ML20079A979: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML20079A979
| number = ML20079A979
| issue date = 04/05/1991
| issue date = 04/05/1991
| title = Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Comply W/Purchase Orders When Shipping 12 3000# Socket Weld Unions,Astm B247 Alloy 6061-T6 & Three 150# Pipe Flanges,Astm B62 Cast Brass.Matl Supplied Following Commercial Program
| title = Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Comply W/Purchase Orders When Shipping 12 3000 Socket Weld Unions,Astm B247 Alloy 6061-T6 & Three 150 Pipe Flanges,Astm B62 Cast Brass.Matl Supplied Following Commercial Program
| author name = Wootton M
| author name = Wootton M
| author affiliation = CONNEX PIPE SYSTEMS, INC.
| author affiliation = CONNEX PIPE SYSTEMS, INC.

Latest revision as of 02:08, 27 September 2022

Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Comply W/Purchase Orders When Shipping 12 3000 Socket Weld Unions,Astm B247 Alloy 6061-T6 & Three 150 Pipe Flanges,Astm B62 Cast Brass.Matl Supplied Following Commercial Program
ML20079A979
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/05/1991
From: Wootton M
CONNEX PIPE SYSTEMS, INC.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
REF-PT21-91 NUDOCS 9106120125
Download: ML20079A979 (3)


Text

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Apnl5,1991 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 -

ATTENTION: James G. Keppler Director, Region lli Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Dear Mr. Keppler:

On March 26,1991, Connex Pipe Systems, Inc. discovered that we had fumished to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, twelve (12 each) 1 1/2" -

3000# Socket Weld Unions, ASTM B247 Alloy 6061 T6 on their order number 90NJS-825570 and three (3 each) 3"- 150# Pipe Flanges, ASTM B62 Cast Brass on their order 91NJA 82667C which fail to comply with their purchase order requirements.

Their Purchase Order required the material to be supplied following an ANSI N45.2 Cuality P ugram. The material was actually supplied following a ecmmercial program.

Connex cannot verity the quality of the items; therefore, our Manager of Quality Assurance is working with Mr. Robert Bradley of TVA to have all of the material on these orders retumed to Connex. We hope to have the material returned by April 5,1991.

Please contact us, should additional information be required.

Sincerely, CONNEX PIPE SYSTEMS, INC.

%%Db M. H. Wootton President

, attachments MHW:cak 9106120125 910405 _

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SIGNIFICANT HAZARD EVALUATION FOR E5004 - QA-1 l

CONNEX JOB NUMBER: E5004 NCR: E5004 - QA 1 1 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT #2 ITEM DESCR/PTION: 12 EA.11/2" 3000# SOCKET WELD UNION, PER ASTM B247 ALLOY 6061-T6 TVA PURCHASE ORDER #: 90NJS 82557C PRELIMINARY EVALUATION BY 7VA:

Twelve of the unions have been accepted by TVA's receipt inspection. Two (2) unions are installed in the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Piping. This is considered a Critical Structure and is safety related, if failure occurred, such as a rupture, then the effect would be a loss of prossure boundary in the 1-1/2" line. Ten (10) each unions are in TVA's warehouse and are now on hold.

The system is complete and has been accepted.

The plant has not gone on line.

The evaluation was conducted by Bill Terry, TVA Engineer.

Persons Contacted at TVA:

Robert Bradley, Jr PE TVA Lead Auditor Supplier Evaluation Program Materials & Procurement Quality Phone (615) 7516782 e

SIGNIFICANT HAZARD EVALUATION FOR E5007 - QA-1 NCR: E5007 QA 1 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT #2 ITEM DESCRIPTION: (3 EA.) 3"- 150# CAST BRASS PIPE FLANGES PER ASTM B62 TVA PURCHASE ORDER #.: 91NJA B2667C ,

PRELIMINARY EVALUATION BY TVA:

Three (3) of the flanges have been accepted by TVA's receipt inspection. Three (3) flanges are installed in the Reactor Closed Cooling System, Drywell Chiller Coils. This is considered a Critical Structure and is safety related, if a failure were to occur, such  !

as a rupture or fracture, the effect would be a loss of the pressure boundary for cooling j i

water.

The status of this system is unknown at this time, however, the plant has not gone on line.

The evaluation was conducted by Bill Terry TVA Engineer.

Persons contacted at TVA:

Roben Bradley, Jr. PE TVA Lead Auditor Supplier Evaluation Program Materials & Procurement Quality Phone (615) 7516782 l

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