IR 05000313/1996026

Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-313/96-26 & 50-368/96-26 on 961028-1101 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Implementation of Land Vehicle Control Measures Implemented IAW 10CFR73

ML20134N271
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/19/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134N235	List: IR 05000313/1996026 ML20134N232
References
50-313-96-26, 50-368-96-26, NUDOCS 9611260243
Download: ML20134N271 (2)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-313 50-368 License Nos.: DPR-511 NPF-6 Report No.: 50-313/96-26 50-368/96-26 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In l Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One i

Location: 1448 S. R. 333  :

Russellville, Arkansas  !

Dates: October 28 through November 1,1996 Inspector: D. W. Schaefer, Physical Security Specialist Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch j Division of Reactor Safety '

Attachment: Supplemental Information l

DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE CONTAINS UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED 9611260243 961119 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G PDR &

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l-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Inspection Report 50-313/96-26; 50-368/96 26 This was a special, announced, inspection of the licensee's implementation of the land vehicle control measures implemented in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73,

" Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," utilizing Temporary instruction 2515/132, " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," dated January 18,1996.

l Plant Support l

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• The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report wording was consistent with the observed plant vehicle barrier system (Section E2).

• The installed vehicle barrier system (VBS) was consistent with the summary description previously submitted to the NRC, encompassed all vital areas essential for the safe shutdown of the plants, and was accurately described in the security plan and the as-built VBS documents maintained on site. An administrative change is needed to a VBS drawing (Section S1.1).

l * The installed VBS was capable of protecting required plant vital equipment l from a vehicle bomb blast. The bomb blast analysis was consistent with the summary description previously submitted to the NRC. Distances between

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the VBS and vital equipment equalled or exceeded the minimum standoff distance. An administrative change is needed to a VBS drawing (Section St.2).

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• The licensee's procedures adequately addressed security surveillance, l maintenance, and implementation of compensatory security measures.

l Additionally, proper procedures had been implemented for access control measures for vehicles. Plant operation procedures addressed the safe j

shutdown of the plant (Section S1.3).

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UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED