ML20066H791
| ML20066H791 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1987 |
| From: | Beratta J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065C236 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-90-269 NUDOCS 9101290248 | |
| Download: ML20066H791 (4) | |
Text
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r YNIAGARA NuWOHAWK
+c NIA0 ARA MOHAWK POWER CoRPoRAfloN ~3N CR'E BOULEV ARD WEST SYRACUSE N Y 13202/1[tENoNE (3t5; C4 1511 January 30, 1987 14r Richar_d W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Program United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission _ Region I 631-Park Avenue -
King Of _ Prussia PA 19406 Re:
Nine Mile Point Unit #2 Docket No. 50-410 HPF-54
Dear Mr Starostecki:
In ~ accordance with '10 CFR 73.71 (c), enclosed for your informat. ion is a copy of a Report of Physical Security Event reported to the NRC Region I office by
~
telephone on January 26, 1987.
This information concerns _ subject matter which is exempt from disclosure under 2.790 (d) of the NRC's Rules of' Practice, Part 2, Title 10. Code of Federal Accordingly, we request that _ the attachment not be placed in the
' Re gu l a t ion s.-
-Public Document Room and that they be disclosed only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR_9.12.
Very truly yours, NI AGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORAT.0N l'P.
_b L,- m oseph~P.-Beratta Supervisor, Nuclear Security JPB/kal
Enclosure:
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,-i-O I-n REPORT OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENT 4
4 REGION 1 USNRC, OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 4
631 PARX AVENUE, KING OF PRUSSIA, PA.
19406 PHONE (215) 337-5000 Date of Occurrence:
01/25/87; 01/26/87*
Time of Occurrence: 0738 hrs; 1419 hrs
- Security Mana9ement became aware that the appropriate
- Date and tirne procedures had not been complied with.
Facility and Location: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Docket No.: 50-410 Unit 2 Lycoming, NY 13093 License No. NPF-54 Licensee's Occurence Report No. 87-01 Brief Title (Subject): Lost Vital Area Xey DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
On Sunday, January 25, 1987, at approximately 0738 hours0.00854 days <br />0.205 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.80809e-4 months <br />, the Security Department was notified yta telephone that an op lost a Vital kea Key.
A search was imediately
-results.
As a direct result of the lost key, a new core change must be
- However, initiated in accordance with our Security Administrative Procedure.
it was confirmed that the appropriate f
on January 26, _1987, at 1419 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.399295e-4 months <br />, Security Pr
- dure had not been fully complied with, Imediately upon being made aware of the lost key,-
Captain, Nuclear Security made the proper notifications as RESPONSE BY LICENSEE:
with in the Captain's Log ard complied al area core change be initiated {
on S-SAP-1.1 which re fres.a n However, it was determined a nitial core change did not comence until 1130, which as a result January
.98 that e
0900 on the 26th of Janua y 1987 and completed atand required us to t
exceeded the further. investigations into the incident and actions ENS.
The results o taken to correct the root causes are contained on attached pages.
Minimal;- any use of the lost Vital Area Key would CONSEQUENCES AT FACIllTY:
-have resulted i cating that it was not found and used by unauthorized perso I
Daniel D. O'Hara, Asst. Nuclear Security Licensee Employee Reporting:15) 349-1319 Specialist (3
Mr. William Jones, N.0.0.
NRC Staff Employee Receiving Phone Call:
Date Of Phone Call: 01/26/87
~
C Security Event Report 87-01 Nina Mile Point Unit I2 50 410/NPF-54 At 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />. January 26, 1987, Security management became aware that a security procewre may not have been properly implemented.
An investigat ton was - imediately initiated to ascertain the circumstances involved and to identify the causes.
The focus of the investigation was to:
1)
- 1. earn the reason why the loss of the vital area key went undetected during the daily audit conducted on((rit$g4mgggt
] shift.
2)
Determine why the appropriate Security Procedure was not properly followed.
The vital area key was first reported lost at 0738 hours0.00854 days <br />0.205 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.80809e-4 months <br /> on January 25, 1987, when the individual to whom it was issued reported for work.
The day sMfr supervisors were apprised of the incident, filed a Security incident Repkrt.
and initiated the appropriate Security Procedure.
25, 1987, the Supervisor of Operations, At approximately 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> on January was notified by the on-duty Captain, that an operator had lost her vital area A search of the area was conducted with negative results.
The Captain key.
advised that he had lef t a message on the telephone answering machine of the individual responsible for lock core changes and that the appropriate procedure was being complied with.
i w
the shif t supervisor reporting for the@
f At of the missing key from the on-duty Captain.
e sane t me~.
shift earne
- the guard who had been involved in the audit conducted during the[I imediate supervi(sor that she had been aware of the key miss learned of the incident.
The (uar en g,
m 1nformec ner when she made the count on the preceding shif t.
The Captain contacted the Supervisor of Operations and advised that a core change had been= done on the which kept us in compliance with.S-SAP-1.1 and the Plan.
previous shif t Additionally, he advised the Supervisor that the key had been lost prior to 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />.
The Captain was then advised to take statement from the parties involved with the improper key count on the previous Statements taken from the Guard and supervisor - indicated that the Guard had mentioned the missing key -to the supervisor while he was involved in other duties and asked what course of action should be taken.
The response by the supervisor was apparently misinterpreted and, as a result, the key count showed no discrepancy.
Thus, the f act that a vital area key was missing was not discovered until 0738 hours0.00854 days <br />0.205 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.80809e-4 months <br /> on January 25, 1987.
On January 26,1987 at 0700-hours, the Supervisor of Operations spoke with the individuals concerned and considered the matter closed.
However, at 11:30 hours he was notified that the core change had just been completed.
As a result, of further conversation, it was recognized that no cores had been changed until 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> on the 26th of January 1987.
1
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Attempts were made to' contact the Captain responsible for initiating the core change, however, he was unavai.lable until 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.
At 1419 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.399295e-4 months <br /> on January 26, 1987, it was confirmed that the appropriate Security Procedure had not been fully complied with, as had been implied in a Security 1.og entry.
According to the log entry, a message had been lef t on the telephone answering machine of the individual responsible for lock core
-changes.
That individual never received the message.
When relieved, the on-duty Captain, who had lef t the message on the answering machine, brought the log entry to the attention of his relief.
The relieving Captain interpreted the log entry as indicating that a core change had been initiated per the referenced security procedure.
The following problems have been identified:
1)
It is apparent that the Guard who conducted the vital area key audit and was aware that one was missing, f ailed to ensure that her comment to the supervisor was fully understood.
The importance of vital area key accountability is well known by all security pcrsonnel and is addressed in training.
Since the supervisor took no inmediate action, it should have been apparent to the Guard that the supervisor w3s not really aware that a
- vital area key had not been accounted for during the audit.
The importance of vital area -key accountability as well as proper audit techniques will be strongly emphasized with the parties concerned.
Th is matter, -in itself, will be further reviewed with procedural changes if applicable.
- 2) -The supervisor to whom the Guard initially reported the missing key was remiss-in not following up the Guards coment.
In an effort to preclude similar problems, the procedures being enanged require a duplicate count of vital area keys.
All levels of security supervision will be instructed on the implementation of changes.
3)
The Captain, who initially received the report of the missing key, initiated the appropriate security procedure.
However, neither he, nor the -Captain who relieved him followed up to ensure that the individuals responsible for core changes had, in fact, received the message and was directing his personnel to perform the task.
This deficiency will be addressed with the procedural change requiring the on-duty supervisor to expediate the core change on his shift and follow up with documentation that has been complied with.
On January 28, 1987, the subject key was located within the protected area and returned to the Security Department.
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