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MONTHYEARML22207A0492022-07-25025 July 2022
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[Table view] |
Text
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems - SW System Alignment
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis and corrective actions regarding a configuration error that occurred when the gland water systems for both divisions of the SW system remained cross-connected for 20 days.
- b. Findings Introduction. A self-revealing finding was identified when the gland water supplies for both SW divisions were discovered to be cross-connected. The finding has potential safety significance greater that very low significance. This is an unresolved item (URI) pending completion of the SDP.
Description. Cooper Nuclear Station is equipped with two divisions of SW, each containing two pumps. The two pumps within a division discharge to a common header which passes through a discharge strainer and continues on to the plant. Each division supplies its own gland water from a tap downstream of the discharge strainer which then splits and goes to each pump. A cross-connect exists between the two gland water supplies which is only used during maintenance activities. If the supplies are cross-connected, the division of SW that is not supplying its own gland water must be declared inoperable.
On February 8, control room operators received trouble alarms on both the Division 1 and 2 SW gland water supplies. In accordance with the alarm response procedure, an operator was dispatched to the SW pump room where it was determined that the alarm was caused by low pressure on each of the gland water systems. There are no operability limits associated with gland water pressure, only gland water flow, which was verified to be acceptable. Since the alarm cleared, no further actions were taken and the occurrence was documented in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Notification 1029449.
On February 11, an additional trouble alarm was received on the Division 2 SW gland water supply. The gland water flow was found to be acceptable and the alarm cleared, however, the licensee performed the additional action of verifying the gland water valve lineup. As a result, it was discovered the Division 2 gland water supply valve was shut and the cross-connect valve was open. In response, the licensee immediately declared SW, Division 2 inoperable as well as EDG 2, Division 2 of RHR, and Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) Division 2. The valve lineup was restored per SOP 2.2.71, "Service Water System," Revision 69, and the affected equipment was declared operable.
Further investigation into this valve misalignment indicated that it had existed since maintenance had been performed on the Division 2 SW discharge strainer on January 21, or approximately 20 days. The apparent cause of this configuration control error was the failure to follow instructions contained in the clearance order for the maintenance performed on the discharge strainer. Clearance Order SWB-1-4324147 SW-STNR-B stated to "release tags and restart [the] strainer lAW [in accordance with]
2.2.71." Neither operator assigned to remove the clearance tags was aware of this
statement nor did they utilize SOP 2.2.71 when restoring the system following the maintenance.
Analysis. The failure to adequately control the configuration of safety systems was considered to be a performance deficiency. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems
.Cornerstone and was more than minor since it was associated with the configuration control of the SW system. The finding was also determined to have potential safety significance greater than very low significance since it resulted in a reliance on Division 1 to maintain operability of Division 2 and rendered EDG 1 inoperable for 20 days.
Enforcement. TS 5.4.1(a) requires written procedures to be implemented as recommended by RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Appendix A recommends procedures for equipment control. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee failed implement the instructions in Clearance Order SWB-1 -4324147 SW-STRN-B by not restoring the system in accordance with the system operating procedure following maintenance. Pending determination of the finding's safety significance, the finding is identified as URI 50-298/04-02-01, Service Water Valve Misalignment.
