Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
February 28, 1990
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-12:
MONITORING OR INTERRUPTION OF
PLANT COMMUNICATIONS
Addressees
- -
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is intended to inform licensees of the potential for
monitoring and/or disruption of onsite radio communications at power reactors.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances
Between January 1989 and January 1990, an individual located offsite monitored
and recorded onsite communications originating from the control room at Seabrook.
No security transmissions were recorded, only routine outgoing operational
messages from the control room.
NRC representatives from both operations and
safeguards randomly sampled portions of these taped communications. No safe- guards or other sensitive information which could have jeopardized safety was
found to have been Intercepted. In an additional Incident at Seabrook, an un- authorized transmission interrupted control room communications by transmitting
on the same frequency. It was not determined if the outside transmitting source
was on or offsite.
Discussion:
Although no safety or security compromise appears to have been involved in
the Seabrook incidents, they demonstrate the potential for such compromise, considering power reactor transmittal of routine operational and security
radio messages on unencrypted (clear) radio frequencies, and the potential
for interruption from external sources. The
Intent
of this notice Is to
call licensees' attention to the potential for similar type communication
events at their facilities and the possible need for additional communi- cations discipline for plant operations and security.
/
/<9 C'
IN 90-12 February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe- guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits.
This
includes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications.
"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected
(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between site
security personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclose
facility safeguards features or response procedures.
There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephones
for transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios have
been increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi- cations links between plant operators.
However, radio communications are not
private.
In viewof the Seabrook event, addressees may wishlto. examine com- munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.
Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies and
are simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic for
communications that are not secure-; lEicrypted systems can.helplin overcoming
the vulnerability of radio transmistions'to exploitation.. However, these systems
may still be susceptible to.imonitoting.. -
.i
The unauthorized transmission~at'Seabrook demonstrates other methods that might
exploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming-.and'deception could be used
in-rad4o-transmissions-although this did not appear to he the intent at Seabrook.
Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and'willfully causing or
attempting to cause physical damage to a utilization fabilityoir cause an inter- ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or-tampering with
the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility,'and prescribes
penalties for such attempts.{(Sectioh 236 of the "AtomicEnergy Act)' -
The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolent
acts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radio
operating procedures, commensurate.iwith the operations and security significance
of the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming,-and- deception.
'
'
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
-
- r~les ER~ossl, Director
'Division of Operational Events'Assessment
Office of;7Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR
(301) 492-3211 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
a
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. I l
j
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Attachment
February 28, 1990
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date ot
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
90-11
90-10
90-09
88-30,
Supp. 1
Maintenance Deficiency
Associated with Solenoid-
Operated Valves
Primary Water Stress
Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
of Inconel 600
Extended Interim Storage of
Low-Level Radioactive Waste
by Fuel Cycle and Materials
Licensees
Target Rock Two-Stage SRV-
Setpoint Drift Update
2/28/90
2/23/90
2/5/90
2/2/90
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs
All holders of NRC
materials licenses.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
____ 90-08
__
Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed
-211/90
Fuel
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors and
holders of licenses
for permanently shut- down facilities with
fuel on site.
88-23, Supp. 2
90-07
90-06
Potential for Gas Binding
of High-Pressure Safety
Injection Pumps During a
Loss-of-Coolant Accident
New Information Regarding
Insulation Material
Performance and Debris
Blockage of PWR Contain- ment Sumps
Potential for Loss of
Shutdown Cooling While
at Low Reactor Coolant
Levels
1/31/90
1/30/90
1/29/90
All holders of OLs
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 90-12 February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe- guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits. This
includes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications.
"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected
(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between site
security personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclose
facility safeguards features or response procedures.
There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephones
for transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios have
been increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi- cations links between plant operators.
However, radio communications are not
private.
In view of the Seabrook event, addressees may wish to examine com- munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.
Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies and
are simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic for
communications that are not secure. Encrypted systems can help in overcoming
the vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation. However, these systems
may still be susceptible to monitoring.
The unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that might
exploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could be used
in radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent at Seabrook.
Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing or
attempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause an inter- ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tampering with
the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and prescribes
penalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act")
The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolent
acts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radio
operating procedures, commensurate with the operations and security significance
of the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, and
deception.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR
(301) 492-3211 Attachment: List of Recently
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR I
NPKadambi
MSWarren
02/22/90
02/22/90
Issued NRC Information Notices
Ddl8O9.~.5R
- C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
C
CHBerlinger
02/A46'90
02/23/90
'C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR
- D/DRIS:NRR
PMcKee
BKGrimes
02/22/90
02/23/90
- RPB:ADM
TechEd
02/22/90
- OGC
02/22/90
IN 90-XX
February xx, 1990
- \\ the transmission of safeguards information except by protected telecommunica- tions circuits. This includes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communi- cations. NUREG-0794 "Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information"
suggests that if protected (encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio
transmissions between site security personnel must be limited to message
formats or codes that do not disclose facility safeguards features or response
procedures. There are no specific requirements related to the security of
radio and telephones for transmission of information on site in support of
operations.
Radios have been increasingly used as a means to provide more
mobile and efficient communications links between plant operators. Licensees
should be aware that their radio communications are not private. Although
operational communications are normally not sensitive, consideration should be
given to whether information potentially being monitored could assist malevo- lent acts that could jeopardize public health and safety.
Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up
are simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all
communications that are not secure. Encrypted systems can
the vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation.
systems may still be susceptible to monitoring.
site frequencies and
radio traffic for
help in overcoming
However, these
The unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that might
exploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could be
used in radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent at
Seabrook.
Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing or
attempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause an
interruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tampering
with its machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and pre- scribes penalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the "Atomic Energy Act")
Proper communications discipline and basic radio operating procedures can
lessen communications vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, and deception.
The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolent
acts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deserve
more attention than others.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR
(301) 492-3211 Attachment: List of Recently
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR ,
NPKadambi
MSWarren
02/22/90
02/22/90
Issued NRC Information Notices
D/DOEA:NRR
C/OGCB:DOEA;NPR
CERossi
CHBerlinger tAL
02/ /90
0
02/0f/90
- C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR
- D/DRIS:NRR
PMcKee
BKGrimes
02/22/90
02/23/90
RPr~A- u~xo
RPB:ADM
TechEd
02/22/90
- OGC
02/22/90
I
IN 90-XX
February xx, 1990 The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolent
acts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deserve
more attention than others.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR
(301) 492-3211 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
j p Zocument Name:
OGCB:DOEA:NRR
NPKadambi
02h=;t9O
Se.
'i.ffatq
cadsl
,rC
sash -~
IN ON RADIOS
RSGB:DRIS:NR
MSWarren
02/22/90
- s4 :szt
RPB:ADM
S TechEd
02/ /90
t74/O
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
02/ /90
D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi
02/ /90