ML20066H777
| ML20066H777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1986 |
| From: | Beratta J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065C236 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-90-269 NUDOCS 9101290242 | |
| Download: ML20066H777 (4) | |
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macana monawx powin contcaAtioN<3x t.si c cou.tvak: at s' 5 n A: r r o v i::c:/tttto ost (3i'a 474.nii November 10, 1996 Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Directot Division of Project and Resident Prot, cam 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Conman,lon, Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prunnia, PA 191106 Re:
Nine Mile Point Unit #2 Docket No. 50-410 NPP-Sil
Dear Mr. Starontecki:
In accordance with 10 CPR 73 71 (c), enclosed for your informa-tion in a copy of a Report of' Physical Security Event reported to the NRC Region I office by telephone on November 6, 1986.
This information concerna subject matter which ta exempt from din-clonure under 2.790 (d ) of the NHC's Rulea of "ractice, Part 2, title 10, Code of' Pederal Regulations.
Accord ingly, we requent that the attachment not be placed in the Public Document Room and that they be diaclosed only in accordance with the provisionn of 10 CPR 9 12.
Very truly yours, NI AG ARA MORAWK POWER COHPORATION no y2b f?
W-o Joseph P. Beratta Supervinor, Nuclear Security Enclonure 1
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9101290242 901016 PDR FOIA PERSON 90-269 PDR
REPOM Of PHYSICAL SECURllY EVENT j
REGION 1, USNRC, OfflCE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT l
631 PARK AYENUE, KING Of PRUSSI A, PA - 19406 r
PHONE (215) 337-5000 j
Date of Occurrence: 11/3/66; 11/6/86*
Tirm of-Occurrence: 2010 hrs; 0445 hrs.*
- Time and Date Breach was recognized facility and tocation: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Docket:
50-410 Unit f 2, Lycoming, NY 13093 License:
NPF 54 Licensee's Occurrence Report No.
86 01 Brief Title (sub,}ect):
Breach of Vital Area Barrier Description - of-Event:
On >bnday, November 3, 1986, at approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, an access plug, measuring 6'X12'X2', was remove ron the ceilf of the g % % 7/2)ff 9 which is located within th.
This was removed f{or@an. adorized reason in accordance w ng reac Permit procedures.
Such procedures do not currently include consideration, or notification, of security.
On Wednesday, November 5,1986, at approximately 0506 hours0.00586 days <br />0.141 hours <br />8.366402e-4 weeks <br />1.92533e-4 months <br />, two members of the security organization entered the area and They, however, f ailed to notify their supervisors, noticed _the penetration.
or to mention the breach to anyone because they assumed that it had already been reported by previous patrols and that management had already evaluated it and taken required measures.
Security supervision first heard of the penetration on -November 6, 1986, at approximately 0445 hours0.00515 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.357804e-4 weeks <br />1.693225e-4 months <br />, when it was mentioned by the--two guards in an informal discussion regarding procedures.
Imediately upon being made aware of the penetration, Response by ticensee:
the Lieutenant, Nuclear _ Security initiated a response by the Sergeant, Nuclear Security to confirm that the breach still existed and to establish a guard post at the breach until. the plug was replaced.
The Sergeant, who was on a patrol of the exterior protected area at the time of notification, arrived at the Service Water Pump Room; at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> and remained in = the area until a post was established at 0511 hours0.00591 days <br />0.142 hours <br />8.449074e-4 weeks <br />1.944355e-4 months <br />.
The results of further guard investigation into the incident and actions taken to correct the root causes are contained on attached pages.
Minimal ;
the penetration was made on the roof of Consequences at f acility:
the-Vital Area which was located approximately 19 feet above the floor of the which itsel f was located within the protected area, R ccess to the roof.15 normally gained through the vital area doors.to the vital area.
Station is presently conducting initial fuel load.
-Licensee Employee Reporting:
Dennis K. MacVittie, Nuclear Security Specialist (315) 349-1030 NRC Staff Employee Receiving, Phone Call: John MacKinon, H 0.0.
Time of Phone Call:
1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />, November 6,1986 T'
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'50 410/NPf.$4 On-November 6,1986, at 1150 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.37575e-4 months <br />, _ Security Manageme'nt uas rode aware of the SubjectJ incident,. An investigation was imediately initiated 10 veri fy the facts and to identify the probicms and root causes.
t-Initially, the scope of the investigation was limited to determining:- when the breach had occurred;.
how the breach' had: occurred - without security notification; and why-the penetration was not _ noticed by security personnel conducting Interior watchtours.
The fact that a breach had -occurred and gone-unrecognized by security personnel for_ nout 57 hours6.597222e-4 days <br />0.0158 hours <br />9.424603e-5 weeks <br />2.16885e-5 months <br /> was reported to the PRC resident inspectors 'at
. approxima tely 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on November 6, 1986.
At 'that time it was thought that the two guards had made their observation on November 6th, and that they had imedia tely notified their supervision.
A review.of computer records, however, indicated that the security personnel involved actually entered the area the previous day.
This fact was verf fled with the individuals by telephone.
The correct sequence of events, as described on the first page of this report, were reported to Region I by ENS telephone at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />.
During the period 2344 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.91892e-4 months <br />, November 6,1986 through 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, November 7, 1986, the-two security personnel who first observed the breach and their supervisors were interviewed and statements were taken.
The movements of the involved individuals were confirmed via a review of computer records, and time
- estimates were better defined.
At 1.420 hours0.00486 days <br />0.117 hours <br />6.944444e-4 weeks <br />1.5981e-4 months <br />, November 7,1986, the NRC resident inspectors were updated, and incorrect information from the previous day was corrected.
The following problems have been identified:
- 1)
The procedure for obtaining a Breach Permit does not include an evaluation of the ef fects of the breach on security commitments, nor does it address notifying security.
This deficiency was recogr.ized approximately two months ago and a revision 'to the procedure was requested by the security department.. The revision had been
- prepared and is undergoing technical review by other disciplines.
- 2) _ The. subject Breach was never discussed at the Plan of the Day meeting.
- 3)l = Securi ty Supervision had been directed to-make guards aware of the deficiencies in the existing breach pennit procedure, ar,d to stress that 'they
- had' to carefully veri fy the integrity of vital area barriers during _their routine intertor patrols.
This was not done.
4)-
The penetration was not detected by security personnel during their performance of watchtours through _the area.
. 5)
When the penetration was detected, it was not recognized as -a-breach and
-- procedures.were not followed to properly compensate.
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_fecurity Event Report 86-01 Wine Mile-Point #2 50-410/NPT-54 Security Supervision, when made aware of the breach, failed to follow up 6) and obtain all of the facts.
7)-
The root cause of this problem is poor comunication between site L
departments and within the Security department.
Security Management is working closely with other departments such as fir Operations in order to develop the necessary coordination between Day meeting and security has been informally notifi such permi ts are issued.
The formal change to the Breach Permit when procedure is progressing at a faster rate.
Security Personnel are cycled into training every five weeks.
One to two for inforcal discussions between the hours are being set-aside each week This will be used to discuss philosophy, guards and security managernent.
-problems, procedures, etc. in--an effort to increase the effectiveness o intradepartaental comunications.
Security supervision. will receive more extensive training in supervisory comunication,
and security philosophy.
In
- addition, regular in ' an discussions will 'be held between supervision. and management
- skills, informal ef fort to increase the ef fectiveness of such comunication, a
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