L-MT-17-025, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accid

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident

ML17101A598
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	04/11/2017
From:	Gardner P Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-MT-17-025
Download: ML17101A598 (68)

Text

Document Control Desk Page4 Please contact John Fields, at 763-271-6707, if additional information or clarification is required.

Summary of Commitments This letter makes no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty or perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April _j_L, 2017.

a;:/

Peter A. Gardner Site Vice President, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company-Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Monticello, USNRC Resident Inspector, Monticello, USNRC

Document Type: Criteria Interface Report Specification Other Drawing Originated by:

F. Ganatra Date: 1 1/28/2016 Checked by:

M. Wodarcyk Date: 02/03/201 7 Approved by:

M. Delaney Date: 02/03/2017 Revision No. Originated by/

Date Checked by/

Date Approved by/

Date Description of Revision

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [

1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [

1]. Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai

-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations

[15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [

1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present

-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request , if necessary, that SSCs

[structures, systems, and components], which may be affected by high

-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions EPRI (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near

-6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [

3]. Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [

2]. This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP). The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [

8] is used for the MNGP engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [

8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report: Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high

-frequency confirmation

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) Estimation of in

-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Estimation of in

-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

-frequency evaluations

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [

1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [

1]. Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai

-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [

1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present

-day NRC requirements , if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high

-frequency ground motion, Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near

-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: 6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [

3]. Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [

2]. On May 14, 2014

, MNGP submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [

4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [

2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken f or MNGP using 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 September 17, 2015 [

3]. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the conclusions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [

8] is used for the MNGP engineering evaluations described in this report. Section 4.1 of Reference [

8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report

MNGP Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and GMRS Information Selection of components and a list of specific components for high

-frequency confirmation Estimation of seismic demand for subject components Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

-frequency evaluations Summary of r esults MNGP submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on May 14, 2014, [4]. In a letter dated July 8, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the MNGP site [14]. The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [

2] that the MNGP GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [

6]. Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference [17] for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed in Section 5.

Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary.

An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference

[8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (Alternating Current/Direct Current (A C/DC) power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation ar e contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal

-in or lockout circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference

[8] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [

8] to be considered preclude the application of seal

-in or - The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal

-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams () attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic).

A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report. Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure.

orifices that are designed to mitigate any leakage due to make up.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The EPRI High Frequency Confirmation guidance [8] assumes AC power is available, and thus control devices for AC powered valves are included.

The discussion of DC powered valves in this section applies.

This section describes the analysis of devices controlling the valves listed in Attachment B, Table B-2 of this report

. Based on this analysis, there are four valves that meet the criteria for selection in this category.

Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected which are also identified below. Devices controlling the valves listed in Table B-1 were selected based on the analysis detailed below.

Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Valves Reactor Head Vent Valve CV

-2371 This valve is normally closed and is controlled by Reactor Vent Valve 2-17 [23]. Control of 2

-17 is via relay SOL 2

-17. There is no seal

-in circuit with this relay so the valve is not affected by SILO.

Safety Relief Valves RV 71A/B/C/D/E/F/G/H Electrical control for RV 71A/C/D is via relays SV2-71A/C/D [24]. In order to energize these relays, relays 2E

-K6A/B or 2E

-K7A/B need to be energized. These relays are protected from seal

-in condition by relays 2E

-K10A/B and 2E

-K12A/B, which cannot seal

-in. Thus, these valves are not affected by SILO. Electrical control for RV 71B is via a rugged hand control switch 2E

-S4B. Thus, this valve is not affected by SILO.

Electrical control for RV 71E/G/H is via relays SV2

-71J/K/L [25, 26]. There are no pathways in which chatter could cause a seal

-in and prevent the valve from closing. Thus, these valves are not affected by SILO.

Electrical control for RV 71F is via relay SV2

-71M [27]. This relay is protected by rugged hand switches S22, HS

-S22A, and JS

-S43, and thus is not affected by SILO [26].

Main Steam Line Drain Valve MO

-2373 The desired state of this valve is closed and there is no seal

-in circuit on the OPEN circuit. There is a seal-in circuit on the CLOSE circuit, but it would take the valve into the desired state [28]. Thus, this valve is not affected by SILO.

Main Steam Isolation Valves A O-2-80A/B/C/D These valves are normally closed and their desired position is closed. There is no seal

-in circuitry that could cause them to stay open [29]. Thus, these valves are not affected by SILO. Reactor Water Clean

-Up (RWCU) Valves RWCU Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve MO

-2397 The desired state of this valve is closed and there is no seal

-in circuit on the OPEN circuit. There is a seal-in circuit on the CLOSE circuit, but it would take the valve into the desired state [30]. Thus, this valve is not affected by SILO.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Valves RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve MO

-2075 This valve is normally open and needs to stay open. There is seal

-in circuitry in the CLOSE circuit but none in the OPEN circuit [31]. The seal

-in is controlled by RCIC Auto Isolation logic via relays 13A-K32 and 13A

-K22 [19, 20]. Both of these relays are prone to seal

-in if contact chattering happens on any of their logic. The seal

-in will continue until limit switch LS

-8 pops open when the valve is fully closed. Opening the valve after it has been closed requires manual action via switch 13A

-S1 [31]. Thus, this valve is affected by SILO.

DC RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve MO

-2076 This valve is normally open and needs to stay open. There is seal

-in circuitry in both the CLOSE and OPEN circuit [32]. The CLOSE seal

-in is controlled by RCIC Auto Isolation logic via relays 13A

-K32 and 13A

-K22 [19, 20]. Both of these relays are prone to seal-in if contact chattering happens on any of their logic, consequentially causing the valve to spuriously close. A seal

-in on 13A-K22 will prevent the valve from being opened even after the chatter has ceased. Thus, this valve is affected by SILO.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Valves RHR Suction Line Equalizer Valve MO

-4086 Neither open nor close circuits have seal

-in circuitry. In addition, this valve is operated solely by rugged hand switches [33]. Thus, it is not affected by SILO.

RHR Discharge Lines Equalizer Valves MO

-4085A/B -in should not happen on the OPEN circuit. A seal

-in exists in the CLOSE circuit but this will take the valve to the desired position. There is no path for a seal

-in of the OPEN circuit [33]. Thus, these valves are not affected by SILO.

RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve MO

-2029 This motor

-operated valve is normally closed but can be opened if manual switch contact 16A

-S9 and contact 16A

-K29 are closed simultaneously [34]. However, there is no seal

-in circuit, so the valve will reclose after the period of chatter. Seal

-in in the CLOSE circuit is protected by rugged limit switch LS

-8 and torque switch TS

-17, which open when the valve is fully closed and torqued, respectively. Thus, this valve is not affected by SILO.

Testable Check Valves AO 46A/B -2016, actuator, limit switches and air lines associated with valve A O-10--2017, actuator, limit switches and air lines associated with valve A O-10-insensitive to chatter.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Core Spray Valves Testable Check Valves AO 13A/B Note 2 and Note 3 on the Core Spray System P&ID state that all electronic controls of these valves have been abandoned in place [37]. Thus, they act as check valves and are considered insensitive to chatter.

High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) Valves HPCI Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve MO

-2034 This valve is normally open and needs to be open to support HPCI operation. There is seal

-in circuitry in the CLOSE circuit but none in the OPEN circuit [38]. The CLOSE seal

-in is controlled by HPCI Auto Isolation logic via relays 23A

-K27/35 [39]. These relays are prone to seal

-in if contact chattering happens in any of its logic, consequentially causing the valve to spuriously close. Opening the valve is only possible if switch 23A

-S2 is turned to the open position. Since this is a manual switch requiring operator action, this valve is affected by SILO and may not open.

DC HPCI Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve MO

-2035 This valve is normally open and needs to be open. Relays 23A

-K27/35, controlled by HPCI Auto Isolation logic, are prone to seal

-in if contact chattering happens in any of their logic, consequentially causing the valve to spuriously close [39]. Opening the valve is only possible if switch 23A

-S3 is turned to the open position [38]. Since this is a manual switch requiring operator action, this valve is affected by SILO and may not open.

The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. However, the same report also states that EPRI 3002004396 [

8] requires confirmation that one train of AC-independent cooling is not challenged by a SILO device. Since the FLEX Phase 1 response includes the steam turbine

-driven RCIC pump and its ancillary components, this requirement is a subset of components covered by the NEI 12

-06 Appendix H [

16] FLEX Phase 1 Category.

NEI 12-06 Appendix H [

16] requires the analysis of relays and contactors that may lead to circuit seal-ins or lockouts that could impede the Phase 1 FLEX capabilities, including vital buses fed by station batteries through inverters. Phase 1 of the FLEX Strategy is defined in NEI 12

-06 [16] as the initial response period where a plant is relying solely on installed plant equipment. During this phase the plant has no AC power and is relying on batteries, steam, and air accumulators to provide the motive force necessary to operate the critical pumps, valves, instrumentation, and control circuits.

In order to select the Phase 1 SILO devices, an Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) specific to FLEX Phase 1 was derived in Calculation 14

-053 [21, 22

] from installed permanent plant equipment identified in the plant

-specific Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) [105] and periodic updates [1 06, 1 07, 1 08, 1 09 , 1 10, 111, 112], using the EPRI Seismic Evaluation Guidance [104].

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 FLEX Strategies specific to a seismic event response or common to all external event responses were examined to identify flow paths, electrical distribution and instrumentation relied upon to accomplish the reactor and containment safety functions identified in NEI 12

-06 [16], omitting response strategies only valid in an outage.

The ESEL is a subset of equipment relied upon to establish the credited flow paths, electrical distribution, and instrumentation identified in the FLEX responses examined. Permanent plant equipment required for implementation of Phase 1 of the FLEX Strategy [1 05 , 1 06 , 1 07 , 1 08 , 1 09, 1 10, 111, 112] was identified by reviewing the FLEX Strategy, FLEX support documents, and associated flow path Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), instrument elementar y diagrams, and electrical distribution one

-line diagrams.

For the Phase 1 FLEX response, Monticello credits their steam turbine

-driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump to provide core decay-heat cooling. However, after the initial automatic initiation and trip of RCIC and HPCI, RCIC will be used as the primary strategy to provide makeup water to the reactor [1 05]. For this effort, the flow paths credited include: (1) Steam from the reactor pressure vessel to the RCIC turbine and exhausted to the suppression pool; (2) Coolant from the suppression pool to the reactor via the RCIC pump; and (3) Steam from the reactor pressure vessel vented to the suppression pool via the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).

For every FLEX Phase 1 item on the ESEL requiring control, the associated control diagrams were ESEL. Power sources for the required control circuits were traced and any power distribution component necessary for the control circuits (and not already identified) was added as well. Relay control logic was analyzed and relays or switches that could cause seal

-in or lockout and leave the circuit in a state other than what would be desired for FLEX response were identified and added to the ESEL. The criteria for inclusion specific to the ESEL is as follows:

(Criterion 1)

The Phase 1 FLEX Strategy for Monticello, as described in the Overall Integrated Plan

[1 05] and its updates [

106 , 107, 1 08, 1 09 , 110, 111, 112], relies on permanent plant equipment in the steam turbine

-driven RCIC and SRV systems. Control elementary diagrams, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and system technical manuals were reviewed as necessary to determine which relays and switches have an impact on the operation of these systems. Any impact to AC powered valves in these systems was ignored as loss of AC power is a requirement for entry into FLEX.

(Criterion 2)

Before entry into FLEX a site must first (in this case) experience a beyond design

-basis seismic event coupled with an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS). In this event scenario the site would need time to assess plant conditions before it would declare itself in an ELAP/LUHS condition. By the time this condition is declared it is expected the period of strong shaking would be over and thus any temporary effect of relay chatter would be cleared before entry into FLEX. In some control circuits, however, contacts are fed back into the control to electrically seal

-in and cause a sustained change of state in the control circuit. This circuit seal

-in may cause valves to change position, pumps to change state, or controls to lock

-out operation of systems or components. Control elementary diagrams, piping and 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 instrumentation diagrams, and system technical manuals were reviewed as necessary to determine the potential of chatter (in the relays and switches identified by Criterion 1) to cause a seal

-in or lock-out. Only those relays and switches with the potential to cause seal-in or lock

-out were screened

-in for evaluation, relays and switches with only the potential to cause temporary conditions that clear on their own before entry into FLEX were screened out. (Criterion 3)

In some cases spurious chatter leads to a circuit seal

-in or lock

-out that either has no effect on the FLEX Response, or has a beneficial effect on the FLEX Response (for example the unintentional change of state in a valve that aids in aligning a credited flow path). Contact chatter having no system effect or beneficial system effects allow a relay or switch to be functionally screened out of consideration for this category. Control elementary diagrams, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and system technical manuals were reviewed as necessary to determine the potential impact of chatter (in the relays and switches identified by Criterion 2) on the operation of the Phase 1 systems. Only those relays and switches which could cause an undesirable effect on these systems were screened

-in. The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal

-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non

-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning. The selection of contact devices for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) overlaps with the RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control Category. Refer to Section 2.2 for more information on the analysis of contact devices for these valves.

The selection of contact devices for RCIC was based on the premise that RCIC operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to RCIC operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection. Only contact devices which could render the RCIC system inoperable were considered.

The largest vulnerability to RCIC operation following a seismic event is contact chatter leading to a false RCIC Isolation Signal or false Turbine Trip. A false steam line break trip has the potential to delay RCIC operation while confirmatory inspections are being made. Chatter in the contacts of RCIC Isolation Signal Relay 13A

-K22 or Steam Line High Differential Pressure Time Delay Relays 13A

-K7 and 13A

-K31; or coincident chatter in the Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation Relays 13A-K3, 13A-K5, 13A-K29, and 13A

-K30, or Steam Supply Low Pressure Relay 13A-K10; may lead to a RCIC Isolation Signal and seal

-in of 13A-K22 [19]. This would cause the RCIC Isolation Valves (MO

-275 and MO

-276) to close and the RCIC Trip and Throttle Valve (MO-2080) to trip. Similar chatter in the contact devices that drive those relays could also lead to seal-in: dPIS-13-83, dPIS-13-84, TS-13-79(A-D), TS-13-80(A-D), TS¬13-81(A-D), and TS 82(A-D) [19, 20].

Any chatter that may lead to the energization of the Trip and Throttle Valve (MO

-2080) Remote Trip Circuit is considered as SILO as it will close the valve and require a manual reset prior to restoration of the RCIC system. Chatter in Turbine Trip Auxiliary Relay 13A

-K11, or in the devices which control this relay; the Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Relay 13A

-K17, the Pump Suction Low Pressure Relay 13A

-K14, and the Isolation Signal Relay 13A

-K22 [19]. Similar chatter in the 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 contact devices that drive those relays (and not already covered in the RCIC Isolation Signal analysis) could also lead to a turbine trip: PS 87(A-D) [19, 20].

Monticello ESEL development is documented in Calculation 14

-053 [21, 22].

The contact devices selected as part of that effort appear in Table B-1. The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal

-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), Battery Chargers, Inverters , EDG Ancillary Systems, and Switchgear, Load Centers, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs). Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGS) and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 [

8] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators, Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems.

General information on the arrangement of safety

-related AC and DC systems, as well as which provide emergency power for the unit. Monticello has two (2) divisions of Class 1E loads with one EDG for each division. The Class 1E AC distribution scheme is shown on one

-line drawing NF

-36298-1 [40]. The Class 1E DC distribution scheme is described in the USAR Section 8.4 [41] and shown on one

-line drawing NF

-36298-2 [42]. The analysis necessary to identify contact devices in this category relies on conservative worse

-case initial conditions and presumptions regarding event progression. The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available. The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus undervoltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class 1E control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices which could chatter during the seismic event, seal

-in or lock

-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to a ll divisions. The contact devices selected as part of that effort appear in Table B

-1. Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators, G

-3A and G-3B, is broken down into the generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the USAR Section 8.4 [41].

Generator Protective Relaying The control circuit for the G

-3A Output Circuit Breaker (105

-502) includes interlocking contacts in the breaker closing logic [43]. The Diesel Generator Lockout relay (186

-502) will prevent remote manual or automatic closure of the breaker if tripped. This relay would have to be mechanically reset. In addition to chatter tripping 186

-502, it could also be tripped by tripping the Phase Overcurrent relay (151V

-502), Differential Current relay (187

-502), or the Anti

-Motoring relay (167

-502). In addition, the Bus Lockout relay (186

-5) could prevent remote manual or automatic closure [44].

Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of each EDG [43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50] [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59] (G

-3A and G-3B). Two conditions were considered for EDG starting

Emergency Response due to LOOP and Manual Start. In both conditions, tripping of the Overspeed Trip Limit Relay (OTR) will prevent starting the EDG. This relay could be sealed in by chattering of the Over Speed Limit Trip Switch (OTLS), which must be mechanically reset. Chattering on other diesel control panel internal relays could cause transient starting problems and inaccurate indications but would resolve once the period of shaking is complete (none of the start sequence relays will seal in once speed sensing is regained). In the automatic starting circuit for the EDGs, chatter in the automatic starting logic relays could only provide an automatic start signal, not prevent one.

The EDGs do not have any automatic circuitry shutdowns outside of the mechanical overspeed trip. Battery Chargers Analysis of 125 VDC battery chargers D10, D20, and D40, was performed using information from Section 8.5 of the USAR [60] as well as vendor schematic diagrams [61, 62, 63]. Each battery charger has a high

-voltage shutdown (HVSD) feature, and alarms for charger supply undervoltage and 125 VDC bus high/low voltage conditions. Since the HVSD circuit is located inside the charger, chatter will not induce an unwanted high voltage shutdown of these chargers.

Chatter Analysis on the 250 VDC battery chargers D52, D53, D54, D70, D80, and D90, was performed using information from Section 8.5 of the USAR as well as vendor schematic diagrams [64, 65, 66, 67, 68]. Under and overvoltage relays provide alarms if voltage on the bus 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 increases or decreases below preset values. The internal high voltage shutdown circuit of the chargers D52, D53, D70, and D80 was replaced by overvoltage relays outside of the charger that will shut them down if energized. Chargers D54 and D90 have spare HVSD contacts that are not connected. Chatter in overvoltage relays 59

-1 will cause a shutdown in battery chargers D52 and D70. Chatter in overvoltage relays 59

-2 will cause a shutdown in battery chargers D53 and D80.

Inverters Analysis of the schematics for the Division I and II 120V inverters (Y71 and Y81) [69] revealed no vulnerable contact devices and thus chatter analysis is unnecessary.

EDG Ancillary Systems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators, a number of components and systems are required. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed.

Starting Air The starting air system consists of two independent banks of three storage tanks, also referred to as receivers, having sufficient capacity to start the diesel engine five times without recharging from the air compressor. The system is passive with the exception of the air start solenoids which enable the air start motors. The air start solenoids are covered under the EDG engine control analysis discussed previously in this section

. Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake is a passive system taking outside air from the roof and filtering the air intake

, removing materials down to 100 microns prior to entering the engine. The system is a passive system and not subject to high frequency failures

. The exhaust system consists of piping and a roof mounted exhaust silencer. The system is a passive system and not subject to high frequency failures [70]

. Lube Oil The lube oil system contains lube oil pumps, filters, and a turbocharger lube oil pump. The system supplies lubricating oil continuously to the turbocharger, and crankshaft. The Emergency Diesel Generators (G

-3A and G-3B) utilize engine

-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps which do not rely on electrical control

. Fuel Oil The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System is described in the USAR Section 8.4 [41]. The Diesel Generators utilize engine

-driven mechanical pumps and DC

-powered auxiliary pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks. The day tanks are re

-supplied using AC

-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps. Electric driven fuel oil transfer pumps (P

-160A/B/C/D) maintain fuel level in the Standby Diesel Generator Day Tanks (T

-45A and T-45B). Analysis of the ESW pump circuit breaker control circuits [71, 72] indicates the auto

-start has been disabled. Manual control revealed no contacts susceptible to SILO

. Cooling Water The Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water System (EDG

-ESW) is described in the USAR Section 10.4 [73]. The EDG

-ESW system provides cooling water to the EDG. The EDG

-

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 ESW system provides river water to the EDG heat exchangers. The EDG

-ESW system gets an auto start signal when the associated EDG reached 125 RPM.

Two ESW pumps, P

-111A and P

-111B, provide cooling water to the heat exchangers associated with the two EDGs [74, 75]. In automatic mode these pumps are started when the EDG reaches 125rpm [56]. Therefore, these pumps rely on the EDGs being started via the EDG Start Signal. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is discussed previously in this section

. Ventilation The Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation System is described in the USAR Section 8.4 [41].The EDG room ventilation consists of a supply fan, and a set of exhaust fans and a recirculation damper for each EDG room.

The EDG room supply fans (V

-SF-9 and V-SF-10) shall automatically be capable of removing heat from the EDG rooms to maintain ambient air temperature during EDG operation. In automatic mode, V-SF-9 and V-SF-10 are started via the EDG start signal. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is discussed previously in this section. Apart from the SILO devices identified for the EDG start signal, chatter analysis of the control circuits for the supply fans [76, 77] concluded that they do not include SILO devices.

Note: For long

-term operation of an EDG, EDG

-ESW and ventilation systems are required

. Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded control circuits for the EDG circuit breakers, which are discussed previously in this section, and the ESW Pump breakers which are molded

-case (see discussion below), as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above. Those medium

- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4160V Essential Safeguards (ESF) Busses and 480V AC Load Centers supplying power to loads identified in this section (battery chargers, EDG ancillary systems, etc.) have been identified for evaluation: 152

-502, 152-509, 152-602, 152-609,52-301, 52-302,52-304, 52-308,52-401, 52-403,52-404, 52-408, 15 2-408, 152-407,52-201, and 52

-202. DC Distribution and l ow voltage Motor Control Center buckets use either Molded

-Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) or fused disconnects which are both seismically rugged [4, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86] [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93]. The only circuit breakers affected by external contact devices not already mentioned were those that distribute power from the 4160V ESF Busses to the 4160/480V step

-down transformers (X20, X30, and X40), and from the 4160/480V step

-down transformers to the 480V Load Centers.

A chatter analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers [44, 94, 95, 96, 97] indicates the phase overcurrent relays 151

-401, 151-402, 151-308, 151-511, 151-408, 151-610, 150/151

-407, 150/151

-509, 151-509, 150/151

-609, and 151-609; ground fault relays 151N

-401, 151N-402, 151N-308, 151N-408, 150G-407, 150G-509, and 150G-609; and bus lockout relays 186

-4, 186-5, and 186

-6 all could trip the transformer primary or secondary circuit breakers following the seismic event

.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The investigation of high

-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref.

[18]. A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B

-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [17] per the methodology and description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B

-1.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Per Reference [8], Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high

-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the MNGP horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS), which was generated as part of the MNGP Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] submitted to the NRC on May 14, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on July 8, 2015

[14]. It is noted in Reference [8] that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. Per Ref. [8], p. 3

-8, soil layers at soil

-founded sites typically shift the frequency range of GMRS

-to-foundation input toward the lower

-frequency part of the response spectrum. Therefore, the use of the GMRS as a surrogate site motion is acceptable for high

-frequency evaluations.

Per Ref. [4], p. 21, MNGP is soil

-founded site. The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

As described in Section 3.2 of Reference

[8], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high

-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

rofile is provided in Reference

[4], Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduce d on the following page in Table 3

-1.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Layer Depth (ft) Depth (m) Thickness, d i (ft) Vs i (ft/sec) d i/Vs i i/Vs i] Vs30 (ft/s) 1 5 1.52 5 700 0.00714 0.00714 1491 2 10 3.05 5 700 0.00714 0.01429 3 15 4.57 5 1,400 0.00357 0.01786 4 20 6.10 5 1,400 0.00357 0.02143 5 25 7.62 5 1,400 0.00357 0.02500 6 30 9.14 5 1,400 0.00357 0.02857 7 35 10.67 5 1,400 0.00357 0.03214 8 40 12.19 5 1,400 0.00357 0.03571 9 45 13.72 5 1,400 0.00357 0.03929 10 50 15.24 5 1,400 0.00357 0.04286 11 55 16.76 5 1,400 0.00357 0.04643 12 60 18.29 5 1,400 0.00357 0.05000 13 65 19.81 5 2,500 0.00200 0.05200 14 70 21.34 5 2,500 0.00200 0.05400 15 75 22.86 5 2,500 0.00200 0.05600 16 80 24.38 5 2,500 0.00200 0.05800 17 85 25.91 5 2,500 0.00200 0.06000 18 90 27.43 5 2,500 0.00200 0.06200 19 95 28.96 5 2,500 0.00200 0.06400 20 100 30.48 5 2,500 0.00200 0.06600 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.

5. The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d i) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs i). The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by i/Vs i]). The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i/Vs i]. Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 30.48m (10 0ft) instead of 30m (98.43ft). This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8], Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.153g and the shear wave velocity of 1491ft/s, the site soil class is A-Intermediate

.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference [8], Table 3

-2. The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8], Table 3-2 values are constant between 0.1Hz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGMRS values are provided in Table 3

-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 of this report provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for MNGP.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz)

HGMRS (g) V/H Ratio VGMRS (g) 100 0.153 0.78 0.119 90 0.154 0.82 0.126 80 0.155 0.86 0.133 70 0.158 0.91 0.144 60 0.167 0.93 0.155 50 0.187 0.95 0.178 40 0.220 0.91 0.200 35 0.237 0.86 0.204 30 0.259 0.79 0.205 25 0.284 0.72 0.204 20 0.321 0.67 0.215 15 0.339 0.67 0.227 12.5 0.327 0.67 0.219 10 0.324 0.67 0.217 9 0.313 0.67 0.210 8 0.302 0.67 0.202 7 0.294 0.67 0.197 6 0.263 0.67 0.176 5 0.215 0.67 0.144 4 0.184 0.67 0.123 3.5 0.164 0.67 0.110 3 0.143 0.67 0.096 2.5 0.119 0.67 0.080 2 0.091 0.67 0.061 1.5 0.060 0.67 0.040 1.25 0.048 0.67 0.032 1 0.038 0.67 0.025 0.9 0.036 0.67 0.024 0.8 0.035 0.67 0.024 0.7 0.035 0.67 0.023 0.6 0.034 0.67 0.023 0.5 0.032 0.67 0.022 0.4 0.026 0.67 0.017 0.35 0.023 0.67 0.015 0.3 0.019 0.67 0.013 0.25 0.016 0.67 0.011 0.2 0.013 0.67 0.009 0.15 0.010 0.67 0.006 0.125 0.008 0.67 0.005 0.1 0.006 0.67 0.004 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:Vertical in

-structure amplification factor AF SV to account for seismic amplification at Vertical in

-cabinet amplification factor AF c to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)The in-structure amplification factor AFSV is derived from Figure 4

-4 in Reference [

8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AF c is derived in Reference [

8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types. Per Reference [

8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in

-cabinet response spectrum:

Horizontal in

-structure amplification factor AF SH to account for seismic amplification at Horizontal in

-cabinet amplification factor AF c to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFSH is derived from Figure 4

-3 in Reference [

8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AF c is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [

8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7 1 48-SL [13] assuming 5% in

-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP

-7148-SL [13] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels

, and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B

-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in

-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [

8] as follows:

Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height

-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front

-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box

-type structure with height-to-depth ratio s of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels

, which results in the higher in

-cabinet amplification factors.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height

-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid

-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 Per Reference [

8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1)If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [

7], then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2)If a contact device was not tested as part of [

7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were us ed: (a)Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program

. (b)Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [

9], [10], [11], and [12]. (c)Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

(d)Station A-46 program reports.

(3)The station A

-46 program reports are also used to determine if operator action can resolve any inadvertent actuation of the essential components.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Referenc e [8] A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B

-1 in Appendix B of this report.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 MNGP has performed a High Frequency Confirmatio50.54(f) letter [

1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [

8]. The evaluation identified a total of 160 components that required seismic high frequency evaluation. As summarized in Table B

-1 in Appendix B:

149 of the components have adequate seismic capacity.

Six (6) of the components will have adequate seismic capacity following a previously

-planned replacement (see note s below and Section 5.2 of this report).

One (1) component (13 A-K26) has inadequate seismic capacity, but chatter in this device due to a seismic eveseismic event.

The remaining four (4) components than seismic demand

, because any chatter in these four (4) components can be resolved by MNGP operator actions.

Note s The dPIS-13-83 and dPIS-13-84 manufacturer and model as shown in Table B-1 are the manufacturer and model of proposed replacement switches (Barton Instrument Systems 288A). The adequacy of the dP IS-13-83 and dPIS-13-84 components are only valid following the replacement of the existing switches with the Barton 288A switches shown in Table B-1. The 87A, PS-13-87B, PS-13-87C, and PS 87D manufacturer and model as shown in Table B-1 are the manufacturer and model of proposed replacement switches (SOR 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ). The adequacy of the PS-13-87A, PS-13-87B, PS-1 3-87C, and PS-13-87D components are only valid following the replacement of the existing switches with the SOR 6RT

-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ switches shown in Table B-1. Existing components dPIS 83 and dPIS 84 shall be replaced with Barton 288A model Existing components PS-13-87A, PS-13-87B, PS-13-87C, and PS 87D shall be replaced with SOR 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ these components are valid.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 1NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near

-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai

-Ichi Ac, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near

-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai

-,ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nucl,ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4MNGP Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated May 14, 2014 ,ADAMS Accession Number ML14136A288 and ML14136A289 5Sensitive to High

- 6Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near

-Term Task Force Recommendation 7September 2014 8 9EPRI NP-7147- 10EPRI NP-7147- 11EPRI NP-7147- 12EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004

- 13EPRI NP-7148-SLProcedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality1990 14NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (P. GardnerMonticello Nuclear Generating Plant Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near

-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai

-ichi Accident (TAC NOS. MF3958July 8, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15175A336 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 15Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 st -Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai

-Accession Number ML111861807 16NEI 12- 1716Q0391-CAL-001, Rev.

0Evaluation of Components 181 6Q 03 91-RPT-001, Rev.

0 19Monticello Drawing NX

-7822-22-2 Rev 76, "RCIC System".

20Monticello Drawing NX

-7822-22-3 Rev 77, "RCIC System Shutdown".

21Calculation 14

-053 Rev 1, "Monticello FLEX Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL)".

22Calculation 14

-053 Rev 1A, "Monticello FLEX Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL)".

23Monticello Drawing NH

-36241 Rev. 8 8, "Nuclear Boiler System

-Steam Supply P&ID".

24Monticello Drawing NX

-7831-143-2 Rev. 75, "Rev Q

- Elementary Diagram Automatic Blowdown System".

25Monticello Drawing NF

-95916-3 Rev. 77, "Blowdown Control System Division 11 Elementary Diagram".

26Monticello Drawing NF

-95916-2 Rev. 76, "Blowdown Control System Division II Elementary Diagram".

27Monticello Drawing NF

-95916-5 Rev. 76, "Blowdown Control System Division II Elementary Diagram".

28Monticello Drawing NX

-7823-4-9 Rev. 81, "Elementary Diagram Primary Containment Isolation System".

29Monticello Drawing NX

-7831-446 Rev. 75, "Rev C

- Schem. Pneumatic Control Panel

- MSIV". 30Monticello Drawing NX

-7823-4-13A Rev. 75, "Rev A

- RWCU Inlet Inboard Isol MO¬2397, Scheme B3328".

31Monticello Drawing NX

-7822-22-5A Rev. 75, "Rev A

- RCIC Steam Supply Isolation MO

-2075 Scheme B3340".

32Monticello Drawing NX

-7822-22-5B Rev. 78, "RCIC Steam Supply Line Isolation MO¬2076 Scheme D31104".

33Monticello Drawing NX

-7831-80-6 Rev. 77, "RHR Suction Line EQ Valve MOV

-4086 RHR Discharge Lines EQ Valve MOV

-4085A". 34Monticello Drawing NX

-7823-4-11C Rev. 76, "RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply Inboard Isolation Valve MO

-2029 Scheme B3333

". 35Monticello Drawing NH

-36247 Rev. 8 6, "P&ID Residual Heat Removal System".

36Monticello Drawing NH

-36246 Rev. 8 5, "P&ID Residual Heat Removal System".

37Monticello Drawing NH

-36248 Rev. 85, "P&ID Core Spray System".

38Monticello Drawing NX

-8292-12-5 Rev. 77, "Elementary Diagram HPCI System".

39Monticello Drawing NX

-8292-12-2 Rev. 78, "HPCI System Shutdown".

40Monticello Drawing NF

-36298-1 Rev. 111, "Electrical Load Flow One Line Diagram".

41Monticello USAR

-8.04, Rev. 33, "Plant Electrical Systems

- Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems".

42Monticello Drawing NF

-36298-2 Rev. 90, "DC Electrical Load Distribution One Line Diagram".

43Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-2 Rev. 77, "Standby Diesel Generator ACB 152

-502 Control.".

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 44Monticello Drawing NE

-36399-3B Rev. 76, "#14 & 15 4.16 KV Bus Lockout Relay".

45Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-2A Rev. 78, "Standby Diesel Generator ACB 152

-602 Control".

46Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-3 Rev. 76, "Schematic Diagrams Standby Diesel Generators".

47Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-3A Rev. 76, "#12 Standby Diesel Generator, Start Circuits 1 & 2 Schematic Diagrams".

48Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-4 Rev. 76, "#11 Standby Diesel Generator Control Scheme G30". 49Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-5 Rev. 75, "Rev K

- Standby Diesel Generators Control & Air Compressor Units Control".

50Monticello Drawing NE

-36403-4A Rev. 76, "Standby Diesel Generator #12 Control Scheme G40". 51Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-1 Rev. 80, "Physical Schematic & Field Connection Model 999 #11 EDG".

52Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-1A Rev. 82, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections Model 999

- #12 EDG".

53Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-2 Rev. 76, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections

-Model 999 #11 EDG".

54Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-2A Rev. 76, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections Model 999

- #12 EDG".

55Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-3 Rev. 77, "Physical Scheme & Field Connections Model #999 - #11 EDG".

56Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-3A Rev. 77, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections Model #999

- #12 EDG". 57Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-4 Rev. 7 8, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections Model 999 - 11 EDG". 58Monticello Drawing NX

-9216-5-4A Rev. 80, "Physical Schematic & Field Connections

-Model 999 #12 EDG".

59Monticello Drawing NF

-157308 Rev. 7 7, "Wiring

- #11 Standby Diesel Generator Engine Control Cabinet C93".

60Monticello USAR

-8.05, Rev. 31, "Plant Electrical Systems DC Power Supply Systems".

61Monticello Drawing NX

-9173-18-1 Rev. 2, "Wiring Diagram 125VDC C & D Battery Chargers (D10, D20, D40)".

62Monticello Drawing NX

-9173-18-2 Rev. 1, "Wiring Diagram 125VDC C & D Battery Chargers (D10, D20, D40)".

63Monticello Drawing NX

-9173-18-3 Rev. 2, "C & D Battery Chargers (D10, D20, D40)".

64Monticello Drawing NX

-20009-7 Rev. 76, "Schematic Diagram 250VDC Batt Charg er". 65Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-4-1 Rev. 78, "Battery Chargers D52, D53, D54 & Schemes B3431, 3433 & 3434".

66Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-4-3 Rev. 75, "Rev G

- 125/250V DC Alarm System Panel D102 Scheme D10201".

67Monticello Drawing NE

-93523-5 Rev. 75, "Rev E - 125/250 DC Alarm System Panel D101".

68Monticello Drawing NE

-93523-2 Rev. 78, " Schematic Metering & Relaying Diagram 125/250V D.C. Dist. Channel 2".

69Monticello Drawing NE

-100344 Rev. 76, "Schematic Diagram Div. I & Div. II 120V Instrument AC UPS".

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 70Monticello Drawing NF

-36672 Rev. 7 9, "Standby Diesel Generators Arrangement & Piping". 71Monticello Drawing NE

-36438-9 Rev. 82, "11 EDG Oil Pumps A and C, P

-160A and P¬160C, Pumphouse Xfmr XP54 & Heating Boiler TK T

-46 Valve SV

-1531 Control".

72Monticello Drawing NE-36438-9-1 Rev. 0, "Diesel Oil Pumps, P

-160B & P-160D Control Schematic".

73Monticello USAR

-10.4, Rev. 32, "Plant Auxiliary Systems Plant Cooling System".

74Monticello Drawing NE

-36394-18 Rev. 76, "Emergency Service Water Pumps".

75Monticello Drawing NE-36394-18A Rev. 75, "Rev F

- Emergency Service Water Pump P

-111B Scheme B4319".

76Monticello Drawing NE

-36375-19A Rev. 75, "Rev A

- Emerg. Diesel Gen. #11 Room Supply Fan V-SF-10 & Scheme B3474".

77Monticello Drawing NE

-36375-19 Rev. 76, "H&V Schematic Diagrams for V

-UH-39 and V-SF-9". 78Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-4 Rev. 86, "#121

- 480V MCC B21".

79Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-2 Rev. 80, "125V DC Distribution Electrical Scheme".

80Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-3 Rev. 84, "Schematic Diagrams 125, 250 & 24 Volt DC Systems".

81Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-5 Rev. 76, "250V DC MCC Schedule D311 D312 and D313".

82Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-4 Rev. 76, "250V DC & Panel Schedule D31, D33".

83Monticello Drawing NE

-366 40-8 Rev. 76, "Schematic Diagram 250VDC Battery #17 & Distribution Panel D71".

84Monticello Drawing NE

-36640-4-2 Rev. 75, "Rev F

- 125/250V DC Distribution Cab. D31 Scheme No. D3".

85Monticello Drawing NE

-93523-3 Rev. 75, "Rev F

- Schematic Metering & Relay Diagram 125/250V D.C. Dist. Channel 2".

86Monticello Drawing NE

-93523-4 Rev. 75, "Rev E

- Battery Chargers Trouble Alarms & Cab. D100 Schedule".

87Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-6 Rev. 87, "#131 480V MCC B31".

88Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-8 Rev. 81, "#133 480V MCC B33".

89Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-10 Rev. 81, "#142 480V MCC B42".

90Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-11 Rev. 8 5, "#143 480V MCC B43".

91Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-13 Rev. 78, "#133 & #143 480V MCC B33 & B43".

92Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-15 Rev. 83, "#134 480V MCC B34".

93Monticello Drawing NE

-36347-16 Rev. 80, "#144 480V MCC B44".

94Monticello Drawing NE

-36399-3C Rev. 75, "Rev F

- #16 4.16 kV Bus Lockout Relay".

95Monticello Drawing NE

-36402-2C Rev. 75, "Rev E

- #102 Load Center Primary ACB No. 152-407 Control".

96Monticello Drawing NE

-36402-2 Rev. 76, "#103 Load Center Primary ACB No. 152¬509 Control.".

97Monticello Drawing NE

-36402-2A Rev. 76, "#104 Load Center Primary ACB #152¬609 Control.".

98Monticello Drawing NH

-36251 Rev. 80, "P&ID RCIC (Steam Side)".

99Monticello Drawing NH

-36249 Rev. 82, "P&ID (Steam Side) High Pressure Coolant Injection System". 100Monticello Drawing NX

-8292-12-1 Rev. 78, "HPCI System Shutdown".

101Monticello Drawing NH

-36252 Rev.

80, "P&ID RCIC (Water Side)".

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 102Monticello Drawing NE-36402-3B Rev. 75, "Rev C

- Load Center B3 Schematic B301 Main Breaker 301".

103Monticello Drawing NE

-36402-3C Rev. 75, "Rev D

- Load Center B3 Schematic Diagram 104EPRI 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near

-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," Final Report, May 2013. 105Letter L-MT-13-017 from NSPM to NRC (ML13066A066), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA 049)," February 28, 2013. 106Letter L-M-MT-13-079 from NSPM to NRC (ML13241A200), "Monticello's First Six

-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events," August 28, 2013. 107Letter L-MT-14-014 from NSPM to NRC (ML14065A037), "Monticello's Second Six

-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events," February 28, 2014. 108Letter L-M T-14-073 from NSPM to NRC (ML14241A260), "Monticello's Third Six

-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-121-049)," August 28, 2014. 109Letter L-MT-15-004 from NSPM to NRC (ML15055A599), "Monticello's Fourth Six

-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA 049)," February 24, 2015. 110Letter L-MT-15-059 from Monticello to NRC (ML15232A553), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Fifth Six

-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA 049)," August 19, 2015. 111Letter L-MT-16-0 09 from Monticello to NRC (ML16053A454), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Six th Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA 049)," February 22, 201 6. 112Letter L-MT-1 6-0 38 from Monticello to NRC (ML16235A005), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond

-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA 049)," August 19, 201

6.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev.

0 The following sample calculation is extracted from Reference [

17]. Notes: 1.Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [

17] reference section shown on the following page.

Attachment citations within the sample calculation also refer to attachments to Ref. [17], not to attachments to this report.

2.This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high

-frequency-sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRI high

-frequency guidance [

8] and the flexible coping strategies guidance document NEI 12

-06 [16].

S&A Calc. No.:

16Q 0391-CA L-001, Rev. 0 Title: High Freque n cy Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation o f Componen tsPrepared: FG Date: 1 1/07/1 6 Reviewe d: MW Date: 11/08/16 S&A Calc. No.:

16Q 0391-CA L-001, Rev. 0 Title: High Freque n cy Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation o f Componen tsPrepared: FG Date: 1 1/07/1 6 Reviewe d: MW Date: 11/08/16

valueas1.0.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 1 dPIS-13-83 2 Process Switch Core Cooling RCIC High Steam Flow Isolation BARTON INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS 288A C-122 (25-52) Instrument Rack RB 935 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 2 dPIS-13-84 2 Process Switch Core Cooling RCIC High Steam Flow Isolation BARTON INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS 288A C-122 (25-52) Instrument Rack RB 935 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 3 dPIS-23-76A Process Switch RV Inventory Control Steam Line High Pressure 300% Flow BARTON INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS 580A-0 C-122 (25-52) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 4 dPIS-23-76B Process Switch RV Inventory Control Steam Line High Pressure BARTON INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS 580A-0 C-122 (25-52) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 5 PS-13-67A Process Switch Core Cooling RCIC Low Pump Suction Pressure Turbine Trip STATIC-O-RING (SOR) 54RT-BB118-M4-C2A-TTNQ C-128 (25-58) Instrument Rack RB 896 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 6 PS-13-87A 2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Low Press Isolation STATIC-O-RING (SOR) 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ C-215 (25-1B) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 7 PS-13-87B 2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Low Press Isolation STATIC-O-RING (SOR) 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ C-215 (25-1B) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 8 PS-13-87C 2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Low Press Isolation STATIC-O-RING (SOR) 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ C-215 (25-1B) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 9 PS-13-87D 2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Low Press Isolation STATIC-O-RING (SOR) 6RT-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ C-215 (25-1B) Instrument Rack RB 935 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 10 PS-13-72A Process Switch Core Cooling RCIC High Turbine Exhaust Pressure Turbine Trip BARKSDALE INC D2H-M150SS C-128 (25-58) Instrument Rack RB 896 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 11 PS-13-72B Process Switch Core Cooling RCIC High Turbine Exhaust Pressure Turbine Trip BARKSDALE INC D2H-M150SS C-128 (25-58) Instrument Rack RB 896 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 12 TS-13-79A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 13 TS-13-79A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 14 TS-13-79B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 15 TS-13-79B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling above INS. TOR Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16 TS-13-79C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 17 TS-13-79C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 18 TS-13-79D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 19 TS-13-79D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 20 TS-13-80A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 21 TS-13-80A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 22 TS-13-80B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 23 TS-13-80B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 24 TS-13-80C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 25 TS-13-80C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 26 TS-13-80D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 27 TS-13-80D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 28 TS-13-81A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 29 TS-13-81A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 30 TS-13-81B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 31 TS-13-81B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 32 TS-13-81C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 33 TS-13-81C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 34 TS-13-81D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 35 TS-13-81D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 36 TS-13-82A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 37 TS-13-82A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner Wall)

Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 38 TS-13-82B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner) Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 39 TS-13-82B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Attached to ceiling (NW Corner) Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 40 TS-13-82C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 41 TS-13-82C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Halfway up RCIC Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 42 TS-13-82D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 43 TS-13-82D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On Pump Room Ceiling Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 44 TS-23-101A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 45 TS-23-101A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 46 TS-23-101B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 47 TS-23-101B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 48 TS-23-101C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 49 TS-23-101C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 50 TS-23-101D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 51 TS-23-101D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 52 TS-23-102A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 53 TS-23-102A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 54 TS-23-102B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 55 TS-23-102B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 56 TS-23-102C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 57 TS-23-102C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 58 TS-23-102D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 59 TS-23-102D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 60 TS-23-103A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 61 TS-23-103A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 62 TS-23-103B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 63 TS-23-103B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 64 TS-23-103C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 65 TS-23-103C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 66 TS-23-103D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 67 TS-23-103D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 68 TS-23-104A-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 69 TS-23-104A-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Right of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 70 TS-23-104B-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 71 TS-23-104B-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Left of HPCI Door Up on Wall Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 72 TS-23-104C-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 73 TS-23-104C-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 On East Wall Over Steam Line Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 74 TS-23-104D-1 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 75 TS-23-104D-2 Process Switch RV Inventory Control HPCI Steam Line High Area Temperature Isolation FENWAL CONTROLS 01-170230-090 Ceiling-Ladder Halfway Down Stairs Rigid RB 935 3 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 76 13A-K3 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-30 (9-30) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 77 13A-K5 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-30 (9-30) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 78 13A-K14 Auxiliary Relay Core Cooling Pump Low Suction Pressure Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-30 (9-30) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 79 13A-K17 Auxiliary Relay Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-30 (9-30) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 80 13A-K29 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-33 (9-33) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 81 13A-K30 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-33 (9-33) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 82 23A-K5 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Manual Isolation Signal Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-39 (9-39) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 83 23A-K6 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-39 (9-39) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 84 23A-K8 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line Area High Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-39 (9-39) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 85 23A-K32 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line Area Excess Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11J52 C-41 (9-41) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 86 23A-K33 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line Area Excess Temperature Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11J52 C-41 (9-41) Control Cabinet PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 87 13A-K26 Auxiliary Relay Core Cooling Auto Isolation Signal Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HGA11A52F C-30 (9-30) Control Cabinet PAB 939 N/A Chatter Acceptable 88 59-1/D6A Overvoltage Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Overvoltage Relays C&D Batteries MBC-3200 D101 Alarm Panel EFT 932.83 N/A Operator Action 89 59-1/D3A Overvoltage Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Overvoltage Relays C&D Batteries MBC-3200 D102 Alarm Panel PAB 928 N/A Operator Action 90 59-2/D6B Overvoltage Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Overvoltage Relays C&D Batteries MBC-3200 D101 Alarm Panel EFT 932.83 N/A Operator Action 91 59-2/D3B Overvoltage Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Overvoltage Relays C&D Batteries MBC-3200 D102 Alarm Panel PAB 928 N/A Operator Action 92 13A-K6 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control MO-2078 Position Monitor Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 93 13A-K10 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line Low Pressure Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 94 13A-K11 Auxiliary Relay Core Cooling Turbine Trip Auxiliary Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 95 13A-K22 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Auto Isolation Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 96 13A-K32 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Auto Isolation Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-33 (9-33) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 97 23A-K2 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-39 (9-39) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 98 23A-K4 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control High Drywell Pressure Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-39 (9-39) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 99 23A-K27 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control HPCI Auto Isolation Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-39 (9-39) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 100 23A-K35 Auxiliary Relay RV Inventory Control HPCI Auto Isolation Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HFA151A2F C-41 (9-41) Control Panel PAB 939 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem 101 13A-K7 Timing Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling RCIC Steam Line High DP (Pressure) Steam Line Break Relay AGASTAT RELAY CO E7014PB001 C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 102 13A-K31 Timing Relay RV Inventory Control & Core Cooling Steam Line High DP (Line Break) Relay AGASTAT RELAY CO E7014PB001 C-33 (9-33) Control Panel PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 103 13A-K33 Timing Relay Core Cooling RCIC Turbine Exhaust High Pressure TD Relay AGASTAT RELAY CO E7012PD C-30 (9-30) Control Panel PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 104 23A-K9 Time Delay Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line High Pressure Relay AGASTAT RELAY CO ETR14D3B004 C-39 (9-39) Control Panel PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 105 23A-K34 Time Delay Relay RV Inventory Control Steam Line High Pressure 300% Flow Relay AGASTAT RELAY CO ETR14D3B C-41 (9-41) Control Panel PAB 939 GERS Cap > Dem 106 152-502 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems G-3A (11 DG) to 15 Bus 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 107 152-509 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems 15 BUS to X

-30 (LC-103) 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE

-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 108 152-602 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems G-3B (12 DG) to 16 Bus 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE

-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 109 152-609 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems 16 Bus to X

-40 (LC-104) 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE

-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 110 152-408 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems 14 Bus to 16 Bus 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE

-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 111 152-407 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems 14 Bus to X

-20 (LC-102) 4kV Supply GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR Magne-Blast Breaker GE

-AMH-4.16-250 BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 112 52-301 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems LC-103 Main Breaker Cubicle ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-3000S LC-103 Switchgear Turb 911 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 113 52-302 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-131 Feeder Breaker Cubicle

- Load Shed ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-103 Switchgear Turb 911 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 114 52-304 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-133A Feeder Breaker Cubicle - Essential ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-103 Switchgear Turb 911 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 115 52-308 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-134 Feeder Breaker Cubicle

- Essential ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-103 Switchgear Turb 911 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 116 52-401 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems LC-104 Main Breaker Cubicle ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-3000S LC-104 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 117 52-403 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-142A & B Feeder Breaker Cubicle - Essential ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-104 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 118 52-404 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-143A Feeder Breaker Cubicle - Essential ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-104 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 119 52-408 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-144 Feeder Breaker Cubicle

- Essential ASEA BROWN BOVERI INC K-1600S LC-104 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 120 52-201 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems LC-102 Main Breaker Cubicle GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR AK-2A-75S-2 LC-102 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 121 52-202 4 Circuit Breaker AC/DC Power Support Systems MCC-121 Feeder Breaker Cubicle GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR AK-2A-25-1 LC-102 Switchgear Turb 931 SQUG Report Cap > Dem 122 186-4 Lock-Out Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #14 Bus Lockout Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HEA BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 123 186-5 Lock-Out Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #15 Bus Lockout Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HEA BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 124 186-6 Lock-Out Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #16 Bus Lockout Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HEA BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 125 186-502 Lock-Out Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Diesel Generator Lockout GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HEA BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 126 186-602 Lock-Out Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Diesel Generator Lockout GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12HEA BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 127 151-401-A 151-401-B 151-401-C Overcurrent Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #14 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC51A101A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 128 151-402-A 151-402-B 151-402-C Overcurrent Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #14 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC51A101A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 129 151N-401 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #14 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A10A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 130 151N-402 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #14 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A10A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 131 151-308-A 151-308-B 151-308-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #15 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A101A BUS-13 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 132 151-511-A 151-511-B 151-511-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #15 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A101A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 133 151N-308 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #15 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A10A BUS-13 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 134 151-408-A 151-408-B 151-408-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #16 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A101A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 135 151-610-A 151-610-B 151-610-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #16 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A101A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 136 151N-408 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Bus #16 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC53A10A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 137 150/151-407-A 150/151-407-B 150/151-407-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 102 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC77B36A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 138 150/151-509-A 150/151-509-B 150/151-509-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 103 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC77B36A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 139 151-509-A 151-509-B 151-509-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 103 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC77A11A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 140 150/151-609-A 150/151-609-B 150/151-609-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 104 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC77B36A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 141 151-609-A 151-609-B 151-609-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 104 Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IAC77A11A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 142 150G-407 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 102 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12PJC11AV1A BUS-14 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 143 150G-509 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 103 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12PJC11AV1A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 144 150G-609 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Load Center 104 Ground Fault Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12PJC11AV1A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 145 151V-502-A Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 146 151V-502-B Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 147 151V-502-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 148 151V-602-A Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 149 151V-602-B Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 150 151V-602-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Phase Overcurrent Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJCV51A13A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. Component Enclosure Building 1 Floor Elev. (ft) Component Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result 151 187-502-A Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 152 187-502-B Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 153 187-502-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 GERS Cap > Dem 154 187-602-A Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 155 187-602-B Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 156 187-602-C Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Differential Current Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12IJD52A11A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 GERS Cap > Dem 157 167-502 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Anti-Motoring Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12ICW52A1A BUS-15 Switchgear Turb 911 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 158 167-602 Protective Relay AC/DC Power Support Systems Anti-Motoring Relay GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR 12ICW52A1A BUS-16 Switchgear Turb 931 Qualification Test Cap > Dem 159 DG1-OST-11 Limit Switch AC/DC Power Support Systems Overspeed Limit Trip Switch Square D Company Class 9007, Series A LV, Type B51B-S1 G-3A Diesel Generator EDG 931 Not Vulnerable 5 Cap > Dem 160 DG2-OST-12 Limit Switch AC/DC Power Support Systems Overspeed Limit Trip Switch Square D Company Class 9007, Series A LV, Type B51B-S1 G-3B Diesel Generator EDG 931 Not Vulnerable 5 Cap > Dem 16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Note 1: Building Key: RB = Reactor Building, PAB = Plant Administration Building, Turb = Turbine Building, EDG =

Emergency Diesel Generator Room Note 2: a.-13-83 and dPIS 84 manufacturer and model as shown in Table B

-1 are the manufacturer and model of proposed replacement switches (Barton Instrument Systems 288A). The adequacy of the dPIS 83 and dPIS-13-84 components are only valid following the replacement of the existing switches with the Barton 288A switches shown in Table B

-1. b.-13-87A, PS-13-87B, PS-13-87C, and PS 87D manufacturer and model as shown in Table B-1 are the manufacturer and model of proposed replacement switches (SOR 6RT

-B3-C1A-JJTTNQ). The evaluation of the PS 87A, PS-13-87B, PS-13-87C, and PS 87D components are only valid following the replacement of the existing switches with the SOR 6RT

-B3-C1A-JJTTNQ switches shown in Table B-1. Note 3: since the seismic demand at the highest elevation of the group of switches would envelop the seismic demand of the rest of the switches.

Note 4: The component IDs are cubicle IDs within which the circuit breakers are located. The circuit breaker IDs and the manufacturer/model information for the circuit breakers within these cubicles are provided in Ref. [17]. Note 5: Seismic capacities for these components are not available. Per Ref. [7], Section 6.2, all limit switches were shown to be rugged in the high

-frequency region. Therefore, all limit switches such as Square D 9007 switches can be screened out.

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency ConfirmationVALVE ID P&ID Sheet Note Included MO-1614 NH-36 2 37 N/A Not a leak path FW 1 & FW-97-2 (Simple Check Valves upstream will prevent Leakage).

No MO-1615 NH-36 2 37 N/A Not a leak path FW 1 & FW-97-2 (Simple Check Valves upstream will prevent Leakage).

No FW-97-2 NH-36241 N/A Simple Check Valve No FW-97-1 NH-36241 N/A Simple Check Valve No RV-2-71H NH-36241 N/A H SRV Yes* RV-2-71C NH-36241 N/A C SRV Yes* RV-2-71D NH-36241 N/A D SRV Yes* RV-2-71F NH-36241 N/A F SRV Yes* RV-2-71E NH-36241 N/A E SRV Yes* RV-2-71A NH-36241 N/A A SRV Yes* RV-2-71B NH-36241 N/A B SRV Yes* RV-2-71G NH-36241 N/A G SRV Yes* AO-2-8 0 A NH-36241 N/A Yes* AO-2-8 0 B NH-36241 N/A Yes* AO-2-8 0 C NH-36241 N/A Yes* AO-2-8 0 D NH-36241 N/A Yes* AO-2-86A NH-36241 N/A Only if AO 8OA fails to be closed No Valve AO-2-8OA, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve AO-2-86A did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency ConfirmationVALVE ID P&ID Sheet Note Included AO-2-86B NH-36241 N/A Only if AO 8OB fails to be closed No Valve AO-2-8OB, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve AO-2-86B did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

AO-2-86C NH-36241 N/A Only if AO 8OC fails to be closed No Valve AO-2-8OC, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve AO-2-86C did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

AO-2-86D NH-36241 N/A Only if AO 8OD fails to be closed No Valve AO-2-8OD, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve AO-2-86D did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-2373 NH-36241 N/A Yes* MO-2374 NH-36241 N/A Only if MO

-2373 fails to be closed No Valve MO-2373, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-2374 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

CV-2371 NH-36241 N/A Yes* CV-2372 NH-36241 N/A Only if CV

-2371 fails to be closed No Valve CV-2371, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve CV-2372 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-2-43A NH-36243 N/A Closed loop No MO-2-43B NH-36243 N/A Closed loop No MO-2-53A NH-36243 N/A Closed loop No MO-2-53B NH-36243 N/A Closed loop No CRD-31 NH-36244 N/A Simple Check Valve No AO-10-46B NH-36246 N/A Yes* MO-2015 NH-36246 N/A Only if AO 46B fails to be closed No Valve AO-10-46B, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-2015 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-4085B NH-36246 N/A Yes* AO-10-46A NH-36247 N/A Yes*

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency ConfirmationVALVE ID P&ID Sheet Note Included MO-2014 NH-36247 N/A Only if AO 46A fails to be closed No Valve AO-10-46A, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-2014 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-4085A NH-36247 N/A Yes* MO-2029 NH-36247 N/A Yes* MO-2030 NH-36247 N/A Only if MO

-2029 fails to be closed No Valve MO-2029, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-2030 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-4086 NH-36247 N/A Yes* MO-1751 NH-36248 N/A Only if MO-1753 fails to be closed No Valve AO-14-13A, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-1753 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18], and therefore this valve did not require evaluation in Ref.

[18]. MO-1752 NH-36248 N/A Only if MO

-1754 fails to be closed No Valve AO-14-13B, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-1754 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18], and therefore this valve did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

MO-1753 NH-36248 N/A Only if AO 13A fails to be closed No Valve AO-14-13A, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-1753 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18]. MO-1754 NH-36248 N/A Only if AO 13B fails to be closed No Valve AO-14-13B, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-1754 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

AO-14-13A NH-36248 N/A Yes* AO-14-13B NH-36248 N/A Yes* MO-2035 NH-36249 N/A Only if MO

-2034 fails to be closed Yes* MO-2034 NH-36249 N/A Yes*

16Q0391-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency ConfirmationVALVE ID P&ID Sheet Note Included MO-2068 NH-36250 N/A Not a leak path FW 1 & FW-97-2 (Simple Check Valves upstream will prevent Leakage).

No MO-2075 NH-36251 N/A Yes* MO-2076 NH-36251 N/A Only if MO

-2075 fails to be closed Yes* MO-2107 NH-36252 N/A Not a leak path FW 1 & FW-97-2 (Simple Check Valves upstream will prevent Leakage.

No MO-2397 NH-36254 N/A Yes* MO-2398 NH-36254 N/A Only if MO-2397 fails to be closed No Valve MO-2397, as evaluated in Ref. [18], will not fail to be closed during a seismic event. Therefore, valve MO-2398 did not require evaluation in Ref. [18].

• Note: the evaluation of this valve is discussed in Section 2.2 of this report as well as in report 16Q0391-RPT-001 (Ref. 18).