ML12339A257
| ML12339A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2012 |
| From: | Geckle M Constellation Energy Nuclear Group |
| To: | Peter Presby Operations Branch I |
| Jackson D | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML12137A368 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01857 | |
| Download: ML12339A257 (89) | |
Text
Question #4 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Choice 'A' is correct because it describes the basis for the 60 sec generator trip time delay explained in the second bullet of P-12, Electrical Systems Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints, step 4.1.5. The second bullet of P-12 step 4.1.5 states the following:
{IOn a major loss of coolant accident (double-ended shear of the reactor coolant cold leg), as the coolant rushes out of the break, the RCP impeller, shaft, flywheel, etc., can be oversped. RCP overspeed could cause catastrophic failure of the flywheel resulting in missiles which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components within the containment. The RCP overspeed concern is minimized by locking the RCPs at -60 Hz for the duration (60 seconds) of the generator trip time delay.//
Choice Ie' is also correct because it describes the basis for the 60 sec generator trip time delay explained in the first bullet of P-12 step 4.1.5. The first bullet of P-12 step 4.1.5 states the following:
"An immediate turbine trip generator trip coincident with a failure of automatic Bus transfer or electrical Buses failure could result in a loss of forced reactor coolant flow. If the reactor trips due to overpower, over-temperature, or low pressure conditions, the loss of flow could make the consequences ofthe accident more severe than reported in the UFSAR. However, if pumping power is lost with a time delayed generator trip, loss of flow is not considered serious because the reactor has been shut down for a period of time."
UFSAR 7.2.2.2.13 states the following:
"Turbine trip causing a reactor trip is provided to anticipate probable plant transients and to avoid the resulting thermal transients. If the reactor were not tripped by the turbine trip, the overtemperature delta T or high pressure trip would prevent reactor safety limits from being exceeded."
Additionally, Technical Specification basis for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation B.3.3.1 states the following relative to the Overtemperature Delta T reactor trip:
liThe Overtemperature A T trip Function is provided to ensure that the design limit departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) is met ... The Overtemperature A T trip Function monitors both variation in power and flow since a decrease in flow has the same effect on AT as a power increase."
As stated in the explanation above, if an immediate loss of flow occurs when the reactor trips on over-temperature the consequences of the accident can be more severe than reported in the UFSAR.
The consequences of the accident are more severe because of power-to-flow concerns, i.e. power is higher with no forced RCS flow sooner than with the 60 second generator trip time delay.
Therefore, choice Ie' adequately describes the basis for the 60 sec generator trip time delay explained in the first bullet of P-12 step 4.1.5.
Page 1 of1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # 1 KIA # G1 2.1.32 Importance Rating 3.8 Conduct of Operations - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
RO Question # 4 Rev 1 Which one of the following statements describes a basis, as explained in P-12, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SETPOINTS, for why the generator trip circuit is designed to be time-delayed, such that the generator trip occurs later than the turbine trip on most turbine trips?
A On a Large Break LOCA the RCP can overs peed causing the motor flywheel to become a missile hazard which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components in containment.
B. On a Large Break LOCA the RCP can overspeed causing the RCP impeller to become a missile hazard which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components in containment.
C. On a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds to prevent formation of excessive voids in reactor head upon the reactor trip.
D. On a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds to prevent an RCS pressure transient upon reactor trip.
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional):
A Correct. Per P-12, on a major loss of coolant accident, the RCP impeller, shaft, flywheel, etc., can overspeed. RCP overs peed could cause catastrophic failure of the flywheel resulting in missiles which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components within containment.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because it is very similar to the correct answer. Incorrect because it identifies the RCP impeller as the missile hazard.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because on natural circulation cooldown and depressurization, potential for void formation may occur. Incorrect because the RCP's remain running after sixty seconds since they transfer to off-site power.
10/30/12
D. Incorrect. Plausible because it is very similar to the other basis for this time delay.
Incorrect because the reactor trip involved has to be a reactor trip that provides DNB protection. The reactor trip from turbine trip does not provide DNB protection.
P-12 Technical Reference(s): P-1 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R0501C, 1.13 Question Source: Bank # C062.0053 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Comments:
10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 3 Group # 1 KIA # G1 2.1.32 Importance Rating 3.8 Conduct of Operations - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
RO Question # 4 Which one of the following statements describes a basis, as explained in P-12, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SETPOINTS, for why the generator trip circuit is designed to be time-delayed, such that the generator trip occurs later than the turbine trip on most turbine trips?
A. On a Large Break LOCA the RCP can overspeed causing the motor flywheel to become a missile hazard which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components in containment.
B. On a Large Break LOCA the RCP can overspeed causing the RCP impeller to become a missile hazard which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components in containment.
C. On a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds to prevent a power-to-flow concern upon reactor trip.
D. On a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds to prevent an RCS pressure transient upon reactor trip.
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional):
A. Correct. Per P-12, on a major loss of coolant accident, the RCP impeller, shaft, flywheel, etc., can overspeed. RCP overs peed could cause catastrophic failure of the flywheel resulting in missiles which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components within containment.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because it is very similar to the correct answer. Incorrect because it identifies the RCP impeller as the missile hazard.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because it is very similar to the other basis for this time delay.
Incorrect because the reactor trip involved has to be a reactor trip that provides DNB protection. The reactor trip from turbine trip does not provide DNB protection.
10/16/2012
D. Incorrect. Plausible because it is very similar to the other basis for this time delay.
Incorrect because the reactor trip involved has to be a reactor trip that provides DNB protection. The reactor trip from turbine trip does not provide DNB protection.
P-12 Technical Reference(s): P-1 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R0501C, 1.13 Question Source: Bank # C062.0053 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Comments:
10/16/2012
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS P-12 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SETPOINTS Revision 02201 Page 8 of 84 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1. Main Generation 4.1.1. The Main Generation System is designed to produce electrical power at 19.5kV and transmit this power off-site to the transmission system (normally 34.5kV or 115kV). The main generator is rated for 613.5 MWe (gross) output at a voltage of 19.5kV. The main transformer steps this voltage up to 115kV for distribution through the generating system.
4.1.2. The normal source of auxiliary power during plant operation is the main generator output via the Unit Auxiliary Transformer 11. The Station Auxiliary Transformers 12A and 12B step down 34.5kV from lines entering the station to 4160V for use in the station 4160V and 480V Electrical Systems.
4.1.3. Standby power required during plant startup, shutdown, and after a reactor trip is supplied from the Station Auxiliary Transformers 12A and 12B.
- Transformer 12A is supplied via circuit 7T which originates at Substation 13A.
Transformer 7 in substation 13A steps down voltage from 115kV to 34.5kV to supply circuit 7T.
- Transformer 12B is supplied via circuit 767 which originates in substation 13A. Transformer 6 in substation 13A steps down voltage from 115kV to 34.5kV to supply circuit 767.
4.1.4. Any type of fault condition that can occur within the 19.5kV system will cause a generator trip. This will result in the de-energization of the Unit Auxiliary Transformer 11 and the tripping of the generator output Breakers 1G13A72 and 9X 13A72. Bus tie Breakers from 4160 volt Bus 12B to 11 B and from Bus 12A to 11A will automatically close to re-energize these Buses with power.
Attachment 3, Generator Trips, lists trips.
4.1.5. On most turbine trips, generator trip circuit is delayed approximately 60 seconds.
The following are two safety-related bases for generator trip time delay:
- An immediate turbine trip generator trip coincident with a failure of automatic Bus transfer or electrical Buses failure could result in a loss of forced reactor coolant flow. If the reactor trips due to overpower, over-temperature, or low pressure conditions, the loss of flow could make the consequences of the accident more severe than reported in the UFSAR. However, if pumping power is lost with a time delayed generator trip, loss of flow is not considered serious because the reactor has been shut down for a period of time.
- On a major loss of coolant accident (double-ended shear of the reactor coolant cold leg), as the coolant rushes out of the break, the RCP impeller, shaft, flywheel. etc., can be oversped. RCP overspeed could cause catastrophic failure of the flywheel resulting in missiles which could damage the containment liner or ECCS components within the containment. The RCP overs peed concern is minimized by locking the RCPs at -60 Hz for the duration (60 seconds) of the generator trip time delay.
GINNAfUFSAR CHAPTER 7 INSTRU!HENTATION AND CONTROLS will directly trip the reactor to prevent departure from nucleate boiling. This trip is bypassed below 8% power by permissive P-7.
The underfrequency on the pump power supply trip provides reactor protection following a major grid frequency disturbance. If an underfrequency condition below 57.7 Hz (one-out of-two logic) exists on both reactor coolant pump buses, all reactor coolant pump breakers and the reactor are tripped. This is done because an underfrequency condition will slow down the pumps thereby reducing their coastdown time following a pump trip.
The undervoltage and underfrequency trip logic is shown in Drawing 33013-1353, Sheet 4.
7.2.2.2.12 Safety Injection System Actuation Trip A reactor trip occurs on the actuation of the safety injection system. The means of actuating the safety injection system trips are described in Section 7.3.2.
7.2.2.2.13 Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Turbine trip causing a reactor trip is provided to anticipate probable plant transients and to avoid the resulting thermal transients. If the reactor were not tripped by the turbine trip, the overtemperature delta T or high pressure trip would prevent reactor safety limits from being exceeded. By utilizing this trip, undesirable excursions are prevented rather than terminated.
The trip is sensed by a decrease in emergency trip system oil pressure or all stop valves shut.
Three switches are mounted on the emergency trip oil header and their outputs are tied together in a two-out-of-three logic. This logic will initiate a reactor trip (auto-stop oil pres sure less than 45 psig) provided the reactor is operating above 50% power as sensed by per missive P-9. It is not necessary to trip the reactor if it is operating below 50% power since rod control in conjunction with steam dump can accomodate a 50% load rejection without a reactor trip (Section 10.7.1). Turbine trip leading to reactor trip logic is shown in Drawing 33013-1353, Sheet 3.
7.2.2.2.14 Low-Low Steam-Generator Water Level Trip The purpose of this trip is to protect the steam generators for the case of a sustained steam!
feedwater flow mismatch. The trip is actuated on two-out-of-three low-low water level sig nals in either steam generator. The trip logic is shown in Drawing 3301 1353, Sheet 13.
7.2.2.3 Interlocks A number of reactor trips applicable to power range operation are automatically bypassed to permit reactor startup and low power operation. The following trip functions are blocked by a coincidence of three-out-of-four power range nuclear flux channels reading less than 8%
power and one-out-of-two low turbine load (turbine impulse chamber pressure) signals:
A. Low reactor coolant flow (both loops).
B. Reactor coolant pump breaker trip (both loops).
C. Turbine trip with P-9 permissive present.
D. Undervoltage.
Page 20 of 187 Revision 22 0312010
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 In MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal or all rods are not fully inserted, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function must be OPERABLE to provide core protection against a rod withdrawal accident. If the CRD System is not capable of rod withdrawal and all rods are fully inserted, the source range detectors are not required to trip the reactor. However, their monitoring Function must be OPERABLE to monitor core neutron levels and provide indication of reactivity changes that may occur as a result of events like a boron dilution. The requirements for the NIS source range detectors in MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.2, "Nuclear Instrumentation."
- 5. Overtemperature IlT The Overtemperature ~T trip Function is provided to ensure that the design limit departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) is met.
This trip Function also limits the range over which the Overpower IlT trip Function must provide protection. The inputs to the Overtemperature ~ T trip include pressure, Tavg' axial power distribution, and reactor power as indicated by loop IlT assuming full reactor coolant flow. Protection from violating the DNBR limit is assured for those transients that are slow with respect to delays from the core to the measurement system. The Overtemperature
- lT trip Function monitors both variation in power and flow since a decrease in flow has the same effect on IlT as a power increase.
The Overtemperature IlT trip Function uses the IlT of each loop as a measure of reactor power and is compared with a setpoint that is automatically varied with the following parameters:
reactor coolant average temperature - the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in coolant density and specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature; pressurizer pressure - the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in system pressure; and axial power distribution f(lll) - the Trip Setpoint is varied to account for imbalances in the axial power distribution as detected by the NIS upper and lower power range detectors.
If axial peaks are greater than the design limit, as indicated by the difference between the upper and lower NIS power range detectors, the Trip Setpoint is reduced in accordance with Note 1 of Table 3.3.1-1.
Dynamic compensation is included for system piping delays from the core to the temperature measurement system.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.1-13 Revision 61
Question #26 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Rev. 1 Both choice 'B' and choice 10' are correct because the statement in the second part of question
- 26 does not clearly ask which design basis accident results in the highest peak containment pressure.
The second part of Question #26 states the following:
"The design basis accident for the peak pressure limit in Containment is _ _ _ _ _ /I Technical Specification Basis B 3.6.4 for Containment Pressure states the following:
"Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the OBA analyses performed to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure. The limiting OBAs considered, relative to containment pressure, are the LOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure transients. No two OBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The worst case SLB generates larger mass and energy releases than the worst case LOCA. Thus, the SLB event bounds the LOCA event from the containment peak pressure standpoint {Ref. 1}./I 1
Both choice 'B' and choice '0 are correct because as stated above both the LOCA and SLB are limiting OBAs considered relative to containment pressure. It is true that the SLB accident produces the highest containment pressure, but this is not clearly asked for in part #2 of the question. For SLB to be the only correct answer then part #2 should have simply asked "which accident produces the highest pressure in containment?/I The original wording is confusing thus resulting in candidates selecting LOCA vice SLB because both are considered, and LOCA is the overall limiting design basis accident for containment based on offsite dose. Therefore, both choices 'B' and 'D' should be accepted as correct.
Page 1 of 1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # 2 KJA# G2 2.2.42 Importance Rating 3.9 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications RO Question # 26 Rev 1 The crew has placed the Containment Mini-Purge system in service and notes that Containment Pressure is 0.4 psig and rising slowly.
If pressure continues to rise, the crew will be required to enter a Tech Spec Action statement at (1) psig, which is the initial pressure used in the analysis for determining the peak pressure limit. The design basis accident resulting in the highest peak pressure in Containment is a (2)
A. (1) 0.5 psig; (2) Steamline break inside CNMT B. (1) 1.0 psig; (2) Steamline break inside CNMT C. (1) 0.5 psig; (2) LOCA D. (1) 1.0psig; (2) LOCA Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the value in (1) is the MCB alarm setpoint which would require CNMT depressurization while (2) is the correct accident.
B. Correct. Per ITS 3.6.4 basis, the initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.7 psia (1.0 psig). The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case steamline break, 59.6 pSig, does not exceed the containment design pressure of 60 psig.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because the value in (1) is the MCB alarm setpoint which would require CNMT depressurization, while (2) is plausible because peak CNMT pressure following DBA LOCA is a valid concern (but not after EPU).
D. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) is the correct setpoint and (2) is plausible because peak CNMT pressure following DBA LOCA is a valid concern (but not after EPU).
10/30/12
Technical Reference(s): ITS Basis B3.6.4 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None R2101C, 1.12 and 1.13 Learning Objective:
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Design, components, and function of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Comments:
10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # 2 KIA # G2 2.2.42 Importance Rating 3.9 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications RO Question # 26 The crew has placed the Containment Mini-Purge system in service and notes that Containment Pressure is 0.4 psig and rising slowly.
If pressure continues to rise, the crew will be required to enter a Tech Spec Action statement at (1) psig, which is the initial pressure used in the analysis for determining the peak pressure limit. The design basis accident for the peak pressure limit in Containment is (2)
A. (1) 0.5 psig; (2) Steamline break inside CNMT B. (1) 1.0 psig; (2) Steam line break inside CNMT C. (1) 0.5 psig; (2) LOCA D. (1) 1.0 psig; (2) LOCA Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the value in (1) is the MCB alarm setpoint which would require CNMT depressurization while (2) is the correct accident.
B. Correct. Per ITS 3.6.4 basis, the initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.7 psia (1.0 psig). The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case steamline break, 59.6 psig, does not exceed the containment design pressure of 60 psig.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because the value in (1) is the MCB alarm setpoint which would require CNMT depressurization, while (2) is plausible because peak CNMT pressure following DBA LOCA is a valid concern (but not after EPU).
D. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) is the correct setpoint and (2) is plausible because peak CNMT pressure following DBA LOCA is a valid concern (but not after EPU).
10/16/2012
Technical Reference(s): ITS Basis B3.6.4 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None R2101C, 1.12 and 1.13 Learning Objective:
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Design, components, and function of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Comments:
10/16/2012
Containment Pressure B 3.6.4 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure BASES BACKGROUND The containment structure serves to contain radioactive material trat may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve the initial conditions assumedin the accident analyses for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and steam line break (SLB). These limits also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere.
Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derived from the input conditions used in the containment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressure analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a DBA, post accident containment pressures could exceed calculated values. Exceeding containment design pressure may result in leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis. Operation with containment pressure outside the limits of the LCO violates an initial condition assumed in the accident analysis.
APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the DBA SAFETY analyses performed to establish the maximum peak containment internal ANALYSES pressure. The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment pressure, are the LOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure transients.
No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively.
The worst case SLB generates larger mass and energy releases than the worst case LOCA. Thus, the SLB event bounds the LOCA eVEnt from the containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1).
The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.7 psia (1.0 psig). The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case SLB, 59.6 pSig, does not exceed the containment design pressure, 60 psig.
The containment was also designed for an external pressure load equivalent to -2.5 psig. However, internal pressure is limited to -2.0 psig based on concerns related to providing continued cooling for the reactor coolant pump motors inside containment.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.6.4-1 Revision 42
Question #31 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Rev.2 Question #31 states the following:
"Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- Annunciator C-l0, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW, is lit.
- One SW pump is running.
Per the alarm response, Annunciator C-10 alarms when Service Water flow from any CNMT Recirc Fan is less than (1) gpm and either CNMT Recirc Fan(s} service water outlet (FCV 4561/FCV-4562) is full open; and, with only a single service water pump operating, refer to (2) "
Only choices 'e' and 'D' are plausible because Alarm Response Procedure AR-C-10 states the low flow setpoint is 1050 gpm.
The second part of question #31 requires the candidate to determine which Service Water AP should be referenced based on the conditions stated in the stem ofthe question. Annunciator C-10 is listed as a possible symptom in both AP-SW.1 and AP-SW.2 and is therefore a possible indication of either loss of SW pumps or a SW leak or both. Alarm Response Procedure AR-C-10 has steps to refer to AP-SW.2 if the alarm is due to loss of SW pumps and to refer to AP-SW.l if a SW leak is indicated.
As written, the stem of the question does not contain sufficient information without making assumptions to allow a candidate to determine positively whether alarm is due to "loss of SW pumps" or if a "SW leak is indicated." Simply stating that one SW pump is running doesn't necessarily imply that alarm is due to loss of SW pumps or that a SW leak is not indicated.
Additionally, the question is asking which SW AP to "refer to". Refer to simply denotes a procedure which may provide necessary or useful information. With only the conditions stated in the stem of the question, it would not be unreasonable to expect an operator with a healthy questioning attitude to reference both APs to determine the optimal recovery actions.
In summary, either choice Ie' or choice 'D' should be considered correct since AP-SW.l and AP SW.2 are both referenced in AR-C-10. Without being able to definitely determine the cause of the alarm, it would be expected that both APs should be referenced.
Page 1 of 1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2
~~--
Group # 1 KIA # 022 2.4.31 Importance Rating 4.2 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (Regarding Containment Cooling)
RO Question # 31 Rev 1 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- Annunciator J-9, SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP, is lit
- Annunciator C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW, is lit.
- One of the two running SW pump trips.
Per the alarm response, annunciator C-1 0 alarms when Service Water flow from any CNMT Recirc Fan is less than (1) gpm and either CNMT Recirc Fan(s) service water outlet (FCV 4561/FCV-4562) is full open; and, with only a single service water pump operating, refer to (2)
(1) (2)
A. 1100 AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak B. 1100 AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water C. 1050 AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak D. 1050 AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the examinee can easily confuse alarm C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM with the setpoint of alarm K-21 , SFP LOW FLOW, which is 1100 gpm. Part 2 is plausible because license class students are always challenged to differentiate entry to AP-SW.1 versus AP-SW.2. Additionally, both AP-SW.1 and AP-SW.2 verify at least one SW pump running in each loop. Incorrect because C-10 alarms when flow is < 1050 gpm, and the appropriate procedure for a single pump running is AP-SW.2.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because the examinee can easily confuse alarm C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM with the 10/30/12
setpoint of alarm K-21 , SFP LOW FLOW, which is 1100 gpm, and the second part is correct. Incorrect because C-10 alarms when flow is < 1050 gpm.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because the first part is correct, and license class students are always challenged to differentiate entry to AP-SW.1 versus AP-SW.2. Both AP-SW.1 and AP-SW.2 are referred to in the required actions section. Additionally, both AP SW.1 and AP-SW.2 verify at least one SW pump running in each loop. Incorrect because the appropriate procedure for a single pump running is AP-SW.2.
D. Correct. Per the Alarm Response, the alarm setpoint is < 1050 gpm, and the correct procedure is AP-SW.2.
Technical Reference(s): AR-C-10 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R5101C 1.04 Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.
Comments: Administratively, the plant cannot operate at full power with only a single service water pump running. The question states: "if only a single service water pump is operating".
This infers that one or more service water pumps must have tripped. There is no information suggesting that a service water leak exists. With the lack of specifics, the examinee cannot assume that a leak exists. Therefore, the appropriate procedure must be AP-SW.2. The examinee must use system knowledge to determine what would cause the alarm, and recognize the purpose of the AP-SW procedures to select the appropriate procedure. Just recognizing the purpose makes this an RO question rather than an SRO only question.
10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 022 2.4.31 Importance Rating 4.2 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (Regarding Containment Cooling)
RO Question # 31 Given the following:
- The plant is atfull power.
- Annunciator C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW, is lit.
- One SW pump is running.
Per the alarm response, annunciator C-1 0 alarms when Service Water flow from any CNMT Recirc Fan is less than (1) gpm and either CNMT Recirc Fan(s) service water outlet (FCV 4561/FCV-4562) is full open; and, with only a single service water pump operating, refer to (2)
(1) (2)
A. 1100 AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak B. 1100 AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water C. 1050 AP-SW.1, Service Water Leak D. 1050 AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the examinee can easily confuse alarm C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM with the setpoint of alarm K-21, SFP LOW FLOW, which is 1100 gpm. Part 2 is plausible because license class students are always challenged to differentiate entry to AP-SW.1 versus AP-SW.2. Additionally, both AP-SW.1 and AP-SW.2 verify at least one SW pump running in each loop. Incorrect because C-10 alarms when flow is < 1050 gpm, and the appropriate procedure for a single pump running is AP-SW.2.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because the examinee can easily confuse alarm C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM with the setpoint of alarm K-21 , SFP LOW FLOW, which is 1100 gpm, and the second part is 10/16/2012
correct. Incorrect because C-10 alarms when flow is < 1050 gpm.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because the first part is correct. and license class students are always challenged to differentiate entry to AP-SW.1 versus AP-SW.2. Both AP-SW.1 and AP-SW.2 are referred to in the required actions section. Additionally. both AP SW.1 and AP-SW.2 verify at least one SW pump running in each loop. Incorrect because the appropriate procedure for a single pump running is AP-SW.2.
D. Correct. Per the Alarm Response, the alarm setpoint is < 1050 gpm. and the correct procedure is AP-SW.2.
Technical Reference(s): AR-C-10 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R5101C 1.04 Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.
Comments: Administratively, the plant cannot operate at full power with only a single service water pump running. The question states: "if only a single service water pump is operating".
This infers that one or more service water pumps must have tripped. There is no information suggesting that a service water leak exists. With the lack of specifics, the examinee cannot assume that a leak exists. Therefore, the appropriate procedure must be AP-SW.2. The examinee must use system knowledge to determine what would cause the alarm, and recognize the purpose of the AP-SW procedures to select the appropriate procedure. Just recognizing the purpose makes this an RO question rather than an SRO only question.
10/16/2012
EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES A*503.1 USERS GUIDE Revision 04405 Page 12 of 56 SS. Perform
- 1. To carry through to completion
- Example - Perform the following.
TI. Place
- 1. To move a control to a specific position.
- Example - Place in auto.
UU. Raise
- 1. To increase in value or amount.
- Example - Raise charging flow to restore PRZR level W. Record
- 1. To document in writing
- Example - Record RCS pressure.
WW. Referto
- 1. To utilize a procedure, attachment, or document to address concerns or conditions
- Example - Refer to AP-IA.1 Loss of Instrument Air XX. Reset
- 1. To restore to a previous or initial state. Generally directs placement of a component or control to a pre-trip or ready/standby condition.
- Example - Reset SI.
YY. Restore
- 1. To place in an original condition.
- Example - Restore power to any train of AC emergency busses.
ZZ. Return to
- 1. To transition to a previous step within the same procedure, or to a previous procedure
- Example - Return to step 2.
- Return to procedure and step in effect.
AAA. Ruptured
- 1. Condition in which a steam generator has primary to secondary leakage in excess of charging pump capacity such that SI is (or was) required to maintain RCS inventory.
BBB. Sample
- 1. To take a representative portion for the purpose of examination
- Example - Sample steam generator blowdown for activity.
EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES A-503.1 USERS GUIDE Revision 04405 Page 25 of 56
- 2. The word OR is used between alternative conditions. Use of the word OR implies the inclusive sense. This application may also use the term AND/OR. The exclusive sense of the word OR is denoted by using the terminology; either A OR B, but not both.
- 3. When two or more actions or criteria are separated by an OR condition, only one action needs to be successfully taken or one criteria successfully met to allow progression to the next step or sub step.
- 4. Action steps contingent upon certain conditions or combinations of conditions, begin with the logic terms IF or WHEN followed by a description of the condition(s), a comma, the logic term THEN and the action to be taken. IF is used for unexpected or possible conditions, WHEN is used for expected or probable conditions, and THEN is only used in conditional statements.
M. Use of Reference Terms
- 1. The words "go to" followed by only a step number directs transition to a subsequent step within the procedure being used.
- 2. The words "return to" followed by only a step number directs transition to a previous step within the procedure being used.
- 3. The words "go to" followed by a procedure designator and title and a step number, direct a transition to the specified EOP/AP. If no step number is specified, then transition is to the beginning of a specified procedure.
- EXAMPLE: Go to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 20.
- 4. The words "refer to" followed by a procedure designator and title, are used to denote a procedure which may provide necessary or useful information during the execution of an EOP/AP. In general, those procedures referenced cover low probability occurrences, or plant evaluations with their own procedures whose inclusion in the EOP/AP would cause excessive complication of and reduced effectiveness of the EOP/AP. Referenced procedures should be performed in parallel with the primary procedure.
- Example: Refer to ER-AFW.1, Alternate Water Supply to AFW Pumps.
- 5. Procedures entered for supplemental guidance or from CSFST direction may contain a "return to" statement.
- 6. A procedure with multiple entry conditions may state: "RETURN TO PROCEDURE AND STEP IN EFFECT", which denotes a return to the last previous EOP and step in use.
- 7. If awaiting a condition to be satisfied before performing the actions in a step/substep, then the RNO may direct the operator to continue with subsequent steps with the stipulation that when the desired condition is satisfied, the bypassed actions should be performed. The word "DO" followed by the appropriate step/sub step numbers is used in this situation.
- Example: Continue with Step 17. WHEN SIG level greater than 17%,
THEN do steps 16c through 16g.
PAGE 1 OF 2 REV. 01000 Controlled Copy #_ _
ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURE AR-C-10 ALARM TITLE:
CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM ALARM SETPOINT (S) :
CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN SW OUT VALVE (FCV-4561) FULL OPEN OR CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN SW OUT BYP VALVE (FCV-4562) FULL OPEN AND SW FLOW FROM ANY CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN LESS THAN 1050 GPM SOURCE (S):
CNMT RECIRC FAN SW Outlet Flow FIA 2033, FIA 2034, FIA 2035, FIA 2036 FCV-4561 or 4562 Full Open LS-1 33/4561 LS-1 33/4562 REQUIRED ACTION:
- 1. Verify at least one of the following status lights bright:
o RECIRC FN SW OUT FCV-4561 OPEN o RECIRC FN SW BYP FCV-4562 OPEN
- 2. Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating
- 3. IF alarm is due to loss of SW pump(s}, THEN refer to AP-SW.2.
- 4. Notify AO to perform the following: (inside Door #37) o Check CNMT Coolers SW outlet FCV-4561 o Check CNMT Fan Coolers SW outlet bypass FCV-4562 o Check CNMT Recirc Fans Coolers outlet flows o Check CNMT Recirc Fans Coolers outlet temperature o Report back on equipment status
- 5. !E SW leak indicated, THEN refer to AP-SW.1.
COMMENTS:
References:
- ELEMENTARY #10905-369
- FCV-4561 is automatically positioned to control Containment Temperature.
- FCV-4561 fails open on Train A SI. FCV-4562 fails open on Train B SI.
- PPCS provides indication by digital points F2033D, F2034D, F2035D, F2036D which CRFC has low flow.
Continued on the next Page
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 1 of 14 Applicable To:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station Approval Authority: Manager - Operations
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 2 of 14 A. PURPOSE - This procedure provides the necessary instructions to respond to a service water system leak.
B. ENTRY CONDITIONS / SYMPTOMS
- 1. ENTRY CONDITIONS - This procedure is entered from:
- a. ER-SH.l, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SCREENHOUSE, if a SW leak has occurred.
- 2. SYMPTOMS - The symptoms of SERVICE WATER LEAK are:
- a. AR-PPCS-P2160, SERVICE WATER PUMPS A & B HEADER, or
- b. AR-PPCS-P2161, SERVICE WATER PUMPS C & D HEADER, or
- c. Sump pump down frequency rises in containment, the AUX BLDG, or INT BLDG, or
- d. Unexplained rise in the waste hold-up tank, or
- e. Visual observation of a SW leak, or
- f. Annunciator C-2, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET HI TEMP 217°F, lit, or
- g. Annunciator C-l0, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 1050 GPM, lit, or
- h. Annunciator E-31, CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN CONDENSATE HI-HI LEVEL alarm, exhibits an unexplained rise in frequency, or
- i. Annunciator H-6, CCW SERVICE WATER LO FLOW 1000 GPM, lit.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 3 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ......- - - - - - - .
1 verify 480V AC Emergency Ensure associated D/G(s) running Busses 17 and 18 - ENERGIZED and attempt to manually load busses 17 and/or 18 onto the D/G(s) if necessary.
neither bus 17 nor bus 18 can be energized. THEN perform the following:
- a. Trip the reactor
- b. WHEN all E 0 Immediate Actions done. THEN trip both RCPs
- c. Close letdown isol. AOV-427
- d. Close excess letdown. HCV-123
- e. Go to E-O. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION either bus 17 OR bus 18 is deenergized. THEN refer to AP-ELEC.17/18. LOSS OF SAFEGUARDS BUS 17/18.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 4 of 14 ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE t------I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED t---------.
2 Verify At Least One SW Pump Perform the following:
Running In Each Loop:
- a. Manually start SW pumps as
- A or B pump in loop A necessary (257 kweach).
- C or D pump in loop B
- b. IF adequate cooling can NOT be supplied to a running DIG.
perform the following:
- 1) Pull stop affected DIG
- 2) Immediately depress voltage shutdown pushbutton
- 3) Refer to ER-D/G.2. ALTERNATE COOLING FOR EMERGENCY DIGs
- c. IF no SW pumps can be operated.
THEN perform the following:
- 1) Trip the reactor
- 2) WHEN all E 0 Immediate Actions done. trip BOTH RCPs
- 3) Close letdown isol, AOV-427
- 4) Close excess letdown, HCV-123.
- 5) Go to E-O. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 5 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1-------...,
Abnormally low pressure in either SI'" loop may indicate that the idle pump check valve is open. This may be corrected by or the idle pump.
o Low Pressure in either SW may be a result of the running pump I configuration.
3 Check SW tern Status:
- a. Check SW loop header pressures: a. three SW pumps operating and either loop pressure less than 0 Pressure in both loops 40 psig, the reactor APPROXIMATELY EQUAL and go to E 0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
0 PPCS SW low pressure alarm status - NOT LOW IF two SW pumps operating and either loop pressure less
- PPCS point ID P2160 than 45 psig. start one
0 Pressure in both STABLE OR RISING
- b. Check SW loop header pressures b. either SW pressure is GREATER THAN 55 PSIG less than 55 PSIG with three SW pumps running AND cause can NOT be corrected, THEN initiate a controlled shutdown while continuing with this procedure to AP-TURB.5. RAPID LOAD REDUCTION) .
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 6 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1--------..,
If SW is lost to any rds equipment, the affected component should be declared inoperable and appropriate actions taken as required by ITS, Section 3.
o CNMT sump A level of 10 feet is app 6 feet 6 inches below the bottom of the reactor vessel.
4 Check For SW In CNMT:
a Sump A level - RISING
-OR o Sump A pump start RISING (Refer to ReS Leakage Log)
- b. Evaluate Sump A conditions: b. Plant shutdown should be considered. consult plant staff.
- 1) Verify Leakage within capacity of one A pump (50 gpm)
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 7 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i - - - - - - - . . . . ,
NOTE: 0 One Reactor Compartment cooling fan should be running whenever RCS temperature is greater than 135°F.
o CNMT recirc fan condensate collector level indicators may be helpful in identifying a leaking fan cooler.
5 Check CNMT fan indications: Dispatch AO with locked valve key to perform ATT-2.3, ATTACHMENT SW o CNMT recirc fan collector dump LOADS IN CNMT to determine leak frequency - NORMAL (Refer to RCS location. WHEN CNMT SW leak Daily Leakage Log) location identified, THEN go to Step 9.
o CNMT recirc fan SW flows APPROXIMATELY EQUAL (INTER BLDG basement by IBELIP)
- Recirc Fan A, FIA-2033
- Recirc Fan B, FIA-2034
- Recirc Fan C, FIA-2035
- Recirc Fan D, FIA-2036 o Reactor compartment cooler SW outle*t pressures - APPROXIMATELY EQUAL (INTER BLDG SAMPLE HOOD AREA)
- Cooler A - PI 2232
- Cooler B - PI 2141
EOI': TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 8 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 - - - - - - - - .
6 Dispatch AO To Screenhouse To Perform The Following:
- a. Verify idle SW pump check valve a. Not Control Room of any closed indication of check valve failure.
a Idle pump shaft stopped o Idle pump discharge pressure ZERO (unisolate and check local pressure indicator) a SW Pump A, PI-2098, V-4501D o SW Pump B, PI 2099, V-4502D o SW Pump C, PI 2100, V-4503C o SW D, PI-2IOI, V 4S04C
- b. Investigate for SW leak in b Perform the following:
Screenhouse NO EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE INDICATED ~) Identify leak location.
IF excessive leakage from underground header indicated.
TlIEN isolation of header should be considered (Refer to ATT-2.2. ATTACHMENT SW ISOLATION)
- 2) Notify Control Room of leak location.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 9 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1 - - - - - 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 - - - - - - - - - ,
Refer to ATT-2.2, ATTACHMENT SW ISOLATION for a list of the or non safeguards loads supplied by each service water header.
7 Check Indications For Leak Di AO to the area to Location: investi e for 1~~"~F'"
o AUX BLDG sump pump start I is from the common SW frequency - NORMAL (Refer to RCS discharge header from the CCW and Daily Leakage Log) SFP Heat the follOWing; o Annunciator L-9, AUX BLDG SUMP HI 1.EVEL - EXTINGUISHED a. Evaluate Leak Rate. If the I to flood o Annunciator L 17, INTER BLDG S1)
SUMP HI LEVEL - EXTINGUISHED
- 1) Trip the Reactor and E 0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Immediate Actions
- 2) both RCP's
- 3) Close AOV 427 and Hev 123
- 4) Close all Aux SW Isolation Valves o MOV-4616.4735 o MOV-4615.4734
- b. Place the SW Redundant Return Line in service per T 36.2, SERVICE WATER REDUNDANT RETURN LINE OPERATION.
C. Close SFP Heat B SW outlet valve V 8685.
- d. If the Aux isolation valve were reopen the valves.
o MOV-4616,4735 o MOV 4615,4734
EOP: TIT LE:
REV; 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 10 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1--------,
8 Dispatch AO To Locally Investigate For SW Leakage And To Monitor Operat Equipment
- Turbine BLDG
- SAFW pump room If SW is lost to either DIG, refer to ER-D/G.2. ALTERNATE COOLING FOR EMERGENCY DIGs. if is 9 Evaluate SW Leak Concerns
- a. Check SW pump status AT LEAST a. either SW header pressure THREE PUMPS RUNNING less than 45 g. start third SW pump.
BOTH LOOPS GREATER THAN 45 PSIG
ATTACHMENT SPLIT Si-l HEADERS)
- 2) IF at power, THEN initiate a controlled shutdown (Refer to AP-TURB.5.
RAPID LOAD REDUCTION).
- 3) Go to 10.
- c. Verify leak location IDENTIFIED c. Return to Step 3.
- d. operating at power d. Verify SW system conditions ropriate for plant mode to ITS Section 3.7.8) and go to Step 10.
- e. Leak isolation at power - e. plant shutdown required.
ACCEPTABLE refer to 0-2.1. NORMAL SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN or AP TURB.s, N\PID LOAD REDUCTION.
EDP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 11 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1 - - - - - - 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 - - - - - - - . . . . ,
10 Dispatch AO(s) To Locally Isolate SW Leak As Necessary
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 12 of 14 ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE \------4 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 - - - - - - - - ,
11 Veri SW Leak Isolated
- a. Monitor SW System Operation a. IF SW leak can be isolated within the affected loop, THEN o SW loop header pressure stop SW pumps in the affected RESTORED TO PRE-EVENT VALUE Archive PPCS point 10 loop A P2160 OR loop B P2161) a Both SW loop header pressures
- STABLE
- b. Verify At Least One SIV Pump b. Perform the following:
Running In Each Loop:
- 1) Ensure two SW pumps running
- A or B pump in loop A (257 kweach).
- C or D pump in loop B
- 2) adequate cooling can be supplied to a running DIG, THEN perform the following:
a) Pull stop affected DIG b) Immediately s voltage shutdown pushbutton c) Refer to ER-D/G.2, ALTERNATE COOLING FOR EMERGENCY DIGs.
This Step continued on the next page.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 13 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED / - - - - - - - -.....
11 continued from previous page)
- 3) no SW pumps can be operated, THEN perform the following:
a) Trip the reactor b) }J:HEN all E 0 Immediate Actions done. THEN trip BOTH Reps c) Close letdown isol, AOV-427 d) Close Excess Letdown Isolation Valve. HCV-123 e) Go to E 0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
- 4) only one SW pump can be operated. THEN refer to AP-SW.2. LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.
- c. Restore to normal position all valves repositioned during leak investigation leak isolation boundary.
12 Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status (Refer to AR procedures)
EOP: 1 IfLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.1 SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 14 of 14 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1 - - - - - - 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1--------..,
NRC IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION. for reporting requirements.
13 Notify Higher rvision END
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 02300 AP-SW.l SERVICE WATER LEAK PAGE 1 of 1
- 1) ATTACHMENT SW ISOLATION (ATT-2. 2)
EOP: II* LE:
REV: 00801 AP-SW.2 LOSS OF SERVICE \i'JATER PAGE 1 of 8 I
Applicable To:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station Approval Authority: Manager Operations N
CATEGORY 1.0 REVIEWED BY: ._______.. __.. __
EOP: I: liLt::
REV: 0080 SERVICE WATER PAGE 2 of 8 I
A. PURPOSE This procedure provides the necessary in to re to a loss of service wate pumps.
B. ENTRY CONDITIONS/SYMPTOMS
- 1. ENTRY CONDITIONS - This re is entered from:
- a. -ELEC.17/ 8, S OF SAFEGUARDS BUS 1 / 8.
- b. Any of everal EOPs, when only one SIr.J pump can be operated.
- c. ER , RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SCREENHOUSE, when at least SW pump is lost.
- 2. SYMPTOMS - The of LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PUMPS are:
- a. AR-PPCS P2160, SERVICE WATER PUMPS A & B HEAJ3R, or
- b. AR-PPCS P2161, SERVICE \'\fATER PUMPS C & D or
- c. Annunciator C 2, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLET HI TEMP 217°F, lit, or
- d. Annunciator C-10, CONTAINMENT RECIRC CLRS WATER OUTLE~ LO F~OW 050 lit, or
- e. Annunc ator H-6, CC'(r~ SERVICE WATER Lo\'I] FLOl'J 000 Gpj\1, lit, r
- f. H 9, AUXILIARY FEED PUMP C~G WTR FLTR HI DIFF PRES , lit,
- g. Annunc I 0, CW PUMP SEAL WATER LO FLOW, lit, or
- h. Annunciator J-4, GENERATOR ISOPHASE BUS COOLING SYSTEM, lit, or
- 1. Annunciator J-9, SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP, lit, or
- j. Annunciator K-30, TURBINE PLANT S]l..]'vIPLING RACK TROUBLE, lit.
Eor: TITLE:
REV: 00801 AP-m'L 2 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PAGE 3 of 8 RESPONSE t-----I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED t--------~
1 Veri 480V AC Emergency Ensure associated D/G(s)
Busses 17 and 18 ENERGIZED and to manually load busses and/or 18 onto thei espective D/G( ).
neither bus 17 nor 18 can be ene THEN fol
- a. Tr
- b. all E 0 Immediate Actions done, tr both RCPs
- c. Clos letdown , AOV-4.27
- d. Close exces letdown, -123 Go to E 0, REACTOR P OR SAFETY INcTECTION
.8 j.s r to AP ELEC.17/18, LOSS OF SAFEGUARDS BUS 1 / 8.
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 00 01 AP-Sv'J.2 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PAGE 4 of 8 RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1--------..."
- 2 Veri SW Pump Alignment:
. Oheck at least Perform the fol in each
- 1) YIan:.1al start S1,,/ pumps
- or B pUI:1p i:1 necessa (257 KW each) .
- 0 or pump i:1 2) be supplied perform a) Pull stop affected D b) 3)
the a) the reactor b) all E-O Inmediate Actions done. t BOTH RCPs 01 letdown iso1. AOV 42 d) Clos excess letdown.
HCV l23 e) Go to E-O. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
- 4) one SW pump c be go to step 3.
IF at least two SW pumps can operated. go tep 8.
- b. Return to procedure r in effect
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 0080 AP-SW.2 LOSS OF SERVICE ~'JATER PAGE 5 of 8 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ~------~ RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1--------....
3 Al Alternate Cool To One G (Refer to ER G.2, ALTERNATE COOLING FOR EMERGENCY Gs) :
o A or C SW is THEN alternat DIG B OR-o IF B or D SW is operating, THEN alternat cool to DIG A 4 I alate SW To Non-Essential Loads
- a. Clos se eeLhouse SW iso~ation valves
- MOV 4609
- MOV-4780 D. Clos air conditioning SW isolation va ves
- HOV 4663
- HOV-4733
- c. Direct AD to rm Part C ATT .2, ATTACHMENT S1,.1 SOLATION
EDP: TITLE:
REV: 00801 AP-S'V'J.2 LOSS OF SERVICE \~ATER PAGE 6 of 8 RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I--------~
5 Monitor Plant IF red, reduc load as Cooled SW - TEMPERATURES sTabilize STABLE ternperatJres (Refer REDUCTIONS. or -TURB.S.
- Exciter LOAD REDUCTION)
- MFP oil coo~ers
- Instr~ment air amp ess rs
- 00 s
- Seal Oil unit
- Turbine lub oil cooler
- CCH Ex
- :Ix
- AFPs
- Condensate
- Secondary oolers 6 Higher rvision
EO?: TITLE:
REV: 00801 AP-Sv~ .2 LOSS OF SERVICE \f\TATER PAGE 7 of 8 RESPONSE 1 - - - - - - 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1-------...,
7 Check SW System Status:
- a. Check SW r press~res: a. Locally isolate selected SW oads desired r to PPCS SW low pressure ATT~2.2, ATTAC3MENT SW I status - NOT ~CW
- PPCS ID P2 60
- PPCS ID P2161 o Pressure in both oops STABLE OR RISING o Check SW loop header Dressures G~EATER THAN 40 PSIG
- b. Check leasL one SW pump h. Perform the 1
.in each efforts to start
- or B pump in SW pun:p each
- C or D pump
- 2) least two SW pumps can be ope rat 8.
to st 3.
8 Noti r rvi ion 9 Select Operable SW Pump For Refer ITS LCO 3.7.8 Auto Start
EOP: TITLE:
REV: n u 801 AP-S~'J .2 LOSS OF SERVICE limTER PAGE 8 0 8 EXPECTED RESPONSE 1-----1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1----------.,
10 Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status (Refer to AR Procedures) 11 Return To Procedure or Gilidance In Effect
-END
EOP: IIHE:
REV: 00801 AP-Sv'V . LOSS OF SERVI::::E \iJATER PAGE 1 of 1
- 1) ATTACHMENT SW ISOLATION 2.2)
Question #54 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Rev.l Question #54 states the following:
"Given the following plant conditions:
- There is a tube rupture in the IB' S/G
- The crew is performing actions to isolate the ruptured steam generator per E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
- 'A' S/G MSIV is closed Which one of the following actions should be performed to stop/reduce the radioactive release in progress, per the Major Action Category isolation steps of E-3?"
The conditions given in the stem of the question place the crew at Step 4 in E-3. Step 4 in E-3 isolates flow from the ruptured S/G. Choices 'B', 1(" and '0' address operation ofthe 'B' ARV and are plausible based on a review of E-3 Step 4.
Choice IB' would be correct if the candidate interpreted from the stem that the action was being taken to minimize (reduce) the radioactive release associated only from an lIuncomplicated" tube rupture in the IB' S/G. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the fB' ARV is operating properly in AUTO (E-3 Step 4.a). Note that, given the conditions stated and assuming an I/uncomplicated" tube rupture, 'B' S/G pressure would be at ""1005 psig controlled by the steam dumps. IB' S/G ARV would already be in AUTO at 1050 psig, and no adjustment as stated in choice IB' would be required.
Choice 10' would be correct if the candidate interpreted from the stem that a radioactive release WAS in progress. This is a reasonable interpretation based on the ambiguity ofthe words II ... to stop/reduce the radioactive release in progress". In this case, the RNa action of Step 4.b would be required when the IB' S/G pressure was less than 1050 psig. Given this interpretation and the fact that the 'B' S/G ARV would already be in AUTO at 1050 psig, it would be correct to conclude that 'B' S/G ARV is malfunctioning in AUTO, i.e. it is open at less than 1050 psig. In this case, the correct answer would be choice '0' which places the 'B' ARV in manual at 0% demand (Closed) per the RNa of E-3 Step 4.b. Both Band 0 choices are reasonable actions which would be considered by a licensed RO/SRO in response to the given conditions. There is no information provided in the stem which would lead the candidate to believe that either of these actions would not be successful.
Therefore, choices 'B' and '0' are both correct depending on a candidate's interpretation of the wording in the stem. Either interpretation is reasonable based on the ambiguity of the words
" ...stop/reduce the radioactive release in progress ..."
Page 1 ofl
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # 3 KIA # G3 2.3.11 Importance Rating 3.8 Radiation Control - Ability to control radiation releases.
RO Question # 54 Rev 1 Given the following plant conditions:
- There is a tube rupture in the 'B' S/G
- The crew is performing actions to isolate the ruptured steam generator per E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
- 'A' S/G MSIV is closed Which one of the following actions should be performed first to minimize a radioactive release, per the Major Action Category isolation steps of E-3?
A Manually open the 'A' S/G ARV to maintain RCS temperature B. Adjust 'B' S/G ARV controller to 1050 psig in auto C. Shut the manual isolation valve for 'B' S/G ARV D. Place the 'B' S/G ARV controller in manual at 0% demand Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A Incorrect. Plausible because the candidate might believe he should lower RCS temp (and ruptured S/G pressure) to prevent lifting a ruptured S/G ARV. This action is taken during the Cooldown phase, but is not used to control RCS temperature to prevent lifting the ruptured S/G ARV. With the intact S/G MSIV closed, steam dump is not available and the 'A' ARV should be set to maintain intact S/G pressure in AUTO.
B. Correct. The ruptured S/G ARV is adjusted to its normal setpressure to ensure that the ARV remains operable and opens BEFORE its associated first safety valve opens at 1085 psig.
10/30/12
C. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate might believe it was a conservative action to isolate a ruptured S/G ARV that was lifting normally in response to pressure. Nothing in stem states the ARV failed.
D. Incorrect. Same reasoning as 'C' - the candidate might believe he/she should take action to close a ruptured S/G ARV that was open.
E-3 Background, Technical Reference(s): EOP Setpoint Document for H.3 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: REP03C 1.02 (As available)
Question Source: Bank # S019.0011 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.
Comments:
10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # 3 KIA # G3 2.3.11 Importance Rating 3.8 Radiation Control - Ability to control radiation releases.
RO Question # 54 Given the following plant conditions:
- There is a tube rupture in the 'B' S/G
- The crew is performing actions to isolate the ruptured steam generator per E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
- 'A' S/G MSIV is closed Which one of the following actions should be performed to stoplreduce the radioactive release in progress, per the Major Action Category isolation steps of E-3?
A. Manually open the 'A' S/G ARV to maintain RCS temperature B. Adjust 'B' S/G ARV controller to 1050 psig in auto C. Shut the manual isolation valve for 'B' S/G ARV D. Place the 'B' S/G ARV controller in manual at 0% demand Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the candidate might believe he should lower RCS temp (and ruptured S/G pressure) to prevent lifting a ruptured S/G ARV. This action is taken during the Cooldown phase, but is not used to control RCS temperature to prevent lifting the ruptured S/G ARV. With the intact S/G MSIV closed, steam dump is not available and the 'A' ARV should be set to maintain intact S/G pressure in AUTO.
B. Correct. The ruptured S/G ARV is adjusted to its normal setpressure to ensure that the ARV remains operable and opens BEFORE its associated first safety valve opens at 1085 psig.
C. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate might believe it was a conservative action to isolate a ruptured S/G ARV that was lifting normally in response to pressure.
10/16/2012
D. Incorrect. Same reasoning as 'C' - the candidate might believe he/she should take action to close a ruptured S/G ARV that was open.
E-3 Background, Technical Reference(s): EOP Setpoint Document for H.3 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: REP03C 1.02 (As available)
Question Source: Bank # S019.0011 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.
Comments:
10/16/2012
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 04800 E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PAGE 5 of 45 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1 - - - - - - 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 - - - - - - - -....
CAUTION o IF THE: TDAFW PUMP IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE SOURCE OF FEED FLOW, STEAM SUPP:::"Y TO THE TDAFW PUMP MUST BE MAINTAINED FROM ONE S/G.
o AT LEAST ONE S/G SHALL BE MAINTAINED AVAILABLE FOR RCS COOLDOWN.
- * * * * * * '* * * * * *k * * '* * * * * * * * * '* * * * * * * * * * '* * * *
- 4 Isolate Flow From Ruptured S!G(s):
B. ust S/G ARV control o psig in AUTO
- b. Check ruptured S ARV - CLOSED b. WHEN ruptured S/G pressure less than 1050 , 'THEN ve S/G ARV closed. closed, controller in MANUAL and close S/G ARV.
S/G ARV can NOT be closed, THEN dispatch AO to locally isolate.
- c. Close ruptured S/G TDAFW pump c. Dispatch AO with locked valve steam supply valve and place in key to locally isolate steam PULL STOP from ruptured S/G to TDAFW pump.
- S/G A, MOV-3S05A
- S/G A, V-3505
- S/G B, MOV-3504A
- S/G B, V-350 /{
- d. Verify ruptured S/G blowdown d. Place S/G blowdown and sample valve CLOSED valve isolation switch to CLOSE.
- S/G A, AOV-S738 blowdown can NOT be isolated
- S/G B, AOV-5737 manually, THEN dispatch AO to locally isolate blowdown
- S/G A, V 5701
- S/G B, V-5702
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 04800 E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PAGE 6 of 45 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 1------1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1---------,
5 Complete Ruptured S/G Isolation:
- a. Close ruptured S/G MSIV - a. Perform the following:
RUPTURED S/G MSIV CLOSED Close intact S/G MSIV.
- 2) Place intact S/G ARV controller at 1005 psig in AUTO.
- 3) Adjust condenser steam dump controller to 1050 in AUTO.
- 4) Plac condenser steam dump mode selector switch to MANUAL.
- 5) Adjust reheat steam supply controller cam to close reheat steam valves.
- 6) Ensure turbine stop valves CLOSED.
n AO to S/G isolation (Refer to ATT 16.0, ATTACHMENT RUPTURED S/G. parts A and B).
- 8) Go to step 6.
- b. Dispatch AO to complete ruptured S/G isolation (Refer to ATT-16.0, ATTACHMENT RUPTURED S/G A)
Question #55 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Rev.1 Choice 'N and choice 'B' are both correct for question #55 because the stem ofthe question does not limit the candidate to only the initial procedure entered in the response to the stated conditions.
Conditions in question #55 indicate a failure of R-17 without RCS in-leakage to the CCW system.
As a result, both choices 'A' and 'B' are plausible.
The second part of question #55 states the following:
"What procedure(s) would be entered in response to these indications?"
Choice (B' is correct because the E-16 Alarm Response would be the initial procedure used by the crew to respond to the alarm.
Choice '0' is correct because STP-O-17.2 would be entered to perform initial assessment of detector operability and to perform post maintenance operability testing following repairs to the radiation monitor. The distracter analysis even recognizes the fact that the STP "would eventually be addressed, but would not be the first procedure entered." The question does not ask what the first procedure entered would be; it simply asks "what procedure(s) would be entered..."
The purpose of STP-O-17.2 is as follows:
- To test operability of Process and Iodine Radiation Monitors by performing the following:
)0- Verify monitor responds properly to installed check source
)0- Ensure High Alarms and Warning Alarms are left at values specified in P-9, Radiation Monitoring System.
)0- Perform functional test.
STP-O-17.2 would be used to troubleshoot the abnormal conditions described and to perform post maintenance operability testing once repairs are completed. STP-O-17.2 is listed as a performance reference in S-14, Area and Process Radiation Monitoring System, and S-14.10, Operation of Pracess Radiation Monitors (R-15 through R-208).
In summary, the second part of question #55 does not limit the candidate to the initial procedure entered in the response to the stated indications. Therefore, both choices 'A' and 'B' are correct.
Page 1 of 1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KJA# 073 A2.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Detector failure.
RO Question # 55 Rev 1 The plant is at 100% power with the following conditions:
- RMS channel R-17, Component Cooling Water, drawer display initially read 2.1 E03 cpm, then rose rapidly to >1 E06, and now reads "EEEEE"
- R-17 drawer WARN and HIGH lights are lit
- 40 gpm letdown orifice valve AOV-200B is in service
- PCV-135, letdown pressure control valve, is 40% open
- Both RCP labyrinth seal DIPs are 40" Which of the following (1) indicates the reason for these indications and (2) what is the procedure first entered in response to these indications?
A (1) Detectorfailure (2) STP-O-17.2, RAD MONITORS R-11 thru R-18 SOURCE CHECK, ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST B. (1) Detector failure (2) E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY C. (1) RCS in-leakage to CCW system (2) E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY D. (1) RCS in-leakage to CCW system (2) AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the CCW Loop Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A Incorrect. Plausible because the given indications indicate a detector failure high which over-ranged the circuit and activated the WARN and HIGH range alarm circuits in the 10/30/12
drawer. Part 2 is plausible because going to the STP-O procedure for checking setpoints and functionality would eventually be addressed, but would not be the first procedure entered. Incorrect because the E-16 alarm which accompanies the HIGH alarm is the higher priority procedure which should be entered initially.
B. Correct. The given indications indicate a detector failure high which over-ranged the circuit and activated the WARN and HIGH range alarm circuits in the drawer. The HIGH alarm will close RCV-017, the CCW vent valve (but that information is not provided) and provide an input into the E-16 annunciator. The E-16 Alarm Response procedure will provide further guidance (e.g., verify that automatic actions have occurred).
C. Incorrect. Part 1 is plausible because Warning or High alarm on R-17 is the primary means of detecting in-leakage into the CCW system. Incorrect because the plant parameters provided in the initial conditions indicate that neither the NRHX or thermal barrier HX is leaking. Part 2 is the correct procedure to be entered initially. Incorrect because there is no other information in the stem which indicates that a valid leak into the CCW system is likely.
D. Incorrect. Part 1 is plausible because Warning or High alarm on R-17 is the primary means of detecting in-leakage into the CCW system. Incorrect because the plant parameters provided in the initial conditions indicate that neither the NRHX or thermal barrier HX is leaking. Part 2 is plausible because it's the procedure which E-16 will direct transition to, but given the lack of supporting plant information to confirm a leak into the CCW system, is not the correct procedure to be entered initially.
. E-16 Technical Reference(s): STP-O-17.2 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R3901 C, 4.01 (As available)
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam: 2007 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 073 A2.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Detector failure.
RO Question # 55 The plant is at 100% power with the following conditions:
- RMS channel R-17, Component Cooling Water, drawer display initially read 2.1 E03 cpm, then rose rapidly to >1 E06, and now reads "EEEEE"
- R-17 drawer WARN and HIGH lights are lit
- 40 gpm letdown orifice valve AOV-200B is in service
- PCV-135, letdown pressure control valve, is 40% open
- Both RCP labyrinth seal DIPs are 40" Which of the following (1) indicates the reason for these indications and (2) what procedure(s) would be entered in response to these indications?
A. (1) Detector failure (2) STP-O-17.2, RAD MONITORS R-11 thru R-18 SOURCE CHECK, ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST B. (1) Detector failure (2) E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY C. (1) RCS in-leakage to CCW system (2) E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY D. (1) RCS in-leakage to CCW system (2) AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the CCW Loop Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the given indications indicate a detector failure high which over-ranged the circuit and activated the WARN and HIGH range alarm circuits in the 10/16/2012
drawer. Part 2 is plausible because going to the STP-O procedure for checking setpoints and functionality would eventually be addressed, but would not be the first procedure entered. Incorrect because the E-16 alarm which accompanies the HIGH alarm is the higher priority procedure which should be entered initially.
B. Correct. The given indications indicate a detector failure high which over-ranged the circuit and activated the WARN and HIGH range alarm circuits in the drawer. The HIGH alarm will close RCV-017, the CCW vent valve (but that information is not provided) and provide an input into the E-16 annunciator. The E-16 Alarm Response procedure will provide further guidance (e.g., verify that automatic actions have occurred).
C. Incorrect. Part 1 is plausible because Warning or High alarm on R-17 is the primary means of detecting in-leakage into the CCW system. Incorrect because the plant parameters provided in the initial conditions indicate that neither the NRHX or thermal barrier HX is leaking. Part 2 is the correct procedure to be entered initially. Incorrect because there is no other information in the stem which indicates that a valid leak into the CCW system is likely.
D. Incorrect. Part 1 is plausible because Warning or High alarm on R-17 is the primary means of detecting in-leakage into the CCW system. Incorrect because the plant parameters provided in the initial conditions indicate that neither the NRHX or thermal barrier HX is leaking. Part 2 is plausible because it's the procedure which E-16 will direct transition to, but given the lack of supporting plant information to confirm a leak into the CCW system, is not the correct procedure to be entered initially.
. E-16 Technical Reference(s): STP-O-17.2 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: R3901 C, 4.01 (As available)
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam: 2007 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10/16/2012
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Purpose and operation of radiation monitoring systems, including alarms and survey equipment.
Comments:
10/16/2012
PAGE 1 OF 1 REV. 11 CONTROLLED COpy #
.",; ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURE ALARM TITLE:
RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY ALARM SETPOINT (S) :
Refer to P-9, Radiation Monitoring System SOURCE (S) :
R-10A through R-20B High Activity REQUIRED ACTION:
- 1. Ensure automatic actions have occurred where applicable.
- 2. Notify Shift Supervisor, Health Physics and Auxiliary Operator to make appropriate investigation.
- 3. Refer to AR-RMS.11 through AR-RMS.20B and ER-RMS.1
- 4. Refer to EPI P 1-1 3 Local Radiation Emergency and/or EPIP 2-3 Major Radioactive Release to the Lake
- 5. Refer to EPIP 1.0 to review for event classification
- 6. Refer to 0-9.3 if necessary
- 7. Refer to CH-RETS-RMS-INOP.
I 9. Refer to the ODCM.
COMMENTS:
References:
ELEMENTARY #10905-384 EFFECTIVE DATE
PAGE 1 OF 1 REV. 5 CONTROLLED COPY # ~
.'trtttItI ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURE AR-RMS-17 LOCATION: CONTROL ROOM ALARM TITLE:
R-17 COMPONENT COOLING ALARM SETPOINT (S) :
REFER TO P-9 SOURCE (S) :
R-17 MONITOR REQUIRED ACTION:
- 1. Verify RCV-017 closed
"'I 2. GO TO AP-CCW.l
COMMENTS:
REFERENCES:
AUXILIARY COOLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER (AC)
P&ID #33013-1245 Computer Points R17, R17H RESPONSI MANAGER
%-/7 -17 EFFECTIVE DATE
Consteliation R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TECHNICAL PROCEDURE STP-O-17.2 PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Revision 00100 Safety Related CONTINUOUS USE Applicable To:
- RE. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Approval Authority:
Manager-Operations GINNA STATION START:
DATE: _ _ _ __
TIME: _ _ _ __
COMPLETED:
DATE: _ _ _ __
TIME:
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINTVERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 2 of 111
SUMMARY
OF ALTERATIONS Revision Change Summary of Revision or Change 00100 PCR-12-01523
- Deleted fifth bullet in Step 6.13.1.10, Plant modification now bypasses storm drain. ECP-10-000310
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINTVERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 3 of 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE .....................................................................................................................................4 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE ..............................................................................................................4
3.0 REFERENCES
AND DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................6 3.1. Developmental References ...............................................................................................6 3.2. Performance References ..................................................................................................6 3.3. Definitions ..........................................................................................................................6 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................7 5.0 PREREQUISITES .........................................................................................................................8 6.0 PERFORMANCE .........................................................................................................................9 6.1. R-10A CNMT IODINE Monitor. ..........................................................................................9 6.2. R-10B VENT IODINE Monitor .........................................................................................15 6.3. R-11 CNMT PART Monitor ..............................................................................................19 6.4. R-12 CNMT GAS Monitor ................................................................................................33 6.5. R-13 VENT PART Monitor ...............................................................................................47 6.6. R-14 VENT GAS Monitor.................................................................................................55 6.7. R-15 AIR EJECTOR Monitor ...........................................................................................68 6.8. R-16 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLING Monitor ...............................................................72 6.9. R-17 COMPONENT COOLING Monitor ..........................................................................76 6.10. R-18 WASTE LIQUID Monitor .........................................................................................80 6.11. R-20A SPENT FUEL POOL HX-A SERV WTR Monitor .................................................. 85 6.12. R-20B SPENT FULE POOL HX-B SERV WTR Monitor .................................................. S9 6.13. R-21 RETENTION TANK Monitor ...................................................................................93 6.14. R-22 HCWT EFF Monitor ................................................................................................99 7.0 POST PERFORMANCE ACTiViTIES ....................................................................................... 106 7.1. Procedure Performer Post Operation Task ...................................................................106 7.2. Supervision Post Operation Task .................................................................................. 106 S.O BASES ......................................................................................................................................107 9.0 RECORDS ................................................................................................................................107 ATTACH MENT 1, SETPOII\JT DATA SHEET ....................................................................................... 1OS ATTACHMENT 2, MONITOR SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT ...................................................................110 ATTACHMENT 3, COMMENTS .........................................................................................................111
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 4 of 111 1.0 Purpose 1.1 To test operability of Process and Iodine Radiation Monitors by performing the following:
- Verify monitor responds properly to installed check source.
- Ensure High Alarms and Warning Alarms are left at values specified in P-9, Radiation Monitoring System.
- Perform Functional Test.
2.0 Applicability/Scope 2.1. Reason for performing Surveillance:
D Scheduled Surveillance D Post-Maintenance Functionality Verification (Enter Work Order Number - - - - -
D Plant Conditions requiring test (explain in remarks)
Remarks: ___________________________________________________________
2.2. This test may be performed in any MODE.
2.3. Surveillance Requirements satisfied by this procedure:
2.3.1. Technical Specifications
- SR 3.4.15.1, Channel Check of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors.
- SR 3.4.15.2, Operational Test of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors.
2.3.2. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
- Table 3.1 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Surveillance Requirements
- Table 3.2-2, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Surveillance Requirements
- Table 3-4, Area Radiation Monitor Surveillance Requirements 2.4. Sections of this procedure may be used to perform individual component testing when required (for example, retesting and increased surveillance), and the remaining sections and associated attachments marked NI A.
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R~11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 5 of 111 2.5. IF this procedure is used for Post Maintenance Testing, THEN with SRO approval, only the pages used to perform the test are required to be attached. This SHALL include Section 5.0, Subsections in Section 6.0 used to test the applicable component(s), Section 7.0 and any attachment(s) used during testing. Steps in these included sections and attachment(s) that are NOT performed are to be marked N/A.
2.6. The following radiation monitors are tested in this procedure:
- R-10A, Containment Vent Iodine
- R-10B, Plant Vent Iodine
- R-11, Containment Vent Particulate
- R-12, Containment Vent Noble Gas
- R-13, Plant Vent Particulate
- R-14, Plant Vent Noble Gas
- R-15, Air Ejector & Gland Seal Exhaust
- R-16, Containment Fan Coolers
- R-17, Component Cooling Water
- R-18, Liquid Waste Disposal
- R-20A, Spent Fuel Pool HX A
- R-20B, Spent Fuel Pool HX B
- R-21 , Retention Tank
- R-22, High Conductivity Waste Tank 2.7. Subsections of Section 6.0 that are NOT performed may be marked N/A.
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 6 of 111 3.0 References And Definitions 3.1. Developmental References 3.1.1 ODCM, Section 3.0 Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.1.2. P-9, Radiation Monitoring System 3.1.3. Radiation Monitoring System Operating and Maintenance Manual (TracerlabNictoreen) 3.1.4. Technical Specifications:
- Section 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
- Section 3.7.10, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) 3.2. Performance References 3.2.1. A-52.4, Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment 3.2.2. A-52.12, Nonfunctional Equipment Importantto Safety 3.2.3. P-9, Radiation Monitoring System 3.2.4. S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions 3.3. Definitions 3.3.1. HV ~ High Voltage
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINTVERIFICATJON, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 7 of 111 4.0 Precautions and Limitations 4.1. IF any step in this procedure cannot be completed as stated, the Shift Manager OR Control Room Supervisor SHALL be notified immediately.
4.2. The Shift Manager SHALL be notified immediately IF any Acceptance Criteria is NOT met, OR IF any malfunction OR abnormal conditions occur.
4.3. The following MCB annunciators could alarm during the performance of this procedure:
- A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- M-2, AVT WATER TREATMENT PANEL TROUBLE
- E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY
- K-27, DRAINAGE SYSTEM PH PANEL
- L-1, AUX BLDG VENT SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL 4.4. Source Check values were determined as approximately two standard deviations less than the historical mean value as determined by the Radiochemist.
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 76 of 111 6.9. R-17 COMPONENT COOLING Monitor 6.9.1. VERIFY R-17 CONTAINMENT COOLING digital readout is ILLUMINATED.
6.9.2. PERFORM the following to determine High Voltage value:
- 1. DEPRESS AND HOLD HV pushbutton.
- 2. WHEN High Voltage Reading on digital display stabilizes, THEN RELEASE HV pushbutton AND RECORD value on Table 17.
- 3. RECORD Tape Value posted on drawer on Table 17.
I INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
- 4. USING Tape Value recorded on Table 17, CALCULATE High Voltage Low Limit AND High Limit as follows, AND RECORD values on Table 17:
_ _ _ _ VDC - 6 VDC = ~_ _ _ VDC (Tape Value) (Low Limit)
IV
~_ _ _ VDC + 6 VDC = --:-:-:----c-:-- VDC (Tape Value) (High Limit)
IV TABLE 17 I
Tape Value Low Limit High Voltage High Limit Reading (VDC) (VDC) (VDC) (VDC) i
- 5. IF High Voltage Reading is outside the Low Limit AND High Limit values recorded on Table 17, THEN PERFORM the following:
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
- a. DECLARE R-17 INOPERABLE.
- b. NOTIFY Shift Manager.
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 77 of 111 6.9.2.5 (Continued)
- c. INITIATE a Condition Report to document failure.
6.9.3. PERFORM the following to determine As-Found alarm values:
- 1. Momentarily DEPRESS HIGH pushbutton AND RECORD High Alarm As-Found value on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
- 2. Momentarily DEPRESS WARN pushbutton AND RECORD Warning Alarm As-Found value on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
6.9.4. PERFORM the following to test automatic functions:
- 1. SET Warning Alarm Setpoint below the meter reading using ATTACHMENT 2, MONITOR SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT.
- 2. VERIFY the following:
- WARN alarm light is FLASHING
- Bar graph is ILLUMINATED in amber
- 3. SET High Alarm Setpoint below the meter reading BUT above the Warning Alarm Setpoint using ATTACHMENT 2, MONITOR SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT.
- 4. VERIFY the following:
- HIGH alarm light is FLASHING
- Bar graph is ILLUMINATED in red
- MCB annunciator E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY, is ILLUMINATED
- CCW SURGE TK VENT, RCV-Oi7, is CLOSED
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 78 of 111 6.9.5. PERFORM the following to determine Source Check value:
- 1. RECORD Rate Meter Indication on Table 18.
- 2. DEPRESS AND HOLD Check Source pushbutton.
- 3. RELEASE Check Source pushbutton AND RECORD Rate Meter Source Check Indication on Table 18.
TABLE 18 Source Check Rate Meter Source Check Indication Indication Increase (CPM) (CPM) (CPM)
I I I INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
- 4. USING values recorded on Table 18, CALCULATE Rate Meter Source Check Increase as follows AND RECORD on Table 18:
=Source Check Increase (Source Check) (As-Found)
IV
- 5. IF Source Check Increase value recorded on Table 18 is NOT greater than or equal to 500 CPM, THEN PERFORM the following:
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
- a. DECLARE R-17 INOPERABLE.
- b. NOTIFY Shift Manager.
- c. INITIATE a Condition Report to document failure.
6.9.6. PUSH ALARM ACK pushbutton.
6.9.7. VERIFY the following are NOT flashing:
- HIGH alarm light
- WARN alarm light
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 THRU R-18, R-20 THRU R-22 STP-O-17.2 AND IODINE MONITORS R-10A AND R-10B SOURCE CHECK, Revision 00100 ALARM SETPOINT VERIFICATION, AND FUNCTIONAL TEST Page 79 of 111 6.9.S. PERFORM the following to set alarm setpoints:
- 1. SET High Alarm Setpoint to P-9 Setpoint value recorded on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET using ATTACHMENT 2, MONITOR SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT.
- a. RECORD High Alarm As-Left setpoint on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
- 2. SET Warning Alarm Setpoint to P-9 Setpoint value recorded on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET using ATTACHMENT 2, MONITOR SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT.
- a. RECORD Warning Alarm As-Left setpoint on ATTACHMENT 1. SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
6.9.9. ENSURE CCW SURGE TK VENT, RCV-017, OPENS.
I INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION 6.9.10. PERFORM an Independent Verification of the following setpoints:
- 1. Momentarily DEPRESS HIGH pushbutton, AND VERIFY High Alarm Setpoint equals P-9 Setpoint value recorded on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
IV
- 2. Momentarily DEPRESS WARN pushbutton AND VERIFY Warning Alarm Setpoint equals P-9 Setpoint value recorded on ATTACHMENT 1, SETPOINT DATA SHEET.
IV
Question #100 - Justification for Accepting Two Correct Answers Question #100 places the crew in E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, with a loss of offsite power. As a result, instrument air is not available. Also, based on stated conditions, adverse parameter values are not in effect. Given these conditions, only choices 'e' and '0' are plausible.
Question #100 asks the candidate to identify how the subsequent Res depressurization will be performed.
The only difference between 'e' and '0' is the value of PRZR level at which the depressurization is terminated. Step 19.c of E-3 states that the depressurization is terminated when the following two conditions are met:
- 1. ReS pressure less than ruptured S/G pressure and,
- 2. PRZR level is greater than 10%.
Therefore, choice 'e' is correct. However, choice '0' is also correct since the PRZR level stated (30%) is greater than 10%. Note that both 'e' and to' are only correct if the depressurization is terminated prior to PRZR level reaching 75%.
Page 1of1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 KIA # 065 AA2.07 Importance Rating 3.2*
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:
Whether backup nitrogen supply is controlling valve position.
SRO Question # 100 Rev 1 Given the following:
- The team is responding to a SGTR.
- Upon transition from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, a loss of offsite power occurred.
- RCS cooldown has been completed with the following plant conditions:
o Containment pressure: 1.2 psig o PRZR level: Below narrow range indication o Ruptured SG pressure: 1030 psig oRCS pressure: 1400 psig Which one of the following identifies how the subsequent RCS depressurization will be performed and the minimum required PRZR level to terminate the depressurization?
A. Using instrument air, open one PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%
B. Using instrument air, open one PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 30%
C. Align nitrogen to one PORV per ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, and open that PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%
D. Align nitrogen to one PORV per ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, and open that PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 30%
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the second part (termination criteria) is correct, and the use of instrument air to the PORV is provided as an alternative before the option of 10/30/12
using nitrogen. Step 14 of E-3 restores instrument air to CNMT if adequate air compressors are running. Incorrect because with the loss of offsite power adequate air compressors will not be running, so instrument air will not be re-established to CNMT when the depressurization step is reached. Therefore, one PORV with nitrogen will be used.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because the use of instrument air to the PORV is provided as an alternative before the option of using nitrogen. Step 14 of E-3 restores instrument air to CNMT if adequate air compressors are running. Also 30% PRZR level would be the criteria if adverse CNMT conditions existed. Incorrect because with the loss of offsite power adequate air compressors will not be running, so instrument air will not be re established to CNMT when the depressurization step is reached. Therefore, one PORV with nitrogen will be used. Also, adverse CNMT conditions do not exist, so the correct criteria for stopping the depressurization is 10% PRZR level.
C. Correct. With instrument air in CNMT unavailable, E-3 directs the alignment of nitrogen to the PORV per attachment-12.0. With normal CNMT conditions, the RCS will be depressurized until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%.
D. Incorrect. Plausible because the response is correct except for the PRZR level.
Incorrect because with normal CNMT conditions the RCS will be depressurized until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%.
Technical Reference(s): E-3 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: REP03C 2.01 (As available)
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10/30/12
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
Comments: This is an SRO Only question because it requires knowledge of when to implement attachments, including how to coordinate them with procedure steps. The examinee requires SRO knowledge of the E-3 procedure to recognize that with the loss of offsite power, instrument air to CNMT will not be reset even though there is a step that would do this if adequate air compressors were available. This will use of nitrogen to the PORV.
Additionally, the examinee must recognize that normal CNMT conditions exist, and that this results in 10% PRZR level criteria rather than the 30% criteria that would be used if adverse CNMT conditions existed.
10/30/12
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 KJA# 065 AA2.07 Importance Rating 3.2*
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:
Whether backup nitrogen supply is controlling valve position.
SRO Question # 100 Given the following:
- The team is responding to a SGTR
- Upon transition from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, a loss of offsite power occurred.
- RCS cooldown has been completed with the following plant conditions:
o Containment pressure: 1.2 psig o PRZR level: Below narrow range indication o Ruptured SG pressure: 1030 psig oRCS pressure: 1400 psig Which one of the following identifies how the subsequent RCS depressurization will be performed?
A. Using instrument air, open one PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%
B. Using instrument air, open one PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 30%
C. Align nitrogen to one PORV per ATT-12.0. ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, and open that PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%
D. Align nitrogen to one PORV per ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS, and open that PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 30%
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. Plausible because the second. part (termination criteria) is correct, and the use of instrument air to the PORV is provided as an alternative before the option of 10/16/2012
using nitrogen. Step 14 of E-3 restores instrument air to CNMT if adequate air compressors are running. Incorrect because with the loss of offsite power adequate air compressors will not be running, so instrument air will not be re-established to CNMT when the depressurization step is reached. Therefore, one PORV with nitrogen will be used.
B. Incorrect. Plausible because the use of instrument air to the PORV is provided as an alternative before the option of using nitrogen. Step 14 of E-3 restores instrument air to CNMT if adequate air compressors are running. Also 30% PRZR level would be the criteria if adverse CNMT conditions existed. Incorrect because with the loss of offsite power adequate air compressors will not be running, so instrument air will not be re established to CNMT when the depressuri:zation step is reached. Therefore, one PORV with nitrogen will be used. Also, adverse CNMT conditions do not exist, so the correct criteria for stopping the depressurization is 10% PRZR level.
C. Correct. With instrument air in CNMT unavailable, E-3 directs the alignment of nitrogen to the PORV per attachment-12.0. With normal CNMT conditions, the RCS will be depressurized until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%.
D. Incorrect. Plausible because the responsE~ is correct except for the PRZR level.
Incorrect because with normal CNMT conditions the RCS will be depressurized until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%.
Technical Reference(s): E-3 (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: REP03C 2.01 (As available)
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New x Question History: Last NRC Exam:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10/16/2012
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
Comments: This is an SRO Only question because it requires knowledge of when to implement attachments, including how to coordinate them with procedure steps. The examinee requires SRO knowledge of the E-3 procedure to recognize that with the loss of offsite power, instrument air to CNMT will not be reset even though there is a step that would do this if adequate air compressors were available. This will use of nitrogen to the PORV.
Additionally, the examinee must recognize that normal CNMT conditions exist, and that this results in 10% PRZR level criteria rather than the 30% criteria that would be used if adverse CNMT conditions existed.
10/16/2012
EOP: TITLE:
REV: 04800 E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PAGE 17 of 45 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ~-------~ RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ~------------~
CAUTION o THE PRT MAY RUPTURE IF A PRZR PORV IS USED TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS. THIS MAY RESULT IN ABNORMAL CNMT CONDITIONS.
o CYCLING OF THE PRZR PORV SHOULD BE MINIMIZED.
o THE UPPER HEAD REGION MAY VOID DURING RCS DEPRESSURIZATION IF RCPS ARE NOT RUNNING. THIS MAY RESULT IN RAPIDLY RISING PRZR LEVEL.
NOTE: 0 If auxiliary spray is in use. spray flow may be enhanced by closing normal charging valve AOV-294 and normal PRZR spray valves.
o When using a PRZR PORV select one with an operable block valve.
19 Depressurize Res Using PRZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:
- b. PRZR PORVs - AT LEAST ONE b. IF auxiliary spray available.
AVAILABLE THEN return to Step ISb.
IF auxiliary spray can NOT be established. THEN go to ECA-3.3.
SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL. Step 1.
This Step continued on the next page.
fOP: TITLE:
REV: 04800 E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PAGE 18 of 45 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE I - - - - - - t RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1-------...,
(Step 19 continued from previous page)
- c. Open one PRZR PORV until ANY of c. auxiliary spray available.
the following conditions return to step 18b.
satisfied:
- 1) IF auxiliary spray can NOT be a PRZR level GREATER THAN 75% established. go to
[65% adverse CNMT] ECA 3.3. SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL.
-OR- Step 1.
oRCS pressure LESS THAN SATURATION USING FIG-I.O.
FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING o BOTH of the following:
- 1) RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G PRESSURE
- 2) PRZR level GREATER THAN 10% [30% adverse CNMT]
NRC Responses to Post-Exam Comments on 2012 Ginna Written Exam Q#4 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Comment The NRC DOES NOT AGREE with the propc)sed change. RO Question #4 Key Answer Choice A is correct and there are NO other correct answers. This question will remain as-is on the exam.
Four of eleven applicants missed this question. All four selected Distracter Choice C.
None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
RO Question #4 asks which one of the statements describes a basis, as explained in P 12, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SETPOINTS, for why the generator trip circuit is designed to be time-delayed, such that the generator trip occurs later than the turbine trip on most turbine trips.
The licensee has proposed Distracter Choice C as a second correct answer. Choice C states "on a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds to prevent a power-to-flow concern upon reactor trip." This statement is a good distracter, in that it contains elements of a valid basis in P-12. The related basis in P-12 describes the increased severity consequence of a reactor trip on overpower, over temperature, or low coolant flow if the generator trips immediately when the turbine trips and subsequently the electrical buses supporting RCP operation fail to transfer automatically to their off-site source. As described in P-12, an overpower, over temperature or low-pressure trip, coincident with loss of forced circulation could make the consequences of the accident more severe than reported in the FSAR.
However, the statement in Distracter Choice C is not a correct answer to the question because it does not describe a basis for the time-delay. The distracter provides a reason for the protection provided, "to prevent a power-to-flow concern upon reactor trip," but ties that reason to an incorrect specific initiating condition, that of "a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip." P-12 does not support the conclusion that the delay in removal of power from RCP motors is required for a turbine trip causing a reactor trip.
In fact, a reactor trip caused by a turbine trip is intended to protect against an over temperature condition.
UFSAR Section 7.2.2.2.13, which is reference.d by the licensee in their recommendation for two correct answers, actually supports the NRC contention of only one correct answer. Section 7.2.2.2.13 describes the reactor trip on turbine trip as an anticipatory reactor trip that will work to avoid the resulting thermal transients that could otherwise result. If the main turbine tripped at a high reactor power and there was no reactor trip on turbine trip protective function then the reactor would subsequently trip on either over-temperature delta T or high pressure to prevent exceeding reactor safety limits. A turbine trip, per design, should not result in a challenge to the over-temperature delta T trip protection function because of the anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip design protective function.
Distracter Choice C links some true statements, but makes an overall incorrect statement. The first part of the statement, "on a Turbine Trip causing a Reactor Trip the RCP is locked at 60 HZ for 60 seconds," is correct. The generator continues to supply power to RCPs for 60 seconds after ANY turbine trip, including those turbine trips at
NRC Responses to Post-Exam Comments on 2012 Ginna Written Exam high enough reactor power level such that the reactor trips on direct interlock when the turbine trips. The second part of the statement, "to prevent a power-to-flow concern upon reactor trip," describes why it is important (under certain conditions) to maintain power to the RCPs for a short period after a reactor trip. Joining the two parts, however, results in an incorrect statement because, per P-12, the prevention of a power-to-flow concern is based on overpower, over-temperature or low pressure reactor trips, not a reactor trip on a turbine trip.
Q#26 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Comment The NRC DOES NOT AGREE with the proposed change. RO Question #26 Key Answer Choice B is correct and there are NO other correct answers. This question will remain as-is on the exam.
Five of eleven applicants missed this question. All five selected Distracter Choice D.
None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
The licensee has proposed Distracter Choice D as a second correct answer. This question challenges the applicant to differentiate between Distracter Choice D and Key Answer B on the basis of identifying whether the SLB accident or the LOCA is the design basis accident for the peak pressure limit in Containment.
The question does not ask for all accidents analyzed in regard to containment design criteria. Rather, it asks for the design basis accident for the peak pressure limit in Containment. The basis for TS 3.6.4 explains that both of these accidents, LOCA and SLB, were analyzed as limiting design basis accidents to predict containment pressure transients. The analyses determined the SLB generates larger mass and energy releases than the worst-case LOCA and that the SLB bounds the LOCA event from the containment peak pressure standpoint. TherE~fore, Key Answer B is the correct answer.
There is one, and only one, correct answer.
Q#31 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Commemt The NRC DOES NOT AGREE with the proposed change. RO Question #31 Key Answer Choice D is correct and there are NO other correct answers. This question will remain as-is on the exam.
Four of eleven applicants missed this question. Three applicants selected Distracter Choice B (a wrong setpoint but the correct procedure). Only one applicant selected Distracter Choice C (the wrong procedure). None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
RO Question #31 gives some abnormal plant conditions at full power (a containment recirc air cooler service water low flow alarm and only one service water pump running) and asks the applicant to identify the alarm sE~tpoint and whether it would be appropriate, per the low cooler flow alarm response procedure, to refer to the service
NRC Responses to Post-Exam Comments on 2012 Ginna Written Exam water leak procedure or to the loss of service water procedure. The alarm response, AR-C-10, directs the operator to refer to the loss of service water procedure if the alarm is due to loss of service water pumps, a condition provided in the question stem.
Therefore, Key Choice D is a correct answer. AR-C-10 directs operators to refer to the service water leak procedure if a service water leak is indicated. No information was provided to indicate a service water leak. Therefore, Distracter Choice C is NOT a second correct answer.
The post-exam comment provided a rules-of-usage basis for "referring" to either procedure as a prudent operator action. There would not be anything necessarily wrong with referring to both procedures during an actual event to verify that all useful actions are being taken. However, the question asks the procedure which should be referenced per the alarm procedure. With the alarm procedure as a constraint, as previously explained, only Key Answer Choice D is correct.
Q#54 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Comment The NRC DOES NOT AGREE with the proposed change to accept TWO correct answers. RO Question #54 Key Answer Choice B is correct and there are NO other correct answers. This question will remain as-is on the exam.
Two of eleven applicants missed this question. One applicant selected Distracter Choice D. The other applicant selected Distracter Choice A. None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
RO Question #54 states a tube rupture is in progress and asks the applicant to select the action that should be performed to stop/reduce the radioactive release in progress per the major action category isolation steps of E-3. The applicable major action category given in the E-3 background document is stated as "Identify and Isolate Ruptured SG(s)." The question stem states the crew is performing actions to isolate per E-3. No other specific plant indications are provided upon which to base a decision to take actions other than the one directed in E-3 Step 4 in the action/expected response (AER) column. In the absence of information indicating the AER column action is or would not be successful, the only correct answer is the key answer, to adjust the ruptured SG ARV controller to 1050 psig in AUTO and to check the valve closed.
The licensee argues the question wording is ambiguous and that, since the ARV is already in auto at 1050 psig, a normal at-power alignment, the applicant could reasonably assume a malfunction of the auto circuit allowing the ARV to be open.
Under this condition they reason it would be appropriate for a knowledgeable applicant/operator to take E-3 Step 4 Response Not Obtained (RNO) column actions to place the ARV in manual with 0% output signal (the second answer proposed by the licensee as correct). The facility's comment states there is no information provided which would lead the examinee to believe either the key answer or the proposed second correct answer would not be successful in isolating the SG and that therefore it would not be reasonable for an applicant to select the third option provided in the procedure step.
NRC Responses to Post-Exam Comments on 2012 Ginna Written Exam The NRC disagrees with this rationale. There is no more information to support an assumption of an auto failure that can be addressed through manual operation than there is for an assumption that the ARV is stuck open requiring manual isolation. The information in the question stem does not support assuming either of these RNO column actions is necessary.
The NRC does not agree with the facility argument. However, for discussion sake, if the facility argument was accepted, then the facility proposed resolution of accepting two answers would not be appropriate. The question would likely have to be deleted. If one was to assume the ARV is open although in AUTO at 1050 psig set point with pressure less than set point, there would be no reason jto assume that taking the ARV controller to manual at 0% output would be successful in closing the valve. Assuming the ARV is open although demanded closed by the controller, it might be just as valid to manually isolate the ARV as described in Choice C. With three correct answers or multiple divergent answers, the question would be deleted.
0#55 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Comment The NRC AGREES with the proposed change. RO Question #55 has TWO correct answers. Key Answer B is correct. Distracter Choice A is also a correct answer.
Distracter Choices C and D are NOT correct answers.
Three of eleven applicants missed this question. Two applicants selected Distracter Choice A (correct reason but the wrong procedure). One applicant selected Distracter Choice D (wrong reason and wrong procedure~). None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
The licensee proposes Distracter Choice A as a second correct answer. Key Answer B is correct because it properly identifies the reason for the indications as a detector failure and identifies an expected procedure entered in response to indications of a detector failure. Distracter Choice B also correctly identifies the conditions as indicating a detector failure and identifies a different procedure that would be entered in response to the indications. The alarm procedure listed in the key answer would be entered because of alarm actuation on the conditions !Jiven. The surveillance procedure listed in the proposed second correct answer would be used to determine operability. There are two, and only two, correct answers. Choices B and A will be accepted as correct.
0#100 - NRC Response to Post-Exam Comment The NRC DOES NOT AGREE with the propc)sed change. SRO Question #100 Key Answer Choice C is correct and there are NO other correct answers. This question will remain as-is on the exam.
One of seven SRO applicants missed this question. That applicant selected Distracter Choice D. None of the applicants asked for any clarification of the question during exam administration.
NRC Responses to Post-Exam Comments on 2012 Ginna Written Exam The question asks the methodology directed by E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" to perform the depressurization. E-3 Step 19 directs opening one PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure AND pressurizer level is greater than 10%
(or 30% for adverse containment conditions). Containment conditions in the question stem are not adverse, so the appropriate depressurization stopping point is when level is greater than 10%. The key answer identifies that, in order to depressurize, the operator will "open the PORV until RCS pressure is less than ruptured SG pressure and PRZR level is greater than 10%," which mirrors the guidance in the EOP.
EOP Step 19 depressurizes to stop primary to secondary leakage. It provides 3 sets of conditions for terminating the depressurization. The first is an upper bound on pressurizer level of 75% (65% adverse) to avoid water solid conditions. The second is a lower bound on pressure as indicated by a loss of subcooling to limit void formation in the RCS. The third set of conditions, that set which is tested by the question, is the combination of RCS pressure less than SG pressure AND pressurizer level greater than 10% (30% adverse). This third set is intended as the point where primary to secondary leakage is stopped due to removal of driving head and where presssurizer level is low in its indicating band. The WOG EOP background documents identify the chosen level setpoint as "PRZR level just in range, including [tolerances], not to exceed 50% ... to ensure margin to filling the pressurizer for RCS inventory controL" The license has proposed accepting Choice D as a second correct answer because the pressurizer level in the distracter is greater than the minimum level required. In contrast to the key answer, Distracter Choice D uses the same wording, but requires pressurizer level greater than 30%. Since the question is asking the depressurization method of the EOP, which is to depressurize until greater than 10% for current conditions, the method is not properly described as continuing to depressurize until level is greater than 30%.
Therefore, Distracter Choice D is not a second correct answer.