ML15005A085

McGuire, Units 1 and 2, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task F

ML15005A085
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	12/17/2014
From:	Capps S D Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MNS-14-097
Download: ML15005A085 (64)

Text

Steven D. CappsVice PresidentMcGuire Nuclear Station'ENERGY, Duke EnergyMG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, NC 28078o: 980.875.4805f: 980.875.4809Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com10 CFR 50.54(f)December 17, 2014Serial: MNS-14-097ATTN: Document Control DeskU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject:

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Responseto NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term TaskForce Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-TermTask Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, datedMarch 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340.2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: SeismicReevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, SeismicEvaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012,Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS AccessionNo. ML13106A331.4. Duke Letter, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response toNRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,dated March 20, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A421.Ac'okj&L United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDecember 17, 2014Page 2On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all powerreactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States(CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from thedate of Reference 1.The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delaysubmittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report so that an update tothe Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could becompleted and used to develop that information. NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurfacematerials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC bySeptember 12, 2013, with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted byMarch 31, 2014. The industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated February15, 2013 (Reference 3).Reference 1 requested that licensees provide interim evaluations and actions taken or plannedto address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior tocompletion of the risk evaluation. In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance in Reference3, the attached ESEP Report for MNS Units 1 and 2 provides the information described inSection 7 of Reference 3 in accordance with the schedule identified in Reference 2.There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this letter.Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphyat 980-875-5715.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed onDecember 17, 2014.Sincerely,Steven D. Capps

Enclosure:

MNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDecember 17, 2014Page 3xc:V.M. McCree, Region II AdministratorU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMarquis One Tower245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257John Boska, Project manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOne White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F1511555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738G. E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission11555 Rockville PikeMail Stop 8 G9ARockville, MD 20852-2738J. ZeilerNRC Senior Resident InspectorMcGuire Nuclear StationJustin FolkweinAmerican Nuclear Insurers95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453 EnclosureMNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATIONPROCESS (ESEP) REPORTDecember 03, 2014Revision 0Duke EnergyMcGuire Nuclear StationPage 1 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORTTABLE OF CONTENTS1.0 PURPO SE AND O BJECTIVE ............................................................................................... 42.0 BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ...................... 43.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL .................................................................. 63.1 Equipm ent Selection Process and ESEL ................................................................... 63.1.1 ESEL D evelopm ent .............................................................................................. 73.1.2 Pow er-O perated Valves ...................................................................................... 83.1.3 Pull Boxes ..................................................................................................... ....83.1.4 Term ination Cabinets ........................................................................................... 83.1.5 Critical Instrum entation Indicators ...................................................................... 83.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ........................................................... 93.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXIm plem entatio n ..................................................................................................... ..94.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS) ........................................................ 94.1 Plot of GM RS Subm itted by the Licensee ................................................................. 94.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) .................................................... 115.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) ................................................................... 135.1 Description of RLGM Selected ................................................................................. 135.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) .................................... 156.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH ................................................................. 156.1 Sum m ary of M ethodologies Used .......................................................................... 166.2 HCLPF Screening Process ........................................................................................ 176.3 HCLPF Capacity Determ ination ............................................................................... 186.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL .......................................... 186.5 Seism ic W alkdow n Approach ................................................................................ 196.5.1 W alkdow n Approach ....................................................................................... 196.5.2 W alkdow ns and W alk-Bys ................................................................................. 206.5.3 Significant W alkdow n Findings ........................................................................ 216.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ...................................................................................... 216.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays ............................................................................ 216.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ................................ 247.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGYCHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION ..................................................... 247.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns ..................................... 247.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX StrategyChanges and New FLEX Component Installations ................................................. 247.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ........................................... 248.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS ............................................................................... 25Page 2 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 08.1 Supporting Inform ation .......................................................................................... 258.2 Identification of Planned M odifications ................................................................. 268.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESELCom ponent W alkdow ns/Evaluations ...................................................................... 268.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments ................................................................. 279 .0 R E FE R EN C ES ...................................................................................................................... 2 8APPENDICESAPPENDIX AMNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsAPPENDIX BMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsAPPENDIX CMNS FLEX Flow PathsFIGURESFigure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] .................................................... 10Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Graphical Format [4] ............................................... 11Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Graphical Format .......................................................... 12Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ............................................... 12Figure 5-1. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) ...................................................................................... 15Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE .............................................................. 17TABLESTable 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] ........................................................ 11Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping) ............................. 13Table 5-2. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) ....................................................................................... 14Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications .................................................... 22Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications .................................................... 23Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions ............................................................. 27Page 3 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 01.0 Purpose and ObjectiveFollowing the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from theMarch 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct asystematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agencyshould make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed aset of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory frameworkfor protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f)letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that theserecommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letterrequests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements andguidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard andthe current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessmentapproaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment(SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, theNRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken forMcGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim actionin response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through areview of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactorcore following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance inElectric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEPevaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enableNRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions madeas a result of the interim evaluations.2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation StrategiesThe MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor InventoryControl/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to theMarch 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequentsix-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS CalculationMCC-1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-TermTask Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic -Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List(ESEL) [18].Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included inAppendix C.Page 4 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried CondenserCirculating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Laterstages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable dieselpowered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) anddischarge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections. Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2,C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations. The TDAFWP flow control valves andMain Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SGheat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removalis achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanicalconnections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, FigureC-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relieson reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populatedwith the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outageconditions includes the following primary make-up connections:" High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanicalconnection near 1/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4)." Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) systemmechanical connection upstream of 1/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5)." Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer toAppendix C, Figure C-2).Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up asaccommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump sealleakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents. The reactorcoolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated toconserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SGcontinued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valvesare electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into thereactor coolant system.There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. Theprimary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train ofHydrogen igniters. Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fansinside of containment.Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND)system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature. This action isaccomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with aportable generator from the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC systemheat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the NuclearService Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear ServicePage 5 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pumpdischarge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manualclosure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow pathpressure boundary. Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required forthe FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine CoolingWater (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting aircompressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIPsubmittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21],and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries,equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoringinstrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containmentintegrity. During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is energized tosupport residual heat removal (RHR) operation.3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B,respectively.The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installedplant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in theMNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3],as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIPand subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and servesas the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for theFLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containmentintegrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21],and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope perEPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and thescope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support corecooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrityfunctions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed)are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2of EPRI 3002000704.1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the corecooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 ofEPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for corePage 6 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in theEPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in theMNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEXconnections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequentupdates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connectionmodifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to supporta single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the"Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recoverystrategies are excluded.6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per theEPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:" Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)* Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.* Manual valves and rupture disks." Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEXmitigation strategies." Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vesseland internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-upstrategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included inthe ESEL.3.1.1 ESEL DevelopmentThe ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEXstrategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and InstrumentationDiagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identifythe boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identifyspecific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of theFLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanicalisolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branchlines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were theprimary reference documents used to identify mechanical components andinstrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected andspecific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrumentdrawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, systemdescriptions, design basis documents, etc.Page 7 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 03.1.2 Power-Operated ValvesPage 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not requiredto change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installedPhase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address thisconcern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failuremodes associated with power-operated valves:" Powered-operated valves that remain energized during the ELAP events(such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with theexception of various air-operated valves which fail to the requiredposition as a result of the ELAP event." Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEXmitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic eventalso causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable ofspurious operation as they would be de-energized.* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEXmitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operatedduring subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated forspurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP haspassed before the valves are re-powered.3.1.3 Pull BoxesPull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these componentsprovide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks orconnections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were consideredpart of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance withEPRI 3002000704 [2].3.1.4 Termination CabinetsTermination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiplecables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide acompletely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL toensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities isaddressed.3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation IndicatorsCritical indicators and recorders are typically physically located onpanels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismicevaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinetseismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).Page 8 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 03.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping ConnectionsItem 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESELincludes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS alP [3] andsubsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 inSection 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEXconnection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required tosupport a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC,and their supports ..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance withEPRI 3002000704 [2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, anyactive valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included inthe ESEL.3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXImplementationThe ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEXstrategy.4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the LicenseeThe MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. DigitizedGMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard andScreening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. TheMNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.Page 9 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control point for McGuire (5% of critical dampingrespo nse spectra)Freq (Hz) 1E-4 UHRS (g) 1E-5 UHRS (g) GMRS (g)100 1.92E-01 6.48E-01 3.05E-0190 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.1OE-0180 2.01E-01 6,86E-01 3.22E-0170 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-0160 2.56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-0150 3.37E-01 1.22E+00 5.65E-0140 4.03E-01 1.44E+00 6.70E-0135 411E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-0130 4.06E-01 1.41E+00 6.60E-0125 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-0120 3.84E-01 1.28E+00 6.03E-0115 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-0112.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+00 5.28E-0110 326E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-019 3.09E-01 9.50E-01 4.55E-018 2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-017 2.68E-01 7.96E-01 3.84E-016 2.45E-01 7.11E-01 3.44E-015 2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.OOE-014 1-80E-01 4.91E-01 2.41E-013.5 1-59E-01 4.24E-01 2.09E-013 1.37E-01 3.58E-01 1.77E-012.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-012 1.05E-01 2.58E-01 1.29E-011.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1.04E-011.25 7-49E-02 1.75E-01 8.86E-021 6.47E-02 1.47E-01 7.49E-020.9 6-25E-02 1.42E-01 7.24E-020.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-01 7.00E-020.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6.69E-020.6 5.35E-02 1.22E-01 6.20E-020.5 4-70E-02 1.07E-01 5.44E-020.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-020.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81E-020.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-020.25 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-020.2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-020.15 1-41E-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-020.125 1.17E-02 2.67E-02 1.36E-020.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4].Page 10 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS GMRS0.8 ----- .....0.6 -0 .4 --- -------II- GMRS~0.3 .0.2....J..0 .0 .------- ...0.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Graphical Format [4].The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of themat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included inSection 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE istabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4].Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g)0.33 0.062 0.366 0.3635/PGA 0.15Page 11 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS SSE5% Damping0.40 --- --0.35 ....0.30 :.0.20.20 0. ..'w 0. 15 SS0.10 --4 .-., ----A0.050.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Graphical Format.MNS GMRS vs SSE0.6 -----------~0.4SSw 0.3~~ --------7 0. -GMRS0.10.0 --~.- ------- --0.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).Page 12 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 05.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM SelectedThe procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectralacceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground responsespectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectralaccelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE groundresponse spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown inTable 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range is at10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determinedby multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGMfrequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM isplotted in Figure 5-1.Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio(Hz) (g) (g) GMRS/SSES _1 0.180 0.075 -2 0.360 0.129 0.358_3- 0.360 0.177 0.492 .4 0.360 0.241 0.669I 5 -0.360 , 0.300 0.8336 I 0.360 0.344 0.956L ~ 0.3332L 0.384 1.151 I8 _0.421 1.349.9 _ _ 0-.294 0455.10 0.279 0 0.486 1.740 .Page 13 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)IAcceleration[ _(Hz) 1 ._(g). .-0.333 0.01041 I _0.313S 2 0.626-3 _j _.626Fiii-2.1 il 4 _0.6265 0.626....................2i o8i2I 10 _ _0._486j .11 0.464 t.12_. 0.444.213 0.427.14 0.41115 0.39717.5 0.36820 0.34522.5 0.32525 0.308.. 27.5 0_2:94I 30 I 0.28235 .0.261-100 0.261iPage 14 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. 0MNS RLGM0.7r0.6F0.5 j-0O.4 ------ -~ --- ..* 0. ----"------~-- -RLGM0.010.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 5-1. MVNS RLGM (5% Damping).5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by theRLGM scale factor of 1.74.6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation ApproachIt is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meetor exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterizedas the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a lowprobability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, inthis case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to orgreater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given inSection 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear PowerPlant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959,Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [8].Page 15 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 06.1 Summary of Methodologies UsedSeismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS IndividualPlant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supportingdocumentation (MCC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE BackupCalculations [19]).MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRAutilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variablesmethodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959 [8]. The calculatedfragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal statesthat these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns andused in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004. Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives thefragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEEEquipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that werenot included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of themedian capacity being greater than 2.0g.The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, includingequipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes consideredwere functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. Theoriginal anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMAwalkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMAwalkdowns.Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented inVolumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004 [19]. The SMA consisted of screeningwalkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used thescreening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns wereconducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended theEPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users GroupWalkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and weredocumented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (meanNUREG/CR-0098 [11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relayreview, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in theSMA.Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used asthe RILE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen thatthe RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. TheRLE is slightly less than the RLIGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This maybe disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.Page 16 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE0 .7 -. --- ----- -0.650.40.3 RLGMVU -IPEEE RLE0.20.0 L--0.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.6.2 HCLPF Screening ProcessThe SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE isequal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greaterthan the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any componentswhose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPFcalculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peakspectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peakspectral acceleration. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSEfloor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB forwhich new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [11]. ThereforeESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEE SMA, met the screeningcaveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened outfrom ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceedsthe RLGM.Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on theSMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculationswere screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individualcomponents with individual documentation. The screening for valves proceededdifferently.Page 17 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, bothpower-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 ofEPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8gpeak spectral acceleration without any review other than looking for valves withlarge extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not afailure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEEMechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacitydetermination. Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEEfragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valveson the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis ofmedian capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meetEPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectralacceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra onthe basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA coveredapproximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on smalldiameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the correspondingUnit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE reviewexcept for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met thecriteria. Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet theEPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria withoutexplicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves werescreened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were notscreened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministicEPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/oranchorage evaluations.6.3 HCLPF Capacity DeterminationHCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, andseismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determinedusing the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF anchorage capacities weredetermined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismicinteraction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SLThe components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. Forcomponents not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings,the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels ofEPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, SeismicFragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for thescreening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.Page 18 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency rangeand were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology inEPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peakswere averaged.6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach6.5.1 Walkdown ApproachWalkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided inSection 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for theSMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] describe theseismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria."The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of allcomponents which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactiveor low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment ofcomponents which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments,or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely moreon alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance onseismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and morehurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean completeinspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring anelectrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets orpanels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown isnot intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy ofthe component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group ofcomponents are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is onlynecessary to inspect one component out of this group. The"similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown duringthe seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference todrawings, calculations or specifications. The one component for eachtype which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probablydoes mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this verylimited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can befound so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant isin operation. At least for the one component of each type which isselected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the firstitems and compare the field configurations with the constructiondrawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence isfound, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as greata detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of thePage 19 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0component class as the SRT becomes confident that the constructionpattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeatedfor each component class; although, during the actual walkdown theSRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. Ifserious exceptions to the drawings or questionable constructionpractices are found then the system or component class must beinspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lock of similarity, anchoragewhich is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed incriteria for that component, potential SI [Seismic Interaction1]problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' pastexperience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If anysuch concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one componentof each typefor thorough inspection will have to be increased. Theincrease in sample size which should be inspected will depend uponthe number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which areobserved. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size sincethey are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of allelements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix Dgives guidance for sampling selection."6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-BysMany of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluationsand have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording theresults. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed byqualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performedand documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that thecomponent and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown andto verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may havedeveloped since the original walkdown.Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previouslywalked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have aspecific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet theRLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity ofmasonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonrywalls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in theIPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.'EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "pipingattached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed inaccordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."Page 20 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 06.5.3 Significant Walkdown FindingsAll of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greaterthan the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacitygreater than the RLGM.6.6 HCLPF Calculation ProcessESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluatedusing the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the followingsteps:" Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included inprevious seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plantconditions;" Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables inEPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and" Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that includeboth structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functionalfailure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and aredocumented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001 [10]. HCLPF results and key failuremodes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations areincluded in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.6.7 Functional Evaluations of RelaysThere are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability forPhase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.Page 21 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.Problem DescriptionUnitESEL IDEquipment #BldgModification/Recommendation1 23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification: Add metal ties toEHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.approximately 15 ft.Modification has been COMPLETED.1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification: Add metal ties tointo cable tray. band cable to horizontal and verticalpotions of this wall-mounted tray near 900bends.Modification has been COMPLETED.1 24 EHM-TB-0589 AB Secure load path: Required modification:Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mountingUnistrut. tabs.Modification has been COMPLETED.1 48 1SV-VA-O0019AB AB Interaction issue: Required modification:A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.subject valve has been rubbing onside of support structure.1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.hold down clip.1 67 EQB-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction: Required modification:Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Remove Unistrut.results in negligible clearance.AB = Auxiliary BuildingDH = DogHouseRB = Reactor BuildingPage 22 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation2 18 NI-VA-0065B RB Potential interaction: Conduit and Required modification:connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequateadjacent structural support. clearance.2 51 SV-CV-0001AB DH Soft target: Required Modification:Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.rubbing against floor grating.2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support: Required modification:Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support fromresistance temperature detector (RTD). structural member or cable tray toSubject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.of cable.AB = Auxiliary BuildingDH = DogHouseRB = Reactor BuildingPage 23 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 06.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 andAppendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in thetables:" For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value isprovided as >RLGM and the failure mode Is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."" For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7) screening tables, the HCLPFvalue is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened perEPRI NP-6041."" For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value isprovided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction -BlockWalls."" For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPFvalue is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."" For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value islisted in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and NewComponent Installation7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for WalkdownsAll ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 dieselgenerator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visualinspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas abovethe tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismicinteraction hazards.7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changesand New FLEX Component InstallationsSeismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding forcomponents which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes tothe FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX componentinstallations. These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "tobe done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close OutThe remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations will becompleted within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed andclosed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.Page 24 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 08.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results8.1 Supporting InformationMNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in theNRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expeditesplant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-termmodifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactorcore following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. OnMarch 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of astudy [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismichazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central andEastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismichazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk forthe fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such,the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safetymargin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with theapproach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter alsostated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached inGI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue tooperate while additional evaluations are conducted."An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleetrisk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, theconclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached"Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed anumber of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain marginbeyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databasesof performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and(3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed usingconservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstandlarge ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that haveactually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process hasinherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismicmargins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects ofthe seismic design process, including:Page 25 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0* Safety factors applied in design calculations;" Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;* Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;" Broadening criteria for ISRS;" Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis andtesting applications;* Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit timehistory based time domain analysis;* Bounding requirements in codes and standards;* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concreteand steel);* Bounding testing requirements; and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additionalcapacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond theessentially elastic range, etc.).These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs willcontinue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.8.2 Identification of Planned ModificationsTables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made inaccordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of theplant.8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESELComponent Walkdowns/EvaluationsPlant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identifiedin NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications notrequiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within twoplanned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations willbe completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.Page 26 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 08.4 Summary of Planned ActionsThe actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Follow-up Actions.Action # Action Description Completion Date1 Complete remaining modifications Follow-up actions will be completed as(Table 6-1), and ESEL follows:walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix A) 0 December 31, 2016 (if actionfor Unit 1 components. completion does not require a2 Complete remaining modifications refueling outage)( The end of the second planned(aledown t 6-2),ndx an Erefueling outage after December 31,walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix B) 2014 (if action completion requiresfor Unit 2 components. outage)3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion ofimplementation of modifications ESEP activities for items 1 and 2.associated with items 1 and 2.Page 27 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 09.0 References1) Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term TaskForce Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.2) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic, Electric PowerResearch Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.3) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With RegardTo Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis ExternalEvents (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy,Huntersville, NC.4) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.5) Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.6) USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f),"June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.7) A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1,August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.8) Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, Electric Power ResearchInstitute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.9) Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuireNuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual PlantExamination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, DukePower, Huntersville, NC.Page 28 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 010) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic RiskEvaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," datedOctober 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, DukeEnergy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.11) Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants,published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0098.12) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage RiskEstimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants inthe Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.13) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward forNTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.14) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening andPrioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations forRecommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From theFukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.15) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and ImplementationDetails (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,February 2013, EPRI 1025287.16) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research InstituteFinal Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach forthe Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, InformationRequest for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.17) Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric PowerResearch Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.18) Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic -Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List(ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00-00-0012.19) Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, 1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC,1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.20) Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke EnergyCarolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2,Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; FirstSix-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedAugust 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.Page 29 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 021) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 CommissionOrder Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategiesfor Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedFebruary 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.22) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; ThirdSix-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedAugust 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.Page 30 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Appendix AMNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsPage 31 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE WalkdownESEL ID EDO Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State or Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes NCLPF** Key Failure Mode-1 1FW-VA-0032B Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 815 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESuction Isolation JJ,/12 1PW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc PumpSuction Isolation3 1FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc PumpSuction Isolation4 1ND-VA-0056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs5 1ND-VA-0061 ND Relief- Hotlegs6 1ND-VA-0064 ND Relief -'B'Coldlegs7 1NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg8 1NI-VA-O151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg9 1NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 & 2AUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUX750750733733733733750733716Rm 811KK/S3Rm 815iJ/S 1Rm 730GG/52EE/52Rm 730HH/52Rm 602GG/52Rm 817HH/52Rm 730il/S1Rm 601AA/63Open/ClosedOpen/ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedOpen/ClosedWalk-ByWalk-ByWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalk-Byp 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,AppendixC Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per IPEEE11 1NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont AUX 733 E Open Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE, p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEEE/S2Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,12 1NC-VA-0272AC RX 774 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown en>RLM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Isolation Valee 275S 17R Appendia C Table 2-4Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Rx Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,13 1NC-VA-0273AC RX 774 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIsolation Valve 27"1RAppendix C Table 2-4273' 17RNC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cavit14 1NC-VA-0034A Sosem Preuric Cor o RX 808 P 02z 35R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls 102' 35R1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply lA CIA Rm25 1NI-VA-0430A 1Nom34A A (M oV e RX 758 1A 48R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE, p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEfrom 1A CIA (MOV) 46' 48R16 IFW-TX-0001 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Meets RIOM Screened per PEEtAppendix C Structural Mechanics Associates (p 1461).17 1I-V-005A l CI Blok Vlve(MOV RX 733 Pipe Chase17 1NI-VA-42'4A 1ACLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 42p 47R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPipe Chase18 INI-VA-0065B 1B CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 136" C0s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included n IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE18 21-V-007A i CIABlok Vave MOV) ~ 2f 733 Pipe Chase19 2NI-VA-0076A 1CCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE20 iI-V-008B 1 CI Blok Vlve MOV RxPipe Chase20 1NI-VA-3088B 1DCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEENew equipment -updated IPEEE SEWS21 1EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p74 evaluation. "Reference 10, AppendixsB1, pg. B1- >RLGM Screened per IPEEE10"iEHMPN-Reference 10,22 EHM-PN- H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 7S0 CC/46 Standby Functional Walkdown ' Bounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-589. >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041HMPPA Appendix C1EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters23 thru TB71 (Odd (35 Ignit H er Train) RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Referencedix10, Nt in experience data base. Tested to SURTS RLGM UndeterminedNumbers only)23 a 1EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-S2, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C Table 2-4Page 32 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode**Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,23 b 1EHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Appence C Table 2-4, HCLPF based on Unit 2 value on save 0.29 FunctionalAppendin C eeainelevation.24 1EHM-TB-589 Local Terminal Box AUX 750 CC/46 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-425 Deleted26 1CA-HX-0003 TDCAP Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE27 1CA-PU-003 TDCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEDriven Pump)27 a ISA-TR-0003 TOCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boox with 1CA-PU-00w3, which has an oRLGM Screened per PEEIPEER SEWS27 b 1SA-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0553, which has un >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWS27 c ISA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus with 1,-PU-SS3, which has an >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWSRule-of-the-boo wish 1CA-PU-0003, which has usa LM SrendprPn27 d 1SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By >RLGM Screened Ser IPEEEIPEEE SEWS28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAP Control Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE29 1SA-VA-004EABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/S3 Closed Open Walk-By p777 Included in IPEEE, p 777 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE(AOV) (DH2)Inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, oRG ScendprERNP6429 a 1SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Dh 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-041(DH2) Appendix C Table 2-429 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Doghouse 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4Rm 60030 1SA-VA-0003 TDCAP Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 Rm Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAA/3231 Deleted32 Deleted33 Deleted34 1VI-VA-0032 1A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction -Block WallInlet Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-435 1VI-VA-B034 AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Inlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-436 1VI-VA-0112 1A VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-437 IVI-VA-0134 1A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-438 1VI-VA-0155 1B VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/75 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-439 1VI-VA-0156 1B Vi Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/55 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-439M-ABVIIA-VAuatorRelef AUXe 73DoghCoeoefrneSOucensotbsdenER N-01SL e.1 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604540 1VI-VA-2009 7SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse DD/44 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604(120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-4Page 33 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode**41 1VI-VA-2019 15M-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790 DD/43 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-442 1VI-VA-2029 1SM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 790 DD/52 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-443 1VI-VA-2039 1SM-5AB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse D/SI Closed Closed Wikd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >51GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-444 1CA-VA-0064AB TACA Flow control to 1A SO andOpen Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls BB/SO Closed44 a 1CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESm 60544 b 1CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 716 88/00 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/SO44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX44 d 1CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX44 e 1CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX44 f 1CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUXTDCA Flow Control to 1B SG and45 SCA-VA-OO52AB AUXAssociated Pneumatic Controls45 a 1CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX45 b 1CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX45 c 1CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter AUX45 d 1CA-VP-0520 Valve Positioner AUX45 e 1CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX45 f 1CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUXTDCA Flow Control to 1C SG and46 SCA-VA-0045AB AUXAssociated Pneumatic Controls46 a 1CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX46 b 1CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX46 c 1CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter AUX46d 1CA-VP-0480 Valve Positioner AUX46e 1CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX46 f 1CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUXTDCA Flow Control to 1D SG and47 1CA-VA-0036AB AUXAssociated Pneumatic Controls716716716716716767716716716716716716767716716716716716716Rm 600BB/50Rm 600BB/50Rm 600BB/50Rm 600BB/50Rm 600BB/51Control Rm 925Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Control Rm 925Rm 600sa/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600BB/51Rm 600AA/43FunctionalFunctionalEnergizedEnergizedOpenFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalEnergizedEnergizedOpenFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalEnergizedEnergizedOpenFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByOpen/Throttled/ Walk-ByClosedFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByOpen/Throttled/ Walk-ByClosedFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByFunctional Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByEnergized Walk-ByOpen/Throttled/ Walk-ByClosedRule-of-the-box with 1CA-64ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-64ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-64ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-64ABp 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-52ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-52ABRule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2ABp 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-48ABRule-of-the-box with 2CA-48ABRule-of-the-box with 2CA-48ABRule-of-the-box with 2CA-48ABRule-of-the-box with 2CA-48ABp 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per PEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perFPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEPage 34 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-47 a 1CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE47 b 1CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAA/4347 c SCA-MT-0360 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAA/4347 d SCA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAA/43Reference 10,nLM ScendprERNF6447 e 1CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C47 f 1CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C48 1SV-VA-0019AB 1A SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse 809 GG/44 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH1) ClosedSB SG Main Steam PORV and Inner DohueOpen/Throttled/ akB 949 1SV-VA-0013AB Doghouse 809 FF/53 Closed e Walk-By p 294 RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed50 1VV-OA C SGMi509mPR ad Inr ohueOpen/Throttled!/ akB 9C S Main Steam POV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF/52 Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed909 ai ta PR nd OtrDohueOpen/Throttled/ WakB p29511D Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse GG/44 Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH1) ClosedVital Battery 125 VDC Distribution52 1EPL-PN-EVDA AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPanel52 a 1EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 BB/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPanelSm 707 Rfrne1,>RL0M5*5 Interaction -Block Wall53 0EPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10,CC/54 Appendix C54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vital Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 FunctionalConnection Box ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-455 1EPE-MX-EMXA2 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE56 1EPE-MX-EMXA4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per PEEE57 1EPE-MX-EMXH 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 FF/56 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEES1EPE-MX-EMXB4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 705 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/41659 1ETP-CA-0008 Pzr PORV Relay/Indication AUX 750 CC/53 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(1ATC 8)Main Control Board Cabinet for60 1EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEETemperature Indication61 1EOA-PN-MC7 H2 Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE62 1EOA-PN-MC10 Main Control Board Cabinet for CA / AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEENC SystemsMain Control Board Cabinet for NI63 1EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIndicationPage 35 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF- Key Failure Mode-*Main Control Board Cabinet for SM64 1EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIndication)Main Control Board Cabinet forICCM a 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEICCM Remote DisplayICMb tI-.-21 Train A Remote Display Processor AU 6 oto m95 Sady Fntoa akon Reference 10, Screens nut based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1, >RG ScendprEIN-61behind 2MC2 Appendiu C ruble 2-4Train B Remote Display Processor Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,ICCM c IEIA-CA-9221 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4ICCM d SRIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SMC1, which has an PEER ScreenedSEWSICCM e 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-tbe-bon with SMCS, which has an FREE ScreenedSEWSReference 0, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1,ICCM f 1EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/55 Standby Functional Walkdown 10, S o 0.29 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-4ICCM g 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-465 IFPE-CA-9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Block Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEClosure Permissive) CC/5466 11PE-CA-9020 SSPSCabinet'B' (CLA Block Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEClosure Permissive) CC/54Sm 603 Sady Fntoa Waknn Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,67 1EQB-PN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters) AUX 750 Standby Functional Walkdown c e 0.29 FunctionalBB/51 Appendix C Table 2-412OVAC Inst and Control Sm 701 Nominal 120 VAC68 1EPG-PN-EKVA AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 203 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPanelboard DD/54 OutputSm 701 Nominal 120 VAC69 1EPG-BI-EVIA Vital Inverter AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 65 >RLGM Screened per IPEEECC/55 OutputSteam Generator NR Level Accum 1A Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,70 1CF-LT-6000 RX 739 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IFEEEIndication Loop 1 39 45R Appendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1B Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,71 1CF-LT-5540 RX 742 Indication Indication Walkdown >eeec 0 cen u ae o FIN-05S. e.1 RLGM Screened per IFEEEIndication Loop 2 146 49R Appendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1C Rm Indication Indication Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >61GM Screened per FEEt72 1CF-LT-5S70 RX 741Iniain Idcto Wadon>GM Sredpr PEIndication Loop 3 214 5SR Appendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1D Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,73 1CF-LT-6030 RX 744 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IFEEEIndication Loop 4 326 56R Appendix C Table 2-474 1SM-PT-50850 DD/44 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Pressure Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Sm 60074 a ICA-PN-AFPA 1A CA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/5175 1SM-PT-51O Steam Generator #2 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-476 FSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator #3 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-4Sm 60076 a SCA-PN-AFPB 1B CA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 C/ Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEcc/s177 1SM-T-570 Steam Generator #4 Wide Range AUX 750 Sm802 Indication Idio Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Pressure Indication Loop DD/45 Appendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator #1 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,76 1NC-RD-5850 RX 740 24° 306 Indication Indicution Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Reactor Vessel Level Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.37 Functional78 a iNC-CA-S0lO Aux 767 86/49 Standby Functional Walkdown AppendixunTablen2-System (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A ppendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator 62 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,79 INC-RD-5870 RX 740 164° 30 Indication Indication WalCdown >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Page 36 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-HotReeee ,SrenoubaeonEINP64-,Rv.,80 1NC-RD-5900 RX 740 203* 30R Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10 Screens out based on EFRI NP-B041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Steam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,81 1NC-RD-5920 RX 740 308° 30R Indication Indication Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Containment NR Pressure Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,82 1NS-PT-5070 AUX 750 DD/S1 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4NC WR Pressurizer Pressure Rm 702 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screened per EPRI NP-604183 1NC-FT-5120 NCW rsuie rsueAUX 7m3702Indication Indication Walkdown>LM ScendprERN-04Indication Loop CC/46 Appendix C Table 2-484 1EIA-CA-9010 Process Control Cabinet 1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(7300 Cabinet) AA/5485A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEStorage Tank18 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil86 1FD-TK-0057 yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEStorage Tank600 VAC Essential for H2 SkimmerRm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3 Fan 1A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 88/45 Closed Closed Walkdomn Appendi>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041IVXIA (04A)600 VAC Essential for H2 SkimmerRm 705 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,88 1EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 1B Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 B8/47 Closed Closed Walkdown AppendiRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-60411VX2B (01C)600 VAC Essential VENVX (04C, 060 Rm 80389 1EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE& 0SD) BB/5290 1EPE-MX-EMXD 600 VAC Essential for VE/VX (06E & AUX 733 Rm 705 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE05D) BB/52HZ Skimmer Fan IA Suction Reference 10,91 1VX-VA-000A isola tion RX 831 265' 43R Closed Open Walkdown 0.60 FunctionalIsolation Valve Appendix CReference 10, 0392 1VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1A RX 818 272' 47R Off On Walkdown Appendie 1 0.39 Anchorage93H Skimmer Fan 1 Suction RX 831 2798 49R Closed Open Walkdown Reference0.44 FunctionalIsolation Valve Appendix CReference 10,94 1VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1B RX 818 268" 47R Off On Walkdown Appence C 0.40 AnchorageAppendix C1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 1A Rule of the box with 1VX-AH-0001 which has IPEEE85 RI 775 270° 0R Closed Open Walk-By sRLGM Screened per IPEEE(1RAF-D-2) Damper SEWS96 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 1A RX 775 270° SOR Off On Walk-By p 434 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEReference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03 nhrg97 1VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1A AUX 767 JJ/51 Off On Walkdown Apendx0.35 AnchorageAppendix C Table 2-498 1VE-XF-0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1B AUX 767 HH/52 Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based ox EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 AnchorageAppendix C Table 2-499 1KC-PU-0003 B1 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPump100 1KC-PU-0004 B2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened 3er IPEEEPump101 1KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUX 767 JJ/57 Intact/ Intact/ Walk-By p528 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESurge Tank In-Service In-Service102 1KC-VA-0050A KC Auxiliary Bldg Supply Non- AUX 750 J /55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEEssential Isolation103 1KC-VA-0230A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non- AUX 750 JJ/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 oRLGM Screened per IPEEEEssential Isolation104 1KC-VA-0200A KC Auxiliary Bldg Return Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEEssential Isolation105 1KC-VA-0003A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 308 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEEssential IsolationPage 37 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-106 1KC-HX-0005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JlJ/56 Intact/ Intact/ Walkdown Reference 10, HCLPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per IPEEEHX In-Service In-Service Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates107 1NC-VA-0032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX8 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed110' 32R108 1NC-VA-0o36B NC System Pressurizer PORV109 1NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve110 1NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve111 1NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve112 1ND-PU-0001 Train A ND Pump113 1ND-PU-0002 Train B ND Pump114 1ND-HX-O003 Train A ND HX115 1ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX116 1ND-HX-O005 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX117 1ND-VA-0002AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation118 1ND-VA-0O01B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction IsolationTrain A RHR Isolation to the119 1N1-VA-O173AColdlegsTrain B RHR Isolation to the120 1NI-VA-O178BColdlegs121 1NI-VA-Ol18A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the HotlegsRXRXRXRXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXRXRXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUX806815801801695695750750695745745733733716742716Pressurizer Cavity105. 32RPressurizer Cavity105' 35RPressurizer Cavity101" 35RPressurizer Cavity101* 35RRm 500FF/54Rm 501GG/54Rm 733LL/52Rm 732LL/52Rm 500FF/54182" 50R180' 22RRm 602GG/52Rm 730HH/52Rm 603JJ/52FF/52Rm 603HH/52ClosedClosedClosedClosedOffOffIntact/In-ServiceIntact/In-ServiceIntactClosed/OpenClosed/OpenOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedIntact PressureBoundaryIntact PressureBoundaryIntact/In-ServiceIntact/In-ServiceIntactOpenOpenOpenOpenOpenOpen/ClosedOpenWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 273 >RLGMWalk-By p 273 >RLGMWalk-By p 458 >RLGMWalk-By p 458 >RLGMWalk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1ND-PU-0002, which has an >RLGMIPEEE SEWSWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGMWalk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGMWalk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGMWalk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGMWalk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGMWalk-By p 774Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGMScreened per PEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEE123 INI-VA-O150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs AUX 750 ,,' Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEHH/52125 1NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX 733 730 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEJi/51Sm 626 Intact Pressure126 1NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump AUX 716 R. Off Bnda re Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per tPEEEHH/54 BoundarySm 5026 Intact Pressure127 INI-PU-O010 Train B NI Pump AUX 716 Off Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEGG/53 Boundary128 INS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump AUX 695 Off Intact Pressure Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEGG/S5 Boundary129 1NS-PU-0002 Train B NS Pump AUX 695 03Off Walk-By 277 >RLGM Screened er IPEEEGG/55 BoundarySm 733130 1NS-HX-O003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEMM/S1Sm 732131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 M Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEMM/51132 1SM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV Outer Doghouse 792 DD/43 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(DH1)Page 38 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsESELID13313413513613713813914014114214314414S146147148149150151152153154155156157158EQUIPMENTEDB Description1SM-VA-0OO5AB Train B MSIV1SM-VA-OO03ABC Train C MSIV1SM-VA-O001AB Train D MSIVTrain A Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0020 ValveTrain A Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0021 ValveTrain A Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0022ValveTrain A Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0023 ValveTrain A Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0024 ValveTrain B Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0014 ValveTrain B Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0015 ValveTrain B Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-O016 ValveTrain B Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0017 ValveTrain B Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-O018 ValveTrain C Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-O0O8 Valve1VV009 Train C Main Steam Safety ReliefValveTrain C Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-001 Valve1VV001 Train C Main Steam Safety ReliefValveTrain C Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0012 ValveTrain D Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0002 ValveTrain D Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-COO3 VlvValveTrain D Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0004 ValveTrain D Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-COOS ValveTrain D Main Steam Safety Relief1SV-VA-0006 ValveIRN-HX-0006 18 RN Pump Motor Cooler1R-A04A RN Pump Discharge Cross TrainSupply Isolation MSV1RN-VA-01 BKC H Cooling Water Supply1RN-VA-01slB1R-AO8BKC HX Cooling Water OutpletIsolationOPERATING STATE Walkdown orBldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Inner Doghouse 792 DD/53 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DM2)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DHI)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Outer Doghouse(DH1)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)Inner Doghouse(DH2)AUXAUXAUX792792791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791791716716750DD/52DD/44EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/53EE/53EE/53EE/S3EE/S3EE/52EE/52EE/52EE/52EE/52EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/43EE/57FF/56LL/55Open/ClosedOpen/ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedIn-ServiceNormally OpenThrottledClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedIn-ServiceClosedOpenWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-Byp 300p 300p 297p297p 297p297p297p 297p 297p 297p 297p 297p 297p 297p 297p 297p297p297p297p 297p 297p 297p 249p 776p 776>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEERule-of-the-box with 1RN-PU-0O04, which has anIPEEE SEWS (p 249)Included in IPEEE, p 776Included in IPEEE, p 7761S9 1RN-VA-0190B KC HX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/54 Throttled Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIsolationPage 39 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown orESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode-160 1RN-VA-8213B B1 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 HH/56 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEWater Outlet Isolation161 1RN-VA-0218B B2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEWater Outlet Isolation162 SRN-VA-0171B EDG KD HX Supply MOV Isolation AUX 776 BB/4 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESm 704163 1RN-VA-0174B EDG KD HX Outlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 88/4 Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/45164 1RN-VA-S235B Train B NS HX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 733 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEKK/S1164 1RN-VA-02058 Train B NS HIPuppl Is ColatonMO AUX 733 KE/0SadySntciakB 5 Rl-ftebxwih1VP-06 hihhsa RG Sree e PERm 630 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p252 Rule-of-the-box with 1NV-PU-0016, which has an vSLOM Screened per IPEEE165 iRN-HX-O0iB Train B NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/5S In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Sm 630 Standby Sole-of-the-hoe with 1NV-PU-0016, which has an166 1RN-HX-0020 Train B NV Pump Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 H/ Indby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 IPEEE with (p w52) >RLGM Screened per IPEEEHH/SS In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Sm 630 Standby/ Inat Wl-BR 5 ule-of-the-bon with 1NV-PU-OO16, which has an167 1RN-HX-0022 Train B NV Pump Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/55 In-Service Inat Wl-y p22 IPEEE SEWS (p 252) >RLGM Screened per IPEtEESm 503 Seference 10,168 1VA-AH-0023 Train B NS Pump AHU AUX 695 Standby Intact Walkdown R Same make/model as U2 ESEL 168 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEGG/SS Appendix CSm 500169 1VA-AH-0027 Train B NO Pump AHU AUX 695 FF/54 Standby Intact Walk-By p 413 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEFF/54170 1RN-HX-0024 Train B NI Pomp Mtr Cooler AUX 716 Rm 626 Standby Intact Walk-By p245 Role-of-the-boo with SNI-PU-0010, which has an vSLOM Screened per P555GG/53 IPEEE SEWS (p 245)171 1RN-HX-0026 Train B NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler1B SN Essential Return Header to172 1RN-VA-O2978SNSWP173 0RN-VA-O283AC 1B/2B RN Disch To RC X-Over Isol174 ORN-VA-01528 1B/2B SN Essential Return Headerto SNSWPSNSWP Return Headers Cross Train175 ORN-VA-O151B IsltoIsolation176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Iso177 1CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump SuctionIsolation from circulating water177 a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve177 c 1CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder177 d 1CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas CylinderAUX 716 StandbyGG/54AUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAuxAuxAuxAuxAuxRm 602EE/52Rm 602EE/52Rm 647WEE/60EE/54Rm 647WEE/60ClosedOpenClosedClosedOpenClosedEnergizedClosedIntactIntactIntactOpenClosedOpenClosedClosedOpenEnergizedClosedIntactIntactRule-of-the-box with 1NI-PU-0010, which has an vRLGMWalk-By p 245>RGIPEEE SEWS (p 245)Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMWalk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMWalk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMWalk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMWalk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGMTBD TBD TBD T7DTBD TBD TBD T7DTBD TBD TBD TEDTBD TBD TBD TBDT8D TBD TBD TBDScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEETBDTB7TBDTBDTBD177 e 1CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD177 f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional T7D TBD TBD TBD TBD177 g 1CA-TB-901 Junction Box houses Relays 'AA' and Aux 733 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD'BB'178 1NV-VA-0055A Letdown Inboard Containment RX 752 Open Closed TBD TBD TBD TED TBDIsolation178 a 1NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RIX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TBDPage 40 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENTESEL ID EDB Description178 b 1NV-SV-0351 Solenoid Valve179 1NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual LoaderLetdown Inboard Containment180 1NV-VA-O457A IsltoIsolation180 a 1NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve180 b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid ValveLetdown Inboard Containment181 1NV-VA-O458AIsolation181 a 1NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve181 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid ValveBldgRXAUXAUXRXRXRXRXRXRXRXRXEL752733767752752752752752752725725OPERATING STATELocation Normal State Desired StateEnergized De-energizedRHR HtX Room Closed ClosedControl Rm 925 Functional FunctionalClosed ClosedDe-energizedDe-energizedClosedDe-energizedDe-energizedClosedDe-energizedDe-energizedDe-energizedClosedDe-energizedDe-energizedClosedWalkdown orWalk-ByTBDTBDTBDTEDTBDTEDTBDTODTEDTBDTEDSEWS*TBDTBDTBDTEDTBDTEDTBDTEDTEDTBDTEDScreening NotesTEDTEDTBDTEDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDHCLPF**TBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTEDKey Failure Mode-5TBDTBDTBDTBDTEDTBDTBDTBDTBDTEDTBD182182 aINV-VA-0025BIdNV-SV-0250Excess Letdown IsolationSolenoid ValveInstrument Air BlackoutDe-energized183 1VI-TK-0010 A AUX 750 Intact Intact TBD TED TBD TBD TBD184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD185 1VI-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED TBD TBD TBD TBDPage number refers to IPEEE scanned document page.** HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the componentwas screened out from further evaluation.Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:Screened per IPEE -Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.Screened per EPRI NP-6041 -Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nornor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.Interaction -Block Wall -Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meetsthe RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.Anchorage -Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.Functional -Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.* Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.Page 41 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Appendix BMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsPage 42 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown SEWS Screening Notes HCLPFo* Key Failure Mode-Walk-By SWYSreigNtsHPF eyFiueMd01 2FW-VA-0032B Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 828 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESuction Isolation JJ/612 2FW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 824 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESuction Isolation J.1/613 2FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc PumpSuction Isolation4 2ND-VA-O056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs5 2ND-VA-O061 NO Relief -Hotlegs6 2ND-VA-0064 ND Relief -'B' Coldlegs7 2NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg8 2NI-VA-0151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg9 2NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units land 211 2NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return ContAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUX750733716733716750733716733Rm 828JJ/6iHH/60FF/6oJJ/61GG/60Rm 830GG/60Rm 788HH/60Rm 601AA/63Rm 602AEE/60Open/ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenClosedWalk-ByWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalk-ByWalk-Byp 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,AppendixC Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776p 785 Included in IPEEE, p 785>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per IPEEEScreened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,12 2NC-VA-272AC Isolation Valve RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screens>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-413 2NC-VA273AC Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Isolation Valve RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screen outRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-4NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer CavitySolenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 y Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE14 2NC-VA-0303A A1052 358 NRrGM Screne pe PAtER5 2NI-VA-o430A 2NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply 762 2A CA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEE, p 785 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEfrom 2A CIA (MDV) 45' 51RReference 10, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Structural16 2FW-TX-OO01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461). >RLGM Screened per IPEEE17 2NI-VA-0054A 2A CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE43' 46R18 Pipe Chaseis 2NI-VA-OO6SB 2B CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE138' 47R18 21-V-007A 2 CI Blok Vlve(MDV RX 733 Pipe Chase19 2NI-VA-O76A 2C2CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE221"47R20 2NI-VA-0088B 2D CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE317" 49RNew equipment -updated IPEtE SEWS evaluation.21 2EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/61 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE"Reference 10, Appendix B1, pg. R1-10"Reference 22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/61 Standby Functional Walkdown enc Bounded by evaluation of 2EHM-TB-158. >GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C Buddb vlaino EMT-59 RG cendprER P642EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters Reference 10, Not in experience database. Tested to SQURTS23 thru TB71 (Odd RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown eRLGM Undeterminednumbers only) (35 Igniters per Train) Appendix C TRS.23 a 2EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C Table 2-4Page 43 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsRev. 0EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdow S or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRi NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 FunctionalAppendixC Table 2-424 2EHM-TB-1549 LocaI Terminal Box AUX 750 CC/61 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRi NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-425 Deleted26 2CA-HX-OO03 TDCAP Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE27 2CA-PU-0003 TDCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEDriven Pump)Rsie-of-the-box with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an27 a 2SA-TR-O003 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By fE t SEWS w>RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWSRsle-of-the-hoo with 2CA-PU-053, which has an27 b 2SA-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By R wiW h >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWSRule-of-the-box wish 2CA-PU-0003, which has an27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By FE t SEWS ' w>RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWSRule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an27 d 2SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIPEEE SEWS28 2CA-PN-AFTp TDCAP Control Panel AUX 716 AA/61 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE29 2SA-VA-O048ABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/59 Idle Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(AOV) (OH3)inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,29 a 2SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve 767 FF/59 Energized De-energized Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(DH3) AppendixC Table 2-429 b 2SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve 767Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-641-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041(DH3) Appendix C Table 2-4Rm 60130 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAP Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 60 Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEFF/6931 Deleted32 Deleted33 Deleted34 2V1-VA-003ý 2A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction -Block WallInlet Relief (115 psig) FF/59 Appendix C Table 2-435 2VI-VA-0034 2B Vl Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 FF/R8 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction -Block WallInlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-436 2VI-VA-011Z 2A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6B41Relief (115 psig) FF/S9 Appendix C Table 2-437 2VI-VA-013 2A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) FF/59 AppendixC Table 2-438 2VI-VA-015 2B VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-439 2VI-VA-015 2B Vi Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-440 2VI-VA-2009 2SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 70/67 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EFRI P-6041(120 psig) (DH4) Appendix C Table 2-4Page 44 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Waikdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By41 2VI-VA-2019 2SM-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,42 2VI-VA-2019 790 DD/69 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604142 2VI-VA-2029 2SM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLOM Screened per EFRI NP-6041(120 psig) (0143) Appendix C Table 2-42SM-5AB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 70/59 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041(120 psig) (DH3) Appendix C Table 2-444TCA Flow Control to 2A S and AUX 716 Open Open/Throttled Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls BB/62 Closed44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGIM Screened per IPEEE44 b 2CA-SS-640 Selector Switch AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/6244 c 2CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Rm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/6244 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Rm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/62Reference 10, LM ScendprERN-6444 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix CReference 10,vLM ScendprERNF6444 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C45 2CA-VA-0052AB TDCA Flow Control to 2B SC and AUX 716 Em 601 Open Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls BB/61 Closed45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/6145c 2CA-MT-520 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/6145 d 2CA-VP-Em20 Valve Po~itioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE813/61Reference 10,vLC ScendprERN-6145 e 2CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendco C >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604145f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix CTDCA Flow Control to 2C SC andRr 0OpnT oted46 2CA-VA-0048AB AUX 716 Em 601 Open Openflhrottled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in FPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls CC/60 Closed46 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEECC/6046c 2CA-MT-0480 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEECC/6O46 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Poxitioner AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEECC/60Reference 10,>LM ScendprERN-6146 e 2CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appence 1 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix CReference 10,vLM ScendprPRN-6146f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendix C >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604147 2CA-VA-0036AB TDCA Flow Control to 2D SG and AUX 716 Rm 601 Open Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls BB/63 ClosedPage 45 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID BDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Walk-By47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE47 b 2CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Sm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/63Sm 60147 c 2CA-MT-0360 Mistc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/63Sm 60147 d 2CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 BB/60 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEEBB/6347e 2CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C48 -CV-001niB 2A SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse tog FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 2642B SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 29449 2SV-C'V-OOS3AR 0 F6 lsdWl-y p24>LMSree e PEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH4) Closed2C SG Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF159 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 29450 25V-CV-0007ABC 80nF5 lsd akB 9 RLGM Screened per IFEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed512D Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF/59 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed52 2EPL-PN-EVDA Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 RLGM Screened per IPEEEPanel52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEPanelSm 707 -Refeence50, edunantrompnentlistng, eferkoWlESE53 OEPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C/ Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Redundant component listing, refer to U- Block WallCC/54 Appendix C item 95354 OEPL-BC-EVCS VitSl Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 FunctionalConnection Box ECBS BB/S4 Appendix C Table 2-455 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 716 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEB1/652ETP-CA-001058 Pzr PORV Relay/Indication AUX 767 HH/58 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE(2ATC 10)Main Control Board Cabinet for59 2EOA-PN-MC5 Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEETemperature Indication60 2OA-F-MC7 Main Control Board Cabinet with H260 2EOA-PN-MC7 Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIgniter Control Switch61 2EOA-PN-MCSO Main Control Board Cabinet for CA / AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 RLGM Screened per IPEEENC SystemsMain Control Board Cabinet for NI62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIndicationMain Control Board Cabinet for SM63 2EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIndication)Page 46 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-CWalk-By C o bICCM a 2EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEICCM Remote DisplayICCM b 2EIA-CA-9211 Train A Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev, 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4ICCM c 2EIA-CA-9221 Train B Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041behind 2MC2 AppendixC Table 2-4Role-of-the-box with 2MCI, which has an RPEEE RG cendprPtICCM d 2EIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By E>RLGM Screened per IPEEESEWSRule-of-the-boo with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEE LM SrendprPtICCM e 2EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By SEWS >RLGM Screened per IPEEEReference SO, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.9FntoaICCM f 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown 0.29 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-4ICCM 2EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/SB Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-464 21PE-CA-9010 SSPS.Cabinet'A (CABlock.Valves AUX 767 Control Rn 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE65666768697071727373 a747575 a767721PE-CA-90202EQB-PN-DGLSA2EPG-PN-EKVA2EPG-BI-EVIA2CF-LT-60002CF-LT-55402CF-LT-55702CF-LT-60302$M-PT-S0802rA-PN-AFPA25M-PT-51102SM-PT-51402CA-PN-AFPB2SM-PT-51702NC-RD-5850Closure Permissive)SSPS Cabinet 'B' (CLA Block ValvesClosure Permissive)Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters)120VAC Inst and ControlPanelboardVital InverterSteam Generator NR LevelIndication Loop 1Steam Generator NR LevelIndication Loop 2Steam Generator NR LevelIndication Loop 3Steam Generator NR LevelIndication Loop 4Steam Generator #1 Wide RangePressure Indication Loop2A CA Pump Control PanelSteam Generator #2 Wide RangePressure Indication LoopSteam Generator #3 Wide RangePressure Indication Loop2B CA Pump Control PanelSteam Generator #4 Wide RangePressure Indication LoopSteam Generator #1 NC WR T-HotIndication LoopAUXAUXAUXAUXRXRXRXRXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXRX767750733No739742740744750716733733716750740CC/58Control RmCC/58Rm 805BB/61Rm 701DD/54Rm 701CC/S5Accum 2A R36' 46RAccum 2B F1459 99RAccum 2C F2159 56RAccum 2D R326' 57RRm 804DD/67Rm 601BB/61Rm 713DD/59Rm 713DD/59Rm 601CC/62Rm 804DD/6724' 30R925 StandbyStandbyNominal 120 VACOutputNominal 120 VACOutputRm Indication1w Indicationm IndicationFm IndicationIndicationStandbyIndicationIndicationStandIndicationIndicationFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalFunctionalIndicationIndicationIndicationIndicationIndicationFunctionalIndicationIndicationFunctionalIndicationIndicationWalk-ByWalkdownWalk-ByWalk-ByWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalkdownWalk-ByWalkdownWalkdownWalk-ByWalkdownWalkdownp 1Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4p 203p 65Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4p 180Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4p 180Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4>RLGM0.29>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMoRLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per IPEEEFunctionalScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per IPEEEScreened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per IPEEEScreened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-604177 a e" or ..n caon AUX 767 BB/63 Standby Functional WalkdownIno EDB #) System (RVLIS) Cabinet0.37 Functional79 2 Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot 65 740 164' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-479 2NC-D5900 Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-Hot RX 740 203' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per FF91 NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4Page 47 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsESEL ID808182838485EQUIPMENTEDB DescriptionSteam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot2NC-RD-5920Indication LoopContainment WR Pressure2NS-PT-5070 Indication LoopNC WR Pressurizer Pressure2 NC-PT-5 120Indication LoopProcess Control Cabinet 12EIA-CA-9010 (7300 cabinet)2A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil2F0-TK-0056Storage Tank2B Diesel Generator Fuel Oil2FD-TS-00S7Storage TankBldgRXAUXAUXAUXYardYardEL740750733767<760<760Location3086 30RDD/60Rm 713DD/67Control Rm 925AA/54N/AN/AOPERATING STATENormal State Desired State Waldown SEWS* Screening NotesWalk-ByIndication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Indication Indication Walk-By p 16Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556HCLPF**>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMKey Failure Mode-f*Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per EPRI NP-6041Screened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEE600 VAC Essential for IH2 SkimmerRm 805 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,86 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Fan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 89/66 Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Scree out >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-60412VXIA (04A) Appendix C Table 2-4600 VAC Essential for H2 SkimmerRm 716 Reference 10 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6141-SL, Rev. 1,87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 2B Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 BB/65 Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence S Scree out >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-60412VX2 (0C) B/65Appendix C Table 2-42VX2B (01C)600 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 06D Rm 80588 2EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE& 051) BA5/5989 2EPE-MX-EMXD 600 VAC Essential for VE/VX (06E & AUX 733 Rm 716 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE6051) BB/60H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10,90 2VX-VA-OOO1A RX 826 264" 451 Closed Open WaAkdown C 0.60 FunctionalIsolation Valve Appendin C91 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2A RX 816 272* 38R Off On Waikdown Reference 10, 0.39 AnchorageAppendix CH2 Skimmer Fan 28 Suction Reference 10,92 2VX-VA-0002B RX 827 283° 46R Closed Open Walkdown 0.41 FunctionalIsolation Valve Appendix C93 2VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2B RX 816 268° 38R Off On Walkdown Reference 10, 0.39 AnchorageAppendix C2VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 775 27 606 Closed Open Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2VX-AH-0001, which has an vRLGM Screened per PEE(2RAF-D-2) Damper IPEEE SEWS95969798991001011021031042VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 2A2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A2VE-XF-000S Annulus Ventilation Fan 2B2KC-PU-0001 Al Closed Cooling Water SystemPumpA2 Closed Cooling Water System2KCC-PU -0002Pump2KC-TK-O009 Component Cooling Water SystemSurge Tank2KC-VA-OOSOA KC Auxiliary Bldg Supply Non-Essential Isolation2KC-VA-0230A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-Essential Isolation-KC Auxiliary Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation2KC-VA-0003A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-Essential IsolationRXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUX270° 50RJJ/59JJ/60GG/SSFF/55JJ/57LL/59LLIS8GG/56GG/56Off OnOff OnOff OnOn OnOn OnIntact/In-Service Intact/In-ServiceOpen/Closed ClosedOpen/Closed ClosedOpen/Closed ClosedOpen/Closed ClosedWalk-By p434Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4Walk-By p 255Walk-By p 255Walk-By p 528Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783Walk-By p 308>RLGM0.350.35>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per PEEEAnchorageAnchorageScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEPage 48 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdows or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode"*Walk-By105 2KC-HX-O005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JJ/57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walkdown Reference 10, HCIPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per PEEEHX Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates106 2NC-VA-0032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE110" 32R107 2NC-VA-00368 NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE105° 32R108 2NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 794 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE109" 34R109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE109" 34R110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE109' 34R111 2ND-PU-O001 Train A ND Pump AUX 695 Rm 506 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEGG/59112 2ND-PU-0002 Train B ND Pump AUX 695 Sm 507 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEFF/58Sm 785113 2ND-HX-0003 Train A ND HX AUX 733 Intact Intact Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Screened per IPEEELL/60114 2ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX115 2ND-HX-O0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX116 2ND-VA-OOO2AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation117 2ND-VA-0OOiB RHR Pump Hotleg Suction IsolationTrain A RHR Isolation to the118 2NI-VA-0173A ColdlegsTrain B RHR Isolation to the119 2NI-VA-0178B Coldlegs120 2NI-VA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs121 2NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs122 2NI-VA-0150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs123 2NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs124 2NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs125 2NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump126 2NI-PU-0010 Train B NI Pump127 2NS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B Ns Pump129 2NS-HX-0003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger130 2NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat ExchangerAUXAUXRXRXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUX733Rm 786LL/60Rm 506GG/59184* 481184' 27RGG/60Rm 788HH/60Rm 646JJ/60Rm 646GG/60Rm 646GG/60Rm 830HH/60Rm 788JJ/61Rm 635HH/58Rm 633GG/59Rm 505GG/57Rm 504GG/57Rm 786LL/60Rm 786LL/60IntactIntactClosedClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedOffOffOffOffIntactIntactIntactIntactOpenOpenOpenOpenOpenOpen/ClosedOpenOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedIntactIntactIntactIntactIntactIntactWalk-By p 458 >RLGMWalk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2ND-PU-0001, which has an >61GMrPEEE SEWSWalk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGMWalk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGMWalk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p 734 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p734 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGMWalk-By p 245 >RLGMWalk-By p 245 >RLGMWalk-By p 277 >RLGMWalk-By p 277 >RLGMWalk-By p 451 >RLGMWalk-By p 451 >RLGMScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEPage 49 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENTESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL131 2SM-VA-0007AB TrainAMSIV Outer Doghouse 792(DH4)132 2SM-VA-0OOSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792(DH3)133 2SM-VA-0003ABC TrainCMSIV Inner Doghouse 792(DH3)134 2SM-VA-0001AB Train D MSIV Outer Doghouse 792(DH4)135 2SV-VA-0020 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788Valve (DH4)136 2SV-VA-0021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788Valve (DH4)137 2SV-VA-0022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788Valve (DH4)138 2SV-VA-0023 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788Valve (OH4)139 2SV-VA-0024 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788Valve (DH4)140 2SV-VA-0014 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (0H3)141 2SV-VA-0015 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)142 2SV-VA-0016 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)143 2SV-VA-0017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)144 2SV-VA-0018 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghouse 788Valve )DH3)145 2SV-VA-0008 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)146 2SV-VA-0009 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)147 2SV-VA-0010 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)148 2SV-VA-0011 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)149 2SV-VA-0012 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788Valve (DH3)DD/S9DD/6ODD/67EE/68EE/68EE/68EE/68EE/658EE/58EE/58EE/58EE/58EE/S8EE/60EE/60EE/60EE/60EE/60Open/ClosedOpen/ClosedOpen/ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedOPERATING STATELocation Normal State Desired State or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-naWalk-ByDD/69 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEClosed Walk-By p 300Closed Walk-By p 300Closed Walk-By p 300Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297Closed Walk-By p 297>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGMScreened per PEEEScreened per PEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per PEEEScreened periPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perIPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEScreened perlPEEEPage 50 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By150 2SV-VA-0002 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEValve (DH4)151 25V-VA-0003 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEValve (DH4)152 2SV-VA-004 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/BB Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEValve (DH4)153 2SV-VA-005 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEValve (DH4)154 2SV-VA-0006 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEValve (DH4)Rule-of-the-boo with 2RN-PU-OO03, which has an155 2RN-HX-0005 2A RN Pump Motor Cooler AUX 716 FF/56 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IPEEE with 24w h >RLGM Screened per IPEEERN Pump Discharge Cross TrainPEER SEWS (p 249)oLM ScendprPEis6 2RN-VA-0040A RN Pump Discharge Crss Train AUX 716 GG/56 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEESupply Isolation MOV157 2RN-VA-0086A KC HI Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 HH/56 Throttled Open Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIsolationKC HX Cooling Water Outlet158 2RN-VA-0089A Isolin AUX 750 HH/58 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIsolation159 2RN-VA-C112A Al KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEWater Outlet Isolation160 2RN-VA-0117A A2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in lPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per PEEEWater Outlet Isolation161 2RN-VA-0070A EDG KD HX Supply MOV Isolation AUX 736 Rm 714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in lPEEE, p786 >RLGM Screened per PEEEDD/68Rm 714162 2RN-VA-O073A EDOKD HIXOutlet MOV Isolation AUX 738 ,1= Open Closed Walk-Sy p756 Included in lPEER, p 78e >RLGM Screened perlPEER163 2RN-VA-0134A Train A NS HX Supply Isolation MOV164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing Oil Cooler166 2RN-HX-0021 Train A NV Pump Gearbox OilCooler167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU168 2VA-AH-0028 Train A ND Pump AHU169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler171 2RN-VA-0279B Unit 2 Aux Bldg Ventilation ReturnIsolation172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC X-Over Isol173 ORN-VA-0149A 1A/2A RN Essential Return Headerto SNSWPAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXAUXuu/68Rm 785MM/elRm 634HH/57Rm 634HH/57Rm 634HH/57Rm 505GG/57Rm 506GG/58Rm 635HH/SSRm 635HH/59Rm 830HH/60Rm 602FF/53FF/59ClosedStandby/In-ServiceStandby/In-ServiceStandby/In-ServiceStandbyStandbyStandbyStandbyClosedOpenClosedClosed Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGMIntact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-O015, which has an >RLGMIPEEE SEWS (p 252)Intact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-0015, which has anIPEEE SEWS (p 252)Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-OO15, which has anintact Walk-By p 252 PERSW p5)>RLGMIPEEE SEWS (p 252)Intact Walkdown Reference 10, Same make/model as ESEL 168 >RLGMAppendix CIntact Walk-By p 413 >RLGMIntact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box with 2NI-PU-OO09, which has an >RLGMIPEEE SEWS (p 245)Intact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box with 2NI-PU-O009, which has an >RLGMIPEEE SEWS (p 245)Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGMClosed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMOpen Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGMScreened per IPEERScreened per PEERScreened per PEERScreened per IPEEEScreened per PEtEScreened perIPEERScreened perIPEREScreened periPEtEScreened per PEtEScreened perIPEERScreened per PEtEPage 51 ofGO0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENTESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Nor2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Rm 647274 2RN-VA-0295A AUl Fr/tIsolation FF/6O175 1RN-VA-0296A 1A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP ReturnIsolation176 1RN-VA-0064A Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to AUX Rm 602ESNSWP FF/55Rmn 724177 2EPE-MX-EMXB 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 FuGG/56178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aux 716Isolation from circulating water179 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve Aux 716 En179 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aux 733 C179 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 733179 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 733179 e 2CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Fu179 f 2CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 FuJunction Boo houses Relays 'AA' and179 g 2CA-TB-1901 Aux 733 Electr Pen Room Fu'BB'10 2NV-VA-003A Letdown Inboard Containment160 2N-AO3ARX 752Isolation180 a 2NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RX 752 EnRev. 0OPERATING STATEmal State Desired StateOpen OpenOpen ClosedOpen Closednctional Functional:losed Openergized De-energized:losed Closedntact Intactntact Intactnctional Functionalnctional Functionalnctional FunctionalOpen Closedergized De-energizedWalkdown orWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-ByWalk-BySEWS' Screening Notesp 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776p 32HCLPF**>RLGM>RLGIM>RLGM>RLGMTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDKey Failure Mode-Screened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEEScreened per IPEEETBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBoTBDRev. OPage 52 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT OPERATING STATEWalkdown cESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-ByWalk-By180 b 2NV-SV-03S1 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized TBD181 2NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHR HtX Room Closed Closed TBD181 a 2NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional TEDLetdown Inboard Containment182 2NV-VA-0457A Lation EnRX 752 Closed Closed TBDIsolation182 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TBD182 b 2NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TEDLetdown Inboard Containment183 2NV-VA-04S8A RX 752 Closed Closed TEDIsolation183 a 2NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED183 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED184 2NV-VA-OO2SB Excess Letdown Isolation RX 725 Closed Closed TED184 a 2NV-SV-0250 Solenoid Valve RX 725 De-energized De-energized TBDInstrument Air Blackout185 2VI-TK-0010 AUX 750 Intact Intact TEDAccumulator186 2V1-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED187 2V1-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBDPage number refers to IPEEE scanned document page.HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the componentwas screened out from further evaluation.Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:Screened per IPEEE -Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.Screened per EPRI NP-6041 -Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nornor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.Interaction -Block Wall -Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meetsthe RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.Anchorage -Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.Functional -Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.-*

• Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-2.However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.Rev. 0SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***TBD TBD TED TBDTED TED TBD TBDTBD TBD TBD TBDTBDTBDTBDTEDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTEDTEDTBDTBDTEDTEDTBDTBDTBDTEDTEDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTEDTEDTEDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDTBDPage 53 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Appendix CMNS FLEX Flow PathsList of FiguresFigure C-1. Auxiliary Feedw ater System ................................................................................... 55Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System ................................................... 56Figure C-3. M ain Steam Header ............................................................................................... 57Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System .............................................. 58Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System ...... 59Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater SystemTe m pering H ead er ............................................................................................................ 60Page 54 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMNON-SAFETY AUXILIARY FEEOWATERSTORAGE TANK (CAST ICA-G4ABCA-52A-9BURIED CONTEVSERCI.RCULATING,AEPIRSTEAM GENERATOR221TU.BINEJ.RIVENPumpCA-49ABSTEAM GENERATORCA-3GA9STEAM GENERATORFigure C-1. Auxiliary Feedwater SystemPage 55 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. 0SORATEDWATER SUPPLYREFUELING W~AER SYSTEMTO RX O*LNFigure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water SystemPage 56 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0MAIN STEAM HEADERCSAE'SSTEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9:RE-HEATERS(2ND STAGE)FDWPTFigure C-3. Main Steam HeaderPage 57 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear StationRev. 0REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UPSAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMRefitPCs B&C HOT LE CSPCs MV~ LMSsRCS mO I437 LECSFigure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection SystemPage 58 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. 0REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP(LOW PRESSURE)RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMFigure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal SystemPage 59 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. 0S/0 SFECNDARY FLE MAKE-UP PUMP C FNNECTIONSILDWATERY ES 'TEM TEMPER £NC H ADCOIN A IENTFigure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.Page 60 of 60