Text

Final Operating Test (Sections a, B, and C) (Folder 3)
	ML20322A350
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	09/17/2020
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Operations Branch I
Shared Package
ML19309E375	List: IR 05000244/2020301; ML20267A420; ML20321A279; ML20322A350; ML20328A162; ML20328A279; ML20328A291; ML20329A141; ML20329A181; ML20329A200; ML20329A223; ML20329A239; ML20329A354; ML20329A432; ML20329A442; ML22103A223;
References
	CAC 000500
	Download: ML20322A350 (491)
	v • d • e

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A1a RO 2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Determine the Allowable Hours an JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1a Operator Can Work RO K/A

Reference:

2.1.5 (2.9)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last 2 Pages of this JPM) and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

Your previous work history is as provided.

Alternate work hour rules during the COVID-19 Pandemic are NOT authorized.

Your work schedule reveals that over the next five weeks you are scheduled to work an average of 52 hours6.018519e-4 days 0.0144 hours 8.597884e-5 weeks 1.9786e-5 months per week.

10/4/20 1740 You report to work for Shift Turnover.

10/4/20 1800 You assume the HCO watch.

Initiating Cue: Based on your previous work history, the US has directed you to:

1. Determine the latest time that you can be relieved without violating Work Hour Rules or requiring a waiver or exception.

2. Assuming that you get relieved and leave the site at the time determined in #1 above, determine the earliest time that you can report to work and assume the watch on 10/5/20, if at all, without violating any Work Hour Rules or requiring a waiver or exception.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will determine that the latest they can work is 1000 (+7 minutes) on 10/5/20 and the earliest they can assume the watch on 10/5/20 is 2000 (-7 Minutes) per the attached KEY.

Required Materials: Calculator General

References:

LS-AA-119, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR LIMITS, Rev 14 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of LS-AA-119 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 32 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because determining that they can work until 1000 (+7 Minutes) on 10/5/20 without violating overtime limits or requiring a waiver or exception is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 This step is critical because determining that they CANNOT assume the watch until 2000 (-7 Minutes) on 10/5/20 without violating overtime limits or requiring a waiver or exception is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last 2 Pages of this JPM) and Handout 1.

1 (LS-AA-119, Section 5.1.1 & 5.1.2) The operator determines that the Determine the latest time that you maximum amount of time that can can be relieved without violating be worked in a 24-hour period is overtime limits or requiring a 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months .

waiver or exception. ___ ___ ___

The operator determines that if the above 16-hour period is worked the 54-Hour Rule, will NOT be violated (6-Week Average will be 51.83 hours9.606481e-4 days 0.0231 hours 1.372354e-4 weeks 3.15815e-5 months or a total of 311 hours0.0036 days 0.0864 hours 5.142196e-4 weeks 1.183355e-4 months

[260 hours going forward + 45 hours5.208333e-4 days 0.0125 hours 7.440476e-5 weeks 1.71225e-5 months last week + 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months worked on 10/4/20]). ___ ___ ___

Examiner NOTE: When the Outage ended the six-week average 54-hour rolling limit was reset per Step 5.1.2.

The operator determines that if the above 16-hour period is worked the No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period, will NOT be exceeded (Maximum of 16 in a 48). ___ ___ ___

The operator determines that if the above 16-hour period is worked the No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day (168-hour) period, will NOT be exceeded. (Maximum 61 in 168) ___ ___ ___

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

The operator determines and documents that they can work until 1000 (+7 minutes) on 10/5/20 without violating overtime limits or requiring a waiver or exception.

(16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months excluding turnover time)

(Note: The 7 minutes allowance incorporates the requirements of Step 5.2.5)

See Attached KEY ___ ___ ___

2 (LS-AA-119, Section 5.1.1) The operator determines that a 34-Assuming that you get relieved Hour Break is NOT required and leave the site at the time because a 34-Hour break was determined in #1 above, determine experienced on 10/3-4/20.

the earliest time that you can report to work and assume on 10/5/20, if at all, without violating any Work Hour Rules or requiring a waiver or exception.

The operator determines and documents that they CANNOT assume the watch until 2000 (As early as 1953) on 10/5/20 without violating overtime limits or requiring a waiver or exception.

(10-hour break between successive work periods)

(Note: The 7 minutes allowance incorporates the requirements of Step 5.2.5)

See Attached KEY JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

Name: Applicants Name Latest date/time you can be relieved: _1000 (As late as 1007) on 10/5/20__

Earliest date/time you can assume the watch: _2000 (As early as 1953) on 10/5/20_

2020 Admin - JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET 2020 NRC RO Admin JPM A1a Data Sheet Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues 8/17 8/18 8/19 8/20 8/21 8/22 8/23 8/24 8/25 8/26 8/27 8/28 8/29 8/30 8/31 9/1 SHIFT D D D N N N HOURS 12 12 12 12 12 12 WORKED Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed Thurs 9/2 9/3 9/4 9/5 9/6 9/7 9/8 9/9 9/10 9/11 9/12 9/13 9/14 9/15 9/16 9/17 OUTAGE SHIFT D D D D N N N N N N N N HOURS 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 WORKED Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat 9/18 9/19 9/20 9/21 9/22 9/23 9/24 9/25 9/26 9/27 9/28 9/29 9/30 10/1 10/2 10/3 OUTAGE SHIFT N N N N N N N N D D D WCC HOURS 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 WORKED Sun Mon 10/4 10/5 SHIFT N HOURS 12 WORKED NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Your previous work history is as provided.

Alternate work hour rules during the COVID-19 Pandemic are NOT authorized.

Your work schedule reveals that over the next five weeks you are scheduled to work an average of 52 hours6.018519e-4 days 0.0144 hours 8.597884e-5 weeks 1.9786e-5 months per week.

10/4/20 1740 You report to work for Shift Turnover.

10/4/20 1800 You assume the HCO watch.

INITIATING CUE: Based on your previous work history, the US has directed you to:

1. Determine the latest time that you can be relieved without violating Work Hour Rules or requiring a waiver or exception.

2. Assuming that you get relieved and leave the site at the time determined in #1 above, determine the earliest time that you can report to work and assume the watch on 10/5/20, if at all, without violating any Work Hour Rules or requiring a waiver or exception.

Name: ________________________

Latest date/time you can be relieved: ________________________

Earliest date/time you can assume the watch: __________________

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A1b RO 2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Complete Plant System Checks JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1b Inside Control Room (Verify SDM) RO K/A

Reference:

2.1.25 (3.9)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

Initial Conditions:

You are the HCO and started shift at 0600 today.

You are performing Attachment 1, Modes 1, 2 and 3, of O-6.13, DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG.

The plant is in Mode 3.

The A RCP is running, and the B RCP is secured.

RCS temperature is stable at 530F.

RCS Boron Concentration is 1275 PPM.

The Rx Core is at 16,000 MWD/MTU.

Initiating Cue: 1. Complete the Attachment 1 check to Verify SDM on Page 6 of 10.

2. Identify, based on your check, if any action is required per Technical Specifications.

3. Identify the latest time that the Shutdown Margin Check of O-6.13, Attachment 1, can be completed.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will determine that adequate SDM does not exist, that the required ACTION is to Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit within 15 minutes and identify that Attachment 1 of O-6.13 must be complete by 0900.

Required Materials: None General

References:

O-6.13, DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG, Rev 202 O-3, HOT SHUTDOWN WITH XENON PRESENT, Rev 049 O-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION FOR THE XENON FREE ALL RODS IN - MOST REACTIVE ROD STUCK OUT SHUTDOWN MARGIN, Rev 063 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT - CYCLE 42, Rev 0 Technical Specification LCO 3.1.1, SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM),

Amendment 122 Technical Specification LCO 3.1.1, SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM),

Basis. Rev 42 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of O-6.13 Handout 2: Technical Specification LCO 3.1.1, SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)/Basis Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 10 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical using Attachment 14 of O-6.13 to determine the Minimum RCS Boron Concentration to be 1290-1310 ppm and comparing the current RCS Boron Concentration to the required RCS Boron Concentration and determining that SDM does NOT exist is necessary to complete the directed task.

Step 2 This step is critical because determining that the required ACTION is to Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit within 15 minutes is necessary to complete the directed task.

Step 3 This step is critical because determining that Attachment 1 of O-6.13 must be complete by 0900 is necessary to complete the directed task.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

1 (Directed Action 1; O-6.13, Step The operator addresses Step 6.3.26) Complete the 6.3.26 of O-6.13.

Attachment 1 check to Verify SDM on Page 6 of 10. ___ ___ ___

The operator addresses Step VERIFY SDM as follows: 6.3.26.1 of O-6.13 and determines that this step does NOT apply and IF in Mode 2 with Keff less than proceeds.

1.0 OR Mode 3 with RCS temperature greater than 535°F, The operator addresses Step 6.3.26.2 of O-6.13 and proceeds to THEN Attachment 14.

IF in Mode 3 with RCS

Temperature less than or equal to Using Attachment 14 of O-6.13, 535°F, OR in Mode 4 OR Mode 5, the operator determines the THEN USE Attachment 14, CSD intersect point for 16,000 Boron Concentration MWD/MTU (X Axis) and the curve Requirement Cycle 42, of this and determines the Minimum RCS procedure to verify Boron Boron Concentration (Y Axis) to be Concentration. 1290-1310 ppm.

The operator compares the current RCS Boron Concentration of 1275 PPM to the required RCS Boron Concentration (1290-1310 ppm) and determines and documents that SDM does NOT exist (Circle NO on Cue Sheet).

See Attached KEY ___ ___ ___

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

2 (Directed Action 2) Identify, The operator addresses Technical based on your check, if any Specification LCO 3.1.1 and action is required per Technical determines that the LCO is NOT Specifications. met, Condition A is applicable and documents (On Cue Sheet) that the required ACTION is to Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit within 15 minutes.

See Attached KEY ___ ___ ___

3 (Directed Action 3) Identify the The operator determines and latest time that the Shutdown documents (On Cue Sheet) that Margin Check of O-6.13, Plant Systems Check (Inside Attachment 1, can be Control Room) section of O-6.13, Attachment 1 must be complete by completed.

0900 (Step 6.3.2 of O-6.13).

See Attached KEY ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

Adequate SDM exists (Circle One)

YES NO Identify, based on your check, if any action is Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit required per Technical Specifications. within 15 minutes.

Latest time that the Shutdown Margin Check of O-6.13, Attachment 1, can be completed:

0900 2020 Admin - JPM A1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You are the HCO and started shift at 0600 today.

You are performing Attachment 1, Modes 1, 2 and 3, of O-6.13, DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG.

The plant is in Mode 3.

The A RCP is running, and the B RCP is secured.

RCS temperature is stable at 530F.

RCS Boron Concentration is 1275 PPM.

The Rx Core is at 16,000 MWD/MTU.

INITIATING CUE: 1. Complete the Attachment 1 check to Verify SDM on Page 6 of 10.

2. Identify, based on your check, if any action is required per Technical Specifications.

3. Identify the latest time that the Shutdown Margin Check of O-6.13, Attachment 1, can be completed.

Adequate SDM exists (Circle One)

YES NO Identify, based on your check, if any action is required per Technical Specifications.

Latest time that the Shutdown Margin Check of O-6.13, Attachment 1, can be completed:

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A2 RO NOTE: This JPM will be performed individually.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Determine Leak Isolation JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A2 Boundaries RO K/A

Reference:

2.2.41 (3.5)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page) of this JPM and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

A leak has occurred on the Service Water System in the Aux Building.

The crew has entered AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak.

The EO reports that the leak is coming from a drain line on a 20-inch header. The pipe upstream of V-4793, Service Water Loop B Drain Valve, has separated from the header.

Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to:

1. Identify the closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak.

2. Identify which, if any, of these valves need to be re-positioned from their current position.

3. Identify the Breaker location for any electrically operated leak isolation boundary valve that may need to be operated.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will review the Piping & Instrumentation Diagram of the Service Water System as well as system procedures and determine the closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak, the boundary valves that need to be re-positioned and identify the Breaker location for the two MOVs in accordance with the Attached KEY.

Required Materials: The operator must have access to all General References.

General

References:

Drawing 33013-1250 Sheet 1 of 3, Station Service Water Safety Related (SW) P&ID, Rev 66 Drawing 33013-1250 Sheet 2 of 3, Station Service Water Safety Related (SW) P&ID, Rev 52 Drawing 33013-1250 Sheet 3 of 3, Station Service Water Safety Related (SW) P&ID, Rev 41 P-12, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SETPOINTS, Rev 029 T-36.1, STATION SERVICE WATER HEADER VALVE ALIGNMENT FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION, Rev 052 T-44.2, SAFW SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR NORMAL OPERATION, Rev 038 OP-AA-109-101, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TAGOUT PROCESS, Rev 016 Handouts: Handout 1: Drawing 33013-1250 Sheet 1, 2 and 3 of 3, Station Service Water Safety Related (SW) P&ID.

Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because reviewing the Flow Diagram of the Service Water System P&ID and determining the closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 This step is critical because reviewing the Flow Diagram of the Service Water System P&ID, T-36.1 and T-44.2 and determining that three valves must be re-positioned is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 3 This step is critical because reviewing the Flow Diagram of the Service Water System P&ID, P-12, T-36.1 and/or T-44.2 and determining that the breaker for MOV-4615 is on MCC C Compartment 14J; and the breaker for MOV-4734 is on MCC D Compartment 6F is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page) of this JPM and Handout 1.

Examiner NOTE: When asked by the applicant for a General Reference procedure such as P-12, T-36.1 and/or T-44.2, provide the applicant with a copy.

1 (Directed Action) Identify the The operator will review the Flow closest leak isolation boundary Diagram of the Service Water valves for this leak. System P&ID and determine and document (Cue Sheet) the closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak are:

MOV-4615

MOV-4734

V-4779

V-9626B See Attached KEY

2 (Directed Action) Identify which, if The operator will review the Flow any, of these valves need to be Diagram of the Service Water re-positioned from their current System P&ID, T-36.1 and/or T-position. 44.2 and determine and document (Cue Sheet) that the following valves must be re-positioned:

MOV-4615

MOV-4734

V-9626B See Attached KEY 2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

3 (Directed Action) Identify the The operator will review the Flow Breaker location for any Diagram of the Service Water electrically operated leak System P&ID, P-12, T-36.1 and/or isolation boundary valve that T-44.2 and determine and document (Cue Sheet) that the may need to be operated. breaker for MOV-4615 is on MCC C Compartment 14J; and the breaker for MOV-4734 is on MCC D Compartment 6F See Attached KEY JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

Closest leak isolation MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLV boundary valves for this MOV-4734, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLV leak. V-4779, SW LOOPS A & B CROSSTIE VLV (AUX BLDG)

V-9626B, SERV WTR INLET ISOL VLV TO STDBY AUX FW PMP RM As a MINIMUM, the above valves must be identified.

Which, if any, leak MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLV isolation boundary MOV-4734, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLV valves need to be re- V-9626B, SERV WTR INLET ISOL VLV TO STDBY AUX FW positioned from their PMP RM current position.

Breaker location for any The breaker for MOV-4615 is on MCC C Compartment 14J electrically operated leak The breaker for MOV-4734 is on MCC D Compartment 6F isolation boundary valve that may need to be operated.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

A leak has occurred on the Service Water System in the Aux Building.

The crew has entered AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak.

The EO reports that the leak is coming from a drain line on a 20-inch header. The pipe upstream of V-4793, Service Water Loop B Drain Valve, has separated from the header.

INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to:

1. Identify the closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak.

2. Identify which, if any, of these valves need to be re-positioned from their current position.

3. Identify the Breaker location for any electrically operated leak isolation boundary valve that may need to be operated.

Closest leak isolation boundary valves for this leak.

Which, if any, leak isolation boundary valves need to be re-positioned from their current position.

Breaker location for any electrically operated leak isolation boundary valve that may need to be operated.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A3 RO NOTE: This JPM will be performed individually.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Evaluate Steam Generator Tube JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A3 Leakage from R-47 Reading RO K/A

Reference:

2.3.5 (2.9)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page) of this JPM, and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Secondary EO has called and indicated that the R-47 AMBER light is blinking, and the R-47 bar graph indication, which is also AMBER, is reading 5.265E2 cpm.

The EO reports that:

The R-47 WARNING alarm setpoint is 4.76E2 cpm.

The R-47 HIGH alarm setpoint is 9.33E2 cpm.

The HCO reports that the PPCS point R47G is reading 4.4 gpd and stable.

RP/Chemistry has been requested to obtain and analyze an air ejector grab sample.

The crew is evaluating the need to enter AP-SG.1, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to:

Determine if the R-47 alarm setpoints are set properly (If NO, identify their current condition as too HIGH or LOW).

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet

Determine the estimated Steam Generator Tube Leakrate based on the local R-47 reading.

Determine if AP-SG.1, Steam Generator Tube Leak, should be entered based on the known information.

Task Standard: The operator will determine that the R-47 alarm setpoints are set lower than identified by P-9, that the leakrate is 4.5 gpd based on the R-47 reading and that this leakrate is below the entry conditions into AP-SG.1.

Required Materials: Calculator All General References must be available to the operator General

References:

AR-RMS-R47, R-47 AIR EJECTOR NOBLE GAS MONITOR, Rev 00000 AR-PPCS-R47AR, SGTL INDICATED, Rev 00000 RE Ginna Curve Book, Curve 06-004, Steam Generator Tube Leak Rate vs. RM-47 Reading, Rev 7/15/19 AP-SG.1, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK, Rev 019 P-9, RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM, Rev 107 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of AP-SG.1 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because using Attachment 1 of P-9 and comparing the required and actual HIGH and WARNING setpoints of R-47 is necessary to determine that the R-47 alarm setpoints are set lower than identified by P-9.

Step 2 This step is critical because comparing the local R-47 reading to Curve #06-004 and determining that Steam Generator Tube Leakage is 4.5 gpd is necessary to determine that the local R-47 reading is too low to support entry into AP-SG.1.

Step 3 This step is critical because comparing the known information to the AP-SG.1 Entry Conditions and Symptoms and determining that none are met; and determining that AP-SG.1 should NOT be entered is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page) of this JPM, and Handout 1.

Examiner NOTE: When asked by the applicant for a General Reference procedure such as AR-RMS-R47, AR-PPCS-R47AR, RE Ginna Curve Book and/or P-9, provide the applicant with a copy.

1 Determine if the R-47 alarm The operator obtains P-9, setpoints are set properly. Radiation Monitoring System.

The operator uses Attachment 1 of P-9 to determine that the required R-47 HIGH alarm must be set at 9.33E6 cpm.

The operator uses Attachment 1 P-9 to determine that the R-47 WARNING alarm should be set at 4.67E6 cpm.

The operator compares the reported R-47 HIGH and WARNING alarm setpoints to that required by P-9 and determines that both alarm setpoints are incorrectly set too LOW and circles NO/Too Low on Cue Sheet.

See Attached Key CUE If the operator requests the alarm setpoints as listed on the PPCS, indicate that the WARNING alarm is set at 4.67E6 cpm, and the HIGH alarm setpoint is set at 9.33E6 cpm.

Examiner Note: There is a potential that the alarm setpoints on the PPCS and the local instrument could be set differently. The PPCS alarm setpoints are set by IT personnel controlling the PPCS Software. The alarm setpoints on the local instrument are set by operators.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 2 Determine the estimated Steam The operator obtains Curve 06-Generator Tube Leakrate based 004, Steam Generator Tube Leak on the local R-47 reading. Rate vs. RM-47 Reading.

The operator compares the local R-47 reading of 5.265E2 to Curve

06-004 and determines and documents (Cue Sheet) that Steam Generator Tube Leakage is 4.5 gpd.

See Attached Key CUE If asked, report as the Secondary EO that the Air Ejector leakoff is 3.0 SCFM.

3 Determine if AP-SG.1, Steam The operator reviews Entry Generator Tube Leak, should be Conditions and Symptoms of AP-entered based on the known SG.1. ___ ___ ___

information.

The operator compares the known information to the AP-SG.1 Entry Conditions and Symptoms and determines and documents (Cue Sheet) that none are met; and determines and documents (Cue Sheet) that AP-SG.1 should NOT be entered.

See Attached Key Examiner Note: The operator may indicate that AP-SG.1 could be entered based on the results of the requested Air Ejector grab sample.

JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

R-47 alarm setpoints are set properly YES / NO IF NO (Otherwise NA):

Too HIGH / Too LOW Estimated Steam Generator Tube Leakrate based on the local R-47 reading. 4.5 gpd Should AP-SG.1 be entered?

YES / NO 2020 Admin - JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Secondary EO has called and indicated that the R-47 AMBER light is blinking, and the R-47 bar graph indication, which is also AMBER, is reading 5.265E2 cpm.

The EO reports that:

The R-47 WARNING alarm setpoint is 4.76E2 cpm.

The R-47 HIGH alarm setpoint is 9.33E2 cpm.

The HCO reports that the PPCS point R47G is reading 4.4 gpd and stable.

RP/Chemistry has been requested to obtain and analyze an air ejector grab sample.

The crew is evaluating the need to enter AP-SG.1, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to:

Determine if the R-47 alarm setpoints are set properly (If NO, identify their current condition as too HIGH or LOW).

Determine the estimated Steam Generator Tube Leakrate based on the local R-47 reading.

Determine if AP-SG.1, Steam Generator Tube Leak, should be entered based on the known information.

R-47 alarm setpoints are set properly YES / NO IF NO (Otherwise NA):

Too HIGH / Too LOW Estimated Steam Generator Tube Leakrate based on the local R-47 reading.

Should AP-SG.1 be entered?

YES / NO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A1a SRO 2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Determine Time to Boil for a Loss of JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1a Shutdown Cooling SRO K/A

Reference:

2.1.25 (4.2)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is in Mode 5 for a mid-cycle outage.

The reactor has been shutdown for 60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months .

The pressurizer is solid with LTOP in service.

RCS temperature is 100°F.

You are the US.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Time to Boil given a Loss of RHR and the following two sets of conditions:

For present plant conditions, AND

Exactly ten (10) days from now when:

PRZR Level will be 13%

RCS temperature will be 100°F

PRZR Manway is OFF 2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will use IP-OUT-2 and determine that the Time to Boil for the present plant conditions is 3.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and for the projected conditions ten days from now is 1.65 hours7.523148e-4 days 0.0181 hours 1.074735e-4 weeks 2.47325e-5 months .

Required Materials: Calculator General

References:

IP-OUT-2, OUTAGE RISK MANAGEMENT, Rev 024 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of IP-OUT-2 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 12 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because determining that Page 5 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to Reach Saturation with Pressurizer Full and RCS Closed, most closely approximates present plant conditions, addressing this page and determining time to boil to be 3.60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months for the present plant conditions is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 This step is critical because determining that Page 9 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to Reach Saturation with Pressurizer at 13% Level and RCS Vented, most closely approximates the predicted plant conditions, addressing this page and determining time to boil to be 1.65 hours7.523148e-4 days 0.0181 hours 1.074735e-4 weeks 2.47325e-5 months for the predicted plant conditions is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

(Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 1

to-boil for a loss of RHR under proceeds to Attachment E.

Present Plant conditions. ___ ___ ___

The operator determines that Page 5 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to Reach Saturation with Pressurizer Full and RCS Closed, most closely approximates present plant conditions, and addresses this page. ___ ___ ___

The operator finds the intersecting cell for Time after Shutdown (hrs) -

60 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 100°F and ___ ___ ___

determines and documents (Cue Sheet) time to boil to be 3.60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months .

See Attached Key (Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 2

to-boil for a loss of RHR Exactly proceeds to Attachment E.

ten (10) days from now when:

PRZR Level will be 13%

RCS temperature will be 100°F ___ ___ ___

PRZR Manway is OFF 2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number The operator determines that Page 2 CONTD 9 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to

Reach Saturation with Pressurizer at 13% Level and RCS Vented, most closely approximates the predicted plant conditions, and ___ ___ ___

addresses this page.

The operator finds the intersecting cell for Time after Shutdown (hrs) -

300 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 100°F and determines and documents (Cue Sheet) time to boil to be 1.65 ___ ___ ___

hours.

See Attached Key JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

Present Plant Conditions:

3.60 Hours Projected Plant Conditions:

(Ten Days from now) 1.65 Hours 2020 Admin - JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 5 for a mid-cycle outage.

The reactor has been shutdown for 60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months .

The pressurizer is solid with LTOP in service.

RCS temperature is 100°F.

You are the US.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Time to Boil given a Loss of RHR and the following two sets of conditions:

For present plant conditions, AND

Exactly ten (10) days from now when:

PRZR Level will be 13%

RCS temperature will be 100°F

PRZR Manway is OFF Record Answers Below:

Present Plant Conditions:

Projected Plant Conditions:

(Ten Days from now)

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A1b SRO 2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Determine Reportability JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1b Requirements SRO K/A

Reference:

2.1.18 (3.8)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

Initial Conditions:

With the plant at 100% power, the following event occurred at 0900 today:

A failure of the A Feed Regulating Valve Controller resulted in an automatic reactor trip signal.

The crew entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and all equipment responded as expected.

The SM has verified that this event has NOT exceeded an Emergency Action Level (EAL).

The SM and the STA believe that this event is reportable to the NRC.

No external persons and/or agencies have been notified of this event, nor have any actions other than those identified been taken.

Initiating Cue: Ten minutes after the event the SM directs you to determine reportability requirements, including completion of any necessary paperwork (Provide to Examiner when ready to Transmit).

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will identify that this issue requires a 4-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with LS-AA-1020 (Reportability Tables and Decision Trees), and complete NRC Form 361 (Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet) in accordance with the provided Key.

Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.

General

References:

LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES, Rev 30 LS-AA-1110, REPORTABILITY REFERENCE MANUAL, Rev 29 LS-AA-1120, REPORTABILITY REFERENCE MANUAL, Rev 21 LS-AA-1130, REPORTABILITY REFERENCE MANUAL, Rev 17 LS-AA-1150, NRC FORM 361, Rev 001 PI-AA-120, ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING PROCESS, Rev 10 OP-AA-106-101-1001, EVENT RESPONSE GUIDELINES, Rev 31 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of LS-AA-1020 Handout 2: Blank copy of LS-AA-1150 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 18 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because determining that Event Number SAF 1.6 is applicable and that this event must be reported via the ENS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of the occurrence is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 Portions of this step are critical because completing the NRC Form 361 per the provided KEY is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

(Directed Action) The SM directs The operator reviews LS-AA-1020, 1

you to determine reportability Decision Trees - Operations and requirements. determines that SAF 1.5, 1.6 and ___ ___ ___

1.7 should be evaluated.

The operator reviews LS-AA-1020, Reportability Reference Manual, Volume 1 - Table SAF. ___ ___ ___

The operator determines and documents on Form 361 that Event Number SAF 1.6 is applicable and that this event must be reported via the ENS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of the occurrence.

See Provided Key Examiner Note: SAF 1.6 is Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation, per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

The operator determines and documents on Form 361 that Event Number SAF 1.7 is applicable and that this event must be reported via the ENS within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the occurrence. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: SAF 1.7 is Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation, per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv). It is NOT considered Critical because it requires an 8-Hour Report and is bounded by the Critical 4-Hour report required because of the same event.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (Directed Action) Complete any The operator enters Ginna in the

2 necessary paperwork for Facility or Organization Block of reportability. Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters their name in the Name of Caller/Title Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters the Control Room # in the Call Back # Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters 0900 EST in the Event Time & Zone Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters the current date in the Event Date Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters 100%/Mode 1 in the Power/Mode (At Time of Event) Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters 0%/Mode 3 in the Power/Mode (At Time of Notification) Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the box associated with 4-HR.NON-EMERGENCY 10CFR 50.72(b)(2), (iv)(B) RPS ___ ___ ___

Actuation (scram), ARPS Block of Handout 2.

See Provided Key 2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number The operator places a checkmark 2

or X in the box associated with 8-(Contd) HR.NON-EMERGENCY 10CFR 50.72(b)(3), (iv)(A) Specified ___ ___ ___

System Actuation, AESF Block of Handout 2.

See Provided Key The operator enters The Reactor was automatically tripped from 100% power due to a secondary system transient or an equivalent description in the Event Description (Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken ___ ___ ___

or planned etc.) Block on Page 1 of Handout 2.

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the WILL BE box associated with Notification of the NRC Resident Block of Handout ___ ___ ___

2.

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the WILL BE or NO box associated with Notification of the State(s) Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the WILL BE or NO box associated with Notification of the Local Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key 2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number The operator places a checkmark 2

or X in the WILL BE or NO box (Contd) associated with Notification of the Other Gov Agencies Block of ___ ___ ___

Handout 2.

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the WILL BE or NO box associated with Notification of the Media/Press Release Block of ___ ___ ___

Handout 2.

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the NO box associated with Anything Unusual or not understood? Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator places a checkmark or X in the YES box associated with Did all systems function as required? Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key The operator enters MODE 3 in the Mode of operations until corrected (if applicable) Block of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key 2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number The operator places a checkmark 2

or X in the NO box associated with (Contd) Additional Information continued on the next page Block of Handout 2, or YES box if additional information is documented in the Event Description (Include:

Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned etc.)

Block on Page 2 of Handout 2. ___ ___ ___

See Provided Key JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

With the plant at 100% power, the following event occurred at 0900 today:

A failure of the A Feed Regulating Valve Controller resulted in an automatic reactor trip signal.

The crew entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and all equipment responded as expected.

The SM has verified that this event has NOT exceeded an Emergency Action Level (EAL).

The SM and the STA believe that this event is reportable to the NRC.

No external persons and/or agencies have been notified of this event, nor have any actions other than those identified been taken.

INITIATING CUE: Ten minutes after the event the SM directs you to determine reportability requirements, including completion of any necessary paperwork (Provide to Examiner when ready to Transmit).

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

JPM A1b SRO KEY RED = Critical LS-AA-1150 Revision 001 Page 1 of 2 Ginna Operator's Name Control Rm #

0900 EST Today's date 100%/Mode 1 0%/Mode 3 X

X The Reactor was automatically tripped from 100% power due to a secondary system transient (Or Equivalent).

X X

X X X

X X X X MODE 3 X X X Notifications: Checking "NO" and/or "Will Be" is acceptable for State, Local, Other Gove Agencies, Media Press Release.

LS-AA-1150 Revision 001 Page 2 of 2

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A2 SRO 2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

A-52.12, Inoperability of a Fire JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A2 Damper SRO K/A

Reference:

2.2.42 (4.6)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-3.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

STP-E-13.26, TESTING OF FIRE DAMPERS, is in progress.

a report from the field has indicated that Fire Damper BA-28, located in the wall separating the Turbine Building from Battery Room A, has failed its drop test and is stuck in its current OPEN position.

No other Fire Protection/Detection System components are OOS.

You are the US.

Initiating Cue:

Document the failure of the Fire Damper by completing A-52.12-F-03, CONTROL OF LCO FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION, DETECTION, FIRE BARRIERS, NFPA 805 AND HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS (HSSC); and identify all, if any, required ACTION.

When documenting the failure, assume all required notifications and response actions are implemented as needed.

Task Standard: The operator will complete an A-52.12-F-03 in accordance with the provided KEY and identify that ACTION A.1.1 or A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2; and A.2 of TRM 3.7.5 must be taken.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.

General

References:

A-52.12, NONFUNCTIONAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, Rev 106 A-52.12-F-03, CONTROL OF LCO FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION, DETECTION, FIRE BARRIERS, NFPA 805 AND HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS (HSSC), Rev 002 TR 3.7.5, FIRE BARRIER RATED ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS, (Rev 68)

STP-E-13.26, TESTING OF FIRE DAMPERS, Rev 004 A-601.16, ON-LINE FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT, Rev 008 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of A-52.12 Handout 2: Blank copy of A-601.16 Handout 3: Several blank copies of A-52.12-F-03 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes 2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Critical Step Justification Step 2 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 4 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 5 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 6 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 7 This step is critical because addressing TR 3.7.5, determining that Condition A is required for Fire Damper BA-28 and identifying that ACTION A.1.1 or A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2; and A.2; must be taken; and because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 8 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 9 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 10 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 11 This step is critical because completing an A-52.12-F-03 using the instructions in Section 6.7 of A-52.12, per the KEY provided is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-3.

(Directed Action) Document the The operator Addresses 1

failure of the Fire Damper as Section 6.7 of A-52.12.

required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Equipment Important to Safety. ___ ___ ___

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters BA-28

2 failure of the Fire Damper as in the Line 1 Equipment of required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional System (EIN) Block on Equipment Important to Safety. Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-03). ___ ___ ___

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.1) RECORD the See Provided Key Equipment OR System deemed nonfunctional.

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters the 3

failure of the Fire Damper as current date and time in the required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Line 1 Out of Service Equipment Important to Safety. (Date/Time) Block on ___ ___ ___

Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-03).

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.2) RECORD the Date AND Time equipment OR See Provided Key system became nonfunctional.

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters

4 failure of the Fire Damper as Unplanned in the Line 1 required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Reason Removed Equipment Important to Safety. (Plan/Unplan, Maint/Test) ___ ___ ___

Block on Handout 3 (A-(A-52.12, Step 6.7.5) RECORD the 52.12-F-03).

reason the equipment is removed from service\including the See Provided Key procedure if removed for testing purposes.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (Directed Action) Document the The operator enters Y in

5 failure of the Fire Damper as the Line 1 Log OOS (Y/N) required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Block on Handout 3 (A-Equipment Important to Safety. 52.12-F-03). ___ ___ ___

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.4) NOTIFY the See Provided Key Fire and Safety Watch (FASW) of the Equipment OR System deemed nonfunctional.

Examiner Note: JPM Step 5 for Line 1 column item Log OOS (Y/N) on Form A-52.12-F-03, is being addressed under A-52.12, Step 6.7.4.

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters Y in

6 failure of the Fire Damper as the Line 1 F&SW (Y/N) Block required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional on Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-Equipment Important to Safety. 03). ___ ___ ___

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.4) NOTIFY the See Provided Key Fire and Safety Watch (FASW) of the Equipment OR System deemed nonfunctional.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (Directed Action) Document the The operator addresses TR

7 failure of the Fire Damper as 3.7.5 and Table 3.7.5-1 required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Function 1.b and determines Equipment Important to Safety. that Condition A is required for Fire Damper BA-28.

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.9) RECORD the type of firewatch required, The operator identifies that CONTINUOUS, HOURLY, OR either a continuous fire watch N/A. (refer to Attachment 1 AND must be established on one Attachment 2 the TRM, AND test side of Fire Damper BA-28 procedure being performed for within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (A.1.1),

guidance.)

OR

1. IF a continuous OR hourly firewatch is established in order to A fire watch inspection of the breach TRM listed fire barriers, affected zones must be THEN an entry should be made performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and that the firewatch is hourly thereafter (A.1.2.1).

CONTINUOUS OR HOURLY AND, if the hourly inspection "while breached". Under this is chosen the fire detectors condition the fire barrier entry on on at least one side of Fire the A-52.12-F-03 may be left Damper BA-28 must be open until the end of the job OR verified to be OPERABLE work day. The firewatch is only within one hour (A.1.2.2).

required while the fire barrier is NOT intact (breached). [G0094] AND Fire Damper BA-28 must be ___ ___ ___

restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days (A.2).

The operator enters Continuous or Hourly in the Line 1 FIREWATCH (Continuous, Hourly, Shiftly, ___ ___ ___

or NA) Block on Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-03).

See Provided Key Examiner Note: The Fire Watch may be continuous or hourly. If hourly, the operator must identify that fire detectors on at least one side of the barrier must be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Note also that the terms may be abbreviated (i.e. Cont. is abbreviated for of Continuous).

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (Directed Action) Document the The operator addresses 8

failure of the Fire Damper as Attachment 7 of A-52.12 and required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional determines that BA-28 is Equipment Important to Safety. NOT an NFPA 805 High Safety Significant (A-52.12, Step 6.7.8) HIGH Safety Component. ___ ___ ___

Significant Components (HSSC) as delineated by Attachment 7 The operator addresses A-AND/OR A-601.16 ON-LINE FIRE 601.16 and determines that RISK MANAGEMENT shall be BA-28 is NOT an NFPA 805 documented on A-52.12-F-03 for High Safety Significant ___ ___ ___

tracking. Component.

The operator enters N in the Line 1 HSSC listed in Att 7 or A-601.16 (Y/N) Block on Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-03).

See Provided Key ___ ___ ___

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters 7 Days

9 failure of the Fire Damper as in the Line 1 Limits for required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional Required Action: Time Limit Equipment Important to Safety. Block on Handout 3 (A-52.12-F-03).

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.10) RECORD the time limit AND date required to See Provided Key implement the necessary action steps. The action requirements are ___ ___ ___

listed in the TRM.

Examiner Note: The operator may enter "1 Hour" in the Time Limit Column to show that the action of TR 3.7.5 Action A.1.1, A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2 must be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

(Directed Action) Document the The operator enters the time

10 failure of the Fire Damper as and date for seven days required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional future in the Line 1 Limits for Equipment Important to Safety. Required Action: Date/Time Due Block on Handout 3 (A-(A-52.12, Step 6.7.10) RECORD 52.12-F-03).

the time limit AND date required to implement the necessary action See Provided Key steps. The action requirements are ___ ___ ___

listed in the TRM.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (Directed Action) Document the The operator enters Y in

11 failure of the Fire Damper as the Line 1 PMT Required required by A-52.12, Nonfunctional (Y/N) Block on Handout 3 (A-Equipment Important to Safety. 52.12-F-03).

(A-52.12, Step 6.7.11) NOTE: For See Provided Key fire barrier seals AND fire doors no functionality test is required.

Shift Manager OR designated ___ ___ ___

alternate will initial the Yes OR No column of PMT required.

JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

STP-E-13.26, TESTING OF FIRE DAMPERS, is in progress.

a report from the field has indicated that Fire Damper BA-28, located in the wall separating the Turbine Building from Battery Room A, has failed its drop test and is stuck in its current OPEN position.

No other Fire Protection/Detection System components are OOS.

You are the US.

INITIATING CUE:

Document the failure of the Fire Damper by completing A-52.12-F-03, CONTROL OF LCO FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION, DETECTION, FIRE BARRIERS, NFPA 805 AND HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS (HSSC); and identify all, if any, required ACTION.

When documenting the failure, assume all required notifications and response actions are implemented as needed.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

N20-1 A2 SRO KEY Control of LCO for Fire Suppression, Detection, Fire Barriers, NFPA 805 and High Safety A-52.12-F-03 Significant Components (HSSC) Revision 002 Page 1 of 1 Record ID: __________ Reviewed by: __________ Category: 3.3.40.1 Current Week 1 Week: ______ Sheet: ______

Line Equipment Out of Reason Log F&SW FIREWATCH HSSC Limits for PMT Restoration or System Service Removed OOS notified (Continuous, listed Required Action Required (EIN) (Date/Time) (Plan/Unplan, (Y/N) (Y/N) Hourly, in Att Time Date/Time (Y/N) PMT In Service Log F&SW Maint/Test) Shiftly, or 7 or A- Limit Due Comp (Date/Time) RTS (Y/N)

N/A) 601.16 (Y/N)

(Y/N) 1 BA-28 Current Unplanned Y Y Cont or Hourly* N 7 days 7 days future Y 2

3 4

5 6

7 Line Equipment or NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Owner (FPE)

System (EIN) Unavailability Type Total Hours Unavailable NFPA 805 Associated IR Reviewing Engineer (Plan/Unplan) Function Number 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

SM Weekly Review (Sunday): _______________

SM FORWARD to NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Owner / Fire Program Engineer (FPE)

Admin Specialist (Engineering Building Mail Slot) SM: _____________

FORWARD Completed Form to Operations Admin Coordinator for FCMS entry.

The Fire Watch may be continuous or hourly. If hourly, the operator must identify that fire detectors on at least one side of the barrier must be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

- The operator may enter "1 Hour" in the Time Limit Column to show that the action of TR 3.7.5 Action A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2 must be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A3 SRO 2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 8 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Review and Approve Gas Decay JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A3 Tank Release Permit SRO K/A

Reference:

2.3.6 (3.8)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

Initial Conditions:

Plant is Operating at 100% Power.

Gas Decay Tank D is at 90 psi.

Gas Decay Tank D is held for release.

Chemistry has initiated a release for Gas Decay Tank D.

The on-shift Chemistry Technician has initiated a release for Gas Decay Tank D and brought the Gaseous Waste Release Form (Attachment 1) from CH-703 (Release of GDTs and other Gaseous Batch Releases) to the Control Room.

The Current Date and Time: 10/4/20, 0600 Initiating Cue: As Shift Manager, review the release permit for approval authorization and document the results on the Cue Sheet.

Task Standard: The operator will review the release permit for Gas Decay Tank D and identify the following deficiencies: (1) Chemistry Supervision signature should be signed, (2) R-14 Alarm listed setpoint is incorrect, (3) R-14 Alarm actual setpoint is incorrect, and (4) the release has to be started within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months vice 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The operator will NOT sign to approve the release.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 8 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.

General

References:

CH-703, RELEASE OF GDTS AND OTHER GASEOUS BATCH RELEASES, Rev 00402 S-4.2.5, RELEASE OF GAS DECAY TANK, Rev 01902 P-9, RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM, Rev 107 Handouts: Handout 1: CH-703, Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form marked up for this JPM.

Handout 2: Blank copy of CH-703 Handout 3: Blank copy of P-9 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 20 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because identifying that Chemistry Supervision must approve the release permit is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 This step is critical because identifying that the listed R-14 alarm setpoint is incorrect per P-9 is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 3 This step is critical because identifying that the actual R-14 alarm setpoint is incorrect per P-9 is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 4 This step is critical because identifying that the START BEFORE time is incorrect is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 5 This step is critical because NOT approving by signature is necessary to complete the assigned task.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 8 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 8 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1 and 2.

CUE Provide Applicant with Handout 3 (P-9) when requested.

1 (Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste The operator recognizes and Release Form) Review and documents (On JPM Cue Sheet)

Approve Gaseous Waste Release that the Authorized by Chemistry Form for Gas Decay Tank D Supervision signature should NOT be N/Ad (Step 6.7.2 of CH-703)

2 (Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste The operator recognizes and Release Form) Review and documents (On JPM Cue Sheet)

Approve Gaseous Waste Release that the R-14 Alarm Set (P9) is Form for Gas Decay Tank D INCORRECT (should be 1.3E+6, Attachment 1 of P-9).

3 (Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste The operator recognizes and Release Form) Review and documents (On JPM Cue Sheet)

Approve Gaseous Waste Release that the R-14 Alarm Set (actual)

Form for Gas Decay Tank D is INCORRECT (should be 1.3E+6, Attachment 1 of P-9).

4 (Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste The operator recognizes and Release Form) Review and documents (On JPM Cue Sheet)

Approve Gaseous Waste Release that the CHEMISTRY APPROVAL Form for Gas Decay Tank D REQUIRED IF RELEASE IS NOT STARTED BEFORE is INCORRECT (should be 10/4/2020 14:33 - Note prior to Step 6.7.3 or Step 6.10.12 of CH-703).

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 8 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

5 (Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste The operator recognizes that the Release Form) Authorized by Shift Release Permit contains multiple Manager Signature errors and does NOT sign as authorized. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant hands completed Handout 1 to Examiner.

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 8 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A3 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is Operating at 100% Power.

Gas Decay Tank D is at 90 psi.

Gas Decay Tank D is held for release.

Chemistry has initiated a release for Gas Decay Tank D.

The on-shift Chemistry Technician has initiated a release for Gas Decay Tank D and brought the Gaseous Waste Release Form (Attachment 1) from CH-703 (Release of GDTs and other Gaseous Batch Releases) to the Control Room.

The Current Date and Time: 10/4/20, 0600 INITIATING CUE: As Shift Manager, review the release permit for approval authorization and document the results on the Cue Sheet.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

RELEASE OF GDT'S AND OTHER GASEOUS BATCH RELEASES CH-703 Revision 00402 Page 29 of 46 Page 1 of 1 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form 10/4/20 G2020035 Date: __________________ Permit No.: ___________

Gas Decay Tank D Tank: __________________ NG Gamma Scan #:___________ 537964.CNF 10/4/2020 02:33 537963.CNF Sample Date/Time: __________________ Iodine Gamma Scan #:___________

8.392E-03 Curies :___________

MAX Recommended Release Rate: __________

4.44E+00 Estimated R-14 Reading : _______________ CPM Above Background William H. Farmer NA Analyst Authorized by Chemistry Supervision 9/27/2020 Date Tank Held: _______________________________________

Vent Monitors: R-13 in service: YES / NO R-14 in service: YES / NO R-14A in service: YES / NO Iodine Monitors: R-10B in service: YES / NO 1.3E+5 1.3E+5 R-14 Alarm Set (P9)________________ CPM R-14 Alarm Set (actual):_____________ CPM Authorized by Shift Manager 10/5/2020 02:33

- - CHEMISTRY APPROVAL REQUIRED IF RELEASE IS NOT STARTED BEFORE __________________***

- - CHEMISTRY APPROVAL REQUIRED IF RELEASE IS INTERRUPTED FOR GREATER THAN 2 HOURS***

Date/Time Pressure (PSIG) Wind Data (MPH/Direct) Operator Initials Start ________ __________ _____________ ___________________ __________

Stop ________ __________ _____________ ___________________ __________

Shift Manager Completing Release Date/Time

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet JPM A4 SRO 2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO (Rev_090820) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Determine if Emergency Dose JPM No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A4 Limits and Thyroid Blocking Agents SRO (Potassium Iodide [KI]) Should be Approved for Use K/A

Reference:

2.4.38 (4.4)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

Following an emergency event, a General Emergency has been declared at Ginna based on FG1, Loss of ANY two barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.

You are the Shift Emergency Director and you are implementing EP-AA-112-100-F-01, SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST.

The Technical Support Center is NOT manned.

You need to send a two-person rescue team of qualified radiation workers into an area where the dose rate is 32 Rem/Hour and the presence of radioactive iodine is suspected.

Both individuals are in good physical condition, between 46-49 years old, volunteer to go and have a current annual exposure of <100 mrem.

It is expected that rescue activities will take a MAXIMUM of 10 minutes.

You are considering the approval of emergency exposure > 5 Rem TEDE and the use of Thyroid Blocking Agents per Step 2.7 of the SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST.

2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Initiating Cue:

Determine if Emergency Exposure Limits need to be approved for the rescue individuals.

Determine if the use of Thyroid Blocking Agents must be recommended for the rescue individuals, and if so, identify recommended dosage and duration.

Prepare any paperwork that needs to be completed.

Task Standard: The operator will determine that the rescuers need to be approved to receive Emergency Exposure Limits > 5 REM TEDE and the Thyroid Blocking Agent must be recommended such that one (1) 130 mg KI tablet (or (2) 65 mg KI tablets) is issued to each rescuer per day for 10 consecutive days or until directed that the risk no longer exists; and prepare an EP-AA-113-F-02 for each rescuer and EP-AA-113-F-03 per the attached KEY.

Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference including several blank copies of the Forms.

General

References:

EP-AA-112-100-F-01, SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST, Rev AB EP-AA-113, PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE ACTIONS, Rev 15 EP-AA-113-F-02, AUTHORIZATION FOR EMERGENCY EXPOSURE, Rev B EP-AA-113-F-03, THYROID BLOCKING AGENT AUTHORIZATION, Rev G RP-AA-203, EXPOSURE CONTROL AND AUTHORIZATION, Rev 5 Handouts: Handout 1: EP-AA-112-100-F-01 marked up for this JPM.

Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 20 minutes 2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical because determining that based on the known data each rescuer will receive in excess of 5 REM upon completing the rescue and that Emergency Dose Limits will need to be approved is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 2 This step is critical because determining that it is recommended that each rescuer be issued one (1) 130 mg KI tablet (or (2) 65 mg KI tablets) per day for 10 consecutive days or until directed that the risk no longer exists is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Step 3 This step is critical because preparing an EP-AA-113-F-02 for each rescuer and an EP-AA-113-F-03 per the attached KEY is necessary to complete the assigned task.

Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

1 (Directed Action 1) Determine if The operator determines that Emergency Exposure Limits need based on the known data each to be approved for the rescue rescuer will receive in excess of 5 individuals. REM upon completing the rescue.

(32R/hr x 1hr/60min x 10 min =

5.33 Rem to each rescuer)

The operator addresses Section 4.3.1 of EP-AA-113 and determines and documents (Circles YES on Cue Sheet) that since each rescuer will receive more than 5 Rem TEDE Emergency Dose Limits will need to be approved.

See Attached Key

2 (Directed Action 2) Determine if The operator addresses Section the use of Thyroid Blocking Agents 4.4.1 of EP-AA-113 and must be recommended for the determines and documents rescue individuals, and if so, (Circles YES on Cue Sheet) that identify recommended dosage. since a General Emergency has been declared it is recommended that each rescuer be issued one (1) 130 mg KI tablet (or (2) 65 mg KI tablets) per day for 10 consecutive days or until directed that the risk no longer exists and documents the dosage on the Cue Sheet.

See Attached Key ___ ___ ___

2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 3 (Directed Action 3) Prepare any The operator addresses Section paperwork that needs to be 4.3.2.1 of EP-AA-113 and completed. determines that each rescuer must complete EP-AA-113-F-02. ___ ___ ___

The operator prepares an EP-AA-113-F-02 per the provided KEY (Separate Document) for each rescuer. ___ ___ ___

The operator addresses Section 4.4.2.1 of EP-AA-113 and determines that an EP-AA-113-F-03 must be completed. ___ ___ ___

The operator prepares an EP-AA-113-F-03 per the provided KEY (Separate Document) KEY. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ Terminating Cue: Applicant states task is complete.

2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:

Emergency Exposure Limits need to be approved for the YES / NO rescue individuals:

Thyroid Blocking Agents must be recommended for the rescue individuals, and if YES / NO so, identify recommended dosage/duration: IF YES, recommended dosage (Otherwise NA):

Each rescuer be issued one (1) 130 mg KI tablet (or (2) 65 mg KI tablets) per day for 10 consecutive days or until directed that the risk no longer exists.

PROVIDE ANY Paperwork Prepared to the Examiner 2020 Admin - JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Following an emergency event, a General Emergency has been declared at Ginna based on FG1, Loss of ANY two barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.

You are the Shift Emergency Director and you are implementing EP-AA-112-100-F-01, SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST.

The Technical Support Center is NOT manned.

You need to send a two-person rescue team of qualified radiation workers into an area where the dose rate is 32 Rem/Hour and the presence of radioactive iodine is suspected.

Both individuals are in good physical condition, between 46-49 years old, volunteer to go and have a current annual exposure of <100 mrem.

It is expected that rescue activities will take a MAXIMUM of 10 minutes.

You are considering the approval of emergency exposure > 5 Rem TEDE and the use of Thyroid Blocking Agents per Step 2.7 of the SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST.

INITIATING CUE:

Determine if Emergency Exposure Limits need to be approved for the rescue individuals.

Determine if the use of Thyroid Blocking Agents must be recommended for the rescue individuals, and if so, identify recommended dosage and duration.

Prepare any paperwork that needs to be completed.

Record Answers Below:

Emergency Exposure Limits need to be approved for the YES / NO rescue individuals:

Thyroid Blocking Agents must be recommended for the rescue individuals, and if YES / NO so, identify recommended dosage/duration: IF YES, recommended dosage (Otherwise NA):

PROVIDE ANY Paperwork Prepared to the Examiner NUREG 1021, Revision 11

N20-1 JPM A4 SRO KEY EP-AA-113-F-02 Revision B Page 1 of 1 AUTHORIZATION FOR EMERGENCY EXPOSURE Rescuer #1 Name: ___________________________ Current Date / Time: ____/____/____ Current Employee ID Number: ________________ <100 Current Annual Exposure: __________ mRem Reason For Request:

Emergency Life-Saving Activities (Or Equivalent)

REQUESTING AUTHORIZATION TO EXCEED:

X 5 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 5 Rem TEDE but less than 10 Rem TEDE) 10 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 10 Rem TEDE but less than 25 Rem TEDE) 25 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 25 Rem TEDE)

Emergency Worker Signature Date / Time

Emergency Worker Exposure Limits and Associated Risks (EP-AA-113 Attachment 1) have been reviewed and the potential health affects are understood.

Rad. Protection Management (Review) Date / Time

Station Emergency Director (Authorization) Date / Time

The Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) may approve prior to transferring Command and Control to the Station Emergency Director.

Document Retention SRRS ID - 5B.100

EP-AA-113-F-02 Revision B Page 1 of 1 AUTHORIZATION FOR EMERGENCY EXPOSURE Rescuer #2 Name: ___________________________ Current Date / Time: ____/____/____ Current Employee ID Number: ________________ <100 Current Annual Exposure: __________ mRem Reason For Request:

Emergency Life-Saving Activities (Or Equivalent)

REQUESTING AUTHORIZATION TO EXCEED:

X 5 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 5 Rem TEDE but less than 10 Rem TEDE) 10 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 10 Rem TEDE but less than 25 Rem TEDE) 25 Rem TEDE (Authorized to receive greater than 25 Rem TEDE)

Emergency Worker Signature Date / Time

Emergency Worker Exposure Limits and Associated Risks (EP-AA-113 Attachment 1) have been reviewed and the potential health affects are understood.

Rad. Protection Management (Review) Date / Time

Station Emergency Director (Authorization) Date / Time

The Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) may approve prior to transferring Command and Control to the Station Emergency Director.

Document Retention SRRS ID - 5B.100

EP-AA-113-F-03 Revision G Page 1 of 2 THYROID BLOCKING AGENT AUTHORIZATION OR ELECTRONIC FACSIMILE Potassium Iodide (KI) Brief Verification / Authorization Rescuer #1 NAME: ________________________ Employee ID Number: ________________

Rescuer #2 NAME: ________________________ Employee ID Number: ________________

NAME: ________________________ Employee ID Number: ________________

The above-named personnel are hereby authorized to take Potassium Iodide (KI) for the purpose of protection against the inhalation/ingestion of radioactive I-131. The applicable dosage (see back of this form for recommended dosage) shall be taken for 10 consecutive days or until directed that the risk no longer exists.

Radiation Protection Manager (Reviewed) Date / Time

Acknowledges review of evaluation for need to use KI and that emergency worker(s) have been briefed on the potential health risks associated with KI. (see back of this form for briefing details)

Emergency Director responsible for authorization of emergency exposure controls (Authorization) Date / Time KI Issuance Verification

- Radiation Protection Manager (Confirmation of KI issuance) KI Issuance Date / Time

- Confirm that individuals listed on this authorization form have been issued a supply of KI and instructed to take appropriate dosage.

Document Retention SRRS ID - 5B.100

EP-AA-113-F-03 Revision G Page 2 of 2 THYROID BLOCKING AGENT AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION ON USE OF THYROID BLOCKING AGENT WARNING People who are allergic to iodine, have dermatitis herpetiformis or hypocomplementemic vasculitis, or have nodular thyroid disease with heart disease should not take KI. Keep out of the reach of children. In case of an allergic reaction (difficulty breathing, speaking or swallowing; wheezing; shortness of breath or swelling of the mouth or throat), contact a physician.

How does Potassium Iodide work? What dosages of potassium iodide (KI) should be Certain forms of iodine help your thyroid gland work right. taken for specific exposure levels?

Most get the iodine they need from foods like iodized salt or fish. They thyroid can store or hold only a certain FDA recommends the following dosing of KI for thyroid amount of iodine. blocking:

In a nuclear radiation emergency, radioactive iodine may Table 2.1 be release in the air. This material may be breathed or swallowed. It may enter the thyroid gland and damage it. Recommended Doses of KI for Different Risk Groups The damage would probably not show itself for years.

Children are most likely to have thyroid damage. If you Milliliters Number or Number or take KI, it will block or reduce the chances that KI (mL) of fraction of fraction of radioactive iodine will enter your thyroid gland. dose oral 130 mg 65 mg (mg) solution, Who should not take potassium iodide (KI) or have tablets tablets 65 mg/mL restricted use? Adults over 130 1 2 2 mL The only people who should not take potassium iodide 40 years are people who know they are allergic to iodine. You Adults over may take potassium iodide even if you are taking 18 through 40 130 1 2 2 mL medications for a thyroid problem (for example, a thyroid years hormone or anti-thyroid drug). Pregnant and nursing Pregnant or women and babies and children may al take the drug. Lactating 130 1 2 2 mL Women How long should potassium iodide (KI) be taken? Adolescents, Since KI protects for approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , it should be 12 through 65 1/2 1 1 mL dosed daily until the risk no longer exists. Priority with 18 years*

regard to evacuation and sheltering should be given to Children over pregnant females and neonates because of the potential 3 years through 65 1/2 1 1 mL 12 years for KI to suppress thyroid function in the fetus and neonate. Unless other protective measures are not Children 1 Use KI oral month through 3 32 1/2 0.5 mL available, we do not recommend repeat dosing in years solution**

pregnant females and neonates.

Infants birth What are the side effects? Use KI oral Use KI oral through 1 16 0.25 mL solution** solution**

month Side effects are unlikely when KI is used at the recommended dose and for a short time. The following

Adolescents approaching adult size (> 150 lbs) should are possible side effects: receive the full adult dose (130 mg)

Skin rashes ** Potassium iodide oral solution is supplied in 1 oz (30 Swelling of the salivary glands mL) bottles with a dropper marked for 1, 0.5, and 0.25 mL dosing. each mL contains 65 mg potassium iodide.

Iodism (metallic taste, burning mouth and throat, sore teeth and gums, symptoms of a head cold, and sometimes upset stomach and diarrhea) What do I do if side effects occur?

An allergic reaction can have more serious symptoms. If the side effects are severe or if you have an allergic These include fever and joint pains; swelling of parts of reaction, stop taking potassium iodide. Then, if possible, the body (face, lips, tongue, throat, hands, or feet); call a doctor or public health authority for instructions.

trouble breathing, speaking, or swallowing; wheezing or shortness of breath. Severe shortness of breath requires immediate medical attention.

Document Retention SRRS ID - 5B.100

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM A 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A (Rev_090920) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Borate for one rod not fully inserted JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control following trip per ES-0.1 Room JPM A (Alternate Path)

K/A

Reference:

004 A4.07 (3.9/3.7)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant has experienced a reactor trip.

The crew has completed ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, through step 3.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

Task Standard: The operator will determine that one control rod has not fully inserted in accordance with Step 4 of ES-0.1 and attempt to initiate boration via the normal method. When it is discovered that boration cannot be started in accordance with step 4 RNO of ES-0.1, the operator will initiate RCS boration in accordance with ER-CVCS.1, Section 6.2.1.

Required Materials: None 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General

References:

ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Rev 032 ER-CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL MALFUNCTION, Rev 00802 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 053 Handouts: Handout 1: Marked up copy of ES-0.1 through step 3 Handout 2: Blank copy of ER-CVCS.1 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 5 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 1 This step is critical, even though NOT a verifiable action (See Section B.3 of Appendix C of NUREG-1021), because observing MRPI and recognizing that control rod D4 is not fully inserted and addressing the Step 4 RNO is necessary to determine that one control rod has not fully inserted in accordance with Step 4 of ES-0.1.

Step 3 This step is critical because placing the RMW Mode Selector switch to BORATE is necessary to attempt to initiate boration via the normal method.

Step 6 This step is critical because placing the RMW Control switch to START is necessary to attempt to initiate boration via the normal method and determine that boration cannot be started in accordance with step 4 RNO of ES-0.1.

Alternate Path Critical Step Justification Step 8 This step is critical because placing the AOV-110B control switch to OPEN is necessary to initiate RCS boration in accordance with ER-CVCS.1, Section 6.2.1.

Step 9 This step is critical because placing the BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A and/or B control switch to START is necessary to initiate RCS boration in accordance with ER-CVCS.1, Section 6.2.1.

Step 10 This step is critical because placing the HCV-110A controller to MAN and adjusting the HCV-110A manual knob to OPEN is necessary to initiate RCS boration in accordance with ER-CVCS.1, Section 6.2.1.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Initiate to any 100% MOL IC (IC-19).

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Insert Override OVR-CVC08A = FALSE (Failure of BORATE Signal REACTOR MAKEUP MODE).

3. Insert Override OVR-CVC08B = FALSE (Failure of AUTO Signal REACTOR MAKEUP MODE).

4. Insert Override OVR-CVC08C = FALSE (Failure of DILUTE Signal REACTOR MAKEUP MODE).

5. Insert Override OVR-CVC08D = FALSE (Failure of ALT DIL Signal REACTOR MAKEUP MODE).

6. Insert Malfunction ROD 03-D4 = UNTRIPPABLE (Stuck Rod D4).

7. Insert Override OVR-CVC34D = FALSE (MOV-350 OPEN Signal IMMEDIATE BORATION VALVE).

8. Place Simulator in RUN.

9. Trip the reactor.

10. Perform actions of E-0 and transition to ES-0.1.

11. Perform ES-0.1 actions through Step 3.

12. Place Simulator in FREEZE.

13. Reset to IC-161 (March 2020)

14. Ensure PPCS Variable Boration Dilution screen is clear.

15. Placekeep the Control Room copy of ES-0.1 up to (but not including) Step 4 and place it on the HCOs desk.

16. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

17. This completes the setup for this JPM.

18. Place Simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

1 (ES-0.1 Step 4) Verify MRPI The operator observes MRPI and Indicates - ALL CONTROL AND recognizes that control rod D4 is SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM not fully inserted. ___ ___ ___

The operator proceeds to the Step 4 RNO. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: If the operator proceeds to ES-0.1 Step 5 (Not Scripted) provide an opportunity for the operator to correct the mistake (Twice Validated Time).

2 (ES-0.1 Step 4 RNO, Bullet 1) IF The operator recognizes that only three or more control rods NOT one control rod has NOT fully fully inserted, THEN. inserted, recognizes that this step is NA and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

3 (ES-0.1 Step 4 RNO, Bullet 2/a) IF The operator recognizes that only one or two control rods NOT fully one control rod has NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the inserted. ___ ___ ___

following:

The operator places the RMW

a. Place RMW mode selector Mode Selector switch to BORATE. ___ ___ ___

switch to BORATE.

The operator observes the RMW Control Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

4 (ES-0.1 Step 4 RNO, Bullet 2/b) IF The operator rotates the upper one or two control rods NOT fully control knob on the HCV-110A inserted, THEN perform the Controller until the Black Diamond following: is pointing towards the desired

b. Adjust boric acid flow control setting on the control knob.

valve, HCV-110A, for desired flowrate. ___ ___ ___

CUE IF the operator questions What is the desired flowrate? respond with US has directed you to borate at the maximum rate. (a setting of > 9 gpm on the HCV-110A controller).

Examiner Note: The HCV-110A Control Knob permits adjustment between 0-10 gpm. The operator is free to choose the desired flowrate.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 5 (ES-0.1 Step 4 RNO, Bullet 2/c) IF The operator recognizes that only one or two control rods NOT fully one control rod has NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the inserted.

following:

c. Set boric acid integrator to the The operator sets the boric acid following: integrator, YIC-110, to 900.0

900 gallons for 1 stuck rod gallons.

1800 gallons for 2 stuck rods Examiner Note: To set the BA COUNTER:

Push SEL Button to move the number column to be adjusted.

Raise or Lower the column value by depressing the + or - Button. There is a decimal point between the last two (2) columns.

Depress the ENT Button to enter (Lock-in) the selected amount to be added.

The C Line is a running total for BA additions.

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP

6 (ES-0.1 Step 4 RNO, Bullet 2/d) IF

The operator places the RMW one or two control rods NOT fully Control switch to START. ___ ___ ___

inserted, THEN perform the following:

The operator observes the Red

d. Place RMW control to start and status light is LIT, Green status verify flow. IF flow can NOT be light is OFF; and then established, THEN refer to ER- immediately becomes Green CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP status light is LIT, Red status CONTROL MALFUNCTION. light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the following and recognizes that BA flow has NOT been established:

RK-10 Yokogawa recorder does NOT indicate flow

BA Counter, YIC-110, NOT counting (C row number remains the same)

Boric Acid audible device NOT clicking ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 6

The operator refers to ER-(Contd) CVCS.1. ___ ___ ___

CUE WHEN the operator seeks to find ER-CVCS.1, Provide Handout 2.

CUE IF the operator seeks US guidance on how to proceed, ASK the operator for recommended action.

PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

(4.1) Charging pump suction automatically switches to RWST (LCV 112B Open, LCV 112C Closed) when VCT level lowers to 5% on BOTH LT-112 AND LT-139.

(4.2) The use of MOV-350 for normal boration at power should be avoided as valve must stroke fully open before it may be reclosed, making it difficult to control amount of boric acid being added.

(4.3) IF boric acid filter D/P exceeds 20 psid, THEN filter should be bypassed and a CR should be submitted.

(4.4) IF seal injection is the only path of boron addition, CCW FROM RCP A (B) THERMAL BARRIER VALVES AOV-754A AND AOV-754B should be closed.

CUE IF the operator contacts the EO for boric acid filter D/P reading in response to the PRECAUTION above, THEN report as the EO that Local boric acid filter D/P is psid. (8 psid if 1 BA Pump is running or 12 psid if 2 BA Pumps are running) 7 (ER-CVCS.1 Step 6.1) NORMAL The operator reads the BORATION Precautions and Limitations and

(6.1.1) PLACE RMW Mode proceeds.

selector switch to BORATE. The operator recognizes that

(6.1.2) ADJUST boric acid flow Normal Boration was already control valve, HCV-110A to attempted unsuccessfully in ES-desired flowrate in AUTO. 0.1 and continues with Section 6.2.

(6.1.3) SET Boric Acid The operator proceeds to Step Integrator to desired amount. 6.2.1, Manual Method for Boration.

(6.1.4) PLACE RMW Control switch to START.

(6.1.5) VERIFY RMW control -

ARMED. (Red light lit above RMW Control switch) ___ ___ ___

CUE IF the operator attempts to implement other boration methods via Section 6.2.3 of ER-CVCS.1, indicate that the Equipment Operator in the field is NOT available.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number Examiner Note: If the operator attempts to implement the Emergency Boration of Section 6.2.2 of ER-CVCS.1, MOV-350 will fail to open and the operator will need to choose another method.

The JPM is designed such that the only method available is the method of Section 6.2.1.

8 (ER-CVCS.1 Step 6.2.1.1/1.a) The operator places the AOV-Manual Method for Boration 110B control switch to OPEN. ___ ___ ___

IF makeup system does NOT The operator observes the AOV-operate properly in BORATE, 110B Red status light is LIT, and THEN PERFORM the following:

the Green status light is OFF.

a. OPEN Blender Outlet to Charging Pump Suction, AOV-110B.

9 (ER-CVCS.1 Step 6.2.1.1/1.b) The operator places the BORIC Manual Method for Boration ACID TRANSFER PUMP A control IF makeup system does NOT switch to START. ___ ___ ___

operate properly in BORATE, The operator observes the BORIC THEN PERFORM the following: ACID TRANSFER PUMP A Red

b. START at least one boric acid status light is LIT, and the Green pump. status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

OR

The operator places the BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP B control switch to START. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP B Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: Only ONE Boric Acid Pump is required to be started.

10 (ER-CVCS.1 Step 6.2.1.1/1.c) The operator places BA TO BA Manual Method for Boration BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV IF makeup system does NOT HCV-110A controller to MAN.

operate properly in BORATE, ___ ___ ___

THEN PERFORM the following:

The operator adjusts the manual

c. PLACE Boric Acid Flow Control knob to OPEN HCV-110A.

Valve, HCV-110A, to MANUAL 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 10 and OPEN to establish desired The operator observes the (Contd) flow. following and recognizes that BA flow has been established:

RK-10 Yokogawa recorder indicates flow

BA Counter, YIC-110, counting (C row number increasing)

Boric Acid audible device clicking ___ ___ ___

The operator continues to monitor flowrate and amount added until the required amount is added. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant has experienced a reactor trip.

The crew has completed ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, through step 3.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM B 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B (Rev_090920) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Initiating a Plant Heatup on RHR JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control w/Subsequent Failure of CCW Room JPM B Pump (Alternate Path)

K/A

Reference:

008 A2.01 (3.3\3.6)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is in Mode 5.

The crew has completed Section 6.5 of O-1.1, PLANT HEATUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN.

The current RCS heatup rate is 13F/hour.

Chemistry has completed all required RCS sampling and has added Hydrazine.

Another operator is standing by to monitor and plot heatup rate.

You are the HCO.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to initiate an RCS heatup at maximum rate not to exceed 50°F/Hour with a maximum RHR System Total Flow of 1500 gpm by performing steps 6.6.1 through 6.6.3 of Section 6.6 of O-1.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will raise the RCS heatup rate in accordance with section 6.6 of O-1.1 to between 20-50F/hour, and then respond to a loss of CCW by attempting to start the B CCW Pump and stopping the RCPs prior to Motor Bearing Temperature reaching 266F when this fails in accordance with AP-CCW.3.

Required Materials: None General

References:

O-1.1, PLANT HEATUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN, Rev 176 AP-CCW.3, LOSS OF CCW- PLANT SHUTDOWN, Rev 01902 HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, Rev 7 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 053 TECO-Westinghouse VTD-W0120-6968, Recommended Settings for Bearing RTD Trip and Alarms, Rev 000 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Section 6.6 of O-1.1 Handout 2: Blank copy of AP-CCW.3 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Note: This JPM will be pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. A full copy of O-1.1, PLANT HEATUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN, should be available to the operator.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Critical Step Justification Step 2 This step is critical because rotating the HCV-624 and HCV-625 Controllers adjust knob in the counterclockwise direction such that the controller output moves towards 100% (Full Closed) while ensuring that RCS pressure remains 300-360 psig is necessary to raise the RCS heatup rate to 20-50F/hour in accordance with section 6.6 of O-1.1.

Alternate Path Critical Step Justification Step 4 This step is critical because if CCW flow has been lost to the RCPs for > 2 minutes or the RCP Motor Bearing temperature is >200F, placing the A and B RCP control switch to STOP prior to Motor Bearing Temperature reaching 266F is necessary to respond to a loss of CCW using AP-CCW.3. (Conditional Critical Step)

Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Reset to IC-009 (Mode 5 RCP Start Solid)

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Adjust plant conditions so that O-1.1 is completed through Section 6.5 (RCS temperature 160F).

3. Stabilize RCS pressure and ensure FCV-626 set at 1200 gpm.

4. Insert Malfunction CLG10 (Failure of the CCW Pump to Auto Start).

5. Place simulator in RUN.

6. Display LTOP Page on Upper Simulator PPCS Monitor.

7. Setup 2plot display on HCO Desk Monitor for T0409B and T0410B (Loop T Cold).

8. Limit unnecessary CCW Loads.

9. Remove B CCW Pump from service, and place in Standby.

10. Insert Malfunction CLG02B (Trip B CCW Pump - will prevent manual start of B CCW Pump).

11. Establish Malfunction CLG02A (Trip A CCW Pump) on Trigger #1.

12. Place simulator in FREEZE.

13. Reset to IC-165 (June, 2020).

14. Swap Shutdown Annunciator Windows (C-5, F-29, A-20).

15. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

16. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

17. This completes the setup for this JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

CAUTION

RCS temperature SHALL NOT be allowed to go above 180°F until hydrazine has been added.

It may be necessary to manually throttle CCW inlets to RHR HXs using MOV-738A and MOV-738B to start heatup of RCS. CCW inlet valves on either RHR HX SHALL NOT be throttled to the point where CCW begins to boil. This is indicated by a drastic rise in CCW surge tank level and possible loud banging in Aux Building basement.

It may be necessary to stop the operating RHR Pump AND CLOSE one RHR loop stop valve (MOV-720 or MOV-721) to enhance RCS heatup.

IF both RHR Pumps are secured, THEN loop requirements of Tech Spec 3.4.7 SHALL be maintained.

IF RCS is solid AND RCS temperature is to be raised, PCV-135, LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS PI-135 AND Charging flow adjustments will be required to control RCS pressure.

(O-1.1, Step 6.6.1) PRIOR to The operator reads the Cautions 1

exceeding RCS temperature of and proceeds.

180°F, VERIFY hydrazine has ___ ___ ___

been added to the RCS.

The operator recognizes that hydrazine has been added and proceeds (Initial Conditions). ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: In the following step the operator will operate HCV-624 and HCV-625 such that the valves are closed together, rather than consecutively.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (O-1.1, Step 6.6.2) RAISE RCS

2 While monitoring RCS pressure temperature while maintaining less (PI-420 and/or PPCS LTOP Page),

than 200°F by adjusting RHR the operator slowly rotates the Flow, using the following valves as HCV-624 Controller adjust knob in necessary to bypass RHR Heat the counterclockwise direction Exchangers:

such that the controller output

HCV-626, RHR HX BYPASS moves towards 100% (Full Closed) ___ ___ ___

HCV-624, RHR HX OUTLET while ensuring that RCS pressure 1B remains 300-360 psig.

HCV-625, RHR HX OUTLET 1A The operator monitors the PPCS Tcold temperature plot and total RHR System Flow (FI-626/689)

While monitoring RCS pressure (PI-420 and/or PPCS LTOP Page),

the operator slowly rotates the HCV-625 Controller adjust knob in the counterclockwise direction such that the controller output moves towards 100% (Full Closed) ___ ___ ___

while ensuring that RCS pressure remains 300-360 psig.

The operator monitors the PPCS Tcold temperature plot and total RHR System Flow (FI-626/689)

The operator observes FI-626/689 indicating that total RHR System flow is 1200 gpm.

The operator determines that the RCS heatup rate is rising and is between 20-50F/hour.

SIM DRIVER: WHEN Heatup Rate is 20-50F/Hour OPERATE Trigger #1.

Examiner Note: When Trigger #1 is operated the A CCW Pump will trip, the B CCW Pump will NOT start and MCB Annunciators A-6, 7, 9, 14, 15 and 22 will alarm.

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (O-1.1, Step 6.6.3) CONTINUE to 3 The operator uses MCB plot pressures AND temperatures Annunciators and indications to every 30 minutes.

recognize trip of A CCW Pump with a failure of B CCW Pump to auto start, and enters AP.CCW.3, ___ ___ ___

Loss of CCW - Plant Shutdown.

Examiner NOTE: The operator may attempt to manually start the B CCW Pump based on Step 5.3.D of A-503.1. The standby Pump will NOT start.

CUE When the operator seeks to find AP-CCW.3, provide the operator with Handout 2.

CAUTION:

IF CCW FLOW TO A RCP IS INTERRUPTED FOR GREATER THAN 2 MINUTES OR IF EITHER RCP MOTOR BEARING TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 200°F, THEN TRIP THE AFFECTED RCP.

IF CCW IS LOST, THEN SEAL INJECTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO THE RCP(S) UNTIL RCS TEMPERATURE IS LESS THAN 150°F, OR UNTIL CCW IS RESTORED.

IF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN LOST WHILE IN LOWERED INVENTORY OR IN REDUCED INVENTORY THEN ACTIONS TO ENSURE CONTAINMENT CLOSURE WITHIN THE TIME TO BOIL SHALL NOT BE DELAYED.

NOTE IF CCW is lost to operating CS, RHR, or SI pumps, they may be left running for brief periods while isolating a CCW leak.

(AP-CCW.3, Caution prior to Step 4 The operator reads the Cautions 1) and Note and proceeds.

IF CCW FLOW TO A RCP IS ___ ___ ___

INTERRUPTED FOR GREATER THAN 2 MINUTES OR IF EITHER The operator notes the time that RCP MOTOR BEARING CCW flow to the RCPs was lost.

TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 200°F, THEN TRIP THE The operator observes the RCP AFFECTED RCP. Motor Bearing Temperatures.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

4 If CCW flow has been lost to the (Contd) RCPs for > 2 minutes or the A RCP Motor Bearing temperature is

>200F, the operator places the A RCP control switch to STOP prior ___ ___ ___

to Motor Bearing Temperature reaching 266F.

The operator observes the A RCP Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.

If CCW flow has been lost to the RCPs for > 2 minutes or the B RCP Motor Bearing temperature is

>200F, the operator places the B RCP control switch to STOP prior ___ ___ ___

to Motor Bearing Temperature reaching 266F.

The operator observes the B RCP Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF.

Examiner Note: The RCPs can be tripped in any order.

(AP-CCW.3, Step 1) Check CCW 5 The operator observes the White Pump Status:

status light is LIT for the A CCW

Both CCW pump breaker white Pump, and proceeds to the RNO.

lights - EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF, RCP CCWP -

EXTINGUISHED ___ ___ ___

(AP-CCW.3, Step 1 RNO a) IF a 6 The operator observes that the B CCW pump has tripped, THEN CCW Pump Green status light is perform the following:

LIT, and the Red status light is OFF; and recognizes that the B Ensure standby CCW pump CCW Pump did not start. ___ ___ ___

running.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number Examiner Note: The operator may have already attempted to start the B CCW unsuccessfully based on Step 5.3.D of A-503.1.

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 5.

The crew has completed Section 6.5 of O-1.1, PLANT HEATUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN.

The current RCS heatup rate is 13F/hour.

Chemistry has completed all required RCS sampling and has added Hydrazine.

Another operator is standing by to monitor and plot heatup rate.

You are the HCO.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to initiate an RCS heatup at maximum rate not to exceed 50°F/Hour with a maximum RHR System Total Flow of 1500 gpm by performing steps 6.6.1 through 6.6.3 of Section 6.6 of O-1.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM C 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C (Rev_090920) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Makeup to the B Accumulator from JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control the RWST Room JPM C K/A

Reference:

006 A1.13 (3.5/3.7)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

AR-C-4, ACCUMULATOR 1B (LOOP A) LEVEL 60 % 75, has alarmed.

The SI Accumulator Makeup Pump is OOS.

An Equipment Operator is standing by to support startup of the C SI Pump and will report the status of the C SI pump when started.

Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to refill the B Accumulator to 69% using the C SI Pump in accordance with S-16.13, RWST WATER MAKEUP TO THE ACCUMULATORS.

Task Standard: The operator will start the C SI Pump and raise the level of the B Accumulator to 69% in accordance with Section 6.2 of S-16.13, RWST WATER MAKEUP TO THE ACCUMULATORS, without the B Accumulator Level rising to greater than 75%.

Required Materials: None 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General

References:

AR-C-4, ACCUMULATOR 1B (LOOP A) LEVEL 60 % 75, Rev 01100 S-16.13, RWST WATER MAKEUP TO THE ACCUMULATORS, Rev 40 HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, Rev 7 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of S-16.13 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 12 minutes Note: This JPM will be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.

Critical Step Justification Step 2 This step is critical because placing the AOV-835B Control Switch to the OPEN position is necessary to raise the level of the B Accumulator to 69% in accordance with Section 6.2 of S-16.13.

Step 8 This step is critical because placing the C SI Pump control switch to the START position is necessary to raise the level of the B Accumulator to 69% in accordance with Section 6.2 of S-16.13.

Step 11 This step is critical because observing LI-934 to be 69% and placing the C SI Pump control switch to the STOP position and allowing it to spring return to AUTO is necessary to raise the level of the B Accumulator to 69% in accordance with Section 6.2 of S-16.13 without the B Accumulator Level rising to greater than 75%.

Step 12 This step is critical because placing the AOV-835B Control Switch to the CLOSE position is necessary to raise the level of the B Accumulator to 69% in accordance with Section 6.2 of S-16.13.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Initiate to any 100% IC (IC-19).

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Insert Malfunction SIS05B = 100 (ACCUMULATOR 1B LEAK).

3. Place Simulator in RUN.

4. When AR-C-4, ACCUMULATOR 1B (LOOP A) LEVEL 60 % 75 is LIT, check that the B Accumulator Level is at 58%, and DELETE Malfunction SIS05B.

5. Place Simulator in FREEZE.

6. Reset to IC-163 (March 2020)

7. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

8. This completes the setup for this JPM.

9. Place Simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

1 (S-16.13, Step 6/6.2.1) Filling SI The operator observes the MOV Accumulator 1B/ ENSURE OPEN 825A Red status light is LIT and the following valves: the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

SI PUMP SUCTION FROM The operator observes the MOV RWST, MOV 825A 825B Red status light is LIT and

SI PUMP SUCTION FROM the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

RWST, MOV 825B The operator observes the MOV

SI PUMP RECIRC TO RWST, 897 Red status light is LIT and the MOV 897 Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

SI PUMP RECIRC TO RWST, MOV 898 The operator observes the MOV 898 Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

CAUTION To prevent cross-tying of SI Accumulators via fill path, only one fill valve at a time can be opened.

2 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.2) OPEN SI The operator reads the Caution ACCUM 1B FILL VALVE, AOV- and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

835B.

The operator places the AOV-835B Control Switch to the OPEN position. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the AOV-835B Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

3 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.3) RECORD The operator observes LI-934 and initial SI ACCUM 1B Level. records the reading in the space

[G0215] provided.

LI-934 ________ %

4 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.4) IF the SI The operator acknowledges the Pump is being used to fill the SI report of the EO.

Accumulator, THEN NOTIFY the Equipment Operator of impending SI Pump start. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

CUE As Equipment Operator, acknowledge Standing by for start of the C SI Pump."

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 5 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.5) IF RCS is The operator recognizes that the less than 350°F, THEN PERFORM plant is at 100% power, that this the following: OTHERWISE, step is NA, and proceeds.

MARK this Step N/A.

NOTE IF SI Pump C were used in this section, THEN the A Train SI would be inoperable while MOV-871A is closed. Additionally, the B Train SI would be inoperable because it would also be necessary to close MOV-878D. Therefore, use of the SI Pump C is NOT permitted in this section.

6 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.6) IF RCS is The operator reads the Note and greater than 350°F AND less than proceeds.

1600 psig, THEN PERFORM the The operator recognizes that the following: OTHERWISE, MARK plant is at 100% power, that this this Step N/A. step is NA, and proceeds.

7 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7/6.2.7.1) IF The operator recognizes that the RCS is greater than 350°F AND direction was to use the C SI greater than or equal to 1600 psig, Pump, that this step is NA, and THEN PERFORM the following: proceeds.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

1. IF the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump is to be used to fill the SI Accumulator, THEN PERFORM Attachment 1, SI Accumulator Makeup Pump Operation, AND MARK Steps 6.2.7.2 through 6.2.7.6 N/A.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

8 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7.2) START The operator places the C SI ONE of the following SI Pumps Pump control switch to the START AND MARK pump NOT started position. ___ ___ ___

N/A.

SI PUMP B The operator observes the C SI Pump Red status light is LIT and

SI PUMP C the Green status light is OFF.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 9 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7.3) CHECK The operator contacts the running pump for mechanical Equipment Operator and indicates performance to ensure that no that the C SI Pump has been unusual noise, vibrations or started and directs that the pump excessive temperatures exist. be locally monitored for performance. ___ ___ ___

CUE As Equipment Operator, report "Conditions Normal on C SI Pump start."

10 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7.4) VERIFY The operator observes PI-923 and pump discharge pressure of determines that the C SI Pump approximately 1500 psi on PI-923. discharge pressure is 1500 psig.

CAUTION SI Accumulator level of 75% SHALL NOT be exceeded during filling.

11 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7.5) WHEN The operator reads the Caution desired level is obtained, THEN and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

PERFORM the following:

STOP the operating SI pump. The operator observes LI-934 to be 69% and places the C SI PLACE the SI pump that was Pump control switch to the STOP stopped in AUTO.

position prior to LI-934 rising to >

75% and allows the control switch to spring-return to AUTO. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the C SI Pump Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

12 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.7.6) CLOSE SI The operator places the AOV-ACCUM 1B FILL VALVE, AOV- 835B Control Switch to the CLOSE 835B. position. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the AOV-835B Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

13 (S-16.13, Step 6.2.8) RECORD The operator observes LI-934 and final SI ACCUM 1B Level. [G0215] records the reading in the space

LI-934 ________ % provided. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

AR-C-4, ACCUMULATOR 1B (LOOP A) LEVEL 60 % 75, has alarmed.

The SI Accumulator Makeup Pump is OOS.

An Equipment Operator is standing by to support startup of the C SI Pump and will report the status of the C SI pump when started.

INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to refill the B Accumulator to 69%

using the C SI Pump in accordance with S-16.13, RWST WATER MAKEUP TO THE ACCUMULATORS.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM D 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D (Rev_091020) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Vent RCS for Accumulator/RHR JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control Injection Room JPM D (Alternate Path)

K/A

Reference:

074 EA1.05 (3.9 / 4.1)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant has experienced a LOCA.

In addition, Bus 15 has tripped. No cause for the Bus 15 trip has been identified.

Due to malfunctions associated with the ARVs and Safety Injection, the ability to cool the core has been lost. Operating crew efforts to establish core cooling in accordance with FR-C.1, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, have so far been unsuccessful.

The operating crew is at Step 23 of FR-C.1.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to continue efforts to establish core cooling in accordance with FR-C.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

Task Standard: The operator will attempt to establish Instrument Air to the Containment and when this fails, use ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, to vent the RCS using both PORVs and the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: Key for Overpressure Accumulator General

References:

FR-C.1, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, Rev 029 E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Rev 049 E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Rev 043 ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, Rev 6 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 052 Handouts: Handout 1: Marked up copy of FR-C.1 Handout 2: Blank copy of ATT-12.0 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 10 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 6 This step is critical because depressing the Y RLY X RLY IAIV AOV5392 pushbutton is necessary to attempt to establish Instrument Air to the Containment.

Alternate Path Critical Step Justification Step 8 This step is critical because inserting the key and rotating the SOV-8616A & B key switches to OPEN is necessary to vent the RCS using both PORVs.

Step 9 This step is critical because inserting the key and rotating the SOV-8619A & B key switches to OPEN is necessary to vent the RCS using both PORVs.

Step 10 This step is critical because inserting the key and rotating the SOV-590, SOV-591, SOV-592 and SOV-593 key switches to OPEN is necessary to vent the RCS using the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Initiate to IC-24.

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Insert Malfunction SIS03A (SI Pump 1A Trip).

3. Insert Malfunction SIS03B (SI Pump 1B Trip).

4. Insert Malfunction SIS03C (SI Pump 1C Trip).

5. Insert Malfunction STM04B = 0 (Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure: VLV 3411 (NO MAN)).

6. Insert Malfunction STM04D = 0 (Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure: VLV 3410 (NO MAN)).

7. Insert Malfunction RHR01A (RHR Pump 1A Trip).

8. Insert Malfunction RHR01B (RHR Pump 1B Trip).

9. Insert Malfunction FDW12 = 0 (AFW Turbine Driven Pump Speed Control Failure).

10. Insert Malfunction FDW11A (Aux Feedwater Pump Failure: Motor Driven Pump 1A).

11. Insert Malfunction FDW11B (Aux Feedwater Pump Failure: Motor Driven Pump 1B).

12. Insert Malfunction RPS05A = Manual Available (Reactor Trip Bkr A Failure).

13. Insert Malfunction RPS05B = Manual Available (Reactor Trip Bkr B Failure).

14. Insert Malfunction FDW02A on Trigger #1 - 10 Second Delay (Feedwater Pump 1A Trip).

15. Insert Malfunction FDW02B on Trigger #1 - 10 Second Delay (Feedwater Pump 1B Trip).

16. Insert Malfunction RCS02D = 3000 on Trigger #1 - Delay 30 Seconds (RCS Leak into CNMT: Loop B Cold Leg) [Throttle as necessary to maintain RCS pressure > 950 psig].

17. Insert Malfunction EDS02C on Trigger #1 - 60 Second Delay (Loss of Station Service Transformer 15)

18. Insert Malfunction RPS11-A1 = Fails As Is on Trigger #1 - 2 Minute Delay (CI Failure -

AOV-5392).

19. Place Simulator in RUN.

20. Stop both RCPs after E-0 immediate actions are completed (Facilitate getting to FR-C.1).

21. Perform actions of E-0, E-1 and FR-C.1 (Up to Step 23), as necessary.

22. ENSURE CETs are greater than 1200°F.

23. Place Simulator in FREEZE.

24. Reset to IC-164 (May 2020)

25. Placekeep a copy of FR-C.1 up to Step 23 and place on HCOs desk.

26. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

27. This completes the setup for this JPM.

28. Place Simulator in RUN when directed by Examiner.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

NOTE Normal conditions are desired but not required for starting the RCPs.

1 (FR-C.1, Step 23/23.a) Check If The operator reads the Note and RCPs Should Be Started: proceeds.

a. Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER The operator observes CETs /

THAN 1200°F PPCS indicate greater than 1200°F. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: In the next Step, the operator may recognize RCPs are not available (loss of power to RCP Oil Lift Pumps); however, it is acceptable for the operator to attempt to start RCP Oil Lift Pump, then return to FR-C.1, Step 23.a. RCP Oil Lift Pumps will indicate running if attempted to start (Red light LIT, Green light OFF). However, the White light will not come on indicating NO lift oil pressure.

2 (FR-C.1, Step 23/23.b) Check If The operator observes S/G narrow RCPs Should Be Started: range levels are less than 25%.

b. Check if an idle RCS cooling loop is available o Narrow range S/G level -

GREATER THAN 7% [25%

adverse CNMT]

o RCP in associated loop -

AVAILABLE AND NOT OPERATING ___ ___ ___

3 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 1) The operator depresses SAFETY Perform the following: INJECTION RESET pushbutton. ___ ___ ___

1) Reset SI. The operator observes Annunciator K-6, THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAY BYPASSED is extinguished. ___ ___ ___

4 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 2) The operator depresses CNMT Perform the following: ISOLATION RESET pushbutton. ___ ___ ___

2) Reset CI. The operator observes Annunciator A-26, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION is extinguished. ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 5 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 3) The operator observes the A Perform the following: Instrument Air Compressor Red

3) Ensure adequate air status light is LIT and the Green compressor(s) running. status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator places the Service Air Compressor Control Switch to START. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the Service Air Compressor Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

6 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 4) The operator depresses Y RLY X Perform the following: RLY IAIV AOV5392 pushbutton:

4) Establish IA to CNMT.

TRAIN A

TRAIN B ___ ___ ___

The operator observes INSTR AIR TO CNMT ISOL AOV-5392 is closed (Green light LIT, Red light OFF). ___ ___ ___

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 7 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 5) The operator places the PCV-

5) Open all PRZR PORVs and 431C Control Switch to OPEN and block valves observes the Green status light is LIT and Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

a) IF any block valve can NOT be opened, THEN .. The operator places the PCV-430 Control Switch to OPEN and b) IF IA NOT available, THEN observes the Green status light is refer to ATT-12.0, LIT and Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS. The operator observes the MOV-515 Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the MOV-516 Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

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Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 7 The operator recognizes that (Contd) Instrument Air is NOT available and proceeds to ATT-12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs.

CUE Provide operator with Handout 2, Blank copy of ATT-12.0 and the Key for the Overpressure Accumulator.

Examiner NOTE: Knowing that there is no Instrument Air to the Containment, the operator may or may NOT take PORV control switches to OPEN WHEN IA to CNMT NOT available, THEN perform the following to operate one (or both) PRZR PORV(s) in accordance with guidance provided by the procedure step:

NOTE

IF RCS overpressurization accumulator pressure lowers to less than 200 psig, then recharge accumulators using S-29.2, CHARGING THE REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM ACCUMULATORS WITH N2. This will require reset of CI and XY relays for the N2 supply valve to CNMT, AOV-846.

For FR-H.1, Bleed and Feed the PORV block valve is not required to be operable.

8 (ATT-12.0, Step A) Select a PORV The operator reads the conditional with an operable block valve, step and Notes, and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

obtain a key for the RCS The operator observes the MOV-overpressurization system, and 515 Red status light is LIT, and perform the appropriate step Green status light is OFF and is below:

OPERABLE. ___ ___ ___

o PCV-431C:

The operator inserts key and a) Verify block valve MOV-rotates the SOV-8616B key switch 515 - OPEN AND to OPEN.

OPERABLE b) Place ACCUM TO SURGE ___ ___ ___

TK VLV SOV-8616B to OPEN The operator observes the MOV-516 Red status light is LIT, and o PCV-430: Green status light is OFF and is c) Verify block valve MOV- OPERABLE.

516 - OPEN AND OPERABLE ___ ___ ___

d) Place ACCUM TO SURGE The operator inserts key and TK VLV SOV-8616A to rotates the SOV-8616A key switch OPEN to OPEN. ___ ___ ___

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Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

9 (ATT-12.0, Step B) To The operator inserts key and depressurize the RCS in rotates the SOV-8619B key switch accordance with the guidance to ARM.

provided by the EOP step, perform the following:

o For PCV-431C, place overpressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619B, to ARM o For PCV-430, place overpressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619A, to ARM ___ ___ ___

The operator inserts key and rotates the SOV-8619A key switch to ARM.

The operator observes PCV-430 Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.

The operator observes PCV-431C Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.

The operator returns to Step 23 RNO of FR-C.1.

Examiner Note: Dependent on operator time to perform actions, JPM Performance Step 10 may NOT be performed since CETs/PPCS indicate less than 1200°F, in which case JPM Performance Step 10 is NOT critical and should be marked N/A.

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Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 10 (FR-C.1, Step 23.b RNO 6) The operator observes CETs/

Perform the following: PPCS indicate greater than

6) IF core exit T/Cs remain greater 1200°F. ___ ___ ___

than 1200°F, THEN open Rx The operator inserts the key and vessel head vent valves. rotates the SOV-590 key switch

SOV-590 clockwise. ___ ___ ___

SOV-591 The operator inserts the key and

SOV-592 rotates the SOV-591 key switch

SOV-593 clockwise. ___ ___ ___

The operator inserts the key and rotates the SOV-592 key switch clockwise. ___ ___ ___

The operator inserts the key and rotates the SOV-593 key switch clockwise. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF for the following:

SOV-590

SOV-591

SOV-592

SOV-593 ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant has experienced a LOCA.

In addition, Bus 15 has tripped. No cause for the Bus 15 trip has been identified.

Due to malfunctions associated with the ARVs and Safety Injection, the ability to cool the core has been lost. Operating crew efforts to establish core cooling in accordance with FR-C.1, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, have so far been unsuccessful.

The operating crew is at Step 23 of FR-C.1.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to continue efforts to establish core cooling in accordance with FR-C.1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM E 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E (Rev_091020) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Synchronize Generator On-Line with JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control Improper Load Pickup Room JPM E (Alternate Path)

K/A

Reference:

045 A2.17 (2.7*/2.9*)

Examinee: Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

Initial Conditions:

The generator is being started following a refueling outage.

The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up.

The generator output voltage is 19 KV.

MTC is negative for this Startup.

You are the CO.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to synchronize the generator on-line per O-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.11.7.

The HCO will control the primary plant.

Task Standard: The operator will synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid, and when it is recognized that the Automatic Load Pickup has failed to function, the operator will manually load the Turbine to 40 to 60 MW, without reverse powering the Main Generator.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: None General

References:

O-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Rev 220 FIG-13.0, FIGURE BACK PRESSURE, Rev 0 HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, Rev 7 Handouts: Handout 1: O-1.2 (Pages 1-13, 56, and 67-76)

Handout 2: Attachment 2 of O-1.2 (No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and

11 Transformers)

Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 16 minutes Note: This JPM will be pre-briefed in the Briefing Room. A full copy of O-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, should be available to the operator.

Critical Step Justification Step 3 This step is critical because rotating CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to the ON position is necessary to synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid.

Step 4 This step is critical because adjusting Turbine Control setter up or down 1 rpm and depressing the GO pushbutton until the synchroscope is rotating slowly in the FAST direction is necessary to synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid.

Step 6 This step is critical because placing the BASE ADJUSTER to RAISE until INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage is necessary to synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid.

Step 12 This step is critical because rotating the CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON is necessary to synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid.

Step 16 This step is critical because rotating the 1G 13A72 breaker pistol-grip switch clockwise to the CLOSE position when the synchroscope is approaching 12 oclock is necessary to synchronize the Main Generator to the Electrical Grid.

Alternate Path Critical Step Justification Step 18 This step is critical because depressing the TURB MANUAL pushbutton and then intermittently depressing the MANUAL CONTROL VALVE RAISE pushbutton to adjust generator gross load is necessary to manually load the Turbine to 40 to 60 MW, without reverse powering the Main Generator.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

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Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Reset to IC-16 (Turbine 1800 rpm)

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Withdraw control rods to ensure reactor power > 15% but < 20%

3. Ensure FRVs in Auto

4. Ensure generator output voltage at 19 KV

5. Insert MALF TUR18, 1 MW (Failure of Turbine Auto Load Pickup)

6. Ensure Grid frequency [Remote E-MIS11] is adjusted so that when the examinee places the Synchroscope to ON it is moving slowly in the SLOW direction (e.g. 60.02 Hz).

7. Ensure Grid voltage [Remote E-MIS10 = 114] is low enough to allow the examinee to adjust incoming voltage to slightly greater than system voltage, while maintaining generator voltage

< 19.3 KV (Step 6.13.4)

8. Set REM EDS017 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 1G13A73)

9. Set REM EDS016 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 9X13A71)

10. Select PBACK on the PPCS Screen in front of the Turbine Control Station.

11. Place simulator in FREEZE.

12. Reset to IC 150 (March, 2020)

13. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

14. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

15. This completes the setup for this JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.1) PLACE The operator places LC-107 in 1

Hotwell Level Control, LC-107, in MANUAL and adjusts such that MANUAL AND CONTROL hotwell Hotwell level is at 26 inches.

level at approximately 27 inches or ___ ___ ___

as directed by US.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.2) PLACE The operator places synchroscope 2

synchroscope switch handle in switch handle in CIRCUIT BKR 1G CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

SYNCHROSCOPE. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: There is a single switch handle that may be placed in either CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE, or CIRCUIT BKR 9X 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE.

NOTE WHEN next step is performed, THEN MCB Alarm J-5, #11 OR #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will cycle in and out of alarm as the Generator phases in and out of sync with the grid.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.3) PLACE 3 The operator reads the Note, and CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 proceeds.

SYNCHROSCOPE control switch ___ ___ ___

to ON.

The operator rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch clockwise to the ON position. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: Alarm J-5 may cycle in and out of alarm per the note.

CUE (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): The US gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash.

NOTE Synchroscope should be rotating slow in the FAST (clockwise) direction in the next step. IF Turbine Generator frequency is slightly higher than system frequency, THEN synchroscope should be rotating in the FAST (clockwise) direction. IF rotating counter clockwise, THEN a raise in speed will be required.

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Appendix C Page 7 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 4 (O-1.2 Step 6.13.4/4.1-3) IF The operator reads the Note, and ___ ___ ___

Turbine Generator speed proceeds.

adjustment must be made, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step The operator observes the N/A. SYNCHROSCOPE (MCB right section) moving slowly in the

1. ADJUST SETTER up OR down SLOW direction. ___ ___ ___

1 rpm. (Turbine EH Control Panel)

2. DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

The operator adjusts the Turbine (Turbine EH Control Panel)

Control setter up or down 1 rpm

3. REPEAT Steps 6.13.4.1 AND and depresses the GO pushbutton 6.13.4.2 UNTIL synchroscope until synchroscope is rotating slow is rotating slow in the FAST in the FAST direction (Repeated (clockwise) direction. as needed). ___ ___ ___

Examiner Notes:

Up, down, and GO pushbuttons are located on EH control panel.

Digital REFERENCE and SETTER indication is located above the EH control panel.

It is likely that the operator will need to perform this action 6-7 times.

5 (O-1.2 Step 6.13.5/5.1) WHEN The operator rotates the Turbine is at synchronous speed, GENERATOR VOLTMETER THEN REPEAT the following as switch to each phase position and necessary to ensure generator compares:

INCOMING VOLTMETER INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly (GENERATOR) voltage to the higher than system RUNNING RUNNING VOLTMETER VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage: (SYSTEM) voltage A-B phase

CHECK voltage on all three B-C phase phases. C-A phase Examiner Notes:

INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) is located to the left of the SYNCHROSCOPE.

RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) is located to the right of the SYNCHROSCOPE.

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Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (O-1.2 Step 6.13.5.2) WHILE 6 The operator refers to Attachment maintaining voltage within the 2.

acceptable operating region of ___ ___ ___

Attachment 2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 The operator observes the Transformers, TRY to adjust BASE INCOMING VOLTMETER ADJUSTER to make INCOMING (GENERATOR) voltage and VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) RUNNING VOLTMETER ___ ___ ___

voltage slightly higher than (SYSTEM) voltage.

RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage.

The operator places the BASE ADJUSTER to RAISE until INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than RUNNING ___ ___ ___

VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage.

The operator does NOT allow GENERATOR voltage to exceed approximately 19.3 KV (per Attachment 2).

Examiner Note: Voltage will remain within the acceptable operating region of Attachment 2 if the operator keeps the GENERATOR voltage < approximately 19.3 KV.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.5.3) IF 7 The operator marks this step NA, INCOMING VOLTMETER and proceeds.

(GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT be made slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. ___ ___ ___

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.6) PLACE 8 The operator Rotates CIRCUIT CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF. ___ ___ ___

counter-clockwise to OFF.

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Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number NOTE Disconnects are operated per GME-13-02-HVDISC, Operation Of High Voltage Disconnects.

9 (O-1.2 Step 6.13.7) WHEN The operator reads the Note, and disconnects are closed at 13A, proceeds.

THEN OBSERVE the following ___ ___ ___

(red) CLOSED lights ILLUMINATED: The operator observes the

GENERATOR DISCONNECT 1G13A71 Red status light is LIT 1G13A71 and the Green status light is OFF.

GENERATOR DISCONNECT 9X13A73 The operator observes the 9X13A73 Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.8) ENSURE 10 The operator observes Power Reactor power is between 15% to Range channels NI-41C, NI-42C, 20%.

NI-43C, and NI-44C between 15%

and 20% (Or equivalent). ___ ___ ___

CUE (If asked to report power level): As the HCO, Power level is 19% (current power level).

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.9) REVIEW 11 The operator reads Caution prior CAUTION at beginning of to Step 6.9.1, and proceeds.

Subsection 6.9. ___ ___ ___

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.10) PLACE

12 The operator rotates the CIRCUIT CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON. ___ ___ ___

clockwise to ON.

CUE (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): The US gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash.

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Appendix C Page 10 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CAUTION At low MWe output, Turbine loading requirements SHALL be observed PER EOP, FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure

Operation in the Avoid Region SHOULD be minimized.

Operation in the DO NOT OPERATE region SHALL be limited to 5 minutes.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.11/11.1) 13 The operator reads the Caution, PERFORM the following to and proceeds.

CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 ___ ___ ___

BUS 1 115KV:

WITH RG&E Energy Control The operator refers to FIG-13.0 or Center concurrence, TRY to adjust calls up PBACK on the PPCS.

BASE ADJUSTER so generator INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly The operator observes the higher than system RUNNING INCOMING VOLTMETER VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage (GENERATOR) voltage and as indicated on all three phases. RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage and determines ___ ___ ___

that no adjustment is needed.

Examiner Note: This action was completed previously. Further adjustment should not be required.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.2) IF 14 The operator marks Step INCOMING VOLTMETER 6.13.11.2. a and b N/A.

(GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT be adjusted slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. ___ ___ ___

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Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.3) REVIEW 15 The operator reviews Steps Steps 6.13.11.4 thru 6.13.11.6 6.13.11.4 thru 6.13.11.6.

prior to closing CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 115KV to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse ___ ___ ___

power.

Examiner Note: The operator may place a CCV identifier on the MCB below the Turbine MANUAL pushbutton.

NOTE MCB Alarm J-5, #11 or #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will stay EXTINGUISHED during performance of next step.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.4) WHEN 16 The operator reads the Note, and synchroscope rotating slow in the proceeds.

FAST (clockwise) direction AND ___ ___ ___

approaching 12 oclock position, THEN CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G The operator observes the 13A72 BUS 1 115KV so breaker synchroscope rotating slowly in the closes at the approximate point of FAST direction.

synchronism (12 oclock).

The operator rotates the 1G 13A72

RECORD time of closure breaker pistol-grip switch clockwise to the CLOSE position when the synchroscope is ___ ___ ___

approaching 12 oclock.

The operator observes the 1G 13A72 Red status light LIT, Green status light OFF.

The operator records time of closure.

Examiner Note: Operator may not record breaker closure time until after automatic load pickup is verified. This is acceptable to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse power.

CUE IF the operator communicates actions to the US, as US, acknowledge.

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number NOTE Load is to be maintained between 40 to 60 MW UNTIL hold time in Step 6.14.5.2 is completed.

(O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.5) VERIFY 17 The operator reads the Note, and Automatic load pickup occurs proceeds.

within approximately 10 seconds.

The operator observes Generator load and determines that automatic load pickup is NOT raising load to the expected range. ___ ___ ___

18 (O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.6) IF The operator depresses TURB automatic load pickup does NOT MANUAL pushbutton.

occur within approximately 10 ___ ___ ___

seconds, THEN PERFORM the following: The operator observes OPER PAN OTHERWISE, MARK this Step light off and TURB MANUAL light N/A. is LIT.

a. DEPRESS TURB. MANUAL pushbutton. (Turbine EH The operator observes digital Control Panel) Generator Gross MW indication.

b. INTERMITTENTLY DEPRESS the following pushbuttons as

The operator intermittently necessary to adjust generator depresses the MANUAL gross load between 40 to 60 CONTROL VALVE RAISE MW:

pushbutton to adjust generator

MANUAL CONTROL gross load to between 40 to 60 VALVE LOWER ___ ___ ___

MW before the Main Generator

MANUAL CONTROL trips on Reverse Power.

VALVE RAISE CUE IF the operator communicates actions to the US, as US, acknowledge.

Examiner Note: The Main Generator will Reverse Power in about 55-60 seconds if the operator does NOT take this action (i.e. JPM Failure).

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (O-1.2 Step 6.13.11.7) PLACE 19 The operator rotates CIRCUIT CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF.

counter-clockwise to the OFF position. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The generator is being started following a refueling outage.

The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up.

The generator output voltage is 19 KV.

MTC is negative for this Startup.

You are the CO.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to synchronize the generator on-line per O-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.11.7.

The HCO will control the primary plant.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM F 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F (Rev_091020) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Verify Containment Isolation and JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control Heat Removal Room JPM F K/A

Reference:

EPE E14 EA1.1 (3.7/3.7)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant tripped from 100% power and Safety Injection has actuated.

The crew entered E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and then transitioned to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Due to a degrading transient, an Orange Path now exists on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

You are the HCO.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to perform FR-Z.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, starting at Step 1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

Task Standard: The operator will establish Containment Spray flow including flow from the Sodium Hydroxide Tank from at least one train of Containment Spray and manually start the C CNMT Recirculation Fan Cooler.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: None General

References:

AR-A-27, CONTAINMENT SPRAY 2/3 + 2/3 > 28 PSI, Rev 9 AR-A-28, CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANNEL ALERT 2/3 > 28 PSI, Rev 8

F-0.5, CONTAINMENT CSFST, Rev 00200 FR-Z.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, Rev 013 P-7, SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS, Rev 23 OP-AA-101-111-1001, OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS, Rev 25 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 052 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of FR-Z.1 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 16 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 4 This step is critical because placing the A & B Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START is necessary to establish Containment Spray flow including flow from the Sodium Hydroxide Tank from at least one train of Containment Spray.

Step 6 This step is critical because placing the Control Switch for AOV-836A or B in the OPEN position is necessary to establish Containment Spray flow including flow from the Sodium Hydroxide Tank from at least one train of Containment Spray.

Step 8 This step is critical because placing the Control Switch for MOV-860A or B and C or D Control Switch in OPEN position is necessary to establish Containment Spray flow including flow from the Sodium Hydroxide Tank from at least one train of Containment Spray.

Step 10 This step is critical because placing the C CNMT RECIRC Fan control switch in the START position is necessary to manually start the C CNMT Recirculation Fan Cooler.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Initiate to any 100% IC (IC-19).

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Insert Malfunctions RPS08A and RPS08B, No Manual (Failure of CS Automatic Actuation/No Manual, Both Trains).

3. Insert Malfunction RPS07I (C CRFC fails to AUTO Start).

4. Place Simulator in RUN.

5. Insert Malfunction STM11A, 1.7e+05 (Steam Line Break Inside Containment, A S/G).

6. Carry out actions of E-0 and transition to E-2 (Do Not Start the C CRFC in ATT-27).

7. Upon transition to E-2, raise malfunction STM11A to 1.7e+07 (Steam Rupture Inside Containment, A S/G). This will create an ORANGE Path on Containment that needs to be addressed with E-0 exited.

8. Ensure Annunciator A-28 is LIT, that Containment Pressure is > 28 psig, and that CS has NOT automatically actuated.

9. Place Simulator in FREEZE.

10. Reset to IC-166 (March, 2020)

11. Place Simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

12. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

13. This completes the setup for this JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

NOTE FOLDOUT Page should be open and monitored periodically.

1 (FR-Z.1 Step 1) Verify All CI And The operator reads the NOTE and CVI Valve Status Lights - BRIGHT proceeds.

The operator observes all CI and CVI Valve Status Lights are BRIGHT. ___ ___ ___

Examiner Note: At any time during this JPM, the operator may recognize that automatic actions have failed, and take manual action as needed to operate equipment as needed (See A-503.1, Step 5.3.D, Manual Backup). While the operator may take this action, and it is permitted by procedures, and expected; if the action is not taken the operator will still be successful by adherence to the procedure assigned.

Examiner Note: Any attempt by the operator to actuate CS by depressing two MCB pushbuttons simultaneously will not be successful (pushbutton operation has failed).

CAUTION IF ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, IS IN EFFECT, THEN CNMT SPRAY SHOULD BE OPERATED AS DIRECTED IN ECA-1.1, RATHER THAN STEP 2 BELOW.

IF E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, IS IN EFFECT, THEN CNMT SPRAY SHOULD BE OPERATED AS DIRECTED IN E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, RATHER THAN STEP 2 BELOW.

2 (FR-Z.1 Step 2/2.a) Verify CNMT The operator reads the Cautions Spray Actuated: and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

Verify RWST outlet to SI and CNMT spray pumps - OPEN The operator observes the MOV-896A Red status light is LIT and

MOV-896A the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

MOV-896B The operator observes the MOV-896B Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 3 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b) Verify CNMT The operator observes the A spray pumps - RUNNING Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the B Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes Containment pressure to be 40-50 psig. ___ ___ ___

The operator proceeds to the Step 2.b RNO. ___ ___ ___

4 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b RNO) Manually The operator places the A start pumps. Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the A Containment Spray Pump Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator places the B Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the B Containment Spray Pump Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

5 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c) Verify NaOH The operator observes FI-930 and flow (FI-930) notes flow at 0.

The operator proceeds to the Step 2.c RNO.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

6 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c RNO) IF NaOH The operator places the Control flow NOT indicated, THEN place Switch for AOV-836A in OPEN.

switches for NaOH tank outlet valves to OPEN.

AOV-836A The operator places the Control

AOV-836B Switch for AOV-836B in OPEN.

Examiner Note: One of the two valve Control Switches must be in the OPEN position to satisfy the Critical Step.

Flow on FI-930 will NOT be observed until Performance Step 8. When the Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN.

7 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.d) Verify CNMT The operator observes the MOV-spray pump discharge valves - 860A Green status light is LIT, and OPEN the Red status light is OFF.

MOV-860A

MOV-860B

MOV-860C The operator observes the MOV-

MOV-860D 860B Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.

The operator observes the MOV-860C Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.

The operator observes the MOV-860D Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.

The operator proceeds to the Step 2.d RNO.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

8 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.d RNO) Ensure at The operator places the MOV-least one in each set open. 860A Control Switch in OPEN. ___ ___ ___

MOV-860A or MOV-860B The operator observes the MOV-

MOV-860C or MOV-860D 860A Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

AND/OR

The operator places the MOV-860B Control Switch in OPEN. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the MOV-860B Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator places the MOV-860C Control Switch in OPEN. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the MOV-860C Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

AND/OR

The operator places the MOV-860D Control Switch in OPEN. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the MOV-860D Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes flow on FI-930.

Examiner Note: The operator may OPEN all four valves; however, at least one valve in each set must be OPEN to satisfy the Critical Nature of this Step.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 9 (FR-Z.1 Step 3/3.a) Verify CNMT The operator observes the A RECIRC Fans Running: CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status All fans - RUNNING light is OFF.

The operator observes the B CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.

The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.

The operator observes the D CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.

10 (FR-Z.1 Step 3.a RNO) Manually The operator places the C CNMT start fans. RECIRC Fan control switch in the START position.

The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 11 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 11 (FR-Z.1 Step 3.b) Charcoal filter The operator observes the A dampers green status lights - CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal EXTINGUISHED Filter Damper Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal Filter Damper Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 12 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant tripped from 100% power and Safety Injection has actuated.

The crew entered E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and then transitioned to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Due to a degrading transient, an Orange Path now exists on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

You are the HCO.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to perform FR-Z.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, starting at Step 1.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM G 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G (Rev_091120) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Establish 100/0 Electric Lineup on JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control Circuit 767 Room JPM G K/A

Reference:

062 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Electric Plant is currently in a 50/50 NORMAL lineup.

RG&E ECC has requested that the plant be placed in a 100/0 lineup on Circuit 767 for scheduled maintenance on offsite Circuit 7T later today.

An A-52.12 for removal of Circuit 7T has been prepared.

You are the CO.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to establish a 100/0 Electric Plant alignment and de-energize the 12A Station Aux Transformer per O-6.9.2, ESTABLISHING AND/OR TRANSFERRING OFFSITE POWER TO BUS 12A / BUS 12B, by performing Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.3.

The SM and RG&E ECC have approved performance of this bus re-alignment.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will transfer 4160V buses from a 50/50 NORMAL Lineup to 100/0 Lineup on Circuit 767 and de-energize the 12A Station Aux Transformer per Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 of O-6.9.2.

Required Materials: None General

References:

O-6.9.2, ESTABLISHING AND/OR TRANSFERRING OFFSITE POWER TO BUS 12A/12B, Rev 030 HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, Rev 7 Handouts: Handout 1: Copy of O-6.9.2 marked up for place-keeping for this JPM.

Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Note: This JPM will be pre-briefed in the Briefing Room.

Critical Step Justification Step 3 This step is critical because placing the synchroscope switch for Bus 12A ALT Feed from 767 to ON is necessary to transfer 4160V buses from a 50/50 NORMAL Lineup to a 100/0 Lineup on Circuit 767 per Section 6.3.1 of O-6.9.2.

Step 4 This step is critical because placing the 52/12BY control switch in the CLOSE position is necessary to transfer 4160V buses from a 50/50 NORMAL Lineup to a 100/0 Lineup on Circuit 767 per Section 6.3.1 of O-6.9.2.

Step 7 This step is critical because placing the 52/12AY control switch to TRIP and then to AUTO is necessary to transfer 4160V buses from a 50/50 NORMAL Lineup to a 100/0 Lineup on Circuit 767 per Section 6.3.1 of O-6.9.2.

Step 15 This step is critical because placing the CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 Control Switch in the OPEN position is necessary to de-energize the 12A Station Aux Transformer per Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 of O-6.9.2.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Reset to IC-19 (Or any appropriate 100% power IC)

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Ensure the electric plant is in a Normal 50/50 electric plant lineup

3. Place Simulator in FREEZE.

4. Reset to IC-167 (March, 2020)

5. Place Simulator in RUN when directed by Examiner.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

1 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1/6.3.1.1) The operator observes the ESTABLISH Offsite Power to 12A 52/12AY Red status light is LIT Bus using Circuit 767 as follows: and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

MARK BUS 12A NORMAL FEED The operator checks the CLOSED FROM 7T, 52/12AY, breaker initial box.

position:

OPEN

CLOSED ___ ___ ___

2 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.2) VERIFY The operator observes the Breaker CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 76702 34 76702 Red status light is LIT and KV BUS. the Green status light is OFF.

3 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.3) TURN The operator places the synch ON BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM switch for Bus 12A ALT Feed from 767, 52/12BY, SYNCHROSCOPE. 767 to ON.

NOTE

Next Step will cause the following MCB Alarms to ILLUMINATE:

J-6, 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP

L-20, 12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE

The next step may cause PPCS Alarm 12AOPDST due to 7T LINE LOAD falling below the minimum load (MINLOAD) setpoint of the 46L/12A Relay.

Steps 6.3.1.5 through 6.3.1.7 SHALL be performed without delay following completion of Step 6.3.1.4.

4 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.4) CLOSE The operator reads the NOTEs BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

52/12BY.

The operator places the 52/12BY control switch in the CLOSE position. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the 52/12BY Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 5 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.5) IF BUS 12A The operator recognizes that NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY was initially CLOSED, 52/12AY, was initially OPEN, and marks this Step N/A.

THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light EXTINGUISHED). OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

6 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.a) IF BUS The operator observes that the 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY Green and White status 52/12AY, was initially CLOSED, lights are LIT and the Red status THEN PERFORM the following: light is OFF.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

VERIFY breaker OPENED (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light ILLUMINATED). IF green light is NOT lit, THEN MARK this Step N/A AND CONTINUE with Step 6.3.1.6.b.

7 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.b) PLACE The operator places the 52/12AY BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM control switch to TRIP and then to 7T, 52/12AY, control switch to AUTO.

TRIP AND THEN to AUTO.

8 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.c) VERIFY The operator observes that the breaker is OPEN AND RESET 52/12AY Green status light is LIT, (Green light ILLUMINATED, White and the Red and White status light EXTINGUISHED). lights are OFF.

9 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.7) IF BUS 12A The operator observes that the NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY Green status light is LIT, 52/12AY, is NOT OPEN, THEN and the Red status and White IMMEDIATELY PERFORM lights are OFF, recognizes that this Attachment 1, 7T/Bus 12A step is NA, and proceeds.

Circulating Current Contingency Action. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 10 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.8) VERIFY The operator observes that the BUS 12A VOLTMETER 4160 V BUS 12A VOLTMETER 4160 V indicates approximately 4000 indicates approximately 4000 VOLTS on all 3 phases. [G0431] VOLTS on all 3 phases.

11 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.9) VERIFY The operator observes that Bus 14 Bus 14 and Bus 18 voltmeter and Bus 18 voltmeter indicates indicates greater than 440 volts on greater than 440 volts on all 3 all 3 phases. [G0431] phases.

12 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.10) TURN The operator places the synch OFF BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM switch for Bus 12A ALT Feed from 767, 52/12BY, SYNCHROSCOPE. 767 to OFF.

13 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.3/6.3.3.1) IF The operator recognizes that an A-Station Aux Transformer (SAT) 52.12 on Circuit 7T has already 12A, is to be DE-ENERGIZED, been submitted (Initial Conditions).

THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

1. SUBMIT an A-52.12 on Circuit 7T.

14 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.3/6.3.3.2) The operator recognizes that NOTIFY RG&E ECC that CIRCUIT RG&E ECC already aware that BKR 7T1352 34 KV BUS will be CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 34 KV BUS opened. will be OPENED (Initial Conditions).

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number NOTE The next step may cause PPCS Alarm 12AOPDST due to LOSS of 34K AND 4KV PT VOLTAGE without a corresponding change in current.

15 (O-6.9.2, Step 6.3.3/6.3.3.3) OPEN The operator reads the NOTE and CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 34 KV proceeds.

BUS.

The operator places the CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 Control Switch in the OPEN position. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Electric Plant is currently in a 50/50 NORMAL lineup.

RG&E ECC has requested that the plant be placed in a 100/0 lineup on Circuit 767 for scheduled maintenance on offsite Circuit 7T later today.

An A-52.12 for removal of Circuit 7T has been prepared.

You are the CO.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to establish a 100/0 Electric Plant alignment and de-energize the 12A Station Aux Transformer per O-6.9.2, ESTABLISHING AND/OR TRANSFERRING OFFSITE POWER TO BUS 12A / BUS 12B, by performing Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.3.

The SM and RG&E ECC have approved performance of this bus re-alignment.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIM JPM H 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H (Rev_091120) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Depressurize the RCS During a JPM No.: 2020 Systems - Control SGTR Room JPM H K/A

Reference:

010 A4.01 (3.7/3.5)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handouts 1-2.

Initial Conditions:

The plant has experienced a Steam Generator Tube Rupture in the B S/G.

The crew has completed E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, through Step 17.

The crew is ready to commence RCS depressurization.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow and refill the Pressurizer starting with Step 18.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

Task Standard: The operator will depressurize the RCS using maximum Pressurizer Spray and terminate the depressurization once one of the four criteria listed in E-3, Step 18.b, are met.

Required Materials: None 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General

References:

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Rev 049 E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Rev 051 FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING, Rev 00200 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 052 Handouts: Handout 1: Pages 1-20 of E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture marked up for this JPM Handout 2: FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 14 minutes NOTE: Even though this is a JPM using an EOP, this task would not be performed without the Unit Supervisor conducting a Pre-Job Brief.

Consequently, this JPM will be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.

Critical Step Justification Step 2 This step is critical because placing the PCV-431A/B Controller in MAN and adjusting output so that the Pzr Spray Valves are fully OPEN (Or PK-431K as an alternative) is necessary to depressurize the RCS using maximum Pressurizer Spray.

Step 3 This step is critical because determining that one of the depressurization termination criteria listed in Step 18.b is met and adjusting the PCV-431A/B Controller output so that the Pzr Spray Valves are CLOSED (Or PK-431K as an alternative) is necessary to terminate the depressurization once one of the four criteria listed in E-3, Step 18.b, are met.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document:

the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps.

These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. Reset the Simulator to any 100% power IC. (IC-19)

NOTE: It is permissible to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently. {Delete this NOTE if not applicable.}

2. Insert Malf SGN04B, 500 gpm (SGTR on B S/G).

3. Perform Steps 1-17 of E-3.

4. Adjust Malf SGN04B = 200 gpm.

5. Ensure PPCS is available.

6. Ensure the following:

RCPs are RUNNING

Feed flow is adjusted properly to both Steam Generators

IA is available to the Containment

Ruptured SG Level is < 90% (As Low as Possible)

7. Place simulator in FREEZE.

8. Reset to IC-168 (March 2020)

9. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.

10. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.

11. This completes the setup for this JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.

NOTE SI ACCUMs may inject during RCS depressurization 1 (E-3, Step 18/18.a) Depressurize The operator reads the Note and RCS To Minimize Break Flow And proceeds. ___ ___ ___

Refill PRZR:

The operator observes Narrow Check the following: Range level in the B S/G to be

Ruptured S/G level LESS 66% and rising. ___ ___ ___

THAN 90% [80% adverse The operator observes that the A CNMT] RCP Red status lit is LIT and the

Any RCP RUNNING Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

IA to CNMT AVAILABLE The operator observes that the B RCP Red status lit is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the AOV-5392 Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

2 (E-3, Step 18.b) Spray PRZR with The operator moves the PCV-maximum available spray until 431A controller slide switch to the ANY of the following conditions MAN position and rotates the satisfied: manual adjust knob clockwise such that the controller output indicates 100% (OPEN). ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the PCV-431A Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator moves the PCV-431B controller slide switch to the MAN position and rotates the manual adjust knob clockwise such that the controller output indicates 100% (OPEN). ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 2 The operator observes the PCV-(Contd) 431A Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.

Examiner NOTE: The operator may elect to open the Pressurizer Spray valves by using Master Pressure Controller 431K to OPEN both Spray Valves. In this case, the operator moves the PCV-431K controller slide switch to the MAN position and rotates the manual adjust knob clockwise such that the controller output indicates 100% (SPRAYS).

The operator observes pressurizer

PRZR level GREATER THAN level (LI-426, 427, 428).

75% [65% adverse CNMT]

OR The operator observes RCS pressure (PI-420-2/420A) and

RCS pressure LESS THAN CETs and uses FIG-1.0 to SATURATION USING FIG1.0, determine RCS saturation FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING pressure is 850 psig.

OR The operator observes RCS BOTH of the following: pressure (PI-420-2/420A) and the

RCS pressure LESS THAN B SG pressure (PI-478, 479, RUPTURED S/G PRESSURE 483A).

PRZR level GREATER THAN The operator observes pressurizer 10% [30% adverse CNMT] level (LI-426, 427, 428).

OR BOTH of the following: The operator observes RCS

RCS pressure - WITHIN 300 pressure (PI-420-2/420A) and PSI OF RUPTURED S/G ruptured SG pressure (PI-478, PRESS 479, 483A).

PRZR level - GREATER The operator observes pressurizer THAN 40% [50% adverse level (LI-426, 427, 428).

CNMT] ___ ___ ___

Examiner NOTE: The Critical nature of stopping the depressurization is that when one of the four criteria are met, the depressurization is stopped. It is expected that the last criteria will be used to stop the depressurization.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

3 (E-3, Step 18.c) Close normal When operator determines that PRZR spray valves: one of the depressurization termination criteria listed in Step Adjust normal spray valve 18.b is met, the operator rotates controller to 0% DEMAND the PCV-431A manual adjust knob Verify PRZR spray valves - counter-clockwise such that the CLOSED controller output indicates 0%

PCV-431A (CLOSED). ___ ___ ___

PCV-431B The operator observes the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF and determines that PCV-431A is CLOSED. ___ ___ ___

When operator determines that one of the depressurization termination criteria listed in Step 18.b is met, the operator rotates the PCV-431B manual adjust knob counter-clockwise such that the controller output indicates 0%

(CLOSED). ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF and determines that PCV-431B is CLOSED. ___ ___ ___

Examiner NOTE: IF the operator previously used the Master Pressure Controller 431K to OPEN both Spray Valves, the operator will close both Spray valves by rotating the manual adjust knob counter-clockwise such that the controller output indicates <50% (HEATERS).

JPM Stop Time: _________ CUE: This terminates the JPM.

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant has experienced a Steam Generator Tube Rupture in the B S/G.

The crew has completed E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, through Step 17.

The crew is ready to commence RCS depressurization.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow and refill the Pressurizer starting with Step 18.

Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with the assigned task.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet IN-PLANT JPM I 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I (Rev_082720) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Release D Gas Decay Tank JPM No.: 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I (Alternate Path)

K/A

Reference:

071 A3.03 (3.6/3.8)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The D Gas Decay Tank (GDT) is full and approved for release.

The D GDT does NOT have elevated activity and the contents are not from VCT gas.

Procedure S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, is in progress with the procedure signed off through Section 5.0.

Initiating Cue:

The US has directed you to release the D GDT in accordance with S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank.

The Extra EO has removed the required tagout and completed the necessary paperwork.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

Task Standard: The operator will lineup and release the D GDT in accordance with S-4.2.5, Section 6.4 and then stop the release in accordance with S-4.2.5, Step 4.2 upon an alarm condition on R-14.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)

Dosimetry General

References:

S-4.2.5, RELEASE OF GAS DECAY TANK, Rev 01902 CH-703, RELEASE OF GDTS AND OTHER GASEOUS BATCH RELEASES, Rev 402 HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, Rev 7 Handouts: Handout 1: S-4.2.5 completed through Section 5.0.

Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 10 This step is critical because unlocking the V-1620 locking device and rotating the V-1620 handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction is necessary to lineup and release the D GDT in accordance with S-4.2.5, Section 6.4.

Step 13 This step is critical because rotating 014H1 IA PCV to AOV 14 clockwise observing the RCV-014 control air pressure rising and observing the RCV-014 Red and Green status lights is necessary to lineup and release the D GDT in accordance with S-4.2.5, Section 6.4.

Alternate Path Critical Step Justification Step 15 This step is critical because determining that the RCV-014 has failed to CLOSE and then rotating 014H1 IA PCV to AOV 14 counter-clockwise observing the RCV-014 control air pressure lowering and observing the RCV-014 Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF is necessary to stop the release in accordance with S-4.2.5, Step 4.2 upon an alarm condition on R-14.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.

Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

1 (S-4.2.5, Sections 1.0 through 5.0) The operator reviews S-4.2.5, Operator reviews Sections 1.0 Sections 1.0 through 5.0 and through 5.0 of S-4.2.5 proceeds. ___ ___ ___

CAUTION Only one gas decay tank may be released at one time.

2 (S-4.2.5, Section 6.0) CAUTION The operator reads the Caution and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

3 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.1) IF GDT D The operator recognizes that this contains VCT gas, THEN is not applicable and marks the REQUEST Shift Manager Step N/A (Initial Conditions).

authorize removal of Operator Aid Tag. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. ___ ___ ___

CUE Inform operator: For the purposes of this JPM, there are no caution tags or operator aids. Mark the Step N/A.

4 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.2) CLOSE The operator observes the PCV-INLET AOV TO GAS DECAY 1039A Green status light is LIT TANK D, PCV-1039A. and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

CUE After the switch is located (on Waste Panel): Green light for PCV-1039A is LIT.

5 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.3) CLOSE GAS The operator observes the AOV-DECAY TANK D REUSE 1632 control switch is in CLOSE CONTROL AOV, AOV-1632. and the Green status light is LIT.

CUE After the switch is located (on Waste Panel): Green light for AOV-1632 is LIT.

6 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.4) CLOSE GAS The operator observes the PCV-DECAY TANK D OUTLET AOV 1039B Green status light is LIT TO GAS ANALYZER, PCV-1039B. and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

CUE After the switch is located (on Waste Panel): Green light for PCV-1039B is LIT.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 7 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.5) LOCK For each valve:

CLOSED GDT manual outlet

The operator attempts to rotate valves on all tanks: the handwheel in the clockwise

GAS DECAY TANK A direction.

MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-

The operator observes the 1617 Locking Device to be installed

GAS DECAY TANK B and locked.

MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1618

GAS DECAY TANK C MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1619

GAS DECAY TANK D MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1620 ___ ___ ___

CUE For each valve: The handwheel does not rotate in the clockwise direction, and The Locking Device is installed and locked.

CUE If asked, the eSoms location for these valves are AUX BLDG Intermediate Level GDT Alley 5 (V-1617 and 1618) and 1 (V-1619 and 1620) elevation.

8 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.6) CLOSE GAS

The operator rotates 014H1 IA DECAY TANK RELEASE AOV TO PCV to AOV 14 in the counter-PLANT VENT VIA CHARCOAL clockwise direction.

FILTER, RCV-014

The operator observes the RCV-014 Green status light is LIT.

The operator observes the RCV-014 Control Air Pressure Gage reads 0 psig.

CUE After the knob is located (on Waste Panel): The knob does NOT rotate in the counter-clockwise direction.

CUE After the RCV-014 status lights are located (on Waste Panel): The Green status light is LIT.

CUE After the RCV-014 Control Air pressure Gage is located, POINT to 0 psig.

9 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.7) REMOVE The operator verifies the hold on eSOMS Tag from V-1620. V-1620 is removed (Initiating Cue). ___ ___ ___

CUE An Extra EO has removed the Tag and completed the necessary paperwork (Initial Conditions).

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

10 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.8) UNLOCK

The operator unlocks the V-AND OPEN GAS DECAY TANK D 1620 locking device.

MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1620.

The operator rotates the V-1620 handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction.

CUE After the Applicant describes lock removal: The lock is removed. The valve no longer rotates in that direction.

CAUTION

WHEN moving water or gas in the Waste Handling Systems with elevated activity present, THEN COORDINATE with RP to monitor local radiation levels. [G0168]

WHEN releasing gas from tanks with elevated activity, THEN INITIATE the release slowly and allow time for the Rad Monitor to stabilize. Raise the release rate, if necessary, in small increments, realizing that it may take several minutes for the Rad Monitor to react to the elevated activity level being released. [G0168]

SECURE gas decay tank from release when approximately 5 psig, to prevent vacuum on the NSA Gas Analyzed (when the GDT is placed in service).

11 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.9) CAUTIONs The operator reads and place prior to Step 6.4.9 keeps CAUTIONs and proceeds.

12 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.9) PERFORM The operator observes PI-1039 the following to begin release: and records initial tank pressure

1. RECORD the following: and time.

GDT D Initial Pressure:

Time GDT D release initiated:

CUE After the PI-1039 is located (on Waste Panel), POINT to 90 psig.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number

13 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.9) PERFORM The operator rotates 014H1 IA the following to begin release: PCV to AOV 14 clockwise.

2. THROTTLE OPEN (may be ___ ___ ___

full open) GAS DECAY TANK The operator observes RCV-014 RELEASE AOV TO PLANT control air pressure rising.

VENT VIA CHARCOAL FILTER, RCV-014, to desired ___ ___ ___

release rate. The operator observes RCV-014 Red and Green status lights.

The operator observes the R-14 indication rising.

CUE Once operator begins rotating 014H1 IA PCV to AOV 14:

POINT to the RCV-014 Control Air Pressure Gage to show air pressure RISING.

As RCV-014 is being opened: Both Red and Green lights are LIT.

Once RCV-014 is fully OPEN: Red light is LIT, Green light is OFF.

After R-14 indication is located (on Waste Panel), POINT to counts RISING.

EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 14 (S-4.2.5, Step 6.4.9) PERFORM The operator contacts the Control the following to begin release: Room and reports initial tank

3. NOTIFY Control Room of time pressure and time that the release GDT D release was initiated was initiated.

and the initial pressure.

CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, acknowledge radio communications.

CUE After RCV-014 is OPEN for approximately 10 to 15 seconds:

As Control Room inform the operator R-14 reads 2 X 105 CPM and rising slowly.

After R-14 indication is located (on Waste Panel): R-14 indicates 2 X 105 CPM and rising.

IF necessary, as Control Room inform operator R-14 is in HIGH ALARM.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 15 (S-4.2.5, Step 4.2) ENSURE RCV- The operator observes the RCV-014 closes if a high alarm occurs 014 Red status light is LIT, and the on R-14. Green status light is OFF, and determines that RCV-014 has failed to CLOSE. ___ ___ ___

The operator rotates 014H1 IA PCV to AOV 14 counter-clockwise. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes RCV-014 control air pressure lowering.

The operator observes RCV-014 Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. ___ ___ ___

The operator observes the R-14 indication lowering. ___ ___ ___

CUE Once operator begins rotating 014H1 IA PCV to AOV 14:

POINT to the RCV-014 Control Air Pressure Gage to show air pressure LOWERING.

As RCV-014 is being closed: Both Red and Green lights are LIT.

Once RCV-014 is fully CLOSED: Green light is LIT, Red light is OFF.

After R-14 indication is located (on Waste Panel), POINT to counts LOWERING.

CUE Once RCV-014 is CLOSED, state: This JPM is complete.

JPM Stop Time: _________

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The D Gas Decay Tank (GDT) is full and approved for release.

The D GDT does NOT have elevated activity and the contents are not from VCT gas.

Procedure S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, is in progress with the procedure signed off through Section 5.0.

INITIATING CUE:

The US has directed you to release the D GDT in accordance with S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank.

The Extra EO has removed the required tagout and completed the necessary paperwork.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet IN-PLANT JPM J 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J (Rev_071020) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Perform SFP-RWST Attachment JPM No.: 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J K/A

Reference:

E04 EA2.2 (3.6/4.2)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

The plant experienced a LOCA outside of Containment, and entered E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

The crew transitioned to ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, however, the LOCA could not be isolated.

The crew transitioned from ECA-1.2 to ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.

RWST Purification is not in progress.

The A SFP Cooling Pump is in service aligned to the high suction.

The Standby SFP Cooling System is OOS.

You are an extra Control Operator.

Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to transfer water from SFP to the RWST using Attachment ATT-18.0, SFP-RWST, bypassing the SFP DI and Filter.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)

Dosimetry Locked Valve Key (Simulated)

SFP Filter Key (Simulated)

Laser Pointer General

References:

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Rev 049 ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Rev 00800 ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, Rev 030 ATT-18.0, ATTACHMENT SFP-RWST, Rev. 008 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 052 S-9, SFP COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION, Rev 014 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of ATT-18.0 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 11 minutes 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Critical Step Justification Step 3 This step is critical because opening V-782 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 4 This step is critical because closing V-781 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 6 This step is critical because closing V-804 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 7 This step is critical because opening V-789 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 8 This step is critical because closing V-790 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 9 This step is critical because closing V-796 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 10 This step is critical because opening V-797 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 11 This step is critical because closing V-798A is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 12 This step is critical because closing V-802 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 13 This step is critical because opening V-897C is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

Step 14 This step is critical because throttling open V-803 is necessary to initiate a transfer of water between the Spent Fuel Pool and the RWST bypassing the SFP DI and Filter in accordance with ATT-18.0.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.

Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

NOTE

Performing this attachment will transfer SFP water to RWST.

Locked valve key AND SFP filter key are required.

(ATT-18.0, Step 1) IF RWST The operator reads the NOTEs, 1 ___ ___ ___

purification is in progress, and proceeds.

THEN..

The operator recognizes that RWST purification is NOT in progress, and proceeds (Initial ___ ___ ___

Conditions).

NOTE IF placing the Standby SFP Pump or the A SFP Cooling System in service per S-9, THEN align only the lower suction.

(ATT-18.0, Step 2) Ensure the The operator reads the NOTE, and 2 ___ ___ ___

Standby SFP Pump or the SFP proceeds.

cooling system A in service or The operator recognizes that SFP align per S- 9, SFP COOLING Cooling System A is in service, SYSTEM OPERATION. (SFP filter and proceeds (Initial Conditions). ___ ___ ___

locked area key required).

(ATT-18.0, Step 3/3.a) Ensure the The operator rotates the V-782

3 SFP suctions are aligned as Handwheel in the Counter-follows: Clockwise direction.

a. Open V-782, LOW SUCTION ISOL VLV TO SPENT FUEL POOL RECIRC PUMPS (ALT) ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem rises, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 3.b) Close V-781, The operator rotates the V-781

4 HIGH SUCTION ISOL VLV TO Handwheel in the Clockwise SPENT FUEL POOL RECIRC direction. ___ ___ ___

PUMPS (NORMAL)

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number NOTE A transfer flow rate of approximately 400 gpm is expected if the SFP DI and filter are bypassed.

(ATT-18.0, Step 4) IF the standby The operator reads the NOTE, and 5 ___ ___ ___

SFP Pump is aligned to SFP Hx B, proceeds.

THEN..

The operator recognizes that the Standby SFP Pump is OOS, and proceeds (Initial Conditions). ___ ___ ___

(ATT-18.0, Step 5/5.a) IF a The operator unlocks the locking

6 ___ ___ ___

transfer flow rate greater than 60 device.

gpm is desired, THEN bypass the SFP DI and filter as follows: The operator rotates the V-804 Handwheel in the Clockwise Close SFP filter discharge to SFP direction. ___ ___ ___

V- 804 CUE The locking device is unlocked.

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 5.b) Open SFP DI The operator rotates the V-789

7 bypass V- 789 Handwheel in the Counter-Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem rises, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 5.c) Close SFP DI The operator rotates the V-790

8 inlet V-790 Handwheel in the Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 5.d) Close SFP DI The operator rotates the V-796

9 outlet V-796 Handwheel in the Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

Examiner Note: Each of the next three valves are in Locked High Radiation Areas; and can be seen from outside the area. Have the operator point to each valve using a Laser Pointer.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number (ATT-18.0, Step 5.e) Open SFP The operator rotates the V-797

10 filter bypass V-797 Handwheel in the Counter-Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem rises, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 5.f) Close SFP The operator rotates the V-798A

11 filter inlet V-798A Handwheel in the Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 5.g) Close SFP The operator rotates the V-802

12 filter outlet V- 802 Handwheel in the Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem lowers, and then stops.

(ATT-18.0, Step 6) Open RWST The operator rotates the 897C

13 REFILL LINE ISOLATION VALVE, Handwheel in the Counter-V-897C. Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem rises, and then stops.

CAUTION IF THE SFP DI AND FILTER ARE IN SERVICE, THEN DO NOT EXCEED 60 GPM (FI -636).

DO NOT REDUCE SFP LEVEL BELOW THE 261 FT. ELEVATION (APPROXIMATELY 16 FEET BELOW THE NORMAL SFP LEVEL. SEE ATTACHED DRAWING)

NOTE SFP volume is approximately 6350 gals (2% RWST level) per foot.

(ATT-18.0, Step 7) Initiate transfer The operator reads the 14 ___ ___ ___

by slowly opening SFP filter CAUTIONs, and proceeds.

discharge to RWST, V-803, and closing SFP filter discharge to The operator reads the NOTE, and SFP, V-804 (valves located below proceeds.

west stairs middle floor).

The operator slowly rotates the V-803 Handwheel in the Counter-Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, the stem rises, and then stops. The sound of flow in the piping system is heard.

Examiner Note: V-804 was closed and locked previously as part of this procedure.

(ATT-18.0, Step 8) IF the STBY The operator recognizes that the 15 SFP Pump is in-service. Standby SFP Pump is OOS (Initial Conditions), and proceeds. ___ ___ ___

(ATT-18.0, Step 9) When transfer The operator reports to the Control 16 is complete, Room that the transfer of water from SFP to the RWST using Attachment ATT-18.0 has been ___ ___ ___

initiated.

CUE Control Room acknowledges.

JPM Stop Time: _________

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant experienced a LOCA outside of Containment, and entered E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

The crew transitioned to ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, however, the LOCA could not be isolated.

The crew transitioned from ECA-1.2 to ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.

RWST Purification is not in progress.

The A SFP Cooling Pump is in service aligned to the high suction.

The Standby SFP Cooling System is OOS.

You are an extra Control Operator.

INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to transfer water from SFP to the RWST using Attachment ATT-18.0, SFP-RWST, bypassing the SFP DI and Filter.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet IN-PLANT JPM K 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K (Rev_061120) NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:

Task

Title:

Align Self-Cooling to the TDAFW JPM No.: 2020 Systems - In-Pump Plant JPM K K/A

Reference:

061 K4.13 (2.7/2.9)

Examinee: NRC Examiner:

Facility Evaluator: Date:

Method of testing:

Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance:

Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.

Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.

Initial Conditions:

There has been a loss of the 480V safeguards buses.

The crew is currently in ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

Fire Water is NOT available.

The TDAFW has been running for one and a half hours with fire water not available.

Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump per ATT-5.2, ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP, Part B.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

Task Standard: The operator will align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump in accordance with ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP within 30 minutes.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)

Locked Valve Key (Simulated)

General

References:

ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER, Rev 044 ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP, Rev 00601 A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, Rev 052 OP-GI-102-106, OPERATOR RESPONSE TIME PROGRAM AT GINNA STATION, Rev 010 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of ATT-5.2.

Time Critical Task: YES. According to Attachment 1 of OP-GI-102-106, TCA-1004A requires that the operator align Diesel Driven Fire Pump output to TDAFW Pump lube oil cooler within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months because it has been demonstrated that the TDAFW Pump can operate for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months without any cooling. According to the ATT-5.2, use of Self-Cooling for the TDAFW Pump depletes the CST inventory and should be delayed as long as possible, but is not to exceed a TDAFW Pump run time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months with no cooling.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Critical Step Justification Step 3 This step is critical because closing SW valve to the TDAFW Pump thrust bearing and lube oil cooler, V-4087D, is necessary to align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump in accordance with ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP within 30 minutes.

Step 7 This step is critical because unlocking and opening the TDAFW Pump self-cooling outer isolation valve, V-4299K, is necessary to align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump in accordance with ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP within 30 minutes.

Step 8 This step is critical because unlocking and opening the TDAFW Pump self-cooling inner isolation valve, V-4299L, is necessary to align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump in accordance with ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP within 30 minutes.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

Information For Evaluators Use:

UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.

Denotes critical steps.

Number any comments in the Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the Comments section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.

Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the sites appropriate tracking system.

Some operations that are performed from outside of the Control Room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the Applicant to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.

The timeclock starts when the Applicant acknowledges the Initiating Cue.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:

Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number CUE Provide Applicant with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.

Examiner Note: After identifying that the operator will obtain a Locked valve Key from SM Office, indicate that the Locked Valve Key will be simulated.

CAUTION MAXIMUM ALLOWED TDAFW PUMP OPERATION WITH NO COOLING IS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

NOTE

IF fire water is available for TDAFW pump cooling, THEN perform Part A.

IF fire water is NOT available, THEN perform Part B.

1 (ATT-5.2) CAUTION/NOTEs The operator reads the Caution and NOTEs and proceeds to Part B. ___ ___ ___

CAUTION THIS ALTERNATE COOLING METHOD DEPLETES CST INVENTORY. THEREFORE, THIS METHOD OF COOLING SHOULD BE DELAYED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT TO EXCEED A TDAFP RUN TIME OF 2 HOURS WITH NO COOLING.

NOTE Locked valve key is required.

2 (ATT-5.2, Step B.1) Ensure service The operator reads the Caution water root valve to the TDAFW and NOTE and proceeds.

pump thrust bearing and lube oil cooler, V-4087C, is CLOSED (south side of pump below MOV- The operator attempts to rotate the 4013). V-4087C Handwheel in the Clockwise direction. ___ ___ ___

CUE The handwheel does not move.

3 (ATT-5.2, Step B.2) Close service The operator attempts to rotate the water valve to the TDAFW pump V-4087D operating in the thrust bearing and lube oil cooler Clockwise direction.

V-4087D (located on the south side of the pump below MOV-4013).

CUE The valve handle rotates 90 degrees and then stops perpendicular to fluid flow.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 4 (ATT-5.2, Step B.3) Ensure open The operator observes the V-4085 SW inlet block valve to TDAFW Handle in the in-line (i.e. parallel) pump lube oil cooler, V-4085. position with the piping.

CUE The Handle is in the in-line position (i.e. parallel) with the piping.

5 (ATT-5.2, Step B.4) Ensure closed The operator observes the V-SW bypass isol from TDAFW 4085B Handle in the cross-line pump lube oil cooler, V-4085B. position (i.e. perpendicular) with the piping.

CUE The Handle is in the cross-line position (i.e. perpendicular) with the piping.

6 (ATT-5.2, Step B.5) Ensure closed The operator attempts to rotate the V-4299D, TDAFW pump casing V-4299D Handwheel in the drain valve. Clockwise direction.

CUE The handwheel does not move.

7 (ATT-5.2, Step B.6) Open V- The operator unlocks the locking 4299K, TDAFW pump self-cooling device.

outer isolation valve.

The operator attempts to rotate the V-4299K Handwheel in the Counter-Clockwise direction.

CUE The locking device is unlocked.

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely and then stops.

8 (ATT-5.2, Step B.7) Open V- The operator unlocks the locking 4299L, TDAFW pump self-cooling device.

inner isolation valve.

The operator attempts to rotate the V-4299L Handwheel in the Counter-Clockwise direction.

CUE The locking device is unlocked.

CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely and then stops.

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Comment SAT UNSAT STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Number 9 (ATT-5.2, Step B.8) Notify the The operator contacts the Control Control Room that the TDAFW Room and informs them that the pump is in the self-cooling TDAFW pump is in the self-cooling alignment. alignment. ___ ___ ___

CUE Acknowledge radio communications.

JPM Stop Time: _________

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K Examinees Name:

Date Performed:

Facility Evaluator:

Number of Attempts:

Time to Complete:

Question Documentation:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:

2020 Systems - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 11

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

There has been a loss of the 480V safeguards buses.

The crew is currently in ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

Fire Water is NOT available.

The TDAFW has been running for one and a half hours with fire water not available.

INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to align self-cooling to the TDAFW pump per ATT-5.2, ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP, Part B.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.

NUREG 1021, Revision 11

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 19-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N20-1-1

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - MODES 1, 2, and 3 (Amendment 118)

2. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray (CS) Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems (Amendment 118)

3. AR-K-31, FIRE SYSTEM ALARM PANEL, (Rev 017)

4. Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.7.1, Fire Suppression Water Sources (Rev 71)

5. STP-O-2.2-COMP-A, Residual Heat Removal Pump A Comprehensive Test (Rev 018)

6. AR-A-9, RHR PUMP COOLING WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 15 GPM (Rev 00701)

7. AP-CCW.2, Loss of CCW During Power Operation (Rev 024)

8. A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide (Rev 053)

9. ATT-1.0, Attachment At Power CCW Alignment, (Rev 3)

10. AR-F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI (Rev 10)

11. AR-F-2, PRESSURIZER HI PRESS 2310 PSI (Rev 11)

12. AP-PRZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure (Rev 01700)

13. ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure (Rev 40)

14. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 122)

15. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (Amendment 112)

16. Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.4.3, Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)

Mitigation (Rev 67)

17. AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak (Rev 00100)

18. AR-J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE (Rev 011)

19. O-6.9, Ginna Station Operating Limits for Station 13A Transmission (Rev 041)

20. AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction (Rev 020)

21. S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, (Rev 033)

22. AR-G-5, S/G/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7% (Rev 00701)

23. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, (Rev 049)

24. ATT-27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification (Rev 00400)

25. E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 043)

26. ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (Rev 030)

27. ATT-8.1, Attachment D/G Stop (Rev 6)

Validation Time: 108 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 090920 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #1 Objectives:

Given the simulator at an initial condition of 100% power evaluate:

1. the SROs ability to supervise the control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise, including compliance with all facility procedures, Technical Specifications, and other commitments.

2. each crew members ability to effectively communicate as part of a control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise.

3. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a Seal Water Cooler failure on an operating RHR Pump in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and AP-CCW.2, Loss of CCW During Power Operation.

4. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed high Pressurizer Pressure Instrument (PT-449) in accordance with AP-PRZR.1, Abnormal PZR Pressure.

5. the BOPs ability to remove a failed Pressurizer Pressure Instrument (PT-449) from service in accordance with ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.

6. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed open Atmospheric Relief Valve in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak.

7. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and mitigate the consequences of a failure of electrical grid circuits 908 and subsequently 913 in accordance with site procedures.

8. each crew members ability to conduct a rapid downpower in accordance with AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, whenever plant conditions dictate the need to do so.

9. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Controller in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures.

10. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose an ejected control rod and the RO and BOPs ability to respond to such an event in accordance with E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

11. the BOPs ability to determine that the Main Turbine has failed to automatically trip during a reactor trip from power and take action to manually trip the Main Turbine.

12. the ROs ability to determine that the SI Pumps have failed to automatically start during a Safety Injection actuation and take action to manually start the pumps.

13. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and respond to the loss of all RHR Pumps during a LOCA in accordance with ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N20-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced unseasonably hot weather with no precipitation. It is expected to maintain power stable at the current power level throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C (TS 3.6.6 Condition D Action D.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. The A RHR Pump has been taken out of service for testing. (TS 3.5.2 Condition A Action A.1).

Critical Tasks: See Below Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description MAL 1 C-RO Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric CLG05 C-SRO Fire Pump ANNARHR 02 TS 2 MAL I-RO Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH (CT-1)

PZR02D I-BOP I-SRO TS 3 MAL C-BOP A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

STM04A C-SRO 4 REM R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Various Circuit Bkrs C-BOP C-SRO MAL 5 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) (CT-2)

FDW07C C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Ejected Control Rod ROD05-K9 M-BOP M-SRO 7 MAL C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip TUR02 C-SRO MAL 8 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start (CT-3)

RPS07A RPS07B C-SRO 9 MAL C-RO B RHR Pumps trips RHR01B C-SRO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced unseasonably hot weather with no precipitation. It is expected to maintain power stable at the current power level throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C (TS 3.6.6 Condition D Action D.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. The A RHR Pump has been taken out of service for testing. (TS 3.5.2 Condition A Action A.1).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the A RHR Pump per STP-O-2.2.-COMP-A, Residual Heat Removal Pump A Comprehensive Test, and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide. The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, Loss of CCW During Power Operation. During this time, a failure will occur on the Electric Fire Pump Breaker and the operator will respond in accordance with AR-K-31, FIRE SYSTEM ALARM PANEL, and be required to address TR-3.7.1, Fire Suppression Water Sources.

Following this, the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter will fail HIGH, causing the Spray Valves to open. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-F-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS 2310 PSI, and AR-F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI, and enter AP-PRZR.1, Abnormal PZR Pressure. AP-PRZR.1 will refer the operator to ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure, for the defeat of PT-449. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits; LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation; and TR-3.4.3, Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation.

Subsequently, the controller for the A SG ARV will fail such that the valve will travel to the fully OPEN position. The operator will respond using A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak, and take manual control of the ARV-3411 and close the valve.

Then, the off-site transmission circuit 908 will de-energize, and the RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) will request that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 490 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon subsequent notification from ECC. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE, enter O-6.9, Ginna Station Operating Limits for Station 13A Transmission, and prepare for plant shutdown. After this, the off-site transmission circuit 913 will also de-energize and the ECC will call requesting that the previously agreed to downpower be executed. The operating crew will enter AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, and lower plant power to 490 MWe.

During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, S/G B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%, or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually.

After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically and the B RHR Pump will trip. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST.

The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control PRZR pressure during the failure of PT-449 before the Reactor automatically trips due to low pressurizer pressure Safety Significance: failure to control PRZR pressure and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Manually control the B S/G level during the failure of the B FRV Controller before the Reactor automatically trips due to low S/G level or Feedwater Isolates due to high S/G level Safety Significance: failure to control B S/G level and stop the level transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the level transient. A failure to stabilize the level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature and/or pressure control.

Establish flow from at least two SI pumps before transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start SI pumps also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to (1) Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component and (2) Effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls. The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow-rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of the following ECCS pumps: Two SI pumps and one RHR pump.

Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. Because compliance with the assumption of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task (under the postulated plant conditions) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 155 T = 0:

(Originally IC-24).

Perform STP-O-2.2-COMP-A up to Step 6.1.11.

Insert MALF MIS02C (C CRCF Trip)

Pull Stop CRFC C and tag. Ensure Black Dot on J-25 for C CRFC OOS.

Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A = OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF TUR02 (Turbine Fails to Trip on Rx Trip)

Insert MALF RPS07A (A SI Pump fails to AUTO Start)

Insert MALF RPS07B (B SI Pump fails to AUTO Start)

Insert MALF RHR01B (B RHR Pump trips)

Insert the following on T-9 (X07I197D==1 [A RHR Pump control switch to PULL STOP]):

MALF RHR01A (A RHR Pump trips)

OVR-RHR05A = OFF

OVR-RHR05B = OFF

OVR-RHR05C = OFF Insert MALF ANN-A-RHR02 = ON (60 seconds after A RHR Pump Start) on T-1 (X07O197R==1

[A RHR Red status light is LIT])

Insert MALF CLG05=10 (CCW Leak) on T-1 (X07O197R==1 [A RHR Red status light is LIT])

Insert MALF ANN-A-MIS50 = ON on T-2 Insert MALF PZR02D (2500, No Ramp) on T-3 Insert MALF STM04A (100 over 45 second Ramp) on T-4 Insert REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) on T-5 Insert REM-EDS-023 (OPEN) on T-5 Insert REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) on T-6 Insert MALF FDW07C (Current Controller Output) on T-7 Insert MALF ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp) on T-8 Ensure PRCS-PS/G graphed during the scenario.

Prior to Crew Briefing Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Equipment (CBP A P16 of 24 of Attachment 2).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

Provide crew with marked up copy of STP-O-2.2-COMP-A to Step 6.1.11.

Handout Reactivity Binder (EOL).

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Event 1 Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump At direction of Trigger#1 examiner MALF ANN-A-RHR02 =

ON (60 seconds after A RHR Pump Start)

MALF CLG05=10 (CCW Leak)

At direction of Trigger #2 examiner MALF ANN-A-MIS50 =

ON At direction of examiner Event 2 Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Trigger #3 PZR02D (2500, No Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 3 A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Trigger #4 STM04A (100 over 45 second Ramp)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 4 Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Trigger #5 Circuit Breaker 90812 -

REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) Note: Loss of Circuit 908 (Followed by Phone Circuit Breaker Call) 7X13A72 - REM-EDS-023 (OPEN)

Trigger #6 Note: Loss of Circuit 913 (Followed by Phone Circuit Breaker 91302 -

Call)

REM-EDS-031 (OPEN)

(Loss of Circuit 913)

Turbine Load at 380 MWe Event 5 B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)

Trigger #7 FDW07C (Current Controller Output)

At direction of examiner Event 6 Ejected Control Rod Trigger #8 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp)

Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip TUR02 Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=0.

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start RPS07A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0.

RPS07B Post-Rx Trip Event 9 B RHR Pumps trips RHR01B Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=0, conditional on SI Actuation.

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the A RHR Pump per STP-O-2.2.-

COMP-A, Residual Heat Removal Pump A Comprehensive Test, and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide. The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, Loss of CCW During Power Operation. During this time, a failure will occur on the Electric Fire Pump Breaker and the operator will respond in accordance with AR-K-31, FIRE SYSTEM ALARM PANEL, and be required to address TR-3.7.1, Fire Suppression Water Sources.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Verify Trigger #1 (MALF ANN-A-RHR02 = ON (60 seconds after A RHR Pump Start) MALF CLG05=10 (CCW Leak)) actuates Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator A-9, RHR PUMP COOLING WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 15 GPM Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments STP-O-2.2-COMP-A, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A COMPREHENSIVE TEST HCO (Step 6.1.11) START RHR Pump A NOTE: The HCO will contact the EO, and direct that the A RHR Pump be monitored during Pump start.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and report that pump start is NORMAL.

HCO (Step 6.1.12) RECORD RHR Pump A start time:

HCO (Step 6.1.13) VERIFY flow is indicated on NOTE: The HCO will contact RHR PMP A RECIRC FLOW IND, FI-673. the EO, and direct that flow be verified.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and report that FI-673 is indicating 210 gpm.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.1.14) RECORD the flow indicated on FI-673.

HCO (Step 6.1.15) CHECK RHR Pump A NOTE: The HCO will Recirculation Flow Acceptance Criteria is determine that the recirculation met. flow acceptance criteria

(>208.7 gpm) is met.

HCO (Step 6.1.16) IF RHR Pump A Recirculation Flow Acceptance Criteria is NOT met,..

AR-A-9, RHR PUMP COOLING WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 15 GPM NOTE: The HCO will contact the EO, and direct that the alarm be investigated.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report that there is yellow water spraying out of the A RHR Seal Water Heat Exchanger and accumulating on the floor.

US (Step 1) GO TO the applicable AP-CCW NOTE: The US will select AP-procedure: CCW.2.

AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION

AP-CCW.3, LOSS OF CCW - PLANT SHUTDOWN A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or HCO will stop the A RHR controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted Pump based on this guidance.

actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected SIM DRIVER: REMOVE A-parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples RHR02 once A RHR Pump is include closing or isolating a failed open stopped.

PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is Verify that Trigger #8 actuates not required. once RHR Pump A is taken to PULL STOP.

NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.2.

AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION CAUTION

IF CCW FLOW TO A RCP IS INTERRUPTED FOR GREATER THAN 2 MINUTES OR IF EITHER RCP MOTOR BEARING TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 200°F, THEN TRIP THE AFFECTED RCP.

IF CCW IS LOST, THEN SEAL INJECTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO THE RCP(S) UNTIL RCS TEMPERATURE IS LESS THAN 150°F, OR UNTIL CCW IS RESTORED.

HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status:

Both CCW pump breaker white lights -

EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP - EXTINGUISHED NOTE

MCB CCW surge tank level indication should be verified locally in the AUX BLDG, if possible.

Local Pressure Indication (PI-2669 or PI-2670) reading greater than 5 psi with PPCS point L0618 off scale low may indicate that LT-618 level transmitter has failed low.

If it is suspected that CCW Fluid will enter the WHUT, NOTIFY the Chemistry Technician.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE. Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE: The CCW Surge Tank Level is lowering, however, the level is lowering slowly. The HCO may or may not refill the Surge Tank. If not, go to Step 3.

HCO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Open RMW to CCW surge tank, MOV-823.

Start RMW pump(s).

IF surge tank level stable or rising, THEN NOTE: The makeup flow into control level at approximately 50% while the CCW Surge Tank will be continuing with Step 3. able to stabilize the tank level.

HCO (*Step 3) Monitor CCW Hx Outlet NOTE: This is a Continuous Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID Action. The US will make one T0621) or more board operators aware.

CCW Hx Outlet temperature - LESS THAN 120ºF HCO (*Step 4) Monitor RCP Indications: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Annunciator A-7 (A-15), RCP 1A (1B)

CCW return Hi Temp or low flow 165 gpm 125ºF alarm - EXTINGUISHED

RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RXP temperature monitor RK-30A recorder) -

200ºF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145ºF -

EXTINGUISHED

Check excess letdown temperature - NOTE: Excess Letdown is LESS THAN 195ºF NOT in service.

HCO (Step 6) Check CCW Valve Alignment -

NORMAL

Check MCB CCW valves (Refer to ATT-1.0, ATTACHMENT AT POWER CCW ALIGNMENT)

Direct EO to check local flow indications NOTE: The US will dispatch per ATT-1.1, ATTACHMENT NORMAL an EO.

CCW FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.

NOTE

IF Seal Water Hx will be bypassed, THEN a rise in VCT temperature is expected.

IF Seal Return Line will be isolated, THEN seal return and excess letdown (if in service) will be to the PRT through RV-314.

HCO (Step 7) Locally Check Seal Water Hx CCW NOTE: The US may direct the Outlet Flow - NORMAL (FI-605) EO to report status of Seal Water Hx CCW Outlet Flow.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report flow is 6 gpm.

NOTE Operation may continue with the reactor support coolers isolated. If this occurs, notify higher supervision.

HCO (Step 8) Check for CCW Leakage In CNMT:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check CNMT sump A level:

Level - STABLE

Sump A pumps - OFF

RCP oil levels - STABLE HCO/ (Step 9) Check for CCW Leakage In AUX NOTE: The EO has already EO BLDG: reported CCW leakage in the Aux Building.

Start frequency of AUX BLDG sump pump(s) - NORMAL (Refer to RCS daily leakage log)

Waste holdup tank level - STABLE OR RISING AS EXPECTED HCO (Step 10) Verify CCW System Leak -

IDENTIFIED

Leak identified NOTE: The leak has been discovered.

Isolate leak if possible NOTE: The US/HCO may direct the EO to isolate the leak by closing V707A and 708A.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and DELETE MALFCLG05 60 seconds after the direction to isolate the leak. THEN, report that the valves have been closed.

Refer to IP-ENV-3, RESPONSE TO A NOTE: The US may ask the SPILL OF HAZARDOUS SM or WCCS to address.

MATERIAL/WASTE If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as needed.

HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown

- IN SERVICE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 15 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated

Surge tank level - APPROXIMATELY 50%

(Step 12a RNO) IF level less than 50%, NOTE: The Surge Tank may THEN continue filling. or may not be being filled. If it is, the Step 12 RNO will be performed.

IF 50% THEN perform the following:

Stop RMW pump(s).

Close MOV-823.

(Step 12 Continued) Surge tank level -

STABLE HCO (Step 13) Direct RP To Sample CCW System NOTE: The US may notify For Chromates Chemistry.

SIM DRIVER: as Chemistry, acknowledge.

HCO/ (Step 14) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status CO (Refer to AR Procedures)

US (Step 15) Evaluate Plant Conditions:

CCW system malfunction - IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED.

CCW system status adequate for power NOTE: The US will likely operation (Refer to ITS Section 3.7.7). evaluate TS LCO 3.7.7 conclude that the LCO is MET.

NOTE Refer to LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES for reporting requirements.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 16) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge. AS WCCS report that the required maintenance on the A RHR Pump will require 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months .

US (Step 17) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed RHR Pump.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC; and direct that the A RHR Pump be placed in PULL STOP.

NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (MALF ANN-A-MIS50 = ON) actuates Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator K-31, FIRE SYSTEM ALARM PANEL AR-K-31, FIRE SYSTEM ALARM PANEL CO (Step 4.1) CHECK fire system panels for NOTE: The US may dispatch specific alarm location. an EO to check the fire panels for the specific alarm.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO; wait 1 minute and report that the Fire Motor Control Cabinet Breaker is OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 17 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 4.2) IF alarm is on the 1G charcoal filter unit, THEN.

CO (Step 4.3) IF alarm is due to CREATS High Temp, THEN..

CO (Step 4.4) IF alarm is due to CONTAINMENT CHARCOAL FILTER MONITOR High Temp, THEN..

CO (Step 4.5) IF Fire Booster Pump is the cause, THEN CO Step 4.6) IF Fire Booster Pump is NOT the cause of the alarm, THEN NOTIFY EO of location of alarm problem.

US (Step 4.7) REFER to ER-FIRE.0, CONTROL ROOM RESPONSE TO FIRE ALARMS AND REPORTS.

US (Step 4.8) REFER to SC-3.1, FIRE EMERGENCY GENERAL INFORMATION AND appropriate Fire Response Plan.

US (Step 4.9) REFER to the following as necessary:

STP-O-13.1.16, PYROTRONICS SMOKE DETECTOR SYSTEM RESET to reset the Pyrotronics smoke detector system ONLY.

SC-3.16.2.6, RESPONSE TO TROUBLE SIGNALS FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM, to respond to FCP trouble signals.

SC-3.16.2 (Step 3.1.12), CONTROL ROOM FIRE PANEL (OLD SYSTEM PANEL), to respond to CONTAINMENT CHARCOAL FILTER MONITOR alarms.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 76 Event

Description:

Failure of A RHR Pump During Surveillance/Failure of the Electric Fire Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

SC-3.16.7, OPERATING INSTRUCTION

- AUTOMATIC DELUGE SYSTEM for deluge system alarms/troubles.

US (Step 4.10) NOTIFY the SM of the problem.

US (Step 4.11) IF necessary, THEN REFER to NOTE: The US will address the TRM (TR 3.7.1). TRM 3.7.1.

TR-3.7.1, FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SOURCES US TR 3.7.1 Two fire pumps shall be OPERABLE and aligned to the fire suppression header.

US APPLICABILITY: At all times.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required fire pump A.1 Restore required pump to 7 days inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, OPERABLE status.

or 4.

The US will enter Condition A based on the Motor Fire Pump being inoperable due to the Control Cabinet Breaker being OPEN.

NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed Motor Fire Pump.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 19 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Following this, the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter will fail HIGH, causing the Spray Valves to open. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-F-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS 2310 PSI, and AR-F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI, and enter AP-PRZR.1, Abnormal PZR Pressure. AP-PRZR.1 will refer the operator to ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure, for the defeat of PT-449. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB)

Limits; LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation; and TR-3.4.3, Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (PZR02D (2500, No Ramp))

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator F-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS 2310

PI-449 reading 2500 psig, all others lowering slowly

Both Pressurizer Spray Valves fully OPEN

Master Pressure Controller 431K output at 100%

PPCS Alarm PZR AVG PRESS HI ALARM

MCB Annunciator F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 (15 seconds delayed)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO NOTE: The HCO may take action to place 431K in MANUAL control, or the Spray Valve Controllers in MANUAL control, before arriving at the procedurally directed step, per the Guidance of Step 5.3.A.5 of A-503.1.

NOTE: The crew may enter AP-PRZR.1 directly.

AR-F-2, PRESSURIZER HI PRESS 2310 PSI US (Step 1) IF RCS pressure is high, THEN go NOTE: Pressurizer Pressure to AP-PRZR.1. is NOT high.

US (Step 2) IF due to instrument failure, THEN NOTE: While an instrument refer to ER-INST.1, REACTOR has failed, the failure has PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER created a pressure transient, INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE and AP-PRZR.1 is the appropriate procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI NOTE: This alarm will occur if the Spray Valves are open 15 seconds.

HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check.

US (Step 2) Go to the applicable procedure:

AP-TURB.2, if turbine load rejection has occurred.

AP-PRZR.1, if pressure is abnormal for plant condition.

ER-INST.1, if channel failed

AP-RCS.1, if RCS leak is indicated.

US (Step 3) Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.1 NOTE: The US will go to AP-PRZR.1.

AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE NOTE

Actual PRZR pressure should be verified by more than 1 indicator.

Refer to ITS section 3.4.1.

HCO (Step 1) Check PRZR Pressure:

All 4 narrow range channels-APPROXIMATELY EQUAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 21 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 1 RNO) IF one pressure channel NOTE: The US may refer to US deviates significantly from the other 3. THEN ER-INST.1 here, or later when perform the following: the pressure transient has a) IF the controlling PRZR pressure channel been verified to be under has failed. THEN place controller, 431K, control.

in MANUAL and adjust output to restore PRZR pressure b) Refer to ER-INST.1. REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE.

Critical Task:

Manually control PRZR pressure during the failure of PT-449 before the Reactor automatically trips due to low pressurizer pressure Safety Significance: failure to control PRZR pressure and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power- STABLE HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure:

a) Pressure- LESS THAN 2235 PSIG b) Pressure- GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status:

a) PRZR proportional heater breaker-CLOSED b) PRZR heater backup group- ON

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 22 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray Valves- NOTE: The HCO may take CLOSED action to place 431K in

AOV-431A MANUAL control, or the Spray Valve Controllers in MANUAL

AOV-431B control, before arriving at THIS step, per the Guidance of Step 5.3.A.5 of A-503.1.

HCO (Step 5 RNO) Place Controllers in MANUAL at 0% Demand. IF valves cannot be closed, THEN..

NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode (refer to TR 3.4.3).

HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, 431K, Demand- LESS THAN 50%

HCO (Step 7) Check PRZR PORVs:

a) PORVs- CLOSED b) Annunciator F-19. PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F-EXTINGUISHED US c) Go to Step 9 HCO (Step 9) Check PRZR Safety Valves:

Position indicator- LESS THAN 0.1 INCH

Annunciator F-18. PRZR SAFETY VLV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F-EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator AA-13, PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSITION-EXTINGUISHED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 23 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 10) Check AUX Spray Valve, AOV-296

- CLOSED HCO (Step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control Restored:

a) Pressure- TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG US b) Go to Step 16 HCO (Step 16) Check PRT Indications:

a) Level- BETWEEN 61% and 84%

b) Pressure- APPROXIMATELY 1.5 PSIG AND STABLE c) Temperature- AT CNMT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND STABLE HCO (Step 17) Establish PRZR Pressure Control In Auto:

a) Verify 431K in AUTO HCO (Step 17 RNO) Place 431K in AUTO, if NOTE: 431K cannot be placed desired. in Auto until the Instrument is defeated. IF the Instrument has NOT been defeated in accordance with ER-INST.1, the US may refer to this procedure here.

NOTE: The US may call WCCS to address the instrument failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS.

ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 24 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.1.1) IDENTIFY the failed instrument NOTE: The US will identify channel by observation of the bistable status that PT-449 has failed.

light board, MCB annunciators, and the MCB metering indication.

NOTE

Channel defeat shall be performed by a licensed operator.

Peer Checks of the channel defeat shall be performed by a Licensed Operator or a qualified STA shall provide oversight.

US (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed instrument loop NOTE: The US will refer to and/or channel has been identified, THEN PRZR Pressure Channel REFER to the appropriate section of this Failure, Section 6.3.

procedure listed below:

NOTE PORV PCV-431C WILL NOT automatically operate while HC-431K is in MANUAL.

HCO (Step 6.3.1) IF the controlling PRZR Pressure channel has failed (normally PT-449, but PT-429 may be selected as controlling channel), THEN PLACE HC-431K in MANUAL at about 50% and control pressure manually NOTE

IF PT-430 OR PT-431 has failed to < 2335 psig THEN PRZR PORV PCV-430 will only operate by MANUAL actions until the PRZR pressure defeat switch is selected to operable channels.

PORV Interlocks will be affected IF PT-429 OR PT-431 has failed. PT-429 affects PCV-430. PT-431 affects PCV-431C.

HCO (Step 6.3.2) IF PT-429 OR PT-431 has NOTE: Neither PT-429 nor failed, THEN .. PT-431 has failed.

HCO (Step 6.3.3) IF hot leg streaming has been NOTE: hot leg streaming has causing single channel T runback signals, NOT been causing runback THEN signals.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 25 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE Completing the attachment changes T runback and rod stop logic to 2/3, and changes T reactor trip logic to 1/3 on the remaining channels.

HCO (Step 6.3.4) REFER TO the appropriate NOTE: The US will go to the attachment to defeat the associated control PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 functions: YELLOW CHANNEL Attachment 8.

NOTE: The US will hand this off to the CO.

ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE ATTACHMENT 8 YELLOW CHANNEL - PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 NOTE: The CO will likely conduct Instrument Defeat Brief.

HCO (Step 1) IF PRZR Pressure channel failure NOTE: The failure did NOT resulted in a runback, THEN . result in a runback.

NOTE Performing the following step will remove the affected channel input to PC-431K controller and replace the input with the input from PI-429:

CO (Step 2) In the PLP PRZR PRESS AND NOTE: The CO will unlock LEVEL rack, VERIFY the PRZR pressure and open the PLP PRZR DEFEAT switch P/429A position. PRESS AND LEVEL Rack

IF P/429A is in NORMAL, THEN place Cabinet, take the required P/429A to DEFEAT-1. action, and then close and lock the cabinet door.

NOTE The following Step removes the input from the following functions:

T Runback and Rodstop

RIL computer

Annunciator F-30 OP DELTA T TURBINE RUNBACK

Annunciator F- 31 OT DELTA T TURBINE RUNBACK

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 26 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 3) In the RIL INSERTION LIMIT rack, NOTE: The CO will unlock PLACE T/405F DELTA T DEFEAT switch to and open the RIL Insertion Loop B UNIT 2. Limit Rack Cabinet, take the required action, and then close and lock the cabinet door.

NOTE The following bistable status lights are expected to be lit after the DEFEAT:

PRZR Lo Press PC449A (Trip)

OTT LOOP B TC408C The following Annunciators are expected to be lit after the DEFEAT:

F-27, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS CHANNEL ALERT 1873 PSI

F-23, RCS OT DELTA T CHANNEL ALERT CO (Step 4) DETERMINE the expected Bistable proving light status for the post defeat condition as follows:

RECORD the following Data:

PRZR Pressure PI-449_______PSIG

LOOP 1B-2 TEMP TI-408B _______0F

OTT SP1 LOOP 1B-2TEMP TI-408A_______0F DETERMINE the expected post defeat Bistable proving light status and circle the expected status in table below:

408 LOOP B-2 NOTE: The CO will determine

OVERTEMP TRIP Light OFF IF TI-408B that the Proving Light should TI-408A be ON in the Post-Defeat condition.

449 CHANNEL 4 NOTE: The CO will determine

LOW PRESS TRIP Light OFF IF PI-449 that the Proving Light should 1873 psig be ON in the Post-Defeat condition.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 27 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 5) In the (YELLOW) Y-1 NOTE: The CO will unlock PROTECTION CHANNEL 4 rack, PLACE and open the Y-1 the following bistable proving switches to PROTECTION CHANNEL 4 DEFEAT (UP) AND verify the proving light Rack Cabinet, take the status is correct: required action, and then 408 LOOP B-2 close and lock the cabinet door.

OVER TEMP TRIP 449 CHANNEL 4 NOTE: Both B/S proving lights LOW PRESS TRIP should be ON after defeat.

HCO (Step 6) PLACE the PRZR pressure recorder transfer switch (MCB) to position 1-3 HCO (Step 7) VERIFY the bistable status lights AND Annunciators listed above are lit.

HCO/ (Step 8) DELETE 404/408 from processing CO by performing the following on the PPCS:

SELECT Group Update display

SELECT List Server Groups

SELECT 404_408 from the pick list

TURN OFF scan processing, THEN click the Set Scan Processing button

ANSWER prompts

SELECT the Sub/Delete/Restore display

SELECT Point ID T0404

TURN ON scan processing

SELECT Change

ANSWER prompts

SELECT the Sub/Delete/Restore display

SELECT Point ID P0449

TURN OFF scan processing

SELECT Change

ANSWER prompts

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 28 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 9) GO TO step 6.3.5 NOTE: The US will return to the body of the procedure.

ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO/ (Step 6.3.5) RESTORE the following CO systems to automatic operation as necessary:

PRZR Pressure control:

HC-431K

PRZR Spray Valves

PRZR Heaters

PRZR Level control

Rod Control

Steam Dump Turbine

Turbine EH Control HCO (Step 6.3.6) OPEN any PORV Block Valve closed in step 6.3.2.

US (Step 6.3.7) REFER TO the following ITS Examiner Note: See Tech Sections for LCO's: Spec evaluation on Page 31.

Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Functions 5, 7a and 7b (7b not required for PT-449)

Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 1d (not required for PT-449)

Section 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1, Functions 1 and 6 US (Step 6.3.8) REFER TO TRM 3.4.3, Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) mitigation.

CO (Step 6.3.9) IF turbine runback has occurred AND rods are in MANUAL, THEN..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 29 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 6.3.10) RESTORE AUTO Rod Control, if desired.

US (Step 6.3.11) GO TO step 6.16.

HCO (Step 6.16.1) IF necessary, VERIFY an operable channel is selected for the affected recorder.

HCO/ (Step 6.16.2) VERIFY the following systems CO in AUTO if desired:

Rod control

Turbine EH control

PRZR Pressure control

HC 431K

PRZR spray valves

PRZR heaters

PRZR level control

Steam Dump (unless 1st stage pressure failed)

MFW control

S/G Atmos Relief Vlv Control US (Step 6.16.3) NOTIFY the following people: NOTE: The US may call WCC/Supervision to address the failed Instrument.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Supervision.

Operations Supervision

STA

Work Week Manager

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 30 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 6.16.4) UPDATE the Temporary Configuration Change Tracking Log for the following as necessary:

Jumper removal

Lifted wires

Slide links US (Step 6.16.5) REFER to the following for NOTE: The US may call the Notification Requirements: SM to address any notification requirements.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as SM.

LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES

OPG-NOTIFICATION, REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS TO THE PSC/PIO/CEG SENIOR MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 17.b) Verify PRZR Spray Valves in Auto.

HCO (Step 17.c) Verify PRZR Heaters restored:

PRZR proportional heaters breaker -

CLOSED

PRZR backup heaters breaker - RESET, IN AUTO US (Step 18) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status (Refer to AR Procedures)

NOTE Refer to O-9.3, NRC IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION, for reporting requirements.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 31 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 19) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify supervision.

SIM DRIVER: acknowledge as required.

US (Step 20) Notify Reactor Engineer for NOTE: The US may notify RE.

Transient Monitoring Program SIM DRIVER: acknowledge as required.

NOTE: The US will address the Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS US (LCO 3.4.1) RCS DNB Parameters for NOTE: The US may pressurizer pressure, RCS average determine that the crew be in temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be and then out of this Technical within the limits specified in the COLR Specification during this event

(<2175 psig).

APPLICABILITY: Mode 1.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months parameters not within limits. parameter(s) to within limit.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP (RTS) INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 (Functions 5, 7a)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 32 of 76 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure (PT-449) fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One or more functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one channel inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s).

D. As required by Required D.1 Place channel in trip 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action A.1 and referenced by Table 3.3.1-1 K. As required by Required K.1 Place channel in trip 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action A.1 and referenced by Table 3.3.1-1 NOTE: The US will determine that Condition A, D and K are applicable.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT 3.4.3, ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITIGATION US TR 3.4.3 ATWS Mitigation shall be OPERABLE as follows:

Each PORV shall be capable of automatic actuation and each block valve shall be open;

Manual rod insertion shall be OPERABLE; and

ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY MODE 1 > 45% RTP.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORV A.1 Declare ATWS Immediately automatic flow path mitigating capability inoperable. inoperable.

NOTE: The US will determine that Condition A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 33 of 76 Event

Description:

A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Subsequently, the controller for the A SG ARV will fail such that the valve will travel to the fully OPEN position. The operator will respond using A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak, and take manual control of the ARV-3411 and close the valve.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 (STM04A (100% - 45 second ramp))

Indications Available:

Steam Noise is heard as the valve OPENs

AOV-3411 Controller Green Status Light goes DARK.

AOV-3411 Red Status light on MCB Panel 6 is LIT (Vertical Section).

AOV-3411 Controller output goes toward 100% demand.

Tavg decreases slightly

Pzr Pressure decreases slightly

Rx power increases slightly

PPCS Alarm Point V3411 A ARV OPEN goes into ALARM

Turbine load reduces automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may take early action per the guidance of A-503.1 (Step 5.3.A.5) and/or go to AP-FW.2.

A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE CO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or CO will take manual control of controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted the valve.

actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required.

OR AP-FW.2, LOSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 34 of 76 Event

Description:

A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (*Step 1) Determine if Plant Operation can NOTE: This is a Continuous continue: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Leak does not present an unmanageable safety threat.

CNMT Pressure is being maintained less than 2 psig.

CNMT Temperature is being maintained less than 125°F.

Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability is not affected.

Leakage is within make-up capability (GE BETZ).

S/G Level Stable at or Trending to 52%.

HCO/ (*Step 2) Determine if a Load Reduction is NOTE: This is a Continuous CO required: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Rx Power less than or equal to 100%.

S/G Level Stable at or Trending to 52%.

MFW Pump Suction Pressure greater than 200 psig and stable.

HCO (Step 3) Check Containment conditions NORMAL.

CNMT Humidity (PPCS Point:

TCVDEW-S)

CNMT Pressure

CNMT Sump A Level

CNMT Air Temperature (PPCS Point:

TCV17)

CNMT Recirc Fan Cooler Dump Frequency

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 35 of 76 Event

Description:

A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION WHEN PERSONNEL ARE DISPATCHED TO LOCATE THE LEAK LOCATION, EXTREME CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE POTENTIAL FOR INJURY DUE TO THE LEAK.

CO (Step 4) Check for Secondary Leak to NOTE: The A ARV has failed Atmosphere. OPEN.

Check S/G Safety Valves CLOSED (PPCS POINTS: VMSSVA and VMSSVB)

Check S/G ARVs CLOSED CO (Step 4.b RNO) Place the ARV controllers in NOTE: Early action may have Manual and Close the Valves. been taken to close the A ARV.

IF the Valve will not close THEN CO * (Step 4 Continued) Verify no Steam or Feedwater Leakage in the Turbine or Intermediate Building (cleanside)

Dispatch AO as necessary to NOTE: An EO may not be investigate leakage. dispatched to look for leaks because the Steam Noise has been eliminated when action was taken to close the A ARV manually.

HCO/ (Step 5) Check Condenser Steam dump CO valves shut if not required for RCS Temp Control NOTE Isolation of MSR will require load reduction less than 70% pwr.

HCO/ (Step 6) Check MSR Tubes intact:

CO

Check PPCS Server group MSR reading normal for each MSR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 36 of 76 Event

Description:

A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Consult with System Engineering to determine if MSR Isolation is required.

NOTE

An HP Turbine rub could result from extended operations with 5A or 5B heater isolated.

Isolation of a #4 or #5 Heater will require a load reduction to less than 50% Power.

CO (Step 7) Check Feedwater Heater intact:

Check MCB Alarm H-29 FDWTR HTR and Drain Tank Hi-Lo level Extinguished.

Dump Valves Shut: (HDT Page on PPCS)

V-3343 for HDT

V-5557 for 3A Heater

V-3347 for 5A Heater

V-5560 for 3B Heater

V-3348 for 5B Heater

V-5561 for 1A Heater

V-5559 for 2A Heater

V-5556 for 1B Heater

V-5558 for 2BHeater US (Step 8) Evaluate effect on continued Plant operation:

Refer to the following Technical NOTE: The US may refer to Specifications: Technical Specification 3.7.4, however, it will be determined that LCO 3.7.4 is met.

ITS Section 3.7 Plant System

ITS Section 3.7.4 ARVs NOTE: The US will determine that the failed ARV is OPERABLE.

ITS Section 3.7.6 CSTs

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 37 of 76 Event

Description:

A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

ITS Section 3.6.4 Containment Pressure

ITS Section 3.6.5 Containment Temperature NOTE Refer to CNGNL1.011004 Regulatory Reporting.

US (Step 9) Check if Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Required:

Consult with SM and Plant Management NOTE: The US may call if plant shutdown and cooldown required WCCS/Supervision to address the Tech Spec Required Shutdown (Previous Event) and the ARV failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction.

US (Step 9.a RNO) Return to Procedure and Step in effect.

NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 38 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Then, the off-site transmission circuit 908 will de-energize, and the RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) will request that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 490 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon subsequent notification from ECC.

The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE, enter O-6.9, Ginna Station Operating Limits for Station 13A Transmission, and prepare for plant shutdown. After this, the off-site transmission circuit 913 will also de-energize and the ECC will call requesting that the previously agreed to downpower be executed. The operating crew will enter AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, and lower plant power to 490 MWe.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (Circuit Breaker 90812 - REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) Circuit Breaker 7X13A72 - REM-EDS-023 (OPEN) (Loss of Circuit 908)

Immediately after the recognition of the PPCS Alarms, contact the Control Room as RG&E ECC and state the following:

This is RG&E Energy Control Center. Circuit 908 has been lost, the exact cause is unknown, and crews are in route. There is no net generation reduction required at this time. RG&E ECC requests that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 490 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon Subsequent notification from RG&E ECC.

Indications Available:

PPCS Alarm Point B7X13A72 Station 13A Breaker 7X13A72 in ALARM

PPCS Alarm Point B90812 Station 13A Breaker 90812 in ALARM

MCB Annunciator J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE US (Step 4.1) NOTIFY Plant Electricians to NOTE: The US may notify the investigate. WCC/Electricians.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

CO (Step 4.2) VERIFY proper generator/system voltages.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 39 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 4.3) VERIFY proper breaker alignment.

Refer to PPCS Electrical Distribution Display by clicking on Station 13 Electrical in the top menu display.

US (Step 4.4) REFER to O-6.9, OPERATING LIMITS FOR GINNA STATION TRANSMISSION.

NOTE: The US will go to O-6.9.

O-6.9, GINNA STATION OPERATING LIMITS FOR STATION 13A TRANSMISSION NOTE The following information SHALL be provided by RG&E ECC:

The transmission circuit(s) that is (are) out of service or scheduled to be taken out of service.

The net generation (MW) level the plant is to immediately ramp down to per grid conditions, IF required.

The net generation (MW) level the plant must certify it can ramp down to within 4, 14 or 29 minutes upon SUBSEQUENT notification to reduce power.

US (Step 6.1.1) AFTER CONFERING with an NOTE: The US/CO may notify SRO THEN INFORM RG&E ECC the plant is RG&E ECC that the plant is capable of meeting the reduced net capable of meeting the generation level within 4, 14 or 29 minutes reduced net generation level upon SUBSEQUENT notification. within 4, 14 or 29 minutes upon SUBSEQUENT notification.

SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge.

US (Step 6.1.2) Shift Manager SHALL NOTE: The US will direct the COMPLETE Attachment 1, Generation SM to perform this action.

Output Ramp Down Written Certification, SIM DRIVER: as SM, AND FAX a copy to RG&E ECC within 15 acknowledge.

minutes of being notified of certification request.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 40 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 6.1.3) IMMEDIATELY REDUCE net NOTE: The US will mark this generation to the level directed by RG&E Step NA.

ECC for the trip or scheduled outage of a transmission circuit. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

NOTE

RG&E ECC will notify Ginna of any overload conditions AND the net generation level the plant is to operate at during the abnormal transmission condition.

Maximum continuous load reduction greater than 5% per minute requires Shift Manager approval.

US (Step 6.1.4) REFER TO AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, for preparations to meet the load reduction time limit(s).

US (Step 6.1.5) IF either generator output NOTE: Neither breaker is breaker (1G13A72 or 9X13A72) is out of OOS or tripped.

service OR has tripped.

US (Step 6.1.6) IF NECESSARY COORDINATE with RG&E ECC in lowering VARs to lower generator output current. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

NOTE A Pre Job Brief SHALL include:

Required load reduction rate required to meet the certification time.

Manual OR Automatic EHC operation desired.

Estimated quantity of boron required to complete load reduction.

Expected boron addition rate.

Final desired power level.

US (Step 6.1.7) PERFORM a Pre Job Briefing so that immediate load reductions can commence upon notification from RG&E ECC of a subsequent circuit failure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 41 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 6.1.8) WHEN notification is received from RG&E ECC that a SUBSEQUENT loss of transmission circuit has occurred, THEN REDUCE net generation to the level directed by RG&E ECC within the required time limit(s).

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #6 (Circuit Breaker 91302 - REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) (Loss of Circuit 913)

Immediately after the recognition of the PPCS Alarms, contact the Control Room as RG&E ECC and state the following:

This is RG&E Energy Control Center. Circuit 913 has been lost, the exact cause is unknown, and crews are in route. Reduce net generation to the level directed by the previous guarantee 490 MWe net generation within 14 minutes.

Indications Available:

PPCS Alarm Point B91302 Station 13A Breaker 91302 in ALARM

MCB Annunciator J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE NOTE: The US has already conducted a Power Reduction Brief.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION CAUTION IF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW SHOULD LOWER TO 25% OF FULL POWER FLOW (1x106 LB/HR) PRIOR TO THE AMSAC SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY BLOCKING AT 40% POWER, THEN A TURBINE TRIP AND AUX FEED PUMPS START COULD RESULT.

NOTE

IF the turbine is to be taken offline, THEN transfer of 4160V loads may be performed at any time. Refer to ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS.

A maximum continuous load reduction rate of greater than 5%/min should not be used unless directed by the Shift Manager.

Perform a Load Reduction Brief per A-503.1 Emergency and Abnormal Procedures User Guide Attachment 1.

HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction

Verify rods in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 42 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO

Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration per S-3.1.

S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 2, NORMAL BORATION HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, is complete.

HCO (Step 2) Board operator SHALL inform US of intent to change core reactivity.

US SHALL acknowledge reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092].

HCO (Step 3) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to BORATE position.

HCO (Step 4) SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, controller to flow rate determined in Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, Step 1.1.

HCO (Step 5) SET BA COUNTER, YIC-110, to quantity determined in Attachment 1.

NOTE Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication, OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as boric acid is injected to ensure proper response. [G0092] [G0132]

HCO (Step 6) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position.

HCO (Step 7) VERIFY the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 43 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A OR B starts.

BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, throttles open to preset flow position.

REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens.

HCO (Step 8) WHEN boration is complete, THEN PERFORM the following:

PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.

PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.

SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, for current RCS boron concentration PER Boration/Dilution tables OR PPCS Engineering Menu Boration/Dilution display.

HCO (Step 9) PLACE BORATE Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.

HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete.

[G0092]

HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION CO

Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 44 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.

Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will select 1-2%/Minute.

Reduce the setter to the desired load

Depress the GO button HCO

Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON CAUTION EXTREME AND RAPID ROD MOTION TO MITIGATE TAVG SWINGS MAY RESULT IN LARGE POWER EXCURSIONS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Tavg - GREATER THAN 545ºF

Tavg - LESS THAN 579ºF HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC):

Maintain rods above the insertion limit

Match Tavg and Tref

Compensate for Xenon NOTE With PRZR pressure controller in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure - NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 45 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

SIM DRIVER: Operate Trigger #7 (FDW07C (Current Controller Output in %)) to initiate Event 5.

Examiner NOTE: See Page 47 for MCB Indications of this failure. When the Crew diagnoses the failed Feed Reg Valve, MOVE to Event #5.

NOTE It is permissible to operate RCPs for limited periods without seal injection, provided CCW is being supplied to the thermal barriers.

CO (Step 7) Check IA Available to CNMT

IA pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG

Instr Air to CNMT Isol Valve, AOV-5392

- OPEN CO (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - LIT

Steam dump operating properly in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 46 of 76 Event

Description:

Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION MANUAL REJECT MAY BE REQUIRED TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON CONDENSATE PRESSURE CO (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level:

Hotwell level controller in AUTO

Controller demand LESS THAN 60%

Hotwell level at setpoint NOTE The load reduction should not be delayed to perform the remaining steps.

CO (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS RUNNING

Verify the following:

Verify Reactor power is 70-75%

US (Step 10b RNO) GO TO Step 18.

US (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status

IF load was reduced more than 15% NOTE: The US will contact RTP in one hour, THEN notify RP to RP.

obtain primary samples required by SIM DRIVER: as RP, ITS LCO 3.4.16 acknowledge

Power stable at desired level (Step 18b RNO) IF power greater than 20%

and further reduction is required, THEN continue load reduction and return to Step 2.

When the Crew diagnoses the failed Feed Reg Valve, Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 47 of 76 Event

Description:

B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)

During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, S/G B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%, or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Trigger #7 (FDW07C (Current Controller Output in %)) [Operated during Event 4]

Indications Available:

Feed flow in the B SG will stabilize during the downpower

B SG level starts to rise.

MCB Annunciator G-22, ADFCS SYSTEM TROUBLE

MCB Annunciator G-5, S/G LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CO will dispatch the EO to the relay room to check the ADFCS Panel.

SIM DRIVER: as EO report that ADFCS Panel indicates Control Card Failure after 3 minutes.

AR-G-5, S/G LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%

CO (Step 4.1) PERFORM a channel check of the following:

LI-471

LI-472

LI-473 CO (Step 4.2) IF Main Feedwater is supplying the S/G, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:

PLACE SG B MFW REG VLV HCV-476 NOTE: The CO will take in MANUAL. manual control of the B FRV, and control B S/G level manually.

PLACE FW FLOW LOOP B BYPASS VLV HCV-481 in

MANUAL.

CONTROL SG level manually.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 48 of 76 Event

Description:

B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually control the B S/G level during the failure of the B FRV Controller before the Reactor automatically trips due to low S/G level or Feedwater Isolates due to high S/G level Safety Significance: failure to control B S/G level and stop the level transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the level transient. A failure to stabilize the level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature and/or pressure control.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically and the B RHR Pump will trip. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #8 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp)

Indications Available:

Pressurizer Pressure starts to lower.

Containment Pressure starts to rise.

MRPI indicates a Control Rod K-9 error.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

At least one train of reactor trip breakers

- OPEN

Neutron flux - LOWERING

MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND NOTE: One Control Rod (K-SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with 9) does NOT indicate on the no instrument fluctuations concurrent Bottom.

with fire.

HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor.

IF reactor trip breakers NOT open OR there is a fire in the power block, THEN..

IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power range NIS indicates greater than 5%,

THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED CO (Step 2 RNO) Manually trip turbine.

IF turbine trip can NOT be verified, THEN..

CO (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Emergency Immediate Action buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:

Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND

Bus 17 OR Bus 18 HCO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action CO

Any SI Annunciator - LIT

SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED NOTE

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.

RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met when two SI Pumps are running.

IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE: The Containment Pressure is expected to be 2 psig and rising slowly.

Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUISHED

CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG CO (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO and continue with the other operator in E-0.

Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at Page 56.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:

CO

All SI pumps - RUNNING NOTE: The A and B SI Pumps are NOT running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 1.a RNO) Manually start SI Pumps CO Critical Task:

Establish flow from at least two SI pumps before transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start SI pumps also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to (1) Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component and (2) Effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls. The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow-rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the following ECCS pumps: Two SI pumps and one RHR pump.

Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. Because compliance with the assumption of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task (under the postulated plant conditions) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Both RHR pumps - RUNNING NOTE: There are NO RHR Pumps running.

HCO/ (Step 1.b RNO) Manually start RHR Pumps NOTE: No RHR Pumps can CO be started.

HCO/ (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans CO RUNNING:

All fans RUNNING NOTE: The C CRCF is OOS.

HCO/ (Step 2.a RNO) Manually start fans CO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/

Charcoal filter dampers green status CO lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should Be CO Isolated:

Any MSIV - OPEN HCO/ (Step3.a RNO) Go to Step 4.

CO HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:

CO

MFW pumps - TRIPPED

MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED

S/G A, AOV-3995

S/G B, AOV-3994

S/G blowdown and sample valves -

CLOSED HCO/ (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -

CO RUNNING HCO/ (Step 6) Verify CI and CVI:

CO

CI and CVI annunciators - LIT

Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION

Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION

Verify CI and CVI valve status lights -

BRIGHT

CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet valve status lights - BRIGHT

FCV-4561

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

FCV-4562

Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED

AOV-200A

AOV-200B

AOV-202 NOTE IF performing E0 per direction of FRS.1, FRS.2, or FRH.1 THEN stop here and return to E0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:

CO

Verify CCW pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING HCO/ (Step 8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow:

CO

SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW

RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR NOTE: There are NO RHR FLOW Pumps running.

HCO/ * (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less CO than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.

HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump CO Emergency Alignment:

RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN

MOV-852A

MOV-852B

Verify SI pump C - RUNNING

Verify SI pump A - RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Verify SI pump B - RUNNING

Verify SI pump C discharge valves -

OPEN

MOV-817A

MOV-817B HCO/ (Step 9.e RNO) Manually open valves as CO necessary.

HCO/ (Step 10) Verify CREATS Actuation:

CO

At least one damper in each flowpath -

CLOSED

Normal Supply Air

Normal Return Air

Lavatory Exhaust Air

CREATS fans - BOTH RUNNING NOTE The hand switches for these valves should be placed in the closed position even if the valve status light is bright.

HCO/ (Step 11) Verify CI and CVI During a Fire CO Event

A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems S05, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).

HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END CO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue HERE.

CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps HCO RUNNING NOTE IF Crosstieing MDAFW Pumps is required, refer to ATT-5.3, ATTACHMENT MDAFW PUMPS CROSSTIE.

CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:

HCO

AFW flow - INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)

AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM CO/ (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Check S/G narrow range level NOTE: Adverse GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] in any S/G this time.

Check S/G narrow range level BOTH S/G LESS THAN 50%

Control feed flow to maintain S/G narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] and 50%. this time.

CO/ (Step 10) Check If TDAFW Pump Can Be HCO Stopped:

Both MDAFW pumps - RUNNING

PULL STOP TDAFW pump steam supply valves

MOV-3504A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

MOV-3505A CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

NOTE IF starting non-safeguards equipment will result in exceeding 278 amps (yellow line) on Buses 14 or 16, THEN DO NOT start non-safeguards equipment.

CO/ (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP thermal HCO Barriers:

Annunciator A-7. RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW -

EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO OR TRENDING TO 547ºF Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE: Tavg is expected to be less than 547ºF and lowering.

CO/ (Step 12 RNO) IF temperature less than HCO 547ºF and lowering, THEN perform the following:

Stop dumping steam.

Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed.

IF cooldown continues, THEN control NOTE: Adverse total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 Containment may exist at gpm until narrow range level greater than this time.

7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one S/G.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

WHEN S/G level greater than 7% [25%

adverse CNMT] in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain level in at least one S/G.

IF cooldown continues, THEN close both MSIVs.

CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVS And Spray HCO Valves:

PORVs - CLOSED

Auxiliary spray valve (AOV-296) -

CLOSED

Check PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG

Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED

PCV-431A

PCV-431B CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:

HCO

RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING NOTE: RCP Trip Criteria may have already been MET and the RCPS may be stopped.

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G NOTE: Adverse pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi Containment may exist at adverse CNMT] this time.

Stop both RCPs NOTE: If RCP Trip Criteria is NOT met, the RNO will be performed (Go to Step 15);

and RCP Trip Criteria is expected to be met later.

CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact:

Pressure in both S/Gs-STABLE OR Rising

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Pressure in both S/Gs -GREATER THAN 110 PSIG CO/ (Step 16) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:

HCO

Air Ejector radiation monitors (R-15, R-47, R-48) - NORMAL

S/G blowdown radiation monitors (R-19) -

NORMAL

Steamline radiation monitors (R-31, R-

32) - NORMAL CO/ (Step 17) Check if RCS is intact:

HCO

CNMT area radiation monitors - NOTE: Containment NORMAL Radiation Monitors are in alarm.

R-2

R-7

R-29

R-30

CNMT pressure - LESS than 0.5 psig US (Step 17.a RNO) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

NOTE: The US will go to E-1.

The US will conduct an alignment brief.

NOTE: The US may notify the WCC regarding the B RHR Pump.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 60 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT CAUTION IF TRANSITIONING TO ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, THEN PROCEDURE SHOULD BE INITIATED WITHOUT DELAY TO ENSURE RCS COOLDOWN CAN BE STARTED WITHIN 1 HOUR OF LOCA INITIATION.

NOTE

FOLDOUT page should be open AND monitored periodically.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees should be monitored. (Refer to Appendix 1 for Red Path Summary.)

Conditions should be evaluated for Site Contingency Reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-1.

RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met.

IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G NOTE: Adverse pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 Containment is likely to exist psi adverse CNMT] currently.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 61 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:

RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING NOTE: RCP Trip Criteria may have already been MET and the RCPS may be stopped.

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]

Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here.

HCO/ (Step 2) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is CO Intact:

Pressure in both S/Gs - STABLE OR RISING

Pressure in both S/Gs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG NOTE TDAFW pump flow control AOVs may drift open on loss of IA.

CO (*Step 3) Monitor Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Narrow range level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse 7% [25% adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist currently.

Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% currently.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 62 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal

Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)

Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The US may contact activity Chemistry.

SIM DRIVER: as Chemistry, acknowledge.

CAUTION IF ANY PRZR PORV OPENS BECAUSE OF HIGH PRZR PRESSURE, IT SHOULD BE CLOSED AFTER PRESSURE LOWERS TO LESS THAN 2335 psig (REFER TO STEP 5b).

HCO (*Step 5) Monitor PRZR PORV Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Power to PORV block valves -

AVAILABLE

PORVs - CLOSED

Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

HCO (Step 6) Reset SI.

HCO (Step 7) Reset CI:

Depress CI reset pushbutton

Verify annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION - EXTINGUISHED CO (Step 8) Verify Adequate SW Flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 63 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check at least two SW pumps RUNNING

Dispatch AO to establish normal NOTE: The US will dispatch shutdown alignment (Refer to ATT-17.0, an EO.

ATTACHMENT SD-1) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and perform Schedule File SD-1.

NOTE IF starting non-safeguards equipment will result in exceeding 278 amps (yellow line) on Buses 14 or 16, THEN DO NOT start non-safeguards equipment.

HCO/ (Step 9) Establish IA to CNMT:

CO

Verify non-safeguards busses energized from offsite power

Bus 13 normal feed - CLOSED OR

Bus 15 normal feed - CLOSED

Verify turbine building SW isolation valves - OPEN

MOV-4613 and MOV-4670

MOV-4614 and MOV-4664

Verify adequate air compressors - NOTE: The C IA RUNNING Compressor is running.

Check IA supply:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG

Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

Reset both trains of XY relays for IA to CNMT AOV-5392

Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 - OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 64 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 10) Check Normal Power Available To Charging Pumps:

Check Normal Power Available To Charging Pumps:

Bus 14 normal feed breaker -

CLOSED

Bus 16 normal feed breaker -

CLOSED

Verify adequate Safeguards Bus capacity to run charging pumps (6 amps each)

Station Service transformer 14 ammeter

Station Service transformer 16 ammeter HCO (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running.

(Step 11a RNO) Perform the following:

IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP NOTE: CCW flow to the thermal barrier OR any RCP #1 seal RCP has NOT been lost, nor outlet temperature greater than is any RCP #1 seal outlet 235ºF, THEN. temperature greater than 235ºF.

Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0%.

(Step 11 Continued) Charging pump suction aligned to RWST:

LCV-112B - OPEN

LCV-1112C - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 65 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

(Step 11b RNO) manually align valves as necessary.

(Step 11 Continued) Start charging NOTE: The HCO will start pumps and adjust charging flow as two Charging Pumps.

necessary to restore PRZR level HCO (Step 12) Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS pressure:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 NOTE: Adverse psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist currently.

RCS pressure is expected to be 1000 psig and stable.

Pressure - STABLE OR RISING US * (Step 12a RNO) Do NOT stop SI pumps.

Go to Step 13.

HCO (*Step 13) Monitor If CNMT Spray Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

CNMT spray pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: No CS pumps running.

US * (Step 13a RNO) Go to Step 14.

CAUTION

RCS PRESSURE SHOULD BE MONITORED. IF RCS PRESSURE LOWERS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER TO LESS THAN 300 PSIG [350 PSIG ADVERSE CNMT], THEN THE RHR PUMPS MUST BE MANUALLY RESTARTED TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE RCS.

RCS PRESSURE MAY BE CONSIDERED STABLE EVEN THOUGH PRESSURE IS LOWERING DUE TO SAFETY INJECTION FLOW, DECAY HEAT REDUCTION OR BREAK FLOW.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 66 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 14) Monitor IF RHR Pumps Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Check RCS pressure:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 300 NOTE: Adverse psig [350 psig adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist currently.

RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING

RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING IN NOTE: There are NO RHR INJECTION MODE Pumps running.

US (Step 14.b RNO) Go to Step 15.

CO (Step 15) Check RCS And S/G Pressures

Check pressures in both S/Gs -

STABLE OR RISING

Check pressures in both S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 110 PSIG

Check RCS pressure - STABLE OR LOWERING CO (Step 16) CHECK IF EMERGENCY D/Gs Should Be Stopped:

Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage - GREATER THAN 440 VOLTS

Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage energized by offsite power:

Emergency D/G output breakers -

OPEN

AC emergency bus normal feed breakers - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 67 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Stop any unloaded emergency D/G and NOTE: Both D/Gs are place in standby (Refer to ATT-8.1, running unloaded.

ATTACHMENT D/G STOP)

Examiner NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO/CO.

Other Examiners continue on Page 68.

ATT-8.1, ATTACHMENT D/G STOP NOTE One D/G must be stopped AND reset prior to stopping the second D/G.

CO (Step A) Perform the following to STOP D/G A and restore to AUTO:

Verify D/G A Bus 14 supply breaker is OPEN.

Verify D/G A Bus 18 supply breaker is OPEN.

Using D/G A GOVERNOR, adjust D/G A speed to return frequency to 60Hz.

Using D/G A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL rheostat adjust D/G A voltage to 480 volts.

Place D/G A CONTROL switch to STOP AND immediately depress D/G A VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN button until voltage decays to zero.

After ~60 seconds, perform the following:

Depress D/G A FIELD RESET

Depress D/G A RESET

Verify D/G A AIR START SOLENOID lights - LIT

Verify D/G A START RELAY lights -

LIT

IF alternate cooling is being supplied to NOTE: Alternate Cooling is the D/G A NOT being supplied.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 68 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step B) Perform the following to STOP D/G B and restore to AUTO:

Verify D/G B Bus 16 supply breaker is OPEN.

Verify D/G B Bus 17 supply breaker is OPEN.

Using D/G B GOVERNOR, adjust D/G B speed to return frequency to 60Hz.

Using D/G B AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL rheostat adjust D/G B voltage to 480 volts.

Place D/G B CONTROL switch to STOP AND immediately depress D/G B VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN button until voltage decays to zero.

After ~60 seconds, perform the following:

Depress D/G B FIELD RESET

Depress D/G B RESET

Verify D/G B AIR START SOLENOID lights - LIT

Verify D/G b START RELAY lights -

LIT

IF alternate cooling is being supplied to NOTE: Alternate Cooling is the D/G B NOT being supplied.

E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Other Examiners continue HERE.

CAUTION WHEN STARTING NON-SAFEGUARD EQUIPMENT ON EITHER BUSES 14/16, OR WHEN THE 13-14/15-16 BUS TIE BREAKERS ARE CLOSED, THEN ENSURE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS BUS 14/16 SST AMMETER IS LESS THAN 278 AMPS (YELLOW ARROW) OR THE EMERGENCY D/G LOAD IS LESS THAN 1950 KW. IF AFTER LOADING THE NON SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT THESE LIMITS ARE EXCEEDED THEN SECURE THE NON-SAFEGUARD LOAD.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 69 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Status:

Check auxiliary building radiation -

NORMAL

Plant vent iodine (R-10B)

Plant vent particulate (R-13)

Plant vent gas (R-14)

CCW liquid monitor (R-17)

LTDN line monitor (R-9)

CHG pump room (R-4)

WHEN TSC is manned, THEN request NOTE: The TSC will NOT evaluation of sampling requirements. be manned.

RCS boron

RCS activity

CNMT hydrogen

CNMT sump boron

CNMT Sump pH

Verify adequate Rx head cooling:

Verify at least one control rod shroud fan - RUNNING

Verify one Rx compartment cooling fan - RUNNING HCO (Step 18) Verify CNMT Sump Recirculation Capability:

Check RHR and Support systems:

At least one recirculation flowpath, NOTE: There are NO RHR including required power supplies, Pumps running.

from Sump B and back to RCS available per ATT-14.5, ATTACHMENT RHR SYSTEM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 70 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 18.a RNO) IF at least one flowpath of cold leg recirculation capability can NOT be verified, THEN go to ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, Step 1.

NOTE: The US will transition to ECA-1.1.

ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION CAUTION

IF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION IS ESTABLISHED DURING THIS PROCEDURE, FURTHER RECOVERY ACTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE BY RETURNING TO ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

IF SUCTION SOURCE IS LOST TO ANY SI OR CNMT SPRAY PUMP, THE PUMP SHOULD BE STOPPED.

NOTE

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-1.1.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Verify CNMT Sump Recirculation Capability:

Check CNMT Sump B Level - AT LEAST 113 INCHES HCO (Step 1.a RNO) IF Sump B level less than NOTE: There is no LOCA 113 inches due to a loss of RCS inventory outside Containment.

outside CNMT. THEN go to Step 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 71 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO * (Step 1.b) Check RHR system:

RHR pumps - OPERABLE NOTE: There are NO RHR Pumps running or available.

HCO (Step 1.b RNO) Perform the following:

Manually or locally try to restore at NOTE: The US may call least one flowpath (Refer to ATT- WCC/Maintenance to 14.5, ATTACHMENT RHR SYSTEM address the need for an to identify minimum components for RHR Pump.

one flowpath). If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

US

Continue with Step 2. WHEN at least one flowpath is available. THEN do Steps 1c, 1d and 1e.

HCO (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans Running:

All fans - RUNNING NOTE: The C CRCF is OOS.

HCO (Step 2.a RNO) Manually start fans HCO

Charcoal filter dampers green status NOTE: The C CRCF is lights - EXTINGUISHED OOS.

HCO (Step 2.b RNO) Dispatch personnel with NOTE: The US will call an relay rack key to locally open dampers EO to perform action.

using trip relay pushbuttons in relay room If so, SIM DRIVER racks.

acknowledge as EO.

AUX RELAY RACK RA-3 for fan C HCO (Step 3) Monitor RWST Level - GREATER THAN 15%

HCO (Step 4) Determine CNMT Spray Requirements:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 72 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Determine number of CNMT spray pumps required from table:

CNMT spray pumps running - NOTE: There are NO CS EQUAL TO MINIMUM NUMBER Pumps running or required REQUIRED to be running.

HCO (Step 5) Add Makeup To RWST As Necessary

Refer to ATT-18.0, ATTACHMENT NOTE: The US/HCO may SFP-RWST (~ 400 gpm can be direct the EO to initiate expected) makeup to the RWST.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and use the following Remotes:

V804 - CLG050=0 V789 - CLG089=1 V790 - CLG049=0 V803 - CLG052=1 Ramped over 60 seconds.

THEN report that Makeup has been initiated from the SFP.

OR

Refer to S-3.2D. TRANSFERRING WATER FROM CVCS HUT(S) TO RWST OR SFP (~ 69 gpm can be expected)

OR

Refer to S-9J, BLENDING TO RWST

(~ 50 gpm can be expected)

CAUTION IF CST LEVEL LOWERS TO LESS THAN 5 FEET, THEN ALTERNATE WATER SOURCES FOR AFW PUMPS WILL BE NECESSARY (REFER TO ER-AFW.1, ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLY TO AFW PUMPS).

NOTE TDAFW pump flow control AOVs may drift open on loss of IA.

CO (Step 6) Monitor Intact S/G Levels:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 73 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT]

Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% [25%

adverse CNMT] and 50%.

NOTE Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown (Refer to FIG-2.0, FIGURE SDM).

CO (Step 7) Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

Establish and maintain cooldown NOTE: The current rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN cooldown rate is 100°F/HR approaching 100°F/hour.

Dump steam to condenser form intact S/G(s)

HCO (Step 8) Check ECCS Pump Status:

SI Pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: All three SI Pumps are running.

OR

RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING IN NOTE: There are NO RHR INJECTION MODE Pumps running.

CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

HCO (Step 9) Reset SI If Necessary HCO (Step 10) Establish One Train Of SI Flow

SI pumps - LESS THAN THREE RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 74 of 76 Event

Description:

Ejected Control Rod/Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ B RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 10.a RNO) Stop one SI pump.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #1 Core Age: EOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:

100% Power, Equilibrium Xe STP-O-2.2-COMP-A

The plant is at 100% power (EOL).

Outside Air Temp = 82°F

The area has experienced unseasonably hot weather with no Water Temp = 70°F precipitation. It is expected to maintain power stable at the current power level throughout the shift.

The A RHR Pump is OOS for Seal Cooling Heat Exchanger replacement.

Post-maintenance testing of the A RHR Pump is in progress Boron: 288 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm) and the A RHR Pump is ready to be started.

Total: .021

Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C is OOS for breaker BAST: 17,500 ppm Identified: .003 maintenance.

RCS Activity: Normal Unidentified: .018

The Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.

Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #1 Equipment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Operator Declarations See NOTES

Perform post-maintenance testing on the A None in effect RHR Pump using STP-O-2.2-COMP-A A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECD 52 hours6.018519e-4 days 0.0144 hours 8.597884e-5 weeks 1.9786e-5 months A RHR Pump 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months ago 3.5.2 ECCS - Modes 1, 2 and 3 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Containment Spray (CS),

Containment Recirculation Fan C CRFC 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ago 3.6.6 7 days 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS TRM /ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECD

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 19-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N20-1-2

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray (CS) Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems (Amendment 118)

2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 88)

3. AR-G-25, MOTOR OFF CTR SECT PMPS EXCEPT MAIN & AUX FEED PMPS (Rev 01000)

4. AR-E-24, RMS AREA MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY (Rev 00901)

5. AR-RMS-9, R9 LETDOWN LINE MONITOR (Rev 4)

6. AP-RCS.3, High Reactor Coolant Activity (Rev 014)

7. S-3.2P, Swapping CVCS Letdown Orifice Valves (Rev 009)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity (Amendment 123)

9. EPIP 1.13, Local Radiation Emergency (Rev 00800)

10. AR-H-22, H2 CLR TEMP HI/BYP VLV < 70% OPEN (Rev 012)

11. AR-H-12, FEED PUMP DC OIL PUMP AUTO START (Rev 5)

12. AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump Flow or NPSH (Rev 021)

13. AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction (Rev 020)

14. AR-C-5, PPCS ROD SEQUENCE OR ROD DEVIATION/PPCS LTOP HI-LOW TEMPERATURE (Rev 00901)

15. AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction (Rev 01400)

16. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits (Amendment 131)

17. Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (Amendment 94)

18. AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak (Rev 00100)

19. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 049)

20. ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 032)

21. FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Rev 042)

22. ATT-5.1, Attachment SAFW From SW (Rev 014)

23. ATT-22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (Rev 00700)

Validation Time: 106 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 091120 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #2 Objectives:

Given the simulator at an initial condition of 70% power evaluate:

1. the SROs ability to supervise the control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise, including compliance with all facility procedures, Technical Specifications, and other commitments.

2. each crew members ability to effectively communicate as part of a control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise.

3. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a Charging Pump trip in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures.

4. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of failed fuel/High RCS Activity in accordance with AP-RCS.3, High Reactor Coolant Activity.

5. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed Generator Hydrogen temperature instrument in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures.

6. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a Main Feedwater Pump trip in accordance with AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump Flow or NPSH.

7. each crew members ability to conduct a rapid downpower in accordance with AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, whenever plant conditions dictate the need to do so.

8. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failure of the Control Rods to move in AUTO and a Stuck Rod in accordance with AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction.

9. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose major secondary coolant break in the Turbine Building and the RO and BOPs ability to respond to such an event in accordance with E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

10. each crew members to manually trip the reactor by normal and alternate means when required to do so.

11. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and respond to a loss of all feedwater to the steam generators in accordance with FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The area has experienced cool weather with no precipitation. The crew is expected to remain at this power level while maintenance is completed during the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C (TS 3.6.6 Condition D Action D.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the B MDAFW Pump (TS 3.7.5 Condition B Action B.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance.

The A HDT Pump is OOS due to abnormal noises.

Critical Tasks: See Below Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description MAL 1 C-RO A Charging Pump Trip CVC12A C-SRO 2 MAL C-RO Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity RCS16 C-SRO TS 3 MAL C-BOP Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas) Instrument fails GEN02 HIGH C-SRO MAL 4 C-BOP B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip (CT-1)

FDW04B FDW02B C-SRO OVR 5 R-RO Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod ROD04C MAL C-SRO ROD03- TS G11 MAL 6 M-RO Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW CND08 M-BOP Pump trips on Overspeed FDW02A FDW12 M-SRO MAL 7 C-BOP Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available (CT-2)

RPS05A RPS05B C-SRO REM 8 C-BOP Loss of Bus 14 (CT-3)

EDS04A C-SRO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The area has experienced cool weather with no precipitation.

The crew is expected to remain at this power level while maintenance is completed during the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C (TS 3.6.6 Condition D Action D.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the B MDAFW Pump (TS 3.7.5 Condition B Action B.1) is OOS for breaker maintenance. The A HDT Pump is OOS due to abnormal noises.

Shortly after taking the watch, the A Charging Pump (Operating in AUTO) will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-G-25, MOTOR OFF CTR SECT PMPS EXCEPT MAIN &

AUX FEED PMPS, and start the B Charging Pump.

Shortly after this, a fuel failure will occur. The crew will address AR-E-24, RMS AREA MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY, and AR-RMS-9, R9 LETDOWN LINE MONITOR, and enter AP-RCS.3, High Reactor Coolant Activity. After Chemistry reports that Dose Equivalent Iodine is 13 µCi/gram, the operator will place the 60 GPM letdown orifice in service, in accordance with S-3.2P, Swapping CVCS Letdown Orifice Valves. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity, and EPIP 1.13, Local Radiation Emergency.

Following this, the Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas/TT-2023) Instrument will fail HIGH causing the Temperature Controller to increase cooling flow to the Main Generator, and Generator Gas temperatures to start to decrease. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-H-22, H2 CLR TEMP HI/BYP VLV < 70% OPEN. Using AR-H-22, the operator will take manual control of the Generator Hydrogen Temp Controller (TC-2023), as necessary, to control Generator Gas Temperature.

After this, the B Main Feedwater Pump will develop an oil leak, and trip within 60 seconds. The operator will respond using AR-H-4, MAIN FEED PUMP OIL SYSTEM, and AR-H-12, FEED PUMP DC OIL PUMP AUTO START, and enter AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump Flow or NPSH. The operator will start the A MDAFW Pump and the TD AFW Pump and initiate a downpower in accordance with AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction.

During the downpower, the control rods will fail to move in auto and the operator will need to insert control rods manually. Additionally, Control Rod G-11 will stick in its original position. After the plant stabilizes, the operator will respond in accordance with AR-C-5, PPCS ROD SEQUENCE OR ROD DEVIATION/PPCS LTOP HI-LOW TEMPERATURE, and enter AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

After this, a large rupture will occur in the Condensate Header resulting in a loss of feedwater.

The automatic Rx Trip system will fail to trip the reactor, and the operator will need to manually trip the reactor from the MCB by de-energizing Bus 13 and 15. The crew may enter AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak, then will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

The TDAFW Pump will trip on overspeed on the reactor trip. Subsequently, after ES-0.1 has been entered, a ground fault will occur on Bus 14, isolating the bus and de-energizing the A MDAFW Pump. A Red condition will eventually exist on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, and the crew will transition to FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will restore Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 AFW flow to the Steam Generators via ATT-5.1, Attachment SAFW From SW, and ATT-22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow.

The scenario will terminate at Step 12.b of FR-H.1, after the crew has returned to ES-0.1.

Critical Tasks:

Stabilize the plant during the Main Feedwater Pump Trip before the Reactor must be manually tripped at 20% or automatically trips on a low Narrow Range Steam Generator level Safety Significance: Failure to control plant power and stabilize the transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the transient. A failure to stabilize the transient, when able to do so (i.e. event initiates from < 75% power), constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure/temperature control.

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before transition to FR-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor from the control room when able to do so (i.e. De-energize Bus 13 and 15) causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions and requires that the facility declare an ALERT based on MA3 when the Emergency Classification would have been an Unusual Event based on MU3 had the Critical Task been completed successfully. The failure to complete the Critical Task constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy demonstrating the inability by the crew to recognize and properly mitigate a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before both Steam Generator Wide Range Levels lower to less than 120 inches [160 inches adverse CNMT]

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any Steam Generator results in the crews having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release. Establishing feedwater flow into the SGs offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. The introduction of feedwater flow immediately restores SG inventory and re-establishes primary-to-secondary heat transfer, decreasing RCS pressure and cooling the core. The RCS pressure decrease then precludes the opening of the PORVs and degradation of the RCS barrier. If no form of feedwater flow is made available to the SGs, the crew must establish RCS bleed and feed on or before SG dryout. When the crew fails to simply establish available feedwater flow (as it could, given the postulated conditions) before SG dryout occurs, it necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 156 T = 0:

(Originally IC-13).

Place 40 gpm Letdown Orifice in service.

Set up EH Panel for 10%/hour operation.

Pull Stop the B MDAFW pump Pull Stop CRFC C and tag. Ensure Black Dot on J-25 for C CRFC OOS.

Pull Stop the A HDP.

Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF FDW02A (A MFWP Trip) conditional on Rx Trip (T-30)

Insert REM FDW12 = 0 (TDAFW Pump Trips on Overspeed) conditional on Rx Trip (T-30)

Insert MALF RPS05A, NO MAN (Reactor trip breaker A failure)

Insert MALF RPS05B, NO MAN (Reactor trip breaker B failure)

Insert MALF CVC12A, on T-1 Insert MALF RCS16 (0.7, 120 second Ramp),

on T-2 Insert MALF GEN02 (200, 30 second Ramp), on T-3 Insert MALF FDW04B (100, 600 second Ramp),

on T-4 Insert MALF FDW02B (B MFWP Trip 60 seconds delayed), on T-4 Insert OVR-ROD04C = FALSE (Rods fail in AUTO) on T-4 Insert MALF ROD03-G11 (Untrippable) on T-4 Insert MALF CND08 (20000, 60 second Ramp),

on T-5 Insert MALF EDS04A (Loss of Bus 14) on T-6 Prior to Crew

Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Briefing Equipment (MC AFW Pump P7 of 24 of Attachment 2, A HDT Pump P15 of 24 of Attachment 2).

Place Black Dot on J-25, SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT LOCKED OFF.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

Handout Reactivity Binder (BOL).

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Event 1 A Charging Pump Trip Trigger #1 CVC12A At direction of examiner Event 2 Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Trigger#2 RCS16 (0.7, 120 second Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 2 Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas)

Instrument fails HIGH Trigger #3 GEN02 200, 30 second Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 4 B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Trigger #4 FDW04B (Leak at 100, 600 second Ramp)

FDW02B (MFWP Trip 60 seconds delayed)

When the Crew Event 5 Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Trigger #4 Note: These malfunctions are entered on addresses AP-TRIGGER 4, during Event 4, to become RCC.2. OVR-ROD04C = FALSE apparent during Event 5.

ROD03-G11 (Untrippable)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 6 Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/ TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed Trigger #5 CND08 (20000, 60 second Ramp)

FDW02A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0, conditional on Rx trip.

REM FDW12 = 0 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available RPS05A Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=0.

RPS05B At direction of examiner Event 8 Loss of Bus 14 Trigger #6 EDS04A Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 60 Event

Description:

A Charging Pump Trip Shortly after taking the watch, the A Charging Pump (Operating in AUTO) will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-G-25, MOTOR OFF CTR SECT PMPS EXCEPT MAIN & AUX FEED PMPS, and start the B Charging Pump.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (CVC12A)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator G-25, MOTOR OFF CENTER SECTION PUMPS/EXCEPT MAIN AND AUX FEEDPUMPS

A Charging Pump Green and White Breaker Status Lights are LIT

Charging Line Flow (FI-128C) reads low (12 gpm)

RCP Seal Flow (FI-115A/116A) reads low (5 gpm)

RCP Seal Labyrinth DPs read low (10-20 H20)

AR-B-9, RCP 1A LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS

AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-G-25, MOTOR OFF CTR SECT PMPS EXCEPT MAIN & AUX FEED PMPS NOTE: The US may direct the EO to check out the A Charging Pump.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report the pump has tripped.

HCO (Step 4.1) DETERMINE affected pump NOTE: The A Charging Pump (white light at control switch ILLUMINATED). (previously running in AUTO),

tripped.

HCO (Step 4.2) ENSURE standby pump AUTO NOTE: The B Charging Pump, STARTS, if required. did not auto start.

CO (Step 4.3) IF HDT Pump(s) or Condensate NOTE: An HDT/Condensate Pump(s) TRIPPED, THEN Pump did NOT trip.

HCO (Step 4.4) IF all Charging Pump(s) tripped, NOTE: All Charging Pumps THEN. are NOT tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 60 Event

Description:

A Charging Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4.5) IF one running Charging Pump NOTE: The HCO will start the TRIPPED, THEN START non-running B Charging Pump and may Charging Pump at minimum speed, if take MANUAL control of desired. Charging Pump speed.

US (Step 4.6) IF Charging Pump TRIPPED due NOTE: The US will direct to a VFD fault, THEN perform P-15.79, WCCS to determine this.

Accessing and Clearing VFD Faults.

US (Step 4.7) Notify Electrician. NOTE: The US may call WCC/Electrical Maintenance to address the Charging Pump Trip.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Electrical Maintenance.

US (Step 4.8) REFER to the following:

TS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater NOTE: 3.7.5 is AFW, and N/A (AFW) System to this event.

TRM TR 3.1.1, Boron Injection System - NOTE: With 2 charging MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 pumps, requirements are met, but crew may submit A-52.12 for tracking.

TRM TR 3.1.2, Boron Injection System -

MODE 5 NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Shortly after this, a fuel failure will occur. The crew will address AR-E-24, RMS AREA MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY, and AR-RMS-9, R9 LETDOWN LINE MONITOR, and enter AP-RCS.3, High Reactor Coolant Activity. After Chemistry reports that Dose Equivalent Iodine is 13 µCi/gram, the operator will place the 60 GPM letdown orifice in service, in accordance with S-3.2P, Swapping CVCS Letdown Orifice Valves. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity, and EPIP 1.13, Local Radiation Emergency.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (RCS16 (0.7, 120 second Ramp))

NOTE: It require approximately 1-2 minutes for this malfunction to cause PPCS Alarm for R-9.

Indications Available:

SPDS Normal OPS Page - Containment Radiation Alarm turns RED (R-2 indication starts to rise)

R-9, Letdown Line Monitor indication rising and in alarm

PPCS Alarm for R-9 WRN (precedes E-24 alarm)

MCB Annunciator E-24, RMS AREA MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-E-24, RMS AREA MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY HCO (Step 4.1) DETERMINE which area monitor has alarmed.

HCO/ (Step 4.2) REFER to applicable AR-RMS CO PROCEDURE.

US (Step 4.3) NOTIFY the following to investigate RMS Alarm:

Auxiliary Operators NOTE: The US may call an EO to address the RMS alarms.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Radiation Protection NOTE: The US may call RP to address the RMS alarms.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RP, and report that radiation levels in the vicinity of the Letdown Line are consistent with R-9.

AR-RMS-9, R9 LETDOWN LINE MONITOR US (Step 1) GO TO AP-RCS.3. NOTE: The US will transition to AP-RCS.3.

AP-RCS.3, HIGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY NOTE Conditions should be evaluated for site contingency reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

US (Step 1) VERIFY RCS Activity:

Direct Chemistry to sample RCS for NOTE: The US will call activity Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry.

RCS activity - GREATER THAN SIM DRIVER: Using Time NORMAL Compression 2 minutes after this request, report Dose Equivalent I-131 activity 13 µC/gm.

Note: Normal DEI is 1.26E-3

µC/gm.

HCO (Step 2) RAISE Letdown Flow to 60 GPM (Refer to S-3.2P, SWAPPING CVCS LETDOWN ORIFICE VALVES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments S-3.2P, SWAPPING CVCS LETDOWN ORIFICE VALVES HCO (Step 6.1.1) VERIFY DIVERT VLV CATION NOTE: AOV-244 is in DEBOR DI, AOV-244 is in the BYPASS BYPASS.

position.

NOTE PCV-135 SHOULD be adjusted to control Letdown pressure at approximately 200 psig to accommodate the pressure rise when swapping from a 40 gpm orifice to a 60 gpm orifice.

HCO (Step 6.1.2) IF letdown temperature adjustment is required, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

HCO (Step 6.1.3) PLACE PCV-135 to MANUAL.

HCO (Step 6.1.4) ADJUST as necessary to control Low Pressure Letdown pressure at approximately 200 psig.

NOTE The next step requires two actions, AOV-200A AND AOV-200B SHALL be closed prior to opening AOV-202.

HCO (Step 6.1.5) CLOSE one of the following 40 NOTE: The HCO will Close gpm orifice valves, THEN IMMEDIATELY AOV-200B and Open AOV-OPEN LTDN ORIFICE AOV-202 (N/A 40 202.

gpm orifice valve not operated).

AOV-200A Closed

AOV 200B Closed

AOV-202 Open

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.1.6) ADJUST PCV-135 UNTIL PI-135 indicates approximately 250 psig.

HCO (Step 6.1.7) ENSURE PCV-135 controller signal is nulled/balanced AND THEN PLACE PCV-135 to AUTO.

HCO (Step 6.1.8) ADUST the Charging Pump that NOTE: The C Charging Pump is in manual UNTIL the speed of the is in MANUAL.

operating pumps is approximately equal.

HCO (Step 6.1.9) VERIFY Letdown temperature is at desired value, THEN ENSURE TCV-130 is in AUTO.

HCO (Step 6.1.10) IF Charging/Letdown mismatch exist, THEN PLACE Charging Pumps in manual AND ADJUST as necessary to maintain Charging/Letdown mismatch at approximately 0. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

HCO (Step 6.1.11) LOCALLY ADJUST SEAL NOTE: The HCO will call an INJECTION INLET NEEDLE VLV TO RCP EO to adjust the valves.

A, V-300A AND SEAL INJECTION INLET If so, SIM DRIVER NEEDLE VLV TO RCP B, V-300B, as acknowledge as EO, and use necessary to maintain labyrinth seal D/P REM-CVC19 for V-300A and between 30 and 40 inches. REM-CVC20 for V-300B.

HCO (Step 6.1.12) MONITOR Letdown temperature is controlling at desired value.

HCO (Step 6.1.13) VERIFY local demin D/P less NOTE: The HCO will call an than 25 psid (DPI-100 or DPI-101). EO to obtain reading.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report local reading is 18 psid.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.1.14) NOTIFY Shift Chemistry NOTE: The HCO will call Technician. Chemistry to address the rise in Letdown flow.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry.

AP-RCS.3, HIGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY HCO/ (Step 3) CHECK Letdown Line Monitor, R-9 NOTE: R-9 is indicating CO - LESS THAN 200 MR/HR ABOVE abnormally high.

BACKGROUND HCO/ (Step 3RNO) Evaluate conditions to NOTE: The US may address CO determine whether local radiation emergency EPIP 1-13.

exists (Refer to EPIP 1-13, LOCAL RADIATION EMERGENCY)

CAUTION PLACING A NEW DI IN SERVICE MAY RESULT IN A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE REACTIVITY ADDITION DUE TO A BORON CHANGE.

US (Step 4) Direct Chemistry to Sample Letdown NOTE: The US will call DI Efficiency - DECONTAMINATION Chemistry to address the FACTOR GREATER THAN 10 samples.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry.

HCO/ (Step 5) Evaluate AUX BLDG Radiation CO Levels:

Direct RP Tech to survey AUX BLDG NOTE: The US will call RP to address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RP.

Check AUX BLDG radiation monitors -

NORMAL

R-4

R-9

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

R-10B

R-13

R-14 US (Step 5.b RNO) Perform the following:

Direct RP Tech to survey AUX BLDG NOTE: The US will call RP to areas as necessary. address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RP.

Evaluate conditions to determine NOTE: The US may address whether local radiation emergency EPIP 1-13.

exists (Refer to EPIP 1-13, LOCAL RADIATION EMERGENCY).

HCO/ (Step 6) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status CO (Refer to AR Procedures)

US (Step 7) Determine If Plant Operation Can NOTE: The US will call Continue (Consult Plant staff if necessary) - Supervision to address the OPERATION CAN CONTINUE elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as appropriate.

RP Supervision

Chemistry Supervision

Reactor Engineer NOTE Refer to LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES, for reporting requirements.

US (Step 8) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US will call WCCS/Supervision to address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as appropriate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may address to EPIP 1-13.

EPIP 1-13, LOCAL RADIATION EMERGENCY HCO (Step 6.1.1) Upon notification that a Local Radiation Emergency exists, the following actions should be taken:

HCO (Step 6.1.2) Make an appropriate announcement over the paging system that all personnel shall evacuate the affected area.

HCO (Step 6.1.2.1) For evacuation of the NOTE: There is no one in the Containment Building: CTMT.

HCO (Step 6.1.2.2) For a fuel handing accident in NOTE: There is no Fuel the SFP area, make the following Handling Accident in progress.

announcement:

US (Step 6.1.3) Take appropriate action to limit contain or correct the condition. Refer to RMS Alarm Response and ER-RMS.1, Determining the Location of High Activity Within the Plant Utilizing the Plant Vent, as required. Consider altering the ventilation lineup to optimize filter flow and negative pressure in the Aux. Bldg.

US (Step 6.1.4) Notify the Shift Manager to NOTE: The US will call perform section 6.2. Supervision to address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as appropriate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 60 Event

Description:

Fuel Failure/High RCS Activity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 6.1.5) Notify the Radiation Protection NOTE: The US will call RP to Section to perform Section 6.3. address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RP.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.16, RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY US (LCO 3.4.16) The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 and 2, Mode 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg) 500°F.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 NOTE -

specific activity not within LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit.

A.1 Verify DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 60µCi/gm.

AND A.2 Restore DOSE 7 days EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limit.

NOTE: The US will identify that SR 3.4.16.2 is NOT being complied with making Condition A applicable.

NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 60 Event

Description:

Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas) Instrument fails HIGH Following this, the Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas/TT-2023) Instrument will fail HIGH causing the Temperature Controller to increase cooling flow to the Main Generator, and Generator Gas temperatures to start to decrease. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-H-22, H2 CLR TEMP HI/BYP VLV < 70% OPEN. Using AR-H-22, the operator will take manual control of the Generator Hydrogen Temp Controller (TC-2023), as necessary, to control Generator Gas Temperature.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (GEN02 (200, 30 second Ramp))

NOTE: It requires approximately 2 minutes for this malfunction to cause MCB Annunciator H-22.

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator H-22, H2 CLR TEMP HI/BYP VLV <70% OPEN

Pt. 9 on RK-30 abruptly increases to 93°C

TC-2023 output moving toward 0%

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-H-22, H2 CLR TEMP HI/BYP VLV < 70% OPEN NOTE

Alarm indicates maximum CNDST flow through H2 Coolers.

Raising CNDST Cooler cooling should cause the H2 Cooler bypass valve to open as cooler water enters the H2 Coolers.

80% open on the H2 Cooler bypass valve corresponds to approximately 20% H2 Cooler controller demand signal.

CNDST TO GEN H2 COOLERS, Tl-2029 SHALL be maintained greater than 73°F.

Lower cooler inlet temperature causes higher delta T's AND low flow which can lead to H2 Cooler leakage into the Main Generator.

Local guidance for maintaining temperature is in P-15.95, LOCAL OPERATION CONTROLLING GENERATOR HYDROGREN COOLER INLET TEMPERATURE.

CO (Step 4.1) CHECK for H2 Cooler controller NOTE: The CO will place the failure (Back of MCB center Section). IF the TC-2023 in MANUAL and Controller has failed THEN PLACE the control output. Controller was Controller in Manual at 50% responding to the FAILED HI RTD.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 60 Event

Description:

Generator Hydrogen Temperature (Cold Gas) Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 4.2) If the controller demand is less NOTE: Controller was at 0%

than 20%, THEN PLACE the controller in (fully OPEN position)

MANUAL at 50%

CO (Step 4.3) MONITOR generator gas temperatures AND MAINTAIN Cold Gas Temperature between 38 and 45 degrees C.

(MCB Back - Recorder RK-30)

CO (Step 4.4) IF the condensate cooler is in NOTE: The Condensate service, THEN .. Cooler is NOT in service.

CO (Step 4.5) IF the condensate cooler is NOT NOTE: It is NOT desired to in service AND it is desired to place it in place the Condensate Cooler service, THEN in service.

CO (Step 4.6) CHECK Condensate Cooler P NOTE: The Condensate (MCB Back - Diff Press PI-2036 -Max 10 Cooler is NOT in service.

PSID).

CO (Step 4.7) CHECK H2 Cooler P (MCB Back

- Diff Press PI-2026 - Max 8.5 PSID)

CO (Step 4.8) IF automatic valve control NOTE: The CO will diagnose failure is suspected, THEN. an RTD Failure.

NOTE: The US may notify the WCC.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 21 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip After this, the B Main Feedwater Pump will develop an oil leak, and trip within 60 seconds.

The operator will respond using AR-H-4, MAIN FEED PUMP OIL SYSTEM, and AR-H-12, FEED PUMP DC OIL PUMP AUTO START, and enter AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump Flow or NPSH. The operator will start the A MDAFW Pump and the TD AFW Pump and initiate a downpower in accordance with AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 (FDW04B (100, 600 second Ramp); FDW02B (B MFWP Trip 60 seconds delayed))

NOTE: OVR-ROD04C (Rods fail in AUTO) and ROD03-G11 (Rod Untrippable) are also operated on Trigger #4 to set-up Event 5 Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator H-12, FEED PUMP DC OIL PUMP AUTO START

Feed Pump DC Oil Pump Red status light is LIT.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-H-12, FEED PUMP DC OIL PUMP AUTO START CO (Step 1) VERIFY DC Oil Pump started.

CO (Step 2) NOTIFY AO to perform the NOTE: The US may direct the following: EO to report status of the B MFWP.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and within 30 seconds report that there is a large oil leak on the pump.

VERIFY Oil in the sump by LG-2764(2773) OR dipstick.

CHECK DC Oil Pump.

CO (Step 3) IF required, THEN START the other NOTE: The B MFW Pump will AC Oil Pump. trip within 60 seconds.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 22 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 4) NOTIFY AO to check the running AC Oil Pump.

CO (Step 5) WHEN AO reports the AC Pump is operating, THEN STOP the DC Oil Pump, AND PLACE in AUTO.

NOTE: The US will transition to AP-FW.1.

AP-FW.1, ABNORMAL MFW PUMP FLOW OR NPSH NOTE IF power reduction is required, OPGREACTIVITYCALC provides the amount and rate of Boric Acid Addition.

HCO (Step 1) Check MFW Requirements: NOTE: Power level is 70%.

Power - GREATER THAN 50%

Both MFW pumps - RUNNING HCO (Step 1.b RNO) IF power greater that 75%, NOTE: Power level is 70%.

THEN CO IF power less than 75% and only one MFW pump has tripped THEN perform the following:

Start all 3 AFW pumps and verify NOTE: The CO will start the A flow. MDAFW Pump and the TD AFW Pump. The B MDAFW Pump is OOS.

Place tripped MFW pump switch to Pull Stop to shut the MFW Pump Recirc Valve.

Initiate power reduction. Refer to AP- NOTE: The US will transition TURB.5, RAPID LOAD to AP-TURB.5.

REDUCTION.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner Note: The US will terminate the load reduction when feed flow is greater than steam flow and continue with AP-FW.1. When the load reduction is terminated continue with AP-FW.1 actions on Page 29.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION NOTE: The US/CO may notify the CENG Generation Dispatch.

SIM DRIVER: as CENG Generation Dispatch, acknowledge.

NOTE: The US may notify the RG&E ECC.

SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge.

CAUTION IF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW SHOULD LOWER TO 25% OF FULL POWER FLOW (1x106 LB/HR) PRIOR TO THE AMSAC SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY BLOCKING AT 40% POWER, THEN A TURBINE TRIP AND AUX FEED PUMPS START COULD RESULT.

NOTE

IF the turbine is to be taken offline, THEN transfer of 4160V loads may be performed at any time. Refer to ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS.

A maximum continuous load reduction rate of greater than 5%/min should not be used unless directed by the Shift Manager.

Perform a Load Reduction Brief per A-503.1 Emergency and Abnormal Procedures User Guide Attachment 1.

HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction

Verify rods in AUTO NOTE: The rods are in AUTO, however, the rods will not move in AUTO.

WHEN this is diagnosed the HCO will manually insert rods to match Tavg with Tref (Step 1.a RNO).

HCO

Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration per S-3.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 24 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 2, NORMAL BORATION HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, is complete.

HCO (Step 2) Board operator SHALL inform US of intent to change core reactivity.

US SHALL acknowledge reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092].

HCO (Step 3) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to BORATE position.

HCO (Step 4) SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, controller to flow rate determined in Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, Step 1.1.

HCO (Step 5) SET BA COUNTER, YIC-110, to quantity determined in Attachment 1.

NOTE Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication, OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as boric acid is injected to ensure proper response. [G0092] [G0132]

HCO (Step 6) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position.

HCO (Step 7) VERIFY the following:

BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A OR B starts.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 25 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, throttles open to preset flow position.

REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens.

HCO (Step 8) WHEN boration is complete, THEN PERFORM the following:

PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.

PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.

SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, for current RCS boron concentration PER Boration/Dilution tables OR PPCS Engineering Menu Boration/Dilution display.

HCO (Step 9) PLACE BORATE Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.

HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete.

[G0092]

HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION CO

Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:

Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 26 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will select 1-3%/Minute.

Reduce the setter to the desired load

Depress the GO button HCO

Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON CAUTION EXTREME AND RAPID ROD MOTION TO MITIGATE TAVG SWINGS MAY RESULT IN LARGE POWER EXCURSIONS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Tavg - GREATER THAN 545°F

Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F NOTE: The rods have failed to move in AUTO.

WHEN this is diagnosed the HCO will manually insert rods to match Tavg with Tref.

As the controls are inserted it will be diagnosed that there is one stuck rod.

HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC)

Maintain rods above the insertion limit

Match Tavg and Tref

Compensate for Xenon NOTE With PRZR pressure controller in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 27 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING to 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

CO (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% in AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE: The MFW Regulating Valves are working in conjunction with the AFW System. The CO may stop feed to the A S/G with the TDAFW Pump (AOV-4297).

This will result in the A MDAFW Pump feeding the A S/G, and the TDAFW Pump feeding the B S/G.

HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE: Stuck rod causes C-5 alarm.

NOTE: The US should NOT stop the load decrease, but at the same time address the Stuck Rod.

Examiner NOTE: The crew may enter AP-RCC.2 at any time based on AR-C-5 or MRPI Indication. If so, MOVE to Event 5 as needed (Page 37). This may result in simultaneous performance of AP-FW.1 and AP-RCC.2.

NOTE It is permissible to operate RCPs for limited periods without seal injection, provided CCW is being supplied to the thermal barriers.

CO (Step 7) Check IA Available To CNMT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 28 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

IA pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG

Instr Air to CNMT Isol Valve, AOV-5392 -

OPEN HCO/ (Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status:

CO

Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - LIT HCO/ (Step 8 RNO) IF steam dump required but CO NOT operating, THEN CAUTION MANUAL REJECT MAY BE REQUIRED TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON CONDENSATE PRESSURE CO (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level: NOTE: Depending on progress through this procedure, the crew may or may not perform the RNO. If not, MOVE to Step 10.

Hotwell level controller in AUTO

Controller demand LESS THAN 60%

Hotwell level at setpoint CO (Step 9 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual and control level.

NOTE The load reduction should not be delayed to perform the remaining steps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 29 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US/ (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous CO Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are no RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running.

CO (Step 10.a RNO) IF only 1 Condensate Booster Pump running, THEN..

CO (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should Be Secured

Power LESS THAN 50%

US (Step 11.a RNO) GO TO Step 18.

US (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status

IF load was reduced more than 15% NOTE: The US will contact RTP in one hour, THEN notify RP to RP.

obtain primary samples required by SIM DRIVER: as RP, ITS LCO 3.4.16 acknowledge

Power stable at desired level (Step 18b RNO) IF power greater than 20% NOTE: The crew will continue and further reduction is required, THEN the downpower and perform continue load reduction and return to Step 2. the remaining actions of AP-FW.1 in parallel.

Examiner NOTE: The crew may enter AP-RCC.2 at any time based on AR-C-5 or MRPI Indication. If so, MOVE to Event 5 (Page 37) as needed.

AP-FW.1, ABNORMAL MFW PUMP FLOW OR NPSH US (Step 1.b RNO 3) WHEN feed flow greater NOTE: The US will stop the than steam flow, THEN stop load reduction. load decrease when feed flow is greater than steam flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Go to Step 3.

IF both MFW pumps have tripped NOTE: The A MFW Pump is THEN still running.

CO (Step 3) Check S/G Status

MFW flows - GREATER THAN STEAM FLOWS

S/G levels stabilizing or returning to program CO (Step 4) Verify at Least 2 Condensate pumps

- RUNNING CO (Step 5) Verify Both HDT Pumps - RUNNING CO (Step 5 RNO) IF greater than 70% power, NOTE: The B HDT Pump is and one HDT Pump has tripped, THEN running.

IF both HDT pumps have tripped, THEN CO (Step 6) Check Condensate Booster Pumps NOTE: There are no

- 2 RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running.

CO (Step 6 RNO) IF no condensate booster pump is running, THEN perform the following:

Ensure power less than 70%. (Refer to NOTE: Power level is < 70%.

APTURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION)

US

Continue with Step 7.

IF a running condensate booster pump NOTE: No Booster Pumps has tripped AND the standby pump has have been running in this NOT started, THEN.. scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 31 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 7) Check Both MFW Pump Recirc NOTE: The B MFW Pump AOVs CLOSED Recirc Valve is Open.

AOV-4147

AOV-4148 CO (Step 7 RNO) Dispatch an AO to locally NOTE: The US/CO will place the associated RECIRC Controller in dispatch an EO.

MANUAL AND CLOSE the associated MFP SIM DRIVER: as EO, RECIRC AOV at the MFW Pump Seal Water acknowledge.

Panel.

CAUTION MANUAL REJECT MAY BE REQUIRED TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON CONDENSATE PRESSURE.

CO (Step 8) Check Hotwell Level: NOTE: Hotwell may be out of band during the transient. If so, the Step 8 RNO will be performed.

Hotwell Level controller in AUTO

Controller demand less than 70%

Hotwell level at setpoint CO (Step 8 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual and control level CO (Step 9) Check MFW Pump Suction Pressure

Both MFW pump suction pressures GREATER THAN 200 PSIG

Annunciator H-17, FEED PUMP NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD -

EXTINGUISHED.

CO (Step 10) Verify Adequate MFW Flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 32 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

A MFW flow - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO A STEAM FLOW

B MFW flow - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO B STEAM FLOW CO (Step 11) Check Status of MFW System:

Both MFW pumps - RUNNING NOTE: Only the A MFW Pump is running.

CO (Step 11.a RNO) IF any MFW has tripped, THEN place pump control switch to PULL STOP to close recirc to condenser. AOV-4262.

IF AOV-4262 will NOT close, THEN (Step 11.b-c) Verify condensate pump recirc valve AOV-4238 - CLOSED (PPCS V4238)

Check MFW pump suction pressure:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 200 PSIG

Pressure - STABLE NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

US (Step 12) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:

HCO

Tavg - AT OR TRENDING TO TREF NOTE: The rods have failed to move in AUTO.

WHEN this is diagnosed the HCO will manually insert rods to match Tavg with Tref.

As the controls are inserted it will be diagnosed that there is one stuck rod.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 33 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 12.a RNO) IF Tavg greater than Tref, THEN restore Tavg to Tref by one or more of the following:

Insert control rods

RCS boration IF Tavg less that Tref, THEN. NOTE: Tavg is expected to be higher than Tref.

HCO/ (Step 12.b-e) PRZR pressure - AT OR CO TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO

PRZR level - AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL

MFW regulating valves - RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO

Rod insertion limit alarms -

EXTINGUISHED Critical Task:

Stabilize the plant during the Main Feedwater Pump Trip before the Reactor must be manually tripped at 20% or automatically trips on a low Narrow Range Steam Generator level Safety Significance: Failure to control plant power and stabilize the transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the transient. A failure to stabilize the transient, when able to do so (i.e. event initiates from

< 75% power), constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure/temperature control.

CO (Step 13) Check Status of Condensate System:

Check hotwell level controller, LC-107

Hotwell Level controller in AUTO NOTE: The Hotwell level controller may be in MANUAL.

Controller demand less than 70%

Hotwell level at setpoint

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 34 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check condensate bypass valve, AOV-3959, CLOSED, IN AUTO

Check condensate pump - LESS THAN 3 PUMPS RUNNING

Verify trim valves in AUTO at 400 psig HCO/ (Step 14) Verify Control Systems In Auto CO

Verify 431K in AUTO

Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO

Verify PRZR Heaters restored:

PRZR proportional heater breaker -

CLOSED

PRZR backup heater breaker -

RESET / IN AUTO

Verify one charging pump in AUTO

Verify MFW regulating valves in AUTO NOTE: The MFW regulating Valves are working in conjunction with the AFW System. The CO may have previously stopped feed to the A S/G with the TDAFW Pump (AOV-4297).

Verify EH controls in OP PAN, IMP OUT

Verify steam dump controller, HC-484, in AUTO at 1005 psig

Verify annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - EXTINGUISHED

Verify Rods in AUTO NOTE: The rods have failed to move in AUTO.

HCO (Step 14.i RNO) Place Rods in AUTO, if NOTE: The HCO will NOT desired. place the control rods in AUTO.

CO (Step 15) Restore AFW System to Auto Standby:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check AFW pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: The A MDAFW Pump and the TDAFW Pump are running.

Verify MFW regulating valves - NOTE: The MFW regulating RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN Valves are working in AUTO conjunction with the AFW System. The CO may have previously stopped feed to the A S/G with the TDAFW Pump (AOV-4297).

Close TDAFW pump steam supply valves

MOV-3504A

MOV-3505A

Direct EO to locally isolate S/G NOTE: The US will dispatch blowdowns, (Refer to T-14N, an EO.

BLOWDOWN SYSTEM FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, CHANGES) acknowledge and report that action is complete in 2 minutes.

WHEN EO has locally isolated S/G NOTE: The CO will stop the A blowdowns, THEN stop MDAFW pumps MDAFW Pump when and place switches in AUTO blowdowns have been isolated.

Open AFW pump discharge valves

MOV-4007

MOV-4008 NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump is OOS, and this valve will remain Closed.

MOV-3996

Open TDAFW pump flow control valves

AOV-4297

AOV-4298

Direct EO to locally restore S/G NOTE: The US will dispatch blowdowns to desired glow rate, (Refer to an EO.

T-14N, BLOWDOWN SYSTEM FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, CHANGES) acknowledge and report that action is complete in 2 minutes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 36 of 60 Event

Description:

B Feed Pump Oil Leak/Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US

GO to Step 17 HCO/ (Step 17) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status CO (Refer to AR procedures)

US (Step 18) Check If PRZR Boron Should Be Mixed

Boration performed for load reduction HCO

Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON NOTE Refer to LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES for reporting requirements.

US (Step 19) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US will call Supervision to address the elevated rad levels.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as appropriate.

US (Step 20) Return to Procedure Or Guidance IN Effect When the crew addresses AP-RCC.2 move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 37 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod During the downpower, the control rods will fail to move in auto and the operator will need to insert control rods manually. Additionally, Control Rod G-11 will stick in its original position. After the plant stabilizes, the operator will respond in accordance with AR-C-5, PPCS ROD SEQUENCE OR ROD DEVIATION/PPCS LTOP HI-LOW TEMPERATURE, and enter AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA NOTE: OVR-ROD04C (Rods fail in AUTO) and ROD03-G11 (Rod Untrippable) were previously operated on Trigger #4.

Indications Available:

Control Rods do not move in AUTO

Control Rod G-11 MRPI indicates that the rod is NOT moving Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-C-5, PPCS ROD SEQUENCE OR ROD DEVIATION/PPCS LTOP HI-LOW TEMPERATURE HCO IF rods are out of sequence, THEN.

HCO IF rod position deviation, THEN

GO TO AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION

Check PPCS for operability (S-26.1, COMPUTER PROGRAM CHECK)

Check PPCS for Fail Over

Refer to ITS 3.1.4 and ITS 3.1.6.

NOTE: The US will go to AP-RCC.2.

AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION CAUTION BANK ROD WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE PERFORMED UNTIL DIRECTED PER APPLICABLE RECOVERY PROCEDURE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 38 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1) Place Rods to Manual NOTE: The rods will be in MANUAL.

HCO (Step 2) Check Dropped Rod Indication: NOTE: These Annunciators are EXTINGUISHED.

Annunciator E-28, POWER RANGE ROD DROP ROD STOP 5%/5 SECONDS- EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator C-14, ROD BOTTOM ROD STOP - EXTINGUISHED.

HCO (Step 3) Check Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: If Tavg is stable at PROGRAM. Program, the Step 3 RNO will not be performed.

HCO (Step 3 RNO) IF Tavg is Low, THEN perform the following:

Place EH control in MANUAL.

Manually lower turbine load to match Tavg and Tref.

IF Tavg is High, THEN perform the following:

Initiate a Boration to lower Tavg to Tref. Examiner NOTE: The HCO may borate the RCS to lower Tavg to Tref (See Pages 24-25).

CO (Step 4) Check Steam Dump Status:

Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED -

LIT.

CO (Step 4 RNO) IF steam dump required but NOT operating, THEN CO (Step 5) Check Main Generator Load -

GREATER THAN 15 MW.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 39 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV-431K will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

HCO (Step 6) Establish Stable Plant Conditions

a. Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF

b. PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO

c. PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL CO d. MFW Regulating Valves -

RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52%

IN AUTO US (Step 7) Check Control Rod Alignment:

a. Verify all rods in affected group - NOTE: Rod G-11 is not WITHIN +/- 12 STEPS OF aligned.

ASSOCIATED GROUP STEP COUNTER US (Step 7 RNO) Refer to ITS Section 3.1.4.

NOTE Step 8 is an attempt to determine whether a rod is misaligned or whether the MRPI System is malfunctioning.

US (Step 8) Check QPTR - LESS THAN 1.02 NOTE: QPTR may be > 1.02 due to the stuck rod. If so, the RNO will be performed. If not, proceed to Step 9.

NOTE IF the MRPI CRT fails, THEN the PPCS can be used for rod position indications until the CRT is made operable. Rod position indication can be retrieved from the PPCS by selecting the CBAW display button.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 40 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 8 RNO) Refer to ITS Section 3.2.4.

HCO (Step 9) Verify All Individual Rod Position Indication Per Bank Operable.

MRPI system - NO MRPI SYSTEM ALARMS

MRPI system - NO KNOWN PROBLEMS WITH MRPI SYSTEM THAT COULD RENDER ROD POSITION INDICATION INOPERABLE.

US (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following

a. Refer to ITS section 3.1.7 for required action.

b. Consult Reactor Engineer and plant staff to evaluated MRPI.

c. Go to Step 11 NOTE: The US will evaluate Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS US LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE AND Individual indicated rod positions shall be within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One rod not within B.1.1 Verify SDM to be within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months alignment limits. the limits specified in the COLR.

OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 41 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments B.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND B.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months POWER to 75% RTP.

AND B.3 Verify SDM is within the Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months limits specified in the COLR AND B.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months SR 3.2.1.2, and SR 3.2.2.1 AND B.5 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

NOTE: The US will identify that Condition B is applicable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.2.4, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO US LCO 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATION (QPTR)

US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 with NOTE: In attempting to THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP stabilize the plant transient the crew lower power to < 50%.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. QPTR not with limit. A.1 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after each QPTR POWER 3% from RTP determination for each 1% of QPTR.

1.00.

AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months A.2 Determine QPTR AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR, equilibrium conditions from a 3.2.1.2 and SR 3.2.2.1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 42 of 60 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in AUTO/Stuck Rod Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THERMAL POWER reduction per Required Action A.1 AND AND Once per 7 days thereafter A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses and confirm Prior to increasing THERMAL results remain valid for the POWER above the limit of duration of operation Required Action A.1 under this condition.

AND A.5 Normalize excore Prior to increasing THERMAL detectors to restore QPTR POWER above the limit of to within limit. Required Action A.1 AND A.6 Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after 3.2.1.2 and SR 3.2.2.1 achieving equilibrium conditions at RTP not to exceed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action a.1 NOTE: If the plant is > 50%

power, AND QPTR is > 1.02, the US will identify that Condition A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 43 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 After this, a large rupture will occur in the Condensate Header resulting in a loss of feedwater. The automatic Rx Trip system will fail to trip the reactor, and the operator will need to manually trip the reactor from the MCB by de-energizing Bus 13 and 15.

The crew may enter AP-FW.2, Secondary Coolant Leak, then will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The TDAFW Pump will trip on overspeed on the reactor trip. Subsequently, after ES-0.1 has been entered, a ground fault will occur on Bus 14, isolating the bus and de-energizing the A MDAFW Pump. A Red condition will eventually exist on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, and the crew will transition to FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will restore AFW flow to the Steam Generators via ATT-5.1, Attachment SAFW From SW, and ATT-22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow. The scenario will terminate at Step 12.b of FR-H.1, after the crew has returned to ES-0.1.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (CND08 (20000, 60 second Ramp))

Indications Available:

Numerous MCB Annunciators.

Feed flow less than Steam Flow to both Steam Generators

B Heater Drains Pump trips

Condensate Pumps Trip

S/G Narrow Levels are lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: US may enter AP-FW.2 or enter E-0 directly.

AP-FW.2, SECONDARY COOLANT LEAK US (Step 1) Determine if Plant Operation can continue:

Leak does not present an unmanageable safety threat.

CNMT Pressure is being maintained less than 2 psig.

CNMT Temperature is being maintained less than 125°F.

Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability is not affected.

Leakage is within makeup capability (GE BETZ).

S/G Level Stable at or Trending to 52%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 44 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip the Reactor and perform immediate actions of E0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

HCO/

Close both MSIV's.

CO

AOV3517

AOV3516

Go To E0, REACTOR TRIP OR NOTE: US may enter E-0 SAFETY INJECTION. When permitted by directly.

the EOP's, Then continue with this procedure at step 3.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

At least one train of reactor trip breakers

- OPEN

Neutron flux - LOWERING

MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND NOTE: The Rod G-11 MRPI SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with light will not be LIT.

no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.

HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action

IF reactor trip breakers NOT open OR there is a fire in the power block, THEN perform the following:

CO

Open Bus 13 and Bus 15 normal feed breakers.

IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN..

Verify rod drive MG sets tripped.

CO

Close Bus 13 and Bus 15 normal feed breakers.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 45 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO

Reset lighting breakers.

IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power NOTE: The reactor is range NIS indicates greater than 5%, considered tripped even with THEN.. one stuck rod (G-11).

Critical Task:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before transition to FR-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor from the control room when able to do so (i.e. De-energize Bus 13 and 15) causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions and requires that the facility declare an ALERT based on MA3 when the Emergency Classification would have been an Unusual Event based on MU3 had the Critical Task been completed successfully. The failure to complete the Critical Task constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy demonstrating the inability by the crew to recognize and properly mitigate a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

CO (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED CO (Step 2 RNO) Manually trip turbine. Immediate Action

IF turbine trip can NOT be verified, THEN close both MSIVs.

IF the turbine CANNOT be tripped AND either MSIV CANNOT be closed from the Control Room THEN CO (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:

Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND

Bus 17 OR Bus 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 46 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action

Any SI Annunciator - LIT HCO/ (Step 4.a RNO) IF any of the following CO conditions are net, THEN manually actuate SI and CI:

PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig OR

Steamline pressure less than 514 psig OR

CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig OR

SI sequencing started OR

Operator determines SI required IF SI in NOT required, THEN go to ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

Examiner NOTE: A Red Path on Subcriticality will exist because the Rx Trip Breakers are Closed (Not Valid).

ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE CAUTION IF SI ACTUATION OCCURS DURING THIS PROCEDURE, THEN E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, SHOULD BE PERFORMED.

NOTE

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees should be monitored. (Refer to Appendix 1 for Red Path Summary.)

Refer to AP(s) that were in effect prior to the reactor trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 47 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor CO these conditions throughout the performance of ES-0.1.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA SI ACTUATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO (*Step 1) Check RCS Temperature NOTE: This is a Continuous Control: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING

Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F HCO/ (Step 1 RNO) IF temperature is less than NOTE: These actions will be CO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the taken between RCS following: temperature is <547F and lowering.

Stop dumping steam:

Establish condenser steam dump pressure control:

Check condenser available:

Any MSIV - OPEN

Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - LIT

IF condenser NOT available, THEN place S/G ARV controller in AUTO at 1005 psig and adjust as necessary. IF S/G ARV NOT controlling in AUTO, THEN control S/G ARV manually.

Adjust condenser steam dump controller HC-484 to 1005 psig in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 48 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Place steam dump mode selector switch to MANUAL.

Ensure S/G ARVs closed.

Ensure S/G blowdown and sample valves closed.

Ensure reheater steam supply valves closed.

HCO/

IF MDAFW pumps supplying greater than CO 200 gpm, THEN ensure TDAFW pump steam supply valves in PULL STOP.

IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow greater than 200 gpm until narrow range level greater than 5% in at least one S/G. WHEN S/G level greater than 5% in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain S/G level.

IF cooldown continues below 540°F, THEN perform the following:

Close both MSIVs.

Adjust S/G ARV controller in auto to control RCS Tavg at 547°F.

IF RCS Tavg greater than 547°F and rising, NOTE: These actions will be THEN dump steam to stabilize and slowly taken between RCS lower RCS Tavg to 547°F. temperature is >547F and rising.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: WHEN ES-0.1 Step 1 RNO actions have been performed AND SG Narrow Range Level is 12%, Operate Trigger

6 (EDS04A)

Examiner NOTE: This will create a loss of all MFW/AFW to the Steam Generators. A Red Condition on Heat Sink will occur in 5-7 minutes and cause the crew to implement FR-H.1. When the Red Path occurs move forward to Page 52.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 49 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The US may address AP-ELEC.14-16 after Bus 14 (Not Scripted) is de-energized.

However, no substantive actions will be taken, and the crew will ultimately need to implement FR-H.1.

HCO (Step 2) Check PRZR Level Control:

Verify charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: Two Charging Pumps are likely running.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 13%

Verify letdown - IN SERVICE NOTE: Letdown may or may not be in service. It may have isolated when Pressurizer level lowered to

<13% during the cooldown due to the secondary system break.

If letdown must be restored, the HCO will use ATT-9.0 (Not Scripted).

PRZR level - TRENDING TO 20%

Check PRZR heaters - ENERGIZED

PRZR proportional heaters

PRZR heater backup group CO (Step 3) Check S/G Feed Flow Status:

Check RCS Tavg - LESS THAN 554°F

Verify MFW flow control valves -

CLOSED

MFW regulating valves

MFW bypass valves

Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 50 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 3.c RNO) Manually start both MDAFW NOTE: The B MDAFW is pumps. OOS.

IF total AFW flow greater than 200 gpm can NOT be established, THEN perform the following:

Manually start TDAW pump. NOTE: The TDAFW Pump has tripped on overspeed.

OR

Perform the following:

Establish MFW on bypass valves.

IF MFW flow established, THEN

IF MFW flow NOT established, THEN go to step 3.d)

CO (Step 3.d-f) Close MFW pump discharge valves

MOV-3977, A MFW pump NOTE: MOV-3977 is de-energized because MCC-A (Bus 13) is de-energized.

MOV-3976, B MFW pump

Stop MFW pumps and place in PULL STOP

WHEN both MFP pumps are stopped, THEN depress MANUAL pushbuttons for A and B MFW regulating valve and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0% demand.

S/G A, HCV-466 and HCV-480

S/G B, HCV-476 and HCV-481

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 51 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4) Verify MRPI Indicates - ALL NOTE: MRPI has been de-CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON energized. However, BOTTOM Control Rod G-11 was NOT on the bottom prior to MRPI being de-energized.

HCO (Step 4 RNO) IF any control rods NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the following:

IF three or more control rods NOT fully NOTE: There is only one inserted, THEN Control Rod not fully inserted.

OR IF one or two control rods NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the following:

Place RMW mode selector switch to BORATE.

Adjust boric acid flow control valve, HCV-110A, for desired flowrate.

Set boric acid integrator to the following:

900 gallons for 1 stuck rod

Place RMW control to start and verify flow. IF flow can NOT be established, THEN..

HCO (Step 5) Check PRZR Pressure Control:

PRZR pressure - GREATER THAN 1750 PSIG

PRZR pressure - GREATER THAN 2210 PSIG

PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG CO (*Step 6) Monitor S/G Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 5%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 52 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 6.a RNO) Maintain total feed flow greater than 200 gpm until narrow range level greater than 5% in at least one S/G.

Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: A Red Path will exist range level between 17% and 52%. on Heat Sink requiring an entry into FR-H.1.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CAUTION

IF TOTAL FEED FLOW IS LESS THAN 200 GPM DUE TO OPERATOR ACTION, THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE PERFORMED.

FEED FLOW SHOULD NOT BE REESTABLISHED TO A FAULTED S/G IF A NON-FAULTED S/G IS AVAILABLE.

IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

NOTE

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

Foldout Page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of FR-H.1.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a) RCS pressure- GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE b) Check RCS cold leg temperature GREATER THAN 350°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 53 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (*Step 2) Check if Bleed and Feed is NOTE: This is a Continuous Required Action. The US will make one or more board operators Both S/G level wide range levels LESS aware.

THAN 120 inches [160 inches adverse CNMT]

US (Step 2 RNO) Go to Step 3.

CAUTION IF CST LEVEL LOWERS TO LESS THAN 5 FEET, THEN ALTERNATE WATER SOURCES FOR AFW PUMPS WILL BE NECESSARY (REFER TO ER-AFW.1, ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLY TO AFW PUMPS).

NOTE

IF it is necessary to crosstie the MDAFW pumps to restore AFW, THEN refer to ATT-5.3, ATTACHMENT MDAFW PUMPS CROSSTIE.

AFW discharge valves MOV-4007 and MOV-4008 switches may be held closed during pump start to allow throttling feed flow to less than the value determined from ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW.

HCO (Step 3) Try to Establish AFW Flow To At Least One Intact S/G:

a) Check Blowdown and Sample Valves-CLOSED b) Check any preferred AFW pump NOTE: Neither MDAFW AVAILABLE Pump is available.

US (Step 3.b RNO) Go to Step 4.

HCO (Step 4) Stop Both RCPs CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 54 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 5) Reset SI if Actuated NOTE: SI has not been actuated.

NOTE IF required SAFW flow cannot be established, THEN isolate non-essential SW loads.

Do NOT isolate Aux Bldg SW loops.

CO (Step 6) Try and Establish SAFW Flow To At Least One Intact S/G:

a) Check any SAFW pump available b) Align SAFW system for operation (Refer to ATT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW)

ATTACHMENT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW CAUTION

IF SELECTED S/G WIDE RANGE LEVEL LESS THAN 50 inches (100 inches ADVERSE CNMT), THEN REFER TO ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW, PRIOR TO STARTING SAFW PUMP.

FEED FLOW SHOULD NOT BE REESTABLISHED TO A FAULTED S/G IF A NON-FAULTED S/G IS AVAILABLE.

IF THE INITIATING EVENT IS A TORNADO, THEN SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE LINE SHOULD BE VERIFIED TO BE INTACT BEFORE RESTORING NORMAL SAFW FLOW TO S/G B.

NOTE

Since establishing SAFW flow is time critical, SAFW flow should be initiated as soon as the first pump is aligned.

IF SI has actuated and the initiating signal has cleared, THEN there is the potential that a second SI may occur tripping the running SAFW pump(s). SI should be reset and the SAFW pumps restarted as soon as possible.

Feed flow should be initiated to both S/Gs if possible to prevent stagnation in the RCS loop in which the S/G is not being fed.

CO (Step A) IF SW is not available OR cannot NOTE: SW is available and support required SAFW flow, THEN.. can support.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 55 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step B) IF feeding both S/Gs using only one NOTE: There is no power SAFW pump, THEN open either STANDBY available to the A Train.

AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV (SAFW pump area):

STANDBY AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV, MOV-9703B CO (Step C) Align SAFW Pump C to feed S/G A NOTE: There is no power as follows: available to the A Train.

NOTE IF SAFW pump D discharge line has been damaged and feed to S/G B is required, THEN go to section E below to establish a flowpath to S/G B. IF the SAFW pump D discharge line has NOT been damaged, THEN perform section D.

CO (Step D) Align SAFW Pump D to selected S/G as follows:

Ensure SI reset.

Ensure MDAFW pump B control switch in PULL STOP.

Ensure the following valves open:

MOV-9701B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE

MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLVS

MOV-9704B, SAFW PUMP D ISOL VLV

MOV-9746, SAFW PMP D EMERG DISCH VLV

Open MOV-9629B, SAFW PUMP D SUCTION VLV.

Verify at least 1 SW pump running.

Notify US that SAFW pump D is aligned NOTE: The US will and ready for start. coordinate starting the pump with FR-H.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 56 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Start SAFW pump D and establish flow as directed.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK HCO (Step 6.c) Check RCS hot leg temperature -

LESS THAN 550°F US/ (Step 6.c RNO) Determine SAFW flow NOTE: The US will direct CO requirements per ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT the CO to use ATT-22.0 to RESTORING FEED FLOW determine the allowable rate of feed flow to the B SG.

ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW CAUTION

FEED FLOW SHOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED TO A FAULTED OR RUPTURED S/G IF AN INTACT S/G IS AVAILABLE.

FEED FLOW RATES SHOULD BE CONTROLLED TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE RCS COOLDOWN AND ASSOCIATED RCS PRESSURE AND INVENTORY REDUCTION.

NOTE

This attachment provides the desired feed flow rate when restoring feed flow to a S/G during FRH.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

IF feedwater is restored via main feedwater or condensate the following may be used to indicate flow to the S/G (100,000 lb/hr is approximately 200 gpm):

S/G feedwater flow meters (MCB)

S/G feedwater flow recorders (MCB)

S/G feedwater flow (PPCS Point ID F0466, F0467, F0476, F0477)

S/G feedwater RTD temperature lowers (PPCS Point ID T2096, T2097)

HCO (Step 1) Check affected S/G Loop RCS NOTE: Thot will likely be Temperature higher than 550°F.

Affected Loop hot leg temperature Less Than 550°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 57 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 1.a RNO) Go to Step 2.

HCO (Step 2) Determine S/G feed flowrate requirements:

Bleed and Feed initiated NOTE: Feed and bleed has not been initiated.

HCO/ (Step 2.a RNO) IF feedwater flow to affected NOTE: Feed flow will be CO S/G is greater than 50 gpm OR affected S/G unrestricted.

is greater than 50 inches [100 inches adverse CNMT], THEN feed flowrate is not restricted, go to step 3.

IF feed flow to affected S/G is less than 50 gpm AND affected S/G level is less than 50 inches [100 inches adverse SNMT]. THEN perform the following:

S/G feed flowrate to the affected S/G is restricted to less than or equal to 100 gpm until S/G level is greater than 50 inches [100 inches adverse CNMT].

WHEN affected S/G level is greater than 50 inches [100 inches adverse CNMT], THEN the feed flowrate restriction no longer applies.

Go To Step 3.

(Step 3) Return To Procedure and Step in Effect.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CO (Step 6.d) Start selected SAFW pump(s) - NOTE: The US will PUMP(S) RUNNING coordinate starting the pump with ATT-5.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 58 of 60 Event

Description:

Condensate Header Break/A Main Feedwater Pump Trip/TDAFW Pump trips on Overspeed/ Automatic Rx Trip fails/No Manual Available/Loss of Bus 14 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 6.e) Check total available feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 215 GPM Critical Task:

Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before both Steam Generator Wide Range Levels lower to less than 120 inches [160 inches adverse CNMT]

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any Steam Generator results in the crews having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release. Establishing feedwater flow into the SGs offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. The introduction of feedwater flow immediately restores SG inventory and re-establishes primary-to-secondary heat transfer, decreasing RCS pressure and cooling the core.

The RCS pressure decrease then precludes the opening of the PORVs and degradation of the RCS barrier. If no form of feedwater flow is made available to the SGs, the crew must establish RCS bleed and feed on or before SG dryout. When the crew fails to simply establish available feedwater flow (as it could, given the postulated conditions) before SG dryout occurs, it necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

US (Step 6.f) Go to Step 12.

HCO/ (Step 12) Check S/G Levels:

CO

Narrow range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 7% [25%

adverse CNMT]

Return to procedure and step in effect At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #2 Core Age: BOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:

70% Power, Equilibrium Xe

The plant is at 70% power (BOL).

Outside Air Temp = 51°F

Plant power was lowered to 70% two hours ago due to Water Temp = 45°F abnormal noises on the A HDT Pump. The pump is stopped and investigation is on-going.

The area has experienced cool weather with no precipitation.

The crew is expected to remain at this power level while maintenance is completed during the shift.

Boron: 1570 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm)

The B MDAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance Total: .021

The Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler C is OOS for BAST: 17,500 ppm Identified: .003 breaker maintenance.

RCS Activity: Normal Unidentified: .018

The following Alarms are in:

J-25, SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT LOCKED OFF (B MD AFW Pump OOS)

Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment (B MDAFW Pump/A HDT Pump).

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #2 Equipment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Operator Declarations See NOTES

Complete maintenance None in effect A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECD Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

B MDAFW Pump Yesterday, 24hrs ago 3.7.5 7 days 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months System Containment Spray (CS),

Containment Recirculation Fan C CRFC 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ago 3.6.6 7 days 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS TRM /ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECD

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 19-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N20-1-3

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Amendment 109)

2. O-5.2, Load Ascension (Rev 083)

3. S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 033)

4. AR-C-29, MRPI SYSTEM FAILURE (Rev 010)

5. AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION (Rev 01400)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication (Amendment 131)

7. AR-J-10, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL (Rev 00901)

8. AR-J-27, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR ALARM (Rev 007)

9. A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide (Rev 053)

10. AR-A-12, NON-REGEN HX LETDOWN OUT HI TEMP 145°F, (Rev 01001)

11. AR-E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY (Rev 01102)

12. AR-RMS-17, R-17 COMPONENT COOLING (Rev 5)

13. AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop (Rev 01901)

14. ATT-9.1, Attachment Excess L/D (Rev 00800)

15. AP-ELEC.1, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses (Rev 033)

16. ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power (Rev 01801)

17. Technical Requirements Manual, TR-3.8.1, Offsite Power Sources (Rev 70)

18. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 049)

19. ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Rev 044)

20. ATT-8.3, Attachment Nonvital (Rev 005)

21. ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required (Rev 034)

22. ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required (Rev 022)

23. E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 043)

Validation Time: 96 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 091020 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #3 Objectives:

Given the simulator at an initial condition of 50% power evaluate:

1. the SROs ability to supervise the control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise, including compliance with all facility procedures, Technical Specifications, and other commitments.

2. each crew members ability to effectively communicate as part of a control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise.

3. each crew members ability to conduct a load ascension in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension, and S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control.

4. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures.

5. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller failure in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures and A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide.

6. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a leak in the NRHX in accordance with AP-CCW.1, Leakage into the Component Cooling Loop.

7. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and mitigate the consequences of a loss of circuit 767 in accordance with AP-ELEC.1, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses, and ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power.

8. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose a Station Blackout and the RO and BOPs ability to respond to such an event in accordance with ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

9. the BOPs ability to determine that the TDAFW Pump has failed to automatically start on a Station Blackout and take action to manually start the pump.

10. the BOPs ability to determine that the Service Water Pumps have failed to automatically start upon manual start of an Emergency Diesel Generator and take action to manually start the pump(s).

11. each crew members ability to recover from a Station Blackout and the RO and BOPs ability to respond to such an event in accordance with ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required, or ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N20-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 50% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the A MFW Pump. Corrective maintenance has been performed and the A MFW Pump is operating. The area has experienced unseasonably cool weather with no precipitation. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG (TS 3.8.1 Condition B Action B.1, B.2, B.3.1 or B.3.2 and B.4) is OOS for fuel pump replacement and is expected to be back in 90 minutes. The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance.

Critical Tasks: See Below Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description MAL 1 R-RO Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure ROD13A-K7 N-BOP N-SRO TS 2 MAL C-BOP Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails HIGH GEN03 C-SRO 3 MAL I-RO Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller Failure CLG14A I-SRO MAL 4 C-RO Leak in the NRHX to CCW system CLG03 C-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B EDS01B C-BOP C-SRO TS MAL 6 M-RO B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit (CT-3)

EDS01A GEN04B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 C-BOP TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and RPS07M C-SRO 3505A) (CT-1)

RPS07N MAL 8 C-BOP Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto (CT-2)

RPS07O C-SRO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 50% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the A MFW Pump. Corrective maintenance has been performed and the A MFW Pump is operating. The area has experienced unseasonably cool weather with no precipitation. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG (TS 3.8.1 Condition B Action B.1, B.2, B.3.1 or B.3.2 and B.4) is OOS for fuel pump replacement and is expected to be back in 90 minutes. The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension. The operator will address S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, to start the load ascension using Alternate Dilute. During the load ascension, a MRPI System Failure will occur.

The operator will address AR-C-29, MRPI SYSTEM FAILURE, AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction, and Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication.

Subsequently, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-10, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL. The operator will reduce generator output voltage using the Base Adjuster and notify RG&E ECC per the NOTE in AR-J-10. The Voltage Regulator will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Following this, the Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller will fail causing the TCV-130 to close, and actual letdown temperature to rise. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, Section 5.3.A.5, and should re-open TCV-130 in manual to restore normal letdown temperature.

The operator will address AR-A-12, NON-REGEN HX LETDOWN OUT HI TEMP 145°F, and the TCV-130 Controller will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Then, a 30 gpm leak will develop on the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY, and AR-RMS-17, R-17 COMPONENT COOLING, which will direct the crew to AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop. Per AP-CCW.1, letdown flow through the NRHX (and the leak) will be isolated and Excess Letdown will be placed in service.

After this, a loss of offsite power circuit 767 will occur, resulting in the loss of 4160 Bus 12B. The crew will respond per AP-ELEC.1, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses, and restore power to 12B in accordance with ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power, using circuit 7T. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Technical Requirements Manual, TR-3.8.1, Offsite Power Sources.

Next, the B EDG will trip and the 7T line will be lost, resulting in a Station Blackout. The operator will enter ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. On the loss of power, the TDAFW Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start the pump.

While in ECA-0.0 (at Step 13), the A EDG will become available. The operator will start the A EDG per Step 7 RNO actions and restore power to 480V vital busses 14 and 18. Upon restoration of power to Bus 18 the A SWP will fail to start automatically, requiring the operator to manually start the SWP. Following power restoration to Bus 14, recovery actions will continue with Step

34. The crew will likely transition to ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required, Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 based on low Pressurizer level. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the crew could transition to ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required.

The scenario will terminate upon completion of ECA-0.2, if the RCP Seal Injection Needle Valves are closed with no Charging Pump running. If these valves are not closed, the scenario should continue in E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, until the point of Charging Pump start (Step 11). If the crew transitions to ECA-0.1, rather than ECA-0.2, terminate at Step 5 of ECA-0.1, after the crew has restored Charging flow.

Critical Tasks:

Establish the minimum required AFW flowrate to the Steam Generators before Wide Range Level in BOTH Steam Generators lowers to 50 inches (100 inches Adverse Containment)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flowrate results in adverse consequences and/or a significant degradation of the mitigative capability of the plant. If AFW flow is not sufficient during a Station Blackout, then cooldown of the RCS cannot be accomplished, and the result would be increased thermal stress on the RCP Seals, and increase the likelihood of increased leakage. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so (i.e. manually opening TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve), results in mis-operation that unnecessarily reduces the margin to safety of the plant.

Manually start a Service Water Pump prior to the running Emergency Diesel Generator trips due to damage caused by engine overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW Pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the DG is running without ESW cooling (will result in the ONLY AC Power Source running loaded without cooling water). Running the DG loaded without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in DG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running DG is the only operable DG.

Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of high-temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the DG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. For Ginna no automatic trip occurs from high D/G temperature. The GE/ALCO Engineering analysis states that the maximum allowable temperature for the engine will be reached in approximately 4 minutes and 23 seconds for initial standby to a full load condition (1950kW). Simulator testing under the postulated plant conditions for the Scenario showed that the EDG trips in approximately 5 minutes and 30 seconds.

Isolate RCP Seal Injection before a Charging Pump is Started Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump under the postulated plant conditions, can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission-product barrier, specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent event recovery actions (except for a RED path condition on the core cooling CSF).

Following restoration of ac power, it is desirable to restore RCP seal cooling as soon as practical to reduce seal temperatures and mitigate potential continued degradation of the RCP seals.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 However, field experience has shown that the restoration of seal cooling must be performed in a controlled manner to avoid thermal shock and related damage to pump parts. Proper restoration of RCP seal cooling is important since it (1) maximizes the availability of the RCPs if required for subsequent event recovery actions and (2) minimizes the possibility of seal damage that could limit subsequent plant operation due to down time to effect RCP repairs.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 157 T = 0:

(Originally IC-21).

Verify that the A & D SWPs are Selected for Auto Operations Take the Control Rod Shroud Fan A Control Switch to the PULL STOP position.

Insert MALF GEN04A=Trip All Conditions, A D/G OOS Pull Stop the following A D/G Control Switches:

A D/G Control A D/G Bus 14 Breaker A D/G Bus 18 Breaker Insert OVR-IND-GEN24=OFF Insert OVR-IND-GEN25=OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF RPS07M, AUTO Failure, TDAFW STM SUP MOV-3504A Insert MALF RPS07N, AUTO Failure, TDAFW STM SUP MOV-3505A Insert MALF ROD13A-K7 on T-1 Insert MALF GEN03 (120%, No Ramp) on T-2 Insert MALF CLG14A (0, No Ramp) on T-3 Insert MALF CLG03 (30 gpm, No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF EDS01B on T-5 Insert MALF EDS01A and GEN04B=Trip All Conditions on T-6 Insert MALF RPS07O to prevent SWP A from Auto Starting on T-6 Prior to Crew

Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Briefing Equipment (EDG A P3 of 24 of Attachment 2).

Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciators J-24 and J-25.

Crew Briefing

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

Provide crew with marked up copy of O-5.2 and S-3.1.

Handout Reactivity Binder (MOL) and Reactivity Plan specific to this power maneuver.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Event 1 Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Trigger #1 MALF ROD13A-K7 At direction of examiner Event 2 Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails HIGH Trigger #2 GEN03 (120%, No Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 3 Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130)

Controller Failure Trigger #3 CLG14A (0, No Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 4 Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Trigger #4 CLG03 (30 gpm, No Ramp)

At direction of examiner Event 5 Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Trigger #5 EDS01B At direction of examiner Event 6 B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit Trigger #6 EDS01A and GEN04B (Trip All Conditions)

Post-Rx Trip Event 7 TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)

RPS07M RPS07N Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0.

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Trigger #6 RPS07O Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension. The operator will address S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, to start the load ascension using Alternate Dilute. During the load ascension, a MRPI System Failure will occur. The operator will address AR-C-29, MRPI SYSTEM FAILURE, AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI Malfunction, and Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO NOTE: it is expected that the HCO will place the Control Rods in MANUAL based on previous steps (6.3.5).

The HCO will establish a Critical parameter of Tavg-Tref

+/-1.5F.

O-5.2, LOAD ASCENSION CO NOTE: The CO will need to place the Turbine Controls in IMP IN.

US (Step 6.7.1) HOLD Reactor Power at less NOTE: All Chemistry than 50% UNTIL secondary chemistry Requirements are met.

requirements are met.

CO (Step 6.7.2) WHEN ready to raise load to greater than or equal to 50%, THEN PERFORM the following:

CAUTION

IF VALVE POS LIMIT light is ILLUMINATED, THEN EH control REFERENCE AND SETTER adjustment will be required until VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED.

Raising Valve Position Limit with Valve Position Limit light ILLUMINATED will raise Turbine load at 200%/minute.

WHEN raising turbine load, THEN VLV POSITION LIMIT SHALL be continuously monitored to ensure it is maintained approximately 10% above SETTER Value.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

VERIFY VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED

IF VALVE POS LIMIT light is NOTE: This step is NA.

ILLUMINATED, THEN LOWER EH Control UNTIL VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED as follows; OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A CAUTION CV TRACKING not indicating approximately zero with SETTER AND REFERENCE matched and VALVE POS LIMIT light EXTINGUISHED indicates a system malfunction.

VERIFY CV TRACKING Meter is indicating approximately zero.

RAISE VPL POSITION LIMIT as desired using VVE POS LIMIT (GREEN) pushbutton.

CO (Step 6.7.3) CONTINUE with load ascension NOTE: The CO will initiate a as follows: Load Ascension.

RAISE SETTER setpoint to desired value using (ORANGE) pushbutton.

DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

ENSURE VLV POSITION LIMIT setpoint is adjusted as required.

OBSERVE turbine load rises at desired rate.

S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 4, ALTERNATE DILUTION NOTE: The crew will perform dilutions based upon the Reactivity Plan provided.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE Dilute and Alternate Dilute both accomplish the same purpose of lowering RCS boron concentration. The effect of Alternate Dilute is observed sooner, and tends to lower RCS hydrogen concentration, because part of dilution flow goes directly to Charging Pumps suction, whereas in Dilute mode, all flow goes to Volume Control Tank.

HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, is complete.

HCO (Step 2) The board operator SHALL inform the US of the intent to change core reactivity.

HCO (Step 3) The US SHALL acknowledge the reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight.

HCO (Step 4) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to ALT DIL position.

HCO (Step 5) SET RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-111, controller to the desired flowrate.

HCO (Step 6) SET RMW COUNTER, YIC-111, to the quantity determined in Attachment 1.

NOTE

Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as reactor makeup water is injected.

[G0092] [G0132].

IF rod motion is blocked or movement is in wrong direction, OR IF subcritical count rate increases by a factor of two, THEN dilution operation SHALL be immediately stopped. [G0092] [G0132]

The first Dilution/Alternate Dilution following an Automatic OR Manual Makeup depending on time in core life, will contain approximately 8 gallons of borated water.

Desired Temperature and Power response may not be obtained until Blender Piping has been flushed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 7) PLACE RMW Control Switch to START position.

HCO (Step 8) VERIFY the following:

RMW Pump 1A OR 1B STARTS

REACTOR MAKEUP TO VCT, AOV-110C opens.

RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-111, valve throttles to preset flow position.

REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens HCO (Step 9.0) WHEN dilution is complete, THEN PERFORM the following:

HCO (Step 9.1) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.

HCO (Step 9.2) SET RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-111, controller to the desired setpoint, normally 40 GPM.

HCO (Step 9.3) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position, and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.

HCO (Step 9.4) PLACE ALTERNATE DILUTE Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.

HCO (Step 9.5) Board operator SHALL INFORM US reactivity manipulation is complete.

[G0092]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 9.6) RECORD amount of reactor makeup water added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Once the Load Ascension is in progress and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, OPERATE Trigger 1 (MALF ROD13A-K7).

Indications Available:

AR-C-29 MRPI System Failure

Blinking Red System Alarm, Check System Status Pages on MRPI Panel NOTE: The crew may go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AR-C-29, MRPI SYSTEM FAILURE NOTE

A red box with ERR in the center (located where the Rod Bottom indication would normally appear) AND a loss of that Rod' s indication may indicate the failure of an individual MRPI coil stack. This may NOT necessarily result in a Turbine Runback.

IF DATA RECEPTION STATUS is failed (SYSTEM STATUS page, under SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS LINK), THEN MRPI may display false Rod position information.

Certain failures may cause MRPI to display the last accurate data received. The Rod position indications may appear normal but will NOT change in response to actual Rod motion.

ROD POSITION pushbutton is used to toggle between Rod Position and Shutdown Rod Position Screens.

SYSTEM STATUS pushbutton is used to review system related issues and is used to toggle between System Status and Rod Data Values pages.

HCO (Step 4.1) VERIFY rod indication using the Examiner NOTE: The HCO MRPI CRT OR PPCS Computer.

addresses the Status Page and determines that the Bus Monitor Failed for Control Rod K-7.

HCO (Step 4.2) PERFORM the following to VERIFY MRPI STATUS AND DOCUMENT any error messages in ESOMs log:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

On Rod Position and Shutdown Rod Position Screens:

Review missing rod position bar

Review Rod Position alarms on the bottom of screen

On System Status page

Review Data cabinet alarms

Review Serial connection link alarms

Review Display cabinet alarms

On Rod Data Values page

Review Rod values showing error codes:

FF - missing detector interface card in the data cabinet

ERR - valid rod position is not available for a particular rod

FC - open or shorted coil in the detector stack or a fault in the cabling to the detector NOTE For a single rod position indication failure, IF a fault occurs and clears within 5 minutes, THEN MRPI is considered OPERABLE.

HCO (Step 4.3) IF a single rod position indication failure occurs AND no other MRPI failures are indicated, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, GO TO AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION.

CHECK associated rod position indication voltage on PPCS (ie CRI11V) returns to pre-fault value.

CHECK MRPI rod position indication returns to pre-fault value.

US

VERIFY fault clears in less than 5 NOTE: The US will transition minutes, IF NOT, THEN GO TO AP- to AP-RCCS.2.

RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION.

OTHERWISE, GO TO step 4.7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-RCC.2, RCC/RPI MALFUNCTION CAUTION BANK ROD WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE PERFORMED UNTIL DIRECTED PER APPLICABLE RECOVERY PROCEDURE.

HCO (Step 1) Place Rods to Manual NOTE: The HCO will place the Control Rods to M (Manual).

HCO (Step 2) Check Dropped Rod Indication:

Annunciator E-28, POWER RANGE NOTE: E-28 is extinguished.

ROD DROP ROD STOP 5%/5 SECONDS - EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator C-14, ROD BOTTOM ROD NOTE: C-14 is NOT LIT.

STOP - EXTINGUISHED HCO (*Step 3) Check Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous PROGRAM Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

HCO (Step 4) Check Steam Dump Status:

Verify Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - EXTINGUISHED US (Step 4 RNO) IF steam dump required but NOTE: The Steam Dumps are NOT operating, THEN.. NOT required.

CO (Step 5) Check Main Generator Load -

GREATER THAN 15 MW.

NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV 431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 16 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:

Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF

PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO

PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL

MFW Regulation Valves - RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO HCO (Step 7) Check Control Rod Alignment:

Verify all rods in affected group -

WITHIN +/- 12 STEPS OF ASSOCIATED GROUP STEP COUNTER NOTE Step 8 is an attempt to determine whether a rod is misaligned or whether the MRPI System is malfunctioning.

HCO (Step 8) Check QPTR - LESS THAN 1.02 NOTE: Since a Rod has NOT dropped, QPTR will NOT be >

1.02.

NOTE If the MRPI CRT fails, THEN the PPCS can be used for rod position indication until the CRT is made operable. Rod position indication can be retrieved from the PPCS by selecting the CBAW display button.

HCO (Step 9) Verify All Individual Rod Position Indication Per Bank Operable:

MRPI system - NO MRPI SYSTEM ALARMS

MRPI system - NOT KNOWN PROBLEMS WITH MRPI SYSTEM THAT COULD RENDER ROD POSITION INDICATION INOPERABLE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 17 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following: Examiner NOTE: Once the Technical Specifications are evaluated, the Lead Examiner may MOVE to Event 2.

Refer to ITS section 3.1.7 for required action.

Consult Reactor Engineer and plant NOTE: The US may notify the staff to evaluate MRPI and to WCC/IMD/RE.

perform flux map per ITS. SIM DRIVER: as WCCS/IMD/RE, acknowledge.

US

Go to Step 11 HCO (Step 11) Verify Affected Group Step Counters Operable:

Affected bank group step counter movement - CONSISTENT WITH MRPI TRANSITIONS (Evaluate affected bank using PT-1, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM).

Group step counters for affected bank -

WITHIN 1 STEP OF EACH OTHER HCO (Step 12) Check Reactor Conditions:

Rod insertion limit alarms -

EXTINGUISHED

NIS PR I - WITHIN DESIRED OPERATING BAND US (Step 13) Evaluated Plant Conditions:

Rod/MRPI malfunction - REPAIRED NOTE: The MRPI problem will NOT be repaired.

US (Step 13 RNO) Return to Step 8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.7, ROD POSITION INDICATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 18 of 73 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ MRPI System Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US LCO 3.1.7 The Microprocessor Rod Position Indication (MRPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.

US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MRPI per group A.1 Verify the position of the Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months inoperable for one or more rods with inoperable groups. position indicators by using movable incore detectors OR A.2 Verify the position of the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months rods with inoperable MRPI AND indirectly by using the Once per 31 EFPD thereafter movable incore detectors.

AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after discovery of each unintended rod movement AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after each movement of rod with inoperable MRPI

> 12 steps AND Prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 50% RTP AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after reaching RTP OR 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months A.3 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 50% RTP NOTE: The US will determine that Condition A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 73 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails HIGH Subsequently, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-10, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL. The operator will reduce generator output voltage using the Base Adjuster and notify RG&E ECC per the NOTE in AR-J-10. The Voltage Regulator will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (GEN03 (120%, No Ramp))

Indications Available:

Main Generator VAR Loading goes from 50 IN to 300 OUT

MCB Annunciator J-18, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FIELD FORCING

MCB Annunciator J-20, GENERATOR TRANSFORMER OVEREXCITE

MCB Annunciator J-27, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR ALARM

MCB Annunciator J-10, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL (After 40 seconds)

Generator Regulator Red Status light goes DARK (After 40 seconds)

Generator Regulator Green Status light is LIT (After 40 seconds)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may go to HOLD on the Turbine.

A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: The CO may adjust mitigate or compensate for equipment or VARs using the Base Adjuster controller failures or to isolate leaks. based on this procedural Permitted actions include those actions allowance.

necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule.

Therefore 50.59 is not required.

AR-J-10, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL CO (Step 1) Regulate voltage with BASE NOTE: The CO will adjust the ADJUSTER. Base Adjuster as needed to restore Main Generator VARs to the pre-failure level.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 20 of 73 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE There is a North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) requirement to notify RG&E Energy Control Center within 30 minutes anytime there is a change of status or capability of the Voltage Regulator. [G0001]

US (Step 2) Notify the following:

Electricians NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Electricians.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

Electrical Planner

RG&E Energy Control Center that the NOTE: The US/CO may notify voltage regulator is in manual. RG&E ECC.

SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that an adjustment was noticed in the Ginna output voltage.

CO (Step 3) Place Voltage Regulator in OFF NOTE If the Regulator tripped to Manual on a "Loss of Sensing" condition, THEN once the potential transformer deficiencies are corrected, the "Loss of Sensing" relays must be reset by operating the reset pushbutton on the "Loss of Sensing" module prior to going to Auto.

US (Step 4) WHEN condition requiring manual operation is corrected, THEN refer to O-6.9.3, PLACING THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR TO EITHER AUTO OR MANUAL.

AR-J-27, GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR ALARM CO (Step 1) VERIFY main generator voltage stable at desired value.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 21 of 73 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 2) NOTIFY an EO to investigate alarm NOTE: The US will dispatch at the Generator Excitation Equipment Panel. an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge. After 2 Minutes report that following Annunciators are locked in:

REGULATOR TRIP TO MANUAL

MXL LIMITING

OXP INVERSE TIMER IS TIMING

OXP UNIT TRIP

ON LINE FORCING CO (Step 3) NOTIFY Electricians. NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Electricians.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

CO (Step 4) REFER to applicable "AR-VOLT-REG " alarm response procedure.

NOTE: The US/CO may contact RG&E ECC and ask for control parameters.

SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that Ginna should maintain an output voltage as necessary to maintain MVARs at 0-50 LAG OUT.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 73 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller Failure Following this, the Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller will fail causing the TCV-130 to close, and actual letdown temperature to rise. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, Section 5.3.A.5, and should re-open TCV-130 in manual to restore normal letdown temperature. The operator will address AR-A-12, NON-REGEN HX LETDOWN OUT HI TEMP 145°F, and the TCV-130 Controller will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (GLG14A (0, No Ramp)

Indications Available:

TI-130 indicates rising Letdown temperature

Controller TCV-130 goes to full output (100%) - Fully Closed

MCB Annunciator A-12, NON-REGEN HX LETDOWN OUT HI TEMP 145°F

TCV-145 Red Status light LIT (Divert to VCT)

VCT Temperature increases Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: The HCO may place mitigate or compensate for equipment or the TCV-130 Controller in controller failures or to isolate leaks. MANUAL based on this Permitted actions include those actions procedural allowance.

necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule.

Therefore 50.59 is not required.

AR-A-12, NON-REGEN HX LETDOWN OUT HI TEMP 145°F NOTE Adjustments made to reduce NRHX LTDN Outlet Temperature will also affect letdown DI boron concentration saturation levels. Anticipate changes to RCS Tavg and RCS reactivity when changing outlet temperature.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 73 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4.1) ENSURE LTDN DIVERT TO DI OR VCT, TCV-145 is diverting to VCT.

HCO (Step 4.2) IF a loss of CCW has NOTE: A loss of CCW has occurred,.. NOT occurred.

HCO (Step 4.3) MONITOR VCT temperature:

NOTE IF the Charging Suction aligns to the RWST a load reduction will be required. REFER TO O-2.1 NORMAL SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN OR AP-TURB.5 RAPID LOAD REDUCTIONS

IF BOTH VCT temperature indicators TI- NOTE: It is expected that the 145 (PPCS point T0145) and TI-140 are HCO take manual control of GREATER THAN 190°F THEN TCV-130 to maintain both temperatures less than 190°F.

IF BOTH VCT temperature indicators TI-145 (PPCS point T0145) and TI-140 are LESS THAN 187°F then ENSURE Charging pump suction is aligned to the VCT.

VCT OUTLET VLV LCV-112C-OPEN

EMERG MAKEUP RWST TO CHARGING PUMP LCV-112B-CLOSED CAUTION Maintaining NRHX LTDN outlet temp TCV-130 at the normal setpoint helps prevent unexpected changes in reactivity or RCP seal performance.

HCO (Step 4.4) ADJUST NRHX LTDN outlet temp (TI-130) TCV-130 to MAINTAIN letdown temp at the normal value.

HCO (Step 4.5) CHECK for proper charging and letdown flows, and temperatures.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 24 of 73 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Valve (TCV-130) Controller Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Charging Line Flow (FI-128B or FI-128C) 25 gpm.

LTDN Line Flow (FI-134)

NRHX LTDN Outlet Temp (TI-130)

(Step 4.6) REFER TO S-8A, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM STARTUP AND NORMAL OPERATION VALVE ALIGNMENT.

(Step 4.7) IF NRHX LTDN Outlet Temp (TI-130) was observed to be < 600 F or > 1400 F, THEN INITIATE a Condition Report per CNG-CA-1.01-1000, CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the controller.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 25 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Then, a 30 gpm leak will develop on the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY, and AR-RMS-17, R-17 COMPONENT COOLING, which will direct the crew to AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop. Per AP-CCW.1, letdown flow through the NRHX (and the leak) will be isolated and Excess Letdown will be placed in service.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 (CLG03 (30 gpm, No Ramp))

Indications Available:

Letdown flow drops from 40 gpm to 16 gpm

CCW Surge Tank Level starts to increase

R-17 indication starts to increase

MCB Annunciator E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The crew may enter AP-CCW.1 directly.

OR The crew may enter AP-CVCS.1 (Not Scripted) as an alternative to AP-CCW.1.

In either procedure, the crew will isolate normal letdown and place Excess Letdown in service per ATT-9.1 (Page 30).

AR-E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY HCO (Step 1) ENSURE automatic actions have NOTE: The US may direct the occurred where applicable. EO to report status of RCV-017.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report that the valve is CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US/ (Step 2) NOTIFY the following to investigate NOTE: The US may call HCO the RMS Alarm. RP/EO to address the RMS alarm.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RP and/or EO.

Radiation Protection

Auxiliary Operators US (Step 3) REFER to the following NOTE: The US may address any of these documents.

AR-RMS.11 through AR-RMS.20B and ER-RMS.1

EPIP 1-13, Local Radiation Emergency and/or CNG-EP-1.01-1024, GNP Dose Assessment

EPIP 1.0, Ginna Station Event Evaluation And Classification

CNG-NL-1.01-1004, Regulatory Reporting (if necessary)

CH-RETS-RMS-INOP, Actions for RMS Monitor Alarm or Inoperability

ITS LCO 3.3.5 and 3.4.15

ODCM, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ODCM AR-RMS-17, R-17 COMPONENT COOLING HCO (Step 1) Verify RCV-017 closed NOTE: The US may direct the EO to report status of RCV-017.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report that the valve is CLOSED.

US (Step 2) GO TO AP-CCW.1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 27 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 3) direct RP to perform CH-PRI-CCW- NOTE: The US/CO will contact LEAK to determine CCW leakage. RP/Chemist.

SIM DRIVER: as RP/Chemist, acknowledge.

NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.1.

AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE COMPONENT COOLING LOOP CAUTION DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, RCV-017 SHOULD BE MONITORED TO ENSURE CLOSURE ON CCW SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR ALARM.

HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Indications

Check CCW surge tank level - RISING

Direct RP tech to perform CH-PRI-CCW- NOTE: The US/CO will contact LEAK, DETERMINATION OF CCW RP/Chemist.

SYSTEM LEAKAGE SIM DRIVER: Using TIME COMPRESSION as RP/Chemist, acknowledge, and after 5 minutes report that leakage is 28.8 gpm.

CCW radiation monitor, R-17, RISING (PPCS Point L0618)

CAUTION IF EITHER RCP #1 SEAL OUTLET TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 215°F, THEN THE AFFECTED RCP(S) SHOULD BE STOPPED.

NOTE RCPs may be safely operated without CCW to the thermal barrier if seal injection flow is maintained.

HCO (Step 2) Check RCP Thermal Barrier Indications:

Labyrinth seal D/Ps - GREATER THAN 15 INCHES OF WATER AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RCP #1 seal leak off flows WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE OF FIG-4.0, FIGURE RCP SEAL LEAKOFF

Annunciator A-7 (15), RCP A (B) CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO FLOW 165 GPM 125ºF - EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 3) Check RCS temperature -

GREATER THAN 350ºF HCO (Step 4) Check NRHX For Leakage:

Normal letdown - IN SERVICE

Check Letdown Indications:

Letdown line flow -

APPROXIMATELY 40 GPM HCO * (Step 4b RNO) Isolate Normal Letdown:

Close letdown isolation, AOV-427. NOTE: The HCO will isolate normal Letdown and stop the leak.

Close letdown orifice valves (AOV-200A, AOV-200B, and AOV-202).

Close letdown isolation, AOV-371.

Place Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve PCV-135 in Manual and Close the valve.

Close charging flow control valve, HCV-142 WHILE adjusting charging pump speed to maintain:

RCP labyrinth seal D/P between 15 inches and 80 inches.

PRZR level at program US

Go to Step 5. NOTE: The HCO may stop one of two running Charging Pumps when normal letdown is isolated (May Use AR-F-14).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 29 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE If it is suspected that CCW Fluid will enter the WHUT, Notify the Chemistry Technician.

HCO (Step 5) check If CCW Inleakage has Stopped:

CCW surge tank level - STABLE NOTE: The leak has been stopped.

Restore an intact letdown flowpath if available (Refer to ATT-9.0, ATTACHMENT LETDOWN OR ATT-9.1, ATTACHMENT EXCESS L/D)

NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO.

ATT-9.1, ATTACHMENT EXCESS L/D HCO/ (Step A) The following conditions must be CO met to place excess letdown in service:

IA to CNMT - ESTABLISHED

CCW - IN SERVICE

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 13%

HCO/ (Step B) Establish excess letdown:

CO

Ensure EXCESS LTDN LOOP A COLD TO Hx, AOV-310 is closed.

Ensure EXCESS LTDN flow control valve, HCV-123 is closed, demand at 0.

Ensure SEAL OR EXCESS LTDN RETURN ISOL VALVE, MOV-313, is open.

Place excess letdown divert valve, AOV-312, to DIVERT

Ensure CCW FROM EX LTDN Hx, AOV-745 - OPEN.

Open EXCESS LTDN LOOP A COLD TO HX, AOV-310.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 30 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION DIVERTING EXCESS LETDOWN TO RCDT WILL RESULT IN CVCS HUT LEVEL RISE OF APPROXIMATELY 4% PER HOUR.

Flush approximately 10 gallons to RCDT as follows (3.2 gal/%, PPCS Point ID LI003).

Slowly open EXCESS LTDN flow control valve, HCV-123, to maintain excess letdown temperature less than 195ºF and pressure less than 100 psig.

Ensure approximately 10 gallons is flushed to the RCDT.

IF RCP seal return has been established, THEN place EXCESS LTDN HX DIVERT TO VCT OR RCDT VALVE, AOV-312, to NORMAL.

Adjust charging pump speed to control PRZR level and labyrinth seal D/P.

AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE COMPONENT COOLING LOOP HCO * (Step 5.c) Check any letdown flowpath - NOTE: Excess Letdown has RESTORED been established.

Adjust charging flow to restore PRZR NOTE: If not already done the level HCO may elect to stop one Charging Pump for RCS inventory control.

NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

HCO (Step 6) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:

Check Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 31 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO

Check PRZR level - TRENDING TO NOTE: If PRZR level is being PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL controlled manually, the RNO will be performed (manually control charging).

HCO (Step 6.c RNO) Perform the following:

Place affected charging pumps in MANUAL

Adjust charging pump speed to restore PRZR level to program.

IF PRZR level can NOT be controlled manually, THEN.

US

Go to Step 17.

US (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Conditions:

CCW inleakage - IDENTIFIED AND NOTE: The leakage into the ISOLATED CCW System has been isolated.

Determine if operation can continue (Consult Plant staff if necessary) -

OPERATION CAN CONTINUE HCO (Step 18) Check CCW Surge Tank Level -

APPROXIMATELY 50%

HCO (Step 19) Establish Control Systems In Auto

Verify rods in AUTO NOTE: The control rods are in MANUAL due to the load ascension/MRPI Failure.

Verify 431K in AUTO

Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO

Verify PRZR heaters restored:

PRZR proportional heaters breaker -

CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 32 of 73 Event

Description:

Leak in the NRHX to CCW system Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

PRZR backup heaters breaker -

RESET, IN AUTO

Verify one charging pump in AUTO NOTE: If PRZR level is being controlled manually, the RNO will be performed (Place Charging in AUTO if desired).

HCO/ (Step 20) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status CO (Refer to AR Procedures)

NOTE Refer to LS-AA-1020, REPORTABILITY TABLES AND DECISION TREES for reporting requirements.

US (Step 21) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the letdown leak.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

US (Step 22) Return to Procedure or Guidance In Effect At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 33 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B After this, a loss of offsite power circuit 767 will occur, resulting in the loss of 4160 Bus 12B. The crew will respond per AP-ELEC.1, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses, and restore power to 12B in accordance with ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power, using circuit 7T. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Technical Requirements Manual, TR-3.8.1, Offsite Power Sources.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (EDS01B)

Indications Available:

Multiple MCB Annunciators

Bus 12B at 0 VAC

Bus 12B at 0 amps

B EDG Starts and loads onto Safeguards Buses Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-ELEC.1, LOSS OF 12A AND/OR 12B BUSSES CAUTION

IF ANY RADIOACTIVE RELEASE IN PROGRESS, THEN IT SHOULD BE TERMINATED UNTILSUPPORT CONDITIONS ARE EVALUATED.

OBSERVE D/G LOADING LIMITS OF 2300 KW FOR 1/2 HOUR, 2250 KW FOR 2 HOURS, AND 1950 KW FOR CONTINUOUS SERVICE.

NOTE Conditions should be evaluated for site contingency reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

HCO (Step 1) Check RCS Temperature -

GREATER THAN 350ºF HCO (*Step 2) Monitor Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Place Rods in MANUAL NOTE: The Control Rods are likely in MANUAL.

Manually move control rods to control Tavg

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 34 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 3) Verify RCPs - BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 4) Verify Emergency D/G Associated NOTE: The B D/G is powering CO With Deenergized Bus(es) - RUNNING Bus 16/17.

Bus 12A - D/G A

Bus 12B - D/G B CO (Step 5) Verify Both Trains of AC Emergency Busses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:

Bus 14 and bus 18

Bus 16 and bus 17 CO (Step 6) Verify Service Water System Operation:

Check at least one SW pump running in each loop

A or B Pump in Loop A

C or D Pump in Loop B NOTE: The B and D SW Pumps are operating.

CO (Step 6.a RNO) Perform the following:

Manually start pumps as necessary (257 kw each).

IF adequate cooling can NOT be supplied to a running D/G, THEN

IF no SW pumps can be operated, THEN.

CO * (Step 6.b) SW header pressure -

GREATER THAN 40 PSIG IN EACH LOOP HCO (Step 7) Check CCW Pump Status:

At least one CCW pump - RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 35 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Annunciator A-22, CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSIG -

EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 8) verify charging pump status - AT NOTE: The RNO will be LEAST ONE RUNNING performed if no Charging Pumps running.

Bus 16 momentarily lost power and caused the C Charging pump to stop. When the bus is re-powered it does not auto start the Charging Pump.

Consequently, they may need to manually start a Charging Pump and re-establish Excess Letdown. This will be avoided if the crew leaves the A Charging (Bus 14) running.

HCO (Step 8 RNO) Isolate letdown flowpaths:

Close letdown isol, AOV-427

Close excess letdown, HCV-123

Close Loop A cold leg to excess letdown Hx, AOV-310 HCO/ (Step 9) verify Annunciator H-16, CO INSTRUMENT AIR COMP -

EXTINGUISHED CO (Step 10) Verify Bus 11A and 11B Normal Feed Breakers - CLOSED CO (Step 11) Check MFW Regulating Valves -

RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO NOTE IF VCT level lowers to 5%, charging pump suction will swap to the RWST. This may require a load reduction.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 36 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 12) check VCT Makeup System:

Ensure the following:

RMW mode selector switch in AUTO

RMW control armed - RED LIGHT LIT

Check VCT level:

Level GREATER THAN 20%

OR

Level - STABLE OR RISING HCO (Step 13) Check Charging Pump Suction Aligned to VCT:

VCT level - GREATER THAN 20%

Align charging pumps to VCT

LCV-112C open

LCV-112B closed NOTE When restarting equipment for recovery, it is preferable to start equipment on busses being supplied from offsite power.

HCO (Step 14) Check CVCS Operation:

Charging pumps - AT LEAST ONE NOTE: The RNO will be RUNNING performed if no Charging Pumps running.

HCO (Step 14.a RNO) Perform the following:

IF all seal cooling has been lost to any NOTE: The US/HCO may RCP, THEN close seal injection to dispatch an EO.

affected RCP(s)

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use REM-CVC019=0 and CVC020=0. After 3 Minutes report that V-300A and V-300B are CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 37 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RCP A, V-300A

RCP A, V-300B

Start one charging pump (75 kw).

IF no charging pumps can be operated, THEN.

Check letdown indications:

Check PRZR level - GREATER THAN 13%

Letdown flow - APPROXIMATELY NOTE: Normal Letdown was 40 gpm previously isolated.

HCO * (Step 14b RNO) Perform the following:

Close letdown isolation, AOV-427.

Close letdown orifice valves (AOV-200A, AOV-200B, and AOV-202)

Close letdown isolation, AOV-371

IF seal injection in service, THEN close charging flow control valve, HCV-142 WHILE adjusting charging pump speed to maintain:

RCP labyrinth seal D/P between 15 inches and 80 inches

PRZR level at program US

IF PRZR level greater than 13%,

THEN go to Step 15.

HCO (Step 15) Establish Normal Letdown: (Refer NOTE: Normal Letdown was to ATT-9.0, ATTACHMENT LETDOWN) previously isolated for a leak.

US (Step 15 RNO) IF normal letdown can NOT Examiner NOTE: Excess be established, THEN establish excess Letdown may need to be re-letdown. (Refer to ATT-9.1, ATTACHMENT established (See Pages 30-EXCESS L/D) 31).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 38 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 16) Verify PRZR Heaters Restored:

PRZR proportional heater breaker -

CLOSED

PRZR backup heater breaker -

RESET/IN AUTO HCO (Step 16 RNO) IF adequate D/G capacity available for PRZR heaters (400 kw each bank), THEN perform the following:

Reset and close PRZR proportional heater breaker if necessary.

Reset PRZR backup heater breaker and return to AUTO if necessary.

IF adequate D/G capacity NOT available,. NOTE: There is adequate capacity on the DGs to energize the Pzr Heaters.

HCO (Step 17) Verify Normal Rod Control Restored:

Annunciator C-5, PPCS ROD SEQUENCE OR ROD DEVIATION -

EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator E-28, POWER RANGE ROD DROP ROD STOP -

EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator F-15, RCS TAVG DEV 4ºF

- EXTINGUISHED

Place rods in AUTO if desired NOTE: The Control Rods are in Manual.

NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3).

HCO (Step 18) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:

Check Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 39 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PISG IN AUTO

Check PRZR level - TRENDING TO NOTE: The RNO may need to PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL be performed.

HCO (Step 18.c RNO) Perform the following:

Place affected charging pumps in MANUAL

Adjust charging pump speed to restore PRZR level to program

IF PRZR level can NOT be controlled manually, THEN..

CAUTION ANYTIME EMERGENCY D/GS ARE THE ONLY SOURCE OF AC POWER TO THE PLANT, PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF THE D/GS. REFER TO T-27.4, DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATION.

NOTE: The US may contact RG&E ECC and check on the status of both the 7T and 767 Lines.

SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge and report that the 7T line available and they are investigating the loss of Circuit 767.

CO (Step 19) Restore Normal Electric System Alignment:

Verify circuit 767 and/or 7T - NOTE: The 7T Line is AVAILABLE available.

Restore power to non-faulted Buses 12A and/or 12B (Refer to ER-ELEC.1, RESTORATION OF OFFSITE POWER)

NOTE: The US will go to ER-ELEC.1.

ER-ELEC.1, RESTORATION OF OFFSITE POWER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 40 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 6.1.3.1) NOTIFY RG&E Energy NOTE: The CO will notify the Control Center that all offsite power to Ginna RG&E ECC.

is being placed on CKT 7T. SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge.

CO (Step 6.1.3.2) ENSURE OPEN AND RESET BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 52/12BY.

CO (Step 6.1.3.3) ENSURE OPEN AND RESET BUS 12B NORMAL FEED FROM 767 52/12BX.

CO (Step 6.1.3.4) ENSURE CLOSED Bkr 7T13A72 at Station 13a (PPCS Point BKR 7T).

CO (Step 6.1.3.5) ENSURE CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 34kv Bus.

CO (Step 6.1.3.6) VERIFY CIRCUIT 7T VOLTMETER 34.5kv is approximately 34kv.

CO (Step 6.1.3.7) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED NOTE: The 52/12AY is FROM 7T 52/12AY is OPEN THEN.. CLOSED.

CO (Step 6.1.3.8) IF BUS 12B ALT FEED FROM 7T 52/12AX is OPEN THEN PERFORM the following:

PLACE IN ON BUS 12B ALT FEED FROM 7T 52/12AX SYNCHROSCOPE

CLOSE BUS 12B ALT FEED FROM 7T 52/12AX.

VERIFY BUS 12B VOLTMETER 4160V is approximately 4kv.

PLACE IN OFF BUS 12B ALT FEED FROM 7T 52/12AX SYNCHROSCOPE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 41 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

GO TO Step 6.2. NOTE: The US may go to Step 6.2, however all 480 Volt Safeguards Buses are energized.

NOTE: The US will return to AP-ELEC.1.

AP-ELEC.1, LOSS OF 12A AND/OR 12B BUSSES CO * (Step 19.c) Verify all AC bus normal feed breakers - CLOSED

Bus 13

Bus 14

Bus 15

Bus 16

Bus 17

Bus 18 CO * (Step 19.c RNO) Restore all AC busses Examiner NOTE: The US will and MCCs to normal power supply continue to restore AC Buses (Refer to ER-ELEC.1, RESTORATION to normal power supply, OF OFFSITE POWER) HOWEVER, moving to the next event will negate these actions.

Examiner NOTE: Since the electric plant is still being recovered, the US may NOT evaluate the Technical Specifications until power is restored.

IF it is apparent that the US will not evaluate TS, THEN move to next event and check TS evaluation after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 42 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified independent offsite power circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and each of the onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Subsystems

- MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4"; and

b. Two emergency diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying their respective onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9.

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Offsite power to one or A.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from discovery of more 480 V safeguards feature(s) inoperable when its Condition A concurrent with bus(es) inoperable. redundant required feature(s) inoperability of redundant is inoperable. required feature(s)

AND A.2 Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

C. Offsite power to one or NOTE - Enter applicable more 480 V safeguards Conditions and Required bus(es) inoperable. Actions of LCO 3.8.9, AND "Distribution Systems -

One DG inoperable. MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4," when Condition C is entered with no AC power source to one distribution train.

C.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months circuit to OPERABLE status.

OR C.2 Restore DG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OPERABLE status.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 43 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will determine that Condition A&C must be entered based on circuit 767 being inoperable UNTIL Bus 16/17 are powered from 7T.

In accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Basis (page 3.8.1-5) One qualified independent offsite power circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and the onsite 480V safeguards buses and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA.

Therefore, while offsite power is NOT connected to Buses 16 and 17, LCO 3.8.1, Condition A applies. Required Action A.1, though not currently necessary for plant conditions, must be entered due to a potential future event.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT 3.8.1, OFFSITE POWER SOURCES US TR 3.8.1 Two qualified independent offsite power circuits shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 44 of 73 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite circuit 767/Restore 4160 Bus 12B Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One offsite power circuit A.1 Initiate action to verify Immediately inoperable. reliability of OPERABLE offsite power circuit.

AND A.2.1 Establish pre-conditions 72 Hours necessary to complete backfeed procedure in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or less OR A.2.2 Restore Offsite Power 72 Hours Circuit to OPERABLE status NOTE: The US will determine that Condition A must be entered based on circuit 767 being inoperable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 45 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Next, the B EDG will trip and the 7T line will be lost, resulting in a Station Blackout. The operator will enter ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. On the loss of power, the TDAFW Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start the pump. While in ECA-0.0 (at Step 13), the A EDG will become available. The operator will start the A EDG per Step 7 RNO actions, and restore power to 480V vital busses 14 and 18. Upon restoration of power to Bus 18 the A SWP will fail to start automatically, requiring the operator to manually start the SWP. Following power restoration to Bus 14, recovery actions will continue with Step 34. The crew will likely transition to ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required, based on low Pressurizer level.

On the other hand, there is a possibility that the crew could transition to ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required. The scenario will terminate upon completion of ECA-0.2, if the RCP Seal Injection Needle Valves are closed with no Charging Pump running. If these valves are not closed, the scenario should continue in E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, until the point of Charging Pump start (Step 11). If the crew transitions to ECA-0.1, rather than ECA-0.2, terminate at Step 5 of ECA-0.1, after the crew has restored Charging flow.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #6 (EDS01A and GEN04B = Trip All Conditions)

Indications Available:

Circuit Breaker 7T1352 indicates OPEN

Bus 12A and 12B are de-energized

B EDG load drops to 0

All Safeguards Buses are de-energized.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may enter E-0 first, but the crew will enter ECA-0.0 at Step 3 of E-0.

ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CAUTION DUE TO POTENTIALLY EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, CAUTION SHOULD BE USED WHEN ENTERING THE INTERMEDIATE BLDG FOR LOCAL ACTIONS.

NOTE

CSFSTs should be monitored for information only. FR procedures should not be implemented.

Local actions may require portable lighting and communication devices.

FOLDOUT page should be open AND monitored periodically.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 46 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-0.0.

ALTERNATE S/G FEED STRATEGY Entry Conditions ELAP DC BUS LOAD SHED/MANAGEMENT Entry Conditions LOW DECAY HEAT TEMPERATURE CONTROL Entry Conditions AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA ALTERNATE SAFW DI Water Storage Tank MAKEUP Entry Conditions MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

At least one train of reactor trip breakers

- OPEN

Neutron flux - LOWERING

MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND NOTE: MRPI is de-SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM energized.

CO (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED HCO/ (*Step 3) Check RCS Temperature Control: NOTE: This is a Continuous CO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

S/G ARVs operating properly to stabilize NOTE: The CO will operate Tavg the ARVs as needed.

Adjust S/G ARVs to control Tavg at approximately 547°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 47 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4) Stop Both RCPs NOTE Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

HCO (Step 5) Check If RCS Is Isolated:

Verify RCS isolation valves closed:

Place letdown orifice valve switches to CLOSE

AOV-200A

AOV-200B

AOV-202

Place letdown isolation valve switches to CLOSE

AOV-371

AOV-427

PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

Place excess letdown isolation valve switch to CLOSE (AOV-310)

NOTE

IF ATT-5.5, ATTACHMENT SAFW WITH SUCTION FROM DI WATER STORAGE TANK DURING SBO is performed to locally establish SAFW feed for S/Gs, THEN a Control Room operator should monitor S/G levels and direct SAFW flow changes as necessary.

Feed flow should be initiated to both S/Gs if possible to prevent stagnation in the RCS loop in which the S/G is not being fed and to maintain both loop Tcolds less than 550°F.

CO (Step 6) Verify Adequate TDAFW Flow:

Verify TDAFW pump - RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 48 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO * (Step 6a RNO) Perform the following:

Verify governor valve, V-3652, latched.

Manually or locally open at least one TDAFW pump steam supply valve.

MOV-3505A

MOV-3504A US

IF TDAFW pump starts, THEN go to step 6b.

Critical Task:

Establish the minimum required AFW flowrate to the Steam Generators before Wide Range Level is BOTH Steam Generators lowers to 50 inches (100 inches Adverse Containment)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flowrate results in adverse consequences and/or a significant degradation of the mitigative capability of the plant. If AFW flow is not sufficient during a Station Blackout, then cooldown of the RCS cannot be accomplished, and the result would be increased thermal stress on the RCP Seals, and increase the likelihood of increased leakage. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so (i.e. manually opening TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve),

results in mis-operation that unnecessarily reduces the margin to safety of the plant.

CO * (Step 6.B) Verify TDAFW pump flow -

GREATER THAN 200 GPM NOTE

Conditions should be evaluated for Site Contingency Reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

IF the TDAFW pump is running, THEN an EO should frequently monitor the pump until AC power is restored.

HCO/ (Step 7) Try To Restore Power to any Train NOTE: The A D/G is OOS, CO of AC Emergency Busses: and the B D/G has tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 49 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Verify emergency D/G aligned for unit operation

Mode switch in UNIT

Voltage control selector in AUTO

Check emergency D/Gs - BOTH D/G NOTE: Neither D/G is RUNNING running.

HCO/ * (Step 7 RNO) IF any D/G becomes NOTE: This step will be CO available, THEN perform the following: performed later when the A D/G is restored.

Depress D/G FIELD RESET pushbutton

Depress D/G RESET pushbutton

Start D/G

IF D/G starts, THEN go to Step 7c.

IF neither D/G available, THEN perform the following:

Dispatch operator to locally NOTE: The US will dispatch attempt to restore emergency an EO.

D/Gs (Refer to ER-D/G.1, SIM DRIVER: as EO, RESTORING D/G). acknowledge (The A D/G will become available at ECA-0.0 Step 13).

US

Go to Step 8.

CAUTION

WHEN POWER IS RESTORED TO BUS 14 AND/OR BUS 16, RECOVERY ACTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE STARTING WITH STEP 34.

IF AN SI SIGNAL EXISTS OR IF AN SI SIGNAL IS ACTUATED DURING THIS PROCEDURE, IT SHOULD BE RESET TO PERMIT MANUAL LOADING OF EQUIPMENT ON AN AC EMERGENCY BUS.

HCO/ (Step 8) Establish the Following Equipment CO Alignment:

Pull stop AC emergency bus loads

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 50 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RHR pumps

CNMT RECIRC fans

CNMT spray pumps

SI pumps

CCW pumps

Charging pumps

MDAFW pumps

CREATS Fans

Evaluate non-vital loads (Refer to ATT-8.3, ATTACHMENT NONVITAL)

NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO.

Examiner following operator performing ATT-8.3 continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-8.3 continue at Page 52.

ATT-8.3, ATTACHMENT NONVITAL NOTE

The following are loads that may AUTO start upon resumption of power to the respective busses.

This attachment may be entered with one or more buses energized. It is NOT necessary to lockout equipment powered by an energized bus.

HCO/ (Step 1) Lockout the following equipment CO from the control board by placing the respective switches in PULL STOP or OFF as necessary:

EH pumps

Turning gear oil pump

Hi Press seal oil backup pump

Condensate pumps

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 51 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RCDT pumps

MFP AC oil pumps

PRZR heaters

Boric acid transfer pumps

RMW pumps

AUX BLDG sump pumps

Air compressors

Containment sump pumps HCO/ (Step 2) Consideration should be given to NOTE: The HCO/CO will CO locking out the following loads locally, dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge (Components not modeled).

ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-8.3 continue HERE.

HCO/ * (Step 8.c) Place SW pump switches to CO STOP, then return to AUTO

Momentarily place switch for MOV-313, RCP seal return isolation valve, to CLOSE

Momentarily place to CLOSE switches for RCP CCW return valves

MOV-749A

MOV-749B

MOV-759A

MOV-759B NOTE Temporary power may be provided to Bus 13 by performing procedure ER-ELEC.5 at the Shift Manager's discretion.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 52 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 9) Try To Restore Offsite Power:

CO

Consult RG&E Energy Control Center to NOTE: The CO will notify determine if either normal offsite power the RG&E ECC.

supply - AVAILABLE SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that offsite power will be available in 1-2 hours.

12B transformer via breaker 76702 OR

12A transformer via breaker 7T1352

(Step 9a RNO) IF normal offsite power supply NOT readily available, THEN perform the following:

Restore IA system using the Diesel NOTE: The US will dispatch Air Compressor (Refer to ATT-11.2, an EO.

ATTACHMENT DIESEL AIR SIM DRIVER: as EO, COMPRESSOR). acknowledge and use REM-MIS042 = OPEN. After 5 Minutes report that the Diesel Air Compressor is running.

Evaluate Main transformer backfeed NOTE: The US may call for long term concerns (Refer to WCC/SM to address the ER-ELEC.3, EMERGENCY potentiality of backfeeding.

OFFSITE BACKFEED VIA MAIN & If so, SIM DRIVER UNIT TRANSFORMER). acknowledge as WCC/SM.

Go to Step 10.

HCO/ (Step 10) Initiate Local Action to Isolate RCS CO And To Provide Cooling To Vital Areas And Equipment

Open all Reactor Protection and Control NOTE: The HCO/CO may System rack doors in the Control Room. be assigned to open doors as needed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 53 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Direct Security personnel to open the NOTE: The US will contact following vital area doors to enhance Security.

cooling: SIM DRIVER: as Security, acknowledge.

Control Room Door S51

Intermediate Bldg Door S37 (AFW pump area)

Intermediate Bldg Door S44 (Steam Header area)

Intermediate Bldg Top Floor Overhead Door S55

Dispatch EO To Locally Isolate RCP NOTE: The US will dispatch Seals (Refer to ATT-21.0, an EO.

ATTACHMENT RCS ISOLATION) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and RUN Schedule RCSISOL, and report when complete.

Critical Task:

Isolate RCP Seal Injection before a Charging Pump is Started Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump under the postulated plant conditions, can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission-product barrier, specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent event recovery actions (except for a RED path condition on the core cooling CSF). Following restoration of ac power, it is desirable to restore RCP seal cooling as soon as practical to reduce seal temperatures and mitigate potential continued degradation of the RCP seals. However, field experience has shown that the restoration of seal cooling must be performed in a controlled manner to avoid thermal shock and related damage to pump parts. Proper restoration of RCP seal cooling is important since it (1) maximizes the availability of the RCPs if required for subsequent event recovery actions and (2) minimizes the possibility of seal damage that could limit subsequent plant operation due to down time to effect RCP repairs.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 54 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

IF TDAFW pump is feeding S/G(s), NOTE: The US will dispatch dispatch AO to align backup cooling an EO.

water to TDAFW Pump (Refer to SIM DRIVER: as EO, ATT-5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE acknowledge (Not Modeled).

COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP)

NOTE

An Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) should be declared within 1 Hour to ensure adequate time to implement Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) and request Phase 3 equipment from the SAFER Response Center per CC-GI-118-1001.

IF the loss of power is expected to continue beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , THEN degassing of main generator should commence as soon as personnel become available (Refer to ATT-8.2, ATTACHMENT GEN DEGAS).

CO (Step 11) Check Status Of Power restoration NOTE: The CO will notify

- POWER CAN BE RESTORED WITHIN 4 the RG&E ECC.

HOURS SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that offsite power will be available in 1-2 hours.

CO (Step 12) Isolate Makeup And Reject From Hotwell To CST By Placing Hotwell Level Controller (LC-107) In Manual AT 50%

CO (Step 13) Isolate S/G:

Manually close both MSIVs

Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for the A and B S/G MFW regulating and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0%

demand

S/G A, HCV-466 and HCV-480

S/G B, HCV-476 and HCV-481

Place MCB master switch for S/G blowdown and sample valves to CLOSE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 55 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments SIM DRIVER Instructions: Clear MALF - GEN04A, OVR-IND-GEN24 and OVR-IND-GEN25 Insert REM-GEN11 (Local Panel Alarm Reset)

AS Work Control Center take the following actions:

Remove the Info Tag from the DG A START Pushbutton Remove the info Tag from the DG A Bus 14 Supply Breaker and place control switch in AUTO.

Remove the info Tag from the DG A Bus 18 Supply Breaker and place control switch in AUTO.

Remove the info Tag from the DG A Start Control Switch and leave in PULL-STOP.

Report to US that the Tags have been removed and the A DG is ready to be started.

NOTE: It is expected that the crew return to ECA-0.0, Step 7.b, and attempt to start the A EDG.

Examiner NOTE: It is expected that the crew return to ECA-0.0, Step 7.b, and attempt to start the A EDG.

ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER HCO/ * (Step 7.b RNO) IF any D/G becomes NOTE: The HCO will need CO available, THEN perform the following: to place the A DG, the A DG Bus 14 Breaker and the A DG Bus 18 Breaker Control Switches in AUTO.

Depress D/G FIELD RESET pushbutton

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 56 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Depress D/G RESET pushbutton

Start D/G

IF D/G starts, THEN go to Step 7c. NOTE: The A D/G will start.

HCO/ * (Step 7.c) Check D/G voltage and CO frequency

Voltage APPROXIMATELY 480v

Frequency - APPROXIMATELY 60 Examiner NOTE: The US Hz may move to ECA-0.0, Step 34, as directed by the CAUTION prior to Step 8 (Page 58). If not, continue.

Verify adequate D/G cooling

Bus 17 and/or Bus 18 - NOTE: Bus 18 is energized ENERGIZED

One SW Pump running for each NOTE: The A SW Pump will running D/G fail to start automatically, and the CO will need to start either the A or the C SW Pump manually.

(Step 7.d.RNO) Manually energize busses and start SW Pumps.

IF adequate cooling can NOT be NOTE: Once one SW Pump supplied to a running D/G, is started, adequate cooling for the D/G will exist.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 57 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually start a Service Water Pump prior to the running Emergency Diesel Generator trips due to damage caused by engine overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW Pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the DG is running without ESW cooling (will result in the ONLY AC Power Source running loaded without cooling water). Running the DG loaded without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in DG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running DG is the only operable DG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of high-temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the DG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. For Ginna no automatic trip occurs from high D/G temperature. The GE/ALCO Engineering analysis states that the maximum allowable temperature for the engine will be reached in approximately 4 minutes and 23 seconds for initial standby to a full load condition (1950kW). Simulator testing under the postulated plant conditions for the Scenario showed that the EDG trips in approximately 5 minutes and 30 seconds.

(Step 7.e) Verify at least one train of AC emergency busses - ENERGIZED

Bus 14 and Bus 18 NOTE: Buses 14 and 18 are energized.

Bus 16 and Bus 17 US

Return to procedure and step in effect. Examiner NOTE: The US will move to ECA-0.0, Step 34, as directed by the CAUTION prior to Step 8.

CAUTION BUS 16 SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED RESTORED IF POWERED FROM THE TSC DIESEL GENERATOR.

NOTE A RVLIS level less than 93% with RCS pressure less than 500 psig indicates the potential for the onset of reflux flow.

CO (Step 34) Check If AC Emergency Power Is Restored:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 58 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Verify Bus 14 OR Bus 16 - ENERGIZED US

Check FSGs - ANY IMPLEMENTED US (Step 34 RNO) Go to Step 35.

CO (Step 35) Manually Control S/G ARVs To Stabilize S/G Pressures NOTE SW isolation may occur when power is restored to AC emergency buses.

CO (Step 36) Verify SW System Operation:

Check Bus 17 and Bus 18 - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

Verify two SW pumps - RUNNING NOTE: If both the A and/or C SW Pumps were not previously started, they will be started here by performing the RNO.

CO (Step 36.b RNO) IF normal power available, THEN establish two SW pumps running.

IF normal power NOT available, THEN establish one SW pump running for each operating D/G.

IF only one SW pump running THEN perform the following:

Manually perform SW isolation

Refer to AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 59 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually start a Service Water Pump prior to the running Emergency Diesel Generator trips due to damage caused by engine overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW Pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the DG is running without ESW cooling (will result in the ONLY AC Power Source running loaded without cooling water). Running the DG loaded without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in DG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running DG is the only operable DG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of high-temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the DG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. For Ginna no automatic trip occurs from high D/G temperature. The GE/ALCO Engineering analysis states that the maximum allowable temperature for the engine will be reached in approximately 4 minutes and 23 seconds for initial standby to a full load condition (1950kW). Simulator testing under the postulated plant conditions for the Scenario showed that the EDG trips in approximately 5 minutes and 30 seconds.

CO (Step 37) Verify Following Equipment Loaded On Available AC Emergency Busses:

480 volt MCCs - ENERGIZED

MCC C from Bus 14

Verify Instrument busses - ENERGIZED

Bus A from MCC C

Bus B from MCC C

Bus C from MCC D

Dispatch personnel to verify proper NOTE: The US will dispatch operation of battery chargers an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.

HCO (Step 38) Select Recovery Procedure:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 60 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0ºF USING FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING

Check PRZR level - GREATER THAN NOTE: It is likely that PRZR 10% [30% adverse CNMT] level will be less than 10%.

Check SI and RHR Pumps - NONE RUNNING US

Go to ECA-0.1, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERVY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED, Step 1.

Examiner NOTE: It is likely that the US will transition to ECA-0.2. If not, and ECA-0.1 is selected, proceed to Page 66.

ECA-0.2, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED CAUTION DUE TO POTENTIALLY EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, CAUTION SHOULD BE USED WHEN ENTERING THE INTERMEDIATE BLDG FOR LOCAL ACTIONS.

NOTE

CSFSTs should be monitored for information only. FR procedures should not be implemented prior to completion of Step 10.

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-0.2.

LOSS of SW CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Reset SI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 61 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 2) Check RCP CCW Isolation Status:

CCW pumps - BOTH PUMPS OFF

RCP CCW supply and return valves - NOTE: The US/HCO may CLOSED dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use:

REMCLG040=disengaged REMCLG041=0 REMCLG042=disengaged REMCLG043=0 REMCLG059=disengaged REMCLG060=0 REMCLG061=disengaged REMCLG062=0 Report that all valves are CLOSED.

MOV-749A

MOV-749B

MOV-759A

MOV-759B HCO (Step 3) Check RWST level - GREATER THAN 28%

NOTE SI actuation to establish safeguards valve alignment is not recommended.

HCO (Step 4) Manually Align SI and RHR Pumps to Establish SI Injection

SI pump suction valves from RWST -

OPEN

MOV-825A

Verify SI pump C discharge valves -

OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 62 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

MOV-871A

MOV -871B

RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN

MOV-852A NOTE: MOV-852A is CLOSED.

HCO (Step 4.c RNO) Ensure at least one deluge valve open.

MOV-852A CAUTION THE LOADS PLACED ON THE ENERGIZED AC EMERGENCY BUS SHOULD NOT EXCEED THE CAPACITY OF THE POWER SOURCE.

HCO (Step 5) Manually Load Following Safeguards Equipment on AC Emergency Bus:

Start all SI pumps NOTE: The B SI Pump is NOT available.

HCO (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following:

Start available SI pumps. NOTE: The HCO will start the A and C SI Pumps.

IF SI pump A or B NOT available, NOTE: The B SI Pump is THEN verify SI pump C aligned as NOT available.

follows:

IF SI pump B NOT available, THEN ensure MOV-871A closed.

HCO (Step 5.b) Check RCS pressure:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 300 psig

Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 63 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Place RHR pump switches in AUTO NOTE: The A RHR Pump will be placed in AUTO.

Start all available CNMT RECIRC fans NOTE: The A&D CRCFs are available to start.

CO

Start both CREATS fans NOTE: The A CREATS Fan is available to start.

CAUTION

IF CST LEVEL LOWERS TO LESS THAN 5 FEET, THEN ALTERNATE WATER SOURCES FOR AFW PUMPS WILL BE NECESSARY (REFER TO ER-AFW.1, ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLY TO AFW PUMPS).

IF S/G NR LEVEL LOWERS TO LESS THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE CNMT] AND FEED FLOW IS LESS THAN 200 GPM, THEN THE MDAFW PUMPS SHOULD BE MANUALLY LOADED ON AC EMERGENCY BUS TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE S/G(S).

NOTE

If MDAFW pump operation is not required, pump switches should be maintained in PULL-STOP to prevent automatic start.

TDAFW pump flow control AOVs may drift open on loss of IA.

CO (*Step 6) Monitor Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [ 25% adverse CNMT]

Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50%

HCO (Step 7) Verify CI and CVI: NOTE: CV and CVI has NOT occurred.

CI and CVI annunciators - LIT

Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION

Annunciator A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 64 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 7.a RNO) Depress manual CI NOTE: Will be performed if pushbutton. needed.

HCO (Step 7 Continued) Verify CI and CVI valve status lights - BRIGHT

CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet valve status lights - BRIGHT

AOV-4561

AOV-4562 HCO (Step 7.c RNO) Dispatch EO to locally fail NOTE: The US may open valves. dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use REM-CLG031 and 032 =1. After 3 Minutes report that AOV-4561 and 4562 are OPEN.

HCO (Step 8) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY -

EXTINGUISHED

CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG HCO (Step 9) Place CNMT Spray Pumps in AUTO HCO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Needle NOTE: The US/HCO may Valves - CLOSED dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use REM-CVC019=0 and CVC020=0. Report that V-300A and V-300B are CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 65 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

V-300A

V-300B Critical Task:

Isolate RCP Seal Injection before a Charging Pump is Started Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump under the postulated plant conditions, can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission-product barrier, specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent event recovery actions (except for a RED path condition on the core cooling CSF). Following restoration of ac power, it is desirable to restore RCP seal cooling as soon as practical to reduce seal temperatures and mitigate potential continued degradation of the RCP seals. However, field experience has shown that the restoration of seal cooling must be performed in a controlled manner to avoid thermal shock and related damage to pump parts. Proper restoration of RCP seal cooling is important since it (1) maximizes the availability of the RCPs if required for subsequent event recovery actions and (2) minimizes the possibility of seal damage that could limit subsequent plant operation due to down time to effect RCP repairs.

NOTE FR procedures may now be implemented as necessary.

(Step 11) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR Examiner NOTE: If RCP OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1 Seal Isolation valves are CLOSED (As expected),

Terminate Exam.

If they are NOT Closed, continue to E-1 and ensure that these valves are closed prior to starting a Charging Pump in Step 11.

ECA-0.1, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 66 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION

IF AN SI SIGNAL IS ACTUATED PRIOR TO PERFORMING STEP 10 OF THIS PROCEDURE, THEN SI SHOULD BE RESET TO PERMIT MANUAL LOADING OF EQUIPMENT ON AN AC EMERGENCY BUS.

DUE TO POTENTIALLY EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, CAUTION SHOULD BE USED WHEN ENTERING THE INTERMEDIATE BLDG FOR LOCAL ACTIONS.

NOTE

CSFSTs should be monitored for information only. FR procedures should not be implemented prior to completion of Step 10.

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-0.1.

LOSS of SW CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Check RCP Seal Isolation Status:

RCP seal injection needle valves - NOTE: The US/HCO may CLOSED dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use REM-CVC019=0 and CVC020=0. Report that V-300A and V-300B are CLOSED.

V-300A

V-300B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 67 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RCP CCW return valves - CLOSED NOTE: The US/HCO may dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use:

REMCLG040=disengaged REMCLG041=0 REMCLG042=disengaged REMCLG043=0 After 3 Minutes report that MOV-759A and MOV-759B are CLOSED.

MOV-759A

MOV-759B Examiner NOTE: If RCP Seal Isolation valves are CLOSED (As expected),

Terminate Exam.

If they are NOT Closed, continue to Step 5.

HCO/ (Step 2) Check CI ANNUNCIATOR A-26, CO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION -

EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) establish IA to CNMT:

CO

Verify non-safeguards busses energized from offsite power

Bus 13 normal feed - CLOSED OR

Bus 15 normal feed - CLOSED CO (Step 3.a RNO) Perform the following:

Close non-safeguards bus tie breakers:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 68 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie NOTE: The US may try to restore power to Bus 13 to get IA back. However, the Diesel IA Compressor is likely running.

Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie CO (Step 3.b) Check SW pumps - AT LEAST NOTE: Only one SW Pump TWO PUMPS RUNNING may be running.

CO (Step 3.b RNO) Manually start SW pumps as power supply permits (257 kw each).

IF less than two SW pumps running, THEN.

CO (Step 3.c) Verify turbine building SW isolation valves - OPEN:

MOV-4613 and MOV-4670

MOV-4614 and MOV-4664 CO (Step 3.c RNO) Perform the following:

Manually align valves.

Dispatch EO to locally reset NOTE: The US/HCO may compressors as necessary. dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.

Start adequate air compressor(s) (75 kw NOTE: The Diesel IA each) Compressor started previously may be sufficient.

Check IA supply:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG

Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 69 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Reset both trains of XY relays for IA to CNMT (AOV-5392) if necessary

Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 CAUTION THE LOADS PLACED ON THE ENERGIZED AC EMERGENCY BUS SHOULD NOT EXCEED THE CAPACITY OF THE POWER SOURCE.

HCO (Step 4) Manually Load Following Equipment On AC Emergency Busses:

Start one CCW pump (122 kw)

CO

Energize MCCs as power supply NOTE: The US may elect NOT to energize based on the risk of losing the only D/G operating.

MCC A from Bus 13

MCC B from Bus 15

MCC E from Bus 15

MCC F from Bus 15

Verify instrument bus D - ENERGIZED CO (Step 4.c RNO) Restore power to instrument bus D from MCC B or MCC A (maintenance supply).

HCO (Step 4.d) WHEN bus 15 restored, THEN reset control room lighting

Start at least one CNMT RECIRC fan

Restore Rx head cooling as power supply permits:

Start one Rx compartment cooling fan (23 kw each)

Start both control rod shroud fans (45 NOTE: This fan cannot be kw each) started if Bus 13 or 15 is de-energized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 70 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/

Dispatch EO to establish normal NOTE: The US will dispatch CO shutdown alignment (Refer to ATT-17.0, an EO.

ATTACHMENT SD-1) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and use Schedule File SD-1.sch.

HCO (Step 5) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING HCO (Step 5a RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure seal injection needle valves to NOTE: The US/HCO may both RCPs isolated: dispatch an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and, if not previously performed, use REM-CVC019=0 and CVC020=0. After 3 Minutes report that V-300A and V-300B are CLOSED.

RCP A, V-300A

RCP B, V-300B

Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0%.

(Step 5.b) Charging pump suction aligned to RWST:

LCV-112B - OPEN

LCV-112C - CLOSED HCO (Step 5.b RNO) Manually align valves as necessary.

IF LCV-112B can NOT be opened, THEN IF LCV-112C can NOT be closed, THEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 71 of 73 Event

Description:

B EDG Trips/Loss of 7T Circuit/ TDAFW Steam Supply Valves fail to Auto OPEN (3504A and 3505A)/ Selected Service Water Pumps fail to start in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Start charging pumps (75 kw each) as necessary and adjust charging flow to restore PRZR level Critical Task:

Isolate RCP Seal Injection before a Charging Pump is Started Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump under the postulated plant conditions, can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission-product barrier, specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent event recovery actions (except for a RED path condition on the core cooling CSF). Following restoration of ac power, it is desirable to restore RCP seal cooling as soon as practical to reduce seal temperatures and mitigate potential continued degradation of the RCP seals. However, field experience has shown that the restoration of seal cooling must be performed in a controlled manner to avoid thermal shock and related damage to pump parts. Proper restoration of RCP seal cooling is important since it (1) maximizes the availability of the RCPs if required for subsequent event recovery actions and (2) minimizes the possibility of seal damage that could limit subsequent plant operation due to down time to effect RCP repairs.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Core Age: MOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:

50% Power, Equilibrium Xe O-5.2

The plant is at 50% power (MOL).

Outside Air Temp = 45°F S-3.1

The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the A MFW Water Temp = 45°F Pump. Corrective maintenance has been performed and the A MFW Pump is operating.

The area has experienced cool weather with no precipitation.

The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The use of Alternate Dilute has been authorized for the Load Boron: 976 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm) Ascension.

Total: .021

All Secondary Chemistry requirements for load ascension have BAST: 17,500 ppm Identified: .003 been met.

RCS Activity: Normal Unidentified: .018

The calorimetric required by Step 6.7.4 of O-5.2 has already been performed.

The A EDG is OOS for fuel pump replacement.

SR 3.8.1.1 was performed an hour ago.

The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance.

The following Alarms are in:

J-24, EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1A PANEL

J-25, SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT LOCKED OFF (A D/G OOS)

Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Equipment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Operator Declarations See NOTES

Raise power to 100% None in effect A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECD AC Sources - MODES 1, 2, 3, A EDG Yesterday, 24hrs ago 3.8.1 7 days 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months and 4 A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS TRM /ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECD A CRDM Shroud Fan Yesterday NA NA NA Indefinitely

PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 19-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N20-1-5

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (Amendment 112)

2. O-5.2, Load Ascension (Rev 083)

3. S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 033)

4. AR-L-23, BUS 18 UNDER VOLTAGE SAFEGUARDS (Rev 01102)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation (Amendment 109)

6. A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide (Rev 053)

7. AP-CVCS.1, CVCS Leak (Rev 016)

8. ER-NIS.3, PR Malfunction (Rev 027)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3, Applicability (Amendment 104)

10. Technical Requirement 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Monitor (Rev 31)

11. AR-PPCS-L2022A, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK A LEVEL (Rev 005)

12. AR-J-16, MOTOR OFF CW-EH EMERG OIL SEAL OIL BU (Rev 6)

13. AP-CW.1, Loss of a Circ Water Pump (Rev 01400)

14. AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum (Rev 021)

15. FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure (Rev 0)

16. AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction (Rev 020)

17. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 049)

18. FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS (Rev 025)

19. ATT-27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification (Rev 00400)

20. E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 014)

21. ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators (Rev 037)

Validation Time: 74 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 091120 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #5 Objectives:

Given the simulator at an initial condition of 70% power evaluate:

1. the SROs ability to supervise the control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise, including compliance with all facility procedures, Technical Specifications, and other commitments.

2. each crew members ability to effectively communicate as part of a control room team during the normal, abnormal, and emergency situations that arise.

3. each crew members ability to conduct a load ascension in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension, and S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control.

4. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the ROs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed VCT Divert Control Valve (LCV-112A) in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AP-CVCS.1, CVCS Leak.

5. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose a Power Range Channel failure leading in accordance with ER-NIS.3, PR Malfunction.

6. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and the BOPs ability to mitigate the consequences of a failed Hotwell Level Controller in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or Annunciator Response Procedures.

7. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose and mitigate the consequences of a Circ Water Pump Trip and a loss of vacuum in accordance with AP-CW.1, Loss of a Circ Water Pump, and/or AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

8. each crew members ability to conduct a rapid downpower in accordance with AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, whenever plant conditions dictate the need to do so.

9. each crew members ability to effectively diagnose an inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal coupled with an ATWS and the RO and BOPs ability to respond to such an event in accordance with E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS.

10. each crew members ability to mitigate the effects of two faulted Steam Generators in accordance with E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N20-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady Thunderstorms for the past 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , with wind from the West at 10-20 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Power Range Channel N44 is removed from service per ER-NIS.3 (TS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A/D/S and Action A.1, D.1 and S.1) and the QPTR Monitor has been declared inoperable. Condensate Booster Pump B is OOS for impeller replacement.

Critical Tasks: See Below Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 R-RO Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure MAL N-BOP A-EDS40 N-SRO TS 2 MAL C-RO VCT Divert Control Valve (LVC-112A) Failure CVC09 C-SRO 3 MAL I-SRO Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure NIS06C TS 4 OVR C-BOP Hotwell Level Controller fails to Full Makeup CND11B C-SRO 5 MAL C-RO Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum CRC01A CND07B C-BOP C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal STM05A/B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS (CT-1)

RPS05A/B C-BOP C-SRO MAL 8 C-BOP One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN STM09A/B C-SRO (CT-2)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Ginna 2020 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady Thunderstorms for the past 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , with wind from the West at 10-20 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Power Range Channel N44 is removed from service per ER-NIS.3 (TS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A/D/S and Action A.1, D.1 and S.1) and the QPTR Monitor has been declared inoperable. Condensate Booster Pump B is OOS for impeller replacement.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension. The operator will address S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, to start the load ascension using Alternate Dilute. During the load ascension, a Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay will fail. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation.

Shortly after this, VCT or Holdup Tank Divert Valve, LCV-112A, will fail to the FULL DIVERT position. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and place the control switch for LCV-112A to the VCT position. The operator will enter AP-CVCS.1, CVCS Leak.

Following this, the N42 Power Range Upper Detector will fail LOW. The operator will enter ER-NIS.3, PR Malfunction, however, removing N42 from service per this procedure will result in a plant trip. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and implement Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The operator will also address Technical Requirement 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Monitor.

Then, the Hotwell Level Controller will fail to Full Makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AR-PPCS-L2022A and B, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK A(B) LEVEL, and manually control the hotwell level for the remainder of the scenario.

Next, the A Circ Water Pump will trip. Simultaneously, a Condenser Expansion Joint low-level condition will occur. The crew will respond in accordance with AR-J-16, MOTOR OFF CW-EH EMERG OIL SEAL OIL BU, and enter AP-CW.1, Loss of a Circ Water Pump, and/or AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The crew will reduce load per AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, as needed to stabilize Turbine Backpressure.

After this, an inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MSIVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip, and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS. On the trip one S/G Safety Valve on each S/G lifted and stuck partially OPEN.

The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing the control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators. The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Upon diagnosing an ATWS, manually insert the control rods within 1 minute, and continue insertion until the reactor is tripped or the rods are on the bottom Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent and unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. According to Section 15.8.3.2 of the Ginna UFSAR it is assumed that manual rod insertion of at least one bank is initiated within the first 60 seconds of the ATWS event.

Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before a severe challenge (Orange Path) develops to the integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. If the action is not taken an unnecessary Orange Path could develop on the RCS Integrity Critical Safety Function requiring a substantial change in the mitigation strategy.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 143 T = 0:

(Originally IC-013).

Remove Power Range Channel N44 from service per Attachment 1 of ER-NIS.3 Take B CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND05A=OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF RPS05A, No Manual, Reactor Trip BKR A Failure Insert MALF RPS05B, No Manual, Reactor Trip BKR B Failure Insert OVR-EDS47D and 47G = FALSE (Bus 15 Low Side Breaker)

Insert OVR-EDS34D and 34G = FALSE (Bus 15 High Side Breaker)

Insert MALF STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp, T-6, 20 Seconds Delayed; (Safety valve 3508 on B SG opens after Rx trip)

Insert MALF STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp, T-6, 20 Seconds Delayed; (Safety valve 3509 on A SG opens after Rx trip)

Insert MALF CVC09 = 0 (VCT Divert Control Valve Failure (LCV-112A)) on T-30 Set T-30 to X07I210A==1 (LCV-112A to VCT)

Insert MALF A-EDS40=ON, on T-1 Insert MALF CVC09 = 100 (VCT Divert Control Valve Failure (LCV-112A)) on T-2 Insert MALF NIS06C = 0, on T-3 Insert OVR-CND11B (100, No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF CRC01A (CW Pump Trips) and CND07B, 900, 240 Second Ramp (Condenser Expansion Joint Level) on T-5 Insert MALF STM05A (0%, No Ramp) on T-6 Insert MALF STM05B (0%, No Ramp) on T-6 Prior to Crew

Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Briefing Equipment (B CBP Pump P16 of 24 of Attachment 2, N44 P21&23 of 24).

Place Black Dot on all required MCB Annunciators (E-7, E-18, E-19, E-21, E-28, F-23).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

Provide crew with marked up copy of O-5.2 and S-3.1.

Handout Reactivity Binder (BOL) and Reactivity Plan specific to this power maneuver.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Event 1 Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Trigger#1 MALF A-EDS40=ON At direction of examiner Event 2 VCT Divert Control Valve (LVC-112A) Failure Trigger#2 MALF CVC09 = 100 At direction of examiner Event 3 Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure Trigger#3 MALF NIS06C = 0 No Ramp At direction of examiner Event 4 Hotwell Level Controller fails to Full Makeup Trigger #4 OVR-CND11B (100, No Ramp)

After 5 minutes of Event 5 Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Trigger#5 lowering power, or at CRC01A, CND07B, 900, NOTE: If Condenser Backpressure stabilizes direction of 240 Second Ramp prior to the crew initiating a downpower at examiner Step 3 of AP-CW.1, USE REM-CND50 = 0.5 (5 Second Ramp) as needed to keep Backpressure rising and force the downpower.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 6 Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal Trigger #6 STM05A (0%, No Ramp)

STM05B (0%, No Ramp)

Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS RPS05A, No Manual Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0.

RPS05B, No Manual Post-Rx Trip Event 8 One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Trigger #6 STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with O-5.2, Load Ascension. The operator will address S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, to start the load ascension using Alternate Dilute. During the load ascension, a Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay will fail. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO NOTE: it is expected that the HCO will place the Control Rods in MANUAL based on previous steps (6.3.5).

O-5.2, LOAD ASCENSION CO NOTE: The CO will need to place the Turbine Controls in IMP IN.

US (Step 6.7.1) HOLD Reactor Power at less NOTE: All Chemistry than 50% UNTIL secondary chemistry Requirements are met.

requirements are met.

CAUTION

IF VALVE POS LIMIT light is ILLUMINATED, THEN EH control REFERENCE AND SETTER adjustment will be required until VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED.

Raising Valve Position Limit with Valve Position Limit light ILLUMINATED will raise Turbine load at 200%/minute.

WHEN raising turbine load, THEN VLV POSITION LIMIT SHALL be continuously monitored to ensure it is maintained approximately 10% above SETTER Value.

CO (Step 6.7.2) WHEN ready to raise load to greater than or equal to 50%, THEN PERFORM the following:

VERIFY VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 10 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

IF VALVE POS LIMIT light is NOTE: This step is NA.

ILLUMINATED, THEN LOWER EH Control UNTIL VALVE POS LIMIT light is EXTINGUISHED as follows; OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A CAUTION CV TRACKING not indicating approximately zero with SETTER AND REFERENCE matched and VALVE POS LIMIT light EXTINGUISHED indicates a system malfunction.

VERIFY CV TRACKING Meter is indicating approximately zero.

CO

RAISE VPL POSITION LIMIT as desired using VVE POS LIMIT (GREEN) pushbutton.

CO (Step 6.7.3) CONTINUE with load ascension as follows:

RAISE SETTER setpoint to desired value using (ORANGE) pushbutton.

DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

ENSURE VLV POSITION LIMIT setpoint is adjusted as required.

OBSERVE turbine load rises at desired rate.

Examiner NOTE: The US may continue in O-5.2 (Not Scripted).

NOTE

Calorimetric is required to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after Thermal Power is greater than or equal to 50% RTP.

IF Reactor Engineering AND on duty SRO agree that NIS is adjusted conservatively as compared to calorimetric power, THEN stopping power ascension when reactor power is between 50% and 55% for purpose of obtaining a calorimetric is NOT necessary and Steps 6.7.4.1 through 6.7.4.3 may be marked N/A. Determination of conservatism SHALL take into consideration, at a minimum, NIS power as compared to calorimetric power AND radial xenon distribution.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 11 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 4, ALTERNATE DILUTION NOTE: The crew will perform dilutions based upon the Reactivity Plan provided.

NOTE Dilute and Alternate Dilute both accomplish the same purpose of lowering RCS boron concentration. The effect of Alternate Dilute is observed sooner, and tends to lower RCS hydrogen concentration, because part of dilution flow goes directly to Charging Pumps suction, whereas in Dilute mode, all flow goes to Volume Control Tank.

HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, is complete.

HCO (Step 2) The board operator SHALL inform the CRS of the intent to change core reactivity.

HCO (Step 3) The CRS SHALL acknowledge the reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight.

HCO (Step 4) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to ALT DILUTE position.

HCO (Step 5) SET RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-111, controller to the desired flowrate.

HCO (Step 6) SET the RMW COUNTER, YIC-111, to the quantity determined in Attachment 1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 12 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE

Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as reactor makeup water is injected.

[G0092] [G0132].

IF rod motion is blocked or movement is in wrong direction, OR IF subcritical count rate increases by a factor of two, THEN dilution operation SHALL be immediately stopped. [G0092] [G0132]

The first Dilution/Alternate Dilution following an Automatic OR Manual Makeup depending on time in core life, will contain approximately 8 gallons of borated water.

Desired Temperature and Power response may not be obtained until Blender Piping has been flushed.

HCO (Step 7) PLACE RMW Control Switch to START position.

HCO (Step 8) VERIFY the following:

RMW Pump 1A OR 1B STARTS

REACTOR MAKEUP TO VCT, AOV-110C opens.

RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-111, valve throttles to preset flow rate.

REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens HCO (Step 9.0) WHEN dilution is complete, THEN PERFORM the following:

HCO (Step 9.1) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.

HCO (Step 9.2) SET RMW TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-111, controller to the desired setpoint, normally 40 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 13 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 9.3) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position, and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.

HCO (Step 9.4) PLACE ALTERNATE DILUTE Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.

HCO (Step 9.5) Board operator SHALL INFORM US reactivity manipulation is complete.

[G0092]

HCO (Step 9.6) RECORD amount of reactor makeup water added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Once the Load Ascension is in progress, OPERATE Trigger #1 (MALF A-EDS40=ON)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator AR-L-23, BUS 18 UNDER VOLTAGE SAFEGUARDS AR-L-23, BUS 18 UNDER VOLTAGE SAFEGUARDS NOTE This alarm is expected during the performance of STP-I-9.1.18, UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION - 480 VOLT SAFEGUARD BUS 18. IF this alarm is due to testing DO NOT PERFORM this procedure US (Step 4.1) IF either L-20, 12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE OR L-28, 12B XFMR OR 12B BUS TROUBLE- IS LIT, THEN..

NOTE Bus 14 Phase voltages are checked to ensure that an issue with offsite power is not affecting both Train A safeguards buses.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 14 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 4.2) IF D/G A ties onto Bus 18 THEN.

US (Step 4.3) IF D/G does not start THEN PERFORM the following:

CO

CHECK all 3 phases of Bus 18 Voltage

[G0431]

IF any phase is < 440 volts THEN GO TO AP-ELEC.2, SAFEGUARD BUSSES LOW VOLTAGE OR SYSTEM LOW FREQUENCY.

CHECK the local Bus 18 UV cabinet to NOTE: The US will dispatch determine which relay is causing the and EO.

condition.

SIM DRIVER as EO, report that The Relay X1/18 on the Bus 18 Undervoltage Cabinet Yellow UV light is LIT.

IF Necessary REFER TO ER-UV.1, NOTE: The US may direct the TRIP OF FAILED AC EMERGENCY UV EO to perform Attachment 4 of RELAY to place a failed relay in the trip ER-UV.1.

condition.

SIM DRIVER as EO, acknowledge (No Action to take).

REFER TO Tech Spec 3.3.4

NOTIFY Operation Management by NOTE: The US will contact sending an Operation Management page the WCCS/Operations Management.

SIM DRIVER as WCCS acknowledge as appropriate.

REFER TO CNG-NL-1.01-1004, REGULATORY REPORTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, LOSS OF POWER (LOP) DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) START INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.4 Each 480 V safeguards bus shall have two OPERABLE channels of LOP DG Start Instrumentation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 15 of 62 Event

Description:

Load Ascension/ Bus 18 Undervoltage Relay Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources

- MODES 5 and 6."

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more 480 V A.1 Place channel(s) in trip. 6 Hours bus(es) with one channel inoperable.

NOTE: The US will recognize that Condition A is applicable.

NOTE: The US may call WCCS/Supervision to address the failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision.

Examiner NOTE: The US/BOP may start the Condensate Booster Pumps while Event 2 is being diagnosed using Section 6.8 of O-5.2. (Not Scripted)

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 16 of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Divert Control Valve (LVC-112A) Failure Shortly after this, VCT or Holdup Tank Divert Valve, LCV-112A, will fail to the FULL DIVERT position. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and place the control switch for LCV-112A to the VCT position. The operator will enter AP-CVCS.1, CVCS Leak.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 CVC09 = 100 (VCT Divert Control Valve Failure (LCV-112A))

Indications Available:

LCV-112A Red Light LIT, Green Light Extinguished

VCT level lowers on MCB LI-112

PPCS LWRN P0139, LOW WRN VCT PRESSURE, at 20 psig Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or HCO will place control switch controller failures or to isolate leaks. for LCV-112A, VCT or Holdup Permitted actions include those actions Tank Divert Valve, to the VCT necessary to take manual control and position.

stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule.

Therefore, 50.59 is not required.

NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/IMD.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS/IMD, acknowledge SIM DRIVER Instructions: When HCO has placed control switch for LCV-112A to VCT, ENSURE T-30 initiates AP-CVCS.1, CVCS LEAK

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 17 of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Divert Control Valve (LVC-112A) Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE

Conditions should be evaluated for site contingency reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

A local radiation emergency should be declared for any unexplained area radiation monitor alarm.

HCO (*Step 1) Monitor PRZR Level - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous PROGRAM LEVEL. Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE IF VCT level lowers to 5%, charging pump suction will swap to the RWST. This may require a load reduction.

HCO (Step 2) Check VCT Makeup System:

Verify VCT level - GREATER THAN 5%

Ensure the following:

RMW mode selector switch in AUTO

RMW control armed - RED LIGHT LIT

Check VCT level:

Level - GREATER THAN 20%

-OR-

Level - STABLE OR RISING HCO (Step 2.c RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure letdown divert valve, LCV-112A, NOTE: LCV-112A was failed aligned to VCT. to divert. If not previously repositioned, the HCO will position here.

Manually raise VCT makeup flow as NOTE: This will not be follows: required.

NOTE A load reduction may be required if charging pump suction is aligned to the RWST.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 18 of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Divert Control Valve (LVC-112A) Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 3) Check Charging Pump Suction Aligned to VCT:

VCT level - GREATER THAN 20%

Align charging pumps to VCT

LCV-112C open

LCV-112B closed NOTE: The remaining Steps of AP-CVCS.1 contain no further actions by the operators and are not scripted.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 19 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure Following this, the N42 Power Range Upper Detector will fail LOW. The operator will enter ER-NIS.3, PR Malfunction, however, removing N42 from service per this procedure will result in a plant trip. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and implement Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3.

The operator will also address Technical Requirement 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD)

Monitor.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF NIS06C = 0, No Ramp)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator E-26, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEV +/-2%.

N42 Upper Detector indication lowers.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will transition to ER-NIS.3.

ER-NIS.3, PR MALFUNCTION US (Step 4.2) Careful consideration should be NOTE: The US will recognize given prior to defeating two (2) failed that if N42 is defeated per ER-channels to prevent an inadvertent Reactor NIS.3, a Rx Trip will occur; Trip OR Safety Injection and decide not to defeat the channel.

NOTE: The US may call SM to address the failed channel.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as SM (What do you recommend?).

HCO (Step 6.1) PLACE the Rod Control Bank Selector switch in M (MANUAL).

HCO (Step 6.2) ADJUST Tavg to Tref.

US (Step 6.3) IF hot leg streaming has been causing single channel T runback signals, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE

Completing the defeat attachment changes the T runback and the rod stop logic to 2/3, and the T reactor trip logics to 1/3.

AFD monitor is operable provided PPCS is receiving valid inputs from the upper and lower detectors of three or more operable power range channels. (TR 3.2.3 Basis)

AFD shall be considered outside limits when two or more operable excore channels indicate AFD to be outside limits. (LCO 3.2.3 Note)

QPTR monitor is inoperable for any PR failure, even after the channel is defeated.

(TRM TR-3.2.4)

Examiner NOTE: The US may direct that the HCO use Attachment 1 of S-26.2 to track the 15-minute Surveillance on AFD.

US (Step 6.4) DEFEAT the inoperable Power NOTE: The US will recognize Range per appropriate attachment: that if N42 is defeated per ER-NIS.3, a Rx Trip will occur; and decide not to defeat the channel.

NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed Channel.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The US will address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)

INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

US APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one channel inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for OR the channel(s).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 21 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Two source range channels inoperable.

The US will recognize that Condition A does not apply (Two Channels failed) and apply LCO 3.0.3.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and (1) the The US will recognize that associated ACTIONS are not met, (2) an LCO 3.0.3 applies.

associated ACTION is not provided, or (3) if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the plant shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated to place the plant, as applicable, in:

MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

MODE 4 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s: and

MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

NOTE: The US may call WCCS/Supervision to address the Tech Spec Required Shutdown.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT 3.2.3, AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) MONITOR US TR 3.2.3: The AFD monitor alarm shall be OPERABLE.

US APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER 50%

ACTIONS:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 22 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 Upper Detector Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.AFD monitor A.1 Perform TSR 3.2.3.2. Once every 15 minutes alarm inoperable.

The US will recognize that Condition A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 23 of 62 Event

Description:

Hotwell Level Controller fails to Full Makeup Then, the Hotwell Level Controller will fail to Full Makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, and/or AR-PPCS-L2022A and B, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK A(B)

LEVEL, and manually control the hotwell level for the remainder of the scenario.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Trigger #4 (OVR-CND11B =100)

Indications Available:

Hotwell level controller output rising to 100%

PPCS Annunciator L2022A, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL A, alarms

PPCS Annunciator L2022B, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL B, alarms

Both MCB Hotwell Level indications start to rise

MCB Annunciator H-13, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK HI-LOW LEVEL 18' 4" 22' 4", alarms if prolonged Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or CO will take manual control of controller failures or to isolate leaks. LC-107 and stabilize Hotwell Permitted actions include those actions level.

necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule.

Therefore, 50.59 is not required.

NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/IMD.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS/IMD, acknowledge AR-PPCS-L2022A, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK A LEVEL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 24 of 62 Event

Description:

Hotwell Level Controller fails to Full Makeup Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE

Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) will overflow into floor drain at 230 level.

ITS LCO 3.7.6, Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs), required volume is 24,350 gallons:

- See O-6.13, DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG, for required level values.

Closing the MCB Master switch for STEAM GEN BLOWDOWN VLVS also closes the S/G Sample VLVS, removing R-19 sample flow.

CO (Step 4.1) NOTIFY EOs to IMMEDIATELY NOTE: The CO may dispatch perform the following: an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.

TRANSFER water to CSTs from Outside Condensate Storage Tank (refer to T-6.12, DI HEADER SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND ALIGNMENT)

CHECK for proper operation of GE BETZ

IF GE BETZ has tripped, THEN.. NOTE: The GE BETZ has NOT tripped.

IF required, THEN COMPLETE NOTE: This action will not be applicable sections of T-14N, S/G required.

BLOWDOWN SYSTEM FLOW CHANGES.

CO (Step 4.2) PERFORM the following in the Control Room.

ENSURE Hotwell Level Controller, LC-107, is NOT causing abnormal makeup to the condenser.

IF hotwell level is not being NOTE: The CO will take maintained in AUTO, THEN PLACE manual control of LC-107 and Hotwell Level Controller, LC-107 in stabilize Hotwell level.

MANUAL and CONTROL hotwell level as necessary.

IF CST level continues to lower, THEN EVALUATE the need to reject water from the hotwell AND SLOWLY REJECT water back to the CST(s) if necessary.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 25 of 62 Event

Description:

Hotwell Level Controller fails to Full Makeup Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

IF IMMEDIATE blowdown isolation is NOTE: This action will not be required, THEN required.

REFER to ITS LCO 3.7.6, Condensate NOTE: The LCO will NOT be Storage Tanks (CSTs) entered unless both tanks are

<13.6 ft.

IF Blowdown sample flow is isolated, NOTE: Blowdown sample flow THEN.. will not be isolated.

NOTIFY Chemistry NOTE: The CO may contact the WCCS/Chemistry.

SIM DRIVER: as WCCS, acknowledge.

US

NOTIFY Shift Manager NOTE: The US may contact the SM.

SIM DRIVER: as SM, acknowledge.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 26 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Next, the A Circ Water Pump will trip. Simultaneously, a Condenser Expansion Joint low-level condition will occur. The crew will respond in accordance with AR-J-16, MOTOR OFF CW-EH EMERG OIL SEAL OIL BU, and enter AP-CW.1, Loss of a Circ Water Pump, and/or AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The crew will reduce load per AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, as needed to stabilize Turbine Backpressure.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (CRC01A, CND07B, 900, 240 Second Ramp)

NOTE: If Condenser Backpressure stabilizes prior to the crew initiating a downpower at Step 3 of AP-CW.1, USE REM-CND50 = 0.5 (5 Second Ramp) as needed to keep Backpressure rising and force the downpower.

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator J-16, MOTOR OFF CW-EH EMERG OIL SEAL OIL BU

MCB Annunciator I-19, CONDENSER EXP JOINT B LO LEVEL

A Circ Water Pump Green and White status lights are LIT, Red status light is OFF

Condenser Backpressure is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: At any time during this event, the US may enter AP-TURB.4. If so, follow the actions on Page 39.

NOTE: The US may directly enter AP.CW.1.

AR-J-16, MOTOR OFF CW-EH EMERG OIL SEAL OIL BU CO (Step 1) IF a Circ Water pump trips, THEN NOTE: The A CW Pump has go to AP-CW.1, LOSS OF A CIRC tripped.

WATER PUMP.

(Step 2) Determine cause of pump trip NOTE: The US may call an EO to address the Pump failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO. After 3 minutes report that there are no abnormal indications at the Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 27 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the Pump failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

US (Step 3) Attempt to restore to normal NOTE: The US will transition to AP-CW.1.

AP-CW.1, LOSS OF A CIRC WATER PUMP CO (Step 1) Verify One Circ Water Pump - NOTE: The B CW Pump is RUNNING running.

HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power - LESS NOTE: Power level is 70%.

THAN 50%

US (Step 2 RNO) Reduce reactor power at Examiner NOTE: The US will approx. 5%/min. using AP-TURB.5, RAPID initiate a Rapid Load LOAD REDUCTION while continuing with Reduction per AP-TURB.5 this procedure. (Page 29) while continuing with Step 3.

CAUTION

TURBINE LOAD REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE MINIMIZING THE AMOUNT OF STEAM DUMP OPERATION.

EXCESSIVE BACK PRESSURE MAY RESULT IN SEVERE TURBINE BLADE VIBRATION.

MINIMIZE TIME OUTSIDE THE SATISFACTORY OPERATING REGION.

LOAD REDUCTION RATE IS TO BE ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY TO PREVENT EXCEEDING 5 MINUTES IN THE DO NOT OPERATE REGION.

CO (*Step 3) Check Condenser Indications: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Turbine back pressure - EACH NOTE: It will be observed that CONDENSER WITHIN THE Turbine backpressure is within SATISFACTORY OPERATING REGION the operating range.

OF FIG-13.0, FIGURE BACK PRESSURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 28 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Condenser vacuum - STABLE OR NOTE: It will be observed that IMPROVING Turbine backpressure is slowly degrading (rising).

CO (Step 3.b RNO) IF greater than 50% power NOTE: Power level is >50%.

then continue to reduce power at 5%/min.

NOTE: The US may elect to perform ATT-23.0 prior to performing the AP. If so, the US will hand this off to the CO, and continue in the AP with the HCO.

HCO Examiner move to Page 29.

ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS CO (Step 1) Place Bus 12A - BUS 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to ON.

CO (Step 2) Close BUS 12A - BUS 11A TIE 4160V.

CO (Step 3) Place BUS 12A - BUS 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF.

CO (Step 4) Open BUS 11A NORMAL FEED 4160V.

CO (Step 5) Place BUS 11B - BUS 12B TIE synchroscope to on.

CO (Step 6) Close BUS 11B - BUS 12B TIE 4160V.

CO (Step 7) Place BUS 11B 12B TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 29 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 8) Open BUS 11B NORMAL FEED 4160V.

CO (Step 9) Reset alarms L-20 AND L-28, locally NOTE: The CO will dispatch in the Relay Room Addition. an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and use REM EDS049 and EDS050 =

RESET, to reset alarms.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiner NOTE: Once the Turbine backpressure is stabilized, the US will return to AP-CW.1. When this occurs Move Forward to AP-CW.1 actions on Page 35.

CAUTION IF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW SHOULD LOWER TO 25% OF FULL POWER FLOW (1x106 LB/HR) PRIOR TO THE AMSAC SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY BLOCKING AT 40% POWER, THEN A TURBINE TRIP AND AUX FEED PUMPS START COULD RESULT.

NOTE

IF the turbine is to be taken offline, THEN transfer of 4160V loads may be performed at any time. Refer to ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS.

A maximum continuous load reduction rate of greater than 5%/min should not be used unless directed by the Shift Manager.

Perform a Load Reduction Brief per A-503.1 Emergency and Abnormal Procedures User Guide Attachment 1.

HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction

Verify rods in AUTO HCO (Step 1.a RNO) Perform the following:

Place rods to MANUAL.

Adjust Rods to match Tavg and Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 30 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 1.b) Initiate boration at the rate NOTE: The HCO will initiate a determined in OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration.

S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 2, NORMAL BORATION HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, is complete.

HCO (Step 2) Board operator SHALL inform US of intent to change core reactivity.

US SHALL acknowledge reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092].

HCO (Step 3) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to BORATE position.

HCO (Step 4) SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, controller to flow rate determined in Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, Step 1.1.

HCO (Step 5) SET BA COUNTER, YIC-110, to quantity determined in Attachment 1.

NOTE Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication, OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as boric acid is injected to ensure proper response. [G0092] [G0132]

HCO (Step 6) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position.

HCO (Step 7) VERIFY the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 31 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A OR B starts.

BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, throttles open to preset flow position.

REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens.

HCO (Step 8) WHEN boration is complete, THEN PERFORM the following:

PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.

PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to START position and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.

SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, for current RCS boron concentration PER Boration/Dilution tables OR PPCS Engineering Menu Boration/Dilution display.

HCO (Step 9) PLACE BORATE Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.

HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete.

[G0092]

HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.

AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 32 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 1.c) Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:

Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.

Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will select 5%/Minute.

Reduce the setter to the desired load

Depress the GO button NOTE: The CO will start the load decrease.

HCO

Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON Examiner NOTE: After 5 minutes of power reduction, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

CAUTION EXTREME AND RAPID ROD MOTION TO MITIGATE TAVG SWINGS MAY RESULT IN LARGE POWER EXCURSIONS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous

Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F Action. The US will make one or more board operators

Tavg- LESS THAN 579°F aware.

HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC):

Maintain rods above the insertion limit

Match Tavg and Tref

Compensate for Xenon NOTE With PRZR pressure controller in manual, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 33 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure- NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

CO (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves- NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

NOTE It is permissible to operate RCPs for limited periods without seal injection, provided CCW is being supplied to the thermal barriers.

CO (Step 7) Check IA Available To CNMT

IA pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG

Instr Air to CNMT Isol Valve, AOV-5392 -

OPEN HCO/ (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous CO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - LIT

Steam dump operating properly in AUTO HCO/ (Step 8 RNO) IF steam dump required but CO NOT operating, THEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 34 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION MANUAL REJECT MAY BE REQUIRED TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON CONDENSATE PRESSURE CO (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level:

Hotwell level controller in AUTO NOTE: The Hotwell Level Controller is in MANUAL from a previous malfunction.

Controller demand LESS THAN 60%

Hotwell level at setpoint CO (Step 9 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual and control level.

NOTE The load reduction should not be delayed to perform the remaining steps.

US/ (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster CO Pumps Should Be Secured Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: If the Condensate RUNNING Booster Pumps are running, continue to stop the pumps below, If there are NO Condensate Booster Pumps running, Perform Step 10 RNO.

Verify the following:

Verify reactor power is 70%-75%

Trim valve controller set at 400 psig

Trim valve, AOV-9508G - GREATER THAN 80% open

PI-4017, CNDST BSTR DISCH PRESS greater than 395 psig

Place the auto condensate booster pump to the trip position

Stop one condensate booster pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 35 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Verify the following:

Condensate pressure - STABLE OR RISING

Verify Trim valves AOV-9508D/9508G - CLOSED OR STABILIZED at new position

Verify HDT level (L2013A) greater than 50% and STABLE OR RISING

Stop the remaining condensate booster pump US (Step 10.a RNO) IF only 1 Condensate Booster Pump running, THEN go to step 10e. IF no pumps running THEN go to step 11.

HCO/ (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should NOTE: It is likely that Rx CO Be Secured power will be > 50%.

Power LESS THAN 50%

US (Step 11.a RNO) Go to Step 18.

US (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status IF load was reduced more than 15% RTP in NOTE: The US may call one hour, THEN notify RP to obtain primary Chemistry to address the samples required by ITS LCO 3.4.16 samples.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry AP-CW.1, LOSS OF A CIRC WATER PUMP Examiner NOTE: Follow action of AP-CW.1 Step 3 and beyond starting HERE.

CO * (*Step 3.c) Determine if Load Reduction NOTE: This is a Continuous Can Be Stopped: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Monitor Condenser Indications:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 36 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Condenser back pressure - NOTE: It will be observed that EACH CONDENSER WITHIN Turbine backpressure is within THE SATISFACTORY the operating range.

OPERATING REGION OF FIG-13.0, FIGURE BACK PRESSURE

Vacuum - STABLE OR NOTE: It will be observed that IMPROVING Turbine backpressure is stable.

HCO (*Step 4) Monitor RCS Tavg: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Tavg - GREATER THAN 545°F

Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 5) Check Rod Control:

Rods in AUTO

Control rods stepping to control Tavg HCO (Step 5 RNO) Ensure rods in manual and adjust rods to control Tavg and minimize condenser steam dump.

CO (*Step 6) Monitor SG Level - GREATER NOTE: This is a Continuous THAN 20% Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

CO (Step 7) Monitor S/G Level Control:

S/G levels - TRENDING TO 52%

MFW regulating valves -

CONTROLLING IN AUTO HCO (Step 8) Verify Tavg - TRENDING TO TREF

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 37 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 9) Isolate S/G Blowdowns to the NOTE: The US will dispatch Affected Waterbox: an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use REM-SGN30=0. After 3 Minutes report that V-3175E is CLOSED.

IF CW Pump A off, THEN close V-3175E CO (Step 10) Dispatch EO to Align the NOTE: The US will dispatch Circulating Water System for one Pump an EO.

Operation (Refer to T-8A, STARTUP AND SIM DRIVER: as EO, SHUTDOWN A AND B CIRCULATING acknowledge.

WATER PUMPS).

CO (Step 11) Determine If Load Reduction Can Be Stopped:

Monitor Condenser Indications:

Condenser back pressure - NOTE: It will be observed that EACH CONDENSER WITHIN Turbine backpressure is within THE SATISFACTORY the operating range.

OPERATING REGION OF FIG-13.0, FIGURE BACK PRESSURE

Vacuum - STABLE OR NOTE: It will be observed that IMPROVING Turbine backpressure is stable.

Stop the load reduction NOTE With PRZR pressure controller 431K in MANUAL, PORV-431C will not operate in the automatic mode. (Refer to TR 3.4.3)

HCO (*Step 12) Establish Stable Plant Conditions: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 38 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO

PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL

Rod insertion limit alarms -

EXTINGUISHED

NIS PR I - WITHIN +/- 5% OF TARGET VALUE

Steam dump valves - CLOSED HCO/ (Step 13) Establish Control Systems In Auto CO

Verify 431K in AUTO

Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO

Verify PRZR heaters restored:

PRZR proportional heater breaker -

CLOSED

PRZR backup heater breaker -

RESET, IN AUTO

Verify one charging pump in AUTO

Verify MFW regulating valves in AUTO

Restore EH controls

Place in OP PAN, IMP OUT

Place load rate thumbwheel to 10%/hr

Match setter and reference

Verify Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - EXTINGUISHED

Verify rods in AUTO HCO/ (Step 14) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status CO (Refer to AR Procedures)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 39 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO (Step 15) Evaluate Status of Affected CW Pump:

Dispatch EO to locally check CW NOTE: The US will dispatch pump and breaker an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and report acrid odor around CW Pump motor.

Notify electricians NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the Pump failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

US (Step 16) Perform Notifications:

Notify higher supervision NOTE: The US may call WCC/Supervision to address the Pump failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

Request Turbine System Engineer NOTE: The US may call evaluate effect of backpressure WCC/SE to address the Pump transient on the turbine. failure.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC.

US (Step 17) Refer to O-5.1, LOAD REDUCTION, For addition Guidance.

US (Step 18) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect Examiner NOTE: At any time during this event, the US may enter AP-TURB.4. If so follow these actions.

AP-TURB.4, LOSS OF VACUUM CO (Step 1) Check Condenser Circulating Water System

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 40 of 62 Event

Description:

Circ Water Pump A Trips/Loss of Vacuum Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

CW pump discharge valves - BOTH OPEN

CW pumps - BOTH RUNNING NOTE: Only the B CW Pump is running.

(Step 1 RNO) IF a loss of circulating water NOTE: The US will transition has occurred, THEN to AP-CW.1, LOSS OF to AP-CW.1.

A CIRC WATER PUMP.

After 5 minutes of power reduction, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN After this, an inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MSIVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip, and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS. On the trip one S/G Safety Valve on each S/G lifted and stuck partially OPEN. The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators. The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps.

SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #6 (STM05A (0%, No Ramp) and STM05B (0%, No Ramp))

Indications Available:

Both MSIVs Closed (Green status lights are LIT; Red status lights are DARK)

All Steam Dump Valves are full Open (Red status lights are LIT)

RCS Pressure is increased to greater than 2335 psig

Both Pzr Spray valves full Open

Pzr PORVs full Open

RTBs are CLOSED

ARVs/Safeties lifting, Steam Noise Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

At least one train of reactor trip breakers

- OPEN

Neutron flux - LOWERING

MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action CO

IF reactor trip breakers NOT open, or there is a fire in the power block, THEN perform the following:

Open Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed NOTE: The BUS 15 normal breakers. feeder breaker did NOT open.

IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN

Verify rod drive MG sets tripped.

Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal NOTE: The HCO/CO may feed breakers. re-close breakers for Bus 13.

Reset lighting breakers.

IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power NOTE: The US will range NIS indicates greater than 5%, transition to FR-S.1.

THEN go to FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS, Step1.

NOTE: The US may direct the EO to open BOTH Control Rod Drive MG Set Breakers locally.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS CAUTION RCPS SHOULD NOT BE TRIPPED WITH REACTOR POWER GREATER THAN 5%

NOTE Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

At least one train of reactor trip breakers

- OPEN

Neutron flux - LOWERING

MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.

HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action

IF reactor trip breakers NOT open, NOTE: The US may direct THEN manually insert control rods. the EO to open BOTH Control Rod Drive MG Set Breakers locally.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.

Critical Task:

Upon diagnosing an ATWS, manually insert the control rods within 1 minute, and continue insertion until the reactor is tripped or the rods are on the bottom Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

According to Section 15.8.3.2 of the Ginna UFSAR is assumed that manual rod insertion of at least one bank is initiated within the first 60 seconds of the ATWS event.

CO (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED CO (Step 2 RNO) Manually trip turbine. Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

IF turbine trip can NOT be verified CO (Step 3) Check AFW Pumps Running: Immediate Action CO (Step 3.a) MDAFW pumps - RUNNING Immediate Action CO (Step 3.a RNO) Manually start MDAFW Immediate Action pumps.

CO (Step 3.b) TDAFW pump - RUNNING IF Immediate Action NECESSARY CO (Step 3.b RNO) Manually open steam supply Immediate Action valves.

MOV-3505A

MOV-3504A CAUTION

ACTIONS TAKEN TO INITIATE RCS BORATION SHALL NOT BE REVERSED WHEN PERFORMING STEPS 3 through 7 of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

NOTE

If offsite power is lost coincident with SI, then MCC C and MCC D lockout relays must be reset to restore BA and RMW pumps.

Foldout page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of FR-S.1.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS:

CO

Check SI status:

All SI annunciators - Examiner NOTE: It is likely EXTINGUISHED that SI will be actuated. If

All SI pumps - OFF IN AUTO NOT, the crew will NOT perform the RNO requiring E-0 Actions.

If this is the case, MOVE forward to FR-S.1 Step 4.b actions on Page 48.

HCO/ (Step 4.a RNO) Perform the following:

CO

Complete steps 3 through 7 of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.

IF SI flow indicated, THEN go to Step 5.

IF NOT, THEN go to Step 4b.

Examiner NOTE: The US may hand off the E-0 Steps to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in FR-S.1.

Examiner following operator performing the E-0 steps continue below.

Examiner following operator NOT performing the E-0 Steps continue at Page 49.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC CO Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:

Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND

Bus 17 OR Bus 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:

CO

Any SI Annunciator - LIT

SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED.

NOTE

FOLDOUT page should be open and monitored periodically.

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The HCO/CO will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.

RCP TRIP CRITERIA LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA HCO/ (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

CO

Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY -

EXTINGUISHED

CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG HCO/ (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-CO 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:

CO

All SI pumps - RUNNING

Both RHR pumps - RUNNING HCO/ (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans CO Running:

All fans - RUNNING

Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should CO Be Isolated:

Any MSIV - OPEN NOTE: Both MSIVs are Closed.

HCO/ (Step 3a RNO) Go to Step 4.

CO HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:

CO

MFW pumps - TRIPPED

MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED

S/G A, AOV-3995

S/G B, AOV-3994

S/G Blowdown and sample valves -

CLOSED HCO/ (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -

CO RUNNING HCO/ (Step 6) Verify CI and CVI:

CO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

CI and CVI annunciators - LIT

Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION

Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION

Verify CI and CVI valve status lights -

BRIGHT

CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet valve status lights - BRIGHT

FCV-4561

FCV-4562

Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED

AOV-200A

AOV-200B

AOV-202 NOTE IF performing E0 per direction of FRS.1, FRS.2, or FRH.1 THEN stop here and return to E0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Both MDAFW CO Running Pumps should have already been manually started.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS CO (Step 4.b) Verify at least one charging Examiner NOTE: If SI has pump - RUNNING NOT actuated, continue HERE.

CO (Step 4.c) Align boration path:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 49 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Start two BA transfer pumps

Open MOV-350

Verify BA flow

IF at least one Charging pump running, THEN close CCW outlet valves from RCP Thermal Barriers:

RCP A, AOV-754A

RCP B, AOV-754B

WHEN Boration complete, THEN open CCW Outlet valves from RCP Thermal Barriers:

RCP A, AOV-754A

RCP B, AOV-754B CO (Step 4.d) Verify charging flow path:

Charging valve to loop B cold leg (AOV-294) - OPEN

Charging flow control valve (HCV-142) -

DEMAND AT 0%

Examiners following operator NOT performing E-0 Steps 3-7 continue HERE.

CO/ (Step 5) Check PRZR PORV Status:

HCO

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG

Check PORVs - BOTH CLOSED CO/ (Step 6) Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation HCO

CVI Annunciator - LIT

Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION

Verify CVI valve status lights - BRIGHT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 7) Check If the Following Trips Have NOTE: If the Rx has NOT HCO Occurred: been locally tripped the RNO will be performed, otherwise proceed to Step 7.b.

Reactor trip CO/ (Step 7.a RNO) Dispatch EO to locally NOTE: The US may direct HCO DEPRESS trip button for BOTH Control Rod the EO to open BOTH Drive Motor Generator Set breakers at Control Rod Drive MG Set CRDM Control Panel: Breakers locally.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.

52-1/MG1A, CRD MG SET A BKR

52-2/MG1B, CRD MG SET B BKR CO/ (Step 7.b) Turbine trip HCO CO/ (*Step 8) Check If Reactor IS Subcritical: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Energize MCC A AND B

Check power range channels -

LESS THAN 5%

Check Intermediate range channels

Startup rate - NEGATIVE OR

Intermediate range channels -

LOWERING US

Go to Step 18.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION BORATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE SHUTDOWN MARGIN DURING SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS.

US (Step 18) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect Examiner NOTE: The US will transition back to E-0 and start at Step 8.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Both MDAFW HCO Running Pumps should have already been manually started.

NOTE IF Crosstieing MDAFW Pumps is required, refer to ATT-5.3, ATTACHMENT MDAFW PUMPS CROSSTIE.

CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:

HCO

AFW flow - INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)

AFW flow from each MDAFW pump -

LESS THAN 230 GPM CO/ (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Check S/G narrow range level - NOTE: Since both S/Gs are GREATER THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE faulted, the CO may use A-CNMT] in any S/G 503.1 Step 5.3.B criteria and limit AFW flow to each S/G to 50 gpm.

Check S/G narrow range level - BOTH S/G LESS THAN 50%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Control feed flow to maintain S/G narrow range level between 7% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50%.

CO (Step 10) Check If TDAFW Pump Can Be Stopped:

Both MDAFW pumps - RUNNING

PULL STOP TDAFW pump steam supply valves

MOV-3504A

MOV-3505A CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

NOTE IF starting non-safeguards equipment will result in exceeding 278 amps (yellow line) on Buses 14 or 16, THEN DO NOT start non-safeguards equipment.

CO/ (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP Thermal HCO Barriers:

Annunciator A-7, RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO FLOW EXTINGUISHED

Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW -

EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Because of the failed HCO OR TRENDING TO 547ºF open SG Safety Valves, the RCS will be cooling down rapidly.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 53 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 12 RNO) If temperature less than HCO 547ºF and lowering, THEN perform the following:

Stop dumping steam.

Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed.

IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one S/G.

WHEN S/G level greater than 7% in one NOTE: Since both S/Gs are S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that faulted, the CO may use A-required to maintain level in at least one 503.1 Step 5.3.B criteria and S/G. limit AFW flow to each S/G to 50 gpm.

IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: Both MSIVs are MSIVs. Closed.

CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVs and Spray HCO Valves:

PORVs - CLOSED

Auxiliary spray valve (AOV-296) -

CLOSED

Check PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG

Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED

PCV-431A

PCV-431B CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:

HCO

RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 54 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]

US (Step 14.c RNO) Go to Step 15.

HCO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is CO Intact:

Pressure in both S/Gs - STABLE OR RISING

Pressure in both S/Gs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG US (Step 15 RNO) IF any S/G pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner OR completely depressurized, THEN go to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

NOTE: The US will go to E-2.

E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION CAUTION

AT LEAST ONE S/G SHALL BE MAINTAINED AVAILABLE FOR RCS COOLDOWN.

ANY FAULTED S/G OR SECONDARY BREAK SHOULD REMAIN ISOLATED DURING SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY ACTIONS UNLESS NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN.

NOTE

Critical Safety Function Status Trees should be monitored.

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

Foldout page should be open and monitored periodically.

HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-2.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 55 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

MULTIPLE FUNCTION LOSS CRITERIA CO (Step 1) Check MSIV of Faulted S/G(s) - NOTE: Both MSIVs are CLOSED Closed.

CO (Step 2) Check If Any S/G Secondary Side Is Intact:

Check pressure in S/G A- STABLE OR NOTE: Both SG Pressures RISING are decreasing uncontrollably.

OR

Check pressure in S/G B - STABLE OR RISING US (Step 2 RNO) IF both S/G pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1 NOTE: The US will go to ECA-2.1.

ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS CAUTION

IF THE TDAFW PUMP IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE SOURCE OF FEED FLOW, THEN STEAM

SUPPLY TO THE TDAFW PUMP MUST BE MAINTAINED FROM ONE S/G.

NOTE

FOLDOUT page should be open AND monitored periodically.

Conditions should be evaluated for Site Contingency Reporting (Refer to EP-AA-1012 ADDENDUM 3, R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS).

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 56 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will CO monitor these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-2.1.

LOSS OF SW CRITERIA

SI REINITIATION CRITERIA

E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA

COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION

AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION

E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA CO (Step 1) Check Secondary Pressure Boundary:

Verify all of the following:

MSIVs - CLOSED NOTE: Both MSIVs are Closed.

MFW flow control valves - CLOSED

MFW regulating valves

MFW bypass valves

MFW pump discharge valves -

CLOSED

S/G blowdown and sample valves -

CLOSED

TDAFW pump steam supply valves -

PULL STOP

TDAFW pump flow control valves -

CLOSED

S/G ARVs - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 57 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Dispatch EO to locally isolate S/Gs (Refer NOTE: The US will dispatch to ATT-10.0, ATTACHMENT FAULTED an EO.

S/G) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and perform Schedule ATT-10 for BOTH SGs.

CAUTION A MINIMUM FEED FLOW OF 50 GPM MUST BE MAINTAINED TO EACH S/G WITH A NARROW RANGE LEVEL LESS THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE CNMT].

NOTE Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown (Refer to FIG-2.0, FIGURE SDM).

CO (Step 2) Control Feed Flow to Minimize RCS Cooldown:

(Step 2a) Check cooldown rate in RCS cold NOTE: The cooldown rate is legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR likely to be higher than 100°F/HR.

CO (Step 2a RNO) Lower feed flow to 50 gpm to NOTE: The CO will lower each S/G and go to Step 2c. the AFW flow rate to each SG to 50 gpm in an effort to control the cooldown rate.

NOTE: A Red Path will likely occur on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree, and the US will address this procedure. The procedure will NOT be implemented however, since operator action has caused the Red Path.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 58 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before a severe challenge (Orange Path) develops to the integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. If the action is not taken an unnecessary Orange Path could develop on the RCS Integrity Critical Safety Function requiring a substantial change in the mitigation strategy.

HCO (Step 2c) Check RCS hot leg temperature -

STABLE OR LOWERING.

HCO/ (*Step 3) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: NOTE: This is a Continuous CO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING

SI pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]

US (Step 3.c RNO) Go to Step 4 CAUTION IF ANY PRZR PORV OPENS BECAUSE OF HIGH PRZR PRESSURE, IT SHOULD BE CLOSED AFTER PRESSURE LOWERS TO LESS THAN 2335 psig (REFER TO STEP 4b).

HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR PORVs and Block NOTE: This is a Continuous Valves: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 59 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Power to PORV block valves -

AVAILABLE

PORVs - CLOSED

Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN HCO/ (Step 5) Check Secondary Radiation Levels -

CO NORMAL

Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)

Dispatch EO to locally check steamline NOTE: The US will dispatch radiation an EO.

SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.

Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The US may call activity. WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

CAUTION IF OFFSITE POWER IS LOST AFTER SI RESET, THEN MANUAL ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESTART SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT. (REFER TO ATT-8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

HCO (Step 6) Reset SI CAUTION RCS PRESSURE SHOULD BE MONITORED. IF RCS PRESSURE LOWERS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER TO LESS THAN 300 PSIG [350 PSIG ADVERSE CNMT], THEN THE RHR PUMPS MUST BE MANUALLY RESTARTED TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE RCS.

HCO (Step 7) Monitor If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

RHR pumps -ANY RUNNING IN INJECTION MODE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N20-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 60 of 62 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Check RCS Pressure:

Pressure - GREATER THAN 300 psig [350 psig adverse CNMT]

Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

Stop RHR pumps and place in AUTO NOTE: The HCO will STOP the RHR Pumps.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #5 Core Age: BOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:

70% Power, Equilibrium Xe O-5.2

The plant is at 70% power (BOL).

Outside Air Temp = 51°F

The area has experienced steady Thunderstorms for the past Water Temp = 45°F 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , with wind from the West at 10-20 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

It is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Power Range Channel N44 is removed from service per ER-NIS.3.

Boron: 1570 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm)

The Condensate Booster Pump B is OOS for impeller Total: .021 replacement.

BAST: 17,500 ppm Identified: .003

SR 3.2.4.1/TSR 3.2.4.2 is being performed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months RCS Activity: Normal Unidentified: .018 and O-6.4, QPTR Calculation, was completed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago.

SR 3.2.4.2 must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of raising power >75% RTP. RE is planning on performing a Flux Map on the next shift.

The following Alarms are in:

E-7, NIS TRIP BYPASS

E-18, POWER RANGE LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLTAGE

E-19, POWER RANGE HI RANGE CHANNEL ALERT 108%

E-21, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD STOP 103%

E-28, POWER RANGE ROD DROP - 5%/5 SEC

F-23, RCS OTT CHANNEL ALERT

Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.

TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #5 Equipment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Operator Declarations See NOTES

Load Ascension to 100% None in effect A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECD Rx Trip System PR N44 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago 3.3.1/3.2.4 NA 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Instrumentation/QPTR A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS TRM /ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECD QPTR Monitor 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago TR 3.2.4 QPTR Monitor N/A 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

v t e Letter Sequence Other
CAC:000500, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML20055D883, ML20055E009, ML20057E559, ML20057E560, ML20087G852, ML20087H514, ML20184A247, ML20184A248, ML20240A318, ML20240A322, ML20254A128, ML20254A272, ML20268A322, ML20268B437, ML20268C197, ML20274A136, ML20279A331, ML20297A306, ML20300A556, ML20301A632, ML20302A234, ML20302A235, ML20303A011, ML20303A016, ML20307A010, ML20307A019, ML20321A279, ML20322A350, ML20323A018, ML20325A031, ML20328A162, ML20329A432, ML20329A442, ML20350B716, ML20350B723, ML20350B739, ML20350B785, ML21012A270, ML21025A073, ML21025A143, ML21025A403, ML21025A405, ML21025A414, ML21040A471, ML21040A483, ML21043A207, ML21050A084, ML21050A119, ML21050A227, ML21056A220... further results
MONTHYEAR2020-03-12 [Table View]

ML20322A350

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