ML20065C455

Forwards Rept of Physical Security Event Reported to NRC on 870522.Rept Partially Withheld

ML20065C455
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	05/29/1987
From:	Beratta J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20065C236	List: ML20065C455 ML20065C460 ML20065C463 ML20066H255 ML20066H256 ML20066H284 ML20066H777 ML20066H791
References
FOIA-90-269 NUDOCS 8706040307
Download: ML20065C455 (4)

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. w'- IT U MHAWK i NINE MILE PolNT NUCLEAR STAtl0N /P O BOX 32 LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093 / TELEPHONE (31$) 343 2110 i

May 29, 1987-Mr. Thomas E. Murley Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United . States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC- '20555 Re: Nine Mile. Point Unit #1 and Unit #2 Docket No. 50-220/50-410 DPR-63/NPF-54 Dear Mr. Murley In accordance with'10CFR 73.71(c), enclosed for your. information is a copy of-a Report of Physical Security Event ceported to the NRC Region'I office by telephone on May 22, 1987.

This information concerns-subject matter which is exempt from disclosure under 2.790(d) of the NRC's Rules of Practice, Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Accordingly, we' request that the attachment not be placed in the Public Document Room and that they be disclosed only in accordance with the provisions- of 10CFR 9.12.

Very truly yours,

. NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION W 4 Joseph P. Beratta Supervisor, Nuclear Security JPB/kar Enclosure 1

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. . REPORT OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENT REGION I, USNRC, OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND EllFORCEMENT 19406 631 PARK AVENUE, KING OF PRUSSIA, PA.

PHONE (215) 337-5000 Date of Occurrence 05/21/87 1525 hrs Time of Occurrence:

racility and Location: Nine Mile Point Nucicar Station Unit 1 & Unit 2, Lycoming, NY 13093 Docket Hos.: 50-220/50-410 License Nos.: DPR-63/NPT-54 1,1censee's Occurrence Report No. 87-02 c

Brief Title (Subj ect) : Security File Restrictive Level Applicator for Access Control On Thursday, May 21, 1- ,

at approximately 1525 DEStRIPTION OF EVENT: inadvertently inserted a contractor's Photo-ID Badge into hours, a guard (ACR) card reader activating the ACR door.

the subject Photo-ID Badge did not have the Unit 1 Access Control Room Inmediately after verifying that accessing the ACR door, the Security the proper rest-!cted level for to randomly select several other Photo-ID it necessary upervisor f elt effort to duplicate the same sequence of events.

ACR dges in an Badges activated not on the

.onsequently, several of the Photo-ID a vital the % Td M G3TMFC E MFIdNf door but also activated to correct thn A complete chronology of events and actions taken area.

root causes are contained on attached pages.

em, Immediately upon realizingSafeguards the scopeandof thecontingenev p1 RESPONSE BY LICENSEE: in accordance with the Secut-ity Supervision Minimal; keeping in mind that compensatory CONSEQUENCES AT FACILITY: fact that we have

- measures were implemented immediatelytoand the the watchtour in addition card readers I

lonally, a spot check was conducted of Vital Area verifying that no unauthorized entries had been made.

Licensee Employee Reporting: Dat:lel D. O'Hara, Asst. Nuclear Security Specialist (315) 349-1319 Mr. Joseph Gritter, H.O.O.

NRC Staff Employee Receiving Phone Call:

Date of Phone call: 05/22/87 me of Phone Call: 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br />

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4 SECURITY DENT REPORT 87-02

• Nine Mile Point Unit il and Unit #2 50 220/0PR 63

• 50 410/NPF 54 This report is to inf onn yot Of a degradation of the Main Alarm System (MAS) discovered by Security Manageaent on May 21, 1987. The scope of the degradation involved, the security file (s file) restricted level scheme, which had not been ef fectively holding for door acceJs control.

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au kf}y*h$ \hkfN}lL .Y.m. . .UV Y Y ' C 0 : 'L At 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br /> on May 21, 1987, a Unit One Guard returning from the vehicle gate post, inadvertently inserted a contractor's keycard into the Access Control Room ( ACR) card reader and it accessed the ACR door. The Guard then advised the Securf ty Supervisor on duty of the sequence of events and ininediately verified that the Keycard did not have the proper restricted level for accessing the door, in an effort to detennine if this was an isolated incident, the $ s Supervisor randomly selected several other Keycards and found that they, too, accessed the ACR door.

The Security Supervisor felt it necessary to ascertain if the same conditions existed at Vital Areas at both Units. Irrned t a tely, a random check of both Units indicated that restricted Icvel access for door control was not holding properly.

the problem. Security Supervision activated the gU on 7,ts/M, realizing the scope of; b! t) g[ M 9 ';. $t.L' ' "..8 I J i~

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- *[" . )) . T C In a fornal conversation with computer besonnel, it was realized that a revision had been made to the disc used in tne computer system. The revision had been in place since the previous Thursday; May 14, 1987, at which time the contractor responsible for the computer system corrected a problem with restricted level- termination dates. However, it appears that the revision jarred the logic of the restricted level applicator which controls door access.

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. M., ,. Lif-However, it appeared that the computer system was allowing access to any card containing a restricted level; in essence a go-no go" type situation, 9 n ,-,--g_  ?..- .- - -e.-- . - - - , . _ _ - _ - - . , - - - . , - - ,

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SECURjiY [VCNT REPORT 87-02

• Nine Mile Point Unit il and Unit #2 50 ??0/DPR 63

- 00 410/NPF 54 Immediately, a patch was incorporated to bypass this faulty logic, and a test conducted to confinn proper operation. A spot check of Vital Area Entry transactions was undertaken at both Units for the seven day period, this revealed that no unauthorized entries had been mada.

The subject disc was replaced with a corrected revision, tested, and proven ef fective in holding restricted level access control.

To preclude a recurrence, the Nalanns test procedure has been revised.

.i x has been completed, an additf oral test In addition, any time a sof tware will be conducted to include a check of restricted levels.

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