Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems

From kanterella
Revision as of 05:13, 14 July 2019 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems
ML031140228
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  
Issue date: 04/24/1990
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-026, NUDOCS 9004180107
Download: ML031140228 (7)


-v UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 24, 1990 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 90-26: INADEQUATE

FLOW OF ESSENTIAL

SERVICE WATER TO ROOM COOLERS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS

FOR ENGINEERED

SAFETY-FEATURE

SYSTEMS

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information

notice is intended to alert addressees

to potential

problems resulting

from using the wrong flow and pressure drop relationship

in estab-lishing adequate flow of essential

service water to room coolers for engineered

safety-feature

systems and from failing to establish

or maintain balanced flows in essential

service water systems. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

On March 9, 1990, the reactor at the Clinton Power Station was in cold shutdown, and the licensee was taking action to implement

the recommendations

contained in Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting

Safety-Related

Equipment." The licensee discovered

that the flow of essential

service water being supplied to several room coolers serving safety-related

equipment

was approximately

half of the design flow. The safety-related

equipment

included components

in the high-pressure

and low-pressure

core spray systems, the low-pressure injection

system, the residual heat removal system, the standby gas treatment

system, the combustible

gas control system, and the nuclear protection

system. After discovering

the problem, the licensee declared these systems to be inoperable.

The room coolers were supplied to the Clinton Power Station by American Air Filter, a subsidiary

of Snyder General Corporation.

Before initial operation

of the Clinton Power Station, the licensee obtained the relationship

of the flow and pressure drop on the water side of the room coolers from the supplier.

Plant personnel

adjusted valving to establish

the pressure drop across each room cooler which would provide the design flow.Plant personnel

did not actually measure the flow to each room cooler.

IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 On March 9, 1990, the licensee discovered

that the relationship

between flow and pressure drop for the room coolers was wrong and that flows of essential service water to the room coolers were too low. Subsequently, the licensee also found that the flows of essential

service water to several other coolers and heat exchangers

were too low.To balance the flow of essential

service water through the system, plant personnel

measured the flow using qualified

instrumentation

and adjusted flows to the room coolers according

to these measurements.

In some instances, the adjusted flows to specific components

were somewhat less than design flows.However, the licensee is performing

analyses to determine

whether these flows are acceptable.

Modifications

to the updated final safety analysis report will be submitted

as necessary.

Discussion:

American Air Filter has supplied room coolers to approximately

50 nuclear power plants including

the Clinton Power Station. The room coolers consist of bundles of folded tubes with supply and return headers at the ends of the tubes. American Air Filter supplies the room coolers either with or without pairs of cleanout plugs at the bends in the tubes. At design flow, room coolers with cleanout plugs have a significantly

greater pressure drop across the tube bundle than room coolers without cleanout plugs.On April 3, 1990, Illinois Power Company, licensee for the Clinton Power Station, stated in a report submitted

to NRC under 10 CFR 21.21 that pressure drop data provided by American Air Filter for 22 of 23 room coolers was incor-rect. Twenty-two

room coolers had cleanout plugs while the 23rd room cooler did not. On April 5, 1990, Illinois Power Company submitted

a licensee event report which indicated

that actual flows for the room coolers with cleanout plugs ranged from 10 percent to 80 percent less than the design flows.The licensee event report also indicated

that 7 of 25 cooling components

pro-vided by vendors other than American Air Filter and connected

to the essential service water system had flows that were less than the design flows. For these cooling components, actual flows ranged from 2 percent to 42 percent less than the design flows. The components

include: two residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers

supplied by General Electric Company, two RHR pump seal coolers sup-plied by Byron Jackson, a switchgear

heat removal condenser

supplied by Carrier Corporation, a fuel pool cooling and cleanup heat exchanger

supplied by Yuba Heat Exchanger, and a standby gas treatment

system radiation

monitor cooler supplied by Sentry Equipment

Corporation.

Other components

served by the essential

service water system were receiving

excess flow. These flows ranged up to 213 percent more than design flows.Failure to properly balance flows of essential

service water during pre-operational

testing or failure to maintain balanced flows can lead to degradation

of safety-related

equipment.

  • %hWJ IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 This information

notice requires 'no specific action or written response.

If you have questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed belowlor the appropriate

NAR project manager.Ear es E. Ross ,Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Roger W. Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

' ttaehment April 24, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES-f r i*. Ato ot*sv?TS Notice No.90-25 90-24 90-23 90-22 90-21 90-20 90-19 90-18 Subject Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent

Reactor Coolant System Neat-Up Transportation

of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic

Exposure Device Improper Installation

of Patel Conduit Seals Issuance 4/16/90 4/10/90 4/4/90 Unanticipated

Equipment

3/23/90 Actuations

Following Restoration

of Power to Rosemount

Transmitter

Trip Units Potential

Failure of Motor- 3/22/90 Operated Butterfly

Valves to Operate Because Valve Seet Friction was Under-estimated Personnel

Injuries Resulting

3/22/90 froi Improper Operation

of Radwaste Incinerators

Potential

Loss of Effective

3/14/90 Volume for Containment

Recirculation

Spray at PWR Facilities

Issued to All holders, of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized

to use, transport, or operate*radiographic

exposure devices and source changers.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees who process or incinerate

radio-active waste.All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.Potential

Problems with 3/9/90 All holders of OLs Crosby- Safety-fls- or CPs-fo-nuc.ar-.

Used on Diesel Generator

power reactors.Air Start Receiver Tanks OL

  • Operating

License CP

  • Construction

Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20556 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE

  • FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT No. 097 IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Roger W. Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE

  • EAB:NRR RWoodruff 4/10/90*C:EAB:NRR

PSwetland 4/13/90*TECH EDITOR BCalure 4/10/90*C:OGCB:NRR

CBerlinger

4/17/90*EAB:NRR *PM:PD32:NRR

PBaranowsky

JHickman 4/12/90 4 10/90 4// P90*C:RVIB WBrach 4/12/90*C:PB3:RIII

RKnop 4/12/90

z NRCIN 90-XX April XX, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Roger W. Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices CONCURRENCE:

  • EAB:NRR RWoodruff 4/10/90*C:EAB:NRR

PSwetland 4/ /90*TECH EDITOR BCalure 4/ /90 CBerlinger

4/(7/90*EAB:NRR PBaranowsky

4/ /90*R4:PD32:NRR

JHickman 4/ /90*C:RVIB WBrach 4/ /90*CBPB3:RIII

RKnop 4/ /90 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi 4/ /90* See previous copy for concurrences

310c.in

NRCIN 90-XX April XX, 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions

about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Roger (301)W. Woodruff, NRR 492-1180 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices FOCURENCE:

EEB: NRRlPWoodruff

-4/10/ 0 Eltland 4/%*)/90 IT'v Yalnq 9 TECH EDITOR 4/ P0/90 C: OGCB: NRR CBerlinger

4/ /90 owsky 4//190 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi 4/ /90 PM: 4 PD32: 4/10/90 1-o0 C:PB3:RIII

RKnop 4/17./90 310b. in