ML20065C460

Forwards Proprietary Rept of Physical Security Event Reported to Region I During 870728 Telcon.Encl Partially Withheld

ML20065C460
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	08/03/1987
From:	Beratta J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20065C236	List: ML20065C455 ML20065C460 ML20065C463 ML20066H255 ML20066H256 ML20066H284 ML20066H777 ML20066H791
References
FOIA-90-269 NUDOCS 8708070094
Download: ML20065C460 (3)

Text

.

r- nl Y 'JI AGAR A Il u MOHAWK .

• . NINE Mitt point-UNIT 1 e o tcx 03 Lycovo Nv immtesoNt (315) m to:

August 3, 1987 Mr. Thomas E. Murley Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation United States 11uclear Regulatory Cornission Washington, DC 20555 Re: tiine Mile Point Unit 41 and Unit 62 Docket 110. 50-220/50-410 DPR- 6 3/!1PP- 54

Dear Mr. Murley:

In accordance with 10CPR 73.71(c), enslosed for your information is a copy of a Report of Physical Security Event reported to the fiRC Region I office by telephone on July 28, 1987.

This information concerns subject matter which is exempt from disclosure under 2.790(d) of the !JRC's Rules of Practico, Part 2,

( Title 10, Code of rederal Regulations. Accordingly, we request that the attachment not be placed in the Public Docunent Room and that they be disclosed only in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR 9.12.

Very truly yours, fil AGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATIO!!

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' Joseph P. Beratta Supervisor, 11uclear Security J PB/kac Enclcsure I

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',, e REPORT or PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENT REGION I, USNRC, OTTICE OF INSPECTION AND EN}ORCEMENT 031 PARK AVENUE, KING Of PkUSSI A. PA. 19406 PHONE (215) 337-5000 Date of Occurrence: 07/28/87 Time of Occurrence: 1120 hrs racility and Location: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 12, Lycoming, NY 13093

, Docket Nos.: 50-410 Licence Nos.: HPT-54 i

Licencee's occurrence Report No. 87-03 '

Brief Title (Subj e c t) : Breach of Vital Area Barrier DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: On Tuesday, July 28, 1987, at approximately 11 r hours, it was identified to securit rvision b two cognizant ',- 5 psu was accccsible to an that a potential breach in theQ@y re sukj an unsecured " access hatch" unauthorized individual, as a t of Incidentally, the " access hatch" leading to the R $ Q 73 M R f M if @ the roof of thedf M fd D 4 W J h ir. located approximately 18 feet irom empl oya bi t-

,Vbuilding, hen ver, an existing ladder alleved an individual means f or gaining access to the subject Vital Area.

RESICNSE BY LICENSEE: Incediately upon2being nade aware of the breach, the Sergeant, Nuclear Security (unit Safeguards supe rvi sor) established a fixed post in accordance with the Security of Walter Martin, and Contingency Plan.

Region I (16Ej At this point, with the concurrence Security Management secured the " access hatch" with a Inspector, ' pT security lock end incorporated this arca in the ent an:!

watchtour. The results of further investigation into the inci actions taken to correct the root causes are contained on attached page.

Minimal if an individual atterpted to osin CONSEQUENCES AT FACILITY:

access to the[ h P M c W R M he must first; gain access to 'the Protected Area, then request a specific key controlled by Security and the Station Shif t Supervisor (SSS), then receive approval from the SSS prior to unlocking this door, areas or climb the outer walls of the M is approximately 30 feet.

pyg.WQg which in tnost Licensee Employee Reporting: Daniel D. O'Hara, Asst. Nuclear Security Specialist (315) 349-1319 HRC Staff Employee Receiving Phone Call: John MacKinon, H.O.O.

- Date of Phone Call: July 26, 1987 Time of Phone Call: 1804 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.86422e-4 months <br />

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StcVkITY EVENT REpokT 87-03

', Nine Mile point Unit il and Unit (2 50-410/NPT-L4 on July 28, 1967, at 1120 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.2616e-4 months <br />, Security Manager.cnt was cade aware of the subject incident. An investigation was Imrediately initiated to )

ascertain the circumstances involved and to identif y the causes,  ;

The Nuclear Security Depa rt ne nt , as noted in a recent Systenatic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report (S A LP) , adeoenstrates a continued con,mitment to execilence and sel f improvement". Consequently, a new "Commitnent to Excellence" program is being developed which encourages guards to becone more actively involved in the overall security operation. A particular segnent of this progran encourages the guard to spend more of his/her of f-hours tine in their respective plants Accordingly, on Tuesday, July 28, identifying any potential problems.

1987 two guards patrolling Unit 2 identified a potential breach in the

}{@422 E j Q TfiQ @ o Security Management.

S t a, rq $ taken from the guards indicated that they entered the M A gg >n roof at approximately2jEttiK 11:15 and proceeded t o cl imb a ladder E. M I M. accessible through (T(oading to thc((WE*i1Myg@t they discovered the " louvers" a access hatch. At this poin position and questioned the 96 square inch requirement. The two guards hen climbed back down the ladder; one retained posted while the other I uard contacted Security Supervision for f urther evaluation.

In consultation with Security Management it was deterrined the 'be louvers in the open position did in fact exceed the 90 squarf,t inch requirement. However, the problem was not so much the louver buy sh. -

accessibility to the " access hatch" also it was deterrined that the physical barrier was not sufficient to neet the criteria of 10cFR 73.2(f)(2). Upon discovery, as previously noted, the breach was immediately and effectively addressed by security Supe rvi s i on in accordance with the Site Security Saf eguards and contingency Plan.

At approxinately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on' Thursday, June 30, 1987, the ladder was permanently removed from the vall on the )@ma'iMWWIDgggG] roof precluding unauthorized entry to the " access ha[tch".A3d it ionally, the access hatch remains locked with the security padlock and access to the

[j$gll roof continues to be controlled by security and the Stataon . aft Su pe rvi s or ,

rurthermore, a work request is currently being circulated to remove the existing wire and replace it with materials sufficient to reet the criteria of 10cFR 73.2(f)(2) .

Security Management has reiterated the importance of each and every -one of us involved in the Security Operation and we strive to continue our c ,amitment to excellence and self improvement.

ow