ML062360287
ML062360287 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Cooper ![]() |
Issue date: | 08/25/2004 |
From: | Gramm R NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4 |
To: | Bergman T NRC/EDO |
References | |
FOIA/PA-2006-0007, TAC MC3829 | |
Download: ML062360287 (16) | |
Text
1 ICýIAL NL August 25, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas A. Bergman, Chief Regional Operations and Program Management Staff Office of the Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert A. Gramm,- Chief, Section 1/RAN Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
G20040484, RE-ISSUED BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR DROP-IN VISIT ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2004, BY NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (NPPD) OFFICIALS WITH CHAIRMAN DIAZ, COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN, COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD, AND THE EDO -
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION (TAC NO. MC3829)
Attached are nine briefing packages in support of the September 2, 2004, drop-in visit by Mr. Bill Fehrman, President and CEO, NPPD, Mr. Randall Edington, Vice President and CNO, NPPD, Mr. Jerry Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety and Assurance, NPPD, and Mr. Paul Fleming, Licensing Manager, NPPD. Region IVinput has been included in the briefing package. The last drop-in visit by the licensee's corporate officials occurred during May 2001.
Ifyou require any additional information or clarification, please contact me at 415-1302 or Michelle C. Honcharik at 415-1774.
Docket No. 50-298 Attachments: As stated ccw/atts: J. Dyer B. Sheron FFICIA USEONLY" May be e mpt from p bli] release under the W. Borchardt Freed 7 of Informatio Act (5 U.SC.2 L. Marsh Exe ,lon. u mber A . H ow ell, RA.
eg HII io n Region IV EN ea~r ruired Regulato.ry releaise before pub omelonRv M. Mitchell, EDO Herbert Serkow. PD NRC4NRRJDLPM/P[ V Date of Determlnati n 8/18 004 ICI USE ONL
LFFICIALýUSE August 25, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas A. Bergman, Chief Regional Operations and Program Management Staff Office of the Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1/RA1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
G20040484, RE-ISSUED BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR DROP-IN VISIT ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2004, BY NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (NPPD) OFFICIALS WITH CHAIRMAN DIAZ, COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN, COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD, AND THE EDO -
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION (TAC NO. MC3829)
Attached are nine briefing packages in support of the September 2, 2004, drop-in visitby Mr. Bill Fehrman, President and CEO, NPPD, Mr. Randall Edington, Vice President and CNO, NPPD, Mr. Jerry Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety and Assurance, NPPD, and Mr. Paul Fleming, Licensing Manager, NPPD. Region IVinput has been included in the briefing package. The last drop-in visit by the licensee's corporate officials occurred during May 2001.
If you require any additional information or clarification, please contact me at 415-1302 or Michelle C. Honcharik at 415-1774.
Docket No. 50-298 OFFICIAL USE ONL' May be exempt from public releasee under the
.C. 552)
Attachments: As stated Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S Exemption number 5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review cc w/atts: J. Dyer required before public release B. Sheron Herbert Berkow, PD NRCINRRIDLPI/PDIV W. Borchardt Date of DeterminetUon 08/18/2004 L. Marsh A. Howell, Region IV M. Mitchell, EDO DISTRIBUTION:
- NON-PUBLIC/SENSITIVE PDIV-1 Reading LCox (hardcopy)
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RidsNrrPMMHoncharik RidsNrrLADBaxley RidsEdoMailCenter (LReyes, EMerschoff, PNorry, MVirgilio, WKane, WDean)
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Package Accession No.ML042330347 ADAMS Accession No.: ML042330327 Incoming ML042050270 NR*C-001 OFFICE PDIV-1/PM PD1V-1/LA. PDIV-1/SC NAME MHoncharik DBaxley RGramm DATE 8/25/04 8/25/04 8/25/04 OFFICIAL REE D COPY C:\MYFILES\Copies\MC3829 briefing package.w OF IAL USE LY
Drop-in by Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station CONTENTS TAB AGENDA Drop-In Visit Agenda .1A FACILITY DATA Facility Data . .3 FACILITY PERFORMANCE Reactor Oversight Process information. .5 Current Issues . . . .6 FACILITY MANAGEMENT DATA Facility Organization . . . * . S 7 Biographical Data of Principal Managers S . 8 OFFI ýAL UýSE 0
lClA USE ONLY TAB 1A DroD-In Visit Aaenda SEPTEMBER 2, 2004 ITINERARY TIME PERSON VISITED CONTACT PERSON EXTENSION 10:00-11:00 EDO L. Reyes Victoria Ibarra 301-415-1700 11:00-11:30 Commissioner E. McGaffigan Antoinette Waller 301-415-1810 1:00-1:30 Chairman N. Diaz Vicki Boiling 301-415-1759 2:00-2:30 Commissioner J. Merrifield Lorna Pini-Kipfer 301-415-1855 VISITORS REPRESENTING COOPER NUCLEAR STATION Bill Fehrman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD).
- Randy Edington, Vice President Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer, NPPD
- Jerry Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety and Assurance, NPPD
- Paul Fleming, Licensing Manager, NPPD TOPICS OF DISCUSSION The licensee indicated the main topics for discussion will be site performance improvements, confirmatory action letter, and the relationship between NPPD and Entergy Nuclear Nebraska, and security.
0FFICIAL E
0 CIAL SE ONLY TAB 3 Facility Data Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Location: Brownville, NE (23 miles south of Nebraska City, NE)
County: Nemaha County Docket No. 50-298 License No. DPR-46 Full Power License 01/18/74 Commercial Operation. 07/01/74 OL Expiration Date 01/18/14 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type. BWR-4 Containment Type Mark I Power Level 2381 MWt (764 MWe)
NSSS Vendor General Electric.
OFFICW SE ONLY
oCl L USE ONLY TAB 5 Reactor Oversight Process Info The plant is currently in the Regulatory Response Column of the Action Matrix. The Mid-cycle Review and Inspection Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) dated August 5, 2004, states the following.
[CNS] began the assessment period in'the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column- of the Action Matrix. The three White findings in the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone were closed in the second Quarter of 2004. On May 3, 2004, the Executive Director for Operations approved a deviation from the Action Matrix to maintain a level of regulatory oversight at CNS consistent with the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column. This will provide the appropriate level of oversight while the licensee completes the actions listed in the Action Matrix that were implemented as a result of CNS entering the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone column.
On January 30, 2003, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to NPPD.
The purpose of the CAL was to confirm the commitments made by NPPD regarding completion of those actions in their improvement plan developed to address regulatory performance issues. Actions included in the CAL addressed long-standing performance issues in the areas of emergency preparedness, human performance, material condition and equipment reliability, plant modification and configulation control, the corrective action program and engineering programs. All CAL items were scheduled to be completed by March 31, 2004. The NRC conducted quarterly inspections to verify completion of these actions and the effectiveness of these actions .in addressing specific performance issues.
Regarding the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, by letter dated July 2, 2004, the NRC closed the three White emergency preparedness findings that on April 1, 2002, resulted in the CNS entering the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone column of the Action Matrix. On the basis of the results of the quarterly inspections of the improvement plan actions addressed in the CAL, baseline inspections, and performance indicator results, NRC concluded that CNS has corrected the specific deficiencies directly related to the emergency preparedness performance deficiencies. Accordingly, NRC concluded that there is a sufficient basis for closing the White inspection findings identified at CNS in the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone.
Based on the guidance in IMC 0305, the closure of these White findings would normally result in a level of regulatory oversight at CNS described in the Action Matrix for a plant in the Regulatory Response column of the Action Matrix. However, the NRC concluded that additional NRC oversight is warranted while CNS completes the actions listed in the Action Matrix that were implemented as a result of CNS entering the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded column of the Action Matrix. This increased oversight will continue until the CNS has demonstrated and the NRC has verified that the improvement plaI actions addressed by the FIC USE ON
lIlA USE ONLY CAL have resulted in sustained improvement in plant performance, absent the identification of additional significant performance issues. During May 2004, the licensee conducted a self-assessment of the Strategic Improvement Plan actions with specific focus on assessing whether actions required by the CAL were complete and effective. The NRC staff performed an independent assessment of the licensee's self assessment activities and a public meeting was held on August 18, 2004, to discuss the results of the licensee's self-assessment. Depending on the results of this meeting, a CAL closeout inspection may be scheduled for fall 2004.
During March 2004, a White finding in the Mitigating System Cornerstone was issued for a high failure rate on the licensed operator biennial requalification written examinations. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure to adequately implement the systems approach to training process required by 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification." Failure to adequately implement the systems approach to training is notable because training and testing deficiencies resulted in a decline in licensed operator knowledge over time. The NRC found that this decline in operator knowledge was evident in both plant operating experience and biennial requalification examination performance. Immediate corrective actions implemented by the licensee included remedial training and retesting prior to returning operators to shift.
On May 7, 2004, a supplemental inspection (95001) was completed at the CNS, to assess the causes for and actions taken related to the performance indicator for unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours crossing the threshold from Green to White. This inspection was conducted to provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes of the events resulting in the White performance indicator were understood and that corrective actions were sufficient to address the root causes and contributing causes to prevent recurrence. Preliminary findings indicate that CNS performed thorough evaluations for each of the three scrams and performed a thorough and broad-based self-assessment to identify performance and process issues that should be addressed as a result of the performance indicator crossing the threshold from Green to White.
<_OFýFUCýIeN
OF 71USýEONLýYý Cooper 2Q/2004 Performance Summary Current Action HMatrix Column:
Inspection Regulatory Response rmance Findings nd0icators r-V Assessment Reports Radtation Safeguards Safy Occupational Public Ihsa Radiation Radiation Protection safee safety I(NOT PUUC)1 Performance Indicators 1ý1 M-1 EVIff-ji, I HOME I
a a
Last Modified., J01 28, 2004 Legend: led 1l--hite T=Thres]olds under developrent N=Not A~pplicable Y=Yellov GGreen I=Insufficient data to calculate PI Vllnique Design FFICIAL\SE ONLY'
Cooper 2Q/2004 Performance Summary Re*actor Radiation Safeguad safety Safety T T tejBaritegritycy Occupational pFubl i P Bsical iqtng Br Eer Radi'ati'on Radiation I Poection sers Integrity ier Prearadn S aeySft (NOT PUBLIC)
Most Significant Inspection Findings Additional Inspection & Assessment Information
" Assessment Reports/Inspection Plans: 4 List of Inspection Reports 2Q012004 + List of Assessment LettersInspection Plans 1Q/2004 4Q/2003 3Q02003
" Cross Reference Of Assessment Reports Last hociec. August 2,2004 "9IAL US
TAB 6 Current Issues A. EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS Site Performance Improvements A Strategic Improvement Plan (TIP) was developed by Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) to be a comprehensive improvement plan to address specific regulatory performance issues and to improve all aspects of station performance. Only those actions developed to address regulatory performance issues were considered for the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL).
Confirmatory Action Letter Details provided in Tab 5, "Reactor Oversight Process Info."
Relationship Between NPPD and Enterqy Nuclear Nebraska (ENN)
On September 12, 2003, the NPPD Board approved a 10-year contract hiring ENN, a subsidiary of Entergy Corporation, of Jackson, MS, to supply support services for the CNS.
The NPPD continues to hold the plant's operating license. The ENN personnel fill certain key management positions and provide daily oversight and direction for plant operations.
Plant Security Enhancements No information available.
B. OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Recent Performance Issues On February 14, 2004, the A reactor recirculating motor generator tripped due to low field voltage, causing reactor power to lower to 67 percent. Subsequent inspection found the several burned brushes and damage of the exciter slip ring. It was later determined that the licensee had not implemented vendor recommendations on the replacement of exciter brushes every six months. The failure occurred after a service time of 10 months.
On March 9, 2004, the control room received a primary containment isolation system partial group 2 and full group 6 containment isolations. This resulted in entering unplanned limiting
- conditions for operations (LCOs). Licensee's preliminary investigation has determined that the breaker for the isolations was incorrectly opened while attempting to open an adjacent breaker.
On March 23, 2004, the fuel oil strainer on the inlet float valve for Diesel Fuel Oil Tank 1 became clogged during the monthly surveillance test on Emergency Diesel Generator 1. This was the third occurrence of this condition and represented a second violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. In response, the licensee modified the fuel oil system to add larger, duplex strainers that can be shifted and cleaned online. In addition, they have committed to draining, cleaning, and lining both fuel oil storage tanks in the fall of 2004. A license amendment request in support of this effort is under review in NRR.
017 ICIAL LY
There have been two instances where supervisors have failed to implement the fitness for duty program by not requiring individuals to be for-cause tested. This issue will be addressed in the current integrated inspection report.
Labor/Management Issues None License Renewal Activities The licensee has not applied for license renewal.
Escalated Enforcement, Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Performance Indicators if Not Included in Section A Plant performance for the most recent quarter was within the Regulatory Response column of the Action Matrix based ona White finding issued in March 2004 for a high failure rate on the licensed operator biennial requalification written examinations.
On May 12, 2004, the NRC completed an inspection in response to the White finding for the high failure rate on the licensed operator biennial requalification written examinations. The corrective actions identified by the NPPD evaluations addressed the root and contributing causes, and should adequately address the program weaknesses if the corrective actions are consistently implemented. However, NPPD's extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations of the high failure rate were not completed at the time of the inspection. A follow up inspection will be conducted to verify adequacy of NPPD's corrective actions.
On February 8, 2004, control room operators received trouble alarms on the Division 1 and 2 service water (SW) gland water supplies. It was determined that the alarms were caused by low pressure on each of the systems. There are no operability limits associated with gland water pressure, only gland water flow, which was verified to be acceptable and the alarm cleared. On February 11, 2004, another trouble alarm was received on the Division 2 SW gland water supply. The gland water flow was found to be acceptable and the alarm cleared. The licensee performed the additional action of verifying the gland water valve lineup. It was discovered the Division 2 gland water supply valve was shut and the cross-connect valve was open. The licensee immediately declared SW, Division 2 inoperable as well as emergency diesel generator 2. The valve lineup was restored, and the affected equipment was declared operable.
Further investigation into this valve misalignment indicated that it existed for 21 days, since maintenance had been performed on the Division 2 SW discharge strainer on January 21, 2004. This finding does not present a current safety concern because the valve lineup was restored to the normal configuration and the affected equipment was returned to an operable condition. This finding is an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement action. The Regulatory Conference has been scheduled for September 27, 2004, in Region IV.
Open Investigations None
Open Allegations Three allegations are under review. Alleger terminated for raising safety concerns regarding hiring of a new training manager, contractor alleged harassment for raising safety concerns regarding adequacy of actions taken by the licensee to restore compliance with environmental qualification regulations, and willful violation of licensee operating procedures and inaccurate information to the NRC.
.Congressional Interest None Harassment and Intimidation Issues None 2.206 Petitions None Selected News Articles None Significant Reportable Events High Pressure Coolant Iniection (HPCI) Pump Inoperability Results in Loss of Safety Function On June 1, 2004, the control room received an alarm from the HPCI exhaust drain pot high-level sensor. The cause of the event was poor maintenance of the HPCI steam supply valve resulting in it leaking excessively, which caused frequent cycling of the HPCI exhaust line drain pot level switch which became misaligned and failed to operate. The HPCI steam supply valve will be refurbished during the next refueling. Preventive maintenance will be established to prevent excessive seat leakage in this valve.
Manual Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Vibration On May 26, 2003, there was-a step change in main turbine vibration indication. A manual reactor scram was initiated from 89% power. An engineering assessment has concluded that the most probable causal factor for blade failure is high cycle fatigue. CNS will perform further analyses to determine the root or most probable cause(s) for high cycle fatigue blade failures.
As an interim action, the inspection interval for the two rotors installed for the remainder of Fuel Cycle 22 is being reduced from four fuel cycles to one fuel cycle.
Inadequate Evaluation Leads to Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Operation On December 3, 2003, operators exited a LCO and entered Mode 2 for unit startup based on an inadequate engineering evaluation of the acceptability of the reactor coolant system for continued operations. This resulted in operations prohibited by TS. The root cause of the problem was individual human performance error. Immediate actions were to return the plant to hot shutdown and correct the engineering evaluation to support a reactor startup. Long term corrective actions include counseling of the individuals, revised processes to improve controls when exiting LCO's based on engineering evaluations, and improvements to the post-event review and startup approval process.
TAB 7A Facility Organization FINC USEO
SE ONLY Cooper Nuclear Station CHART. 18 Vice President - Nuclear & Sheet Ilof 27 Chief Nuclear Officer FRESOU H&E 713112004 W.J. Fehm-on 4
MIE PRESIDENWJOLAR
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TAB 8 Biociraphical Data of Principal Managers (as provided by licensee)
Bill Fehrmran President and CEO Nebraska Public Power District Bill Fehrman assumed the position of President and CEO of Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) on January 1,2003. Prior to being named to the post, he served as Vice President of Energy Supply. Bill joined NPPD in May of 1981. Mr. Fehrman has also held the positions of Mechanical Engineer-Nuclear, and Nuclear Projects Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS),
Technical Services Manager, Assistant Station Manager, Senior Manager Operations, Maintenance and Environmental at Gerald Gentleman Station and Vice President, Fossil Energy.
Mr. Fehrman graduated from the University of Nebraska in LincoIn in Jwith a bachelor's degree in Civil Engineering. In 1998, he earned a master's degree in-usiness Administration from Regis University, Denver, Colorado. Bill also holds Reactor Technology Certification from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has completed the INPO Senior Nuclear Plant Management Training Course.
Randall K. Edington Vice Presidentand CNO Nebraska Public Power District Randall K. Edington became chief nuclear officer and vice president, reporting to Nebraska Public Power District's CEO at the Cooper Nuclear Station In Nebraska, early September 2003, under Entergy Nuclear's management agreement with NPPD. Edington is responsible for managing Entergy's management services contract at the site.
Previously, Edington was vice president, operations support for Entergy Nuclear Northeast out of the White Plains nuclear headquarters, and for the two prior years, he was vice president of training for Entergy Nuclear Northeast. He also served as site vice president at Entergy's River Bend Nuclear Station in St. Francisville, LA.
Edington began his Entergy career at Arkansas Nuclear One in 1981, where he obtained a reactor operator license and a senior reactor operator license. He.was plant manager at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 for two years, plant manager for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 for two years, and then site general manager at Arkansas Nuclear One.
Before joining Entergy, Edington served in the U.S. Navy. Edington earned a Bachelor's degree in physical science from Arkansas Technical University and a Master's degree in operations management from the University of Arkansas.
Jerry Roberts Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance Nebraska Public Power District Jerry Roberts became the Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance (NSA) at CNS in January of 2004, under Entergy Nuclear's management agreement.
Roberts comes from the Entergy Nuclear Grand Gulf station, where he was the NSA director.
He also was the NSA director at Grand Gulf s parent corporation from 1993-1996.
He started his career in 1974 as an engineer at Hatch, soon after receiving his bachelor's degree in Nuclear Engineering from Mississippi State University. He subsequently was an engineer and auditor for the Ingalls Shipyard in Mississippi. He joined Grand Gulf in 1978, and spent much of his career there. He was on the start-up team as engineer, group leader, and start-up manager. The station went online in 1985. At Grand Gulf, he also was modifications and construction manager, performance and systems engineering manager, maintenance manager, training manager, and QA director. He received his Senior Reactor Operator license at Grand Gulf.
Paul Fleming Licensing Manager Nebraska Public Power District Paul Fleming joined Cooper Nuclear Station as Licensing Manager in October 2001. In November 2002, he was promoted to Risk &Regulatory Affairs manager. He assumed his current duties in April 2004.
Mr. Fleming began his nuclear career with the Navy in 1973. In 1979, he started his commercial nuclear experience at DC Cook, where he worked in the Operations department as a plant operator. Then in 1980 he joined Florida Power Corporation initially with the Operations group where he qualified through shift supervisor with a Senior Reactor Operator's license.
During his 20 years with Crystal River, he also worked in the Licensing group as a principal licensing engineer and in the Design Engineering group as a supervisor where he was promoted to Assistant Manager.
FICIAL USE NLY