affect NOTE: The HCO will place the PRZR level setpoint. Place charging in Charging Pump Speed in MANUAL to stabilize PRZR level. MANUAL (if not done previously)

CRS (Step 6.2.4) Since Rod Insertion Limits (RIL) Note: Power <50%

are generated from average t::. T, and RTD failure may result in unwarranted RIL alarms.

Refer to ITS LCOs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 to determine actual insertion limits.

CRS (Step 6.2.5) IF hot leg streaming has been NOTE: Power level too low for causing single channel t::.T runback signals, hot leg streaming to be a THEN .... concern CRS (Step 6.2.6) Refer to the appropriate NOTE: The CRS will attachment for defeat of the associated determine that the Yellow control functions: Channel Attachment Tavg 404/Delta T 408 applies.

  • T AVG 404/DELTAT 408 YELLOW CHANNEL NOTE: The CRS will hand this off to the CO, to coordinate with the HCO.

ER-INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE YELLOW CHANNEL ATTACHMENT TAVG 404lDELTA T 408 Note: Operator will obtain data per step 5.0 to prepare for the instrument defeat brief and to determine expected status of proving lights during the defeat BOP Hold brief for instrument defeat per OPG Note: Attachment 1 of OPG BRIEF BRIEF used HCO (Step 1.0) Verify Rod Control selector switch in MANUAL.

HCO (Step 2.0) Verify Charging Pump speed controllers in MANUAL.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ~2__________ Page 19 of _5;;;,;5:"--i Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high BOP (Step 3.0) In the RIL INSERTION LIMIT rack, PLACE T/405 DELTA T DEFEAT switch to LOOP B UNIT2 BOP (Step 4.0) In the STEAM DUMP rack, PLACE the TAVG DEFEAT switch T/401B to LOOP B UNIT2 (Note Before Step 5.0)

  • lOOP a: to lAVG TC404A
  • OPAl L.OOP e- TC400A
  • OHT 1.001' e TC4O$C
  • G-l0,RCSlOOPeHtGH"fAVG~79F
  • F-e. RCS LOQP 81..0 TA'VG 545 F

" F-3ZJ(CS OP DELTA T CHANNeL AlERt'

  • F*2l,RCSOT8ElTATCHANNE.LALEl=rT BOP (Step 5.0) Determine the expected Bistable Examiner NOTE: Initiate Proving light status for the post defeat Event 3 while the CO/HCO is conditions as flows: behind the MCB tripping bistablas.

(Step 5.1) Record the following Data: NOTE: Data may have been TI-404 _ _OF obtained for the instrument lOOP B-2 TAVG defeat brief earlier.

lOOP 18*2l1 TEMP TI-4088 _ _uF OTliT SP1l00P 18-2 TEMP TI-408A _ _"F OPt.T SP2 LOOP 1 B-2 TEMP TI-408C _ _OF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _2~_________ Page 20 of 55

~~-il Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high BOP (Step 5.2)

DETERMINE the expected post defeat Bistable proving light status and circle the expected status in table below; NOTE: Expected Proving light 404 LOOP B*2 stats may have been obtained HIGHT'AVG Light OFF IF TI-404 ~ 579"F for the instrument defeat brief LOWrAVG Light OFF IF TI-404 " 545°F earlier.

408 LOOP B-2 OVERTEMP TRIP Light OFF IF T -408B '" TI-408A OVERPOWER TRIP Light OFF IF TI-4086 ? TI-408C Bistable Expected Proving Post Def.at Light

!

Light status (Circle) Status Verified 41J4LooP B-2 ON OFF HIGHT'AVG Note:

404 LOOP B-2 ON OFF LOWTAVG


ON 40SLooPB*2 ON OFF OVERTEMP TRIP ON 40BLooP8-2 OVERPOWER TRIP ON OFF ON ON BOP (Step 6.0) Place the affected channel NOTE: All Bistable lights are Bistables in the Trip condition by LIT.

PERFORMING the following:

(Step 6.1)

In 1M: {YELLOW) y~ 1 PROTECTfON CHANNEl 4 ~ PlACE the IOOowIng bistable provtng w11ches to O£FEAT (UP) AND VERiFY the PfOVWigltght status -Is cmect per tne table above.

404 bOOP!}i1 Note:

HtGHTAVG lOWrAVG ON 40HOOPIl-2 ON OVERTEMP TRIP OVERPOWER TRIP ON ON (Step 6.2) Verify Correct Bistable Status Light And Annunicator status.

BOP (Step 7.0-7.5) Delete 404/408 from the PPCS by performing the following:

  • Select "Group Update" display
  • Select "List Server Groups"
  • Select 404_408 from the pick list

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ...;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of ....5....

5----4 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high

  • Turn "OFF" scan processing, then click the "Set Scan Processing" button
  • Answer prompts CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 6.2.7 INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE (Step 6.2.7) Restore following systems to automatic operation as necessary:

HCO o PRZR level control NOTE: The HCO will place Charging Pump Speed Control back in AUTO.

HCO o Rod control NOTE: The HCO will place Rods back in AUTO.

BOP 0 Steam Dump BOP 0 Turbine EH control (Step 6.2.8) Check the following ITS NOTE: The CRS will evaluate Sections for LCO's: the Technical Specifications.

CRS (Step 6.2.8a) Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Functions 5 and 6 CRS (Step 6.2.8b) Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4d CRS (Step 6.2.9) GO TO Step 6.15 HCO (Step 6.15.1) IF necessary, verify an operable channel is selected for the affected recorder.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _2"'--_ _ _ _ Page 22 of ..,;5;,;5;"'--11 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high HCO (Step 6.15.2) Verify the following systems in AUTO if desired:

HCO

  • Rod control BOP
  • Turbine EH control HCO
  • PRZR Pressure control
  • HC43'IK
  • PRZR spray valves
  • PRZR heaters
  • PRZR level control st BOP
  • Steam Dump (Unless 1 stage pressure failed)

BOP

  • S/G Atmos Relief Vlv Control CRS (Step 6.15.3) Notifications to the following NOTE: The CRS may notify people will be made by the Shift Manager: the SM/STA.

Booth Instructor: as SM/STA, acknowledge.

  • Operations Supervision
  • STA CRS (Step 6.15.4) During normal working hours, NOTE: The CRS may notify Maintenance personnel shall be notified theWCC.

immediately of the problem. Booth Instructor: as WCCS, acknowledge.

CRS (Step 6.15.5) During back shifts Maintenance personnel will be called in. HOWEVER, the Shift Manager may defer calling people in, IF repairs may be deferred to the next working day.

NOTE: The CRS will evaluate the Technical Specifications.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # ....:2=--_ _ _ _ Page 23 of _5:;,;5:"'--1 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) INSTRUMENTATION LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3."1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTIONS

-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one channel referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable. for the channel(s).

OR Two source range channels inoperable.

B- As required by Required B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE status.

by Table 3.3.1-1.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition B not AND met C2 Initiate action to fuUy insert 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> all rods.

AND C.3 Place Control Rod Drive 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 24 of Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPUCABlE MODES OR LIMITiNG OTHER SAFETY SPECIFlfD REQUIRED SURVEIllANCE SYSTEM FUNCTION CONOITlONS CHANNElS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS SETTINGStOf

1. Manual R.acto.rTlip 1.2. 2 e,c SR 3.3.1.11 NA 3(1)), 4(1)). 5(1))
2. P~Range Neutron Flux
a. High 1.2 D.G SR3.3.1.1 S 109.27%

SR3.3.1.2 RTP SR3.3.1.7 SR3.a.1.m

b. Low ,(Ci, 2 D.G SR 3.3.1.1 .s 29.2B%

SR 3.3.1.8 RTP SR3.3.UD

3. Intermeciiate Range 1(e). 2 2 E.G SR3.3.1.1 (0)

Nevtron Flux SR3.3.1.8 SR3.3.UD

4. Souroe Range ,2le) 2 F.G SR3.a.l.1 jel)

Neuiron Flux SRll.a.l.S SR3.3.1.1O 4{ll),5 11l ) 2 H.I SR 3.3.1.1 (tI)

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 4ill.5ill J SR 3.3.1.1 SR3.3.UD

5. Overtemperarure: L!.T 1.2 4 D.G SR3.3.1.1 Referio SR3.3.1.3 Note I SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.m
6. Overpo'M:rJ.T 1.2 D.G SR 3.3.1.1 Referio SR 3.3.1.7 Hotel SR3.3.1.m

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # ..;2;;;....._ _ _ _. Page 25 of 55

......;..;~.....I Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION LC03.32 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.32-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.32-1.

ACTIONS

-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one channel or train referenced in Table 3.32-'1 inoperable. for the channel or train.

B- As required by Required B.l Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Action A. 1 and referenced OPERABLE status.

by Table 3.3.2-1.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MOOE2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Conlpletion Time of Condition B not met.

O. As required by Required 0.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Action A. 1 and referenced OPERABLE status.

by Table 3.3.2-1.

E. As required by Required E.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action A. 1and referenced status..

by Table 3.3.2-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni2-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 26 of _5;.;;5~-!1 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Table 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Ins1rumentation APPUCA81E MODES OR LIMITING OTHE.t! SAFETY SPECIF!ED REQUIRED SURVEILlANCE SYSTEM FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS SETIINGSlai

4. Steam Une Isolation ii. Manual 1 per loop D.G SR 3.3.2.4 NA

[nillation

b. Automa1ic ZlTsins E.G SR 3.3.2.7 NA Actua!ion Logic and Actuation Relays
c. Containment 1.21d).3 Id ) 3 F.G SR 3.3.2.1  ::; 18.0 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.2.2 High SR 3.3.2.5
d. High Steam 2 per steam 1m" F.G SR 3.3.2.1  :::130Efl Flow SR 3.3.2.2 IbmJhr SR 3.3.2.5 C 1OO5 psig Coincident Refer to Function 1 (Safety Iniecfu>fl) for allll1rtialion ful'!ctIoris and wi!h Safety requirements.

tnjeclion and Coincident .2 per loop F.G SR 3.32.1 c: 544J}"F wi!h T"og-Low SR 3.3.22 SR 3.3.2.5

e. High-High 2 per steam line F.G SR 3.3.2.1 54.53E6 S!eamRow SR 3.3.2.2 IbmJhr SR 3.32.5 @785psig Coincident Refer to Function 1 (Safety Inj.ecOOo) for aU initiation functions and with Safety requirements.

Injectioo At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ....;3~_ _ _ _ Page 27 of ....,;5=5---1 Event

Description:

'B' RCP Thermal Barrier Leak Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per:

  • AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or
  • F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or
  • A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8%

The crew may first enter AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS in-leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B. Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B - the alternate isolation method.)

Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 3 Indications Available:

  • AR-B-1O, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20
  • AR-A-5, CCW Surge Tank Hi-Level
  • AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 HCO P 1) Check AOV-142 position correct for conditions.

(Step 2)

GO TO applicable procedure:

  • AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION
  • AP-CVCS_1, CVCS LEAK
  • AP-CVCS_3, LOSS OF ALL CHARGING FLOW AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling HCO 1. Verify RCV-017 closed
2. GO TO AP-CCW.1
3. Direct RP to perform CH-PRI-CCW Note: CRS enters AP-CCW.1 leakage. when CCW surge level rising

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES~D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ...,;3:..-_ _ _ _ Page 28 of _5;..;.5--1 Event

Description:

'8' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop Note: Due to the cylindrical shape of CCW surge tank, using level indication to determine leak rate would be inaccurate. For a more accurate leak rate determination, use of Charging/Letdown mismatch should be used.

HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Indications

a. Check CCW surge tank level - RISING (PPCS Point L0618)
b. Direct RP tech to perform CH-PRI-CCW NOTE: The CRS/CO will LEAK, DETERMINATION OF CCW contact RP.

SYSTEM LEAKAGE SIM DRIVER: as RP, acknowledge.

c. CCW radiation monitor, R-17, RISING Note: May declare a Local Radiation Emergency per EPIP 1-13 HCO * (Step 2) Check RCP Thermal Barrier Note: RCPs may be safely Indications: operated without CCW to the thermal barrier if seal injection flow is maintained.

o Labyrinth seal DIPs - GREATER THAN 15 INCHES OF WATER AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL o RCP #1 seal leak off flows-WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE OF FIG-4.0, FIGURE RCP SEALLEAKOFF o Annunciator A-7 (15), RCP A (B)

CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO Q

FLOW 165 GPM 12S F EXTINGUSHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 29 of 55 Event

Description:

'B' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak (Step 2 RNO)

IF either pump has indication of a thermal barrier leak, THEN perform the following:

a. Verify seal injection flow to affected RCP.
b. Close CCW return from affected RCP Note: HCO closes AOV-754B thermal barrier (labyrinth seal DIP should rise)
  • RCP B, AOV-754A
  • RCP B, AOV-754B
c. Evaluate CCW surge tank level trend. If leakage has stopped, THEN go to step 17.

(PPCS Point L0618)

CRS (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Conditions:

  • CCW inleakage - IDENTIFIED AND NOTE: The leakage into the ISOLATED CCW System has been isolated.
  • Determine if operation can continue SIM DRIVER: If asked, OPS (Consult Plant staff if necessary) - management has determined OPERATION CAN CONTINUE that operation should continue.

HCO (Step 18) Check CCW Surge Tank Level APPROXIMATELY 50%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _3.:;......_ _ _ _ Page 30 of _5;;.;5~-I Event

Description:

'B' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak HCO (Step 19) Establish Control Systems In Auto

  • Verify rods in AUTO
  • Verify 431 K in AUTO
  • Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO
  • Verify PRZR heaters restored:
  • PRZR proportional heaters breaker-CLOSED
  • PRZR backup heaters breaker RESET, IN AUTO
  • Verify one charging pump in AUTO HCOI (Step 20) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status BOP (Refer to AR Procedures)

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..:..-_ _ _ _ Page Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with lOOP and lOCA Outside Containment Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A" train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD flowpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath. Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the "A" MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary.

The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi - not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26.

(Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.)

At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment. (The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow*

has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The I team should realize this.)

IBo~th Operator Instructio~s: Trigger 4, all other faults were entered at T=O Indications Available:

  • Numerous MCB alarms

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 32 of _5.;;..;5~-11 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment CRS Directs HCO and CO to perform Immediate Note: D-Panel alarm with Rx Actions of E-O Trip Breakers still closed HCOI Perform Immediate Actions Note: HCO manually trips Rx.

BOP HCO Manual start of 'A' EDG CRS Upon report from the HCO that immediate actions are completed, starts E-O.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip:

-OPEN

  • Neutron flux - LOWERING I. MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BODOM BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Emergency Buses

.---f---

Bus 14 and Bus 18 Note: HCO will start 'A' DG

  • Bus 16 and Bus 17 (RNO)

Attempt to start any failed emergency DIG to restore power to ALL AC emergency buses.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4__________ Page 33 of 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Critical Tasks:

E-O--C Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of E-O.

Safety Significance:

Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power capacity, needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory_

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No emergency bus energized.
3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip.
2. Offsite power is lost, "B" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.
3. "A" DG can be started manually.

HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:

BOP a) Any SI Annunciator - LIT Note: 0-19, Pressurizer LO Press Trip may be lit but only

'A' Train sequencing (RNO)

a. IF any of the following conditions are MET.

THEN manually actuate SI and CI:

o PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig o OR o Steamline pressure less than 514 psig o OR o CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig o OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 34 of ~~

Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 4.b.)

SI Sequencing -BOTH TRAINS STARTED HCO (Steb 4b RNO) Manually actuate SI and CI Note: HCO Manually actuate SI and CI HCO (Step 5*) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

o Annunciator A-27 , CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUSHED o CNMT pressure-LESS THAN 28 PSIG CRS (Step 6) Direct HCO to perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The CRS will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-O.

Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at page 38.

ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO I and RHR Pumps Running:

s-RUNNING pumps - RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of N12-1

.-;..----

Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans Running:

  • All fans - RUNNING
  • Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:
  • Any MSIV - OPEN HCO (Step 3a RNO) Go to Step 4.

HCO (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:

  • MFW pumps - TRIPPED
  • MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
  • S/G A, AOV-3995
  • S/G B, AOV-3994
  • S/G Blowdown and sample valves CLOSED HCO (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps RUNNING HCO ep 6) Verify CI and CVI: Note: HCO notes CCW valve reopened CI and CVI annunciators - LIT
  • Verify CI and CVI valve status lights Note: AOV-371 (Auto Isolation BRIGHT failed) and MOV-814 (Loss of Power) failed to close. Refers to ATT-3.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 36 of _5.;.;5~-t Event

Description:

Spurious 51 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment ATT..J.O, ATTACHMENT Cl/eVI HCO AOV-371: Takes MCB switch to close. Note: Uses ATT -3.0 for AOV 371 and MOV-814 HCO

  • Dispatches AO to locally close V-815A. Note: Local isolation for MOV 814 Note: HCO/CO continues with ATT-27.0 ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC AC"nON VERIFICATION HCO
  • CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet valve status lights - BRIGHT
  • FCV-4561
  • FCV-4562
  • Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
  • AOV-200A
  • AOV-200B
  • AOV-202 HCO (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
  • Verify CCW pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING HCO (Step 8) Verify SI and RHR Pump Flow:
  • SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
  • RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW HCO (Step 7b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4"""'-_ _ _ _ Page 37 of 55

"";;"';'---1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump Emergency Alignment:

a. RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge

-OPEN

  • MOV-852A
  • MOV-852B
b. Verify SI pump C RUNNING
c. Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
d. Verify SI pump B - RUNNING
d. (RNO)

(1) Ensure SI Pumps A and C running. If

  • either pump NOT running, THEN go to step ge.

(2) Ensure SI pump C aligned to discharge line B:

o MOV-871 B open o MOV-871A closed (3) Go to Step 10.

HCO (Step 10) Verify CREATS Actuation:

  • At least one damper in each flowpath CLOSED
  • Normal Supply Air
  • Normal Return Air
  • CREATS fans - BOTH RUNNING HCO Reports completion of ATT-27.0 and status SIM DRIVER: To reset update. TDAFW trip throttle valve, REM-FDW32, [1]

Reports status of completing ATT-27.0 to crew.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..;...-_ _ _ _ Page Event

Description:

Spurious 81 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at HERE.

Note: Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely HCOI (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps BOP Running (RNO Step 7) Manually start both IVIDAFW Note: Only power available for pumps. A MDAFW pump.

HCOI (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:

BOP

  • AFWflow-INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)
  • AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM (Step 8 RNO) align valves as necessary HCOI (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink:

BOP

  • Check S/G narrow range level - NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE Numbers should be used, until CNMT] in any S/G Containment Pressure is less than 4 psig.
  • Check S/G narrow range level BOTH S/G LESS THAN 50%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..:.-_ _ _ _ Page 39 of '-;";~....IJ Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment BOP

  • Control feed flow to maintain SIG narrow NOTE: The CO may stop range level between 7% [25% adverse feeding the A SG based on the CNMT] and 50%. indications.

HCO (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP Thermal Barriers:

a. Stop affected RCPs.

(Step 11 RNO)

b. Reset SI.

HCO (Step 11 RNO)

c. Check adequate power available to run one charging pump.
1. NIA
2. If Bus 14/16 DIG breakers are closed THEN verify adequate emergency DIG capacity to run one charging pump. (75 kw).,
d. IF seal outlet temperatures are greater than 235°F, THEN go to step 12.

BOP (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F (Step 12 RNO) If temperature less than 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following:

  • Stop dumping steam.
  • Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~_ _ _ _ Page 40 of _5;:;.;5:"--1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment

  • IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 20 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one S/G.
  • WHEN S/G level greater than 7% [25%

adverse CNMT] in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain level in at least one S/G.

  • IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: Both MSIVs are MSIVs. closed.

HCOI (Step 13 ) Check PRZR PORVs and Spray CO Valves:

  • Auxiliary Spray valves (AOV-296)

CLOSED

  • Check PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG
  • Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED
  • PCV-431A
  • PCV-431B HCOI (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:

CO

  • RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING (RNO)-GO to step 15.

HCOI (Step 15) Check I S/G Secondary Side Is CO Intact:

o Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising o Presssure in both S/G's -GREATER THAN 110 PSIG

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4__________ Page 41 of 55


II Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 16) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:

o Air Ejector radiation monitors Note: R47 and R48 only (R-15, R-47, R-48) -NORMAL detectors with power (PPCS).

o S/G blowdown radiation monitors (R-19) -NORMAL o Steam line radiation monitors (R-31 , R-32) -NORMAL CRS (Step 17) Check if RCS is intact: Note: May go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT OR SECONDARY COOLANT if conditions met.

Note to examiner: Go to page 45 for E-1, IF not continue in E-O.

a. CNMT area radiation monitors -NORMAL
  • R-2
  • R-7
  • R-29
  • R-30
b. CNMT pressure -LESS than 0.5 psig
c. CNMT sump B level-LESS THAN 8 inches.
d. CNMT sump A level o Level-STABLE o Annunciator C-19-CONTAINMENT SUMP A HI LEVEL EXTINGUISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No .. N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~ _ _ _ _ Page 42 of _5,;;.;5;;""--i\

Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (step 18) Check if SI should be terminated:

a. RCS Pressure:

o Pressure-GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG o Pressure -STABLE OR RISING

a. (RNO) Do NOT stop SI pumps. Go to Step 19.

CRS (Step 19) Initiate Monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees BOP (Step 20*) Monitor SIG Levels:

a. Narrow range level-GREATER THAN 7%
b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% and 50%

HCO (step 21) Check Secondary Radiation Levels-NORMAL o Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32) o Dispatch AO to locally check steam line radiation o Request Chem Tech sample SIGs for activity HCO (Step 22) Reset SI HCO (step 23) Rest CI:

a. Depress CI reset pushbutton
b. Verify annunciator A-26 , CNMT ISOLATION-EXTINGUISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;...-_ _ _ _ Page 43 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment BOP (Step 24) Verify adequate SW flow"

a. At least three SW pumps running Note: Only power available for twoSW pumps
a. (RNO) Manually start SW pumps as power supply permits (257 kweach)

IF less than three pumps running, THEN Note: Manually performs SW ensure SW isolation isolation by manually closing SW valves on MCB.

BOP b. Dispatch AO to establish normal shutdown alignment (refer to ATT-17.0, ATTACHMENT SD-1)

BOP (step 25) Establish IA to CNMT:

a. Verify non-safeguards buses energized from off-site power o Bus 13 normal feed breaker CLOSED OR o Bus 15 normal feed breaker CLOSED
a. (RNO) Perform the following: Note: Since only 'A ' EDG is
1) Close non-safeguards bus tie breakers: running with -1875 KW, they may direct starting DIG Air
  • Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie Comp per ATT-11.2 and not
  • Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie tie to non-safeguards buses in
2) Reset Control Room Lighting step 25c.
b. Verify SW isolation valves to turbine Note: Closed earlier due to building -OPEN less than 3 SW pumps
  • MOV-4613 and MOV-46'70 running.
  • MOV-4614 and MOV-4664
b. (RNO) Restore IA using Service Air Compressor per step 25c.
c. Verify adequate air compressor(s)

RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ...:.,4_ _ _ _ _ Page 44 of 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment

c. (RNO) Manually start electric air Note: Since only 'A ' EDG is compressors as power supply permits: running with -1875 KW, they
  • Buses 13/15 normal feed breakers may direct starting DIG Air closed-no restrictions Comp per ATT -11.2 and not tie to non-safeguards buses.
  • Buses 14/16 normal feed breakers CLOSED 6 amps per air compressor
  • Buses 14/16 DIG breaker CLOSED 75 kw per air compressor IF eclectic air compressors CAN NOT be started, THEN start the diesel air compressor and tie to Instrument Air (refer to ATT-11.2, ATTACHMENT DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR)

BOP (Step 25d) Check IA supply:

o Pressure -GREATER THAN 60 PSIG o Pressure-STABLE OR RISING (Step 25d RNO)

d. Perform the following:
1. Continue attempts to restore IA (refer to AP-IA.1, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR)
2. Continue with Step 26. WHEN IA restored, THEN do Steps 25e and f.

HCO tep 25e) Reset both trains of XV relays for to CNMT AOV-5392 HCO (Step 25t) Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;....-_ _ _ _ Page 45 of ....,;5;..;;.5-1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 26) Check Auxiliary Building Radiation NORMAL

  • Plant vent particulate (R-13)
  • Plant vent gas (R-14)
  • CCW Monitor (R-17)
  • Letdown Line monitor (R-9)
  • Charging pump room (R4)

CRS (step 26 RNO) Evaluate cause of abnormal Note to examiner: Go to conditions. page 51 for ECA-1.2 IF the cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside CNMT. THEN go to ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1)

E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:

  • SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
  • RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
  • Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here.

BOP (Step 2) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is Intact:

  • Pressure in both SIGs - STABLE OR RISING
  • Pressure in both SIGs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~________ Page 46 of 55

......;;.;~-I Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment BOP (*Step 3) Monitor Intact S/G Levels:

  • Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMn
  • Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50%

(Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal

  • Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)
  • Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The CRS may contact activity Chemistry.

SIM DRIVER: As Chemistry, acknowledge.

HCO (*Step 5) Monitor PRZR PORV Status:

a. Power to PORV block valves AVAILABLE
b. PORVs - CLOSED
  • (Step 5b RNO) IF PRZR pressure less than 2335 pSig, THEN manually close PORVs.

IF any PORV can NOT be closed, THEN NOTE: The CRS will manually close its block valve. IF block recognize that the Block Valve valve can NOT be closed, THEN has failed, and that this step is dispatch AO to locally check breaker. NOT applicable.

  • MOV-515, MCC D position 6C
  • MOV-516, MCC C position 6C
c. Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

HCO (Step 6) Reset SI.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~_ _ _ _ Page 47 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Depress CI reset pushbutton

  • Check at least two SW pumps Note: Manually start SW RUNNING pumps as power permits
  • Dispatch AO to establish normal NOTE: The CRS will dispatch shutdown alignment (Refer to ATT-17.0, anAO.

ATTACHMENT SD-1) SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge.

HCO (Step 9) Establish fA to CNMT:

a. Verify non-safeguards busses energized from offsite power
a. (RNO Perform the following:
1) Close the non-safeguards bus tie breakers
  • Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie
  • Bus 15 to Bus 19 tie
2) reset Control Room Lightning
b. Verify turbine building SW isolation valves

-OPEN

  • MOV-4613 and MOV-4670
  • MOV-4614 and MOV-4664 C. Verify adequate air compressors RUNNING
d. Check IA supply:
  • Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG
  • Pressure STABLE OR RISING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ~4_________ Page 48 of .....:;.;55::""'--1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment

e. Reset both trains of XY relays for 11 to CNMT AOV-5392
f. Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 - OPEN BOP (Step 10) Check Normal Power Available To Charging Pumps:
  • Bus 14 normal feed breaker - CLOSED
  • Bus 16 normal feed breaker - CLOSED (Step 10a. RNO)

Verify adequate emergency DIG capacity to run charging pumps (75 kweach)

If sufficient power is available GO to Step 11.

HCO (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

  • Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running.
  • (Step 11a RNO) Perform the following:
  • IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP thermal NOTE: CCW flow to the RCP barrier OR any RCP #1 seal outlet has NOT been lost, nor is any temperature greater than 235°F, RCP #1 seal outlet THEN ...... . temperature greater than 235°F.
  • Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0%.
  • (Step 11 Continued) Charging pump suction aligned to RWST:
  • LCV-112B - OPEN
  • LCV-1112C - CLOSED (Step 11 b RNO) manually align valves as necessary.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # .....;.4_ _ _ _ _ Page Event

Description:

Spurious 51 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 11 Continued) NOTE: The HCO will start one Start charging pumps and adjust charging Charging Pump even though flow as necessary to restore PRZR level Pzr Level is off-scale high.

HCO (Step 12) Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

  • Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 psig

[1650 psig adverse CNMT]

CRS (Step 12a RNO) Do NOT stop SI pumps. Go to Step 13.

HCO (*Step 13) Monitor If CNMT Spray Should Be Stopped:

  • CNMT spray pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: No CS pumps running CRS (Step 13a RNO) Go to Step 14.

HCO (*Step 14) Monitor IF RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

  • Check RCS pressure:
  • Pressure - GREATER THAN 300 psig

[350 psig adverse CNMT]

  • RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING
  • RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING IN IN.IECTIOI\I MODE
  • Stop RHR pumps and place in AUTO NOTE: The HCO will STOP the RHR Pumps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4~________ Page 50 of """;";"---1 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment CRS

  • Dispatch AO to perform ATT-14.6, NOTE: The CRS will dispatch ATTACHMENT RHR PRESS anAO.

REDUCTION, Part A. SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge. Use INSIGHT point t_p682a to provide RHR pump suction pressure. If asked, report RHR discharge pressure -100 PSIG, and pressure reduction is not necessary per this Att.

BOP (Step 15) Che.ck RCS And SIG Pressures

  • Check pressures in both S/Gs STABLE OR RISING
  • Check pressures in both S/Gs GREATER THAN 110 PSIG
  • Check RCS pressure - STABLE OR LOWERING BOP (Step 16) CHECK IF EMERGENCY DIGs Should Be Stopped:
  • Verify Safeguards busses 14,16,17, and 18 voltage - GREATER THAN 440 VOLTS
  • Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage energized by offsite power:
  • Emergency DIG output breakers OPEN
  • AC emergency bus normal feed breakers - CLOSED Stop any unloaded emergency DIG and place in standby (Refer to ATT-S.1, ATTACHMENT DIG STOP)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: 2 Event # _4~________ Page 51 of _5;;.,;5;;""--11 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Status:

a. Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL
  • Plant vent particulate (R-*13)
  • Plant vent gas (R-14)
  • CCW liquid monitor (R-17)
  • LTDN line monitor (R-9)
  • CHG pump room (R-4)
b. WHEN TSC is manned, THEN request NOTE: The TSC will NOT be evaluation of sampling requirements. manned.
  • CNMT Sump pH (Step 17 ) RNO Note: The team will If cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 CNMT, THEN go to ECA-1.2 LOCA step 17.

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, step 1.

ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 1) Verify Proper RHR Normal Cooling Valves Alignment:

a. Verify the following valves CLOSED o MOV-700 and MOV-701 RHR suction valves from A hot leg CLOSED o MOV-720 and MOV-721 RHR discharge valves from B cold leg CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;....._ _ _ _ Page 52 of ...,;5;;,;;;.5----Jj Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Critical Task:

ECA-1.2--A Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of ECA-1.2.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing radioactive release.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

HCO (Step 2) Check CVCS Valves Alignment:

b. Verify the following valves CLOSED o AOV-310 Excess letdown isolation o AOV-296, auxiliary spray valve o AOV-392A, Charging line isolation valve to loop B hot leg
b. Verify the following CI valves CLOSED o MOV-313 seal return isolation o AOV-371, letdown isolation valve

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..;....._ _ _ _ Page 53 of _5;;.;5~~

Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 3) Check Safeguards Valves for backflow:

(Step 3 conti)

a. Ensure SI reset.
b. Close RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge MOV-852A (turn DC power keyswitch)
c. Check for RCS pressure rise. Note: The leak will be isolated and RCS pressure will rise.
d. Go to Step 7.

HCO (Step 7) Check if Break is isolated:

a. RCS pressure is rising.

HCO (Step 8) Check if Leakage to the Auxiliary Building has stopped.

a. Monitor Leakage to the Auxiliary Building has stopped.
  • Auxiliary Building sump
  • WHUT Levels
b. Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT.

Note: Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1, per Lead Examiner

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #2 UNIT STATUS:

Power level: -2% RCS [B] 2160pm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm


Power History: The Plant is at 2% power (BOl), Core Burnup: 150 MWD/MTU with 0-1.2 Startup in progress..

INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

  • The plant is at -2% power (BOL) with a plant startup in progress per 0-1.2.
  • Fuel pre-conditioning limits are no longer in effect
  • The plant tripped several days ago due to a malfunction on the A Main Feedwater Pump.
  • Corrective Maintenance has been completed, all post-maintenance testing was completed satisfactorily, and the A MFW pump is currently running.
  • Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 60 gpm.
  • The electric plant is in a normal 50/50 lineup, and no electrical declarations are in effect.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

  • The B Diesel Generator is OOS for repairs to the governor. Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. LCO 3.B.1 was entered 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago, and an A 52.4 has been submitted. SR-3.B.1.1 (offsite circuit availability and breaker alignment) was performed 1 hr ago, and all other required surveillances are current.

The crew has been directed to continue the plant startup at Step 6.7, Transition from AFW to MFW. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 %

Reactor Power till notified.

As part of this major action sequence:

  • S/G Blowdown will not be placed in service at this time.
  • P-15.36, 'A' MFW Pump Seal Drain Tank Water Diversion and Restoration, has been completed

A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion OatefTime B EDG ~_/12 0800 Governor ITS 3.8.1 0800 yesterday. ITS 3.8.1 linkage will not Enter Condition B Enter Condition G reset Required Action: Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 B.1: Perform SR 3.8.11 for the in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> oftsite circuit.-Perform every 8 AND hours, [Due in 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s] Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 AND in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> B.2. Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.

AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. [7 days]

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial License Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-3

REFERENCES:

1. 0-6.9.2, Establishing and/or Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A112B
2. AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or
3. AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 220S psi;
4. A-S03.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide S. AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure
6. ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure
7. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
8. TRM 3.4.3, ATWS Mitigation
9. AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 14soF
10. AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure
11. Tech Spec LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer PORVs
12. Tech Spec LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage
13. AR-H-7, Condenser High Pressure 2S.S" Hg
14. AR-K-30, Turbine Sampling Rack Trouble 1S. AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump or NPSH
16. AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum
17. AP-TURB.S, Rapid Load Reduction
18. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection
19. FR-H.1, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
20. ATT-12.0, N2 PORVs
21. ATT-S.1, SAFW
22. ATT-22.0, Restoring Feed Flow Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor Facility Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50%

due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%.

RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 - 0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-PROTECTED-EQUIPMENT, The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow at 0800 .. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Action.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

0 FDW1'IB 'B' MDAFW trip on overcurrent on start FDW15B SAFW Pump "D" fails to start 1 NA N-BOP Swap to 100/0 electrical lineup on Circuit 767 per 0-6.9.2, N-SRO Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power To Bus 12A / 12B 2 PZR02D I-BOP Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails high (ITS 3.3.1: Trip (2500) I-RO channel within 6 hrs, TRM: TR 3.4.3 Immediately declare ATWS mitigating capability inoperable - was applicable until channel 429 IND- I(ITS)-SRO RPS07BK was selected as the controlling channel in the PLP)

(off)

TC408C Bistable status light failed 3 PZR05B C-RO Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage> "PORV INOPERABLE"

[7.4] C(TS)-SRO condition (-21 gpm)

OVR PZR03B (OFF) 4 REM- R-BOP Loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be CND50 R-RO ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region (0.04) R-SRO criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) Turbine Trip causes a Reactor Trip.

5 OVR-DI- C-BOP EH "Go" pushbutton does not work TUR05BD C-SRO

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 6 STM09A M-BOP "B" SG Safety Valve 3508 and 3510 failed open (close when Bleed (100) M-RO and Feed criteria met)

STM09C M-SRO (100)

STM11A Steam break on "A" SG inside CNMT (1 EO?)

EDS08 4KV Auto Bus Transfer fails to occur automatically (Both)

EDS04A Loss of Bus 14 (conditional on reactor trip)

FDW12 TDAFW Pump speed control failed to 0 (0)

? SIS02A C-RO SI fails to actuate automatically SIS02B C-SRO (man avail)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Overview of Scenario #3: PORV Leakage, Loss of Vacuum, Reactor Trip, SI, FR-H.1 The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to SO% due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 - 0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-Protected Equipment. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow at 0800. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action.

Shortly after taking the watch the team will swap to 10010 electrical lineup per 0-6.9.2.

Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure.

The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or
  • AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 220S psi;
  • AP-PZR.1 , Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and
  • ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition. The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly I/C to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact I/C directly, and sometimes he will request that the WCC contact I/C. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable).

While the PT-449 defeat is in progress, approximately a 20 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431 C.

The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
  • AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure The crew will attempt to close PORV-431 C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-S1S, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage). Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >1 Ogpm must also be declared inoperable (Block valve closed and power removed) per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions."

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS I TRM requirements associated with the PT-449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

  • AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
  • AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
  • AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure. When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur.

Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, RCS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "C" SBAFP has no power. Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed, or attempt to align and start "0" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per 2.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "0" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160] inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs.

After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the WCC that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow per the guidance of step 3.

Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is established.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks:

E-O--D Manually actuate at least one train of 81 before transition to FR-H.1.

Safety Significance:

The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.
2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room.

Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of Condenser vacuum causes a forced crew trip of the turbine, once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met or a trip on low vacuum will occur.

crew to trip the turbine trip which causes a reactor trip (P-9 present). Upon reactor trip, steam flow through the SG safeties will be sufficient to cause a valid 81 signal prior to the team completing E-O step 4.

2. Manual SI is available.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 FR-H.1--F Initiate RCS Bleed so that the ReS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed (SI injection) to occur.

Safety Significance:

Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No AFW available.
3. Secondary heat sink required.
4. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS

~~~~~~~~

D Reset to IC-27 70% power MOL At T=O, insert:

  • MALF FDW11B, MDAFW Pump 'B' trip
  • MALF FDW15B, SAFW Pump 'D' trip
  • MALF FDW12 [0], TDAFW speed control failure
  • MALF SIS02A [Man Avail], SI Train A failure
  • MALF SIS02B [Man Avail], SI Train B failure Make a schedule file as follows:
  • Set T-30 conditional on "Reactor Trip Signal from Either Logic Train (1/2)"
  • Set to Event 29 conditional to "x05i098d", Turbine manual trip PB
  • Set to event 29, OVR-D.I.-RPS03, [True], manual Rx Trip pushbutton
  • Set to event 29, MALF A-RPS12, [Off], D-1 MCB alarm
  • Set to event 29, MALF, A-TUR01, [On],D-24 MCB Alarm
  • Run schedule file while simulator in run.

Insert the following:

  • MALF PZR02D [2500], on T-2 (PT-449 failure)
  • OVR-DO-IND-RPS07BK [OFF], on T-2 (B/S status light failure
  • MALF PZR05B [7.4], on T-3 (PORV-431C leakage)
  • REM CND50 [0.04] on T -4, (Condenser vacuum leak)
  • MALF-A-MIS49, [ON, 120 sec delay], AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Touble
  • OVR-DI-TUR05BD [False], on T-4 ('GO' pushbutton failure)
  • MALF STM09A [100%], on T-30 (Safety valve fails open on 'B S/G)
  • MALF STM09C [100], on T-30, (Safety Valve fails open on 'B' S/G)
  • MALF STM11A, [2E+6, 120 second Ramp], on T-30 (MSLB on 'B' S/G inside CNMT)
  • MALF EDS08 [BOTH], on T-30 (4KV Auto Bus Transfer)
  • MALF EDS04A, on T-30 (Loss of 480V Bus 14)

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 o Prior to Crew Briefing RUN To take 'B' CS pump OOS:

  • Pull stop the 'B' CS Pump II Place CAUTION tag on 'B' CS Pump
  • Place PROTECT tags per OPG-Protected Equipment
  • Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Equipment
  • Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciator J-28 and AA 25 o Crew Briefing
  • Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
  • Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
  • Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-6.9.2, Section 6.4 marked up as follows:

o All steps in Sections 6.4.1 are marked NA o All steps in Sections 6.4.3 are marked NA 0 T-O Begin Familiarization Period 0 At direction of Event 1 Shift Electric Plant examiner At direction of Event 2 PT-449 fails High examiner Trigger #2 2500, No Ramp PZR02D RPS07BK 0 At direction of Event 3 PORV-431C leakage >10 9pm requiring closing of examiner IVIOV-515 Trigger#3 PZR05B '7.4 % open with open indication light override OVR-D.0.-PZR03B,

[OFF]

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 At direction of Event 4 Loss of Condenser Vacuum with loss of auto EH control 0 examiner Trigger#3 REM CND50 [0.04]

No ramp OVR-D.l-TURB05D

[False]

0 At direction of Event 5 Upon Reactor Trip [Conditional T-30]:

examiner Trigger #30 STM09A S/G safety for B S/G lifts (2)

STM09C Steam line break in CNMT STM11A Failure of 4KV Auto Bus Transfer EDS08 [BOTH] Loss of Emergency Bus 14 EDS04A 0 Continued Event 6 SIS Train A and B failure to actuate from Event 5 T=O NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O.

SIS02A SIS02B 0 Continued Event 7 AUX Feedwater Pump 1B Failure from Event 5 T=O NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O.

FDW11B 0 Continued Event 8 TDAFW Speed Control Failure from Event 5 T=O NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O.

FDW12 0 Continued Event 9 Standby AFW pump D fails to function from Event 5 T=O NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O.

o Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _1~ _ _ _ _ Page 11 of 67

......;;..;..~

Event

Description:

Shift Electric Plant Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift the Electric Line-up from 50/50 to 10010 in accordance with 0-6_9.2, Establishing andlor Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A112B, section 6.3.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0-6.9.2, ESTABLISHING AND/OR TRANSFERRING OFFSITE POWER TO BUS 12A1BUS 12B BOP (Step 6.3.1) ESTABLISH Offsite Power to 12B Bus using Circuit 767 as follows:

(1.) MARK BUS 12A NORMAL FEED Note: Closed FROM 7T, 52/12AY, BREAKER INITIAL POSITION.

(2.) VERIFY CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 76702 34 KV BUS.

(3.) TURN ON BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, 52/12BY SYNCHROSCOPE Note: BOP reviews expected alarms with CRS.

AR-J-6: 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP AR-L-20: 12A XFMR or 12A BUS TROUBLE (4.) CLOSE BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767,52/12BY.

(5.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM Note: Marks N/A 7T, 52/12AY, was initially OPEN, THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White Light EXTINGUISHED). OTHERWISE, MARK this step N/A.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # --:..._ _ _ _ Page 12 of 67

--'----I Event

Description:

Shift Electric Plant BOP (6.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY was initially CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the following: IF NOT, THEN MARK this Substep N/A

a. VERIFY breaker OPENED (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light ILLUMINATED).
b. PLACE BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY Control switch to the TRIP position AND THEN to AUTO
c. VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light ILLUMINATED).

(7.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM NOTE: 52/12AY is OPEN.

7T, 52/12AY, is not OPEN, Marks step N/A THEN IMMEDIATELY PERFORM Attachment 1, 7T/Bus 12A Circulating Current Contingency Action, OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A (8.) VERIFY BUS 12A VOLTMETER 4160V indicates approximately 4000 VOLTS (9.) TURN OFF BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, 52/12BY SYNCHROSCOPE AND REMOVE the handle.

SIM DRIVER: Use REM EDS49 to clear 12A transformer alarm L-20 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 13 of _6';";"'---11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI PRESS 2310 psi
  • AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi;
  • AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and
  • ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition. The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly IIC to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact IIC directly, and sometimes he will request that the WCC contact IIC. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable).

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 Indications Available:

  • AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi
  • AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI PRESS 2310 psi AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi BOP 1. Perform a channel checl<. Note: HCO will take 431 K to CRS manual and restore PRZR pressure per A-503.1.

CRS 2. Go to applicable Procedure: NOTE: The CRS will go to ER

  • AP-TURB.2, if turbine load INST.1, may refer to rejection has occurred. AP-PRZR.1 and at exit at
  • AP-PRZR.1, if presence is step 1.

abnormal for plant conditions.

  • ER-INST.1, if channel failed.
  • AP-RCS.1, If RCS leak is indicated.

CRS o Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.1

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No .. N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 14 of _6;;.,;7_-lI Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

ITS 3.4.1, ReS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits lCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperatufe. and RCS total flow rate shall be Withm the limits specified in theCOLR.

- NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to:

a. THERMAL POWER ramp> 5% RTP per minute; or
b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP.

APPLICABILITY: MODEl ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A1 Restore RCS DNS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters not within parameter(s) to within limit limits.

B. Required Action and S.1 Be In MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2"--_ _ _ _ Page 15 of _6;;;.;7_..,1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

CRS 3. Notify the following: NOTE: The CRS may notify o SM the WCC or request STNSM perform notifications.

o I&C Booth Instructor: as wee, o WCC acknowledge.

AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI Press 2310 psi BOP 1. IF RCS pressure is high, THEN go to Note: Should go to AP AP-PRZR.1 PRZR.1 due to controlling channel failure.

CRS 2. If due to instrument failure, THEN refer to ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 1) Check PZR Pressure:

  • All 4 narrow range channels - Note: Channel 449 failed high APPROXIMATELY EQUAL
  • All 4 narrow range channels TRENDING TOGETHER (Step 1 RNO) If one pressure channel deviates significantly from the other 3, THEN perform the following:
a. IF the controlling PRZR pressure channel Note: HCO may have has failed, THEN place controller 431 Kin previously have taken 431 K to MANUAL and adjust output to restore PRZR manual and restore PRZR pressure. pressure per A-503.1.
b. Refer to ER-INST.1 Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power - STABLE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...,;2;;...._ _ _ _ Page 16 of """;';--11 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure:

  • Pressure - LESS THAN 2235 PSIG
  • Pressure - GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status:
  • PRZR proportional heater breaker CLOSED
  • PRZR heater backup group- ON HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valves - NOTE: The Spray Valves CLOSED should be CLOSED now, but were previously opened.
  • AOV-431A
  • AOV-431B HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, NOTE: The 431 K Output is at 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50% 100% (at time of failure).

HCO (Step 6 RNO) Place 431 K in MANUAL and NOTE: This may have already lower output to restore PRZR pressure to been accomplished, per the 2235 psig. Guidance of A-503.1.

HCO (Step 7) Check PZR PORVs:

  • Go to Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.. N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # .....;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 17 of .....;6;.;,.7--1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

ER-INST.1 REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE CRS (Step 6.1.1) Identify the failed instrument BOP channel by observation of the bistable status light board, MCB annunciators, and the MCB meteri indication.

CRS (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed instrument loop and/or channel has been identified, THEN refer to the appropriate section of this procedure listed below:

PRZR Pressure Channel Failures Sect 6.3 HCO (Step 6.3.1) (IF the controlling PRZR NOTE: The HCO may already Pressure channel has failed (normally have taken HC-431 K to PT-449, but PT-429 may be selected as manual previously and controlling channel), THEN place HC- controlling RCS pressure 431K in MANUAL at about 50% and manually.

control ure manual CRS (Step 6.3.2) IF PT-430 OR PT-431 has NOTE: N/A failed closed THEN CLOSE block valve:

  • PT-429: MOV-516
  • PT-431:MOV-515 CRS (Step 6.3.3) IF hot leg streaming has been NOTE: N/A but should causing single channel IIT runback evaluate.

signals, THEN perform step 6.3.4.1.

IF NOT, THEN go to step 6.3.5.

1. IF reactor power is greater than 98.5%, THEN reduce reactor power to approximately 98.5% RTP to minimize the possibility of reactor trip due to hot leg streaming.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 18 of Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

CRS (Step 6.3.4) Refer to the appropriate Note: Refers to PI-449 attachment to defeat the associated YELLOW CHANNEL control functions: Attachment PRZR PRESSURE PI-429 RED CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-430 WHITE CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-431 BLUE CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 YELLOW CHANNEL ER-INST.1 Attachment 8, YELLOW CHANNEL-PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 Note: Operator will obtain data per step 4.0 to prepare for the instrument defeat brief and to determine expected status of proving lights during the defeat CRS Directs CO review attachment and hold a channel defeat brief.

BOP Reviews Attachment-8 and notes expected NOTE: The CO will request a plant response for conditions and when peer checker during the defeat ready hold brief for defeating PI-449. brief.

Expected alarms/Indications during defeat:

AR-F-23, RCS OTAT Channel Alert Bistable Lights:

PC449A Lo Press Trip TC408COTAT CRS Once brief is complete, directs CO to perform defeat.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # .....;2"--_ _ _ _ Page 19 of ""';;";"---i 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

BOP (Step 1.0) IF PRZR pressure channel NOTE: N/A failure resulted in a runback, THEN verify the Rod Control selector switch (MCB) is in MANUAL until the defeat is completed.

(step 1.1) Ensure Rod Control Select Switch (MCB) in MANUAL until the defeat is "'l"'irYlnIIO:>T~.n BOP (Step 2.0) NOTE: Places P/429A to In the PLP PRZR PRESS AND LEVEL DEFEAT-1.

rack, check the PRZR pressure DEFEAT switch P/429A position.

  • IF P/429A is in NORMAL, THEN place P/429A to DEFEAT-1.

OR

  • IF P/429A is NOT in NORMAL, THEN notify the Shift Manager.

BOP (Step 3.0) NOTE: Places T/405F DELTA In the RIL INSERTION LIMIT rack, T DEFEAT switch to LOOP B PLACE T/405F DELTA T DEFEAT UNIT2.

switch to LOOP B UNIT 2.

Note:

While PT-449 defeat is in progress, a 20 gpm leak will occur on PORV-431C [Event #3] when directed by Lead Examiner. This attachment will be completed after PORV-431C event is completed BOP (Step 4.0) Determine the expected Bistable light status for the post defeat condition as follows:

(Step 4.1)

RECORD the following Data:

  • PRZR Pressure PI-449_ _PSIG
  • LOOP 18-2 A TEMP TI-408B _ _oF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ~2__________ Page 20 of _6;;;,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

(Step 4.2)

Determine the expected post defeat Bistable proving light status and circle thEl expected status in the table below:

408 LOOP 8*2 OVERTEMP TRIP Light OFF !E TI4088 ~ TI408A 449 CHANNEL 4 LOW PRESS TRIP Light OFF lie PI449 < t873 psig Expected Proving Post DE'feat light Bistable Light Status (Circle) Statu~, Verified 408 LOOP 8*2 ON OFF OVERTEMP TRIP 449 CHANNEL 4 ON OFF LOW PRESS TRIP (Step 5.0) Note: Expected proving lights:

In the (YELLOW) Y1 PROTECTION CHANNEL 2 rack, PLACE the following bistable proving switches to DEFEAT (UP) and VERIFY the proving light status is correct per the table above.

[ON]

408 LOOP 8-2

  • OVERTEMP TRIP [OFF]

449 CHANNEL 4 AR-F-23, RCS OT~ T Channel

  • LO PRESS TRIP Alert BOP (step 6.0) NOTE: Takes PRZR pressure PLACE the PRZR pressure recorder recorder transfer switch (MCB) transfer switch (MCB) to position 1-3. to position 1-3.

BOP (Step 7.0) NOTE: Bistable TC408C not lit Verify the bistable status lights listed and informs the CRS.

above are lit.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2~ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of _6.;;.,;7_....

Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

CRS Notes that TC408C Bistable light is not lit..

Informs the SM and I&C. Directs the CO to continue with the defeat if not completed.

BOP Step (8.0-8.15) Deletes 404/408 from processing in PPCS:

o Select "Group Update" display o Select "List Server Groups" o Select 404_408 from the pick list o TURN "OFF" scan processing, then click the "SET SCAN Processing" button o Answer prompts o Select the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display o Select Point ID T0404 o TURN "ON" scan processing o Select "Change" o Answer prompts o Select the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display o Select Point 10 P0449 o TURN "OFF" scan processing.

o Select "Change" o Answer prompts BOP (Step 9.0) Informs CRS that defeat is completed and next attachment directs to go to step 6.3.5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 22 of ....,;6::..:.,7----4 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

CRS (Step 6.3.5) Note: Only controls in manual.

Restores systems to automatic:

  • PRZR Pressure Control o HC 431K o PRZR Spray Valves o PRZR Heaters o PRZR Level Control o Rod Control o Steam Dump o Turbine EH control CRS (Step 6.3.7 Note: N/A Open any PORV Block Valve closed in step 6.3.2.

CRS (Step 6.3.8) Note:

Check the following ITS Sections for LCO's: ITS 3.3.1: Reactor Trip System

1. Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-'1, (RTS) Instrumentation Functions 5, 7a and 7b (7b not required for PT -449) ITS 3.3.2: Engineering Safety
2. Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-'1, Function Feature Actuation System 1d (not required for PT-449) (ESFAS) Instrumentation
3. Section 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-'1, Functions 1 and 6 ITS 3.3.2: Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2=--_ _ _ _ Page 23 of Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip (RS) Instrumentation 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3,3.1 The RTS instrumentation fOr each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTIONS

- NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.l Enter the Condition Immediately with one channel referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable. for the channel(s).

Two source range channels inoperable.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 24 of _6;;,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR LIMITING ornER SAFETY SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS SETTINGS!a)

1. Manual ReaclOrTrip 1,2, 2 S,C SR3.3.1.11 NA 3ib 1, 4fb1, 5,b)
2. Power Range Neutron Flux
a. High 1,2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1  :;;109.27%

SR3.3.1.2 RIP SR3.3.U SR3.3.UO

b. low 1(0), 2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1 ~29.28%

SR 3.3.1.8 RTP SR 3.3.1.10

3. Intermediate Range 1(Cl, 2 2 E,G SR 3.3.1.1 (a)

Neulron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.10

4. SOurce Range ;2!"1 2 F,G SR3.3.1.1 (a)

Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.B SR3.3.1.10 3ib), 4(b), 5(b) 2 H,I SR3.3.1.1 (a)

SR3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.10 3in, 4(1), Si"fl 1 J SR3.3.U NA SR3.3.1.10

5. OVertemperaiure aT 1,2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to SR3.3.1.3 Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.10
6. Overpower aT 1,2 4 D,G SR3.3.1.1 Refer to SR3.3.1.7 Note 2 SR 3.3.1.10

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ~2__________ Page 25 of _6;;..;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR LIMITING OTHER SAFETY SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS SETTINGS'*)

7. Pressurizer Pressure
a. Low 4 K,L SR 3.3.1.1 21791.3 SR 3.3.1.7 psig SR 3.3.1.10 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.

Post accident (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

- NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ~1 Restore required channel to 30 days OPERABLE status.

-NOTE Not applicable to Functions 3 and 4.

One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

Table 3.3.3-1 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation fUNCTION REQUIRED CONDITION CHANNELS

1. Pressurizer Pressure 2 F
2. Pressurizer level 2 F
3. Reactor Coolant System (ReS) Hot Leg Temperature F
4. Res Cold Leg Temperature 1 per loop F
5. Res Pressure (Wide Range) 2 F
6. Res SUtxooling Monitor 2 F CRS (step 6.3.9) Note: N/A Check TRM 3.4.3, Anticipated Transients Without Scram TW ation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2;;;;...._ _ _ _ Page 27 of "';;';--11 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

TECHNICAL Requirements Manual 3.4.3 Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation TR 3.4.3 Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation TR 3.4.3 ATWS Mitigation shall be OPERABLE as follows:

B. Each PORV shall be capable of automatic actumon and each block valve shall be open;

b. Manual rod insertion shall be OPERABLE; and
c. ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AM SAC) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 45% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A One or more PORV A.1 Declare ATWS mitigating Immediately I automatic flow inoperable.

path capability inoperable.

Manual rod insertion inoperable.

AMSAC inopemble CRS (step 6.3.10) Note: N/A IF turbine run back has occurred AND rods are in MANUAL, THEN verify Rod Control is available by stepping Rods IN THEN OUT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 28 of _6;;;.,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#)

CRS (step 6.3.11) Note: N/A Restore AUTO Rod Control if desired.

CRS (Step 6.3.12)

Go to Step 6.15 CRS (Step 6.15)

Performs Follow Up Actions instrument defeated is completed following after the PORV-431C failure (Event #3), per Lead Examiner, commence event # 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 29 of 67


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

While the PT-449 defeat is in progress, a 21 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431C. The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

  • AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
  • AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure The crew will attempt to close PORV-431C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-515, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage). Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >10gpm must also be declared inoperable (Block valve closed and power removed) per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions. >>

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 Indications Available:

  • AR-F-10, Pressurizer LO Press 2205 PSI
  • AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
  • PPCS Indications and alarms AR-F-19. PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F CRS (Step 1) IF Pressurizer pressure is lowering, NOTE: The HCO will THEN GO TO AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL recognize that PZR Pressure PRESSUR~ERPRESSURE. is lowering because of the Open PORV.

AR-F-10, Pressurizer LO Pressure 2205 psi, ITS LCO 4.3.1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 30 of 67


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

HCO (Step 2) Check PRZR PORV outlet NOTE: The HCO may attempt temperature, TI-438. to close PCV-431C, in accordance with A-503.1.

Upon recognizing that PCV 431C did NOT close, the HCO will close MOV-515.

HCO (Step 3) Check PRT parameters .

HCO (Step 4) Check Containment temperature.

CRS (Step 5) Start OR swap Containment Recirc Fans per Shift Manager directions.

CRS (Step 6) Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.11 and 3.4.13. Note:

ITS 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 31 of 67


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

CRS Declares PORV-431C inoperable and Note; This nay be performed informs SM. in AP-PZR.1 Note: When block closed and CRS directs AO to open breaker for MOV-515, (MCC D pos 6c), which removes form MOV-515 and makes PORV-431C INOPERABLE to meet ITS 3.4.11.

SIM Driver INSERT the following:

  • OVR-D.O-PZR04A,

[OFF], MOV-515 closed green light

  • OVR-D.I.-OVR PZR04D, [False],

MOV-515 open signal

  • OVR-D.I-OVR PZR04C, [True],

MOV-515 close signal AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 1) Check PZR Pressure:

  • All 4 narrow range channels Note: If PORV-431C closed APPROXIMATELY EQUAL previously, all pressures are rising except PT-449 which is failed high and defeat in progress.
  • All 4 narrow range channels TRENDING TOGETHER HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power - STABLE HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure:
  • Pressure - LESS THAN 2235 PSIG
  • Pressure - GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 32 of


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status:

a. PRZR proportional heater breaker CLOSED
b. PRZR heater backup group - ON Note: Depends how quickly PORV-431C is isolated. Steps 4b RNO may be required.

HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valves - NOTE: The Spray Valves CLOSED should be CLOSED now, but were previously opened.

  • AOV-431A
  • AOV-431B HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, NOTE: 431 K in manual 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50% previously during PT-449 failure HCO (Step 7) Check PZR PORVs:
a. PORVs Closed
a. (RNO) Manually close PORVs. Note: May have previously IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN closed MOV-515 manually close the associated block Valve
  • MOV-516 for PCV-430
  • MOV-515 for PCV-431C HCO Closes MOV-S15 HCO 7b. Annunciator F-19 PRZR PORV OUTLET Note: Alarm response actions HI TEMP 145"F-EXTINGUSHED may have been completed previously.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 33 of 67


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

b. (RNO) IF PORV leakage is indicated Note: MOV-515 should be THEN perform the following: closed and RCS pressure
1) Close PORV block valves one at a time rising.

AND check if pressure stabilizes.

  • MOV-516 for PCV-430 Note: Only MOV-515 closed.
  • MOV-515 for PCV-431C
2) If a leaking PRZR PORV identified, THEN open any non leaking PORV block valve and go to Step 8.

HCO (Step 8) Attempt to reseat any leaking any leaking PORV

a. Verify affected PORV block valve Note: MOV-515 is closed CLOSED
  • MOV-516 for PCV-430
  • MOV-515 for PCV-431C
b. Cycle the leaking PORV open and closed. Note: PORV-431C does not operate due to failure.
c. Open affected PORV block valve Note: Since PORV-431C does not operate, they may not open associated block valve.
d. Verify leakage has stopped. Note; Leakage is stopped with block shut and PORV-431C failure
e. Go to step 11.

HCO (step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control restored

a. Pressure-Trending to 2235
b. Go to Step 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12.1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 34 of 67


Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

HCO (step 16) Check PRT indications

a. level-Between 61-84%
b. Pressure-Approximately Stable 1.5 PSIG and Stable
c. Temperature-At CNMT ambient temperature and stable HCO (step 17) Establish PRZR pressure Control in AUTO
a. Verify 431 K in Auto
a. (RNO) Place 431 K in AUTO if desired Note: Maintains in manual due to PT-449 failure
b. Verify PRZR spray in AUTO
c. Verify PRZR heaters restored:

o PRZR proportional heaters breaker closed o PRZR backup heaters breaker reset in AUTO CRS (Step 18) Evaluate MCB Annunciators CRS (Step 19) Notify higher supervision CRS (Step 20) Notify Reactor Engineer for Transient Monitoring Program

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Even1:# 3 Page 35 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure. Temperature, and FIO'III' Departure from Nudeate Boiling (DNB)

Limits LCO 3.4_1 RCS DNB parameters for p"*,surizer pressure, Res average temperature, and RCS tctaJ flow rate shall be within the limits specified in theCOLR.

- NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to:

a. THERMAL POWER ramp"> 5% RTP per minute; or
b. THERMAL POWER stoep"> 10% RTP.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Res DNB A.t Restom RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters not within parame~ter(s} to within limit.

limits.

B. Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure is within limit specified in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> theCOLR.

SR 3.4.1.2 Verify Res average temperature is within limit 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> specified in the COLR.

  • Go to Step 9.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Evenll # 3 Page 36 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

-NOTE

1. Separate entry into Condition A is allowed for each PORV.
2. Separate entry into Condition C is allowed for each block valve.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both PORVs A.1 ClOSE! and maintain power 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OPERABLE and not to associated bloCK valve.

capable of being automatically controlled. OR A.2 Place aSSOCiated PORV in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> manual control.

B. One PORV inoperable. 8.1 Close associated block 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> valve.

AND B.2 Remove power from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> aSSOCiated block valve.

AND B.3 Restore PORV to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPEI~ABLE status.

C. One block valve C.1 Place associated PORV in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. manual control.

AND I I I

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 37 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

d. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and d_ 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any I one steam generator (SG).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LEAKAGE not within limits.

limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to I secondary LEAKAGE.

B. Required Action and 6.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> assodated Completion Time not met B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> RCS pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.

Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit I I I At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 38 of 67

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS I TRM requirements associated with the PT-449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur.

(The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

  • AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
  • AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
  • AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure. When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 Indications Available:

  • AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG, and
  • AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction
  • Numerous secondary plant PPCS alarms

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _4~_ _ _ _ Page 39 of _6;..,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum CRS Upon PPCS alarms may refer to AP-FW.1 Note to Examiner: Depending BOP until load rejection or lowering vacuum is on indications diagnosed, the noted. crew will commence AP-FW.1 until a more applicable AP entered. Crews during validations did steps in AP-FW.1 AP-TURB.2, Load Rejection AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum SIM Driver: AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack will alarm and after 2 minutes after sent to investigate as Chem. Tech, report alarm due to high Condensate Dissolved Oxygen and investigating cause.

AP-FW.1, ABNORMAL MFW FLOW or NPSH (Step 1) Check MFW requirements:

a. Power - GREATER THAN 50%

. Both MPW pumps running

. Go to Step 3 CRS (Step 3) Check S/G Status:

  • MFW flows> Steam flows
  • S/G levels stabilizing or returning to program BOP (Step 4) Verify At Least 2 Condensate NOTE: The B Condensate Pumps - RUNNING Pump may automatically START.

BOP (Step 5) Verify Both HDT Pumps - RUNNING NOTE: The A Heater Drain Pump has tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 40 of 67

~--------- -~~

Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum BOP (Step 6) Check Condensate Booster Pumps Note: Power at 70% and not running required.

(Step 6 RNO) Ensure power less than 80%

and continue with step 7 BOP (Step 7) Check hotwell Level Note: Hotwell levels and temperatures are rising due to hotwell recuirc valve open o Hotwell Level Controller in AUTO o Controller demand less than 70%

o Hotwell Level at setpoint (Step 7 RNO) Take manual control of hotwell level BOP (Step 8) Check MFW Pump Suction Pressure o Both MFW pump suction pressures GREATER THAN 200 PSIG o Annuciator H-17, FEED PUMP NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD EXTI NGU ISH ED BOP (Step 9) Verify adequate MFW flow o A MFW flow-GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO A STEAM FLOW o B MFWflow-GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO B STEAM FLOW BOP (Step 10) Check Status of MFW System:

a. Both MFW pumps -RUNNING

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;....._ _ _ _ Page 41 of Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum

b. Verify condensate pump recuirc valve Note: Valve is open due to AOV-4238- CLOSED (PPCS V4:238) opening to provide more cooling water to the air ejectors due to lowering vacuum.

AP-Turb.2 Load Rejection BOP (Step 1) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: May enter AP-Turb.4 CRS

  • Tavg GREATER THAN 545'F directly.
  • Tavg LESS THAN 579°F BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine valves:
  • Turbine stop valves and reheat steam valves-OPEN
  • Turbine control valves-ALL VALVES AT APPROXIMATEL Y THE SAME POSITION BOP (Step 3) Check Steam Dump Status HCO (Step 4) Verify Tavg-TRENDING TO TREF HCO (Step 5) Monitor PRZR Pressure-TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG AUTO BOP (Step 6) Monitor MFW regulatin Valves RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO HCO (Step 7) Monitor PRZR Level-TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 42 of ....;6;.;.,.7--1 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum BOP (Step 8) Check Turbine Runback: Criteria:

  • Any D. T annunicator -LIT BOP (Step 9) Check condenser Back Pressure- NOTE: May send AO to CRS PBACK LESS THAN 3 INCHES AND investigate lowering vacuum STABLE
  • IF loss of main condenser vacuum SIM DRIVER: as AO, indicated THEN go to AP-TURB.4 acknowledge, and report that all normal, still monitoring.

AP*Turb.4 Loss of Condenser Vacuum BOP (Step 1) Check condenser circulating Water sytem:

  • CW pump discharge valves-BOTH OPEN
  • CW pumps -BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) Check condenser Indications: NOTE: BOP/HCO may be CRS
  • Turbine back pressure-EACH monitoring back pressure on CONDENSER WITHIN THE PPCS and may be in DO NOT SATISFACTORY OPERATING OPERATE REGION already.

REGION OF FIG-13.0 FIGURE (PPCS Warnings and clock BACK PRESSURE started)

  • Condenser vacuum-STABLE OR IMPROVING CRS (Step 2) IF in the avoid region, THEN adjust BOP turbine load to return to the SATISFACTORY OPERATING REGION.

CRS (Step 2) While continuing with procedure BOP reduce load per AP-TURB.5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 43 of 67

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure. When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock.

Booth Operator Instructions: None (inserted on initial setup Indications Available:

  • AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG, and
  • AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction
  • Numerous secondary plant PPCS alarms AP-Turb.5-Rapid Load Reduction CRS Perform a load reduction brief per A-503.1 HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction
  • Verify rods in AUTO
  • Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:

BOP

  • Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.
  • Select desired rate on thumbwheel
  • Reduce the setter to the desired load
  • Depress the GO button Note: No response in AUTO BOP Reports that there is a failure of AUTO EH control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 44 of 67

~--------- -~~i Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control CRS Directs the CO to take manual control of EH NOTE: The load reduction will and reduce load on turbine continue till loss of vacuum trip or meeting the 5 minute time limit on AVOID region and manual trip is initiated.

HCO

  • Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACT1VITY-CALC. boration.
  • Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg
  • Tavg - GREATER THAN 545°F
  • T avg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY CALC):
  • Maintain rods above the insertion limit
  • Match Tavg and Tref NOTE: The CRS will return to the body of the procedure.
  • Compensate for Xenon HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure NOTE: Pressurizer Pressure is TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO trending down.

(Step 4 RNO) Control PRZR pressure by one of the following:

  • 431 K in MANUAL
  • Manual control of PRZR heaters and sprays If PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled manually, THEN refer to AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _5=--_ _ _ _ Page 45 of ....;6;;.;7_~1 Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control BOP (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - Note: Continue with load RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO reduction till trip HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Note: The next events automatically start upon the Reactor Trip

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...,;6=--_ _ _ _ Page 46 of ...;6;.;..7~

I Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur.

Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, ReS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "e" SBAFP has no power.

Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed, or attempt to align and start "D" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per Attachment 22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "D" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160] inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs.

After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the wee that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow pE;r the guidance of step 3.

Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is ~~t_a_b_lis_h_e_d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--i Booth Operator Instructions: Entered at T-0, occurred on trip Indications Available:

  • Numerous alarms on trip

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Evenl# 6 Page 47 of 67

~--------- -~~I Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip:

-OPEN

  • Neutron flux - LOWERING
  • MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Emergency Buses
  • Bus 14 and Bus 18 Note: The BOP notes that Bus 14 is not energized (L-5, SAFEGUARD BUS MAIN BREAKER OVER CURRENT)

TRIP is illuminated.

  • Bus 16 and Bus 17 HCO Notes status of Emergency DIG's HeOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:

BOP

  • SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;;...-_ _ _ _ Page 48 of _6;;.;7_-IJ Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 4 RNO) Manually actuate SI and CI Critical Tasks:

E-O--O Manually actuate at least one train of 51 before transition to FR-H.1.

Safety Significance:

The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.
2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room.

HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

  • Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY Note: Continuous action step EXTINGUISHED when CNMT pressure rises to setpoint

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 49 of _6..;.,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink CRS Directs HCO to perform Att-27.0 NOTE: The CRS will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-O.

Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at page 53.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:

  • All SI pumps - RUNNING
  • Both RHR pumps - RUNNING HCO (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans RUNNING:
  • All fans RUNNING
  • Charcoal filter dampers l~reen status lights - EXTINGUISHED i I (:::>lteo;;} (;heck If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:
  • Check if ANY main steamlines should be isolated
  • Low Tavg (545°F) AND high steam 6

flow (O.5x10 Ib/hr) from either S/G OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario #

--3 Event # _6;;..._ _ _ _ Page 50 of _6;;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink 6

  • High-High steam flow (4.4x10 Ib/hr) from either S/G
  • (Step3c RNO) Go to Step 4.

HCO (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:

  • MFW pumps - TRIPPED HCO
  • MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
  • S/G A, AOV-3995
  • S/G B, AOV-3994
  • S/G blowdown and sample valves CLOSED HCO (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps RUNNING HCO (Step 6) Verify CI and CVI:

Fail to close due to loss of MCC-C/Bus 14 power.

H rs to Attachment-3.0 to isolate MOV-313 OV-813 locally with AO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 51 of 67

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-3.0-AITACHMENT CI/CVI HCO Dispatches AO to isolate MOV-313 by SIM DRIVER: as Primary AO, closing: acknowledge and Close V-265

[CVC15] to simulate V-315A

  • V-315A and V-315C and report that
  • V-315C those valves are closed. [3 min delay]

HCO Dispatches AO to isolate locally close MOV- SIM DRIVER: as Primary AO, 813 acknowledge and locally close MOV-813:

-CLG63 [Disengaged]

-CLG64: [0]

Report that MOV-813 is locally closed [5 min delay]

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO * (Step 6 Continued) CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet valve status lights BRIGHT

  • FCV-4561
  • FCV-4562
  • Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
  • AOV-200A
  • AOV-200B
  • AOV-202 HCO (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
  • Verify CCW pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;....._ _ _ _ Page 52 of _6;;.,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink

8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow:

I flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW I. RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR LOW

  • (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 53 of _6..7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump Emergency Alignment:

  • RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
  • MOV-8S2A
  • MOV-8S2B
  • Verify SI pump C - RUNNING
  • Verify SI pump A - RUNNING 1----+---

Verify SI pump B - RUNNING

  • Verify SI pump C discharge valves OPEN
  • MOV-817A
  • MOV-817B BOP (Step 10) Verify CREATS Actuation:

1----+---

At least one damper in each flowpath CLOSED

  • Normal Supply Air
  • Normal Return Air
  • Lavatory Exhaust Air
  • CREATS fans - BOTH RUNNING BOP Performs a Status update and informs crew of status of Att-27.0 E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 54 of _6;;.;7_~

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps RUNNING (Step 7 RNO) Manually start both MDAFW NOTE: A MDAFW pump has pumps. no power (Bus 14) and B MDAFW pump tripped.

IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam supply valves.

  • MOV-3505A
  • MOV-3504A NOTE: The CO notes that the TDAFW pump is not operating.

CRS Notes that this a total loss of Heat Sink and continues with E-O to Step 9.

  • HCO (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment: Note: AFW not available.
  • AFW flow - INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)
  • AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;...-_ _ _ _ Page 55 of ~~I Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Sus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink:

  • Check S/G narrow range level Note: Adverse CNMT GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in any S/G
  • RNa-Verify total AFW flow GREATER THAN 200GPM
  • Notes that no AFW flow and go to FR H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK HCO (Step 1) Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a) RCS pressure- GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE b) Check RCS cold leg temperature GREATER THAN 350°F BOP (*Step 2) Monitor Secondary Heat Sink: Note: Adverse CNMT. In RNa o Verify either S/G level- WIDE to go to step 3 initially.

RANGE GREATER THAN 120 inches [160 inches adverse CNMT]

o Verify PRZR pressure- LESS THAN 2335 PSIG HCO (Step 3.a) Try to Establish AFW Flow To At Least One Intact S/G:

a) Check Slowdown and Sample Valves-CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # .....;6~_ _ _ _ Page 56 of .....;6;.,;..7---1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink (Step 3.a RNO) Place Blowdown and sample valve switches to CLOSE BOP (Step 3.b) Verify 2 MDAFW Pump AVAILABLE (Step 3.b RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The TDAFW Pump is IF the TDAFW is available THEN ..... . NOT available, however, the SBAFW System is available.

IF SBAFW is available THEN go to Step 4.

(Step 4) Stop Both RCPs set SI if Actuated BOP (Step 6) Try and Establish SAFW Flow To At NOTE: The CRS will hand off Least One Intact S/G: ATT-5.1 to either the HCO or a) Perform the following: the CO, and continue with the other operator in FR-H.1.

1) Align SAFW system for operation (Refer to ATT-5.1, Examiner following operator ATTACHMENT SAFW) performing ATT -5.1, continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT -5.1 continue at page 58 ATTACHMENT-S.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW NOTE: The CO will attempt to align Train Busing D SBAFW pump to feed the B SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # .....;6~_ _ _ _ Page 57 of .....;6;.;..7----i1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP (Step C) Align SAFW Pump D to selected S/G as follows:

1) Ensure SI reset
2) Ensure the following valves open:
  • MOV-9701 B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE
  • MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLVS
  • MOV-9704B, SAFW PUMP D ISOL VLV
  • MOV-9746, SAFW PMP D EMERG DISCH VLV
3) Open MOV-9629B, SAFW PUMP D SUCTIONVLV
4) Verify at least 1 SW pump running 5a) To feed S/G B, go to step 6.
6) Restore SAFW flow as directE!d by procedure in effect.

NOTE: The CO will report that the D SBAFW Pump is ready to be started.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CRS/ (Step 6.a.2) Determine SAFW flow NOTE: The CRS will direct the BOP requirements per ATT-22.0, ATI"ACHMENT CO to use ATT-22.0 to RESTORING FEED FLOW determine the allowable rate of feed flow to the B SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 58 of 67

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW BOP 1. Initiate Feed flow as follows: NOTE: The CO will determine a) Bleed and Feed initiated or required. that the B SG can be filled as desired to restore Narrow b) IF feedwater flow to affeGted S/G Range Level to > 25%. when a greater than 50 gpm OR affected SG Feedwater flow source is level greater than 50 inches (100 restored.

inches adverse CNMT), THEN fill as desired to restore narrow range greater than 7% (25% adverse CNMT) and go to step 2 of this attachment.

2. Check RCS Loop Hot Legs- BOTH HOT LEG TEMPERATURES LOWERING Return to step 1 of this attachment.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK BOP (Step 6.a.3) Start selected SAFV-J pump(s) NOTE: The D SBAFW Pump

a. IF greater than 215 gpm total SAFW will fail to start.

flow can NOT be established. THEN go to Step 7 CRS Notes that the SBAFW pump trips and might order second attempt before continuing on in FR-H.1 CRS (Step 6.a RNO) If greater than 2"15 gpm total SAFW flow can NOT be established. THEN go to Step 7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # .,.;6::.....-____ Page 59 of ...,;6;;.;..7---1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP (Step 7) Try to Establish MFW Flow to at Note: B FP is OOS and power Least One S/G not available to A FP.

  • RNO-Go to Step 8 BOP (Step 8) Establish conditions to Feed S/G's from condensate System.
  • RNO-Go to Step 8 BOP (Step 8) Establish Conditions to Feed S/G's with Condensate System
  • Any Condensate pumps running CRS RNO-Power not available, go to step 12. Note: Power not available due.

CRSt (Step 12) Verify Secondary Heat Sink BOP

  • a) Check S/G wide range levels Note: CRS will return to step both LESS THAN 120 INCHES one and continue attempts to

[160 inches adverse CNMT] restore Heat Sink until the requirements for BLEED AND FEED met.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;;...-_ _ _ _ Page 60 of _6;;;,.;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink CRITICAL TASK Initiate RCS Bleed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed (SI injection) to occur.

Safety Significance:

Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery.

Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip.
2. No AFW available.
3. Secondary heat sink required.
4. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint.

HCO (Step 13) Actuate SI and CI HCOI (Step 14) Verify RCS feed path:

CRS a) Check SI pump status-All running

  • a) RNO Manually start pumps and align valves as necessary
  • b) If at least 2 SI piumps running, GO to Step 15.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;....._ _ _ _ Page 61 of _6;;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCOI (Step 15) Establish RCS Bleed Path:

CRS

  • a) Open both PRZR PORV block valves Opens MOV-515 closed earlier clue to PORV Note: Opens available PORV, leakage crew may choose open block valve of INOPERABLE PORV to get additional bleed flow. If power was removed from block valve, then directs AO to restore power.

SIM Driver Remove the following:

  • OVR-D.O-PZR04A,

[OFF], MOV-515 closed green light

  • OVR-D.I.-OVR PZR04D, [False],

MOV-515 open signal OVR-D.I-OVR-PZR04C,

[True], MOV-515 close signal

  • b) Place both PORV switches to OPEN
  • c) Align RCS overpressure system to open both PRZR PORVs per ATT 12.0

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 62 of _6;;;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-12.0: ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS HCOI (Step A) Select a PORV with opE~rable block BOP valve, obtain a key for the RCS over pressurization system and perform the appropriate step below:

HCOI PCV-431C:

BOP

  • a) Verify block valve MOV-515 OPEN AND OPERABLE
  • b) Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616B to OPEN HCOI PCV-430:

BOP

  • a) Verify block valve MOV-516 OPEN AND OPERABLE
  • b) Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616A to OPEN BOP B) To depressurize the RCS in accordance with the guidance provided by the EOP step, perform the following:

PCV-431C, place over pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV 8619B, to ARM PCV-430, place over pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV 8619A, to ARM

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;....._ _ _ _ Page 63 of _6.;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 15d) Verify PORVs-BOTH OPEN HCOI (Step 16) Check if SI can be reset:

CRS a) Check SI blocked status light is EXTINGUISHED b) Check the following:

PRZR pressure-LESS THAN 1750 PSIG OR Either steamline pressure LESS THAN 514 PSIG c) Reset SI HCO (Step 17) Reset CI

a. Depress CI reset pushbutton
b. Verify annunciator A-26, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-EXTINGUISHED SIM DRIVER: Once SBAFW pump failed and Bleed and Feed is established, AND at the Lead Examiner's discretion, remove [MALF FDW11B], B MDAFW Trip and report as wee that B MDAFW pump is available to start.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 64 of 67 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink Note: CRS refers back to step 3 to start MDAFW pump and A TT-22.0 for feed requirements.

CRS (Step 3c) Check MCB indications for cause of AFW failure:

1) Verify CST level -GREATER THAN 5 FEET
2) Verify busses supplying power to MDAFW pumps -ENERGIZED
  • Bus 14 Note: Bus 16 is energized and
  • Bus 16 B MDAFW pump is avilable
3) Determine AFW Flow requirements per ATT-22.0 ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW CRS Directs starting MDAFW pump and feed limits per ATT-22.0.

ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW

  • CRSI (Step 2) Initiate Feed flow as follows: NOTE: The CRS will BOP a) Bleed and Feed initiated or required. determine that the B SG can be filled as desired to restore b) Check if RCS temp stable or Narrow Range Level to > 25%,

lowering when a Feedwater flow source c) Establish less than or equal to 100 is restored.

gpm feed flow to affected S/G.

WHEN S/G level greater than 50 inches (100 inches adverse CNMT, THEN fill as desired to restore narrow range greater than 7% (25%

adverse CNMT)

BOP Starts B MDAFW pump and feeds at max rate of (235 gpm)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;......-_ _ _ _ Page 65 of _6,;;..;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP Notes rising wide range level of B S/G.

CRS Continues with FR-H.1 while S.G water level Examiner NOTE: Terminate is restored. the Exam at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK BOP (Step 18) Verify Adequate SW flow:

a. Verify at least two SW pimps-RUNNING
b. Verify AUX BLDG SW isolation valves-AT LEAST ONE SET OPEN
  • MOV-4615 and MOV-4734
  • MOV-4616 and Mov-4735 BOP (Step 19) Establish IA to CNMT:
a. Verify non-safeguards buses energized from off-site power Terminate the Exam at the discretion of the Lead Examiner

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #3 UNIT STATUS:

Power Level: 70% RCS [B] 1075 ppm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm


------

Power History: The Plant is at 70% power (MOL), Core Burnup: 10000 MWD/MTU for four days.

INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

  • The plant is at 70% power (MOL).
  • The plant power was reduced several days ago due to a malfunction on the B Main Feedwater Pump.
  • Corrective Maintenance has been completed, and the MFW pump is running and is being observed for two more days at present power level, then raise power to 100%.
  • RG&E Energy Control Center has requested that the electric plant be aligned to a 10010 configuration on circuit 767 to allow the RG&E personnel to perform an insulator inspection on the 7T Line. Evolution should occur immediately after crew assumes the watch to adhere to planned work schedule.
  • Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 40 gpm.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

  • The B Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since 0800 yesterday. OPG-Protected Equipment signs are hanging. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 for ITS 3.6.6.A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO. has been submitted.

The crew has been directed to shift the electric: plant be aligned to a 10010 configuration on circuit 767 to allow the RG&E personnel to perform an insulator inspection on the 7T Line. Evolution should occur immediately after crew assumes the watch to adhere to planned work schedule.

A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion DatefTime B Containment .../.../12 0800 Bearing ITS 3.6.6 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from ITS 3.6.6 Spray Pump Replacement Enter Condition A 0800 yesterday. Enter Condition C Required Action A.1: Restore CS Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 Train to OPERABLE Status in 72 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> hours. AND Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />