Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
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MONTHYEARL-MT-20-003, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF Initiative 4b2020-03-30030 March 2020 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF Initiative 4b Project stage: Request L-MT-20-036, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times2020-12-21021 December 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times Project stage: Response to RAI ML20328A0382021-01-0808 January 2021 Regulatory Audit Summary License Amendment Request to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk Informed Extended Completion Times RITSTF Initiative 4B Project stage: Other L-MT-21-017, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 22021-04-20020 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2 Project stage: Response to RAI L-MT-21-043, Supplement to License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2021-06-30030 June 2021 Supplement to License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b Project stage: Supplement ML21148A2742021-07-12012 July 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 206 TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b Project stage: Approval 2021-01-08
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Category:Letter type:L
MONTHYEARL-MT-23-054, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 82024-01-11011 January 2024 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 8 L-MT-23-047, License Amendment Request: Revision to the MNGP Pressure Temperature Limits Report to Change the Neutron Fluence Methodology and Incorporate New Surveillance Capsule Data2023-12-29029 December 2023 License Amendment Request: Revision to the MNGP Pressure Temperature Limits Report to Change the Neutron Fluence Methodology and Incorporate New Surveillance Capsule Data L-MT-23-056, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 22023-12-18018 December 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 2 L-MT-23-042, 2023 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.462023-12-11011 December 2023 2023 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 L-MT-23-052, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 72023-11-30030 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 7 L-MT-23-051, Update to the Technical Specification Bases2023-11-28028 November 2023 Update to the Technical Specification Bases L-MT-23-049, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 12023-11-21021 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 L-MT-23-043, 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Request Regarding OMN-17, Revision 1. VR-092023-11-13013 November 2023 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Request Regarding OMN-17, Revision 1. VR-09 L-MT-23-038, License Amendment Request to Revise Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.6.62023-11-10010 November 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.6.6 L-MT-23-046, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 12023-11-0909 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 1 L-MT-23-041, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Confirmation of Information Set 22023-10-0303 October 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Confirmation of Information Set 2 L-MT-23-037, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 32023-09-22022 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 3 L-MT-23-036, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 62023-09-0505 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 6 L-MT-23-035, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 52023-08-28028 August 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 5 L-MT-23-034, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 12023-08-15015 August 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 1 L-MT-23-028, 2023 Refueling Outage 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report2023-07-31031 July 2023 2023 Refueling Outage 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report L-MT-23-032, 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Request Regarding MO-2397, VR-112023-07-31031 July 2023 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Request Regarding MO-2397, VR-11 L-MT-23-031, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 4 and Responses to Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 12023-07-18018 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 4 and Responses to Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 L-MT-23-030, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 32023-07-0404 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 3 L-MT-23-025, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 22023-06-26026 June 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 2 L-MT-23-019, Submittal of 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-MT-23-020, Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-MT-23-021, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant for Cycle 322023-05-0202 May 2023 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant for Cycle 32 L-MT-23-017, 2022 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP)2023-04-18018 April 2023 2022 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) L-MT-23-010, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 12023-04-0303 April 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 1 L-MT-23-013, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Cycle 31, Revision 32023-03-28028 March 2023 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Cycle 31, Revision 3 L-MT-23-012, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Cycle 31, Revision 22023-03-17017 March 2023 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Cycle 31, Revision 2 L-MT-23-008, 10CFR50.55a Request to Use Later Edition of ASME Section XI for ISI Code of Record (RR-003)2023-02-0707 February 2023 10CFR50.55a Request to Use Later Edition of ASME Section XI for ISI Code of Record (RR-003) L-MT-23-004, CFR 50.55a Request RR-001, Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for the Monticello Third Interval Containment Inservice Inspection Program2023-01-23023 January 2023 CFR 50.55a Request RR-001, Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for the Monticello Third Interval Containment Inservice Inspection Program L-MT-23-005, Response to the NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 50.55a Request Pr 08, HPCI Pump Quarterly Testing (EPID Number L-2022-LLR-0088)2023-01-0606 January 2023 Response to the NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 50.55a Request Pr 08, HPCI Pump Quarterly Testing (EPID Number L-2022-LLR-0088) L-MT-22-049, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative Special Report2022-12-15015 December 2022 Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative Special Report L-MT-22-052, L-MT-22-052 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. Pr 08, Request for HPCI Pump Quarterly Alternative2022-12-15015 December 2022 L-MT-22-052 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. Pr 08, Request for HPCI Pump Quarterly Alternative L-MT-22-046, 2022 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.462022-12-13013 December 2022 2022 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 L-MT-22-048, Update to the Monticello Technical Specification Bases2022-11-28028 November 2022 Update to the Monticello Technical Specification Bases L-MT-22-047, Withdrawal of Request for Relief from ASME OM Code for the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval2022-11-10010 November 2022 Withdrawal of Request for Relief from ASME OM Code for the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval L-MT-22-045, Letter Submitting Post-Exam Package2022-11-0404 November 2022 Letter Submitting Post-Exam Package L-MT-22-030, Sixth Interval Inservice Testing (1ST) Plan2022-09-0606 September 2022 Sixth Interval Inservice Testing (1ST) Plan L-MT-22-037, Supplement to 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval, Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency2022-08-29029 August 2022 Supplement to 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval, Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency L-MT-22-007, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Alternative Request VR-08 (EPID: L-MT-22-007)2022-07-22022 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Alternative Request VR-08 (EPID: L-MT-22-007) L-MT-22-026, Changes to the Emergency Plan2022-07-19019 July 2022 Changes to the Emergency Plan L-MT-22-024, Response to a Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Related to the Amendment to Adopt Advanced Framatome Methodologies2022-06-0606 June 2022 Response to a Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Related to the Amendment to Adopt Advanced Framatome Methodologies L-MT-22-022, Response to a Request for Additional Information: Monticello Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency2022-05-25025 May 2022 Response to a Request for Additional Information: Monticello Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency L-MT-22-017, 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2022-05-11011 May 2022 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-MT-22-018, 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2022-05-11011 May 2022 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-MT-22-016, 2021 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring2022-04-28028 April 2022 2021 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring L-MT-22-019, Withdrawal of Requests for Relief from ASME OM Code for the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval2022-04-18018 April 2022 Withdrawal of Requests for Relief from ASME OM Code for the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval L-MT-22-010, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray Header and Nozzle Surveillance Frequency2022-03-18018 March 2022 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray Header and Nozzle Surveillance Frequency L-MT-22-012, Special Report for the Bypass of the Offgas Treatment Storage System2022-03-15015 March 2022 Special Report for the Bypass of the Offgas Treatment Storage System L-MT-22-008, 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval Alternative Related to Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency (L-MT-22-008)2022-03-0707 March 2022 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval Alternative Related to Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency (L-MT-22-008) L-MT-22-006, 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval OMN-26 (L-MT-22-006)2022-02-18018 February 2022 10 CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Monticello Sixth Inservice Testing Ten-Year Interval OMN-26 (L-MT-22-006) 2024-01-11
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARL-MT-23-056, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 22023-12-18018 December 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 2 L-MT-23-049, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 12023-11-21021 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 L-MT-23-046, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 12023-11-0909 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 1 L-MT-23-037, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 32023-09-22022 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 3 ML23262B0372023-09-19019 September 2023 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 2023 Monticello and Prairie Island Plant Decommissioning Funding Status Reports L-MT-23-036, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 62023-09-0505 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 6 L-MT-23-034, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 12023-08-15015 August 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 1 L-MT-23-005, Response to the NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 50.55a Request Pr 08, HPCI Pump Quarterly Testing (EPID Number L-2022-LLR-0088)2023-01-0606 January 2023 Response to the NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 50.55a Request Pr 08, HPCI Pump Quarterly Testing (EPID Number L-2022-LLR-0088) ML22220A2722022-08-0808 August 2022 Response to a Request for Additional Informational Regarding the Monticello Fuel Oil Storage Tank Inspection L-MT-22-007, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Alternative Request VR-08 (EPID: L-MT-22-007)2022-07-22022 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Alternative Request VR-08 (EPID: L-MT-22-007) ML22161A9152022-06-10010 June 2022 and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Response to a Request for Additional Information Xcel Energy Amendment Request to Create a Common Emergency Plan and Emergency Operations. L-MT-22-024, Response to a Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Related to the Amendment to Adopt Advanced Framatome Methodologies2022-06-0606 June 2022 Response to a Request for Additional Information for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Related to the Amendment to Adopt Advanced Framatome Methodologies L-MT-22-022, Response to a Request for Additional Information: Monticello Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency2022-05-25025 May 2022 Response to a Request for Additional Information: Monticello Alternative VR-10, Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Frequency L-MT-21-017, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 22021-04-20020 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2 L-MT-20-036, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times2020-12-21021 December 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times L-MT-20-024, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Monticello 10 CFR 50.55a Request: Request RR-016 Associated with the Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval2020-07-20020 July 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Monticello 10 CFR 50.55a Request: Request RR-016 Associated with the Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval L-MT-20-015, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Long-Term Replacement Steam Dryer Inspection Plan2020-06-0808 June 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Long-Term Replacement Steam Dryer Inspection Plan ML20045E8942020-02-14014 February 2020 Response to a Request for Additional Information for Proposed 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Alternatives to Utilize ASME Code Case N-786-3, Alternative Requirements for Sleeve Reinforcement of Class 2 and 3 Moderate-Energy Carbon Steel Piping, and AS L-MT-19-030, Supplement to a Response for a Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors.2019-05-15015 May 2019 Supplement to a Response for a Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors. L-MT-19-024, Response to a Request for Additional Information for Removal of a Note Associated with Technical Specification 3.5.12019-04-18018 April 2019 Response to a Request for Additional Information for Removal of a Note Associated with Technical Specification 3.5.1 L-MT-19-018, Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk- Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2019-03-13013 March 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk- Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-MT-18-058, Response to Request for Additional Information: Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to ...2018-10-23023 October 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information: Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to ... L-MT-18-041, Response to Request for Additional Information Re Request for Permanent Exemption from 10CFR50, App R, III.G.2.a Requirements for Exposed Structural Steel2018-07-20020 July 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Re Request for Permanent Exemption from 10CFR50, App R, III.G.2.a Requirements for Exposed Structural Steel L-MT-18-032, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, and Supplement (EPID: L-2017-LLA-03602018-06-0101 June 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, and Supplement (EPID: L-2017-LLA-0360 ML18131A2232018-05-11011 May 2018 Prairie and Monticello - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Di L-MT-18-013, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 152018-04-0505 April 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 15 L-MT-17-071, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of Drywell Spray Motor-Operated Valves2017-11-20020 November 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of Drywell Spray Motor-Operated Valves L-MT-17-066, Supplemental Information for the Notification of Full Compliance of Required Action for NRC Order EA-12-049 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events2017-09-28028 September 2017 Supplemental Information for the Notification of Full Compliance of Required Action for NRC Order EA-12-049 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events L-MT-17-065, License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Action Level Scheme - Supplement and Response to Requests for Additional Information2017-09-25025 September 2017 License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Action Level Scheme - Supplement and Response to Requests for Additional Information L-MT-17-063, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Response Times2017-09-20020 September 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Response Times L-MT-17-025, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accid2017-04-11011 April 2017 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident L-MT-17-022, Response to Second Round PRA Related RAIs for the License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval2017-03-29029 March 2017 Response to Second Round PRA Related RAIs for the License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval L-MT-17-007, Part 3 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval2017-02-0707 February 2017 Part 3 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval L-MT-17-002, Part 2 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval2017-01-31031 January 2017 Part 2 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval L-MT-16-062, Part 1 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval2016-12-16016 December 2016 Part 1 Response to Probabilistic Risk Assessment Related Requests for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval L-MT-16-058, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Battery Charger Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.22016-11-22022 November 2016 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Battery Charger Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.2 ML16288A0972016-10-14014 October 2016 and Monticello - Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools L-MT-16-044, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval2016-10-10010 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request for a Permanent Extension of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Containment Type a Test Interval L-MT-16-045, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Battery Charger Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.22016-10-0303 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Battery Charger Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.2 L-MT-16-041, License Amendment Request for Areva Extended Flow Window Supplement to Address Power Distribution Uncertainties2016-09-14014 September 2016 License Amendment Request for Areva Extended Flow Window Supplement to Address Power Distribution Uncertainties L-MT-16-038, Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order No. EA-12-049)2016-08-19019 August 2016 Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order No. EA-12-049) L-MT-16-039, Response to Nuclear Security and Incident Response Requests for Additional Information Regarding Changes to the Monticello Nuclear Generation Plant Physical Security Plan (Revision 16) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2)2016-08-15015 August 2016 Response to Nuclear Security and Incident Response Requests for Additional Information Regarding Changes to the Monticello Nuclear Generation Plant Physical Security Plan (Revision 16) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2) ML16221A2742016-07-31031 July 2016 ANP-3435NP, Revision 2, Areva Responses to RAI-8 and RAI-32 from Srxb and Snpb on MNGP EFW Lar. L-MT-16-026, Response to Request for Additional Information for Approval of Alternative to Apply the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Section XI Code Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals and Components Inspection2016-06-0202 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information for Approval of Alternative to Apply the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Section XI Code Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals and Components Inspection L-MT-16-028, Transmittal of Extended Power Uprate, Extended Steam Dryer - Response to Requests for Additional Information2016-05-18018 May 2016 Transmittal of Extended Power Uprate, Extended Steam Dryer - Response to Requests for Additional Information L-MT-16-024, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report2016-04-21021 April 2016 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report ML16091A2282016-03-29029 March 2016 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dry Shielded Canister Dye Penetrant Examinations, Supplemental Information to Respond to the Second Request for Additional Information (TAC No. L25058) L-MT-15-081, ANP-3435NP, Revision 1, Areva Responses to RAI-8 and RAI-32 from Srxb and Snpb on MNGP EFW Lar.2015-12-0808 December 2015 ANP-3435NP, Revision 1, Areva Responses to RAI-8 and RAI-32 from Srxb and Snpb on MNGP EFW Lar. ML15274A4732015-09-29029 September 2015 License Amendment Request for Areva Extended Flow Window Supplement to Respond to NRC Staff Questions ML15348A2172015-08-31031 August 2015 Enclosure 6, Areva Report ANP-3424NP, Non-Proprietary, Areva Responses to RAI from Scvb on MNGP EFW LAR, Revision 0, August 2015 2023-09-05
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fl Xcel Energy 8 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55089 April 20, 2021 L-MT-21-017 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b," Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (EPID L-2020-LLA-0062)
References:
- 1) Letter (L-MT-20-003) from NSPM to the NRC, "License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, 'Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b,'" dated March 30, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20090F820)
- 2) Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (TSTF-505-A, Revision 2), dated November 26, 2018
- 3) Letter (L-MT-20-036) from NSPM to the NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (EPID L-2020-LLA-0062), dated December 21, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20356A131)
- 4) Email from the NRC to NSPM, "Monticello TSTF-505, Request for Additional Information," dated March 9, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No.ML21068A277)
In Reference 1, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), submitted a license amendment request to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP). The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements to permit the use of Risk-Informed Completion Times in accordance with TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion
Document Control Desk Page 2 Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (Reference 2). NSPM provided information in Reference 3. The NRC identified the need for additional information in Reference 4 . The enclosure to this letter provides NSPM's response to Reference 4.
The information provided in this letter does not alter the evaluations performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 .92 in Reference 1.
NSPM is notifying the State of Minnesota of this request by transmitting a copy of this letter and enclosure to the designated State Official.
Please contact Mr. Ron Jacobson at 612-330-6542 or ronald.g.jacobson@xcelenergy.com if there are any questions or if additional information is needed.
Summary of Commitments This letter makes no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments .
I declare under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on April l..O, 2021.
Thomas A. Conboy Site Vice President, Monti ello uclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Monticello, USNRC Resident Inspector, Monticello, USNRC State of Minnesota
L-MT-21-017 NSPM ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI)
RELATED TO LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO IMPLEMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE TRAVELER TSTF-505, REVISION 2, "PROVIDE RISK-INFORMED EXTENDED COMPLETION TIMES - RITSTF INITIATIVE 4B" MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
1.0 BACKGROUND
In Reference 1, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP). The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements to permit the use of Risk-Informed Completion Times (RICTs) in accordance with TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (Reference 2). NSPM provided information in Reference 3. The NRC identified the need for additional information in Reference 4.
2.0 RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RAI 4.b.01 - PRA Model Update Process Section 2.3.4 of NEI 06-09, "Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12286A322), specifies "Criteria shall exist in PRA configuration risk management to require PRA model updates concurrent with implementation of facility changes that significantly impact RICT calculations."
In RAI 4 the NRC staff requested a description of the criteria that would be used to require an unscheduled PRA update, and how the impact on the RICT program is considered when reviewing plant changes or conditions for implementation in the PRA.
The response to RAI 4 stated the RICT impact assessment of PRA changes will be conducted on a quarterly basis by assembling and quantifying the latest living PRA model files. The response states that an interim model update occurs if certain cumulative thresholds (e.g.,
Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Birnbaum, delta CDF/LERF) are met or if a significant impact to a PRA application is predicted. The response further explain that significant impact is defined as all hazards total core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) risk values change by more than twenty-five percent. The RAI response does not explain how the impact on RICT is considered when deciding whether an interim model update is necessary. The NRC staff notes that small increases in baseline CDF or LERF, for individual hazards PRA or total combined all hazards PRA, could translate into a large impact on RICT estimates when equipment is taken out of service.
a) Provide clarification on the additional quantitative criteria, other than the twenty-five percent change in total CDF or LERF, used when deciding whether an interim PRA model Page 1 of 8
L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure update is necessary. Include in this discussion justification how these proposed quantitative criteria ensure that no significant impact on RICT estimates occurs prior to reaching these thresholds.
b) Discuss any additional considerations (e.g., qualitative), used to assess the impact on RICT estimates when deciding whether an interim PRA model update is necessary.
NSPM Response:
a) As documented in Enclosure 7 of the LAR (Reference 1) and response to RAI 4 (Reference 3), the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model maintenance and update procedure specifies that a review of cumulative changes between the model of record (MOR) and the living model be performed on a quarterly basis by performing an assembly and quantification of the living model. The quantification includes evaluation of the impact on each separate hazard model (i.e., internal events including internal flooding and internal fire) and all hazards. If the quantitative review predicts the PRA results for an individual or all-hazard model will be impacted by greater than +/-25% for CDF or LERF, then an application specific model or MOR is published and the affected application is updated. If the +/-25% for CDF or LERF criteria is exceeded, then entrance into RICTs is suspended until corrected, except when the deviation is such that impacted RICTs remain conservative. Since RICT estimate changes cannot be directly correlated to an absolute value change in CDF or LERF, the qualitative measures described in the response to 4.b.01.b below, are used to inform the impact on the RICT estimates.
b) The impact of PRA model changes on RICT estimates is addressed qualitatively in two ways:
- 1) As documented in RAI 9.c, when a plant modification, enhancement or PRA model error has been identified that may have a model impact, the change is assessed to determine its impact on regulatory applications, including RICT. If it is not practical to assess the risk impact quantitatively, then a qualitative assessment, utilizing the experience and judgement of the PRA engineer, is performed considering the potential change in basic event importance measures for each application.
- 2) The quarterly quantification report includes a qualitative review of open PRA model change items with risk levels that had not immediately resulted in the development of a PRA model update. This assessment utilizes the experience and judgement of the PRA engineer to determine if there are any issues that are individually small but could collectively impact one of the existing PRA applications.
In both qualitative assessments, the impact on RICT is evaluated and a determination made as to whether a PRA model update is necessary. Information that supports these assessments is documented in accordance with the process requirements and then reviewed by another PRA engineer.
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L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure RAI 9.01 - PRA Model Uncertainty Analysis Process The NRC staff safety evaluation to NEI 06-09 specifies that the LAR should identify key assumptions and sources of uncertainty and licensees should assess and disposition each as to their impact on the RMTS application. Section 2.3.4 of NEI 06-09 states that PRA modeling uncertainties shall be considered in application of the PRA base model results to the RICT program. It states that sensitivity studies should be performed on the base model prior to initial implementation of the RICT program on uncertainties which could potentially impact the results of a RICT calculation. It also states that the insights from the sensitivity studies should be used to develop appropriate risk management actions (RMAs), including highlighting risk significant operator actions, confirming availability and operability of important standby equipment, and assessing the presence of severe or unusual environmental conditions.
The response to RAI 9 stated that the specific criterion in assessing some sources of uncertainty, as demonstrated in the response to RAI 9.d, is an estimation of the change in risk associated with the uncertainty being qualitatively evaluated as negligible.
The response to RAI 9.d regarding the uncertainty related to rupture of containment with the loss of containment heat removal (CHR) provided an updated sensitivity study that resulted in an increase of twelve and twenty percent in risk for CDF and LERF, respectively. The response evaluated that the risk increase is primarily associated with the control rod drive (CRD) injection due to other failure modes and since the CRD components are not included in the RICT program that this uncertainty would not impact any RICT calculations. The NRC staff notes that although the CRD may not have an associated LCO in scope of the RICT program, other RICTs may be impacted. The response did not demonstrate that this potential source of uncertainty does not have an impact on any RICT calculations.
The response regarding the uncertainty related to reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) availability after battery depletion provided results of a sensitivity study in which the failure of this operation was tripled. The study appeared to have a small impact on overall risk and demonstrated minimal impact for several RICTs, however it appears to have a larger impact on the RICT estimates for LCO 3.3.5.1.B and 3.8.4.B, of twelve and twenty-five percent, respectively.
Address the following:
a) Provide justification, such as a sensitivity study, that the source of uncertainty regarding loss of CHR resulting in containment failure does not constitute a key assumption or source of uncertainty. If determined to be key, then provide adequate disposition of this uncertainty for the RICT application. Consistent with the guidance in NEI 06-09-A, this disposition can include discussion of risk management actions (RMAs).
b) Similarly, it appears that the assumption regarding RCIC operation after battery depletion could constitute a key assumption or source of uncertainty for some RICTs. Provide further disposition of this uncertainty for the RICT application. Consistent with the guidance in NEI 06 09 A, this disposition can include discussion of RMAs.
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L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure c) The response to RAI 9.a states that a total of 33 candidate sources of uncertainty were evaluated for their effects on the calculation of RICTs. The response further details some of the criteria used: uncertainties are qualitatively shown to have a very small impact on total risk, and would be expected to have a negligible impact on delta-CDF and delta-LERF, or uncertainties are represented through conservative PRA modeling and demonstrate a negligible impact on delta-risk RICT calculations.
Its not clear to the staff that the process described in the response to RAI 9.a and b ensures that key assumptions and sources of uncertainty are adequately addressed. The qualifiers of very small and negligible impact appears to be key to the appropriate disposition of the PRA assumptions and uncertainties for the RICT application. However, some sources of uncertainty discussed in response to RAI 9.d appeared to have an impact on RICT that are large enough to merit further evaluation. While RMAs may or may not be necessary, assessment of these impacts should be documented.
Discuss how the items of negligible impact are considered when addressing impact on the RICT program. Provide confirmation that all key assumptions and sources of uncertainty are and will be identified, appropriately examined, and adequately addressed for the RICT program.
NSPM Response:
a) As documented in the response to RAI 9.d (Reference 3), the updated sensitivity study regarding potential loss of CHR resulted in a significant reduction in the impact on CDF and LERF as compared to the original study documented in the MNGP PRA Uncertainty Notebook. The updated study included a small amount of non-conservatism in the PRA because it assumed that no gradual containment overpressurization scenarios would result in a rupture of containment. To address this non-conservatism the PRA model to be used for MNGP RICT calculations will be updated to reflect the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) assessment of containment failure mechanisms for gradual overpressurization scenarios.
Since non-rupture leakage remains the dominant failure mode as pressure slowly rises to the mean containment failure pressure, the new modeling treatment results in a small reduction in the RICT estimates for eight of the 41 LCOs eligible for RICT application.
Therefore, consistent with NEI 06-09-A, the potential loss of CHR resulting in containment failure is not a key source of uncertainty for the RICT program. With the change in the PRA modeling, no RMAs are required. The model update has been added as an implementation item (Attachment 1, Revised Table A5-1, Item 8).
b) The operator actions to operate the RCIC pump following battery depletion are proceduralized actions. Specifically, they are incorporated into the plants Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) using pre-staged equipment and operators are trained in the performance of this action. The calculation of the human error probability (HEP) for this action is based on industry-standard methods that are applied within their range of Page 4 of 8
L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure applicability, and the human reliability analysis considered the time available to perform the action, the stress levels involved, and the availability of written procedures.
Although the sensitivity study results documented in RAI 9.d response indicate that the PRA model retains some sensitivity to the value of the HEP used in the model for RCIC operation following battery depletion, the HEP used for RCIC operation under such conditions is not a source of uncertainty due to the modeling standard and conservative approach used. No RMAs are required.
c) As documented in the response to RAI 9, four basic considerations were used to determine if candidate uncertainties were relevant to the RICT application. One of those considerations concluded that the candidates that relied on an industry consensus model were not uncertainties. Another consideration utilized quantitative sensitivity analysis to determine the impacts of the candidate on calculated RICTs. The remaining two considerations qualitatively evaluated the characteristics of each candidate uncertainty with respect to the RICT program.
Application of these qualitative evaluation considerations was documented by experienced PRA engineers whose qualification and knowledge of the PRA models as well as knowledge of the as-built, as operated plant provide confirmation that all candidate assumptions and sources of uncertainty were identified, appropriately examined, and adequately addressed for the RICT program.
The overall process used to evaluate the candidate uncertainties that were dispositioned under the two qualitative considerations is summarized below:
- 1) Determine if the current PRA model had addressed the uncertainty, thereby removing the candidate as a source of uncertainty.
- 2) Determine the impacts of the candidate uncertainty on the systems, procedures, and scenarios involved. This resulted in some candidate uncertainties being dispositioned based on the candidate having a negligible impact on system or plant response considering, for example, expected system flow rates, heat removal capacities, and maximum expected flow diversions.
- 3) Determine the possible impacts on specific initiating events and component failure modes of concern if the candidate uncertainty is applicable based on expected system or plant operation through a review of the all-hazards PRA results to identify those that would have negligible impacts on CDF and LERF. This review is performed by PRA engineers, considering such factors as the frequencies and conditional core damage probabilities for initiating events as well as Fussell-Vesely, Risk Achievement Worth and Risk Reduction Worth importance measures for specific failures or appropriate surrogate events. The evaluations specifically consider the impact on the delta-risk calculations that are used to establish the RICT values.
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L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure The PRA update process identifies, examines, and adequately addresses key assumptions and sources of uncertainty for the RICT program.
RAI 14.b.01 - PRA Modeling Regulatory Position 2.3.3 of RG 1.174 states that the level of detail in the PRA should be sufficient to model the impact of the proposed licensing basis change. The characterization of the change should include establishing a cause-effect relationship to identify portions of the PRA affected by the change being evaluated. Full-scale applications of the PRA should reflect this cause-effect relationship in a quantification of the impact of the proposed licensing basis change on the PRA elements.
The NRC staffs safety evaluation for NEI 06-09 specifies that the LAR should provide a comparison of the TS functions to the PRA modeled functions and that justification be provided to show that the scope of the PRA model is consistent with the licensing basis assumptions.
Regarding unmodeled SSCs, the evaluation states the following:
NEI 06-09, Revision 0, specifically applies the RMTS only to those SSCs which mitigate core damage or large early releases. Where the SSC is not modeled in the PRA, and its impact cannot otherwise be quantified using conservative or bounding approaches, the RMTS are not applicable, and the existing front stop CT would apply.
Further, Item 11 in Section 2.3 of TSTF-505, Revision 2, states:
The traveler will not modify Required Actions for systems that do not affect core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) or for which a RICT cannot be quantitatively determined.
Regarding TS LCO 3.7.2.A for emergency service water (ESW) system, the LAR states that ESW is not required to prevent CDF and LERF. In RAI 14.b the NRC staff asked the licensee to justify inclusion of TS LCO 3.7.2.A in the scope of the RICT program. In response to RAI 14.b the licensee stated that ESW provides cooling to the main control room emergency filtration train, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) room coolers, and ECCS pump motor cooling. It further states that a hydraulic analysis determined that no heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC) were required in meeting the PRA mission time of twenty-four hours and therefore HVAC could be excluded from the PRA model. The response however does not appear to justify screening out ESW for pump motor cooling. The NRC staff notes that pump motor cooling is usually related to pump seals and bearings and it is unclear how the HVAC analysis addresses these components. In light of these observations:
a) Describe and justify the analysis performed to address pump motor cooling requirements, such as pump seals and bearings, and how it was determined that the loss of pump Page 6 of 8
L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure cooling is not required for the twenty-four-hour PRA mission time. Include in this discussion whether this model exclusion has been peer reviewed.
b) Provide justification why not crediting ESW for ECCS pump motor cooling is not a key assumption or source of uncertainty that could impact the RICT estimates for this system NSPM response:
a) A review of the previous analysis used to screen out the emergency service water (ESW) system from the MNGP PRA model was performed. The review of the analysis concluded that the control room cooling function was adequately evaluated using a GOTHIC analysis that concluded that explicit modeling of the control room cooling function in the PRA was not required. However, the review of screening criteria for the ESW system concluded that the existing analysis for screening ECCS room/pump motor cooling was inadequate and further analysis is required to justify screening the equipment from the PRA model.
In lieu of performing additional analysis, NSPM has added ECCS room/pump motor cooling to the PRA model used for sample RICT calculations. The addition resulted in essentially no change to the number of days allowed in the sample RICT calculations for all LCOs with the exception of 3.5.1.E which decreased from 27 to 23 days. LCO 3.7.2.A remained at the 30-day backstop. The modeling of the ECCS room/pump motor cooling has been added as an implementation item (Attachment 1, Revised Table A5-1, Item 9).
b) Since modeling of the ECCS room and pump motor cooling has been added as an implementation item, the pump motor cooling is not a key assumption or source of uncertainty.
3.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Letter (L-MT-20-003) from NSPM to the NRC, "License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, 'Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b,'" dated March 30, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20090F820)
- 2. Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (TSTF-505-A, Revision 2), dated November 26, 2018
- 3. Letter (L-MT-20-036) from NSPM to the NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" (EPID L-2020-LLA-0062), dated December 21, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 2020356A131)
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L-MT-21-017 NSPM Enclosure
- 4. Email from the NRC to NSPM, "Monticello TSTF-505, Request for Additional Information,"
dated March 9, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No.ML21068A277)
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ATTACHMENT 1 MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b" Revised RICT Program PRA Implementation Items (1 Page Follows)
L-MT-21-017 NSPM Revised RICT Program PRA Implementation Items Revised Table A5-1 Table A5-1 provided with the LAR has been updated to reflect changes due to specific RAI responses in the preceding sections of the Enclosure. Changes from the version included in the LAR have been identified by change bars.
Table A5-1: RICT Program PRA Implementation Items No. Implementation Items
- 1. NSPM shall ensure that Reactor Protection System RPS Instrumentation is modeled in the MNGP PRA with sufficient detail to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 2. NSPM shall ensure that Mechanical Vacuum Pump system and isolation instrumentation are modeled in the MNGP PRA with sufficient detail to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 3. NSPM shall ensure that the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) and instrumentation is modeled in the MNGP PRA with sufficient detail to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 4. NSPM shall ensure that the L- 41 AC panel is modeled in the MNGP Fire PRA with sufficient detail to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 5. NSPM shall ensure that the Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) System is modeled with sufficient detail in the MNGP Fire PRA to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 6. NSPM shall ensure the PRA success criteria for Drywell vacuum breakers are clear in the MNGP PRA to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 7. NSPM shall ensure that appropriate joint HEP is used in the MNGP PRA to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
- 8. NSPM shall ensure that an overpressure containment rupture probability is added to the PRA consistent with the IPE failure mechanisms for gradual overpressurization events.
- 9. NSPM shall ensure that ECCS room/pump motor cooling are modeled in the MNGP PRA with sufficient detail to accurately calculate a RICT prior to implementation of the RICT Program.
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