ML061940438

CNS Notification 10132527

ML061940438
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	12/26/2001
From:	Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2006-0007, R4-5A15
Download: ML061940438 (102)

Text

rd - 2/26/2001 110:561

• Endd date time 01/02/2-002 09:10"56 "* ',-,/.-

S-2-DSW-PD ORIGINAL SOR"~'S -P-D Odier 16374 I NA E. Aqssembty MaimPlAwGroup CNS Planning Dept Tel.

Malf. Start Date Ma'. End date 51 Maif. Sian tine 00:_00:00 Malf. End lime 00:00:00 12/26/2001 11:20:00 David J. Bromen (DJBROME)

I) Description of Condition: Started D SWP, system pressure did not change and .steady state pump amps were 18. Expected response would be an increase in the system pressure with pump running amps at 35-40. Pump discharge pressure was. noted to be 1.5 psig prior to and after pump operation.

2) Requirement Not Met- SWP-D :did not develope discharge pressure when

-started.

3) Method of Discovery: Starting SWP.-D

4) Immediate Actions Taken: Notify CRS, secure. D SWP.

5) Recommendations: Investigate cause.

6) Location of Evidence: 'SWP-D 12/26/2001 11:38:25 Steven IP. Norris (SPNORRI)

1) Immediate Actions 'Taken: Secured SW pump D

2) Basis For Ops Review: Basis for review N/A for on-shift operations generated notifications.

3) Basis For Classification: RCR-apparent cause # III-C-I # cause unknown for SW pump D being air bound.

4) Basis For Disp. Department: System engineer responsible for evaluating eauipment performance

5) Apparent Cause: unknown

6) Clarification Comment: Determine cause of SW pump D being air bound and correct as necessary. Perform OD on remaining SW pumps. Modify.

Standing' order 2001-0011 as necessary.

-,- 3

. a .. "____________

P fcUoJSCMs C~y

-C -9Pe2 2527.

Task REVIEW OPRV INOPERABLE, NARRATIVE LOGS 12-26-01/932 Parner d:

System Status TSCO 12/26/2001 13:34:28 Andrew R. Ohrablo (AROHRAB)

OPERATIONS REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION Equipment Identification Section Affected Equipment/System: SW-P-D Equipment/System Classification '(check all that apply):

[X] TS

[ I TS SUPPORT

[X] SAFETY-RELATED

[lTRM ODAM

[ ] PASS

[X] MRRS

[ ] FHA/APP. R SBO

[ .RG 1.,97 CAT 1 or CAT 2

[]HELB

[]ATWS 1] FLDG

[ EMERGENCY FACILITY/EQUIPMENT Operations Review Screening Section Operations Review of Notification required if any question below is yes:

[X] YES; [ 3 NO Any classification above marked and not PLANNED WORK?

[X] YES; [ ] NO Condition may apply to similar equipment, including non-SSC (generic concern/common cause failure)? If YES, document in Comments :section below.

[XI YES; [ I NO Present OPERABILITY concern - includes conditions with an indirect impact on OPERABILITY? Past OPERABILITY concerns should be addressed under the REPORTABILITY question below.

[ ) YES; [X] NO POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE per 10CFR20, i0CFR26.73, 10CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, or.IOCFR73.71? Reportability concerns for past events should be identified below for Licensing review.

[ I YES; [X] NO Immediate personnel or equipment safety concern not yet adequately addressed. If YES, document in Comments section below.

( ] YES; [X] NO Plant operational concern, including Reactivity event?

[ ] YES; [X] NO Fitness for Duty issue?

I I1YES; [X] NO Site Security issue?

\* X] YES; [ ]NO Operations Review of Notification required?

• . ~ . , - .- .%

DISCUSSIONS WERE RHEI.M WITH MANAGMENT ON ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.

Comme ts:

PREVIOUS .OD WRITTEN ON SW-P-A, ALL 4 SERVICE WATER PUPMS HAVE A STANDING ORDER THAT THE PUMP IS TO "BE STARTED WHEN DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF THE SECURED PUMP REACHES 2 PSIG.

Operability Determination Screening Section An OD is required if any question below is YES, unless declared INOPERABLE:

[ ] YES; EX] NO Degraded condition of SSCs where functionality is called into question?

[ .JYES; [X] NO Nonconforming conditions affecting SSCs .where the qualification is Called into question?

[ ] YES; [X] NO Existing but previously unanalyzed condition affecting SSCs?

[ ] YES; [X] NO OD required? If NO, provide BASIS below.

Basis for No OD:

DECLARED INOPERABLE NO OD PER 0.5OPS 3.1.11.5b.

Operability/Reportability Review Section

[ I YES; EX] NO Risk assessment required? If YES, ensure assessment performed per Procedure 0.49, Schedule Risk Assessment. NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE IN PRESENT PLANT CONDITIONS.

[X] YES; f ] NO Previous OD/OE/BCO written for an identical concern? If YES, identify previous OD/OE: 10131419 FOR SW-P-A

[X] YES; [ ] .NO OPEN OD/OE File for aggregate effect?

[X] YES; [ I NO System, Structure, Or Component determined to be INOPERABLE?

t I YES; [X] NO Safety Function Determination required?

[ I YES; [X] NO LCO, TLCO, or ODAM Action Statement entered?

Date/Time Entered: 11-26-01/ 09:32 TS/TRM/ODAM LCO Action Statement (s):

LCO Work Order Number:NARRATIVE LOGS

[ ] YES; EX] NO Condition Immediately Reportable per Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC operations Center?

4I"eport,.Completed at Date/Time:

."ign..'ture

.e..ed

• ii SI.3i! NO SS signature required?

Ullikb i:otification "overview I JSCAMPB Copy 9 Page 4 Notificaticn: 10132527 Equipment/System Comments:

Safety Function Determination Comments:

Reportability Comments Task REVIEW CAP RCR-R/C I.B.1 PED Panner System Status TSCO 12/28/2001 09:45:37 Ronnie Deatz (RCDEATZ)

RCR-R/C I.B.1 PED Task REVIEW SCRN PRI 21 MODE R MWR M-SHOP, CM Partner

'System Status TSCO

'Task REVIEW LIC INDETERMINATE Panier System Status TSCO 12/27/2001 14.:46:21 Coy L. Blair (CLBLAIR) 12/27/01 BY CLBLAIR - REPORTABILITY FOR NOTIFICATION 10132527 IS INDETERMINATE. INFORMATION IN THE NOTIFICATION (AND OTHER REPORTS) RAISES A QUESTION ABOUTTHE PAST OPERABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER PUMPS, BECAUSE M THE COUPLING FAILURE MAY REPRESENT A ,SINGLE CAUSE THAT COULD HAVE . nf PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF TRAINS OR CHANNELS IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS";. PER PROCEDURE 0.5. CLSS, THE ACTION OWNER FOR THIS

NOTIFICATION, PED, SHALL PROVIDE THE LICENSING DEPARTMENT WITH INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE THEREPORTABILITY DETERMINATION WITHIN 14 DAYS OF DISCOVERY, 'I;E., BY 01/09/02.

Task REVIEW MRUL EXPORT Parner System Status TSCO TSSC Task REVIEW OPRV PREPARE OD Py tauner System Status TSCO 12/29/2001 06:00:14 John R. Myers (JRMYERS) Phone 5624 Notification Number: 10132527 Revision Number: 0

1. Identify affected equipment/system(s): Service Water Pumps (A, B, C,

-and D),

• ~* .t~, ,. -

2. Identify all Safety Functions of affected SSC(s): The systen shall continuously provide a supply of cooling water directly to the diesel generator and to the secondary side of the REC heat exchangers and to the RHR service water booster pumps adequate for the requirements under both normal operations and under transient and accident conditions.

The system shall be capable of providing direct cooling to essential REC heat loads following a 7-day post accident time period or after a passive REC failure.

The service water pumps supply cooling water to the systems necessary to achieve and-maintain a safe shutdown condition during and following Design Basis Events.

For:transient and accident conditions, a SW pump degraded to the minimum allowable must be able to meet the minimum post LOCA flow and RHR SWBP suction head.

References:

USAR Volume IV, Section 8.0, Service Water and RHR Service Water:Booster System.

DCD-3, Volume 1, Service Water (SW) and Residual Heat Removal Service Water Booster System.

3. Identify when the Safety Functions of affected SSC(s) are required:

[X1 Mode I (X] Mode 2

[XI Mode 3

[XI Mode 14 1Ix Mode 5 / 21' above flange (XI Mode 5 >/= 21' above flange

[XI Fuel movement in Sec Cont I] Core Alterations (I OPDRVs 1X] ýOther: When supported systems are required operable.

NOTE - Common cause failure analysis of the EmergencyDiesel Generator (EDG) in the opposite division shall be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of an -7.7

,i EDG being declared inoperable per Technical Specification LCO03.8.1. *This is not required if Surveillance Testing per Technical Specification SR 3.8.1.2 is:performed.

4. Identify potential failure mechanisms, -including common mode failure/generic concerns of redundant or similar equipment as a result of the degraded and/or nonconforming condition. Identify commitments or requirements not met.

N,5,;

ý9/3112001 NPPD: Notifcation overview 1 JSCAMPB Copy 9 Page 6 Notification: 10132527 4.1 Potential failure mechanisms: The pump casing and shaft are manufactured from differentmaterials. These materials expand and contract at different rates with temperature changes of the pumped fluid.

As river temperature lowers, the clearance between the impeller and pump bowl lowers. The potential failure mechanism is that when the pump impeller comes in contact with the pump bowl liner, due to inadequate impeller lift (clearance), the pump may not perform its design function.

A metallurgical flaw (see NRC Information Notice 93-68) in some couplings make it:the weakest link in the pump shaft, which can lead to failures from the increased starting loads caused by the impeller being forced into the bowl.

4.2 Commitments

None.

5. [ 3 YES; LX] NO Are any potential failure mechanisms time dependent?

Does the condition have thepotential to continue to degrade and/or wil!

any-potential consequences increase? If so, describe tracking mechanism including procedures and formal processes:

An impeller to bowl clearance change is caused by a temperature change due to the different coefficient of expansion between the pump column and pump shaft. This change is not d-irectly related to time.

6. List potential cumulative effects, if any.

[X] None 3 Credit Taken For Alarms I

I Interfacing Systems

(( I Fire Loadings

] Gross ECCS Leakage

[ 3 Electrical Load Calculations

[ ] Pipe Support/Hanger

[ 3 Electrical Separation

[ ] Operator Actions 3 Other:

.Comments: None.

7. [X] YES; [ I NO Impact of this condition on Open OC/OEs reviewed?

Comiments: The issue previously identified in Notification 10131419 (air binding) does not impact the condition of this OD (inadequate T impeller lift)

8. Technical Basis for OPERABILITY:

-On 12/26/01, during an attempted start of Service Water Pump SW-P-D, the motor started but pump parameters indicated the pump was not functioning.

An inspection of the pump revealed'a failed coupling. Investigation into

ýthe coupling determined that it did not conform to the -required metallurgical properties. A review of the repair and parts issue records for the other service water pumps could not provide assurance that couplings manufactured in the same time frame Were not installed in the other service water pumps. This OD provides a basis for operability of SW pumps A, B, and C with couplings which may contain manufacturing defects similar to the defect found on the D SWP shaft coupling. Couplings on SW-P-D have been replaced.

I

, "..-_3:

)-2*3M/2001 NPPD: Notification overview I JSCAMPB Copy 9 Page 7 Notification: 10132527 Additionally, the pump lift *must be periodically adjusted to accommodate changes, in river temperature. The lift setting procedure does not provide specific requirements related to river temperature. Therefore, the lift

'settings for all of the pumps are being checked and adjusted for the existing river temperatures to ensurethat adequate clearance exists to prevent impeller-bowl interference while not impacting the ability of the pump to meet performance requirements. This OD will provide adequate controls for pump operability until the procedure has been appropriately modified to accommodate changes in river temperature.

41:

4, Upon visual inspection of pump, SW-P-D, it was determined (as indicated by Alý sharp edged indications on the bowl and impeller) that the impeller had contacted the bowl liner. Investigation indicated this was caused by a temperature decrease in the river temperature from the time the' lift to set clearance was last adjusted (12/5) to the time of failure. Each one degree lowering of river temperature results in a clearance reduction of 0.0015 :inches. Based on the temperature of the river at the .time the lift was adjusted and present river temperature, and elongation of.the shaft due to hydraulic loading of :the impeller, an interference of :up to -0.016 inches could have existed, or a significant bending load could have been applied to the coupling. When attempting to start pump D, a higher than A;;

normal 'torque was created as a result of the inadequate impeller clearance. This increase in torque. caused the weakest link (shaft coupling, see factor 2 below) to fail.

The :failure of the coupling was the result of a combination of two circumstances:

Factor 1: Based-on visual inspection, the impeller was impinging upon the bowl liner. The resulting friction between the bow] and impeller significantly increased the amount of torque needed to-XoLate the impeller.

Factor 2: The coupiing had a metallurgical flaw as a result of manufacturing and heat treating. This caused the coupling to be the weakest link in the transmission of the higher than normal torque from the motor to the impeller. Consequently, when the pump experienced a higher torque requirement, the coupling 'failed first.

To ensure operability of the'pumps until the couplings can be inspected and those-which were improperly manufactured are replaced, it will be necessary to ensure 'the impeller lifts are properly set to prevent the impeller from contacting the bowl liner. Work-orders have been initiated to accomplish 'this action. The lift for each of the SW pumps has been set per MP 7.'2.45, with the lift set at near the minimum procedural limit of

.0404, with the river at the lowest expected temperature I(-32 degrees F).

At this lift setting the impeller will not come in contact with the bowl liner, normal starting torque'on the pump will not be exceeded, and therefore reasonable assurance exists that even an incorrectly manufactured-coupling will not fail.. A temperature of-'32 degrees F is appropriate as the pumps could see this temperature during a transient or

accident when deý-icing flow is lost.

Not iicatin: 27 ...

The pump impeller to bowl clearances can also adversely impact pump performance as the clearances widen .(due to rising temperatures). At Z large clearances, pump efficiency will degrade and the IST performance requirements may not be met. Setting the impeller clearance in the range required by MP 7.2.45 (0.040 to 0.060 inches), will keep the clearances such that pump performance will remain within IST requirements as river temperatures rise. This conclusion is valid for temperatures up to 50 degrees F. it is conceivable that a transient could occur while the plant is in a condenser backwash lineup, and for some period the SW pumps could be required to operate at a temperature above river temperature.

With the above actions to adjust lift complete, and limitations on service "*

water temperature in place, the service water pumps can be considered conditionally operable. An LCO Tracking Order will be initiated to ensure these requirements are observed and tracked.

References:

Evaluation of Failure of Service Water Pump D, Rev 1 Maintenance Procedure 7.2.45 WO 4216375 (Pump D)

WO 4216873 (Pump B)

WO 4216874 (Pump C)

WO 4216875 (Pump A)

9. 1 ] YES; IX] NO Are interim compensatory actions required? If so, describe actions and tracking mechanism-and review Step 13:

N/A NOTE -Manual operator action cannot be used in place of automatic action for protection of safety limits to justify OPERABILITY.

10. 1]YES; [X] NO Is manual action being substituted for automatic actions? Is local action being substituted for remote action? If so, describe actions and tracking mechanism and review Step 13:

N/A

11. List or describe any operating modes, plant conditions, or seasonal variations-not supported by this OD (i.e., OPERABILITY is CONDITIONAL):

Operability is conditionai based on a service water temperature between 30' F and 50 F. (PMIS Points M138 and M137 are the preferred source of data)

The 30 degree F service water temperature will ensure the pump .impeller will not come in contact with the bowl liner after the lifts are set.

The .50 degree.F service water temperature will ensure that the pump satisfies IST flow requirements.

12. List the mechanism(s) in place to control the condition(s) necessary forCONDITIONAL.OPERABILITY (i.e.,LCO Tracker,*Night Order, procedure change, 'etc.) and review Steps 13 and .14:

':" -5' i*

6 ; te:iip?.6.WZ.

eure. . ril1b.6ia.tilized

" "" ; . .: ' -to monitor service water (river)

.3...',[ .- YES;-.[XI X]O;Ar[ ],-.-N/A Is'a 10CFR5O.59 Review required-for

.":tion(s) identi'fT -.-bove? Basis (if NO).- A 50.59 review is not required

• d~e to the 'pibpo itei.im compensatory actions being supported by

- current SORC approved; procedures.

13.1 [ ] YES; I3 NO; X] :N/A 10CFRS0.59 Evaluation required for implementation?

14. [] YES; [X] NO; [ I N/A Is a Safety Assessment required for the required action(s) identified above? Basis (if NO): A safety assessment is not required due to the proposed interim compensatory actions being supported by current .SORC approved procedures.

15. [ ] YES; [ ] NO; [X] N/A OE Required.

"OE due' from Engineering - Date/Time:

] YES; I [XI N/A Engineering Notified.

16. 'OD Performed By/Date/Time:

Mike Matheson -- John Myers / 12-29-01 / 0535

17. OD Accepted: -SS/Date/Time:

Task REVIEW OPRV APPROVE OD

.Yaner System &ams TSCO Task REVIEW OPRV STATUS OD Parner syvem Swis TSCO 12/29/2001 07:29:20 Steve Wheeler (SCWHEEL)

'OD/OE STATUS Notification Number: 10132527 OD/OE Revision Number: 00 Basis for SSApproval for OD.Extension Beyond 24 hrs: SW PP D WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE.

.'i.YES; 1X] No cumulative Effects. 0 YES,. IX] NO Interim Compensatory Action Required.

]-"YES;; [X] :NO." ?4anal

- Action ion Substituted for Automatic Act' Action.

WACO" . -- itRzaa M

] .Y-ES;.[X]"OI No I Action Substituted for Remote Action.

. [. YES;. 4X] NO Condition has Potential to Degrade Over Time.

• K.." L~YES; []-No -Operability is Conditional.

B[ YES; [X] NO OD Awaiting OR.

NOTE - If none of the above are checked YES, the OD/OE may be closed.

OD/OE [1 CLOSED OD/OE [X] OPEN Actions Required to Allow Closure (if initially open),:

IMPLEMENT PROCESS 'CHANGE TO ASSURE LIFT OF SW PUMPS ARE ADEQUATE TO COMPENSATE FOR RIVER TEMPERATURE CHANGES.

EXIT LCO 1002002.

REMOVE SUPPLEMENTAL RIVER TEMPERATURE MONITORING FROM TECH SPEC LOGS.

[X] YES; [H NO OD/OE Logged in OD/OE Database:

OD/OE Closed (if initially open) based on (provide short explanation):

[3 YES; [] NO OD/OE Logged in OD/OE Database:

Task REVIEW OPRV PREPARE OD QUALITY CHECK Paflne system &ar TSCO 12/29/2001 13:07:08 Andrew R. Ohrablo (AROHRAB)

Notification Number: 10132527 Revision Number: 00 OD Quality Criteria:*

G = Very Good A = Adequate I .- Improvement Needed

N = Not.Applicable IN] The OD was completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the Notification Supervisor review or a justification for exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is provided.

[A] The OD is correctly characterized as open or closed and the appropriate criteria are referenced.

[A] The conditions required for closing the OD are objective, reasonable',

and clearly stated.

[A] The affected equipment is accurately identified.

[A] The safety function of the affected equipment is accurate and complete, and refers to appropriate design..and licensing basis requirements. Appropriate references are identified.

[A] When the safety functions are required is accurate and complete.

[A3 Potential failure mechanisms are identified. Similar equipment is identified and generic concerns and common mode failures are evaluated.

(A] Cumulative effects (e.g.,,multiple operator actions, multiple degraded hangers, etc.) are addressed.

[A] The time and operational dependency of the potential failure mechanism and associated consequences is addressed.

[N] "Interim compensatory actions, operational restrictions, and/or mode/configuration limits are identified and a tracking mechanism specified (e.g., additional surveillances being required, manual or local operations being necessary, system capability limitations).

[A] The evaluation is logical and can be followed without talking to the Originator.

[A] Assumptions or Engineering judgements made are clearly stated and adequately discussed. Where feasible, ;the basis for Engineering judgements is quantitative rather than qualitative.

[A] The bases for evaluation logic is clearly stated and references listed.

[A] If used, informal inputs (e.g., telecons, faxes) are identified.

(A] Applicable codes, standards, etc., are referenced where appropriate.

[N] Where actions are required as a basis for operability, the necessary 10CFR50.59 paperwork is attached.

[N] Where actions are required as a basis for operability, the necessary Safety.Assessment paperwork is attached.

IN] A date and time are assigned for the OE, if required.

~4.-?~t~ctab~ (~oI Areas).

~rpf~ns UPrevis~or):

Resolution of I Areas: .4.

• ~1, t

Item -detail 0001 BULMER,J -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE PRESS Objec pan P PUMP Cause of damage UINK UNKNOWN Cause 1w BULMER,J -INDICATOR IS INDICATING WITHIN "*T Aswnbly Error dan 12/26/2001 16:46:02 Jerry W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

BULMER,J -PI IS WITHIN REQUIRED TOLERANCE.

12/26/2001 16:42:42 Jerry W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

_BULMER,J -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATOR SW-DPI-360D PER IAC PROCEDURE 14.28.1. FOUND NO EVIDENCE 'OFSTICKING OR DRAGGING ON INDICATOR.

INDICATOR RESPONDED SMOOTHLY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE RANGE.' THE LOW END (I PSI) INDICATED LOW (0 PSI, BUT STILI IN TOLERANCE) AND NEAR THE HIGH END, (75 PSI) READ 74.5 PSI, OTHERWISE ALL OTHER TEST POINTS WERE EXACTLY AS EXPECTED. SAT

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ýi511 le a ýF-4Yli,

R pTir-..-,Oxbers.-id4(41sticd.or unknown mage A-4'08'-. '-MA1NTANCE (REAIR OR REPLACE'EQUIPMENT

.;PRE2O Item detail 0003 Tea Object pan MOO0 DISC METH N/A Damage Cause of damage Cause lea Assembly Error lass Activity PUMPSYS CHK CHECKED PI CALIBRATION. AS FOUNDS ARE SA End of report

1ý' 0t, I

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--- - .- ~----

RC-31-67# 0;ý - ij&3

~ ir 4216374 -ordertype CAP Corrective Action Progra m Deslerbon RCR'*20.01-1667 #1 X 10132527 PM Act. Type EVL Evaluation St. t a4rte 12/27/2001 End date 12/27/2001 Paork9y 4 Routine 4 M

Slar Date 00:00o-00 Ml End* oDate 00:0:00 Stus REL GMCO NMAT PRC SETC INPR rFundLocation CNS-2-SW-P-D ABC Ind. E SORT SW-P-D DesWon J. SWP D Maintenance RdMe: M

'MRRS "

" IST SSEL  :

Trekh Spec Components.

3.7.2 A Equipme Descsiption Locadon 903 Room SWP RM Plant Section IS NatPia Group CAP CNS .CAP/NAIT MasnWrkCoaer NEPM CNS 'PLANT ENGINEERING MANAGER MaintenancePlan MaintPlanlkem Schedde Window RE2 0 CNS REFUELING OUTAGE RE20 Requied in Mode. I RUN Repair in Mode: 4 COLD SHUTDOWN 2 :STARTUP 5 REFUEL

.3 HOT SHUTDOWN .4 4

Tech Spec:Ref.: 3.7.1 References.

RCR 2001-1667 ,#

SW PUMP INOPERABLE, LCO.3.7.2 - DIV 1, REQURIED PRIOR TO MODE CHANGE NO REACTIVITY IMPACT REQUIRED DOES NOT IMPACT CONTAINMENT FIRE IMPAIRMENT WILL BE REQUIRED.

4

.1,;

CC Cs . ~ .

'iki~- ~'~;

NpN P'LANT No.

A

ANGR

)N4ýB~NG -

12277/20-01. Ma.ntime 12/27/2`001. 08:46:00

'4'.

'End linie 08:46:00 s.. RCR 2001-1667 .#1.

NOT!F. PERFORM ROOT CAUJSE EVALUATION

1. 10132527 R/C CO1MENTS:

N/c NOTES-:

-Oporatiou 0010 REL NEPM CNS PLANT ENGINEERING MANAGER ConVpoiW No. 380346 Actuvty I*' PROF

£arlswilDate 12/27/2001 ot eEndDae Stan time 08:46:00 12/27/2001 B&etime '68:4t:'66

~A~'.;2?

• f-

9

-M)WN A.. *,*.,....

• l*CAP d6jrectj*Lve

" 0 i NPPD- WORK PRVDI*.A~tigou

. 1uiitogram 7 SB " O rtg+/-7i4a l Pagge 3

• Order, object list: 4216374 RCR 2001-1667 #1.

Sort fleld Processing* are FundLocadon CNS-2-SW-ýP-D SWP D SORT SW-PD ABC Ind.: E Malatenance Rate:

?.RRS IST SSEL Tech Spec Components:

3.7.2 A Equipment MaoinotfA'o. 10132527 SW-P-D STARTED. NO DISCHARGE PRESSURE End of repom

• ~4,

! /Nofijdo, 1013252.7".- 'Not:ication type CRI DescTipdon S SW-P;fD !TARTED, NO DISCHARGE PRESSURE ConditionReport Repoed by DJBROME" 1110:56 NodjictnDoe 12/26/2001 Start date --12/2'6/*2001 End date 01/02/2002 Start time .II:.10,:6 End time 09:10:56 m1?ofliy CM Fun4oca**on CNS-2-SW-P-D SWP D SORT SW-P-D Equipmemn Order 4216374 MainPlanGroup MEC Mtchanical Shop Tel.

Mall. Star? Date Malf. End date Malf. Skan time 00:00:00 Maif. End time 00:00:00 12/26/2001 11:20:00 David J. Bromen (DJBROME)

1) Description of Condition: Started D SWP, system pressure did not change and steady :state pump amps were 18. Expected response would be an increase in the system pressure with pump running amps at 35-40. Pump discharge pressure was noted to be 1.5 psig prior to and after pump operation.

2) Requirement Not Met: SWP-D did not develope discharge pressure when started.

3) Method of Discovery: Starting SWP-D OD

4) Immediate Actions Taken: :Notify CRS, secure D SWP.

5) Recommendations: Investigate cause.

6) Location of Evidence: SWP-D 12/26/2001 11:38:25 Steven P. Norris (SPNORRI)

1) Immediate Actions Taken: Secured SW pump D

2) Basis For Cps Review: Basis for review N/A for on-shift operations generated notifications.

'3)Basis For Classification: RCR-apparent cause # III-C-i .4cause unknown for SW pump D being air bound.

4) Basis For Disp. Department: System engineer responsible for evaluating eauipment performance

5) Apparent Cause: unknown

6) Clarification Comment: Determine cause of SW pump D being air bound and correct as necessary. Perform OD on remaining SW pumps. Modify Standing order 2001-0011 as necessary.

4; V_ - £

__17 12~1bIa HE Copy 8 Page 2 Notifica tio'n 10132527

'Task REVIEW OPRV INOPERABLE, NARRATIVE LOGS 12-26-01/932 Panmer System Status TSCO 12/26/2001 13:34:28 Andrew R. Ohrablo (AROHRAB)

OPERATIONS REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION Equipment Identification Section Affected Equipment/System: SW-P-D Equipment/System Classification (check all that apply):

[X] TS

[ TS SUPPORT

[X] SAFETY-RELATED 3 TRM

[ ] ODAM

[ PASS

[XI] MRRS

[ 3 FHA/APP. .R

[ SBO

[ ] RG 197 CAT 1 or CAT 2 1 ] HELB

[ ATWS I I FLDG

] EMERGENCY FACILITY/EQUIPMENT I

Operations Review Screening Section Operations Review of Notification required if any question below is yes:

[XI YES; I ] NO Any Classification above marked and not PLANNED WORK?

"3

[XI YES; I ] NO Condition may apply to similar equipment, including non-SSC (generic concern/common cause failure)? If YES, document in

.Comments section below.

[XI YES; ] ,NO Present OPERABILITY concern - includes conditions with an indirect impact on OPERABILITY? Past OPERABILITY concerns should be addressed under the REPORTABILITY question below.

I] YES; [X] NO 'POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE per 10CFR20, 10CFR26.73, 10CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, or 10CFR73.71? 'Reportability concerns for past events'should be identified below for Licensing review.

I ] YES; IX] NO Immediate personnel or equipment -safety concern not yet adequately addressed. If YES, document in Comments section below.

I I YES; IX] NO Plant operational concern, including Reactivity event?

I ] YES; IX] NO Fitness for Duty issue?

] YES; I [I] NO Site Security issue?

IX] YES; E I NO Operations Review of Notification required?

• . *.L ... -'-..' ..- '-. **

• .',-* Immodiate Actions Taken:

DISCUSSIONS WERE 'HEt WITH MANAGMENT ON ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.

Comments:

PREVIbUS OD RITTE ON 'SW-P-A, ALL 4 SERVICE WATER PUPMS HAVE A STANDING

-ORDER .THAT .THE PFMP..

1 S To:13E STARTED WHEN DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF THE SECURED PUMP REACHES 2 PSIG.

Operability Determination Screening Section

'An OD is required if any question below is YES, unless declared INOPERABLE.

I ] YES; IX] NO Degraded condition of SSCs where functionality is called into question?

I ] YES; [X] NO Nonconforming conditions affecting SSCs where the qualification is called into question?

[ I YES; [X] NO Existing but previously unanalyzed condition affecting SSCs?

I" YES; IX] NO OD required? If NO, provide BASIS below.

Basis for No OD:

DECLARED INOPERABLE 'NO OD PER 0.SOPS 3.1.11.5b.

Operability/Reportability Review Section I 3 YES; [X] NO Risk assessment required? if YES, ensure assessment performed per Procedure 0.49, Schedule Risk Assessment. NOT REQUIRED TO BE

'OPERABLE IN PRESENT PLANT CONDITIONS.

IX] YES; [ I NO Previous OD/OE/BCO written for an identical concern? If YES, identify previous OD/OE: 10131419 FOR SW-P-A IX] 'YES; [ I NO OPEN OD/OE File for aggregate effect?

[X] YES; I ] NO System, Structure, or Component determined to be INOPERABLE?

I Y yES; [X] NO Safety Function Determination required?

]" YES; [X] 'NO LCOi TLCO, or ODAM Action Statement entered?

Date/Time Entered: 1i-26-01/ 09:32 TS/TRM/ODAM LCO Action Statement(s):

LCO Work Order Number:NARRATIVE LOGSý

][YES; [X] NO Condition Immediately Reportable per Procedure 2.05, Reports to NRC Operations Center?

. Report Completed at Date/Time:

>*.. Report Number:

• X  ;. [3 NO SS signature required?

-A ~~~

-. -" - - J

-M0 fiction overview 1 SCWHEEL Copy 8 Page 4 Notification: 10132527 Equipment/System Comments:

Safety Function Determination Comments:

Reportability Comments Task REVIEW CAP RCR-R/C I.B.I PED Partner System Status TSCO :tj:

12/28/2001 09:45:37 Ronnie Deatz (RCDEATZ)

RCR-R/C I.B.I PED Task REVIEW SCRN PRI 21 MODE R MWR M-SHOP, CM Partner System Status TSCO Task REVIEW LIC INDETERMINATE Partner System Status TSCO 12/27/2001 14:46:21 Coy L. Blair (CLBLAIR) 12/27/01 BY CLBLAIR - REPORTABILITY FOR NOTIFICATION 10132527 IS INDETERMINATE. INFORMATION IN THE.NOTIFICATION (AND OTHER REPORTS) RAISES A QUESTION ABOUTTHE PAST OPERABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER PUMPS, BECAUSE THECOUPLING FAILURE MAY REPRESENT A "SINGLE CAUSE THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF TRAINS OR CHANNELS IN

,DIFFERENT SYSTEMS". PER PROCEDURE 0.5.CLSS, THEACTION OWNER FOR THIS NOTIFICATION, PED, SHALL PROVIDE THE LICENSING DEPARTMENT WITH INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE THE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION WITHIN 14 DAYS OF DISCOVERY, r.E., BY 01/09/02.

Task REVIEW MRUL EXPORT Panner System Status TSCO TSSC Task REVIEW OPRV PREPARE OD

'Partner System Status TSCO 12/29/2001 06:00:14 John R. Myers (JRMYERS) Phone 5624 Notification Number: 10132527 Revision Number: 0

1. Identify affected equipment/system(s): Service'Water'Pumps (A, B, C, and D).

-. ~.-" ..- ';-. - -. -. '-',.... -- .-- ~.

10132527 1ion

2. Identify all)Safety Functions of affected SSC(s): The system shall continuously provide a supply of cooling water directly to the diesel generator and to the secondary side of the REC heat exchangers and to the RHR service water booster pumps adequate for the requirements under both normal operations and under transient and accident conditions.

The system shall be capable of providing direct cooling to essential REC heat loads following a 7-day post -accident time period or after a passive REC failure.

The service water pumps supply cooling water to the systems necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition during and following Design 3Basis Events.

For transient and accident conditions, a.SW pump degraded to the minimum allowable must be able to meet the minimum post LOCA flow and RHR SWBP suction head.

References:

USAR Volume IV, Section 8.0, Service Water and RHR Service Water Booster System.

DCD-3,Vol6ume 1, Service Water (SW) and Residual Heat Removal Service Water Booster System.

3. Identify when the Safety Functions of affected SSC(s) are required:

[Xi Mode 1 jX] M6de 2 XII Mode 3 L[X] Mode :4 jX] Mode :5 </= 21' above flange

[X3 Mode 5 >/= *21' above flange IX] Fuel movement in Sec Cont

[ ] Core Alterations

[ ] OPDRVs

[XI Other: When supp6rted systems are required operable.

NOTE - Common cause :failure analysis of the 'Emergency Diesel "Generator (EDG) in the opposite division shall be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of an EDG being declared inoperableper Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1. This is not required if Surveillance Testing per Technical Specification SR 3.8.1.2 is performed.

4. Identify potential failure mechanisms, including common mode failure/generic concerns of redundant or similar equipment as a result of the degraded and/or nonconforming condition. Identify commitments or requirements not met.

~

oft iId WP iW SC WHEEL Copy 8 Page 6 J.

tificiii .162S 527 4.1 Potential failure mechanisms: The pump casing and shaft are, manufactured .from different materials. These materials expand and contract at different rates with temperature changes of the pumped fluid..

As river temperature lowers, the clearance between the impeller and pump bowl lowers. The potential failure mechanism is that when the pump impeller comes ,in contact with the pump .bowl liner, due to inadeqruate impeller lift (clearance), the pump may not perform its design function.

A metallurgical flaw (see NRC Information Notice, 93,-68) in some couplings make it the weakest link in the pump shaft, which can lead to failures from the increased starting loads caused by the impeller being forced into the bowl.

4.2 Commitments

None.

5. [ :3 YES; [XI NO Are any potential failure mechanisms time dependent?

Does the condition have the potential to continue to degrade and/or will any potential consequences increase? If so, describe tracking mechanism including procedures and formal processes:

An impeller to bowl clearance change is caused by a temperature change due to the different coefficient of expansion between the pump column and pump shaft. This change is not directly related to time.

6. List potential cumulative effects, if any.

[X] None f ] Credit Taken For Alarms

[ ] Interfacing Systems

[ ] Fire Loadings

[ ] Gross ECCS Leakage

[ I Electrical Load Calculations

[ J Pipe Support/Hanger

' Electrical separation

[ , Operator Actions

[ I Other:

'Comments: None.

7.. [X] YES; [ I NO Impact of this condition on Open OD/OEs reviewed?

'Comments: The issue previously identified in Notification 10131419 (air.binding) does not impact the condition of this OD (inadequate impeller lift)

8. Technical Basis for OPERABILITY:

On 12/26/.01, during an attempted start of Service Water Pump SW-P-D, the motor started but pump parameters indicated the pump was not functioning.

An inspection of the pump revealed a failed coupling. investigation into the coupling determined'that it did not, conform'to the required metallurgical properties. A review of the 'repair and parts issue records

,for the other service water pumps could not provide assurance that couplings manufactured in the same time frame were not installed in the other service water pumps. This OD provides a basis for operability of SW pumps A, .B, and C with couplings which may contain manufacturing defects similar to the defect found on the D SWP shaft coupling. Couplings on

.SW-P-D have been replaced.

-oficitibh: '1013251.7 Additionally,-the pump lift must be periodically adjusted to accommodate changes in river temperature. The lift setting procedure does not provide specific requirements related to river temperature. Therefore, the lift settings for all of the pumps are being checked and adjusted for the existing river temperatures to ensure that adequate clearance exists to prevent impeller-bowl interference while not impacting the ability of the pump to meet performance requirements. This OD will provide adequate controls for pump operability until the procedure has been appropriately modified to accommodate changes in river temperature.

Upon visual inspection of pump, SW-P-D, it was determined (as indicated by sharp edged indications on the bowl andimpeller) that the impeller had contacted the bowl liner. Investigation indicated this was caused by a temperature decrease in the river temperature from the time the lift to set clearance was last adjusted (12/5) to the time of failure. Each one degree lowering of river temperature results in a clearance reduction of 0.0015 inches. Based on the:temperature of the river at the time the lift was adjusted and present river temperature, and elongation of the shaft due to hydraulic loading of the impeller, an interference of up to -0.016 inches could'have existed, or a significant bending load could have been applied !to the :coupling. 'When attempting to start pump D, a higher than normal torque was created:as-a result ýof the inadequate impeller clearance. This increase in torque caused the weakest link (shaft coupling, -see factor 2 below) to fail.

The failure of the coupling was the result of a combination of two circumstances:

Factor 1: Based on visual inspection, the impeller was impinging upon the bowl liner. The resulting friction between the bowl and impeller significantly increased the amount of torque needed to rotate the impeller.

Factor 2: The-coupling had a metallurgical flaw as a result of manufacturing and-heat treating. This caused the coupling to be the weakest link in the transmission of the higher than normal torque from the motor to the impeller. Consequently, When the pump experienced a higher torque requirement, the coupling failed first.

To ensure operability of the pumps until the couplings can be inspected and those which were improperly manufactured are replaced, it will be necessary to ensure the impeller lifts are properly set to prevent the impeller from contacting the bowl liner. Work orders have been initiated to accomplish this action. The lift for each of the SW pumps has been set per MP 7.2.45, with the lift set at near the minimum procedural limit of

.040#, with the -river at the lowest expected ýtemperature (-32 degrees F).

At this -lift setting the impeller will not come in contact with the bowl liner, normal starting torque on the pump will not be exceeded, and therefore reasonable assurance exists that even an incorrectly manufactured coupling will not-fail. A temperature of 32 degrees F is appropriate as the pumps could -see this temperature during -a transient or accident when de-icing flow is lost.

I i;:":"

... :*? ".lf6 k:* i .tionZ:" 10232527' "". .... '. . .. "*'"':.

The pump impeller to bowl clearances can also adversely impact pu.rp performance as the clearances widen (due to rising temperatures). At large clearances, pump efficiency will degrade and the IST performance requirements may not be met. Setting the impeller clearance in the range required by MP 7.2.45 (0.040 to 0.060 inches), will keep the clearances such-that pump performance will remain within IST requirements as river temperatures rise. This conclusion is valid for temperatures up to 50 degrees F. It is conceivable that a transient could occur while the plant

.is in a condenser backwash lineup, and for some period the SW pumps could be required to operate at a temperature above river temperature.

With 'the above actions to adjust lift complete, and limitations on service water temperature 'in place, the service water pumps can be considered

,,,IUJl., i ,y .=.yr. .L .AJ.L' ,. JUA JJ.J . ,.%._.,, atAW-JJ LJ, =,, . W.,..L ,,* .,iJ. J.*I. ,L ,..J WJ.= ,LL these requirements are observed and tracked.

References:

Evaluation of Failure of Service Water Pump D, Rev 1 Maintenance Procedure 7.2.45 WO 4216375 (Pump D)

WO 4216873 (Pump B)

WO 4216874 (Pump C)

WO 4216875 (Pump A)

9. [ ] YES; [X] NO Are interim compensatory actions required? If so, describe-actions and tracking mechanism-and review Step 13:

N/A NOTE - Manual operator action cannot be used in place 'of automatic .action for protection of safety limits to justify OPERABILITY.

10. [J YES; IX] NO ,Is manual action being substituted for automatic actions? Is local action beingsubstituted for remote action? If so, describe actions and tracking mechanism and review Step 13:

NIA

i. List or describe any operating modes, plant conditions, or seasonal variations not supported by this OD (i.e., OPERABILITY is CONDITIONAL):

Operability is conditional based on a service water temperature between 30 F and 50 F. (PMIS Points M138 and M137 are*the preferred source of data)'

The 30 degree F service water temperature will ensure the pump limpeller will not come in contact with the bowl 'liner after the lifts are set.

The 50 degree F service water temperature will ensure that the pump satisfies IST flow requirements.

12. List the mechanism(s) 'in place to control the condition(s) necessary for CONDITIONAL OPERABILITY (i.e., LCO Tracker, Night Order, procedure change, etc.) and review Steps 13 and 14:

-. .** N,; .,' a-',s,'.-

-. ,,.*-** - r*" g*- ,- -cr..->* * '..'.;-],'. *-* ".*-s- ,,,

S.. '~beeiinitiated-to triack this lImitaition.

'0 or *,IOG,:602* w'll'be utilized to monitor service water (river) 1..

13.~.. YE; s a 2OCFR5O.59 Review required for

...action(s)-,'-entWiied.bove?7 Basis (if NO): A 50.59 .review is not required

,*. -due.

cUrrent o'.;.the -,opobed"

'SORC apprqved nterim compensatory actions being supported by procedures.

13.1 (3 YES; [ 3 NO; [X] N/A 10CFR50.59 Evaluation required for

,i implementation?

ý1A

14. [J YES; [X] NO,- I N/A Is ,a Safety Assessment required for the requitred action(s) identified above? Basis (if NO): A safety assessment is not required due to the proposed interim compensatory actions being supported by .current SORC approved .procedures.

15. 13 YES; [ ] NO; [X] N/A OE Required.

OE due from Engineering -Date/Time:

]I YES; IXI N/A Engineering Notified.

16. OD Performed By/Date/Time:

Mike Matheson - John Myers / .12-29-01 / 0535

17. OD Accepted - SS/Date/Time:

Task REVIEW OPRV APPROVE OD Partner system status TSCO Task REVIEW OPRV. STATUS OD Partner system Srnms TS6 12/29/2001 07:29:20 Steve Wheeler (SCWHEEL)

OD/OE STATUS Notification Number: 10132527 OD/OE Revision Number: 00 Basis for SS Approval for OD Extension Beyond 24 hrs: SW PP D WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE.

• [] YES; .X] NO Cumulative Effects.© 2~

YES:,.X]: NO. "Interim Compensatory Action -Required.

SOh*4[*C.-.1O'-anua Action Substituted for Automatic Action,

... ..-  :..- ,-*...* :.o .. ,,;  ;. ,. ..

[e YESn; SI*ilbg , Od for Remote Action.

-Il[ YES; XNO, Condjitln*,*hs' Potential to Degrade Over Time.

' ,. E S 0Codtional.

U D BES [XJNO ODAwaiting OE.

NOTE If none of the above are checked YES, the OD/OE may be closed.

OD/OE [] CLOSED OD/OE [X1 OPEN Actions Required to Allow Closure (if initially open)-

IMPLEMENT PROCESS CHANGE TO ASSURE LIFT OF SW PUMPS ARE ADEQUATE TO COMPENSATE FOR RIVER TEMPERATURE CHANGES.

EXIT LCO 1002002.

7REMOVE SUPPLEMENTAL RIVER TEMPERATURE MONITORING FROM TECH SPEC LOGS.

[XI YES; [1 NO OD/OE Logged in OD/OE ,Database:

OD/OE Closed (if initially open) based on (provide short explanation):

[1 YES; [0 NO OD/OE Logged in OD/OE Database:

Task REVIEW OPRV PREPARE OD QUALITY CHECK amner System Mtai TSOS

+ '+:.

+,,*,*

,., +t *.+'* , ++.*, Aj .I11 8o"+*";*,-, .+:+?

• Notfictions 10132527 item detail 0001 Tex BULMER, J -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE PRESS Objea pan P PUMP Damage Cause of damage UNK UNKNOWN 1 Cause text BULMER, J -INDICATOR IS INDICATING WITHIN Assembla Error class Zf, 12/26/2001 16:46:02 Jerry W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

BULMER,J -PI IS WITHIN REQUIRED TOLERANCE.

I 12/26/2001 16:42:42 Jerry W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

BULMERIJ -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATOR SW-DPI-360D PER IAC PROCEDURE 14.28.1.*FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF STICKING OR DRAGGING ON INDICATOR.

INDICATOR RESPONDED SMOOTHLY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE RANGE. THE LOW END (1 PSI) INDICATED LOW (0 PSI,. BUT STILL IN TOLERANCE) AND NEAR THE HIGH END,

(75 PSI) READ 74.5 PSI, OTHERWISE ALL OTHER TEST POINTS WERE EXACTLY AS EXPECTED. SAT Item detail 0002 Text Object pan M102 PLANT EVENT Damage OTH Others not listed or.!unknown Camse of damage -A408 MAINTENANCE (REPAIR OR REPLACE EQUIPMENT Cause text PUMP, RE2 0 Asembly Error class Item detail 0003 Tea Object pan MOO0 DISC'METH N/A Damage

'Cause of damage Cause text Assembly Error class Activity PUMPSYS CHK CHECKED PI CALIBRATION. AS FOUNDS ARE SA End of report

___*" " . * :,* ~i.. . ** * ,,S,.' .. * ,..,~*.*"*

. +' ' ' * ""i . . ": " . . ..'+,:..... , ;**

.*, ,[,+. I4,. .-.. +*,; ...:, ... . .:..

~~ 5 .- rim

- Z :1 ,. -

7,~n. 3 -S I ATTACHMENT 3 NA1T FEEDBACK FORM ACTION ITEM TRACKING STATUS FEEDBACK FORM CAP 3D NUMBER MP-CR zoo)-I6(7 17tZCEIVeo, CAP ACTION NUMBER: .1 SAP CAP ORDER NUMBER:

• Ll 2-113 -7 SAP ORDER TYPE: CAP (CAP Order, Tech Support Order)

ASSIGNED DEPARTRFMW.-

V-3 ACTION REQUESTED:

qký q

[14 Closure [ Extension [ ]Action Owner Transfer

[1 Resp. Transfer [ Status Update [J]Reopen PMActType:

(Present Over Due Date: ) [1 I ] (New Over Due Date:  :/ )

RESPONSFIEXTENSIOMRANSFER JUSTIFICATION: re 9 SAFETY 1MPACTIGENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

SUBMIWIED BY:- 1w&H 7- V0 f-P4*# /7?.A .41~j DATE: 2 /o S

RESPONSIBLE MGR: M0p" <4 DATE: *-)-t,-.3.J OTHER REVIEW #I: .. 'DATE:____

OTHER REEW #2: DATE:

OTHER REVIEWM#: N DATE:

PROCEDURE 0.5.NAIT REVISION 7 PAGE 18 OF 24

- ~.1 ~.

ATTA 1 iWAT-ACTION ASSIGNMENT DocumentNumber.: 200 1--16 1(7 ACV.1 4A j ~I

/Z .27y Page:I..J_ of..Jb

• Action Assigned B: 2 W l-'1T StiA A LZDate:

INSTRUCTIONS: acarly identify the action to be taken, the assigned dep.rtnt, and the completion datc. List each aion separately and. io If an action is contingent an the completion of a previous action. If necessary. use additional shects. Note that the actions (including the actionk ci wording) and completion dates (if Firm) should be developed jointly by the *assigned by" and the "assign~ed to* departmcnt. Each action must be accepted by die "a~signed'o"

.department In addition, if corrective actions ar alsotregulatory Commitments, the commitment number should be refrno ced and sip'awre of the Assigned Work Center acknowledges acceptance. NOTE: Enhancement actions are not tracked as part of CAP Orders. -Reference Procedure O-NPG.4.12 for Priority.

PMAetTýpe: PRe :ActionStatementfiiT ?Tlq Nn.

,-h-I~~ AA~A M - '*,,4A~Ut Schedul Aype: ority. Over Due Date:  : Firm Due Date (Y/N): __

Lcewning Concurrence (Y/N): A. -Assigned Work Center: IVEFA Assigned Work Center Acceptance:

SAP CAP ORDER NULMBER OTHER REVIEW: V PMAtType:.. Action Statement_

Schedule Type: Ptiorit*. Over Due Date: *- Firm Due Date (YIN):

LicensingConcurrence(YI): Assigned Work Conter._ _ _

Assigned Work Center Acceptance:

SAP' CAP ORDER NUMME OTHER REVIEW:

PMActTy*:. Action Statement:_

Schedule Typ. Priority Over Due Date: Firm Due Date (Y/):

Licensing Co=ncurec (YAN) - AssiAgned Work Center:_____

Assigned Work Center Acceptanew SLAP CAP ORDER NUMBER: OTHER REVIEW:

PHCEUE .MN1 BVSION? PA 16 OF 24

,* * , ; * .-. . . : .:* .. . + . ' . . * ...- . . . . ... . .

EVALUATION OF D SW PUMP FAILURE ROOT CAUSE CONDITION REPORT RCR 2001-1667 ACTION #1 ORDER #4216374 02/18/02

-'1

- I L- -, .- l. 'ý. 4LMM;Zý.- .

PROBLEM STATEMENT The D service water pump failed to pmp water when started on 12/26/01 at 9:32 am.

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION Emm DESCRIMTO According to the log entries, on 12/26101 at 0932, an attempt was made to place the D Service Water (SW) pump in service. When the pump was started, the pump only drew 18 amperes. The normal amount is 34 to 40 amperes. Also, no change in D SW pump discharge pressure was noted. Because ofthis, '1D" service water pump was then secured.

The pump in question is a single stage, mixed flow vertical pump manufactured by the Byron Jackson Pump Company, type 28 KXL, 1180 rpm, rated nominally foi 8000 gpm with a TDH of 245 feet. The impeller diameter is nominally 18-1/4 inches. The pump has been in regular service since the plant went on line in 1974.

According to thelog entries, on,12/26/0 at 0932, the D SW pump was declared inoperable "due to being air bound." It was subsequently declared operable on 12/29/01 IN,

-:7 N, at 1139. The D SW pump was inoperable for a period of approximately 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />.

At the time, "D" service water pump was noted to have a pressure of,1.5 psig on its disciarge pressure gage (SW-PI-360D). The river level was approximately 877 feet in elevition. With'the river at an elevation of 877 feet, to be air bound would require a

.pressure in the pump colunm of 7.4 psig. At this pressure the column would be .4ý-

sufficiently full of air to expose the pump impeller and exit the bottom of the column at i860 feetelevation.

When pressure was released through the discharge pressure gage connection, a small amount of air was observed to vent from the column commensurate with a pressure of 1.5 psig. The pressure then dropped to zero.

gt After the pressure was vented, a subsequent re-start was attempted. The pump shaft was noted to spin and the pump motor was observed to use 13 amperes of*current However, the pump did not pump water and the discharge pressure did notuchange from 0 psig.. The pump was not air bound.

Disassembly ofthe pump found that one ofthe shaft couplings had failed, as shown in photograph 1. The pattern ofthe fracture was typical of failure by torsion, i.e., the classic "barber pole." The location ofthe failed coupling was approximately halfway down the pump shaft, which is about 46 feet in total length.

• .4..

2

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. ° I.,

I.

hotograph 1. View of coupling as it emerge during disassembly of the )"T:servicewater pump.

RV5qTPMI(Y1MPAn1ThT nIlPR~ ATTANT DFSGWAND OPEA I7ON OF THE SW PUMPS Figure I shows the layout ofthe SW pump and motor. Each service water pump has 5 couplings, 4 long shafts of 10' each, and one short shaft of ebout 4' in length that is connected to the impeller. The suction of the SWpump is appr ately 46 feet below the bottom ofthe'SW pump motor and the suction ofthe SW pump is approximately 22"

'above the bottom of the pump bay.

• t :.'... .';

i W=,,--,775777ý-Fal G*~- * ~ ~

The SW pumps normally operate with a; injection supply of gland water from the riverwell water system. This water source is injected in the stuftfg box gland. Part of this water lubricates the packing and is discharged out of the pump packing to the envimnment, whoich then flows into the discharge elbow casing and through a bole back down into the pump bay. The restofthe injected water flows down the shaft 'in the enclosing tube (which encapsulates the pump shaft) lubricating the lineshaft bearings.

This water thien exits the top case bearing (top of the impeller see figure 2 item #12) and exits into the hollow chamber above the impeller. This water exits from the area between the top edge radius area of the impeller (figure 2 item #2) and the wear ring (figure 2 item 6), where it mixes with the pumped fluid, subsequently flushing any sand/silt and river water out of this area ofthe pump.

The stainless steel open style impeller of this pump matches the contourofthe impeller liner (figure 2 item #9). The impeller is designed to be able to be raised above the impeller liner to allow for shaft stretch and for increasing or decreasing performance. As

ýthe impeller is rnised, the impellerlift increases; widch increases the dimension between the impeller and impeller liner. Increasing the lift decreases the pumps performance due to increased recirculation of the pumped fluid. This liftsetting can be adjusted from 0.000" to approximately 0.500". At 0.000", the impeller is touching the liner, and in actuality would bind upon pump startup due to downthrust causing the shaft to stretch,

'forcing it to rub against the liner (explained in detail in following paragraphs). At 0.500",

'the top of the impeller comes in contact with the bowl ofthe pump.

The original lift setting specified by the pump manuhcfre, Byron Jackson,; was 0.02 1".

The lift is set under a static condition (pumps off and water in column only up to river elevation). This recommended lift setting was changed by Byron Jackson in 1993 to be greater than 0.0567. 'The reason for this change was due to shaft elongation resulting from the hydraulic forces action on the impeller prodwxe a downward thrust which will stretch ihe shaft. This stretch was determined to be 0.030" at 6000 gpm and 0.039" at shutoff head.

The SW pumps are also exposed to another phenomena that will cause the lift to change on these style of pumps. This is caused by different coefficients ofthermal expansion of the impeller shaft and the pump outer column based on changes in the river water temperature. As the river warms up, the pump lift inceases due to the shaft expanding at a lower rate than the column and as the river cools down the opposite occurs and pump lift decreases.

The gland water supply to the lineshaft bearings.also plays a role. The temperature of the gland water in theinner column around the pump shaft causes additional thermal expansion and contraction effects because this water may be a different temperature than the pumped water. If the gland water is at a significantly different temperature than the pumped fluid, the thermal expansion and contraction effects can be large.

J

I

.4 4

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J; Other factors than can affect the clearance or lift setting of the pump include the following:

• Static stretch of the shaft. The weight of the shaft and impeller will stretch the shaft.

• Stretch of the pump column dueto hydraulic forces. During operation, the discharge pressure and weight of the water will be t.-nsferred to the column, causing the column to lengthen.

• Thermal expansion of the motor shaft and frame. The stator and rotorwill be at different temperatures and the resulting differential expansion will affect the axial position of the pump shaft.

" Looseness in coupling and impeller fitsto the shaft.

Taking these factors into acc6unt using design river water temperatures of 32 "'F to 90 *F, ".

4 the lift can vary up to 0.087" due to thermal expansion, and can stretch a minimum of 0.030" from hydraulic forces.

It may be helpful to consider the basic steps in establishing the running clearance for the

-SW pumps. The following example is intended to clarify the relationship between the

,various factors that affect the pump clearance and the process of establishing the lift setting and operating the pump. The example is for illustrativ, purposes only. The actual sequence of activities followed by station personnel is slightly different.

The conditions in effect when the pump is removed from service and when the lift is adjusted can affect the lift setting. For example, if the'lift is adjusted while well water is still being injected into the shaft-enclosing tube or if there is a substantial height ofwater in the column, the conditions will be different than if all water has been drained from the pump and it is at ambient temperature. For simplicity, the following steps assume the pump is completely out of service-and is being reassembled at ambient temperature.

Prior to re-establishing the lift, there is no'flow through the shaft enclosing tube or the column and the shaft and column are at the same temperature (ambient). Since there is no water in the colu n, there are no hydraulic forces acting on the impeller or on the column. The shaft and impeller are sitting on the lower.bowl liner surface and the shaft is in compression due to its own weight. The column is elongated due to its own weight and because it is carrying the weight of the shaft and impeller.

Before the shaft is lifted, the'desired lift setting is established at the coupling. When the bolts are tightened and the shaft is lifted, the shaftzcomes out of compression and goes

.7

• t .5 I

into tension. The shaft is elongated due to its own weight plus that of the impeller. The lifting of the impeller and shaft reduces the load on the column slightly, but it remains in tension due to its own weight.

After reassembly of the coupling is completed, water from the gland water system is supplied to the shaft enclosing tube. Since the source of gland water is the well water

,,system, the temperature ofthe (enclosed) shaft will approach the temperature of the well water. Since the well water temperature will, most likely, be different than the ambient temperature, the shaft will expand or contract. The column, however, will remain at ambient temperature.

Before'the pump is started, vwaer enters the column and, depending on river level, reaches some height above the impeller. Once the pump is started, river water flows up through the column. The hydraulic forces acting on the impeller produce an additional stretch of the shaft. The hydraulic forces acting on the column produce an additional stretch of the column.

Since the source ofthe water is the Missouri River, the'temperature of the column will approach the temperature of the river., Since the river temperature may be different than the ambient temperature, the column may expand orcontract. However, whether ornot the ambient and riverteImperatures differ, the well water and river temperatures almost certainly will.'There will be some heat transfer across the shaft enclosing tube and so the exact temperature of the shaft is difficult topredict. In general, however, the expansion or contraction of the column will differ from the expansion or contraction ofthe shaft and, as a result, the clearance between the impeller and bowl will undergo a further change.

Each time the lift is adjusted, the static and hydraulic effects should be approximately the same. However, depending on the ambient, well water, and iiver temperatures, the thermal effects can be very different. Thus, if the net effect is to increase the clearance between the impeller and the bowl, the pump performance will be degraded. If, on the other hand, the net effect is to decrease the clearance, the pump performance could actually improve. If the decrease in the clearance is excessive, the impeller and bowl surfaces will come into contactdand will begin to wear, This, in 'turn, will cause the pump performance to be degraded and will cause the motor to draw excessive amps. [Note:

Although impeller wear will decrease the impeller's flow area sand, thereby, cause some decrease in the"performance of the pump, contact between the impeller and bowl liner might wear away only a relatively small amount of material. This could, effectively, establish very tight clearances and, perhaps, better match the contours ofthe impeller and liner-which would tend to improve the performance ofthe pump..In some cases, the net effect would be that pump performance would appear to improve temporarily.]

Effective monitoring and trending of these items can be used to ensur? frequent SW pump lift adjustments are performed to keep the SW pumps operating in a desired band.

These items are being monitored and trended by the System Engineer which is used as a basis to recommend adjusting SW pump lifts when required.

8

The original vendor specified pump lift setting for tae SW pumps was 0.021". In fact this is still stamped on the pump nameplate. Ifthe pumps were set at a lift of 0.021" and the shaft stretch is at least 0.030" from downthrust alone when the pump is sted, it can

.easily be seen that the impeller will contact the liner. This is not even taking into account the effects the river temperatue changes have on the impeller and liner clearance. Both ofthese materials (impeller and liner) are stainless steel and rubbing of these two materials together under high speeds (1180 rpm) will produce galling of the surfaces.

This could lead to pump binding and/or shaft breakage.

Due to the shaft stretch from downthnzst, the SW pump vendor manual was revised in 1993 to increase the recommended lift settings on the SW pumps from 0.021" to a range of 0.040" to 0.060".

Figure 3 is from a recent SW pumpbowl assembly after being replaced. The galling in

,the liner and at the impeller vane tips from rubbing can be easily seen and is typical of all of the SWpump bowl assemblies that are replaced.

FIGURE 3 These problems with this type of pump are common in the industry and have come to light in the early 90's. Many utilities are still struggling to deal with these seasonal changes in pump lift.

DESIGNAND OPER 7TON OFTHEE BAY (SWPUMPBA)9 A guide wall, known as the weir wail, has been constructed in front of the Intake Structure to reduce sediment buildup in the Intake"Structure. The primary purpose of the weir wall is to reduce the sediment input to the Intake Structure by forcing bed load and other material contained at lower elevations in the river to flow past the intake to a point 9

RrMWIMMIMI"Mý-TWXM U

ýX, where inflow to the intake will not influence river behavior. The upper elevations of the

.river containing relatively finer sediment flow.over the submerged weir. A model study[2] indicated a potential reduction ofas much as 75% in the amount of sediment to be arried into the Intake Structure wvth the weir wall intaled.

A reinforced concrete intake structure is constructed at the zivebank. The operating floor of the structure, on which the Service Water pumps awe mounted is at Elevation 903.5 feet. The bottom elevation of the SW pump bay is 857.5 feet. (see figure 4)

The shape of the SW pump bay can be described as follows; Where the water enters the

-bay it necks down to nine feet, eight inches wide at the area where the trash racks'and travelling screens are. The bay then widens out approximately 16' upstream of the SW pumps. (see figure 5)

Silt accumulation in the entrance and interior of the intake is controlled by the following:

A water jet sparging system is installed near the bottom of the Intake Structure to agitate the silt and keep it in suspension, thus preventing its settling out. The sparging system consists offive rows of high-pressure water-spmy nozzles in the SW bay. Each set is approximately I foot offthe floor.of the pump bay with one set (JAC) installed approximately 3 to 6 inches upstream of the SW pumps. These spargers are adequately located in the SW pump bay and in sufficient number to prevent the silt from settling out.

Sounding of the bay in front of the SW pumps continues to show little, if any sit/sand build up on the floor of the bay directly upstream ofthe SW pumps.

The E bay travelling screen is located upstream of the SW pumps and functions to remove debris greater than 3/8" in sizefrom the water entering the SW purmp bay (E bay). The screenwash system functions to backwash the debris that accumulates in the screen and flushes the debris back out to the river.

The spray wash assembly and/or the traveling screens may be turned off for short periods oftime (seven days) to perform maintenance. Silting has been evaluated and determined not to be a problem for these short periods oftime. In addition to the above, flow,

ýpressure and temperature data from the critical heat exchangers is periodically analyzed to detect any trends that could occur as a-result ofsilt accumulation per Generic Letter 89-13.

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Pubfk I FIGUR 4 RIVER M-,7li* ...

FIJG1RE-5 12

N The D SWpump inspection on 12127102 revealed the following information:

Examinafion ofall the rubber Cutlass bearings in the pump found no evidence of unusual wear or "drY" contact They all appeared in good condition. No damage or unusual wear was noted in the pump shaft sections. The area under the pump (floor ofthe SW intake bay) was sounded to ensure there was no unusual build up of silt or sediment. This was.

performed under work order 4216375 on 12/27/01 where a weight was used to sound the

bay could be felt hitting concrete and the depths indicate no silt buildup. Close ecamination of the fracture found no evidence of fatigue. The appearance of the fracture appeared consistent with over-load by torsion with some bending moment, posswbly due to secondary moments caused bydeflection (Photograph 2 and 3 below).

., T!:1 Photograph 2. General view ofthe fracture in'the coupling..

13

[]

O Photograph 3. Close up view fracture surface.

A check of the Byron Jackson pump material specifications for this coupling found that it is specified to be heat-treated 410 stainless steel. Heat treatment was to be in accordance with ASTM 479 HT2 specifications, which -indicatesthat the material should have a final hardness of 269 13HN or Rc27. This hardness is consistent with a tensile strength of 126,000 psi.

The impeller and liner were disassembled, removed and examined. The liner and impeller were badly abraded, as shown in photographs 4 and 5. The linerlhad an especially deep phonograph type wear pattern caused by impingement of the impeller into the liner. This was caused by insufficient lift adjustment. Some ofthe marks on the 14

liner appeared fresh. Roll over material abrad 4 from the edges of the impeller blades was also razorsharp, which is an indication of having been recently made. Abrasions that have been present fbr some time in the'liner or impeller tend to be "sOftened" and blunted by erosion ofthe suspended solids in the water.. CM Photograph 4.'Phonograph abrasion pattern in liner.

Photograph 5. Close up view ofabrasion pattern in liner.

At the time this event occurred, the river temperature had dropped to approximately 32 OF (P0MS point M138). The D SW pump had previously'had alift adjustment performed on December 5,200 L At that time, the river temperature was approximately 43 0 F (PMIS

point M138). .The as-lef" lift setting on'December 5, 2001, was 0.048 inches. Since pump down thrust causes the shaft to extend more than 0.030 inches when operating, this left a net dearance ofabout 0.018 inches when the pump was operating. Based on the difference in rates of thermal expansion caused by a drop in river temperature of I I OF this would have caused the pump impeller to'impinge upon the liner at the time that this failure occurred. This would have significartly increased the required starting torque.

It is known from past experience at CNS that the shaft and couplings have been sufficiently strong with respect to torque. Experience shows that when the shaft is held immobile, the motor will trip off or burn out prior to failure of the shaft or coupling.

This was demonstrated on March 2,1987, with service water pump"D". As was reported in NCR 87-0827: Uponsart up ofpqp,i blue moke cme out ofthe motor.

Rewvedgroundalrmon breaker BG. Inwesgate andreparrasnecessar. Pumpwas very difficult to rotateatfist but was rotatingfreely before the attempt to stari it.. Other examples are listed in the CNS experience section.

The failed coupling was sent to Rail Sciences, Inc. for analysis. The analysis was performed by Hans iwand, PE., who reached six conclusions:

a. The coupler contained an interoranular crack that existed from the time of 4,;

installaior1

,-. 16

--. -. - P

b. The presence of bronze on the fracture surfice indicates the crack existed during operation (ofthe pump), and when bronze particles from nearby bearings became present it was trapped in the crack.

c. The hardness of the coupler exceeds the allowable standard.

d. The coupler failed due to bending ofthe shaft transverse to its major axis.

e. The coupler failed as a consequence of the pump impeller becoming jammed.

f. No fatigue orother progressive fracture morphology was noted on the fracture surfaces.

The intergranular crack found in the coupling did not cause it to'fail, rather it caused the coupling to become the weak link in the drive train (i.e. imotor overloads, motor shaft, shalt key). The weak link failed clue to the increased starting torque caused by the impeller and liner impingement.

The SW pump lifts since plant startup until 1993 were specified to be in the 0.02l': range and review of past work packages confirm the lifts were set at this value. It should also be noted that the pre-1993 events occurred even after peiforming frequent rotations ofthe pumps.: In 1993,'the required lift setting was increased to 0.056'" nominally with a

.recommended range of 0.040" to 0.060" to account for shift stietch. No failures resulting from impeller/liner contact occurred after adjusting the lift setting on the SW pumps in this range until this event.

The lack of understanding of the real issue has caused many operational changes to the rotation of the SW pumps, as evidenced by the changes to Procedure 2.2.71.

The timeline of these changes to Procedure 2.2.71, "Service Water System" and justification for each change is identified below and in the references.

" 1974, based on suspected SW pump bindingproblems and input from Byron Jackson,

pump rotation by hand using a wrench was initiated every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

17

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 2, added a requirement to manually rotate the SW pumps once per 8-hour shift (cire~a 1975).

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 15, per standing order 78-5, shift running and standby SW pumps each 8-hour shift (4/83).

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 20, per nonconformnance report 87-004 (smoked SW motor due to bound pump caused by heavy silting) added a requirement to manually rotate each SW pump before each ioun-atomatic start (7/87).

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 25, standardized method of rotating idle pumps daily (7/89)

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 34, instituted 12-hour pump rotation to be consistent with procedure 2.1.11, 'Station Operations Tour" and management direction (8/94).

17 J

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• Pocedure 2.231'Pev 36, deld manual rotation requirements (2/95).

-,Pr6cedr2.2.71,Rev45, added a specific section providing guidance for performing Testing csiltatio'n in the SW pump bays with and without the sparger systems in 1973 was also revieied (reference 76). Thistestingwasconducted to determine siltation levels in the E bay and was p rmed o .And a oy t C SWpumpsbetwe October 5 and 12,1973. During this period of time the travelling screens and spargers were secured, the sluice gate between bays D and E was open and the spargers and screens in bay D were WE During the test, river levels and condition were recorded.

During this period of time the river level varied between 881.5' to 890.5' (emergency flood procedure entered at elevation 895') and river condition was described as muddy to very muddy at the higher river level. The muddy condition described at the higher river level is as expected due to the known increase in suspended solids with increased river level and velocity, which also results in'conservative test results.

The following conclusions were reached from these events:

• With the two SW pumps rumnng, the area around the SW pumps and fire pumps remained almost entirely free of sediment, except for small lumps near the sidewalls.

• The sediment deposition in oiher areas gradually increased during the lest period of a week as follows:

From2' 6" to 9' 6"atthe trash racks From 2' 6"-to 7",0" in front of the travelling screen From 2'"6" to 5' 0" behind the travelling screens

• After this test the bay was easily.cleared of silt by putting the spargers J1, J2 and J3 on with low pressure water (30 psig). However, high dps were experienced across the .3ý SW pump discharge strainers due to the spargers lifting sediment into the waterway to be carried into the pumps and strainers.

These conclusions indicate that silt has less affect on pump operation than originally believed.

Silt accumulafing in the area between the top side of the impeller and wear ring to the extent that the pump could not start is just not feasible considering the amount of force applied to the shaft when the motor starts. Silt would have to be completely packed into the whole pump and would have to be dry with no lubrication. ýThe motor shaft would not physically contort from the forces exerted by sand in the wear ring, the sand would give as opposed to metal/metal contact

-*. Ifthe pump was completely packed and encased in silt, the pump would still operate and pump Alt. The rdatvely high amount ofporosity in samples taken from the river,: which 4i

• ":". ,. " . ... 18

is typical of sand, indicates that when fully F sturated, the sand still remains "flowable."

In other words, unless a-binding agent is added which creates additional cohesion between the individual sand particles (sand is naturally non-cohesive), or unusual compressive forces "iqueeze" out the normal amount ofporosity, the water which fills the intehsces acts as an internal lubricant and keeps the material "fluidized." 'Such water saturated sand Will simply flow in accordance with the usual characteristics of a liquid with a high specific gravity. At saturated conditions, sediment that would be found in the intake bays has a density ofabourt 2.02 and a porosity ofabout 37%. (reference # 77)

Previous inspections of the pump impellers and the area above the impeller during overhauls have not shown any signs of significant amounts of silt or sand in the wear ring areas. Normal wear is also seen on these surfaces.

Previous inspections ofthe SW pumps' stainless steel impellers and liners during 2 overhauls show signs ofgalling'and rubbing between these surfaces. -This can be seen by the deep grooves and rolling over of stainless steel material (up to /" ddpth) along the

,liner and grooving and rolling over of the-stainless steel material ofthe vane tips. (figure

1. 3)

The issue of thermal expansion differences between the pump shafts and columns causing

the impeller lift to change in combination with the downthrust experienced during pump runs is'now well understood at Cooper and throughout the industry. This is being

,addressed separately and will ultimately improve the performance ofthe SW pumps and allow less frequenft, maintenance to.be performed.

lBased on the information obtained and studies performed,-the cause of the failure of the SSW pump was not due to the coupling flaw nor siltation in the pump orpump bay, but the result of the impeller impinging into the liner from diflTrential thermal expansion.

This differential thermal expansion was introduced by an inadequate glandwater system design and also differences in the respective coefficients of thermal expansion of the pump shaft compared to the bowl and columns.

Based on this the lifts were reset on the A, B and C SW pumps onl2/28/01 (Work orders 4216875, 4216873 and 4216874).

Actions have been established by the SW system engineers for monitoring and setting lift adjustments to preclude binding from impeller/liner contact in the future. This monitoring will also preclude the lift from opening up to far which could result in the performance ofa.SW pump degrading significantly. This is monitored by the SW system trend plan.

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TVZF 7REXWr z ANALMTCALI ECHNOUES Barrier Analysis and Kepner-Tregoe analytical techniques were used in this root cause evaluation.

Some ofthe key points that came out of these analysis techniques were evidence ofthe impeller rubbing against the liner, the coupling flaw was present at the time of manufactui and the river temnperature decreased rapidly. Together these items were used to determine the root cause of this event.

CNS EXPERIENCE AND INDUSTRY EVENTS CNSXPERIENCE A review of the unidatadtabaiewasperformed on this subject and nmany operations personnelwere interviewed includingindividualsWith manyparsof CooperNuclear Station experience. The referenceddocuments that were identfifed as beingrelatedto this issue via the unidatasearch were reviewed awd referenced These documents center around significant issues .ofsilt entrainment in the SW and CW pump bays and in the systeins themselves from the Missouri River. Most of these documents were from the early. 1970's timeframe.

This review did not show any documented cases of significant amounts of silt directly in front ofthe SW pumps. This review did identify 4 previous instances ofSW pump binding but the details of these events are'lacking. These events all incorrectly classified the failure of the pumps as being silt related as opposed to galling from contact with the impeller and liner. Athough, it was noted several times, juistas passing ihoughis, that impeller, wear ring contact could have been the cause of some of these failures.

These four events are:

At approximately 0210 hours0.00243 days <br />0.0583 hours <br />3.472222e-4 weeks <br />7.9905e-5 months <br /> on 3-7-74, SW pump D failed to start during routine pump switching operations. The pump motor breaker tripped on overload; and the pump shaft was not observed to rotate. Subsequently, While performing surveillance procedure 6.3.18.1 as required by Technical Specifications, secion 4.11.C.2, SW pump "A" failed to start. With observations identical tothose on SW pump D,

,neither pump could be rotated by hand. An orderlytreactot shutdown was commenced as required by section 3.11 .C.3 of the technical specifications. All control rods were inserted and the reactor mode switch was placed in "shutdown" at 1134 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.31487e-4 months <br /> on 3-7-74.

The apparent cause was determined to be higher than normal silt concentrations being experienced adjacent to the intake structure due to weir wall construction upstream, and because of this, sand had infiltrated into the wear rings of these pumps. The spargers wereoperational at this time. SW pump Dhad been shut down for a peiod 20

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I

N of approximately 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> and SW puwap A for approximately 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br />. SW pump A was freed and placed into service at approximately 1130 hows on 3-7-74 and SW pump D was fieed and placed into service at approximately 1600 h6urs on 3-7-74.

The pumps were freed by simply uncoupling the motor from the shaft, which essentially raised the-umpeller lift setting, and recoupling the motor.

Corrective actions were to change operational procedures (approved by the Byron Jackson service representative),which was to alleviate this particular problem until the weir wall was completed. At the time it was believed that the buildup of sand in the pump wear rings was a function of river silt concentration and the length of time that the pump remains idle. Corrective actions were to run two SW pumps in one loop and one pump in the remaining loop continuously with routine manual rotation of the idle pump to assure that the impeller was free to rotate. This procedure change was to ensure maximum availability of all SW pumps.

I third event occurred on 3/2/87 (reference 48). Upon startup of SW pump D, blue The .;j:

smoke came out of the motor. Prior to the pump stiat, it was rotated with a pipe wrench and was difficult to rotate at first but was rotating freely before attempting to start it. When it was started the shaft was observed to rotate and a ground alarm on breaker IBG was received and the motor tripped. NCR 87-016 was written and documented the cause of this failure to be silt in the wear rings.

'The fourth event was the failure of the A SW pump motormin December 1988. The inspection report by GE (reference'52-56) indicated several problems with the motor.

The rotor was removed and inspected. It was found that the motor shaft was twisted and bent, most noticeably near the lower end. The upper and lower shaft keyways were out of line by approximately five degrees. Also, a fault occurred in a motor coil

'midway through the stator. The top coil in the slot hd burned completely thrugh, and the bottom coil was also damaged. Damage to the stator iron next to the fault also occurred.

The conclusion as to the cause of the failure is that age-related insulation breakdown contributed to the fault, which occurred at the weakest insulation poini in the windings. Loading problems on the motor,are also considered to have been present because of the mechanical condition ofthe rotor high vibration readings for the motor immediately prior to the failure. It was determined that these two items were probably unrelated. A recommendation was also made to inspect the A SW pump and motor forpossible impeller or shaft damage.

Once again it was'thought that silting in the wear ring clearance areas Was the cause of this failure.

fjf,

21

M 1NDUSMRYFXPERIUECE Information Notice 93-68 published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated September 1, 1993, details how a puMp shaft coupling made of 410 stainless steel failed in service on June 20, 1991, due to temper embrittlement during manufacture. The failure occurrW at Beaver Valley Nuclear Station. The pump and coupling were manufactured by Byron Jackson.

The failure involved an internally threaded coupling similar to the one used a+/-CNS. Two additional couplings from the same lot of couplings purchased in 1977 were found to have. cracks and were part ofa lot of 13. All of the deficient couplings came from the same heat treatment batch, HT821336, of type 410 stainless steel.

The notice concludes that "pump shafts containing temper embrittled couplings could fail during operation ifthe pump has worn bearings, the pump shaft is misaligned, or shaft motion is impeded by silt or debris ingestion."

A more complete report concerning this event is available at the following web address:

http://192.168..100.22/fulltext/nrcnotes/in93068.txt.

FORT CALHOUN The SW pumps at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant are the same style Byron Jackson pumps that are at Cooper Nuclear Station with the exception that they are two stage pumps and smaller with a shorter shaft length. The water supply for their SW system is also the Missouri Rivei and they do have significant amounts of siltation in the pump bays., The silt is kept in suspension in'the bays via'a sparger system. Four SW pumps takesuction 7" offthe bottom of a concrete platform in the bay.

Discussions with the SW system engineer indicate that'they have historically swapped their SW pumps once per shift due to potential perceived binding and have overhauled their SW pumps on a 2 year frequency due to perceived wear due to sand erosion.

However approximately 3 years ago, they changed the operation of their SW system due Its.

,togained knowledge on proper lift settings on the SW pump and the notionthat silt in the clearance area between the wear ring and impeller would not cause a SW pump to bind.

They now rui one to two SW pumps all the time and twice a week start and run their idle SW pumps for a couple of minutes. They do not swap pumps and basically run one pump to failure, prolonging the life on nonoperational pumps.

Since Fort Calhounhas chwagedits operatingphilosop,.-therehas been no degzration inperfornimwe of the sacnficialpwmp in 3yea& 'Nor hae any opqeationalproblems occurredon the idle SWpimps when sartedhi-weekly.

22

BEAVER VALLEY The SW pumps at Beaver Valley Nuclear are the same style Byron Jackson pumps that are at Cooper Nuclear Station with the exception that they are larger capacity pumps and have alonger shaft length. The water supply for their SW system is the Ohio River, which is high in suspended solids also. They do have significant amounts of siltation in the pump bays but do not operate with a sparging system. They have'three SW pumps that take suction 7".off the bottom of their pump bay.

Discussions with the SW system engineer and pump component engineer indicate that they have historically had problems in the pastwith the lift settings of their pumps affecting performance from river temps, gland water temps and downthrust They typically run one pump all the time and do not routinely rotate or swap their SW pumps.

They do infrequently swap them to equal the run time.

On February 8, 2000 (OE 334-000208-1) 2 oftheir 3 SW pumps were made inoperable due to an overcurrent trip during start attempts from the control room. The cause of both of these overcwrent trip conditions was due to physical contact between the rotating element (impelier) and the lower casing of the pumps. The cause ofthis conditionwas due to differential thermal expansion between the pump shaft and the pump casing. This was caused by injecting an alternate lube water supply, which was approximately 30 degrees higher than the normal supply. 'This in combination with the downthriust upon pump start caused the impeller to contact the liner and bind. This event was not attributed to silt binding.

SURRY On 11/06/87, a SW pump was discovered to be binding and difficult to turn. This was also attributed to binding between the impeller and liner from thermal expansion and downthrust, not silt binding.

ROOT CAUSE V

The root cause of the coupling failure is aninadequate SW pump design and gland water system design. The D SW pump impeller was impinging upon the bowl liner. The resulting friction between the liner and impeller significantly increased the amount of torque needed to start the pump.

Some of the key points that came out ofthe analysis techniques were evidence of the impeller rubbing against the liner, the coupling flaw was present at the time of manufacture and the river temperature decreased rapidly. Together these items were used to determine the root cause of this event.

• . r23

CORRECTIVE ACTION IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1) The coupling was replaced on the D SW pump by work order 4216375. The lift was reset and the pump was tested and declared operable. (This addresses the condition.)

2) 'The A, B, and C SW pump lifts were reset by work order numbers 4216875,4216873 and 4216874. They were tested and declared operable. (This addressed the extent of condition.)

3) Engineering is continuing to monitor river temperatures and other SW parameters to predict when the lift setting needs to be adjusted on the SW pumps. This is part of the SW system trend plan. (This addresses the cause and condition)

INTERIM ACTIONS

1) The Plant Engineering Department Manager will educate the Plant Manager, the Work Control Manager and the Maintenance Manager on the importance of performing SWpump lift adjustments when required. (This addresses the condition.)

LONG TERM ACTIONS

1) None. Additional long term actions are being tracked by RCR 98-015.(This will address both the condition and cause for the long term).

E'NHANCEENS I) None REFERENCES

1) CNS VendorManual 0180 for Service Water Pumps, Materials of Construction

2) Working Data- CarpenterStainlessSteels, Carpenter Steel Division, 1973, page 26.

3) MetalProgressData Book, Second Edition, American Society ofMetals, page 4, Typical Mechanical Properties of Selected Carbon and Alloy Steels, table I.

4) ASTM A-479, Stainless and Heat-Resisting" Steel Bars and Shapes for Use in'Boilers and Other Pressure Vessels.

5) ASTMA-276, Stai**ess andHea ResistingSteel BarsandShapes 24

, ."*' .* ',-.. - .... /

6) PraicalDataforMellhugistr,The TLaken Company, 'May 1977, pages 88-89, hardness conversion chart.

7) Drawing #2009 - (J-4A)

8) Drawing # 2008 - (J4B)

9) Drawing # 2007 - (J-4C)

.10)Drawing # 2056 11)Drawing # 2C-4747

12) March 28, 1973 - Letterfrom I. Gabel to (obstructed view) concerning proposed sectionalizing Walls in intake structure service bay.

13) April 18, 1973 -'Memo from I. Gabel and M. Kushner to Distribution with attached letter listing areas ofpossible silt build-up.

14) June 13, 1973 -. Letter from M. N. Kushner to E.R. Scott, Burns & Roe Inc. -

Confirms engineering authorization to run pilot test program on two stage cyclone separators for CNS river water silt.

15) September 24, 1973 - Evaluation of Screen Wash and Sparging Pump Arrangement, prepared by Eric Haemer, Mechanical Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc. .- Discusses various problems noted in the screen wash and sparging systems.

16) September26, 1973 -Factual. data and calculations confirming that pump size CSK I 1/ xl-6 successfully passed seismic qualification.

17)November 21, 1973 - Shipping Invoice from CNS to Byron Jackson for 28" KxH-1 stage VCr, sN-68 1-I 1-o441/44, & parts.

18) December 6, 1973- Letter from ER R. Scott, Director, Generation Projects to E. M.

Kuchera, Burns & Roe, Inc.- Discusses diesel generator cooling water strainers.

19)March 12, 1974-NCR 132- SW-P-A & SW-P-D and MWR 74-3-102.

20)March 15,1974- Letter from L.C. Lessor, Station Superintendent, CNS, toE. Morris Howard, Director, US AEC - Discusses abnormal occurrence at CNS.on 3/7/1974.

.21)March 18,1974 -Letter from S. M. Peterson, Site Mechanical Engineer, CNS, to P,.

P. Lovci - Abnormal occurrence involving service water pumps.

22)March 21, 1974 - Letter form IL P. Lovc, Project Manager, CNS, to Burns and Roe, Inc. - Service Water Pumps.

23

.1.". 1;

-. ,s4.

23) March 28, 1974 - Burns and Roe, Inc. -kecord of J. Butz's telephone conversation with A. Acton of Byron Jackson -Discusses W.O. 2978 NPPD/CNS, Service Water Pumps Failure to Rotate and Start.

24) April 11, 1974 - Letterfrom S. M.Peterson, Site Mechanical Engineer, CNS, to W.

G. Corn - Discusses service water pump degradation.

25) April 11, 1974 -Letter from L.C. Lessor, Station Superintendent, CNS, to Irv Gabel

- J. Butz's "Record of Telephone Conversation" with A. Acton of Byron Jackson.

26) April 25,1974 - Letter from Paul B.Davis, Project Engineer, Burns & Roe, Inc. to A.

Acton, -ByronJackson Pttmp Division - Conhrms Byron Jackson is studying methods ofredesigning service water pumps.

27) April or May, 1974 - Letter from C. P. Noyce to Leo concerning degradation curves.

28)May 9, 1974 -Letter from L. C. Lessor to R. P. Lovci concerning SWand CW pumping systems.

29) May 20, 1974 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to Bill Conn concerning SW pump degradation.

30) June 28, 1974 - Letter from H. A. Swarthlout to Sam Peterson concerning Service Water Pumps and W.O. 2593 3 1)July 9, 1974 -Letter from A. J. Acton, Sales Engineer, Byron Jackson Pump Division to Paul B. Davis, Burns & Roe, INC. - Discusses binding problem caused by sift build up in the balance wearring of service water pumps:

32)July 10,_ 1974 - NCR 317 and Functional Test of Service Water.Pumps - less than 6000 gpm at 125'TDH.

33)July 16,1974 - Letter from Paul B. Davis to R. P. Lovci concerning W.O. 2978 Service Water Pumps Modification.

34) August 8, 1974 - Letter from K. L. Meyer to W. G. Conn and C. R. Noyes about Service Water Pumps.

35) August 9,1974 - Letter from M. N. Kushner for Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc. to A. 3. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Requests Byron Jackson to investigate feasibility of specific modifications to service water pumps.

36) August 23, 1974- Memo from M. L. Alexander to L. C. Lessor concerning Service Water Pump Testing.

37) September 5, 1974 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to C. R. Noyes - SW pumps.

26

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• .,S '. ,

38) October 4, 1974 - Letter from L. C. Lesso, to Meeting Attendees - SW booster pump meeting minutes.

39)November 12, 1974 - Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice - Adds "Manually Rotate each idle pump once per shift" to Procedure 2.2.71 Rev. No. 2.

40) December 4, 1974 -Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Bums and Roe, Inc.

to A. J. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Confirms telecons and requests feedback on service water pump design proposals.

41 )December 16, 1974 - Letter from Paul B. Davis,'Project Engineer, Bums and Roe, Inc. to A. J. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Request for Byron Jackson to

-review potential effects of design modifications on seismic analysis of service water pumps.

42) February 4, 1975 -Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc.

to R. P. Lovci, CNS - Discusses stainless steels used to manufacture impellers.

43)March 17, 1975 -Letter from L. C. Lessor to K. L. Meyer concerning SW pumps and SW booster pumps.

44) March 26, 1975 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to Meeting Attendees - SW and SWBP meeting -minutes.

45) March 27, 1975 - Letter from A. J. Acton, Sales Engineer, Byron Jackson Pump Division, to Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns & Roe, Inc. - Discussion of proposed service water pump modifications.

46) April 16,1975 -Letter from L. C, Lessor, Station Superintendent, CNS, to John Butz, Burns and Roe, Inc. - Discusses service water pump binding.

47)May 8, 1975 - Letter from Paul B, Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc. to R.

P. Lovci, CNS - Summarizes and reports the Engineering status and recommendations for PAW list item 0-10 on the service water pump binding

ýproblem.

48) July 9, 1975 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to T. G. Hoeman - Service Water Pump Bindin&

49) September 9, 1975 - NCR 603 - SW pump IB was inop on 9-5.

50) December 30, 1975 -Letter from L. C. Lessor to C. I. Noyes - Indicates more than normal binding of SW pumps.

51)December 9, 1980- MWR 08-0457 - SW-P-A vibrates excessively: overhaul.

27

,-.. ." .  ; A.;.

• tf... -

52)March 23, 1983 - Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice - Incorporated Special Order 78-5, de~ilng with shifting the running and standby service water pumps on 0000-0800 shif, in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 15.

53) December 12,1986- MWR 86-4320 - "Overhauled Service Water Pump as needed and replaced expansion boot."

54)April 8,1987-MWR 87-0827 - 4Disconnect SW-MOT-SWPD electrically, Verified motor grounded at motor, Put motor on, Set lift, and Returned to service."

55) June 26, 1987 - Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice - Changes valve letter designations in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 20.

56) March 2, 1988 -NCR 87-016 - SW pump motor ID had a certificate of compliance, not a technical letter report provided with the repaired motor.

57) May 12, 1988 - NCR 88-130 - SW pmnp A failed to run during surveillance testing forpost maintenance testing.

58) December 20,1988 - NCR 88-230 - SW-P-A failed to start twice.

59) December 20, 1988 -MWR, WI.No 88-4941 - SW-P-A.

60)December.28, 1988 -,Letter from R. A. Schultz to J. L. Peaslee - SW-P-A Reference Values and AcceptanceOCriteria.

61) January 23, 1989 - Record of phone conversation between J.D. Dykstra, CNS, and Jim Mokri, GM. - SW-P-A motor vibration data.

62) Jamiary 25,1989-,Letter from J. D. Dykstra, Electrical/I&C Engineer to J. R.

Flaherty - Trip Report, January 16, 1988, for Service Water Pump Motor Failure.

63)May 19,1989 -Procedure change notice - Changes mode selector from Pill-to-Lock to'Manual in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 25.

64) August 14,1989 - Letter from J. M. Meacham, Sr. Manager, Operations, to D. J.

Brager, Services Project Manager, GE Authorization for a Task 156 Item for CE to review vibration data and operating history on SW pump motor A.

65)February 12,1993 -Procedure Change Notice - Changes operating configuration of service water gland water systems and other service water changes in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 34.

66)November 6, 1993 -DR 93-438 and evaluation / corrective action - Service Water Pump lift adjustment settings.

28 I

F' n-1.:¶.. ,:;g~ .

67)November30, 1993 -VMCF 93-350 - Change to vendor manual 0180 replacing

.initial release and change record page 681-H-0441/4.

68)Februhay 25, 1994- Closure ofDR 93-438 - Service water pump lift adjustment settings.

69)March 1, 1994 - VMCF 94-093 - Change to vendor manual 0180 with revised instruction manual pages affecting SW-P-A, B, C, D.

70) August 7, 1994 - Temporary Procedure Change Notice - Station Operators Tour -

Procedure 0.4.2 - no longer necessary to rotate all SWBPs.

71) August 7, 1994 - Temporary Procedure change notice to 2.2.71 - shift SW pumps once per 12-hr. shift.

72)February 28, 1995 -Procedure Change Notice - changes procedure # 2.2.71 by changing reference for low river level effects.

73) June 29, 2000- CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.2.71 -

Service Water System.

74) September 28, 2000 -CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.1.11 -

Station Operators Tour.

75)December 21, 2000 - CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.1.12 -

Control Room Data.

76) December 21, 2000- C'NS Operations Manual System Opterating Procedure 2.2.3.1 -

Traveling Screen, Screen Wash, and Sparger System.

77)February 1, 2001 - CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.1.11 -

Station Operators Tour.

78)February 13, 2001 -Failure Report with Unit Information - SURRY 2 -

2-SW-P-10B.

79)February'13, 2001 -Two of three safety-related river water pumps made inoperable by change to seal water supply- 334, Beaver Valley 1.

80) Februaiy 13, 2001- Failure Report with Unit Information - SW-P-A.

81)February 13,12001 -E-mail from Dwight J. VorpahK, Jr.to Dwight J. Vorpahl, Jr. -

OE 10760- (Update to OE 10671) BVPS-1 B and C River Water Pumps Tripped on Overcurent During Pump Starts.

82) CooperIntake Performcnceof SprgingSystem.

29

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• tintw11i Mce water *.*ter

ýcwn, se~wh printout producing the above refernces.

ATTACHMENTS I) Report byRail Sciencsý, Inc., dated December 27,2001, by Hans Iwand, P.,E Fai**feAnalys ofPýi S CozpllngforNPD

2) February 20, 2001 - Report titled, "Evaluation of SW Pump.Rotsaion Frequency",-

Dwight Vorpabl

3) Work Order4216374

4) Notification 10132527

5) SAP screen print ofwork order 4216875

6) SAP scrween print of work order 4216873

7) SAP screen print of'work order 4216874

8) SAP screen print ofwork order 4216375

PED-BOP GROUP Dwight Vorpahl- SW System Engineer Bob Thacker -"PED-BOP Supervisor February 20, 2001

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no-foxswp 4" Pagerrotatd ver twelve hours per system operating Pb 2~74 iev 4Thd.System0Operting ftoedure 1o Mm t~e 403~ '~SrieWaler ' (SW)jpumps are rotate every tWeoilt and sand from the suction aiea ofthe SW pumps. It has been hiitoý ay tbn~oub that this will enisure that large accumulations Of silt and.a. io p to bind sptartup. es frequent strsstops of the SWp.mps causcIdi onal stress on the pumps, additional operator burdens and ddon/~~e adiiiWstraiive LCO's which ae taken when rotating pumps. This LCO is taken due torthe selector switch for the SW pumps being placed in manual vs auto to eliminate the potential for the SWpump in auto to either auto start on low pressure or trip on high pressure.

This evaluation is being written to determine the effects of silt and sand in the SW pump, bay and its affect on the ability of the SW pumps to start when required. An evaluation will also be made as to the cause of the pump binding incidents that have occurred in the the SW pumps, sparger system, design information on the SW pumps and industry experience related to this issue. '7his information will then be used to determine the true cause ofthe past incidents of pump binding and will determine if the rotation frequency for the SW pumps can be relaxed.

DISCUSSION

'DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE SW PUMPS Figure I shows the layout of the SW pump and motor. The suction of the SW pump is approximately 46 feet below the bottom of the SW pump motor and the suction of the SW pump is approximately 22" above the bottom of the pump bay.

A.

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-. 4

o6-FIGURE 1

The SW pumps normally operate with an injection supp'y of gland waterfrom, the riverwrll water system. This water source is injected in the stufrmg box gland. Part of this water lubricates the packing and is discharged out of the pump paeking to the enviromment, which then flows into the discharg elbow casing and through a'hole back down into the pump bay. The rest of this water flows down the shaft in the enclosing tube (which encapsulates the pump shaft)lubricating the lineshaft bearings. The water then exits the top case bearing (top of the impeller see figure 2 item #12) and exists into the hollow chamber above the impeller. From here the water exits from the area between the top edge radius area of the impeller (figure 2 item #2) and the wear ring (figure 2 item 6), where it mixes with the pumped fluid. This gland water will flush any water out of the impeller/wear ring area when the pump is idle.

The stainless steel open style impeller of this pump matches the contour of the imnpeller liner (figure 2 item #9). The impeller is designed to be able to be raised above the impeller liner to allow for shaft stretch and for increasing or decreasing performance. As the impeller is raised,the impeller lift increases, which increases the dimension between the impeller and impeller liner. Increasing the lift decreases the pumps performance duec to increased recirculation of the pumped fluid. This lift setting can be adjusted from 0.000" to approximately 0.500'" At 0.000" the impellerfis touching the liner, and in actuality would bind upon pump startup due to downthrust causing the shaft to stretch

,forcing it to rub against the liner. (explained in detail in following paragraphs). At

'0.500" the top of the impeller comes in contact with the bowl of the pump.

The original lift setting specified by the pump manufacturer, Byron Jr;mson, was 0.0217.

The lift is set under a static condition (pumps off and water in column only up to river elevation). This recommended lift setting was changed by Byron Jackson in 1993 tobe greater than 0.056". The reason for this change was'due to shaft elongation resulting from the downthrust of the impeller pushing Up on the column ofpumped water. This stretch was determined to be 0.030" at 6000 gpm and 0.039t at shutoff (0 pumped flow).

These pumps are also exposed to another phenomena that will cause thelift to change on these style of puips. This is caused by differential expansion of the impeller shaft and the pump outer column based on changes in the river water temperature and riverwell water temperature. As the river warms up this creates the lift to increase due to the shaft expanding a lower rate than the column and as the river cools down vice versa. The riverwater supply to the lineshaft bearings also plays a role but to a lesser degree. Based on design river water temperatures of 32 deg F to 90.deg F, the lift can vary up to 0.060" due to thermal expansion

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005 0ý-.Vg q;-

I ICA 1

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If the pumps were set at a lift of 0.021" and the shaft stretch is at least 0.030" from downthrust alon when the pumpis started, it can easily be seen that the impeller will contact the liner. This is not even taking into account the effects the river temperature changes have on'the impeller and liner clearance area. Both of these materials (impeller and liner) are stainless steel and rubbing of these two materials together under high speeds (H18("rpm) will produce galling of the surfaces. This could lead to pump binding and/or shaft breakage.

Figure3 is from a recent SW pump bowl assembly after being replaced. The galling in the liner and at the impeller vane tips from rubbing can be easily seen and is typical of all of the SW pump bowl assumblies that are replaced.

FIGURE 3

'tiz.

These problems with this type of pump are common in the industry and have come to light in the early 90's. Many utilities are still struggling to deal with these seasonal changes in pump lift.

.2.,

F;WFW DESIGN AND OPBRATION OF THE E BAY (SW PUMP BAY)

A guide wall, known as the weir wall, has been constructed in front of the Intake Structure to reduce sediment buildup in the Intake Structure. The primary purpose of the weir wall is toreduce the sediment input to the Intake Structure by forcing bed load and other material contained at lower elevations in the river to flow past the intake to a point where inflow'to the intake will not influence river behavior. The upper elevations of the river containing relatively finer sediment flow over the submerged weir. A model study[2] indicated a potential reduction of as much as 75%"in the amount of sediment to be carried into the Intake Structure with the weir wall installed.

A reinforced concrete intake structure is constructed at the river bank. The operating

.floorof the structure, on which the Service'Water pumps are mounted is at Elevation 903.5 feet. The bottom elevation of the SW pump bay is 857.5 feet. (see figure 4)

The shape of the SW pump bay can be described as follows; Where the water enters the bay it necks down to nine feet, eight inches wide at the area where the trash racks and travelling screens are. The bay then widens out approximately 16' upstream of the SW pumps. (see figure 5) J..

The spray wash assembly and/or the traveling screens may be turned off for short periods of time (seven days),to perform maintenance. Silting has been evaluated and determined not to be a problem for these short periods of time. In addition to the above, flow, pressure and temperature data from the critical heat exchangers is periodically analyzed to detect any trends that could occur as a result of silt accumulation per Generic Letter 89-13.

Silt accumulation in the entrance and interior ofthe intake is controlled by the following:

A water jet sparging system is installed near the bottom of the Intake Structure to agitate the silt and keep it in suspension, thus preventing its settling out. The sparging system consists of five rows of high p0essure water spray nozzles in the SW bay. Each set is approximately r1 foot off the floor of the pump bay. Figure 6 shows one set ofspargers, 34-C which are the closest to the SW pumps. Spargerjet J-3 is installed within the traveling screens to keep'the screen boot area free of silt buildup. The above-mentioned principal operating jet J-3 is utilized on an automatic sequential schedule. 1-2 header is used to clear the guides for the screens when they are replaced following maintenance.

SW bay jets J-4A agitate silt 1.5 feet upstream of the centerline of the Fire Pumps where the bay expands. Spargerjet J-4B agitate silt 3.5 feet downstream of the Fire Pwmp, yet upstream of the SW pumps. Spargerjets J-4C are installed approximately 3 tD 6 inches upstream of the SW pumps.

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FIGURE 5

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n r-r HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PROBLEM A review of the unidata database was performed on this subject and many operations personnel were interviewed including individuals with many years of Cooper Nualear Station experience. The referenced documents that were identified as being related to this issue via the unidata search were reviewed and referenced.

These documents center around significant issues ofsilt entrainment in the SW and CW pump bays and in the systems themselves from the'Missouri River. Most of these documents were from the early 1970's timeframe.

This review did not show any documented cases of significant amounts ofsilt directly in front of the SW pumps. Ws review did identify 4 previous instances of SWpump bindtug but the details of these events are lacking. These events all incorrectly classified the failure ofthe pumps as being silt related as opposed to galling from contact with the impeller and wear ring. Although, it was noted several times, just as passing thoughts, that impeller, wear ring contact could have been the cause of some of these failures.

These four events are:

The first two events occurred on 3/7/94 (reference 14). At appproximately 021.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> on 3-7-74, SW pump D failed to start during routine pump switching operations. The pump motor breaker tripped on overload, and the pump shaft was not observed to rotate. Subsequently, while performing surveillance procedure 6.3.18.1 as required by Technical Specifications, section 4.1 1.C.2, SW pump "A" failed to start. 'With observations identical to those on SW pump D, neither pump could be rotated by hand. An orderly reactor shutdown was commenced as required by section 3.11 .C.3 of the technical specifications. All control rods were inserted and the reactor mode switch was placed in "shutdown" at 1134 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.31487e-4 months <br /> on 3-7-74.

The apparent cause was determined to be higher than normal silt concentrations being experienced adjacent to the intake structure, due to weir wall construction upstream, and because of this, sand had infiltrated into the wear rings of these pumps. The spargers were operational at this time. SW pump D had been shut down for a period of approximately 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> and SW pump A for approximately 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br />. SW pump A was freed and placed into service at approximately 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br /> on 3-7-74 and SW pump D was freed and placed into service at approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on 3-7-74.

The pumps were freed by simply uncoupling the motor from the shaft, which essentially raised the impellerlift setting, and recoupling the motor.

Corrective actions were to change operational procedures (approved by the Byron Jackson service representative) which was to alleviate this particular problem until the weir wall was completed. At the time it was believed that the buildup of sand in the pump wear rings was a finction of river silt concentration and the length of time that the pump remains idle. Corrective actions were to run two SW pumps in one

- - ~ .. 4......~..-.--..- - I

loop and one pump in the remaining loop continuously with routine manual rotation of the idle pump to assure that the impeller was free to rotate. This procedure change was to ensure maximum availability of all SW pumps.

0 The third event occuiied on 3/2/87 (reference 48). Upon startup ofSW pump D, blue smoke came out of the motor. Prior to the pump start, it was rotated with a pipe wrench and was difficult to rotate at first but was rotating freely before attempting to start it. When it was started the shaft was observed to rotate and a ground alarm on breaker IBG was received and the motor tripped. NCR 87-016 was written and documented the cause of this failure to be silt in the wear rings.

a The fourth event was the failure of the A SW pump motor in December 1988. The inspection report by GE (reference 52-56) indicated several problems with the motor.

Mhe rotor was removed and inspected. It was found that the motor shaft was twisted and bent, most noticeably near the lower end. The upper and lower shaft keyways were out of line by approximately five degrees. Also, a fault occuired ina motor coil midway through the stator. The top coil in the slot bad burned completely through, and the bottom coil was also damaged. Damage to the stator iron next to the fault also occurred.

The conclusion as to the cause of the failure is that age-related insulation breakdown contributed to the fault, which occurred at the weakest insulation point in the

,windings. Loading problems on the motor are also considered to have been present because ofthe mechanical condition of the rotor high vibration readings for the motor immediately prior to the failure. It was determined that these two items were probably unrelated. Arecommendation was also made to inspect the A SW pump and motor for possible impeller or shaft damage.

.Once again it was thought that silting in the wear ring clearance areas was the cause of this failure.

During the timeframe of these events, the pump lift setting was always specified to be in the 0.021" range and review of these work packages confirm this value. It should also be pointed out that all of these events occurred even afterperforming frequent rotations of the pumps and no failures occurred after adjusting the lift setting on the SW pumps to 0.056" in 1993. The lack of understanding of the real issue has caused many operational changes't the'SW pump starting frequency overbuidening the operating staff and the operations procedures group. I The timeline of these changes to Procedure 2.2.71, "Service Water System"tand justification for each change is identified below and in the references.

11974, based on suspected SW pump binding problems and input from Byron Jackson, pump rotation by band using a wrench was initiated every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

• Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 2, added a requirement to manually rotate the SW pumps once per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift (circ.a 1975).

" Procedure'2.2.71, Rev 15, per standing order 78-5, shift running and standby SW pumps each 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift (4/83). ýSl A4

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 20, per nonconformance report 87-004 (smoked SW motor due ,

to bound pump caused by heavy silting) added a requirement to manually rotate each SW pump before each non-automatic start (7/87).

" Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 25, standardized method of rotating idle pumps daily (7/89)

• Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 34, instituted 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> pump rotation to be consistent with procedure 2.1.11, "Station Operations Tour" and management direction (8/94).

• Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 36, deleted manual rotation requirements.

• Procedure 22.71, Rev 45, added a specific section providing guidance for pcrforming the pump rotations.

Testing of siltation in the SW pump bays with and without the sparger systems in 1973 was also reviewed (reference 76).

A test to determine siltation levels in theE bay was performed operating only the A and C SWpumps between October 5 and 12, 1973. During this period of time the travelling screens and spargers were secured, the sluice gate between bays D and E was open and the spargers and screens in bay D were off. During the test, riverlevels and condition

ýwere recorded. During this period of time the river level varied between 881.5' to 890.5' (emergency flood procedure entered at elevation 895') and river condition was described

as muddy to very muddy at the higher river level. The muddy condition described at the higher river level is as expected due to the'known increase in suspended solids with increased river level and velocity, which also results in conservative test results.

The following conclusions were reached from these events:

• With the two SW pumps running, the area around the SW pumps andfire pumps remained almost entirely free of sediment, except for small lumps near the side walls.

T*

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a The sediment depositionin other areas gradually increased during the test period of a week as follows:

From 2' 6" to 9' 6" at the trash racks From 2' 6" to 7" 0" in front of the travelling screen From 2' 6" to 5' 0" behind the travelling screens a After-this test the bay was easily cleared of silt by putting the spargers Ji, J2 and 33 on with low pressure water (30 psig). However, high dps were experienced across the SW pump discharge strainers due to the spargers lifting sediment into the waterway to be carried into the pumps and strainers.

Silt accumulating in the area between the top side of the'impeller And wear ring to the extent that the pump could not start is just not feasible considering the amount of force appiied to the shaft when the motor starts. Silt would have to be completely packed into the whole pump and would have to be dry with no lubrication. The motor shaft would not physically contort from the forces exerted by sand in the wear ring, the sand would give as opposed to metal/metal contact If the pump was completely packed and encased in silt, thepump would still operate and pump silt. The relatively high amount of porosity in samples taken from the river, which is typical of sand, indicates that when fully saturated, the sand still remains "Ilowable."

In other words, unless a binding agent is added which creates additional cohesion between the individual sand particles (sand is naturally non-cohesive), or unusual compressive forces "squeeze" out the normal amount ofporosity, the water which fills the interstices acts as an internal lubricant and keeps the material "fluidized." Such water saturated sand will simoly flow in accordance with the usual characteristics of a liquid with a high specific gravity.. At saturated conditions, sediment that would be'found in the intake bays has a density of about 2.02 and a porosity of about 37%. (reference # 77)

Previous inspections of the pump impellers and the area above the impeller during overhauls have not shown any signs of silt orsand in the wear ring areas. Normal wear is also seen on these surfaces. Normal operation of thegland water supply to the pumps will also flush this area out and keep it free ofdebris.

Previous. nspections of the SW pumps' stainless steel impellers and liners during overhauls do support galling and ribbing between these surfaces. This can be seen by the deep grooves and rolling over of stainless steel material (up to V" depth) along the liner and grooving and rolling over of the stainless steel material of the vane tips. (figure # 3)

The issue of thermal expansion differences between the pump shafts and columns causing the impeller lift to change in combination with the downtrust experienced duringppump iruns is now well understood at Cooper and is being addressed separately. This will ultimately improve the performance of the SW pumps and allow less frequent maintenance to be performed. j

.~. ~.- ~ -. -....

Current actions in place by the SW system engineers for monitoring and setting lift adjustments are in place to preclude binding from impeller/liner contact in the future.

INDUSTRY OPERATING EXPERIENCE 7kK FORT CALHOUN The SW pumps at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant are the same style Byron Jackson pumps that are at Cooper Nuclear Station with the exception that they are two stage pumps and smaller with a shorter shaft length. The water supply for their SW system is also the Missouri River and they do have significant amounts of siltation in the pump bays. The silt is kept in suspension in the bays via a sparger system. They have 4 SW pumps and they take a.suction 7".off the bottom of a concrete platform in their bay.

Discussions with the SW system engineer indicate that they have historically swapped their SW pumps once per shift due to potential perceived binding and have overhauled their SW pumps on a 2 year frequency due to perceived wear due to sand erosion.

Howe erapproximately 3 years ago, they changed the operation of their SW system due to gained knowledge on proper lift settings on the SW pump and the notion that silt in the clearance area between the wear ring and impeller would not cause a SW pump to bind.

They now run one to two SW pumps all the time and twice a Week start and run their idle SW pumps fora couple of minutes. They do not swap pumps and basically run one pump to .failure, prolonging the life on nonoperational pumps.

Since they have changed their operating philosophy, they have not had any degradation in performance on their sacrificial pump in 3 years. Nor have they had any operational problems with operation of the idle SW pumps when .tarted hi-weekly.

BEAVER VALLEY Ov.

The SW pumps at Beaver Valley Nuclear are the same style Byron Jackson pumps that are at Cooper Nuclear Station with the exception that they are larger capacity pumps and have a longer shaft length. The water supply for their SW system is the Ohio River which is high in suspended solids also. They do have significant amounts of siltation in the pump bays but do not operaie with a sparging system. They have 3 SW pumps and

.they take a suction T' off the bottom of their pump bay.

Discussions with the SW system engineer and pump component engineer indicate that they have historically had problems in the past with the lift settingsof their pumps affecting performance from river temps, gland water temps and downthrust. They typically run one pump all the time and do not routinely rotate or swap their SWpumps.

They do infrequently swap them to equal the run time.

On February 8,2000 (0E 334-000208-1) 2 of their 3 SW pumps were made inoperable due to an overcurrent trip during start attempts from the control room. The cause of both

of these ove.purro. ti.p conditons was due to physical contact between the rotating element (ip~e)and the lower casing of the pumps. noh cause of this condition was IN due to di Vehirma1 expansion btween the pump shaft and the pump casing. This was caused b trn lubewat suppl which was approximately 30

• ,-.degree*..*igi.t. t lih noimal supply. This in-combination with the downthrust upon pump start crated-the impeller to contact the liner and bind. This event was not attributed

to silt binding.

SURRY On 11106/87, a SW pump was discovered to be binding and difficult to turn. This was also attributed to binding between the impeller and liner from thermal expansion and downthrnst, not silt binding.

ROTATING SWPUMPS VS STARTING AND STOPPING The four SW pumps each have a selector switch which has three positions; Auto, Manual, or Standby. One ofthe two SW pumps in each loop is required tobe in Auto and the other in Standby. The pump in Auto will autostart (ifnot running) on a low System pressure of 20 psig and will trip off (if running) at ap of 75 psig. The pump in Standby would load shed on a loss of power and be powered from a DG.

Historically it was thought that the running pump should be the pump in Standby as an added measure of conservativism. Since the pump is operating and ifa LOOP were to occur, the pump would be assured to start when powered from the DG since it was just running and would not be, as they thought, susceptible to silt binding. Since it is known that the cause is not fr6m silt binding, there should be no requirement to have the selector switch for the running pump in Standby. Tlhis will eliminate uncecessary LCO's when swapping pumps, resulting from moving the selector switches forthe pumps while rotating.

Also, there is no requirement to rotate the pumps, only to start the pump and run it for a couple ofminutes. This will flush any silt around the suction of the pump, where it would then combine with the flow from the other pump in that diVision directly upstream oof the SW strainer. To equal runtimes on the pumps, the run times, which are currently logged, can be monitored and pumps can be rotated on an infrequent interval.

CONCLUSIONS This through review has'determined that the cause of the previous events of SW pump binding upon startup have been misdiagnosed. The binding is due to galling between the SW pump impeller and linl and not due to silt in the clearance area between the impeller and wear ring.

1- " ,'

As a result '0=6A t SW pumps on a twelve hour frequeny can be rclaxed !M' *prAn'tie miuncwould be seven days. Thnis interval is appriopriat based on Al.* i n dn.e=fereed documentation- However, it is

.0f~

M- C s aem h baywa disaled for long durations, m~~ie~S ~ IpPOIaybPene cs=aYduring this dowafntie to keep Ssilt w *tlzbay. -Thisi2reducethe amountof silt introduced into the SW system up* s'sytem startu, which could cause higher than normal dp's across the SWstrainers fo sortperiods of time.

There is no requiement to rotate the pumps but simply start the idle pump for several minutes before se it. And there is no basis for keeping the running pumps selector switches in Standby verses Auto.

Prepared by: 2L Dwigbz(Vornfihlf

~ L Senior SW System Engineer PED-BOP Group Approved by:.

Bob Thacker BOP Supervisor PBD-BO? Group

- . * -° L**;,O,_

.a*.*u. "_m *.*2 -

REFERENCE LIST I. Drawing # 2009 - (J-4A)

2. Drawing# 2008 - (J-4B)

3. Drawing # 2007- (J4C)

4. Drawing # 2056

5. Drawing # 2C-4747 I1 I

6. March 28, 1973 - Letter from 1.Gabel to (obstructed view) concerning proposed sectionalizing walls in intake structure service bay.

7. April 18, 1973- Memo from 1.Gabel and M. Kushner to Distribution with attached letter listing areas of possible silt build-up.

8. June 13, 1973 -Letter ftron M. 1. Kushner to ER. Scott, Burns & Roe Inc. -

Confirms engineering authorization to run pilot test program on two stage cyclone separators for CNS river water sill

9. September 24, 1973 -Evaluation of Screen Wash and Spar.'ng Pump Arrangement, prepared by Eric Haemer, Mechanical Engineer, Bums and Roe, Inc. - Discusses various problems noted in the screenwash and sparging systems.

10. September26, 1973 -Factual data and calculations confirming that pump size CSK I Yz xl-6 successfully passed seismic qualification.

11. Novmber2 1, *1973- Shipping Invoice from CNS to Byron Jackson for 28" KxH-I stage VCT, S/N-681-11-0441/44, & parts.

12. December6, 1973 -oLetter from E.R. Scott, Director, Generation Projectsto E.

M. Kuchera, Burns & Roe, Inc. - Discusses diesel generator cooling water strainers.

13. March 12,1974-NCR.132 - SW-P-A &SW-P-D and MWR 74-3-102.

14. March i5, 1974- Letter from LC. Lessor, Station Superintendent, CNS, to E.

Morris Howard, Director, US AEC - Discusses abnormal boccur-ence at CNS on 3/7/1974.

15. March 18, 1974 - Letter from S. M. Peterson, Site Mechanical Engineer, CNS, to R. P. Lovci - Abnormal occurrence involving service water pumps.

.... er" I 1,1 , 1 II 1:,,I * -q

16. Mardb 24,1974- e form P p. Lovci, Project Manager, CNS, to Bums and Roe, Inc. -Seivice Water Pumps.

17. March 28,1 974.-ýBurns and Roe, Inc. - Record of5. Butz's telephone cvr, . a onmwith.A. Acton of Byron Jackson - Discusses W.O. 2978 NPPD/CI9, Servie Water Pumps Failure to.Rotate and Start

18. April 11, 1974-Letter from S. M. Peterson, Site Mechanical Engineer, CNS, to W. G. Conn - Discusses service water pump degradation.

19. April I1, 1974- Letter from L.C. Lessor, Station Superintendent, CNS, to Irv Gabel -. Butz's "Record of Telephone Conversation" with A. Acton of Byron

.Jackson.

20. April 25,1974 - Leiter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Bums & Roe, Inc.

to A. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Confirms Byron Jackson'is studying methods of redesigning service water pumps.

21. April orMay, 1974 - Letterfrom C. P. Noyce to Leo concerning degradation curves.

22. May 9,1974- Letter from L. C. Lessor to R. P. Lovci concerning SW and CW piumping systems.

23. May 20,1974 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to Bill Conn concerning SW pump degradation.

24. June 28,1974 - Letter from H. A. Swarithout to Sam Peterson concerning Service Water Pumps and W.A. 2593.

25. July 9, 1974 - Letter fiom A. J. Acton, Sales Engineer, Byron Jackson Pump Division to Paul B. Davis, Burns & Roý, INC. - Discusses binding problem caused by silt build up in the balance wear ring of service water pumps.

26. July 10, 1974- NCR 317 and Functional Test of Service Water Pumps - less than 6000 gpm at 125' TDHL

27. July 16,1974 -Letter from Paul B. Davis to R. P. Lovci concerning W.O. 2978-02 - Service Water Pumps Modification.

28. August 8, 1974 -Letterfrom K. LMeyer.to W. G. Conn and C. R. Nyes about Service Water Pumps.

29. August 9,1974 - Letter from kv1N. Kushner for Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Bums and Roe, Inc. to A. J. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Requests

-1/4.

Byron Jackson to investigate feasibility of specific modifications to service water pumps.

30. August 23,1974 -. Memo from M. L. Alexander to L. C. Lessor concerning

• ~~Service Water PUMP Testing..1

31. September 5, 1974- Letter from L. C. Lessor to C. R. Noyes- SW pumps.

32. October 4,1974-Letter from L. C. Lessor toMeeting Attendees - SW booster pump meeting minutes.,

33. November 12, 1974-Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice -Adds "Manually Rotate each idle pump once per shift" to Procedure 2.2.71 Rev. No. 2.

34. December 4,1974 - Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc. to A. J. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division - Confirms telebons and requests feedback on service waterpump design proposals.

.35. December 16,ý 1974 - Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and ROei Inc. to A. J. Acton, Byron Jackson Pump Division -Request for Byron Jackson to review potential effects ofdesign modifications on seismic analysis of service water pumps.

36. February 4,1975 -Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Bums and Roe,

ýInc. to R. P. Lovci, CNS - Discusses stainless steels used to manufacture impellers."...

37. March 17,1975-Letter from L.C. Lessor to K. L. Meyer concerning SW pumps

,and SW booster pumps.

38. March 26, 1975 -Letter from L. C. Lessor to Meeting Attendees- SW and 4 SWBPmeeting -minutes.

39. March 27,1975 - Letter from A. J. Acton, Sales Engineer, Byron Jackson Pump Division, to Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns & Roe, Inc. - Discussion of proposed service water pump modifications.

40. April 16, 1975 -Letterfrom L"C Lessor, Station Supermintendent, CNS, to John Butz Bums and Roe, Inc. - Discusses service water.pump binding.

41. May 8, 1975 -Letter from Paul B. Davis, Project Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc.

to R. P. Lovci, CNS - Summarizes and reports the Engineering status and recommendations for PAW list item 0-10on the service water pump binding problem.

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42. July 9, 1975 -. Lettt"from L. C. Lessor to T. G. HoemanService WaterPurnp Binding.

43. September 9,1975 - NCR 603 - SW pump lB was inmp on 9-5.

F, 44. December 30,1975 - Letter from L. C. Lessor to C. R. Noyes- Indicates more than normal binding of SW pumps.

45. December 9, 1980 - MWR 08-0457 - SW-P-A vibrates excessively: overhaul.

46. March 23,1983 - Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice - Incorporated Special Order 78-5, dealing with shifting the running and standby'service water pumps on 0000-0800 shift, in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 15.

47. December 12,1986 MWR 86-4320 -"Overhauled Service Water Pump as needed and replaced expansion boot"

48. April 8, 1987 - MWR 87-0827.- "Disconnect SW-MOT-SWPD electrically, Verified motor grounded at motor, Put motor on, Set lift, and Returned to service."

49. June26, 1987 - Operations Manual Procedure Change Notice - Changes valve letterdesignations in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 20.

50. March 2, 1988 -NCR 87-016 - SW pump motor ID had a certificate of compliance, not a technical letter report provided with the repaired motor.

51. May 12, 1988- NCR 88-130 - SW pump A failed to run during surveillance testing for post maintenance testing.

52. December 20,1988 -NCR 88-230 - SW-P-A failed to start twice.

53. December20,1988 -MMWR, W1.No 88-4941 -SW-P-A.

54. December 28, 1988 -Letter from L.A. Schultz to J. L. Peaslee- SW-P-A Reference Values and Acceptance Criteria.

55. January 23,1989 - Record ofphone conversation between J D. DYkstra, CNS, and Jim Mokri, GE. - SW-P-A motor vibration data.

56. January 25,1989 - Letter from J. D. Dykbtra, Electrical/I&C Engineer to J. K.

Flaherty - Trip Report, January 16,1988, for Service Water Pump Motor Failure.

57. May 19,1989 - Procedure change notice - Changes mode selector from Pull-to-Lock to Manual in Procedure 2.2.71, Rev 25.

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59. ~-Chnges perat nconluratgmion I..

60. Novembr,6, i993 .-AIR93-438 and evaluation /corrective action-Service Water Punp lift adjusmn settings.

61. *November'30, 1993 -VMCF 93-350 - Change to vendor manual 0180 replacing initial release and change record page 681-H-0441/4.

62. February 25,1994- Closure ofDR 93-438 --Service water pump lift adjustment settings.

63. March 1, 1994 - VMCF 94-093 - Change to vendor manual 0180 with revised instruction manual pages affecting SW-P-A, B, q D.

64. August 7,1994- Temporary Procedure Change Notice - Station Operators Tour

- Procedure 0.4.2 - no longer necessary to rotate all SWBPs.

65. August 7,1994 - Temporary Procedure change notice to 22 shift SW pumps once per 12-hr. shif.

66. Februmy28;1995 -Procedure Change Notice -,changes procedure # 2.2.71 by changing referencefor low river level effects.

67. June 29, 2000- CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.2.71 -

Service Water System.

68. September 28, 2000-.CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.1.11 -Station Operators Tour.

69. December 21,:2000 - CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 2.1.12 - Control Room Data.

70. December 21, 2000-CNS Operations Manual System OperatingProcedure 22.3.1 - Traveling Scren, Screen Wash, and Sparger System.

71. February 1, 2001 - CNS Operations Manual System Operating Procedure 21.11 -

Station Operators Tour.

72. Februwy 13, 20061 - Failum Report with Unit Infonration -SURRY 2 -

27PW-P-ý1013."

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73. Fe.bxur 13, 2001- I a vf-wat;, made "T eyttr

1. 4

• ,, . 74. Febnmlary.1j, 2001'-Fog. uReport with UzjlWormatiin- SW-P-A.

95, ..*75. M uy 13, 2001o uailfrom Dwigbt*I*.V *AL Jr. to Dwvight*LVpaK,Jr.

-OE 1060 -(Up~te-t~bli10671)IMPS-1 Rand CRiver Water Pumps

'Triped.on Overcurren Durng Pump Starts. -

.76. Cooper Intake Performanceof SpargingSyst~em.

77. Pcbraiy 7,2001.- Laboratory Report "Specific Gravityand Porosity Measurements of Sediment fom Near the Plant Intake and Sediment in the Service Water BoosterPump Sub-System"- RandaU Noon.

MCWT search printouts producing the above references.

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A' Change Corrective Action Pogram 4216374: OperationOverview T-1 V

5; 4,

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• a NotajlcatIn 10132527 Notifcation type CR Descipion SW-P-D STARTED, NO DISCHAPGE PRESSURE Condition Report RepO.e b D,.Ao0ME 11:10:56 ,fidnDate o 12/26/2001 Start date, .12/26/2001 End date 01/02/2002 Star time 11:1Q.:56 End tme 09:10:56 Priority Cm .

FunaLocadon CNS-.2-SW-P-D SWP D SORT SW-P-D Etppment

'Order 4216374 MainPlkmGroup CNS Planning Dept Td.

May. Stan Date Mlf. End date May, Setan dme 00:00:00 EMa('.End rime 00:00:00 12/26/2001 .11:20:.00 David J. Bromren (DJBROME)

1) Description of .Condition: Started :D SWP, system pressure did not change and steady ýstate pump amps were 18. Expected response would be an increase in the system pressure with pump running amps at 35-40. Pump discharge pressure was noted to be 1.5 psig prior to and after pump operation.

2) Requirement Not Met: SWP-D did not develope discharge pressure when started.

3) Method of Discovery: Starting .SWP-D

4) Immediate Actions Taken: Notify CRS, secure D SWP.

5) Recommendations: Investigate cause.

6) Location of Evidence: SWP-D 12/26/2001 i1:38:25 Steven P. Norris (SPNORRI)

1) Immediate Actions Taken: Secured SW pump D

2) Basis For Ops Review: Basis for review N/A for on-shift operations generated notifications.

3) Basis For Classification: RCR-apparent cause # III-C-I # cause unknown for SW pump D being air bound.

4) Basis For Disp. Department. System engineer responsible for evaluating eauipment performance

5) Apparent Causei -unknown

6) Clarification Comment: Determine cause of SW pump D being air bound and correct, as necessary. Perform OD on remaining SW pumps. Modify Standing. order 2001-0011 as necessary.

7'212I 10 'NPb.Nc~ifitlon overview.1 Page TMSANDF Copy 2

Np)ti]fiaat:ion : 10132527 Task REVIEW OPRV INOPERABLE, NARRATIVE LOGS 12-26-01/932 Partner Systent Status TSCO 12/26/2001 13:34:28 -Andrew R. Ohrablo (AROHRAB)

OPERATIONS REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION Equipment Identification Section Affected Equipment/System: SW-P-D Equipment/System Classification (check all that apply)}:

[XI TS C I TS SUPPORT

[X] SAFETY--RELATED JTRM

] ODAM 3 PASS.

[X] MRRS LI FHA/APP. R C3SBO

[ RG 1.97 CAT I or 'CAT 2

[] HELB

[ ATWS

[ FLDG 12EMERGENCY FACILITY/EQUIPMENT Operations Review Screening Section Operations Review of Notification required :if any question below is yes:

'X] YES; [ ] NO Any classification above marked and not PLANNED WORK?

[X] YES; [ I NO Condition may apply to similar equipment, including non-SSC (generictconcern/common cause failure)? If YES, document in Comments section below.

[X] YES; [ I NO Present 'OPERABILITY concern - includes conditions with an indirect impact on OPERABILITY? Past OPERABILITY concerns should be addressed under the REPORTABILITY question below.

E I YES; [XI NO POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE per iOCFR20, 10CFR26.73, i0CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, zor :10CFR73.71? Reportability concerns for past events should be identified below for Licensing review.

I] YES; [X] NO Immediate personnel or equipment safety concern not yet adequately addressed. If YES, document in Comments 'section below.

[ I YES; [X] NO Plant operational concern, including Reactivity event?

[ 1 YES; [X] NO Fitness for Duty issue?

E I YES; IX] NO Site Security issue?

[XI YES; E 3 NO Operations Review of Notification required?

I

• ',on:. pa~ton overvieW".i :. UISANd*DF*':..".*6.V *10' ,Paige'.,-  ::3, Immediate Actions Taken:

DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH MANAGMENT ON ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.

Comments:

PREVIOUS OD WRITTEN ON SW-P-A, ALL 4 SERVICE WATER PUPMS HAVE A STANDING ORDER THAT THE PUMP IS TO BE STARTED WHEN DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF THE SECURED PUMP REACHES 2 PSIG.

Operability Determination Screening Section An OD is required if any question below is YES, unless declared INOPERABLE:

[ I YES; [X] NO Degraded condition of SSCs where functionality is called into question?

J I YES; IX] NO Nonconforming conditions affecting SSCs where the qualification is called into question?

E I YES; IX] NO Existing but previously unanalyzed condition affecting SSCs?

IJ YES; [X] 'NO OD required? If NO, provide BASIS below.

Basis for No OD:

DECLARED INOPERABLE NO OD PER 0.50PS 31.11.5b.

Operability/Reportability Review Section I ] YES; IX] NO Risk assessment required? If YES, ensure assessment performed per Procedure 0.49, Schedule Risk Assessment. NOT REQUIRED TO BE, OPERABLE IN PRESENT PLANT CONDITIONS.

[X] YES; E j NO Previous OD/OE/BCO :written for an identical concern? If YES, identify previous OD/OE: 10131419 FOR SW-P-A IX] YES; I ] NO OPEN OD/OE File for aggregate effect?

[X] YES; [ ] NO System, Structure, or Component determined to be INOPERABLE?

3 YES; IX] NO I Safety Function Determination required?

[ 3 YES; [X] NO LCO, TLCO, or ODAM Action Statement entered?

Date/Time Entered: :11-26-01/ 09:32 TS/TRM/ODAM LCO Action Statement (s):

LCO Work Order Number:NARRATIVE LOGS I J YES; IX] NO Condition Immediately Reportable per Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center?

Report Completed at Date/Time:

Report Number:

[X] YES; [ I NO SS signature .required?

-.4

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TMSANDF Copy 10 Page 4 Xotif!iation: 10132527 Equipment/System Comments: 'Wý Safety-Function Determination Comments:

Reportability Comments Task REVIEW CAP RCR-R/C I.B.31 PED Partner System Status TSCO 12/28/2001 09:45:37 Ronnie Deatz (RCDEATZ)

RCR-R/C I.B. iPED Task REVIEW SCRN PRI 21 MODE R MWR M-SHOP, CM Partner System Status TSCO Task REVIEW LIC INDETERMINATE Partner System Status TSCO 12/27/2001 ;14-46 :21 Coy L. Blair (CLkLAIR) 12/27/01 BY CLBLAIR -REPORTABILITY FOR NOTIFICATION 10132527 IS INDETERMINATE. INFORMATION IN THE NOTIFICATION (AND OTHER REPORTS) RAISES A QUESTION ABOUT THE PAST OPERABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER PUMPS, BECAUSE THE COUPLING FAILURE MAY REPRESENT A "SINGLE CAUSE THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF TRAINS OR CHANNELS IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS". PER PROCEDURE 0.5.CLSS, THE .ACTION OWNER FOR THIS NOTIFICATION, PED, SHALL PROVIDE THE LICENSING DEPARTMENT WITH 'INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE THE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION WITHIN 14 DAYS OF DISCOVERY, I.E., BY 01/09/02.

Task REVIEW MRUL EXPORT Partner System Status TSCO TSSC Task REVIEW :OPRV PREPARE OD Partner System staus TSCO 12/29/2001 06:00:14 John R. Myers (JRMYERS) Phone 5624 Notification Number: 10132527 Revision Number: 0

1. Identify affected equipment/system(s)]: Service Water Pumps (A, B, C, and D).

fE

.oPDy owSANDF C' 1D0v Page

2. Identify all Safety Functions of affected SSC(s): The system chall continuously provide a supply of cooling water directly to the diesel generator and to the secondary side of the REC heat exchangers and to the

ýRHR service water booster pumps adequate for the requirements under both normal'operations and under transient and accident conditions.

The system shall be capable of providing direct cooling to essential REC heat loads following a 7-day post accident time period or after a passive REC failure.

The service water pumps supply cooling water to the systems necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition during and following Design Basis Events.

For transientl and accidehn conditions, a SW pump degraded to the minimum allowable must be able to meet the minimum post LOCA flow and RHR SWBP suction :head.

References:

USAR Volume IV, Section 8.0, Service Water and RHR Service Water Booster System.

DCD-3, Volume 1, Service Water (SW) and Residual Heat Removal Service Water Booster System.

3. Identify when the Safety Functions of affected SSC(s) are required:

[X] Mode I

[X] Mode 2

[XI Mode: 3

[X] Mode 4

[XI Mode 5 </= 21' above flange

[XI *Mode 5 >/= 21' above !flange

[x] Fuel movement in Sec Cont

[ ] Core Alterations E] OPDRVs

[X] Other: When supported systems are required operable.

NOTE - Common cause failure analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) in the opposite division shall be performed Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of an

.EDG being declared inoperable per Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1. This is not required if Surveillance Testing per Technical Specification SR 3.8.1.2 is performed.

4. Identify potential failure mechanisms, ;including common mode failure/generic concerns of redundant or similar equipment as a result of the degraded and/or nonconforming condition. Identify commitments or requirements not met.

Ios-

.3ýc 12)3 12001 NPPf: NoMtflcation overview 1 TMSANDF Copy 10 Page 6 Notification: 10132527 4.1 Potential failure mechanisms: The pump casing and shaft are manufactured from different materials. These materials expand and contract at different rates with temperature changes of the pumped fluid. eq, As river temperature lowers, the clearance between the impeller and pump bowl lowers. The potential failure mechanism is that when the pump impeller comes in contact with the pump bowl liner, due to inadequate impeller lift (clearance), the-pump may not perform its design function.

A metallurgical flaw (see NRC Information Notice 93-,68) in some couplings make it the weakest link in the pump shaft, which can lead to failures from the increased starting loads caused by the impeller being forced into the'bowl.

4.2 Commitments

None.

5. 1J YES; .[X NO Are iany potential failure mechanisms time dependent?

Does the condition have the potential to continue to degrade and/or will any potential consequences increase? If so, describe tracking mechanism including procedures and formal processes:

An impeller to bowl clearance change is caused by ýa temperature change due to the different coefficient of expansion between the pump column and pump shaft. This change is not directly related to time.

6. List potential cumulative effects, if any.

[X] None

] Credit Taken For Alarms I Interfacing iSystems S3. Fire Loadings j ] 'Gross 'ECCS Leakage A ] Electrical Load Calculations

[ ' Pipe Support/Hanger

] Electrical Separation I

t I Operator Actions

[ I Other:

Comments: None.

7. [Xj YES; [ ] NO Impact-of this condition on Open OD/OEs reviewed?

Comments: The issue previously identified in Notification 10131419 (air binding) does not impact the condition of this OD (inadequate impeller lift)

8. Technical Basis for OPERABILITY:

On 12/26/01, during an attempted start of Service Water Pump SW-P-D. the motor started but pump parameters indicated the pump was not functioning.

An inspection of the pump revealed a failed coupling. Investigation into the coupling determined that :it did not conform to -the required metallurgical properties. :A review of the repair and parts issue records for the other service water pumps could not provide assurance that couplings manufactured in the,same time framewere not installed in the other service water pumps. This OD provides a basis -for operability of SW pumps A, B, and C with couplings which may contain .manufacturing defects similar to the defect found on 'the D SWP shaft coupling. Couplings on SW-P-Dflhave been replaced.

• • ~ i*-*..... I

12/*i/*61 vPb'D*oildfica on overview 1 TMSANDF Copy 10 Page 7 Notification: 10132527 Additionally, the pump lift must be periodically adjusted to accommodate changes in river -temperature. The lift setting procedure does not provide specific requirements related to river temperature. Therefore, the lift settings for all of the pumps are being checked and adjusted for the existing river temperatures to ensure that adequate clearance exists to prevent impeller-bowl interference while not impacting the ability of-the pump to meet performance requirements. This OD will provide adequate controls forpump operability until the procedure has been appropriately modified to accommodate changes in river temperature.

Upon :visual inspection of purrp, SW-P-D, it was determined (as indicated by sharp edged. indications ýoi the bowl and impeller) that the impeller had contacted the bowl liner. Investigation indicated this was caused by a temperature decrease in the river temperature from the time the lift to set clearance. was last adjusted (12/5) to the time of failure. Each one degree lowering of river temperature results in a ýclearance reduction of 0.0015 inches. Based on the temperature of the river at the tiime the lift was adjusted and present river temperature, and elongation of the shaft due :to.hydraulic loading of the impeller, an interference of up to -0.036 inches *could have *existed, or a significant bending load could have been applied to the coupling. When attempting to start pump D, a higher than normal 'torque was created as -a result of the inadequate impeller

-clearance. This increase in torque caused the weakest. link (shaft coupling, see factor 2.below) to fail.

The failure of the coupling was the result of a combination of -two

circumstances:

Factor 1: Based on visual inspection, the impeller was impinging upon the bowl liner. The resulting friction between the bowl and impeller significantly increased the amount of torque needed to rotate the impeller.

Factor 2: The coupling had 'a metallurgical flaw as a result of manufacturing and heat- treating. This caused the coupling to be the weakest link in the transmission of 'the higher than normal torque from the motor to the impeller. Consequently, when the pump experienced a higher torque requirement, 'the coupling failed first.

To ensure operability of the pumps until the 'couplings can 'be inspected and ýthose which were improperly manufactured are replaced, it will be necessary.to 'ensure the impeller lifts are properly set to prevent the impeller from contacting the bowl liner. Work orders have been initiated to accomplish this action. The'lift for each of the ;SW pumps has been set per MP 7.2.45, with the lift set at near the minimum procedural limit of

.040#,.with the -river at the lowest expected temperature (-32 degrees F).

At this lift setting the impeller will not come in contact with the bowl liner, normal starting torque on the pump will:not be exceeded, and therefore reasonable assurance exists that even an incorrectly manufactured coupling will not fail. A temperature of '32 degrees F is appropriate as the pumps could see'this temperature during a transient or accident.when'de-icing flow is lost.

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-'.j The pump impeller to bowl clearances can also adversely impact pump performance as the clearances widen (due to rising temperatures). At large clearances, pump efficiency will degrade and :the IST performance requirements may not be met. Setting the impeller clearance in the range required by MP 7.2.45 (0.040 to 0.060 inches), will keep the clearances such that pump performance will remain within IST requirements as river temperatures rise. This conclusion is valid for temperatures up to 50 degrees F. It is conceivable that a transient could occur while the plant >

is in a condenser backwash lineup, and for some period the SW pumps could be required to operate at a temperature above river temperature.

With the above actions to adjust lift complete, and limitations on :service-water temperature in place, the service water pumps :can be considered conditionally operable. An LCO Tracking Order will be initiated to ensure these requirements are observed and tracked.

References:

Evaluation of Failure of Service Water Pump ,D, Rev 1 Maintenance Procedure 7.2.45 WO 4216375 '(Pump D)

WO 4216873 (Pump B)

WO 4216874 (Pump C)

WO 4216875 (Pump A)

9. E '] YES; [XI NO Are interim compensatory actions required? If so, describe actions and tracking mechanism and review Step 13:

N/A NOTE- Manual operator action cannot be used in place of automatic action for protection of safety limits to justify OPERABILITY.

10. [ I YES; [XJ NO Is manual action being substituted for automatic actions? Is local action being substituted for-remote action? If so, describe actions and ltracking mechanism and review Step13-:

N/A

11. List or describe :any operating modes; plant conditions, or seasonal variations not supported by this OD (i.e., OPERABILITY is CONDITIONAL):

Operability is conditional based on a service water temperature between 30 F and 50 F. (PMIS Points M138 and M137 are the preferred source of data)

The 30 degree F service water temperature will ensure the-pump impeller will not come in contact with the bowl liner after the lifts are set.

The 50 degree F service water temperature will ensure that the pump satisfies IST flow requirements.

12. List the mechanism(s) in place to control the condition(s) necessary for CONDITIONAL OPERABILITY (i.e., LCO Tracker, Night Order, procedure change, etc.) and review Steps 13 and 14:

A

, ~.**

O-P** 2* s been initiated -to..track'this limitation.,

p" 6.L 10:or-6"L"G.602 Will be utilized to monitor service'water (river) temperature.'

13. [ YES;. L] )-0;5[-]N/A Is a IOCFR50.59 Review required for action(s) idnt3-OZd&.'above?, Basis (if NO):'A 50.59 review is not required due to the, 6pr.'sdL, I nterim compensatory actions being supported by current SORC approved procedures.

13.1 I] YES; [ J NO; [X] N/A 10CFR50.59 Evaluation required for implementation?

14. J YES; [iX] No; [ ] N/A Is a Safety Assessment required 'for the required action(s) identified above? Basis (if NO): A safety assessment is not required due to the proposed interim compensatory actions being supported by current SORC approved procedures.

15. [ I YES; I I NO; -[X] N/A 6E Required.

OE due from Engineering - Date/Time:

I YES; [X] N/A 'Engineering Notified.

16. OD Performed By/Date/Time:

Mike Matheson - John Myers/ 12-29-01 / 0535

17. OD Accepted - SS/Date/Time:

Task REVIEW OPRV APPROVE OD Panner

$stem Sams TSCO Task REVIEW OPRV STATUS OD Parter

'.ystem Slaus TSCO 12/29/2001 07:29:20 Steve 'Wheeler (SCWHEEL)

OD/OE STATUS Notification Number: 10132527 OD/OE Revision Number: 00 Basis :for SS Approval for OD Extension, Beyond 24 2hrs: SW PP D WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE.

[] YES; [X] NO Cumulative Effects.©

[3 YES; [X] .NO Interim Compensatory -Action Required.

[3YES; EX NO Manual Action',Substituted -for Automatic Action.

• *,.. A".*

', A.

'.~'.

.. .*...:..'.' . . . . . .. 'A. . . . . .

"3.-.. .

[YE S; [X]. NO Local Action Substituted for Remote Action. "

[3YES-- [X].NOQ Condition has Potential to Degrade Over Time.

'*-..X] YES; ,["$N -erability is Conditional.

r.. [] YES; [X] NOOD.Awaiting OE.

NOTE - If none of the above are checked YES, the OD/OE may be closed.

OD/OE [3 CLOSED OD/OE (X] OPEN Actions Required to Allow Closure (if initially open):

IMPLEMENT 'PROCESS CHANGE TO ASSURE LIFT OF SW PUMPS ARE ADEQUATE TO COMPENSATE FOR RIVER TEMPERATURE CHANGES.

EXIT LCO 1002002.

'REMOVE SUPPLEMENTAL RIVER TEMPERATURE MONITORING FROM TECH SPEC LOGS.

[X] YES; (3 NO OD/OE Logged in .D/OE Database:

OD/OE Closed (if initially open) based on (provide short explanation):

E] YES ; [] NO OD/OE Logged in OD/OE Database:

.Task REVIEW OPRV PREPARE OD QUALITY CHECK PFaer Sysem Sams, TSCO 12/29/2001 13:07:08 Andrew R. Ohrablo (AROHRAE)

Notification Number: 10132527 Revision Number: 00 OD Quality Criteria:"

G Very Good A = Adequate

' .- "..2

M

'01" " *AM $Cop" P27ge i1' A SN= Not A-pplicable

[N] The OD was completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the Notification Supervisor review or.a justification for exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is provided.

[A]

j The OD-1s coi-rectly characterized as open or closed and the

• . appropriate criteria are referenced.

[A] The conditions required 'for closing the OD are objective, reasonable, and clearly stated.

[A] The affected equipment is accurately identified.

[A] The safety function of the affected equipment is accurate and complete, and refers to appropriate design and licensing basis requirements. Appropriate references are identified.

[A] When the safety functions are required is accurate and complete.

[A] Potential failure mechanisms are identified. Similar equipment is identified and generic concerns and common mode failures are evaluated.

[A] Cumulative effects (e.g., multiple operator actions, multiple degraded hangers, etc.) are addressed.

[A] The time and operational dependency of the potential failure mechanism and associated consequences is addressed.

[N] Interim compensatory actions, operational restrictions, and/or mode/configuration :limits are identified and a tracking mechanism specified (e.g., additional surveillances being required, manual or local operations being necessary, system capability limitations)..

[A] The evaluation is logical and can be followed without talking to the Originator.

[A] Assumptions or Engineering judgements made are' clearly stated and adequately discussed. Where feasible, the basis for Engineering judgements is quantitative rather than qualitative.

[A] The bases for evaluation logic is clearly stated and references listed.

[A] :If used, informal inputs (e.g., telecons, faxes) are identified..

JA] Applicable codes, standards, etc., are referenced where appropriate.

[N] Where actions are required as a basis for operability, the necessary 10CFR50.59.paperwork is attached.

[N] Where actions are required as a basis for operability, the necessary Safety Assessment paperwork is attached.

[N] A date and time are assigned for the OE, if required.

.t" OD.avkage is well organized, in accordance with prcedural

, and in a manner that makes it easy for a reviewer to follow

!XJ IYES;. .-Nd "*D'is Acceptable (No I Areas).

,:;ý reas.,.(Nitify Operations Supervisor):

Resolution of I Areas:

Item detail 0001 Texr ULMNER, J -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE PRESS Object part P PUMP Damage Cause of damage UNK UNKNOWN Cause text BULMER,J -INDICATOR IS INDICATING WITHIN Error dais 12/26/2001 16:46:02 Jerry W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

BULMER,J -PI IS WITHIN REQUIRED TOLERANCE.

12/26/2001 16:42;42 Jerry'W. Bulmer (JWBULME)

BULMER, J -CHECKED CAL ON DISCHARGE :PRESSURE INDICATOR. SW-DPI-360D ;PER IAC PROCEDURE 14.28.1. FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF STICKING OR DRAGGING ON INDICATOR.

INDICATOR 1-.RESPONDED SMOOTHLY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE RANGE. THE LOW :END (I PSI). INDICATED LOW (0 PSI, BUT STILL IN TOLERANCE) AND NEAR THE HIGH END, (75 P'SI) READ 74.5 PSI, OTHERWISE ALL OTHER TEST POINTS WERE EXACTLY AS EXPEtCTD. SkT

7 '1102 .'PIANT EVENT

-H""mot le, or unknown iaaeQA4Q8*ANT~ANCE (REPAIR OR REPLACE EQUIPMENT PUM, R2O1 Ttem detail1 0003 Teat Object pan MOO0 DISC METH N/A Damage Cause of damage Cause text Assembly Error class Activity PUMPSYS CHK CHECKED PI CALIBRATION. AS FOUNDS ARE SA Endof report

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- ~

- From: EStraI, Roman M.

Sent: Moiday, March 04,20024:56 PM Danny Da To: nyder Mark Ray Ronnie Deatz; Donny Anderson: Jacqueline Campbell; Lisa Mitchell

" ,Subject . Upfont Tr.nd coding AS of 3/4/02, Uefol]0w6 g praIcs need to occur to support our coding of Notifications:

1) The use ofAC6 andi AC-6 will not be used unless It Is provided In the apparent or root cause section of the evaluation lepa. vihenn~ dh;A b wu-t 2**) Al tOoot causti ev"aluations that are turned In to the NAIT staff will have an U~front coding review prior to completion of' processing*. The.NAIT staff.,..will u~se the most available CAP evaluator, to.get these,done In real time space..

"°3)iF the Notification is going to be a RCR, SCR, or CBOAT and no apparent cause or an unknown cause is provided AND

• . you cannot get an apparent cause from the information provided, the Notification will be returned to get more clarifying Information.

This change Is a result of the February CAP Trend report which reflects UNKNOWN as the top cause coded Item. This Is in part our fault for not getting anAPPARENT cause code and partly the supervisor's fault for not being held to come up with a cause for the Issue.

Mark please update the CAP Guide .1to reflect this and to add the fact that Jacque Is placing an OD code in CAP orders for Items that had an OD performed.

. * . " .-4 **,.* .... ....

4M.,

.. . .. .* ... .. . ,,... . ... * -. ,"2 ," ,

m MT*ACHMENT 3 IT.:..FEEDBACK FORM ACTION ITEM TRACKING STATUS FEEDBACK FORM CAP ID NUMBER: (Z 001- 116(0"*

CAP ACTION NUMBER--_"

SAP CAP ORDER NUMBER: L4V-3 O q15 SAP ORDER TYPE: oAp (CAP Order. Tech Support Order)

ASSIGNED DEPARTMENT: 4* PE-M C1)

ACTION REQUESTED:

R.lE LKClosure [ ] Extension j ] Action Owner Transfer

[ ] Resp. Transfer I ] Status Update I I Reopen PMActType:

(Present Over Due Date:' iPI 107-) [] (New Over Due Date: / I )

RESPONSEW.XTMNSION/TRANSFER JUSTIFICATION:_

MlAkwmjmg &AA74x Ar V79 60Jrieot.,~ v i4

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AAO cc-ý P"eAitym .!SW AhPLJ I-lfI jqA-g '

WW ýwJL4ijQOLAiR*01 R.j A44~ 'WPW IV~DLUf- A--4ICý . A. '-rnmot- &AA*Jpj.j; SAFETY IMPACTGENERIC IMPI1CATIONS: 4-rl&14 A1'f)CJ 1~

P(tl-J"~h 0WWAf SUBMUTIED BY. DATE:_______

RESPONSIBLE MANAGER: DATE: 3LLh*_/2*

OTHER REVIEW #I: NA1 DATE:

OTHER REVIEW #2: A At DATE:_

OTHER REVIEW #3: At/A O'IAR 8LUZ V.

PROCEDURE D.5.NAIT I REVISION 8 1 PAGE 18 OF24 A

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