Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600

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Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600
ML031470647
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/23/1990
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-010
Download: ML031470647 (3)


Information

Notice No. 90-10: f Z WIndex Site Map FAQ I Help I Glossary I Contact Us j Seaml A_ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

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Notices > 1990 > IN 9 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 23, 1990 Information

Notice No. 90-10: PRIMARY WATER STRESS CORROSION

CRACKING (PWSCC) OF INCONEL 600

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for pressurized

water reactors (PWRs).

Purpose

This information

notice is intended to alert addressees

to potential problems related to primary water stress corrosion

cracking PWSCC of Inconel 600 that has occurred in pressurizer

heater thermal sleeves and instrument

nozzles at several domestic and foreign PWR plants. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

During the 1989 refueling

outage at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 (CC-2), visual examination

detected leakage in 20 pressurizer

heater penetrations

and 1 upper-level/pressure

tap instrument

nozzle. Leakage was indicated

by the presence of boric acid crystals at the penetrations

and on the nozzle. Non-destructive

examinations (liquid penetrant

and eddy current examinations)

were performed

on 28 thermal sleeves and 3 instrument

nozzles. Crack indi-cations were reported in 24 thermal sleeves, including

the 20 originally

identified

to be leaking as well as the leaking nozzle. No crack indications

were found in the two lower instrument

nozzles. The examinations

showed that all cracks in the sleeves and the nozzle were axially oriented with a maximum length not greater than 10.5 inches. The mode of failure for the thermal sleeves was identified

as PWSCC.The heater sleeves and the instrumentation

nozzles were made of Inconel 600 tubing and bar materials, respectively, supplied by INCO. All thermal sleeves were made in a high strength heat (NX8878) with a reported yield strength of 63.5 ksi. No chemical contaminants

were found on the sleeve fracture surfaces.

A review of the fabrication

records showed that all 120 thermal sleeves in CC-2 were reamed 3.5 inches from the top before welding and all but two were also 9002160093 IN 90-10 February 23, 1990 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rrn/doc-collections/gen-cornm/info-noticesl1990/in90010.html

03/13/2003 Infonnation

Notice No. 90-10: reamed after welding to facilitate

the insertion

of the heater rods. All cracks in the sleeves were reported to be located inside the reamed region either above or below the J-groove weld.All instrument

nozzles were made from heat no. NX8297 and its yield strength was reported to be 36 ksi. The licensee indicated

that four upper instrument

nozzles, including

the leaking one, had been extensively

reworked when the faulty J-groove welds were repaired.

Based on the results of the investigations, the licensee, Baltimore

Gas and Electric (BG&E), postulated

that the leaking in the pressurizer

thermal sleeves and the instrumentation

nozzle was due to PWSCC. The licensee is in the process of removing a metallurgical

sample from the leaking instrument

nozzle for failure analysis to identify the mode of failure.On February 27, 1986, a small leak (about 0.15 gpm) was observed on a 3/4-inch-diameter

upper pressurizer

level instrument

nozzle at San Onofre Nuclear Generating

Station (SONGS) Unit 3 while the plant was in hot standby. An axial flaw about 5/8 inch in length was identified

on the inside diameter surface of the nozzle. The flaw appeared to originate

from the end of the nozzle inside the pressurizer

and extended beyond the attachment

weld (1/2 inch in depth) approximately

1/8 inch into the annulus area of the nozzle assembly.

The flawed nozzle was cut out, including

the entire attachment

weld. The results of the metallurgical

examination

performed

on the flawed nozzle assembly indicated

that the cracking was PWSCC.In spring 1989, leakage from instrument

nozzles was observed in two foreign PWRs (one from each 1300-MW plant) when the hydrostatic

pressure testing of the primary system was performed

during the first refueling

outage. The instrument

nozzles were made of Inconel 600 material.

The installation

of the nozzles included mechanically

rolling a portion of the nozzle into the pressurizer

shell. Nondestructive

examinations (NDEs) were performed

on the leaking nozzles and found the cracks to be principally

axial in orientation;

however, some circumferential

cracking was observed.

Destructive

examination

of these two leaking nozzles to identify the root causes has not been completed.

Additional

NDEs were performed

on all the instrument

nozzles of five 1300-MW PWRs. Crack indications

were found in 12 instrument

nozzles.Discussion:

Extensive

laboratory

testing has shown that intergranular

stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) requires the presence of the following

three key elements: an aggressive

environment, susceptible

material, and sufficient

tensile stresses for crack initiation

and propagation.

PWSCC refers to IGSCC in the primary water environment

of PWRs. The laboratory

demonstration

of PWSCC in Inconel 600 was first reported by Coriou almost 30 years ago. The studies of PWSCC in Inconel 600 have been documented

in numerous published

reports.However, the mechanism

for PWSCC in Inconel 600 is still not well understood.

In PWRs, PWSCC of Inconel 600 was first reported in steam generator

tubing.IN 90-10 February 23, 1990 The cracking to date in the thermal sleeves and the instrument

nozzles of the domestic PWRs has been reported as being only axially oriented.

The safety implication

of an axial crack is not considered

a significant

threat to the structural

integrity

of the components

and most likely will result in a small leak. However, limited circumferential

cracking was reported in the instrument

nozzles of several foreign PWRs. The difference

in the cracking morphology

has been attributed

to the different

type of mechanical

working (rolling vs. reaming) being performed

on these nozzles and thermal sleeves.The appearance

of the crack in the rolled instrument

nozzle is consistent

with that observed in the roll-expanded

region of steam generator

tubing.Circumferential

cracking poses a more serious safety concern because if it were to go undetected

it could lead to a structural

failure of a component rather than to a limited leak.The reported cracking of the pressurizer

thermal sleeves and the instrument

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1

990/in900

1 0.htmI 03/13/2003 Information

Notice No. 90-10: nozzle at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 and the instrument

nozzle at SONGS Unit 3 are the most current PWSCC events for Inconel 600 in domestic PWRs besides the cracking problem associated

with the steam generator

tubing and plugs.The pressurizer

thermal sleeves in Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 (CC-1) were also made of the same heat of susceptible

material, but the recent inspection

of the CC-1 pressurizer

did not reveal any leaking or cracking of the thermal sleeves. The licensee indicated

that the major difference

in the fabrication

of thermal sleeves between CC-1 and CC-2 is that the pre-installation

reaming operation

was not performed

on CC-1 sleeves. The Combustion

Engineering

Owners Group (CEOG) performed

an evaluation

of pressurizer

heater sleeve susceptibility

to PWSCC for plants designed by Combustion

Engineering.

The CEOG recommended

a visual inspection

program for the thermal sleeves. The inspection

program for the thermal sleeves varied, depending

on the degree of susceptibility

of the sleeve materials.

The sleeve susceptibility

was rated by the elements described

above. The staff notes that at CC-2 the yield strength of the thermal sleeve material is higher than that of the instrument

nozzle material.

However, PWSCC occurred in both heats of materials.

This circumstance

may indicate that the yield strength of the material is not necessarily

a reliable screening criterion

for PWSCC susceptibility.

The CEOG is performing

additional

work to address PWSCC of Inconel 600. The CEOG programs include the following activities:

evaluations

to gain better understanding

of the cracking mechanism

in pressurizer

thermal heater sleeves and instrument

nozzles; an analytical

determination

of a temperature

profile for the heater sleeves;review of the fabrication

history of all Inconel 600 penetrations

in the primary system components;

conduct of a test that is primarily

a system leakage test on a mock-up of the flawed components;

and improvement

of NDE methods for cracking evaluation.

PWSCC of Inconel 600 is not a new phenomenon.

However, very little special attention

has been given to the inspection

for PWSCC in Inconel 600 applica-tions other than that associated

with the steam generator

tubing. As a result of the recently reported instances

of PWSCC in the pressurizer

heater thermal sleeves and instrument

nozzles in several domestic and foreign PWRs, it may be prudent for licensees

of all PWRs to review their Inconel 600 applications

in the primary coolant pressure boundary, and when necessary, to implement

an augmented

inspection

program.IN 90-10 February 23, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

William H. Koo, NRR (301) 492-0928 Robert A. Hermann, NRR (301) 492-0911 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices.ENDEND http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/gen-comnilinfo-noticesll

990/in900

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