IR 05000293/2002004
| ML022110342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2002 |
| From: | Anderson C NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Bellamy R Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR-02-004 | |
| Download: ML022110342 (21) | |
Text
uly 30, 2002
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-293/02-04
Dear Mr. Bellamy:
On June 29, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Pilgrim reactor facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 17, 2002, with Mr. and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.
The NRC has increased security requirements at the Pilgrim reactor facility in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Clifford Anderson, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
Robert Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-293/02-04 Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: M. Krupa, Director, Nuclear Safety & Licensing W. Riggs, Director, Nuclear Assessment Group D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager B. Ford, Regulatory Affairs Department Manager J. Fulton, Assistant General Counsel R. Hallisey, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Vincent deMacedo Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee Plymouth Civil Defense Director D. OConnor, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources J. Miller, Senior Issues Manager Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy S. McGrail, Director, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee Electric Power Division J. Perlov, Secretary at the Executive Office of Public Safety R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff
Robert
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000293-02-04; Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; on 05/12 - 06/29/02 Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Resident Inspection Report.
The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a reactor inspector, a security inspector and a health physicist. This inspection identified no significant findings. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector Identified Findings None B. Licensee Identified Findings None ii
Report Details SUMMARY OF
PLANT STATUS
On May 29, 2002, power was reduced to 50 percent to perform a thermal backwash of the main condenser. The unit returned to 100 percent on May 30, 2002. On June 7, 2002, power was reduced to 50 percent to perform a backwash of the main condenser. At the completion of the backwash, power ascension was delayed approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> due to a problem with the "A" reactor feed pump. The unit returned to 100 percent on June 9, 2002. On June 16, 2002, power was again reduced to 50 percent to perform a backwash of the main condenser. The unit returned to 100 percent power on June 17,
REACTOR SAFETY
(Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity)
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed licensee procedures 5.2.2, "High Winds (Hurricane)," and 2.1.37, Coastal Storm - Preparations and Actions," for site preparations for adverse weather. No actual hurricane or high wind conditions were experienced at the site during this inspection. The inspection included a review of problem reports generated within the last two years to ensure items identified were properly corrected. The inspector also toured the intake structure and the protected area to verify adequate precautions for adverse weather had been implemented in accordance with licensee procedures.
The inspector also reviewed licensee procedure 2.2.108, "Diesel Generator Cooling and Ventilation System," to verify that the emergency diesel generators (EDG) were in the proper summer mode alignment for high temperature conditions. The inspector performed a walkdown of the EDG ventilation system and verified dampers were in their proper positions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector conducted a partial system review of the A emergency diesel generator (EDG) on June 18 -19, 2002, at a time the B EDG was out of service for an extended period for scheduled preventive maintenance. The inspector reviewed applicable plant drawings and operating procedures, and verified licensee actions to protect redundant equipment. The inspector reviewed control room indications and conducted a walkdown of diesel support systems. The inspector confirmed that the A EDG was properly aligned to support normal and emergency plant operations.
The inspector performed equipment alignment verifications on redundant equipment during a planned reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system outage. The inspector reviewed the technical specifications and performed plant walkdowns and main control room tours to verify that the planned RCIC outage did not adversely affect the redundant core cooling systems and electrical power sources. The inspector verified the redundant high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system standby status using PNPS Procedure 2.2.21, High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI). The inspector verified that the RCIC system was restored to an operable condition after the planned outage was complete.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed walkdowns of the A and B electrical switchgear rooms, reactor building 23' elevation and quad rooms, the diesel-driven fire pump room, and the electric fire pump area. Plant walkdowns included observations of combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, and compensatory measures. The inspector performed fire protection inspections due to the potential to impact mitigating systems in these areas.
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
C Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Individual Plant Examination for External Events C PNPS Procedure 5.5.2, Special Fire Procedure C Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Report Number 89XM-1-ER-Q C PNPS Procedure 2.2.25, Fire Water Supply System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed a walkdown inspection of the emergency diesel generator room to assess the effectiveness of internal flood control measures. Items selected for review included checking the condition of watertight doors and passive equipment barriers such as curbing. Drain scuppers were also checked to verify freedom of movement and free of foreign debris.
The inspector also reviewed the adequacy of the corrective actions implemented for problem report 01.9816 which identified several of the underground Appendix R manholes submerged underwater. The manholes contain Appendix R duct line safety-related cables. As part of the corrective actions, the licensee established an inspection schedule to inspect the manholes to ensure the safety-related cabling is not submerged. The inspector determined that the licensee established a reasonable frequency for inspection and verified that the manhole inspection results were acceptable. The inspector verified that the licensee entered the inspection frequency into their master surveillance tracking program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed performance testing and preventive maintenance (PM) records for the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) and the turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchangers to verify that the performance monitoring techniques used to ensured heat removal capabilities were acceptable. The inspector verified that the inspection results were compared against established acceptance criteria; the performance monitoring considered the differences between plant conditions and design conditions; the frequency of testing and inspections was sufficient; and, the licensee had a program for bio-fouling control. The inspector verified that the results were evaluated to ensure proper heat exchanger operation, and discrepancies were evaluated and corrected. The documents listed in the enclosed Attachment were used to facilitate the review for this inspection.
The inspector also reviewed a sample of corrective action condition reports related to the selected equipment to verify that identified problems were appropriately resolved.
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the selected heat exchangers to assess material conditions.
The inspector verified that the licensee program was adequate to ensure proper heat exchanger performance for the reactor building and turbine building closed cooling water heat exchangers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed all reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and emergency diesel generator (EDG) related corrective action condition reports (CRs) initiated between November 21, 2001, and May 21, 2002, for potential system functional failures. The inspector further reviewed the root cause analysis for numerous CRs to assess the functional failure determinations. The inspector reviewed the RCIC and EDG PNPS System Report Cards and discussed the system health with the respective system engineers. To assess PNPS implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 Maintenance Rule requirements, the inspector reviewed selected documents listed in the enclosed
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector evaluated on-line risk management for planned and emergent work, including for the planned outage of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system concurrent with the emergent outage of the A control rod drive pump. The inspector reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, recent corrective actions, and control room logs to verify that other concurrent planned and emergent maintenance or surveillance activities did not adversely affect the plant risk already incurred with the out of service components. The inspector verified that the licensee took the necessary steps to control work activities, took actions to minimize the probability of initiating events and maintained the functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspector assessed Pilgrims risk management actions during plant walkdowns. The inspector also discussed the risk management with maintenance, engineering and operations personnel for the following activities:
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system outage on May 21, 2002, concurrent with the emergent outage of the A control rod drive pump
- Emergent Maintenance on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Valve MO 2301-3 per Work Order 02-111517 on June 5, 2002
- B Emergency Diesel Generator Online Maintenance per 2M2-61.2 and 61.5 on June 17-21, 2002.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed selected operability determinations to assess the adequacy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, compliance with the technical specifications, and the risk significance of the issues. The inspector used the technical specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, Final Safety Analysis Report, associated Design Basis Documents and PNPS Procedure 1.3.34.5, Operability Evaluations, as references. The specific issues reviewed included:
- CR 200210586, Reported Errors in LOCA Analyses per 10 CFR 50.46(3)(ii)
- OE 01-064, Out of cal torque wrench use on safety relief valve, RV-203-3D
- OE 02-003, A EDG Air Start Motors The inspectors also reviewed the following documents: PNPS Procedure 2.2.8, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), and SOER 80-1, Loss of Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System, to assess the adequacy of OE 02-003.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the following post maintenance testing (PMT) activities:
- 3.M.3-61.7, EDG Woodward Governor Tuning Procedure,
- TP01-059, Special Test for EDG Governor Adjustment or Replacement Post Work Testing,
- MR01120814, Replace directional control valve, HCU-26-39,
- MR02110586, "A" control rod drive pump overhaul,
- MR02110755, "B" recirculation scoop tube positioner unlock on run back initiation signal, and
- MR011112666, E reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) pump preventive maintenance.
The inspector ensured that the effect of the test on the plant had been evaluated adequately, verified that the test was properly performed and the test data met the required acceptance criteria, and that the test activity was adequate to verify system operability and functional capability following maintenance.
The following documents were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the PMT for the E RBCCW pump maintenance:
C PNPS Procedure 3.M.4-17.4, Lubrication Sampling and Change Procedure C PNPS Procedure 3.M.4-14, Rotating Equipment Assembly and Disassembly C V0251, Lubrication Manual C PNPS Procedure 8.5.3.1, RBCCW Pump Operability and Flow Rate Tests C PNPS Procedure 2.2.30, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the results of the E reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) pump inservice test. The inspector reviewed the test procedure to verify that applicable system requirements for operability were incorporated correctly into the test procedure, test acceptance criteria were consistent with the TS and UFSAR requirements, and the system was capable of performing its intended safety function.
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
C PNPS Procedure 8.5.3.1, RBCCW Pump Operability and Flow Rate Tests C PNPS Procedure 2.2.30, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)
System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed temporary plant modification TM 02-15, "B" Recirculation Scoop Tube Positioner Unlock on Run back Initiation Signal." The inspection included a review of PNPS procedure 1.5.9, Temporary Modifications, TM 02-15 and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation to ensure that the modification did not adversely affect system operability. The inspector also reviewed the post installation test results to confirm that the test was satisfactory, and verified that the affected controlled drawings and the licensees computer database (IRIS2) were properly annotated to reflect the installation of the temporary modification.
Based on the number of long-term temporary modifications (11 of 15 open longer than six months), the inspector evaluated the synergistic effects of the outstanding modifications with regard to mitigating systems and the integrity of radiological barriers.
The inspectors toured the plant and control room, focused on identifying potential temporary modifications not previously identified by the licensee.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2PS1 Gaseous and Liquid Effluents
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the following documents and conducted the following activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs. The requirements of the radioactive effluent controls are specified in the Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (TS/ODCM):
- 2000 and 2001 Radiological Annual Effluent Release Reports and Radiation Dose Assessment Reports;
- implementation of the compensatory sampling and analysis program when the effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) is out of service;
- walkdown for determining the:
- (1) availability of radioactive liquid/gaseous effluent RMS,
- (2) standby gas treatment system integrity,
- (3) augmented offgas system, and
- (4) equipment material conditions;
- observation of sampling techniques (charcoal and filter);
- selected 2001 and 2002 radioactive liquid release permits;
- the following associated effluent control procedures;
- 2.5.2.17, Processing Liquid Radioactive Discharge,
- 6.2-055, Radioactive Effluent Dose Assessments
- 7.3.25, Particulate and Iodine Monitoring at the Main Stack and the Reactor Building Vent
- 7.3.31 Determination of Tritium releases in Gaseous Effluents of the Main Stack and Reactor Building Vents
- calibration records for gamma spectroscopy;
- selected 2001 and 2002 analytical results for charcoal cartridge, particulate filter, and noble gas samples;
- implementation of quality control programs (split/spike/blank samples, measurement instrumentation) by the licensee measurement laboratory and a contractor laboratory, including interlaboratory comparisons;
- 2002 effluent control self-assessment (Assessment No. LO-2002-00001-CA00027);
- Condition Reports (CR) and corrective actions (CR-2000-00750, CR-2000-02531, CR-2000-02629, CR-2002-10454, and CR-2002-10520);
- corrective action packages to restore the turbine deck Gaseous Effluent Monitors Panels C-3003 and C-3004;
- 2001/2002 QA Audits (Audit Nos. 01-02 and 02-04) and QA Surveillance Reports (Report Nos.01-072, 01-081,02-008, and 02-009) for the radiological effluent control/ODCM implementations;
- most recent effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) channel calibration and flow monitor calibration results listed in Table 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 of the ODCM and accident RMS;
- Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line RMS;
- Reactor Building Close Cooling Water RMS, Channels A and B;
- Main Stack Noble Gas Monitors, Channels A and B (Normal Range);
- Main Stack High Range Noble Gas Monitor;
- Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Monitors, Channels A and B;
- Reactor Building Vent High Range Noble Gas Monitor;
- Turbine Building High Range Monitor;
- Steam Jet Air Ejector Noble Gas Monitor, Channels A and B;
- Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Flow Monitor;
- Main Stack Flow Monitor;
- Reactor Building Vent Flow Rate Monitor.
- the most recent surveillance testing results (delta P, in-place testing for HEPA and charcoal filters, air capacity test, and laboratory test for iodine collection efficiency) for the:
- TS 3/4.7.B.1 Standby Gas Treatment System; and,
- TS 3/4.7.B.2 Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
SAFEGUARDS
Physical Protection [PP] 3PP4 Security Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
An in-office review was conducted of changes to the Physical Security Plan, identified as Issue 2, Revision 16, submitted to the NRC on August 16, 2001, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The review was conducted to confirm that the changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p), and did not decrease the effectiveness of the plan.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed operator logs, NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports and monthly operating reports for the period of January 2000 to June 2002 to determine the accuracy and completeness for the reported Pilgrim performance indicators (PIs).
The following PIs were reviewed:
- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
- Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences The inspector reviewed the following documents to ensure the licensee met all requirements of the performance indicator from the first quarter 2001 to the first quarter 2002 (4 quarters):
- monthly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases
- quarterly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases
- associated procedures
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
1. Condition report CR-PNP-2001-09873
a. Inspection Scope
Reactor Safety Cornerstone - Initiating Events On September 14, 2001, during the installation of temporary modification 01-48, the plant experienced a recirculation pump run back and resultant power reduction when maintenance technicians inadvertently grounded out a jumper that was being installed to disable the number 2 speed limiter. The licensees actions to address this issue were selected for review because they were contributors to the initiating event of September 14, 2001.
The inspector reviewed the licensees root cause analysis and corrective actions to address this condition to ensure corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue have been identified and implemented by the licensee.
b. Findings
The inspector verified selected corrective actions to be complete. The inspector confirmed that an I&C operator aid was developed to capture the lessons learned from the incident and verified through discussions with licensee personnel that the maintenance craft had been briefed on the cause of the errors.
The inspector determined that the licensee classified the condition appropriately and considered the corrective actions to address the conditions to be reasonable.
No findings of significance were identified.
2. Problem Reports 01.9775, 01.9776, and 01.9779
a. Inspection Scope
Reactor Safety Cornerstone - Initiating Events On August 13, 2001, while the licensee was performing a surveillance test of emergency diesel generator protective relays, a procedure error led to the loss of the A5 4160 Volt bus. Complications of the event included loss of the "B recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set, loss of the Y4 instrument bus, unit scram and reactor vessel water level measurement anomalies. The level instrument anomalies observed during the August 13, 2001, event were discussed in inspection reports 05-293/2001-05, section
1R14 ; 05-293/2001-07, sections 4OA2 and 4OA3; and, 05-293/2002-003, section 4OA2.
The licensees actions to address the loss of bus issues and loss of the MG set were selected for review because they were contributors to the initiating event of August 13, 2001.
The inspector reviewed problem reports (PRs) PR01.9775, PR01.9776, PR01.9779, Licensee Event Report (LER) 05-293/2001-006, the root cause analyses/determination, related drawings and procedures, and corrective actions associated with the August 13, 2001, loss of bus A5 and the loss of the "B" recirculation motor generator set to determine the timeliness and effectiveness of those corrective actions.
b. Findings
The inspector determined that the problem reports were complete, accurate and issued in a timely manner. The evaluations and immediate disposition of the performance issues associated with maintenance was effective. Long term effectiveness reviews are included in the licensees corrective action program. The LER 05-293/2001-006 associated with these events was accurate and complete. The licensees review included extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences at other plants. The classification and prioritization of the problem resolution was commensurate with its safety significance. The licensees evaluation included identification of root and contributing causes of the problem. Corrective actions were appropriately focused to correct the problem and were being completed in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspector observed that the change to procedure 1.3.34, Rev. 73, Conduct of Operations, failed to address Quality Verification and Validation (QV&V) specifically identified in the root cause analysis as a contributing cause. The licensee issued condition report CR
-PNP-2002-10297 for the failure to incorporate QV&V into Attachment 5 for Major Evolutions.
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
(Closed) LER 50-293/2001-006: Automatic Scram During Surveillance Test and Subsequent Reactor Water Level Anomalies.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions associated with Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-293/2001-006-00, Automatic Scram During Surveillance Test and Subsequent Reactor Water Level Anomalies. The transients associated with the loss of Bus A5, the trip of the "B" recirculation MG set and the loss of instrument bus Y4 are discussed in section 4OA2 of this report. This LER is closed.
4OA6 Management Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Bellamy, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 17, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered propriety. No propriety information was identified.
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
a. Key Points of Contact
- S. Das, Sr. Staff Engineer, Electrical Engineering
- R. Daverio, Supervising Engineer, Electrical
- D. Ellis, Sr. Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Keyes, Supervisor, Corrective Action Program
- W. Lobo, Sr. Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- B. Lyons, Supervisor, Operations Support
- K. ODonnell, Maintenance Specialist
b. List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed
Closed
LER 50-293/2001-06 Automatic Scram During Surveillance Test and
Subsequent Reactor Water Level Anomalies.
c. List of Documents Reviewed
RBCCW System Health Report, 1st Quarter 2002
NOP02E1, Rev 0 Service Water Inspections, Maintenance and Testing
M591,Revision E6 SSW & Safety-Related Piping & Heat Exchanger
Inspection, Maintenance and Test Requirements in
Response to Generic Letter 89-13,
Report PD04413.02 HX E-209B Eddy Current Test Report, April 2001
MR 9700206 B RBCCW HX Inspection and Cleaning, 4/29/01
Calculation M650 RBCCW Heat Exchanger Performance Test Instrument
Uncertainty
8.5.3.14.1 RBCCW Heat Exchanger E209A Thermal Performance
Test
3.M.4.98 B RBCCW heat exchanger inspection reports
TP00-028 General Procedure to Eddy Current Testing of Heat
Exchanger Tubing
MR 9700121 TBCCW heat exchanger E122B Inspection, 2/28/02
Report PR No. 7-19 HX E-122B Eddy Current Test Report, 2/13/02
TP01-056 General Procedure for Eddy Current Testing of Heat
Exchanger Tubing
PNPS MRSSC 12 RCIC Maintenance Rule SSC Basis Document
PNPS MRSSC 31 EDG Maintenance Rule SSC Basis Document
PNPS Procedure NE16.03 10CFR50.65 NRC Maintenance Rule
Regulatory Guide 1.160 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants, Revision 2
(contd) 14
NUMARC 93-01 Industry Guideline For Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2
DRB for Corrective Action Plan for the Instrument Air Compressor (NESG 02-054)
meeting minutes dated May 2, 2002
DRB for A1 Action Plan for SBO Diesel Generator (NESG 02-055) meeting minutes
dated May 9, 2002
PR 01.9775 B" Recirculation MG Set Trip during transient caused by
Loss of Bus A5
PR 01.9776 Loss of Instrument Bus Y4 during transient caused by
Loss of Bus A5
PR 01.9779 Loss of Bus A5 during testing of EDG relays
LER 2001-006-00 Automatic Scram During Surveillance Test and
Subsequent
Reactor Water Level Anomalies
ENN LI-102, Rev.2 Corrective Action Process
NOP98A1, Rev. 7 Procedure Process (PCF submitted for Attachment 6)
1.3.34, Rev. 69&73 Conduct of Operations
1.3.121, Rev. 10 Corrective Action Program (Superseded)
1.4.5, Rev. 56 Tagging Procedure
3.M.3-1, Rev. 52 A5/A6 Buses Protective Relay Calibration/Functional Test
3.M.1-34, Rev.19 Generic Troubleshooting and Maintenance Procedure
E-SP-07-01-04 Plant Statue Update Session 01-04, Instructor Guide,
2/20/01
E1, Rev. E18 Station Single Line Diagram
E14, Rev. E33 120V Instrument System Single Line Diagram
E28, Rev. E12 Typical Breaker Wiring 4160V Breaker Schematic Diagram
E37, Rev. E6 4160V Breaker 152-505 Schematic Diagram
E38, Rev. E12 4160V Breaker 152-504 Schematic Diagram
E40, Rev. E18 4160V Breaker 152-509 Schematic Diagram
SE155, Rev. E39 Single Line Composite Diagram, 4.16KV & 480V AC
Systems
2.2.22 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
Condition Reports CR-PNP-2001-00353, CR-PNP-2001-05024, CR-PNP-
2001-01103 CR-PNP-2001-02665, CR-PNP-2001-09146,
CR-PNP-2001-09491 CR-PNP-2001-09759, CR-PNP-
2001-09833, CR-PNP-2001-09963
(contd) 15
d. List of Acronyms
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRD Control Rod Drive
CR Condition Report
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
HEPA High-Efficiency Particulate Air (filter)
HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection
I&C Instrumentation and Controls
MR Maintenance Request
ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
PR Problem Report
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Control
RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RMS Radiation Monitoring System
SDP Significance Determination Process
SSC Structures Systems and Components
TS Technical Specifications