ML20247Q133

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Part 21 Rept Re Defect W/Two Air Conditioning Units Provided by Ellis & Watts.Caused by Undocumented Electrical Components & Cabling in Units.Tva Will Use Addl Procurement Receipt Insps of safety-related Matl
ML20247Q133
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/20/1989
From: Medford M
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-89-141-000 PT21-89-141, PT21-89-141-000, NUDOCS 8909280108
Download: ML20247Q133 (4)


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. . TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 6N 38A Lookout Place SEP 201989 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A1TN: Document Control Desk i Washington, D.C. 20555  !

Gentlemen: ]

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR 10 CFR 21 REPORT ON AIR CONDITIONING UNITS On September 15, 1989, O. D. Kingsley, Jr., Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power, was informed of a defect with two air-conditioning units provided by Ellis & Hatts (E&W) that was determined reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21. M. J. Ray of TVA notified D. A. Moran of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation by telephone that same day. This letter serves as the five day report required by 10 CFR 21.21(b)(2).

The defect was identified as a result of an audit of the E&H quality assurance practices and subsequent field investigations that led to an evaluation of a deviation from a TVA procurement contract. The TVA contract required the two E&W air-conditioning units, the basic components, to be environmentally qualified to IEEE 323-1974 and to satisfy other Class IE quality requirements including ANSI N45.2 and ICEA S-66-524. A TVA Condition Adverse to Quality l Report initiated in July 1989 described the use of undocumented electrical l

I components and cabling in these air-conditioning units and inadequate l

environmental qualification documents.

i These redundant air-conditioning units, each consisting of an air-handling unit (Model AEH-275) and a compressor unit (Model LC-39), are installed above the D 4160V shutdown board room on the 593 foot elevation of BFN unit 2.

This area of the plant could be subject to a harsh environment during certain design basis accidents. These air-conditioning units provide area cooling for the C and D 4U 'V shutdown board rooms which contain essential electrical equipment. There is no assurance that these redundant air-conditioning units could survive the postulated harsh environment resulting from a design basis accident and maintain the proper temperature of these shutdown board rooms without adequate environmental qualification for the electrical components and cabling. In turn, the essential electrical equipment contained in the shutdown board rooms and the safety-related equipment powered by this electrical equipment can not be assured to complete their intended safety function with the loss of the redundant air-conditioning units.

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An Equal opportunity Employer

U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission SEP 201989 Based on the engineering evaluations of the functional capability of the units, it was determined that the deviation could create a substantial safety hazard and is a defect reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21.

Although a 10 CFR 21 deportability determination has been made, there is no immediata safety concern with these air-conditioning units installed at BFN.

Unit 2 is currently in cold shutdown and has been since the installation of the air-conditioning onits was ir.itiated in January of 1988. There is no accident condition that could cause a temperature-induced harsh environment in the two shutdown board rooms with unit 2 in cold shutdown. TVA is currently reviewing various corrective actions including possible replacement of the affected electrical components and cabling, or possible relocation of these components and cabling te locations that would not be subject to a harsh environment resulting from certain design basis accidents.

Ellis & Watts has been granted procurement w itacts in the past, and is currently under contract to provide other ufety-related components, including spare parts, to BFN, Sequoyah, and Watts sar. TVA is assessing the extent to which other safety-related components previously provided to TVA nuclear facilities by E&W could be similarly affected. Additionally, TVA will use additional procurement receipt inspections of safety-related material received from E&W in the future and source inspections of safety-related material that will be fabricated by E&W to ensure compliance with the procurement contracts.

TVA will provide NRC with a status report of the corrective actions identified in the enclosure within 90 days of the date of this letter. If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patrick P. Carter at (205) 729-3570.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 872.f M Mark O. Medford Vice President and Nuclear Technical Director Enclosure cc: See page 3

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission

, SEP 201989 cc (Enclosure):

l Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director I

for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland '20852 Mr. B. A.-Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II -

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 D. A. Moran TVA Projects. Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000

' ' ENCLOSURE LIST OF COMMITMENTS l

1. TVA is currently reviewing various corrective actions including l

possible replacement of.the nonqualified electrical components and cabling, or possible relocation of these components and cabling to locations that would not be subject to a harsh environment resulting from certain design basis accidents.

2. TVA is assessing the extent to which other safety-related components previously provided to TVA nuclear facilities could be similarly affected.
3. TVA will use additional procurement receipt inspections of safety-related material received from E&W in the future and Source inspections of safety-related material that will be fabricated by E&W to ensure compliance with the procurement contracts.
4. TVA will provide NRC with a status report of the corrective actions taken in this matter within 90 days of the date of this letter.

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