Information Notice 1989-80, Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping

Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping

ML031190089
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date:	12/01/1989
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-080, NUDOCS 8911270002
Download: ML031190089 (9)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL

STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING

IN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

PIPING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro- blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valves

in a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCI

system during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature was

greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load

was caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensate

storage tank.

During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 3500F,

and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con- densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injection

valve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injection

valve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.

On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi- ciently to raise the temperature between the injection valve and the HPCI

pump discharge valve to 2750F and at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 2460F.

Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature

gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded that feedwater

leaking through the injection valve was flashing and displacing some of the

water in the piping with steam. This conclusion was confirmed by closing the

pump discharge valve and monitoring the temperature of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature decreased to ambient.

891127000

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IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe

supports were found near the injection valves.

Concrete surfaces near the

support attachment points were spalled.

The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, and

notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.

After performing a review under 10

CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closed

the normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarily

as the injection valve.

Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated that

less significant leakage was occurring.

Discussion:

The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for water

hammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for

steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump.

Further, failure of HPCI

piping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of two

feedwater pipes.

The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with water

hammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concrete

surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that

water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump

tests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation on

the piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak.

NRC

Information Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer

events at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other references

mentioned in this notice.

Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is related

to three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for

issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. These

events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. In

all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system

through closed valves in an emergency coolant system.

Thermal stratification

of water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations of

the interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal

fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of welds

and in the base metal.

For these reactors, the configuration of the piping

between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency cooling

system is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. The

licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at the

next scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.

During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pump

existed because the discharge valve was normally open.

Events have occurred

in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary -$ '

'4, IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

I

• e4

Charles E. Rossi, Drec

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I

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1.

5/1 1/89

7/18 /89

1 0/23/89 A

140 F

175 F

248 F

B

180 F

220 F

275 F

c

INJECTION

VALVES

D I SCHARGE

VALVE

B

FEEDWATER

A

FPC I

PUMP

TEST RETURN

• (

DRESDEN 2 - HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINE

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Attachment 2

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"

September 19, 1985.

2.

NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves

Causes

Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"

January 1, 1986.

3.

NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer During

Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.

4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage

Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"

April 18, 1988.

5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"

October 29, 1985.

6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor

Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.

Attachment 3

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

89-79

89-56, Supp. 1

89-78.

89-77

Degraded Coatings and

Corrosion of Steel

Containment Vessels

Questionable Certification

of Material Supplied to

the Defense Department

by Nuclear Suppliers

Failure of Packing Nuts

on One-Inch Uranium

Hexafluoride Cylinder

Valves

Debris in Containment

Emergency Sumps and

Incorrect Screen

Configurations

Biofouling Agent:

Zebra

Mussel

Falsification of Welder

Qualifications for

Contractor Employees

Clarification of Trans- portation Requirements

Applicable to Return of

Spent Radiopharmacy Dosages

from Users to Suppliers

Potential Overpressurization

of Low Pressure Systems

12/1/89

11/22/89

11/22/89

11/21/89

11/21/89

11/20/89

11/7/89

11/1/89

All holders of OLs

or CPs for LWRs.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All NRC licensees

authorized to possess

and use source material

and/or special nuclear

material for the heating, emptying, filling, or

shipping of uranium

hexafluoride in 30-

and 48-inch diameter

cylinders.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for PWRs.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All manufacturers

and distributors of

radiopharmaceuticals

for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

89-76

89-75

89-74

89-73 OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger

(301)

Woodruff, NRR

492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2.

Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB: NRR

• RWoodruff:db

11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII

• WShafer

11/13/89 IRB:AEOD

• EWeiss

11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR

• CHaughney

11/15/89 TECH EDITOR

• RSanders

11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR

• CBerlinger

11/22/89 EAB:NRR

• PBaranowsky

11/1§/89 D:06A.

CERossi DO

11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR

• BSiegel

11/15/89

I

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at less

than saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS

EAB:NRR

• RWoodruff:db

11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII

• WShafer

11/ /89 CONCURRENCE

IRB:AEOD

• EWeiss

11/

/L6 TECH EDITOR

EAB:NRR

PBaranomsky

11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegelrP

11115189 Ko

D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/ /89

1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A

4.1.d

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less than

saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.

If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

EAB:NRR

RWoodruff:db

11/11189

3BM tricpkoa~

C:PB1:RILI~

WShafer-Cd,'

11/13/89 IRB:AEOD

EWei S

11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR

CHaughney

11/ /89 TECH EDITOR

11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR

CBerlinger

11/ /89 EAB:NRR

PBaranowsky

11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegel

11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/ /89