Text

Technical Review Rept,Nrc Region I Insp 50-410/86-02,Review of Nine Mile Point,Unit 2 Tech Specs, of Onsite Activities Conducted on 860106-17
	ML20066H284
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	01/17/1986
From:	Beckman D, Kaufman S, Rogers J; PARAMETER, INC.
To:	Gramm R, Sharon Hudson, Linville J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20065C236	List: ML20065C455; ML20065C460; ML20065C463; ML20066H255; ML20066H256; ML20066H284; ML20066H777; ML20066H791;
References
	FOIA-90-269 NUDOCS 9101290099
	Download: ML20066H284 (72)
	v • d • e

- -. .

TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT NRC REGION I INSPECTION NO. 50-410/06-02 REVIEW OF NINE MILE POINT, UNIIT 2, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS N!AGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NRC DOCKET NO. 50-410 NPC CONTF AC T NO. NPC-157 ':'1 c.O?

OriSITE ACTIY1 TIES CONDUCTED Januar, 5 - 17. 1936 t'W*

F'r c p ar c a for Pr ep :.r e d by:

U. S.rl. P. C. Peglan 1 Par a.te t er . !n:.

671 P ar l; A.cnue 17 7.C Wa t er t cun P1 ani: F;d .

King of Pru::ia. PA 1 ? i '.O Elm Gro.'e, WI 5:122 NRC Liat on Perconnel: Authors:

J. Lin.illo D. Bect. man R. Gramm J. Rogers S. Hudson S. Kaufman 9101290099 901016 PDR FOIA PERSON 90-269 PDR

TADLC OF CONTENTS ,M

[)l{g,w, sldh SECTION TITLE PAGE E .M E C U T l ','E S U M t1 A R Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.0 I t n P O D UC 1 10t l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 F UPPOSE

1. O BACI GF OutlD ' GENEPAL CCOPE

1. 2 GENERAL C','ALUAT ION CRI TERI A 1,q GEtlEPAL C','ALUAT lot t NE1 HODS 2.O CYALUATIOil.................................... 7 2.t F EAC TOP PPOT ECT ! Ori CY5 f CN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ,

2.? g I nAF.Y col l T A ! ! iNC t lT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 10 INTEGEITY P LEntAGE '

DF:YL1CLL SUPPPESSION C H Al1E E R

!. . _ t 'R I MAR" CDilT A l f ir1Erl f ISOLAT.ON SYSTEM............................... 1 2.1 CECONDARY COf iT A l f lMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 SECCilDARY CONT A l t iMEtlT ItlTEOP! T i STANDDY GAS TPEATNENT SYSTEM 2.5 C E P'.' I C E N A T E F C Y S T E M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 . !,, CEACTOP CORE ISOLATIOri COOLlHG,....... 19 2.' AC POLLER SOUPCES...................... 2*'

(INCLUDING HIGH PFESSURE COPE SFRAY DEDICATED D I E 3 E L O E rlE P A T O P','

.; PL POWER SOURCEL...................... 24 2.o OrtSITE POWER D15TRIBUTION............. 06 2,10 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY AND AUTOMATIC DEPPE3 CUR 12 AT I ON OY3TEMS. . . . . O

O.!! PESli.'UAt. HE AT REMO'.'AL SYS TEN . . . . . . . . . 32 (ItiCLUDING LOW PREGOUPE COOLANT I rlJ ECT I ON . SHUTDOHN COOL ING L CONTAIN-g MENT SPPAY MODES) ,

.[

2.1;l, LOW PRESSURC CORE SPRAY SYSTEM.........T.5 2.t3 STATIDD/ LIOUID COrlTPOL SYSTCM......... 27 e

2.I1 RADIATION NOf11TORING SYSTENS........... '.

C. . O GEllEP AL CONCLUS I ONS . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :.?

1.0 APPENDICES.. ............................... 41 PERCONS CONTACTED INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION DATA CHEETS

DF .'# T C:ocutt.e Zummary 1 ; % '36 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Fartmeter. Inc.. under the dire:ttor, cf the Nut) car F.egulptory Commission. conduct?d an in:pection at the 'line Mile Feint. Unit C. Nuc1 ear Pouer Ctations to det?rmine whether the dr>pt Technical Spe: 1fi;ation (TCi :.nd-thc F1nal Eafet. An al cri: F,co c r t ( F E A F. ' are compatible with the as-butit plent configuration and occr eting :h ar acter t :tt :: t Ind.

to determine whether the draft Technt:al 202:1!1:atton F.eq u i r c men t r. are defi ni ti .c l . m e s t t' A b l e .

The in:ocction uns concentr at ed :n plant r, stems. :tru:tures and

moanent; h a. i ng part cular :1 pni f I c sn;e utth rc:cc:t to minimi:ing the :e.srity of : tenti al accident: and accident

cr.:eaven c.. The Oc: tem: e.!!uated included: the reactor proto:ti:n and :afeguards 3:tvatten 2,: tem . :tancb. liautd

c-tre! n e:t ch primar, an: tc :-: r : r. t : I n .r c r: t :. and ecleted ouptert :s:trm:. ;:t er g r n , ::re c:a1tng :,at2ms, e adi at t :n

~~*

m:nitortn;. :nd c1c:tr1:21 tcuc- :.:tems. * * -

'(h e tn::?:t1:n tn.01.20 3 r r u *. ~'<' *n To:t:- ur: Or:itr dur r. ;

the perted J r.nur rc i -

1~. Irii.

The # Petlit de:cclption: Ord :: r:iting ansr., teristic: :r the

', to m:.. -:tructure and :cmecnc-t: fcund in tnc FIAC. the flRC Safety E.31uatt:n Fecert '5EF' and the 'croof and re ieu" f cr :/ t ? 'E usee c cmt ar e d t: -11::n:cc crautn;;. or::ccuret and actual elant harduare t: e s t 331 t t h uhother the a:-but!t

niigur3tton of the :.: tem:. :tructurcs .b n d comoonents t r, c omp a t i t l-r u t ' h the rafot. anal.:e: and precated TE.

c rooi :.nc recteu TS 1::ved b. hr C 1 NF.F on No.cmber 29. !DO5 and pending re.t: ton prspOred b ,- a 11:entee 1ett2r of December 70.

1o?! ucrc .i:c:! i or th1: 1n:pection.

Licensen dccument: r o', i ?u rd includ dt Ftping and In:trumentati:n Drawings. L ;1: Di agr amc. Electric 1 Echematter and One Line Diagram , Operating and Emergen:, Proceduren. Iur.0111ance and In:crvi:c Te:t Frccedurc . Ca11tration Fro:edurc; and data.

Maintenance c rD 0 dure . P-2 pcrattanal Test Procedures and data.

Admtn!Etrat ce Proceduret. E.: tem Detign Epectileottont and data sheeta c al cul a t i ens, and correspondence. In 31tu plant equipment wa: .inualli Incpected O r, a rampling batir to verify that ac tu al i nst all ati on: agr2ed utth the various documents.

Cur .el l l ance Proceduret uero al a re ci cued to certfy that the survot11anca methods planned b '. t. h e 1icensee were c onti s t on t with the recuirement of the dr af t TS and that the propored TS

. Page 1

DFAFT E:ccutt c ?ummar/

l N36 recuirement: uere definitt',el, measurable or determinable.

At the timc cf tts i n spec t l er, the TS vere still under de . cl ocmen t by the Itcon:ee in conjunction uith the NFC Office of tJuc1 ear F:o a: t or F:ogulat1cn ( NF.F, ) , %r ir. uw.w. m mmdw: t:d : mg dr 'i 7 r v.-l;sicJ b ,- r u i. .;i ; w e.T,p e r v.

t.c.M,, +.4W . : ; 7 twnd i m; '? -

.1 : 1m: r u M * *. c d L, 'nc

, s .o i a 3,p w w -s*,a % yg -- , ,-33, _

The TC apcl i c At l e to the c l em t :. Item: included tht: In.pection were re=,icued fer congruence uith the : , t or, gene"31 :1arit,,

- tnd the eti1ity to def1 nit 1.cl, cctab!tth O cm: 1;ar.cc. Comments.

re ultin'; from thiI revieu are included heroin and uero provided top tar a t e l *. t c N F:C F.c;: 1Cn I fer di: poi 1 tion utth NF;F:, BL JF;-5 Standard Te:hni: 31 ScectJ iration: dated Ieptember 11, lo?) ucre uced for thi r e '. t e w .

The in pection determined that the c Technical Ic eci f t ::at t an:

uerc corrcititic w:th the 3:-built :.:temc. :tructures, and ccm Onert: In the are3; in::ett2d !' n d that : mpl13nc e utth the To:rna L! E c cs i f i c ti t i ;n : :cul ; 1: : ; t t cc l . mq::ured c)r deturmined,

~- ,

De 3une 5cth the T2 and the 11 : en t ee ' : t mel tner t ing precedures ucr ti!1 under :'c .cl :: mer t , mar . :.1 : n t : nf1gurction, operating .h ar ac t er i : t t :, and parameter det ail: remained to be 4 i r m ) ,- c:t3bl thed. The 11cer. cc'I program: 'or at::Mpl1 thing thi: a:pe: .:d to be fur:ttoning at;:factoril..

1: leted t r.: en t i : t en:i c: .n : diz:repancier :4r e a t uere identified with re:pnet to the:e arti,itte and us c crosented to the 1i:cntee during the in:ce: tion and .nt the c:. I t meeting he1d on January 1", l'S4, Thes e in' col' ed: updating p r e c i cu a l *,- prepared Intertm Operating and Eur.cillance protecurc to reflect recent ana nget r g e n. t :i zn: e. : tne 7?, adi t:r t al and t echni c al crror:

in the z.bo cc tro:ccuret, equipment n menclature and identift:ation '13 belling' deficienciet, and 23ti sf ac tion 'of F I AF- Commitments.

In thi: r: gard, the licen ee': form 31 crograms included a

" f i n : 1 " r e ', t eu c' o!I caer ating phate prececure: to 1dontify-and corro:t :ecn di:crocan:le:. The li censee ha ::e . or al effort; in progre:: uh1:h ut!l pro,1dc addtt1cnn! 2 :urancc that precarattons for 11:2n:ad scarat1:n: ui11 be rattIfact,rt1y c:mpleted, i These program: includet FSAF commitment .erification, complete update and re.ieu of interim TS implomenting procedurer, post preoperational testing as-built (as-tested) .erification of 0,; tem configuration and d suing accuracy, and 3 computcri: ed ryttom which lists all ba:eline references u:ed in sur'. ei l l anc e

, procedure prep ar ati on.

Page 2

,- DFAFT C;acuti'O Summ3r, 1+O?-96 All discrepancies uer? either resol ,ed during the inspection or apprcDriate retolut or, wa: Identified and initiated by the 1 i ten soo, flo programmatic brcaldount_or systemic problems uere

dentifled CSI)Ch.Idd.QU The Tachn1: a1 ?coc1!-::atton r parat1on pracost appear to be f ur.:ii oni ng r r caer 1. . - The 11Tennes 1: mainta1nang adequate management c r. t r ol a.or the proco :.

The Te:hnt: 21 h:O t #icitton: and im;lementing proccoure r e'. t rued appear to be ::.T.c a t i b l e uith tho 32-bu11t riant ccnfiguration.- That .i n f cc m at i on uhich 1: still ender de'.alopment 'or incorporation into the Technic al 30ecification r.n d i mn l e.T.en t : .g pr-:c odur e: 3ppur; to be cubject to tuifi::ent management ;Ontrol to a :t"e 3d ec;'.'at a c omp l et i on o f tra precas:.

M w

Page 7

INTFODUCT10N 1.0 - INTRODUCTION i.1 -

F'UF F OBE The ourpo:e of thi: 1n:pect1on ua: to a1: 1st the Nuclcar F egul ator , Commt :sion in determining that the fli ne Mile Foint.

L'n t t 2. 'NMP O) T f.L Nn t f. 31 20ectfIcatton: uere compat1ble utth the I.t-bul l t configv stien of ;l ant EY tem:. ctructure and component: and that f.h c technt:31 Spectfication r ?qu i r e.nen t s

i. t r e definit 1'.ely mco:urrble or determinable.

1.2 - EAC'GPOUtID AND GENEPAL SCCFE Startuo tc:t:ng and cub:ccuent pl ant operation at ccmmerci al nucicar pouer plant: has demonstrated that di:crepancies c:nc t i mo cui;t between the plant'; Technical 5;cctfications (TS). Fin 31 'i a f e t y Anal.si: Peport 'FTAP), Safety Evaluatt n c: ce t (ECF). Jnd n:-built pl:nt c:nfiguretton, During !cw

ctier p r. =. : t :: : 3 :: t i n g at the Gr3md ,;u l f Nucl:ar It3ttOn. Untt !. ,

igrific?nt di::repancic: cf thi: nature usrc ident3fied and sub:cquantl, ccrroctod.

Tni: in:ca:tt:n uat cnducted t: gain addttt:nal at: uran:3 t's*.

5c prep cod NMC

. TS arc comp ati ble ui th the at:umption: and r ec u i r em er. t : cf the Iafety c.aluations per f or:ned and t"e

-but1t 01 ant c onf t gur a t i cr. . C-rameter. Irt, u:: recue:ted to ps:t:t flF C -Pag t en I in cerf rmtrg tht: in:pe: tion at the

IMP 2

itc. The-intecction t n'. cl ve d about 700 in:cector hour: Cn Ite during the part od Januar, 5 !". l^36.

The gener al croc of tne :n:pect:en included:

P c;' c r t Sc tion 2.1 PEACTOR PFOTECTION SYSTEM (F PS )

0.2 *RIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGPITY

LEAVAGE ORYNELL SUPPF ESSION CHAME'EP MA!!1 STEAM ! ?OL A T I ON '.'AL'.'E S ( M S I '.'s )

0.7 FP!MAPY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS'

.1 SECONDARV CONTAINMENT SECONDARY COflTAltlMENT' IrlTEGPITY ,

STANDDY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SDGTS) 2.5 SER',' ICE MATER SYSTEM (SWS) 0.6 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) 2.7 AC POWER SOUPCES (INCLUDING HPCS EDG) 2.8 DC POWER SOURCES hul Psyc -- w C.9 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 24tw ' O 10 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (HPCS)

Page 1

INT PODUCT I Oti AND AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS) 2.11 PESIDUAL HEAT PEM0'.'AL SYSTEM ( F HR)

IrlCLUDitlG LOW PRESSURE COOLANT ItlJ ECT 10ti (LPCI), SHUTDOWN COOLING, AtID CONTAINMENT SPRAY MODES) 2.10 LOW PFESSUPE COFE SPFAY SYSTEM 'LFCS) 0.10 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (SELC) 2.14 PADIATION MONITOPING SYSTEM The f ollouing gener al categorier of documents were revicued:

Technical Soecification:

Final Safety Analy:AI Report NRC Safety Evaluation Poport (uith Supplement 0)

P2 ping and In trumentation Diagrams ( P.t I Ds )

I n s tr umen t a t i on and Control Logic Diagrama Eloctrical One Line Di agrams - gu,u.wraay}

El ec tr i c al Schemati:TDirgrams In trument Loop Drauings Plant General Arrangement ? L ayout Draulega

. Fr eop er a t i en al Test Procedurc: nnd tort data Sur . el l l ance Te,fg F r ocedures

.Mn a nten anen Proccoures -~

Oper ating Frecedure Emergency 0;cr ati ng Procedures Inner.lce Test Frocedures Admini str ative Procedures Setpoint C al c ul a t i on :-

Lcon Calibration Procedure: and data

1. .!. - GENERAL E'.'ALUATION CPITEFI A The above 2.' Item and documentation were re,teued with re:pect

.to:

The compatibili ty of the draft TS uith the as-built conftguration of the cyctemt. structurec and componentst The const:tenc1 of the draft TS uith the document:

110ted in 1.2 abovet The capability to defintti.cli measure or determine complannce with the TS reautrement: conc!dering both the softuare and hardware avail abl et and.

The adeq4acy of the licennee's curveillance and

-incervice Fest programs to provide for the implementation of the TS Surveillance Requirements.

j fed s gag -

M 1.4 - GENERAL E'.'ALUAT I ON METHODS Page 5

I rlT F ODUC T I ON Frior ( c, the oncite ingpection LCtiYttier, the prcof and review Technical 2pecifica/tions uere reviewed to identify there Q---

f;.7 t e m . :tructure: and component which were p ar ti cu! arly -

signif1: ant uith raspect to pre'.enting or 31t1 gating the centeavences of anal :ed accidents.

h)';L/7(13 :$

Durtng the onstto in:pection acti.itie ;, nd.theTD ' frY" a c t I L t '.

descripticn!, operat:ng c h ar ac t er 1 :, t i c ; an related : n f orir.a t t on found in the T3, the F3AP, and the SEP ere : cmp ar ed to the licen,ee documenti 11 ted in Section 1.2, Concurrentl,. the TS were o. aluyed to confirm that the perf ormanc e criteria and

<c---

reauiremenPe:tablIched thercln were definitvel' me 3 : L'r/a b l e or determtnable.

Partituiaf emphatt: L:3 3 g i '. en to the officac,' of :Ur /e 11an: 2 text: and intervice tertc establ::hed b ', the 1tcentee to demonstrate conformance uith T3 and the reau t r emen t: ct 1 OC F F:50. 55 a The detatled' in:c : t '. s r. pl on u rd to cnduc* ; v? :n:tto act: . . t t i: c 1: or,c. ded n; Aopendt: * *1 . 0 t; t *. . : "cc cet. Fey e , al ua t t on item: included!

P1 ant d r .u i r. g : uc-r a 2*.1 ued to a :- t a b 1 12 h that th? c 1 ant Scat;n and con:tructicr, document; ucre :cr at:bla utth the FSAP. T2, and 3EF.

Prescarat:cnal '

: . : -- . text: uero re.:2ue: to .ortf thet the "3: tc;ted" tyrtem configuration; tscre con 1; tent utth the F5AP, T2, and GEP.

Sur.atllance Test: uere enviewed uhrre a. at l abl e to . a r t f ',

their conforman:e uith the TC and to e tab!1;h that the TS rout.cament: CulO be defini+'.017 mea:Urra.

Operating, Ett cr g en c , , Maintenance, and Inter tce Test proceduren uer e revieued uhere avai1abla to ont351ich theie confermance with the TS and accuracy With re: acct to the design and con truction document: and unth the a built clant.

Liconcae peracnnel ccntactad dering the incpecticn orO 1: 2ted in lip c e n d i . 1.1 An eult meeting us; conducted u.th nen t ar 11:entee management on January 17, '?S6 to present the recult: of thl ,

intpect1on.

Page 6 r

DFAFT E'.%LUAT I ON 1-2'-96 2.0 EVALUATION GCNERAL In addit 1on to the :pecifac inspectton and rc'dau 1tems belou, the administrative and Emergenc, Operating Procedure: lirted in Appendi 2.0 uere u:ed W-m+p % the inspection for evalution f the itcenzee'c programs. d4/NG (NOTE: All procedures litted herein are crofined b ',

"f!2 " tignif. ting their app l i c ab t 11 t .- tc NMP 2.) g__.

21 - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

.1.1 - E','a1uat1on Criteria and Ecopo oco The Fo:4c tor P rot ec t;i on IV: tem (F P? 1s a d u a l - t. r 1 p i+1octri;31 tlarm and actuating : . ;tc m 0 0:',1 ;; t; pro.cnt *hc

. " o c c t ;,r from operating under unrafo. or potent!all' unsafe ::cn r i t t on ; . T n &'-

F.P S it derigned to pronde ://tgnal to cause rapid in:crtion of control rods (scram) and :hutdown the reactor . hare.nr p r e d e ', er m i ne d Octoctnt: a r .y reached.

The PP5-ccnJt:tz of tuo indcDonden* 2 ,1, t e m : . A and D: rath ,

,ctem ha: tot independent r e a : t o'- hutdcun logic ch annal 3.

Feactor chutdoun logic channola 7l and A2 for the "A" :y: tom and El and D2 for the "D" .ctem. Each logic channcl r e c e t , ci : 4 a, a m i n i mu.n . c,n e input :ignal fr:m the PP? mcntt: red ;: ar amn t er s ,

There carameters are measur:d b ,' st least four indepcrdent anrtrument channels.

Eacn :hittccun 1ogic hanne! .: *anged.1n a 'me v't ,p tuo' Iog1c and each ren: tor shutdcm :. Item 1: arr ar.ged 1n a "cne out of tuc twice" logic. Tht: arrangement pr o'. t d o: to: ting capability during reactor ope"?tton Without : hutting dcun t. h e reacter. Senior trip channel inovtr to FPS causing roactor :cr o ,

ares a) Noutron Mcn i tor i ng 'I t?m bi Pcactor ' 'e ; ;c l

. ( R',' ) high pecanure c) P ',' 1ou uater 10,el di Tur;.tne Etop ' ':il. . e p o n t t i on e) Turbine Control 'hl , e poi s i t i on f) Main Steam Inclat1on * ' c l .' e (ME !)

. centtton l g) Scram Di :ch ar ge ','ol u,ne u ater level h) Dryuell prensure i) Main Steam 1ine radtaticn nonitor:

/A/G In addition to the abo /e. the reactor can bo crammed by actuatt <:~~

Page 7

. - -- .~ _ - _- - - - - , _ - , - . .. ~

EYAl.UA710N .

d the appropri ate manual ceram ;uttche: or b ', placing th& Feactor Mode Sultch in the SHUTDOWN oosttion.

The RPS instrumentation Pnd cautement uere revtcued with re:pe:t to the criteria and methed: of Section 1.7 anc ).1 of thl:

report. See Ap p en d 11. 2.1 for . listing of document: r e'.'t eued .

Speci f i c channel s or functicns of the PPS uere al:o re',teuod in cnjuncti:n with other clant tyrtems. F:ci er to the cther Secti:n: of this report an d their respective app end 'scre r?.icued for the Oy tem: an:

equipment listed ab o .'e , and namp3 red to the cucuments listed m Appendin 2,1 to

er 1 i' - that
. the proossed TS a::uratel, represented the a:-buiIt plant conftguriticn: ind operating characteri stics and uers in ag r e eme r.t utt5 the inform 2tton in the FEAP and SER.
C 1.2 Ot:ce:21:n Tho rr.'Iru of the PPS 1 n s t r u m en tA,11 en i r c l ud ed r.cr m al . 3 b n c e .n 31.
and einer g en c y operat1cnz deucribed b <. thc FSfiF ,nd the 1iconsee': c--"t procedure . 4
~ - ,
The : ,*I,t e 3. :oniigurat:cr. drautngt, operat1og 1og: d 1.4 9 w. s .
sy0 tom operating p ar ame t er : ari d 11mits. : v ". 21 i 1 a n c e and p re::or at ; cn:1 tc:t nr:redurer. oer ting procecuret. and netpoint: uere re,tpued :n a :3mpiing t 3: 1: to snrur s that the de:ign Jcatures were 0 : c u r s t e l ;. refIected b. the tett and oper at i n g nethod: and that the:S mathods were ccnsistent uith the reaut rement: Of the ;rcp;;ed -TS. ;
The re.isu of the f<PS s', tem docu.rnnt: ateve indicat?c that th?
cr: tan 4 c :, t ur e: - ar e . i n t g r e e m e n *. utth t N: .r::' rd r e i gt u T3.
Visual inspection of. the FPS i n s t r e.nen t a t i on system per ;e ua:
not perf ormed. - The independent inctrumentation channel separatton requirements and the FPS i n s t re.anen t 3 t t on and c.ontrole in the contr ol roem and other pl ant areat were in;perted. 'These inspections estabit hed that the datign f e at ur? Here in a g r ee:nen t utth the prcpe:ed TS. i 2,1.! Obser.ation2 .
No di screpancies were identified in the licensee *2, drawings. I procedurec. or in citue equipment. The following commentc about the proof and reviou TS uere provided to TIPC: kt for revtew -and dispctitton utth NRC NRR.
1. TS Table. 1.7.1.l'-1. FPS Sur.et11ance Frequentia2, The ,
l l
Page G l l
EVALUAT 1 Oil
. 4catnotes applicable to the f requency columns are di ( f i cul t to uso and are, in some cases, redundant, e.g. Table Item 1, t RM ?,- APF.M . I F.M Neutron F'l u t, H]gh, footnote "1" is redundant Item 2.b, Flou Pta:ed Si mul atec Thermal Power, footnote "g".
refers to "ettablished driw flou". Tht t er m appears go d i undefined. The 1:icensee uaa unab j e to el vi f '/. Ue usago of "eit t ab l i ched core flan" from Standard TS appears appropriat9.
2.1.4 Concluttons No inconnistenci en botueen the ' S , FSAP, SEP and the a5-bui1+
plant were noted durtng the .tzual incpection. Too a :,-b u i l t system uaa found in agreement utth the art:u: documents ravinued. The TS r e::u t r emen t : uer 'i found to be definitivoly measurable.
2.2 - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 2,2.1-- Evaluation Criter1a 3 r ;' R:c o I
-The primary cont rinnent :.; tem: er - bared on a Marl II o r t i. a r y containment and a c lincet:al roccndary c on t a i n.+ cn
ur r ou n d i r. ;
-the orimar.' and heurtng equioment essenti31 fcr a 'a . 4 e shutdoun, t
{, & ~^
Thn drywell- i l is a frustrum chaped. :trel lined, reinfor:ad concrete vessel cic:0d b. I done. The prec:ure suporetclon chamber tz a elv ndr,:31,
_.sel 11 red controte er d :Iuro 10tatad beneath the drvuell.
The p tmary cent 3inment and it3 r'el at od acu:pment were revieuad with resoect to the criteria :s n d methods o# 3ections 1.0 and 1.4 of this t'oport. See ,ip p en d i : 2. 0 -f or a listing at documents l r e .>i e v e d .
l The rav1ou included:
Pri mary Cont ainment Integrtt f 3nd Leatage Primary Contcinment Air 1ocks l Dryuoll TS and Design Featurea ,
Supproszion Chamber TE and Design Features Primary Containment Furge System Primary Containment Izolation System (PCIS? is discussed in Sec t i on ~'. 0 of this report and the Secondary Containment in Section 2.4.
Page o -
g E',' AL U AT 1 ON I
C Fe" nhu pet .W / cret.'inment :.: tem ren ew , pr cO c ced T S !..' 1. 6.1.1 L e n'sr?qh 7 ' T . \ .1. h . 1 . ': . 2 , and 1. /'.S uere compared to the me.u g ntc 1 't x it) i r. 4,w d i : 2. 2 to .erify that the proposed TS ac c. - a t 21 ~. r 3rmarte 1 t h -? :. 2 - b u t I t plant conf 1gur3 tion 3rd op e r's t i n o char actort st i c; and uere tn agreement utth the i nf or mati on in the I' SAP and T E F .,
l 2. 0. 2 Di:cutsior7 L
c The festure of ths:e estems sw oue1 1ncluded normal. at:nor a 3 l D and eme genc, cperetton: M der:rined by the FSAR. Section 6.2.
Containment 'l v o t oo,s . and the 1iceruee'I & d - e ra : .c c-orc:Odur95.
1 i
The 3 -but1t configurat1cn port 1:n af the r s', t eu 1nclu<tN a sampling bored o.er.tcu cf .: tem t,1 c t ?.g c on f ' g u r :s t p.%
i n ;trumen t A n t' cntr01 setootri md :p e r r.1 : o g 1ontc, 3,et5' rperating r.z.c aetery .d elec+r * : 31 c or. t r o l design. The cir:uits 4 and 1Ogic : - - '. 1 2ni M 'h0
- ,; Eh: ' Jwr 9 ! GC 1 V:f $
. 1A tb4 t' e . 1 { u .
Q -
Oversting Proceduren, E ur . c t ! '. a n t e and I n : e r . i t.c T a !. t . . Ud ,
Pracqerational Tott: :ier n s.tewed :n 9 nol t rg b>:1: t:
k determinc *53t the d e :1 ;- f e , t . 's : ua r. .
acct." ateli reilerted U.
the te t and or,er a t in; metnod; and that *here .ne t +, ed s uer e i cenn1Itent utth th+ requiretent ci the prc,pcied TS, -w 1
To .t .no .ha d ; anu re tilt 2 mi t' e pr e::er : t t an 31 tests uere used r
on I, :ropling rn.:t* tc crti t.et tw rectem functioned utthtn t h., p s r W w i of *- k o dettgn d autogi .iJ r equit eman t s.
T , p t a l l '. ,- where a preopersti; 31 *e:t pro ved the functions of a .
l ogi . : t rnt i . . the det,tled pr::? dero; ard esultz uere :cmo 3r r e utth ;hc lagt ; :. n 1 61c.scr ,o ' . agr 3a to .e. , t h iit the test k Accuratal, r e f l ec t ac' the :a +- and that the circuits wer 0 con tstent utth the Ut:tgn ba:ez ref l ec t ed in the FSAR, SER, and TS.
I L 9pect. call,, the .,ctem t mter n and yxzr a t t on s invol.ing tP e follou.rg uere re.tmsud:
Norw a ! r, a t em al i gnt en tu an1 cp ur Sci on; C a e r g e n c .. r . 7 t ent al t r.nsn t s and r;ce +ttonc f'r r.' u ur a 30c p r o;;i un Op m . '_1 on S, stem testtng a l 1 greTen t 3id metheds
.ILC Functtanal Vent
, Flou Fath '.'a i 've L i n ?vp : .nd Operabilit/ Testing E :. tem Operational Re .id t tot: Te: ting L ,
A usual tnapection af pcrtic.'; of the si; tem and : elected e gu t r. men t e t t. ob l i shed tnet the design featuret uero accurately transl at ed into the as-built 2,2temt. The .tsual incpectten L. F3ge 10
_ .--_a_--- - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - -
E',' ALUA T 10N included .erification of r,2 tem piping. f ' in d System flcu path and compenent conii gur at t on. -
conteel :tation i n s,t r umen t a t i on . I1mulated D ) r t i sil performance of system alignments and toits. And general comparison of the 59 stems uith the proposed TS.
".O.7 Ob: Pr va t i on I Tuo minor i nconsi stenci es were identified. In each ca:e. the 1)centee e1ther provtded a. renclut1on or demonEtrated that the matter h?d been pre tou:lv identified and us2 in the pre:ess of retolutton.
1. In 05F-!?C-M000. '.' 3 t uum Er e al r r Operact11ty. FevtIion O. the vacuum brept er : 3r a c.'cled closed to .erify ocorability per the TI Surveillsnce Fequir9ments. In 9 tup: 7.0.1.3
".O.1.e. .C.1.t3. etc. .01.e polit 1on thould read " c l o t rid "
c vice ":cen" t: . er t f *, cloted indic ati on f oll euing :1czure, Thu 11:en;ee P: 4houlsdped the bb;.c .+ n d : tot ed th %t the c o met e r t uculd be revicued ar d atso23i+1ened jgjng the i i n 31 ,
prOceduct re.tou pr er to 1 1 ; era;o d overation.
C. In IIf -F F 1- M . H ! W <? L : :'. -- 2cr3n F : :: t.nc e . Po. i n :n O.
Itect " . T .1.';) 0 n r d 0.1 de net ar:1ude tFe "Ic2t than cr oauct
t. o " :.tbol r ee,u 1 r Od to t36 2 the t1 me r esponte 3c c ?p t anc ir
r1ter: a of ;0.010 :econd; :'_ n s t : t en t utth T2 2.7.1-2.
The 11:entee act neuledge d the above and Itsted that the c o m<t c e
uauld be r:~.1 rued rnd $1:tca1t1cr2d sur1nq the f i n 31 pr:cedure revleu prior to licented operation.
7. . OEF -MS E -MC"? i . Ml?Y Part)si E.or:1:e To:t and Functical Te t ci F c E - M E ! '.' C 1 0 u r 1. Dr 9 t . t . . l u :: e t en incorrect refcrcnce to T3 13tilo. 1.7.1.1-1.5 .1:e f5 T)ble !.!.1-1. Item 5.-
The 11contee acLnouledged the ab o v re and ttated that the comment uauld be recicued nd di: cost tioned dur1ng the ftns) pr ocecure r e. i eu tr 1or to 11conced operation,
b j,< ~4. TT ~.:.1 w Dr fuell J?vppresst en Fool Yacuum Ere> Lor .
p df Actton C. requirer thet if cre , scuum breel er of 3 osir in d i nop er :.bl c . the ather, tperable vn1t uti1 be .ov1!ted
s te .
closed .1 thin 2 hourg and then tn t least once every fifteen tlava.
The 3bo.c requirement it inconsistent uith the "ncr m al "
turveillance requirement of T{ 4.6.4 uhtch requirer the all vacuum brealcro be corif1ed clo2ed at least once e'ery reven days.
Page 11 f
I i i mii
CYALUAT!ON Tht: comment- WPt pr ovi ded tC NF;C s F;) for resolut1en unth NFCghpp, C. 2.1 Conc!uttonr.
E:; c ep t .as noted 3bc.e. no dt:crepanctez ucre identiftrd. The a:-butIt conf 1gerat1on of the "s y I t o m t , r. t r u c t u' e t . and components c e n,p 3 r e d :att: factor 1, utth the .t e um tm t s r evi ewed.
The Technt;el Spe: 1fic3 tion reautrementz ucre defanitively me3:Ur;tb1e.
(, p L 7. - PR1MAflYJLJNT_A[t{tiXNT 1 Q.QLA_T.,1QtJ SYD_TE.a sr 2.7.1 - E.alust1on Criteri3 and 5: po Pri m ar ,- ccitsinment 1 cl3t :n 13 .niti. rd uhen senters monitoring ;;;,ider*t diagnostic p r r :.e.e t o r n trar tc initiato r1c :ur e .3 '4: ::r:m r, ::ntsinecnt a:1atien .31.r; ; .d : t * ::
4:c1etten f u r. :; t 1 :n : . There >r e t,picti1, tuo 1:: 1sti:n , p l .vc per 1ina. Tha centr 01 c1r; ult: pro arr3rgod 1n du31 1:olat1cn channelt to t*3t tric r.u z t :::ur in tath logic :h anncl . to c l Ci: P 3h a 01 ^ t i .; n ,?) c. CA:h 1 .> y l c: O h J n r.e l : r * , t r> I Is t 1 E '* : t t uo i ndep end.s n '. tricp1ng sen:er: 4 rem cach me3nred 3rioble.
on i ,- one of uht;h is required to trip a logt: chonnel.
It:1at1on .31vo: .r e d1 tejed nt: 1 ~; groupt per T3 Table
. . . ... ~1 The P r i .r. > r , Crntain+ent :clAtt:n 9,; tem 'PC!?) 3hd it: rel3ted eautpment uere re.leued with respe t to the cri tori a and methods of Sectsons 1.7 and 1. 4 of this repert. Teo Appendth 2.7 for =
11Lting of de:ument: restewed.
Proposed T ~' T J 1. .' . O and 2/4.5.7 were compared to the document:
l i ru t ed in appendtn 2 . 7. t o v e r i f ', that the propoced TE 3 :urstoly repre:ent?d the at-built plant configuration and oper ati ng
.h,racter2:tter and uerc in ogreement utth the inicrmation in t hu F T AF- And TEP. Ptrticul3r amph.:1: uaa pl3eed On the 31.o cloring t t w: fer the automotic i:clotton .cl.e: 11 ted in TS Table 7.A.7.-1.
The precf and re.1Tu T5 uero re teued for the :v:tet: 3nd equipment a b o ', e .
i 2.7..O 01scussion The features of the:O 1,atem: reciewed inciuded normal. 3bnormal and emergenc, cperatt,ons as doccribed by the FSAR. Section 6.0, Page 12
EVALUATION Containment Systems. Section 5.1.5. Main Steam I sol at i on Y a l .> e (MS1Y) Ecaling 3, stem. and the licensco's draft and approved procedures.
The as-built configur> tion porticn of the re.teu included P sampling based o.erviou of tittem piping configuration.
instrument and control setpoints and op2 rating logic. I,2 tem oper ating par ameter n and e l ec t r i c al control design. The circutts and Icgic functions of the Nuc l ear Steam Supply Shuteff I. item and the M51Y Ecaling Ey; tem were included in the review.
Oper ating Procedures. Eurveillance and Inter.tce Testx. > *. d Freoperational Te:tc were re.'teued on a t0mpling b2:1; to determine that the Jetign features uere 3ccuratel,' reflecte: t .-
the test and operating methodt and that tnece methodt vero consi stent wi th the r3quirementi of the preposed T3.
Test methodt and retultc of the preoperational testI ucre ured on a sampling bpsit to .eri f ', th3t the system functiered ut+*: a the paratutcrI of the dertgn drawing and recuirements.
Spe: 1fi:311.. the : : tem fonturr and operations in.cl.ing **p f ol l owi ng uer er r ev a c ued :
Nor m eil :. Item a l l .)n men t s and :perations Emer'gch:.- c , I t s. m 311;n ur*I ?nd operetiont 5,7 tom te: ting alignmonts >nd methods ItC Functic.n31 Tatts Flou hth '/31 e Lineupa and Cecrab11st i T e s t i r.g Sys tem Operat ional F.e a d i n e s : Testing PCIS .31 e c l e:vr e time requirnments and t s c ! ., t t or 11;r al ;
re.ioved in detail u,i r e Orcupt 1 O 12 of TS Table 7.6.5-1. <!
~
A vizual inipett1Ln of pcrticn: of the I', s t em s and Jele:t3J A.tulpment e s t at,l i :ned th;.t the d r ti gn f e a t u r o ;, ucre accurstely translated into the Ji s - b u i l t :,ttems. The .' i z u i l inspection included verificetton of system piping. fluid Eystem flow path and component configur3t1on. *+t-tr control at3t1:n 4-instrumentation. 11mulated certial performance of t,ctem alignments and test:. and general ccmparison of the 3,2tems utth the propocod TE.
D.O.! Obzer.3 tion:
The following inc on si stenci es were identified in the proof end review TS. In each case.,he item was identified to NRC F 1 for @
resolution Uith NPC1 f @ P .ind uas provided to the licencee f or information and concideration for incorporation into the net:t pl anned TS ch ange.# A d D
1. TS Table 2.5.3-1. Primar / Containment liolatten ' '31. e s includen .alve closing s trol e timec for PCIS automatic Page 10
CYALUATION 4
1 i
i
?
J j 1 Solation valvez different from those litted in FEAR Table i
J 6.0-!6. zheets 1-11.
I
The li censee acinowledged the abos e Pnd advi sed that the j FEAR .aluet are "at pur; hit ed" val ve speci f i c ati on d at a as I reflected by FEAP Tabl e Ncte !, whereas the TE <>luec are
) the actual results of "de," calve tinsing testc cluc a 50%
tol er >nce to ac: cunt fcr . al s e performance ur.d te flow '
conditionn.
The 50*; t ol er ance 15 an arbitrary. 2 ngi r aec 4 ng Judgment
.alue Added to the );tual t est resul t s.
The licencee stated thAt. e s e r, with t h e ab o . increate tc the dry tett re:UltI.
l
! p11 . 31 cc t ' TS criteria are lets than or equal to the j etcadent analvit z maninum strol e time requirements.
i The 11 contes stated that the bater fer the T5 .aluet and the j di f f er encer from the FEAF .ylves would te addrested uith NF C i ts: and rpp+ cpri atel . annotated in the T2 or T3 Bases or
, an Pr other 9pprocriate document loc 3t10n.
J l
2. FSAP 7 tt l e 1. 0 'i d . Page 17 "L ev tc lacl? tion Eignalt" cont 31ns discrepin:let with regard to the eq u l '. a l en t TE l Titic 7.7.0-5.
FEAF ltem J contPins refernece to 3 testter Witer Clebnut
.; high differential flow Elgnalt T5 pr ;11ent.
l W FSAP ltem c contains a ref erance to a CCIC Icw starm zupply 1 prett. c :1;nalt the TS hould but dces not.
FEAR ltems FB. V. ond W do not mat:h the equi.alent T3 4
notes.
An ! *. r m is u:ed in TE. nct in the FEAF.
7. The licensee's December 30. 1995 proposed revisions to TS Table 7.6.!-1 deleted containmurt isolation sdive:
F:C5-SOY-013 010 200. 021 based on a plant modification of rec i r cul a t i on pump e4-4 fire protection features. At the 4, t ime of vi cual ingoection of the drywell. the volsen and penetration 7 pere still i n;t s l l ed but neither had been re-incorporated into TE to reflect the e;pected inolation status (e.g. cal.et disabled and l ocLed closed. .31.c3 removed and penetrationc capped. etc.).
l The 11 en7eo advised their i n t er ', is to remove the valves and teal the penetrations.
Additionally. FSAR T3ble 6.2-56 will require amendment to reflect the final intended penetration status, i Page.14 -
, . _ , _ _ _ . - , _ _ _ _ _ . _ , . _ , , _ _ . . _ _ ,__ .~~ ._ _ . _ _ , . _ _ ___
EVALUA1JON ,
4. The nomenclature used for idontification 14 1ndividual Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) : hear isolation val.es at inconsistent between the FSAR and TE, e.g. " T ! P SO'.' A . E4 C.
D, E". "CSI-J004". etc.
5. TS 7. 6. 2. L1mittng Condition for Operstion - Pr 1 m a r ',-
Con t ai nmen t I so l a t i on '.'a l v e s . Includet a "t" note which permtts i nt er mi t t en t cpening of inoperable containment isolation val.es under administrative control. The note does not spect 4y any conds t1 enz, durat1on. nor centrel2, tc be applied wh11e the .alve( ) are open.
The licen:ee 3dvised that the note was added to ac:omodste periodi open1ng of the ECCS "Ieep fi11" s, stem vent .alves as required by the ECCS TS.
The note is too general. :an result in undestrable at:tdent entry conditions. and should be limited spec i f i c al l .' to only the keep fill 5. stem '.alves neces2ary.
2.".4 Conclusions ~..
Encept rt noted a t' : . e . no 31screpancies w er e identified. 7F?
a z,- b u t 1 t confi;uratton of the 2. tem:. structure:. and components comp > ret rattsfactort1, utth the d e c u ,t e m t t revttwed.
The Techn t c al Ere: 1fIcat1on re;uirementc were deftntti.-ely mes2vreable.
2.4 - SECONDARY CONTAINMQQ 2.4.1 - E.aluaticn Cri t eri a and Scope The secondar,- containment function tc provided by the reactor building and functsons to mintmt:e the ground level relcase ci r adi oac t i .'o ma t er 131 during normal and accident operations.
Through the Standb, Ga s Treatment 3, stem (E/GTS). It p r o'. t d e : <-
the controlled, ele,sted rolesse of the building a t tt c : p h er e .
The secondary containment al so functions as the primar, containment /confanoment uhen the drywel1 is open durang refueling er maintunan:e neratt:n:.
The reactor building en: loses the pri mary containment 2,: tem and provtdes fuel storage taci1ities and other reactor aun11iary and seryl o equipment. The Reactor ButIding Yenti1at1on System control > the presture in recondary centainment during normal operation to -0.25 in, water gage (WG). Following an accident signal, the butiding will be maintained at a negative pressure of 0.25 inches of water by E/GTS. e Page 15
1 EYALUAT1OM i
l i
The secondary containment and it: related equipment were revleued with re2pect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.7. and 1.4 of this report. See Appendnu 2. 4 for a listing of documents re'.leued.
Primari Centainment isolation System (PCIS) is discussed in Section O.! of thlu report and the Frimary Centainment in Section T.O.
For the second3ry cont 31nment zyT. tem re /t eu, propose: TS 3.' 4 . 6. 5.1. .2. and .7 were ccmcered to the document s li t te 3 in Appendin C. 4 to .ertfy thbt the prope2ed T3 accur3tel',
represented the PE-built pl 7nt c onf i gur at i on and oper7 ting charseteristics and were in >gr ooment with the informhti:n in the FSAF: and SEF;.
The proof and review TS were also revleued for the s yc t ern s and e:uipment above.
O.4.2 D12cessish The 'orteras Of there 3, stems c9eieued included normal. 3 r ;- T.a l
.and emergenev cperationt a s ce I:ri t:ed by the FEAR. Ecct1cn .2.
Contaannent E', : t ?m t . Section :.I. Filtratt:n. Factrculat:c . and
en t i l at i on
. System, and the licentec*t draft and it: ;.ed peccadures.
The as-built ccnfigurati:n pcrti n of the re. leu inciv:e: a lampling baced overvleu of t h e F.e p c t or Du11 ding and contain*ent w, c'.em f e a tur es i nc l udi n g du c t uor t- Ocnfigurotten, fant. 1.ter traint. dampert, doort. Instrument and control setpoints and operating logic, system ocerating parameters and el ectri cal control design. The circuits and logie functions of the ECCS Actuaticn '3 r t t em wer e included in the revteu.
Opereting Proceduret, Survel11ence and I n se r .* 1 c e Testc. and Prooperational Tests were revleued on a sampling bar:s to determine that the de%1gn f eature: were accurately reflected by the test and operating methcd3 and that the:c methods ucra concirtent with the requirements of the propored TS.
Tect .he t h ed s and results af the pr ec>per at i onal tasts were used ~
on 0 23mpling basic to vertf', that the c, stem functioned within the parameters of the design drawings and requirements. te er e a preoperational test proved the functions of a logic circuit. the detail ed procedures and resul t s were compared wi th _ the l ogic and elementary di agr amc to verify that the test accurately reflected the circuits and that the' circuits were consistent with the design bases reflected in the FEAR. SER, and TS.
i Specifically, the system features and operations i nvol v i ng the Page 1.6
1 l
EVALUATION j f ollowing wore re.iewed:
Nor mal s', stem alignments and op er a t i on s.
Emergency system alignment >. and cp er a t i on r, J Contr ol l ed , filtered Peactor Eu11 ding enhaust
, Post-LOCA Operations System testing alignments and methods )
ISC Functional Tests Flow Path Lineups and Drerebility Testing
3. item Operational Paedine n Terting A vi sual inspec ti on of portions of the systems and 3 01 Pc t ed equipment ev.tablached that the design features were occurately
-translated into the as-built s,3tems. The .itual in:pe tlen jncluded verification of t;ystem c1 ping and ductwort. s', nt em f l ow path and compenant configuraticn. wm control staticn 4c-- -
instrument at t on. simulated pert al periormance of I,& tem ali gnments and ter.tl. and gener al comparison cf the systems ulth the pronczed TS.
2 . 4 . C :: l er'.4 t i : n :
The following inconsisten: tot were identified Dnd . sere re, t ead with the licenroe f or correctivo nct2cn. The 11:ensee Etated that precedure comments vauld be re.tewed and 913 rc 11 t . ; r nti during the final procedure revi ew r. heduled prior to l i c o - 'r ed operatiend.
1. OSF -GTS-DOOI . SEGTE a l . o Ocer nb a l i ty Test. Fe'131cn G.
i mpl emente val .e eaerci ce requi rement s of TS 4.0.5 but dcen not tnelude inytruct):ns for determi nst i on cr dccumentwtich of acceptable test resultc. The data cheet p r o','i d o c only for pl3cing zi c h eci mar' in the rippr ?pr i s t e "5AT" or "Uf 4E AT "
column.
1. OSP-GTT-PO91. 20073 Oper abili ty Test. Draft. contains out of date acceptance cri t eri a for TS 4. 6. 5.1. c . ! and .2 conc erni ng Sec ondary-- Con t e i nmen t draw dcun seconds) and subsystem flow requirements ITS
O 160 time (T3 [c0 (
cim). 4 The 313c r ep anc i e s ' i n . ci ve pr oc edur e settlons ".2.5. 7. 2. s .
and S.1.
During a re.n ew of c on t r ol room panels used during the teit.
the fcllowing instrument s and controls were not identt i1ed by cautpment " marl" numbers:
s.v.n o r SGTS Train Initiation Switch Inlet Air Instrument Gage
,f. 5 0'# -
Furge Dutboard el ve Overri de. .
Page 17
CVALUATION The licensee showed that these and similar items had been 4 identified by a control reom human factors, and design reslew and were scheduled for correction.
~,. P O T -;'00. Secondary Containment Leat Test. Fe.1sion 0, alst includet acceptence criteria which nc 10nger mptch TS 4.6.5.1.c (see Item O abo.-e).
YTest bp[ 4. Loop Isolaticn Damper.
Dangram. Reactor Building ' 'en t Eupply CH','F S A 0 0- l & . was revacued 32 part of Air t$e E,ys t ern wal l down . Demper ru e l ch ol d valve: are identified on the diagram 07, 50VX-lO and SOVY-1B. In the field. neither
'alve}agca&p includes the "X" cr "Y" designation, Probl em Feport .# 1 13 4 was i ssued during the inctection to correctl,- 1abel the .alves. gtt
5. During the 3, a me wall dcun. orientatt
err rt invo!<1ng installation of l e '. e r ectuated 'NAMCO) al- ccerated . el ve
( AO'.' ) and dsmce- ( f.D D ) Itilt tut (che uer ? 1*J e n t i f i e d . The instel1etton crswings An W-4 pr:.sde t r, t ut f 1 ;. l e n t infcrmaticn to correctl. orient the limit Jiut-net 4 ;r proper sctuation. The respont1ble ItC engir.es" ad.lsed that about SO'; of the installstions recuire fiels :nyn;et, (p [
h 15 L'. StO The !! C engi neer h r. d grev1 cutis initiated Pr o t:l c m feccrt H O'!" 51 identifying t _ abo.e and - a generic De f 1 c t rnc'< Feport
( D F. ) it l t -'O ' o effect and document corrects.e action. The as-built changes are documented in the field unth indi',1du31 DRc and Temporary Modification forms. The 11:entee intends to tran:mlt the DF: ta Ergineering f ol 1 sul r a t e s t n r ;) fer issuance e t. Engineering Change Notices.
2. 4.1 Ceneiv: 1en:
Encept as noted above, no discrepancies were identifled. The at-built configuration of the Eyctems, ttructuret, and component 2- ccmpared satisfactorily with the doc u. ten t s reviewed.
The Technicsl Spec i f I c e t t or, requirements were def i n i t t .* e l y mearurable.
L5 - PLANT GF;By1CE WATER AND EMEfRGENCY. SERVIGLWATE1Lj3YSTEMS, 2.5.1 - Evaluetion Cri teri a and Scope The Stati on Service Water System (SWP) serves as both the normal and emergency syttum for post accident operations. The SWP nystem i s designed with three m 3 ,) o r flow loops. Two 3re "ecuentsal"1 one is "non-essential". Al1 essential components Page 19
EVALUATlON 3
are pouered from safety related Ecurces.
i
~I Served heat loads includo! FHR heat e:;c hanger s and pump reals.
EDG coolers. control building chillert. h idrogen re:ometners, reactor building ventilation I, stem. and baclup c:Cl i ng us *. ar to the spent fuel pocl. A Eystem cross t1e i s al so provided to the RHP system to permit ilcoding of the re ac tor er contal r.ent.
During accident conditions. the non-e: ential loop it 1scl3ted.
The ?WP 15 an open loop cccling syste.n consisting of an 1.tal s and discharge comple8. st' pumpr. associated . el s et. ;1 ting. <
trash r aci 5 tr3.el1i ng uat er 2creens and 2001ing comc: snt:.
The ultimate heat s i nl. i n Lal e Ontario.
Doth stems were revi eued per the criteria 3nd m: t h : :: 2 Of (
Sections 1.7 and 1.4 of thi: report. See Appenci: 2.5 tor a listing of document s revi eued.
Proposed TE 7.'4.'.l. 7. ' 4 . 7 . 0 and 4.0.5 were ccmpared t: the document: listed in App endi: 2.5 to , e r i f ', thPt the pr:pt:s: 'T a::urntal, represented the oc-built pl3nt c c n f i g u r > +. : - and operating chars teritt1:3 and uere in 3greement ult- *he information in the FEAR and EER.
0. 5. 0 - Di r c u ss l or.
The feature; cf there : . :t e n: rev1 cued included r:"m31.
abn rmal. and emergenc, :perttlons des:rabed by the CEAR.
Section o.O. and the 11:ansce*: draft and 3 p p r o'. ed proced'. s!.
Thc at-built canfiguretion c:irtion of the re.' leu incl. ed a nampling bated r ev t eu cf system piping c onf i gu > t i on, instrumentation 3nd control retrointe end operating 1:gic.
x, tsm c t e r s t i n g p :.r .u e t e r n .1 l i .ti t t : .
Operating Procedures. Sur=elllence 3nd I n t er vi ce Tent vere revleued determine that th? design feature: uere a c c '. - 3 *. I l ',
reflected b. the t:st and operating methods and that
ose methoJ: a r r i, c n :1.> t c r t ult- *na r a :;v i r n :n t : :* the pr:c::ed T3.
T h e C " :$ r t ? r o t i c". 31 TO t for the IWP hstem uas r e .-t r u e d on a sampling barit tc estabit:h that the system functiored as portraved by the design drawings and requirements.
Specifically. the Aystem featurec and operations invol.Ing the f ollowing uere revieued!
l Normal sistem alignmente and operations Emergency system al 1 gnments and operations System testing alignments and methods Page'19 i
l
r EVALUATION Flow Path Valve Lineups and Operability Testing System Operational Readiness Testing Fump and Valve Inservice and Operability Tecting 0.5.0 - Observations Minor procedure incenst stencies were identified and discuteed with the licensee during the inspection. The licensee advised that the comments would be reviewed and dispositioned during the planned final procedure review prior to licensed operations.
1. OSP-SWP-DOO1. SWP Yalve Operabi1ity Test. Draft. does not include testing of valvrs having test requirements identified by q Intervice Test (IST) Plan, e.g. ADY-97A L B. AOV-581. -a54p -572. -570. -574 -78A L B. V800A 6 B, 7-V700A L B. No other applicable procedure containing the valves were identified.
/-
O. ;
The licensee recently decided to deselcp piping and A v 5 A-instrumentation drJetings (F? ids) for plant s', stems. R:rmer plans included use of the AE finw diagrams for oper3 ting phase activities. The PEIDs were avail able in pF411 mi n ar y f or m during the inspecticht the licensee 3dvised that dr awi ng des el opment was not ,et complete.
SWP valves 11sted in the IST P1an were found to be mi3 sing from the SWP POID. q/cett lA through 10: Y1024 ViO25. e VIO27 FY47A N B. F Y54 A ?- B. RV!4A ?s B. AO/ ~9A ?< B. Y?:OA ?-
B. YSOOA t, B. /
2.5.4 Conc l usi on s Enc ept 33 ncted abo.a. no J1screpancies were tdertified. The as-built configuration of the system. structures, and components compared sati sf actorily with the documents reviewed. The Technical Specification requirements reviewed were definitively measurable.
216 - REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING __ SYSTEM
0. 6.1 - Evaluat ion Cri teri a and Scope The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System consists of a turbine, pump, piping and valves, and instrumentation designed to maintain sufficient reactor water level inventory to ensure the continuity of core cooling.
System provide the means to inject wat er to.the core when the Page 20 -
l
1 EVALUATION l l
l I
l reactor i s i sol ated or during a smalI breal Locs of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
l This system and rel ated equipment were revicued wi th respect to the criteria and methodt of Sections 1.0 and 1.4 of thi s report.
See Appendin 2.6 fcr a listing of documents revicued.
Pr op o r.ed TS 0/4.7.4 7'4.3.2. and 3/4.7.5 uere comp Ared to the documents 11sted in Append t : 2.6 to verify that the Orce,, red TS accurately represented the at-butIt plant configuration and operating charscteristics and were i r, agreement with the Information in the F5AP and ICR,
0. 6. 2 - Di scussi on The features cf these systems re.tewed in:luded ncrmal, e b n or m ril , and emergency cperations described b ,- the FEAR, Section 15. Acc13snt Anal, tis. and the 12cantee's dr>ft and
ccre.od proceduren.
The n +.' 1 1 t :cn'i;vration pcrti:n c' the ro.tsu tr.cl:.'ded a
n pl .c t. ? e d c lew cd ;,ctsm papin; :On4 1gurttion.
inotrY!iat:ta:n fr$ ::nte ! :rtcoint: shd c:ersttrg 1;gic, r Item :: r atin; :.*:.Tst: _ n '
1 t r. . inc ele:tri:rl antrols design.
h :? :1r:vits 3r0 ! c ;1 ; i c n c t !' ;r : If ' -- e 211 .
- stach Inctrumentation 5. ECIC 1

clattOn Inz' .arant,+t::- . tor 4 in:1 ded i n the e r. i eu.
Operating Frocedvers. Iuraell13nca and In2er ice "est:. rd freepor?tional Test; were re.lewed :n a { 3 t ;: 11ng te t: to de t. er m i n e that the der,ign features were 3:curttel. ieill.cted b.
the test and operating method; 7 d that there tie t h : d ; isere con si s tent with the reavir ement: Of the propo:ed TE.
The test method; and re:Ults of the precperaticn31 toets uero used on a sampling basis to ert 3bli sh that the :< atem functioned at portra,ed by the design drauings and recuirements.
For enampie. uher e a pr?op.ratlensi trt ,erif1ed t' e functi s n c.
of a logic _lement, the >t ai l ed ten methods and results uere omp ar ed 1th the 1ogi and e l eme' . a r '.- diSgra a to 77 . ab i 17' that thC test SCcurst V r e f l*e c i r the circut.z and ut
e circu1*o were ccn st :urnt uith tta-destgn basi, ref 1 et t ed in .he l
FSAR. EE. and TS.
Specifically, the system features and operations i n v e l .- i n g the f ollout ng were revi eued:
Normal system al i gnment s and operations Emergency system alignments and operations System testing alignments and methods Page 01 1
1
EVALUATION
!!C Calibeatiuns ItC Functsonal Test' Flow Path Val'e Lineups and Operabil1ty Testing System Ocerational Readiners Testing Pump and Valve Innervice and Operability Testing A vi sual inspection of porttons of the c'. s t e m s and selected equipment establiIhed that the destgn ieature2 were accuratal, translated inte tho at-buiIt s. tems. The vttual Int;cction included .erification of system piping and fluid system flowpath and component configuration. main and au:: t l i ary control tation instrumentaticn and con tr ol s, simul ated cartial perf:.rmance cf p .r1 t,Etem alignments,. and general compar:Jon of the cistems d~
and equipment with the proposed T3.
2.i.7 - Ob se r .' a t i on s S
1.
f Pr ecper ati cnal Test 'OT-!!. FCIC 2ntem Freoper aticn M Test.
Fe.icion ':' . . e r i f *. 'c ; that the High S t a an. Fl ou I ccl a t t ;r. Ti me Delay rela, uas set at ' a p p r x i s. 3
e l y .' seconds" instaad cf the 7 - 10 second celteria of TS Table 3.7. 3-2.
The philcipphy of the t i .ne delay fLncticn 26 .: the de s i r ab 111 t ,- te hA.'e the time del 3Y Eet higher :n the acceptable r ange to 3.old spur 1ous FCIC pump tr:ps on ntartup :taam flow t. urges wat di: curs.ed with the I t c o n ",s e .
The 11censee ac t newl edg ed the abo.e and conftrmed that the FOT had been writ. ten in acccrdance with the NESS preoperational test specification. The licensee a d'. i s e d that the time delay rela. uculd be reset. if necec ar). In accordance utth the TS sur.et11ance requirement.
: ' f i c at: on ci the RCIC
. High Steam Flow Isolation Time Dels, is recommended for conftrmation by NRC during a future instection. ,
2. FOT-25 31:o included requirements fer strole t i s.e 'W4 vertfication of motor coerated . al' en which were greater than (unc c n:er v a t t '. e3 the current . al ue s of T5 Tablo 7.4.5-1. E amples include s a l '. e c t 21 C5 t MOY- ! f,4 ind -148 (22.5 sec. .1 :: e TS limit = 14 sec.) and MOV-121 and -1;3 (tc soc. . ice TE limit = 14 Ecc.). The licensee stated that a review of the POT and actual valve performance would be conducted to ensure TS could be met.
{ .
.~---
2. . IOP-75. PCIC Interim Operating Procedure. Revision 0, pages t, o . include an incorrect value of 60 psig for the steam cupply Icw pressure interlock of TS 3. 0. 2 (70-75 psig). The Page 22
EV ALU AT I Ott licensee adva ted that thi s di screpanc, would be reviewed and corrected as necessary in the ne':t 1: sue of the procedure.
1. 05P- I SC-RiX' t . RC!C Functional Test. Fe.ision O. Sections
7. O. ?. S and 7. 2. !!. O. i denti f i es AOV-loo as " T URE' EXH TO SUPP FOOL": AO'.'-!Oc is actually a : team line dratn pot drain. Other sal.e " noun" names appeared inappropriate to the ,a1ve appltcattons. c.g. P.'- 10 E . MO'.'- 10 4 etc. The licensee agreed to revi ew and ccrrect thi s i tem in the n e:: t proce1ure issue.
5. TS Table 1.5.0.1-1. Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Sur vei l l an::e Requi r enen t s . Item 2h. RCIC Isol ation Signal s -
Manual I sol ation Fushbutten. contains a "1" note involving TG : top valve posttion and 1ou main condenser ca:vum. The note is not applicable to the subject item and its reference shculd be deleted. The note does r, p p l y to item le. same table.
6. T2 0. 7.1 FCIC LCO. inc1udes a "tt" note which permits the
" ;co n u :s l " i n i t a r, t t on :ircu:t t- te ano:ersble with l en than 600 pst steam pressure. The 11 c er. n ee ad.15ed that the note was inserted to at:ommodcto R ',' le.ol instrument errors resulting f r o.t. Cal i br at i on to hot Tystem conditions.
At cold system condttions. the lovel in struments indic ate an erroneously high level, causing a Level 9 trip (r ese t .'of f )
of RCIC. effectively bloct2ng manual initiation. Automatic (low level) initiation functions <re conside. ed operable due tc an ac tual lou level clearing the L e .'e l 8 condition and causing a l ow level i ni ti ati on si gn al .
The abo.e "tt" note 1C toc general for the int 1ded purpose and permits inoperability for inapplicable reasons.
Additional f lF:CtRI review and re f erral of this item to NFC:NPR i2 recommended.
2.6.4 Con:1usiens E:i c ep t as noted above no discrepancies were identified. The as-but 1 t conf Iguration of the system, structures, and components compared satisfactorily with- the dccuments reviewed. The Technical Specification requirements reviewed were def i ni t i vel y measurable.
(W.N 2.7 - AC POWER SOURCES Page 23
l EVALUAT 10tJ 2.".1 - Evaluation Cr a teri a and Scope OCf i
, s, The AC Feuer Sourcer consiat of 115 l'y offIste pcwor. .. . G iv sedety related and non-sofety related busses. 4.16 19.' safety r el ated and non-safety related busses. and 600 '.'AC . 109/040 YAC. l an:1 100/208 VAC distribution systems and 100/003 '.' AC unsnterruptible power supply system.
The safety related Clant lE AC power distribution I, stem is divided inte three independent di vi st ons (Div111cns I. II. and
!!!). Ench d t .~1 s t on has 4.16 1:Y normal and a l t ter n a t e power sources and a dedicated 4.1b W emer gency di esel generator (EDG) wt th complete aun111 ery systems such as fuel and lube oil, uterting air. and cooling s, stems.
The AC Power St.ur c o s end their essociated equipment were reviewed with ressett ta the cr1ter a and methods of Sections i 1,.! and 1.4 of this report. See Appendin O." for a 11 sting of documents reviaued.
Prcof and r evi ew TS 7/3.3.1 was reviewed for the , r y *; t e m ? and equipment listed ebove and compared to the documents listed in Appendi.t 2.' to 'arif, that the TS accurately r epr es ent the At-built plant ::n!Iguration and operating chara:ter t tics and were in agreement with t r 'e information in the FSAR and SER.
2.".O Dtscustion-The revleu cf the syrtems and equipment include: the normal.
ebnormal and emergency operations described by the FSAF: and the ,
1icensee's procedures. l The l', Item conf 1gerat1on drswings. operating 1 :-g I c diagrams, system operating parametern and limits, sur . el l i anc e and
.preoperational test procedures. and- operating procedures were reviewed on a sampling basi; to ensure that the ' *tgn features- l were accuratel y reflec ted by the test and o p e r t, , methods and t h'a t there methods were con:1 stent utth the rec.
ten p of the !
proposed TS.
i The follouing 3*, 1 t e m features and operaticns were specifteally reviewed:
Normal and abnormal system alignmentu and oporations Emergency 'iystem alignments and operations During l as of offsite power (LOOP)
Simultaneous LOOP and LOCA LOOP with Del ayed LOCA LOCA w.th Delayed LOOP System tes;Ing alignments and methods System equ pment operability testing
', Page 24 i
J E'.%L U AT I ON l
l g Emergenc, Daetel Generators EDG Au::t 1i sry Eyst ems A selacti.e vtnual inspect 1on of the 3, stems and equipment d
established that the deftgn featuren Were accuratel. tranElsted into as-but1t s,stemt. The ,1Sval inspection alto ver1fied that the c, stem ccnf1garatiDn. equipment, bus arrangement. maln control recm and local Stattens. Initrumentation and control s, and e,Itum operabi1 ty were an agreement wtth the proposed TS requirements.
2.'.7 Obser attons The follcWing discrepancies wer e identi f ied. The TE cce.ments pro.'i ded bel ou vere f orwerced to NRC:RI (or disposit1on with NRCthbP. In cach case of ;recedure or drawing commentt, the 11cen:ee either provided cr intttsted a resolution.
1. Peferentn T3 7 / 4. E. : 1 05F-EGS-M001. DG Operab111ty Test.
D 1,'t : : o r. !'. Re. I1; 7 Os CEC-EGE-M000. DG Cper at i 11 t y Te1t, Dt s 111 On 7 Fevis1on G Dr ow n ng EE-ICA-s,. One Ltne Diagram. Emergen:. G-d V,1 t e l bus, Fower Dictribution..
Re I i:n 5.
T5 ?.3.1.1.b.0 and 7. 9.1. 2. b . identif. fuel on! minimun recuire.tentE of 52 d,14 gal 1onL for EDG-1 and EDG-7 and 76.1*7 g311ons for E05-2.
05F-EGI-MOO 1. I ec t 1 ca . : 1.1.1 and O.1 1dentif,- e manimum reautreaent cf "0.14E g llonz. ,
Sections ?.7 (ncts) Snd 7.2.1 of the same cr::edure identify a minteum requi r ement of 'M . 5^2 ge11ans.
DSF-EGE *c0. Se:t t :* : :.1.1 .s n d E.1 1dentif.- a .ra r i mu m requiroment of ?!. ??P g a l I c.n r . Sect 1ons '.2 (no:e) and ' . 2.1 of the same procedure ident1f1es a minimum r et ui r emen t. of 14,405 gallons.
TS Eection 4.3.1.1.2.a.7 1dentifies the reautred EDG wir
tart r e c e t '. e r prettcre for EDGt-1. -2, and -2 to be pstg.
1225 OSF -EG3-MOO . Sect on2 1.1.2 and 2.2. identif, a .nl n 1 me:n recei.er pre:suro of 2240 psig. OSP-EGS-M002, Sections 1.1. 2 an:1 S.O 1dentify a prerzure of 2 215 psig.
T TS 3 '4. 8.1 refert to the EDGc ay' EDG-1. EDG-2, and EDG-3.
OSP-EGS-MOO 1 references 2 EDG-1, -2, - !. . OSP-EGS-R001 uses the nomencalature 2EGStEG1. tEGO. and *EG!. Constctent use of nomencl ature Was rec ommended to the licensee.
Pagu 25
EVALUAT!ON M
The TO reference num rc throughout both procedures (-MOQ1, and -MOOO) above consi st ent l y incorrect and reference nonen1 stent TS oarageaphs, e.g. 4.9.1.1.2.O.a.: vace
4. 3.1.1. 0. 3. 0. etc.
The licensee advised that the procedures would be corrected a t. Part of the final revt ew pri or to licensed operations.
O. Dr aut ng EE-M01D-2 1 denti f i es the 2. 000 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months rating of dietel generator 2EGStEG1 to be 4.700 i:W. TS 4.8.1.1.2.f.10 and the FSAR tdentify the 2.090 hcur rating ta be 4750 F'W. The Itcensee itsued internal correspondence during the e intpection to corrett this discrpancy. j e.
7. The 1 c a d i n ;; cecuence of the Di.1sion I EDG ' f or LOCA and
, simultaneous LOOP identified by IOF-70 Standby .:i n d Emergenc, AC Distribution Sistem Interim Operating Prctedure. Fevision 0, is inccrrect with re9 "
pect to FSAR e Table S.0-1.
] OP-7. 'd e c t i on !.19.3).41.b) states that infection 31. e CEL4M'.'104 receives en open permitntve signal at T = 6 sec:ndst FSAR Table 3.5-1 st)tes that T = 17 seconds f:r the 21.e coen cermtzu1vc 21;nal.
Sect 1c" l.19.8).5).a. Ncte. statts that OSL1PvP1C and eP!E are 4 12: Und cut untti T = 5 minutes. FSAR Teble S.7-1 ctates that the locicut 12 released at T = 55 seconds.
Eect1cr. 1.19.9).0)b statet that injecticn valve CRH S i MQ','04 P
recet.es an open permtasive time at gnal at T ' 1 Icc:nd.
D[4 F5AR T ab l e S. !- 1 staten the cignal will occur at T = 0
'p/ rse : c n d s .
Si mt ; v1. . IDP ~2 disagrees utth FSAR T a b l + 3 . '*. - . ior LOOF and Delaved LOCA for the Division i! EDG 1 cad sequence. IOP-72 Seetion 1.12.10).b).a. Note. states that OSWPiP1D and iP1F are locLed out until T = 5 minutes. The FSAR Table S . 4. - 1 va!ue is 55 seconds.
Sectier 1.18.10).1). .?'. and .8) state that OTWPtPl? starts at Tv 70 cecendt. (P!D at T = !4.5 second:. and tP1F at T = 07 -
seconds. Table 2.0-2 states 70, 74. and !? accends r e 2.p ec t i ve l y .
The licensee stated that the correct values would be vertited and the procedures correc ted. Confirmation of actual time del ay r el ay settings .s. the FSAR values i s al so recomended by the team. NRCtRI verification of these settings is r ec ommended .
, 4. Fr1or issues of draft TS included requirements to maintain Page 26
EYALUATION mintmum EDG-2 room air temperatures subsequent equipment modi f i c at i on s he'.-e r emo . ed that need and the December 70.
1995 11 c enseo submi t t al deleted most ref erences f rom TB. TS 3.8.1.1. Action d. still includes a partial reference to the abo.e requirement s and needs an editorial :hange.
5. TS 4.3.1. Tab.e 4.3.1.1.0-1. Diesel Generator Test Schedule.
ts inconsistent with Standard TS and U3NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108 and appear s to be mi ssing column headings or other ley infermation to mal:o the table readable. The table appears unu s abl e th its current form.
6. T3 4. 3.1.1. 0. a 5 providec f or peri odic .crification of EDG standby alignment per the schedule of Table 4.3.1.1.0-1 (mentioned a b o .'e ) based on f ailure frequent,'. The TE should also pro.ide for similar .eri f icati on af ter "esch occasien when the diesel generator 15 oper ated f or an, reason". Thin is consistent with other recently issued TT (Mill st one. Unit
!) and providet addi t i onal assurance thet the units are nervice ready after a clar.ned or unplanned coeration.
7. Tb 4.9.1.1.0.f.4.a.O and .b.2" require cc-rection of the "it" note referances in tent snd at the bottcm of the page to te coni:stant thecughout. The "Ie" note applies to the frecuency of " cold start" es. " pre-warted and pre-lubud" starte for tecting. The ertginal tent and the licencee marl /ups (December 00. !?SS subInttal) Ore both d-~
in:entistent.
O. TS 4.S.I.1.2.f.3. addresses EDG trip bypasses and pro,1 des for generator differenttal trips not to be bypassed. The i tem was modi f i ed by the December 70. !?E5 submittal to delete " current" from the di f f erenti al trip description.
" Current" shculd therefcre be r ec. l a c a d u.th the ccrrect descript1.c inf ormation.
9. T3 4.3.1.1.0. f.? cross references to "4.1.1.0.e.4.a and b.
Thtc reference should read 4.9.1.1.0.f.4.a. and b.
10. Motor Control Center EHS MCC 000 c on si st s of two f ph , si cal l y separate free standing sections of MCC
[C#gv[
er.c l os ur e s . Drawing zection a. " Pus D" and the other as EE-1CA-6 identifies one g " E and Tccce The ontite AC pcuer distributien s. stem includet all arqu i p men t and 3*. st ems r eavi ced to pr: Wide AC couer to all unit auntli>rles and t er .'i c o lcadz under all conditi:nc si clant :per#ticn. This constits off the,}7.3 FV Lwitchgebr. 4.14 63.' zwitchgear. 1 G"
. '/
load contors. motor :ontrol centert. caricut distribution panels. un i r,t s r r up t ab l e pcuer Iutcly :.: tent. c >tl es and r a c e u r, s . the EtAndby d'. ciel gener atur a tnd the tcctem Icads.
The- snsite ac power r, L t s m la divided intc two distin:t catcy:rlsta emergency Or safet- related And n:rmal or non-$ af ety rel at ed. The equipment, s,2tes, and loads r equi r ed to :afelv thutd wn the reactor in cote of anel.:ed a::1 dents are designed ruclear safet, related to Class lE.
The system and associated equipment were revicued with retpect to the cri teri a and methods of Sections 1.7 and 1.4 of this report. 500 At;ondin 2." for a 11cting of docunentc re towed.
Froposed TS 7/4.3.0 was re,iewed for the systems and equipment s li sted above and compared to the documentz listed in Appendin 2.9 to .erify thbt the TS accuratel v represent the 33-tuilt plant configuration and cperating charac teri sticc and were in agreement with the information in the FEAR and SEP.
2.?.0 Discuttton The review of the systems and equipment included the normal.
abnormal and omergency operation described by _the FSAR and the licensee's procedures.
The system configuration drawings, operating and alarm logic diagramt. circuit b r eal. or schematic diagrams, system operating parameteis and limits. surveillance and preoperational test Page 30
EVALUATION ,
t-p procedures, and operating procedures were reviewed on a campling basis to ensure that the design f eatures 64ere accurately i,
reflected b/ the test and operating methods and that these metheds were consistent with the requirements of the proposed TS.
The f ollowing s', stem f eatures and operations were specifically reviewed:
1 Normal and abnermal 311gnments and operations Emergenc. system alignments and ocerations During loss of off11te ocwer (LOOP)
Durting simultaneout LOOP and LOCA During LOOP with delayed LOCA During LOCA wi th del eyed LOOP Gystem testing alignments and methodt System operabilitv testing Emergency Diesel Generators Reactor Protec tion S. st em ( F.P3 ) Power Supply System A : elective visual i nste:titn Of the Systems and cavipment a::t ett i shed j; hat the dcItgn f estures were accuratel .- t r e n a.1 e t e d i n t o -a s - b u t.1 t syste41. The v1rual 1nspecticn al 3 o vo'r t f 1 ed that th e Ive'.em c on f I gur a t i or.. e:uienent and but ar r an g emer.t . main ,
contr:1 rcom .3 n d local stat: n tr.Itrumentaticn and cantrels were i n agreement with the prcac ted TE recui rements.
1 ".' Obzer,at1on2 Ne discrep;.ncies were i der t1 412d. Felsted discrrpanetas are discutted in Sectiont :'.? a n:f 0.9 of thia report.
i L o. 4 C nt)utt:ns No inconst4tencies were noted during the visual inspection.
Encept as noted above. the at-built cyntem it in agreement with the documents re.tewed and the TS recuirements were def ini tively mea 7,urable P
Page 01 9
s'-..-v -n-- ---r--v.---r+r ----+=+~.rs ---wm.m r e- -c--
~_- _ - - . . . _ - . _ - - - . . - - - . . . . - . . . . . - _ - .
EVALUATIOtJ pd alO -
HIGH _PPEEEUFE pf rigSSLIR I :' AT I QM SYS T Ed -
CORE SPRAv SYSTEM AtJD AUT_QMELC, O.10.1 - Evaluation Criteria and S:opo The High Fressure Core Spra, (HPCS) S. stem provides the means to inject uater to the core during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The z+, stere consists of a motar driven pump rewered by
'dedt c ated di esel generator and t al 1 ng suction from either a 1 dedicated Condensate Storage Tani or Suppression Pool.
The Automatic Depressurt:ation System uill reduce reactor pressure upon indication of a design basis accident and fsilure of HPCS to permit injection to the reactor core by the low pressure ECCS systems 'Lew Pressure Cere Spray and Low Pressure Coctant !njection).
These sv2tems and their r el at ed cautoment were reviewed utth resce:t to the criteria and methodt ei Sectiont 1.5 and 1.4 of this raport. Gee Appendie C.19 f:- *
. 1isting cf documents re.1eued.
Prc:csed TS 7J1.5.1.. '" ' 1. 5 . 2 . 7,' 1. 7. ! . 7.' 4 . 4 . 2. were compared to the document; listed i n Ap::end t : 2.19 t :i .erifv that the prcocsed TS accurately represented- the as-bunit plant confiQuration and operating characteristicc and were in agreement unth the i nf creati on in the FSAP and SER.
2.10, 2 - Di 2:ur s i on The features of these s', s t a m s r evi ewed included normal, abnor m al , and emergen:v ooerat1ons desceibed bi the FSAR, Secti n 15. accident Anal , s i r , and the licensee's draft and appro.ed pro:edures.
The.as-butit eenfiguration portten cf the reviow included a rampling based _revteu of system piping ccn'iguration, instrumentation and centrol setpoints and operating _ legic, system operating parameters and limits, and electrical centrols design. The circutts and logic functions of the ECCS Actuati n Instrumentat1on and HPCS Isol at1on Ir strument at1on were included 1n the revtew. 1 Operating Procedures, Surveillance and Inservice Teste. and Preoperational_ Tests were reviewed on- a sampling basi s to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were
, consi st en t with the requirements of the proposed TS.
The test methods and results of the precperational tests were Page 02 3 +~ ~ - , - . r-,~.,-,,...4 . . - - _ - , , _ ___r. .,-,-.,__y,- ..._..--.--.-,,,r. .m -.- ,-,. - . - - _ ,
EVALUATION used on a sampling basi c to eIt abli sh that the system functioned as portra,pd by the design drawings and requirements. W
+ -,wis, l% er e a precoerational test .erified the functions of a l ogi c el ement, the detailed t?It metheds and results were
[ht-ccmpared with the l ogi c and elementary diagrams to establish that the test 3:curatal. reflected the Circuits and that the circui ts were :onsi stent with the detign basis reflected in the FSAP. SER. and TS.
Specifically. the sistem features and operatiens i n v o l .'i n g the fellowing were reviewed:
Nor mal s. sten alignment; and cperaticns Emergency r, stem alignments and operations ECCS Inject 1on Phace Operatienz ECCS Peci r cul ati on Phase Coerations 5', stem testi.g alignments 3no methods IR C Calibr ations IRC Functi:nal Test:
Flow Patn 31 ce Li neup: and Oter3t111tv T e s t i r.g E, tes 0:c- sti:r al Ecadant:r Te'4 ting Pump 3nd el ce Innervice 2nd Operability Te: tin; A ci: val incoc:ticn of r ec t l en t of the s< stems and 091ceted e q u 1 ; :r e n t eI t ): 11thed thPt the R: 1gn 4eeture: uere 9:curatal, tr ansl ated int; the as-built 2,ztems. The .itual inspection included .er1 4 1:stion of system piping and fluid Ivatem ficwpath and :cmponent :c-figurption, mai n Pnd aunsliar, control tstion i nstrument at i r and :entr:lt. :tmulated part131 perfccmsnce af n-
- ' W- cy s t em alignmente. And texts. and general czmcertson of 4 the 1,ste3: ard :quipment with the proposed TS.
2.t0.7 - Ob :,er , 3 t i on c See Tecti;n C.~ i :.r obser att:n i n v ol '. i n g the HPC5 dedicated diesel generator.
Several nt ncr in:2rsistencies were ident1 4 1edt
1. FSAR Section 5.0.0.10 ( t hr ough t Amendment O!) includes entan:19e commitments to m31nt31n and test ADS svit?m Sai e t . 'Rel i c d V 31 c " ( S R ',' 4 in en:ets of current plant procedure:. Thete C?AP commitments had been identified and assigned.tc the station Mechanical Maintenance Department for implementation by the licentee's FSAR vertfication and commitment program via memo dated October 16, 1985.
Currently available and pl.snned licensee procedures and the draft TS did not appear to meet all the FSAR requirements.
The Superintendent of Mechanical Maintenance pr ovi ded the inspector a January 14 1996 tr ansmi t t al to NMPC Ci c en si ng Page 77-
EVALUATION responding to the above and recommending a change to the FSAR to delete maintenance and test items b e l l e'r ed to be unnecessary and to bring the FSAR into agreement with the current 1icensee pns.
NPC R1 followup of thi s item is recommended to assure that the proposed FSAR amendment 15 submitted to NRR and/or that the licensee's implementation of OR',' maintenance and testing act1<1tles meets the is-licensed requirements.
O. TS 4.5.1.b (and Tablo 7. 7.2-2. and others) include a "+"
footnote uhtch inds:stes that proof and revi ew TS c:ceptance cri teria par ameter s are preliminary subject to confirmation of final data vi a the preeperational and startup test programs.
The various notes ar? inccnsistently uritten. some providing ljcensee submi t t al time requiroments (within 90 days), some not, etc. Further. the notei do not prc.1d3 fcr c i r c um:.t an c e s in uhtch the "! ! n al " paremeter: r e v.:l t i , , p trom the test prcgram ar ? lera con servati .e t n .a t those pral i mi n ar t l , i n c l >.td e d in the TE. cousing post 1ble compli ance di f f 1 ul tie s.
NFC FI r cr. i s w pi thi; . natter with NRC 1 NF P 1: reccomenced.
2.10.4 Con:lusions Encept as noted above no discrapancies were identiftsd. The ps-built configuration cf taw . : t e m , structures, and ::tponentc compared satisfactorili uith the documents reviewed. The Technical Specification reautrements revieued were ded inttively measurable.
E L1 - RESIDUAL HEAT REMQVA SYSTEM 2.I1.1 - Evaluation Cr1ter1a and Sccpe The Residual Meat Pe m o'. a l 3,st?m cenststs of three locps each containing a motor driven pump taling suction f r o.t the suppression pool. Loeps A '
9 also contain heat 3: changers cooled by servico water, can take suction from the recir:ul ati on loops and can discharge to the e ocircul ati on loops. the suppression pool and dr,well spray soargers.
The Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal ( F:HR ) system and provides the means to inject high volume. lou pressure water to the core during a l.oss of Cool an t Accident (LOCA).
Page 04
- - - . _ . . ~ -
l EVALUATION
Thit system and the related equipment was reviewed With rbspect to the criteria and methods of Sec t i ons 1.7 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendin 0.11 f or a listing of documente reviewed.
Proposed TS listed in Appendi, 0.11 were compared to the documents listed in Appendi:. O.11 to verify that the precosed TS accuratel / represented the 32-built plant configuratien and operating characteristics and were in agreement with the inf ccmation in the FEAR and SER.
O.11.0 - Discussion The features of these systems r evi ewed included normal, abnormal. ond emergency coerations described by the F5AR, Section 15. Accident An al y s 13. And the licensee's draft and approved procedures.
The a s-t ui l t :Onfiguration porti n of the r evi ew included b sac;11ng based rc.iew of s '. s t em piping conitguretion.
i ns t r ument at i on 3rd centrol setpoints and op er -n t i n g logi:.
svstem cperating parameters Anc limits. and e16tetrichl controls dostgn. The circuits and icgic ' unctions of the ECCS Ac t u.u. t on
. Instrumentation were in:lund 1% the revicut S spec 141: r .t~. t e w of: reactor .essel level trips'and LPCI actuation stgnals was performed.
< Oper ating Pr cedures. Turve111ance and Inservice Tests. and Precoerational Tests listed in Appendin 0.11 were re.*iewed on a }
semcling basis to determine that the design 4eature! were accurately reflected by the test-and operating methods and that those methods were c onsi s t en t with the requirements of tne prepeted TS.
The test methods and results of the preoperational terts were used on. a sampling basis to_ establish that the system functioned
-as portrayed by the design drawings and requirement s.
Specift: ally, the system f eatures and operations involving the f ol i c.wi ng were rev t ewed t Normal system alignments and operations Emergency system alignments and operations ECCS Injection Phase Oper ations ECCS Fecirculation Phase Operations Containment Cooling System testing alignments and methods I SC . Cal i br a t i ons System Functional Tests Flow Path Val ve Lineups and Operabili ty Testing Pump-and Valve Inservice and Operability Testing Page 35
_ _ . . _ . _ _ _ , . , _ . _ ___ _._ _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ ~
~ - - - _ - _ _ - . .. - . - _ - _ - _ _
EVALUAT10fl A visual inspection of portions of the cystems and sel ec t ed equipment e st ab l i shed that the design features tere accuratel, teanslatod anto the at-but1t systems. The vt>ual 1nspect1on included verification of lystem ptDing and fluid a v 2 t eem flowppth and romponent conf 1guration, main and auni1iers control station i ns t r umen t a t i on and controli, ana general c omp ar i r.on of the systems and ecutpment With the proposed TS.
F 2.11. 7 - Ob t er . s t i ons A number of minor inconsistencies were i d :rn t i f i ed end were resolved by the 11consee dur1ng the 1nspect1on1
1. OSP-RHS-DOO4 FHR Lcop A Fump and Yelve Operabi1itv and 5, stem Integraty Tett. Fevttton O. reautres updating to current TS as reflected by "laters" in procedure. The licenroe advised that that would be addreIsod during conver31:n of the procedure from " interim" to corsanent Etetus.
2. IDP-71 FUC Intarlm Operating Procridere. Pe'.111cn O. p3ge 5.
Ihutdove ::011ng .31vo 1nterloci retp:;nt of ;1:5 c11g requiret u t :t a t e to current value of (170 pang per T3 T >bl s 0.0.7-2. The 11Cen:,ee adviEed that thtn would be 3ddretted dur.tng c o .or s t en of the procedure f r an " interim" to permenent Atatus, ISP-IIC-MOOT. LFC1/LFCS Injection '.' a l v e gg%
?. . Permisit e Functtentl Test. Draft, includes a s e t p o ,t n t of 6 *;O cstd (consistent with price design requirement:) The curr?nt Ti (.~,
.alue on- :: cop 0:ed Itcen ce disporition are a: per item 2 above.
4. TS Table 4.7,0.1.-l. I sol ation Actuation Instrumentation Survet !! ante Requirement s. Item ).g. PCIS. Reactor Yetzel Pressure H1gh (PHP Cut tn Permt531ve), fcetnote "(d)" ts inapprocriate and sh.uld be deletvd. The fcotnote watvon requirementi for perf orming channel 7.ensor calibrations .nd '
1 appl 1cabl e on! , to cpac al cases of , area temperature inntrument2. (n i [. .-% f- -
5. TS Tabl e 7. 7,0-4 Yalve Grcups and Asunctsted Isolatten Signals. The "RHR Head Spray Yalve" should be added to Group 5 of this table for clar!ty and consistency uith TS Table 2.i.3.1.
Page 76
_ . _ ~ . _ . . _ -
EVALUA710N GAM *\
6. TS t' . 6. 2.1, Suppr ez s t on Pool Temperature. refers to suppression pool " Sectors" for tem ier ature monitoring instruments but does not define or refr.ence a source for ,
identifying actua.1 sectors. >
5.v/
j<
s
7. TS 5.4.6.O. Reacter Steam Demo F rc ,sur e. f tion. requiren that if pressure ecceeds 1000 psig, pressur be reduced to the 11mtt W1 thin 15 minutes or place the p1 ant 4n Operational Condition 5 (Hot Shu t doten ) 691 thin the n e:: t 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .
The time limits 3ppear inappropriate and detract from the nicaningfulness of the TS. The 1imit appears to be bezed upon the 1020 ps A g in t ti al conditien for the analysts of high reactor pressure transients and accident sequences. TS C.1. 5 provi des the Taf et y Limit value of 1725 psig for reactor pressure.
A mcre r eal i s t i c ar.: meaningful TS
~'
2.6.2 Action uould include 1) reductt:n of the everpressure within 15 minutes or 2) reducu power to a spectfled l evel Q begin r e d u c i r.g s, stem potenttol er er g ,' ui t h i n the ne': t """ minutes. and if unable to accompliza. 11 and 2) utthin the 20ecified t i .t o r e r 1 od s . hw) ,b e 3 in Ocndttion ! W1 thin the nest 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . (~
The TS ccmmen t s abo.e wer e pr o'. i ded to NFCtRI for re. t sw and disposttion. The ccuent s were elso prosadod to and aclnowledged by the licorsee.
2.I1.4 Conclusionu No signift: ant dt :regir:tes were identified. Th:2 as-tutit configuration of the system. structures. and component s compared natisfactorily ten th the documents reviewed. The Technical Speci f i c ati on requirements revleued were definitively ]
measurible.
k L h y
Page !? 1 l
~- ._ _ . . . -, . _ _ . _ . 1
EVALUATlOti
aJ 2 - 1,9W PBtmg)EILCpffC GPRAY SYSTQ1
)
2.12.1 - E.aluat1on Cr1teria and Sccpo Tne Low fressure Core Spray (LFCS) E, stem functtens to sprey water from the Suppression Ch a;nb er at high .olume and 1ou pressure directly to the core during a Loss of Co lent Atctdont (LOCA). The s *f s t em c on s t s t s cf one motor d r t '. e n petp ;'.r a u t r.g suction from the Suppression Pool and di sch a
ging to the reactor e r., s e l <ta aparger no::l es i mmedi at el y above the cere.
This system ond the rel at 'd eautpmant was reviewed utth respect to the <.-iteria and methods of Sections 1.7 and 1.4 c, f this repert. 3ee Appendi: 2.12 fcr a 1isting c3 document:. re.teued.
Prcposed 15 7/4.% 1.. 7 / 4 . 5 .1. . 2/4.7.2. 7 / 't . 7 . .* . and 7 / '4 . 5 . 7 were comoared to the documentc 1isted in Appendt: 2.12 to corify that the proposed TS accurately ric-esented the as -t:et)' plant conitgurstion and cperating cha"acteristict and uere in v.g r wh e n t unth the 1nf3rmAtiun in the FEid N r. d :i E F .
2.17.2 - DiT Utsion The i ff a t u r e s of these systems revtewed e incle1ed n ;r m a l .
3bncemp!, and emergenty OperaticrL described b, the FEAR.
Secti.;n 15. Acctdent An al , si ! . snd the 11censce', dr3 4t enc oppro.ed procedures.
The 3s-Dui1t cchiiger3ticr Cort 1 n of the re'iew Ihc1uded a s -a.T o l i n g based review of system piping configuration, instrumentation and centrol :etpoint:, and operating Icgic, 3, item operating parametert 3nd l i m i t y. . and electrical controls The circuits : r.1 1: 0 1: J un: tion: Of the ECC5 Actu3tt;r, dertgn, In:trumentat1on bero 1ncludet .n the r evi ewI a :pec1ftc r .r.1 ew of reactor .essel l evel t. r l p s . LFCS actuaticn Si gnal s, individubl p uito s and .31.e :sc l u a t i o n logics, and 2:, stem time response w a ?, performed.
Operating Procedures. Sur .-ei l l 3nc e and inser tce Tests, ar. d Freeperational Tests listed in Appendi: 2.12 were re.'teued on a campiing $331s to detc>rmtne that the deotgn i astur es were accuratel, reflected by the test and operating m e t h o d t;. and th at these methods uere c on si st ent with the requi remerit s of the proposed TS.
The test methods and result 3 of the prcoperatianal tests were used on a sampiing basis to establ1sh that the system funct1oned as portra,ed by the design drawings and requiremenu.
Specifically, the system features and operations involving the l l
Page 38
1.
EVALUATION
(
following'were reviewed j Normal system alignments and operations Emergency system alignments and operations ECCS Injection Phase Operations ECCS Recircul ati on Phase Operations System testing alignments and methods System Functional Tests Flow Path Val ve Lineups and Operability Testing
,_ Pump and Yalve Inservice and Oper abili ty Testing A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment established that the dest (n features were accurately translated into the as-built systems. The visual inspection included ver t iitation of system piping 7d fluid system flowpath and comeonent configuration, main and auxiliary control station instrumentation and controls, and general comparison of the systems and equipment with thw proposed TS.
2.12.0 - Obser.ations Minor i nconsi stenci es were i denti f i ed. All inspectre questions wero resolved by the licensee during the inspection cucept as noted below.
,~ v~-
1. p107-30. LPCS Interim Operating Procedure. Fevision O.
Esction E.7.1. indicates a LPCS Injection Yalve MOY-104 interlnct setpoint of 725 psig '.s. the current T2 4.~.3.1
<alue of SS-?S puid. The licensee stated that the discrepancy would be corrected during the neut r e s t s i on ci the IOP.
2. See Sectic n 2.11.0 of thi- eport for additional discussicn
.j of a cami43r ;etpoint discrep n y in Procedure ISP-ISC-MOOO, (w. LPC1/LPCS Yal.e Permissi c Functional Test.
2.10.4 Conclusions
{
No signi f icant discrepancies were identified. The as-built configuration of the system. structures, and components compared natisfactortly with the documents reviewed. The Technical Specification- requirements reviewed were definitively smeasurable.
/
, g5[ 2,._Q - STANDDY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM l
2.13.1 - Evaluati on Cri teri a and Scope
, Page 29
EVALUATION !
l The Stendby Liquid Control (SBLC) Syttem provioes the means to manually (or aut oma' i c al l y in conjunction with the Redundant Reactsvity Control SyM (.A) inject borated water into the reactor core to terminate cri tic al reactor operation.
The system consi sts of two pump trains, a storage tani, and tnst/ flushing tank and accessortes.
This system and its related equipment were revtewed with respect to the criterna and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendi:: 2.17 for a 11 sting of documents reviewed.
Proposed TS 3/4.1.5 was ccmpared to the documents listed in Appendtn 2.13 to verify that the proposed is accurately represented the aG-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agreement with the information in the FSAR and SER.
2.10.2 - Discussion
- 'f ~
The{ features M '! w system /y, revtewed includeo normal, abnor m al , and emergency operations describec br the FSAR, Section 15. Accident An > l . s t s . and the licensee's dr:dt and approved procedures.
The as-built configurati:n portion of the rettew included a sampling based re'.len of system piping :onfiguration, instrumentatton and control setpoints and cperating logic, system operating parameters and limits.
Operating Procedures. Sur.elllance and Inservice Tests were reviewed determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were conststent with the requirements of the creposed TS. Precperational tests were not reviewed.
Specifical1y, the system features and operat1ons 1nvolv1ng the f ollout ng were reviewed:
Normal system alignments and operations Emergency s. stem alignments and operations System testing al i gnmen t s and methods Flow Path Valve Lineups and Operability Testing
. System Operational Readiness Testing A Pump and Valve Inservice and Operability Testing L
l 2.13.3 - Observations l
l Paga 40
EVALUATIOt1
1. !OP-06 SBLC Interim Operating Procedure, Revision 0, requires updating to current TS 0/4.1.5 values for minimum tanl: levels.
2. OSP-SLS-00G1. SBLC Pump. Checi Valve and Relief Valve Test, Revi si on O. did not include a list of "laters" (data to be incorporated when available) In accordance ni th licensee administrative procedures. "Laters" exist in-sections 7.2.4 7.2.11. 7.0.4, etc.
mDWr# l
3. TS- 4.1.5.d.4 SOLC Storage Tank Heater Sur . ei 11 ance Requirement, does hot include numer i c al values for mi ni mum heater porformance (temperature rise vs. time) as is included !
In Standard TS. The absence of such criteria permits the licensee to unilaterally determine the acceptability of heater performance.-
Items 1 and 2 acove were act nowl edged by the licensee and will be reviewed and rescl.ed during the ne: t pr oc edure r e .1 E l on s.
Item 7 was provided to f13C RI for review wi th f1FC a llRR.
2.13.4 Conelustons E::c ec t as noted above. no d i s c r ep a r.c l e s were identifted. The as-bull t _ conf t gur at t on of the svstem. structure.. and c c.r.p o n e n t s comp 3 red sat t af actori1 y wi th the document 3 reviewed. The Tec h r. i c a l Spoc t f i c ati on r equi r emer.t n reviewed were definitively measurable.
Page 41
E/ALUATION 2.14 - RADIATION MONITORING _SYSTEd 0.14.1 -
Evaluation Cri teri a and Scope The Radi ation Moni toring S/ stem collects and processes data f rom radiation monitoring sensors throughout the plant. It incorporates the functions of an area radiation monitoring nystem and a process radiation monitoring system. With the euception of the Main Steem Line Process Radiatin Monitors and the Geseous Eifluent Monttering System. these two functional
-groups are brought together digital r adi a t i on monitoring sistem, a computer vn surf . the ed and operated system.
control N[0 The Radiation Monitoring System and associated equipment were reviewed with respect to the criteri a and methods of Sec t i ons 1.0 and 1.4 0- thi s repor t. The review performed was limited to-a general re.1ew of the system c oer a t t r.g procedure (!OP 'o, Radiation Monitoring Syctem Interim Operating Procedure) and FSAP and SEP Sections 11.5.
Proof and re.tew TS C/4.5.' uns revtowed for the m, stems and equipment listed above and compared to the FSAP. SER, and operating precedure-to ertfy that the TS ac c ur a t e l ,- represent the as-butIt c1 ant configuration and operating charactertst1cs and Were in a;reement utth the inicemation in the FSAR and EEP.
2.14.0 Discussion The review cf the systems and equipment included the normal.
abnormal and emergency operations described by the FSAR and the I t cens ee's proc edures.
The system ccnfigur3tton drautogs, operating 2nd alarm lo;tc diagramt. circuit bresLer schematic diagrams. Eystem operating parameter s and limits, and operating pr:cedures wer e revt eued on a sampling -basis to enture that tne design features were accur at el'. "?flected by the test and operatin0 methods-and that thece methocs wcre conststent With the requirements of the proposed TS.
A ver, _g en er a l revieu Was performed. i sual
. inspections were performed in conjunction with other process system revtews discussed herein.
2.14.3-Observations No di screpanci es were identi f ied in the areas of general review.
Page 42
. .. -- _ = _ _.
EVALUATION 2.14.4 Conclusions No inconsi stencies were noted during the general r evi ew of the system. The documents reviewed were in agreement vii th the TS.
Page 43
1 General Concl usi on s L O - GENERAL CONCLt@lQNJ The inspection found that the proof and review Technical Specifications (TS) were compatible with the Final Gafety Analysis Report (FSAR), Safety Evaluation Report (SER), the facility's procedures, and the as-built plant as reflected by the engineering drawings, data and in situ hardware.
The TS and FSAR are r easonabl y ccmplete and in agreement for the project status (Operating License projected for early 1986).
The licensee's production of operating phase TS implementing procedures was in progress during tne inspection. All operating pr ;cdures requested were avai l abl e in " interim". (see below) 4*"6 forQ Procedure Status The licensee has i mpl emen t ed an administrative procedure program of " interim" procedures for operating and surveillance ac t > t ti es. Under thi3 pr ogr p the intttal Tld4dk of each pr c redur e are tscued for .erification, val i da t i on, and r e v t s.i on dur ing the preoperati onal phase ac ti vi ti es.
Frior to licenced oper a t t or s. the interim procedures will be updgraded to meet current 11 cense requirements and lessons learned during the test program. This program appeared to be fur:ttoning satisfactortly.
At the time of inspection. the licensee had identified needs for 4?' sur ell 1 ance procedures. Ab ca t !?6 of theco had been 1usued in approved " interim" form. Another 185 were repcrted as craftod but not yet appro.ed. Ieaving about 110 prncedures to be dratted.
Abcut 130 surveil l ance procedures are required to support Operational Conditions 4 (Cold Shutdown) and 5 (Refueling). Of these 60 had been appro.ed with another 98 in unapproved draft.
l e s .*t n g about 30 procedures to be prepared.
The licensee has also adopted a system to identify and tract:
Information unavailable or missing from the procedures using "later" identifications. Onl , one di screpanci es was identtfied in this program involving a missing summary theet in a nurveillance procedure; all " l a t er s" within the procedure were ,
correct.
Although not reviewed during this inspection, the licensee advised that a computer based program has been developed to tract- survei l l ance procedure reference and input documents.
Th i s program will permit identification of impact on the procedures resulting from changes in the input documents.
Page 44
Gener al Conclusions l The i n centee's' programs f or TS development and implementation j appear to be f unctioning satisfactarily.
As-Duil t VLei f ication The licensee has implemented an as-built verification program aimed et cchi t e ning the "as-tested" configuration of the systems i follovgng precterational testing. The program is intended to ensurs r that the plant crautng securately reflect the as C tested states and that desi gn changes are properly coordinated with the s stem test status, draatng ttatus, and license i c ommi t men t s .
The sertfi: 3tton of c4+:tical, instrument and :ontrcl Ivstem features involses ute of the preliminari test and preoper a ti onal test drawi ng - (") ell ow lined") martups to establish as-tested sistem conitguration. The mechant: 31 portten2 of- the systems are <i rvall i inspected .s, design dr3Wirg2.
The program was r e .'1 eWed ontv briefIV d ur 1 n ;; thi : 1n:pe: tion but, in pr i nc i p l e appear:- to oro.'tde additional assurance that the as-built plant it : nsistent utth the deIngn drsWingt and
- tes t' procedure r esul t a.
FSAR Verification and Commitments The licensee has al so implemented a program fsr identification and certitcaticn of F5AP requirements and :cmmitments. The program ident t i t es CSAP content uhtch Warrants con-firmation of implmentattan, assigns urttten action items to, and requires Written response and response .ertitcation fram the cognicant action carties.
Thi s program was not specifically inspected during this site visit but se,eral enamplen of its output uere encountered and appeared sattsfactory.
Inspection Findings The findings from this inspection are discussed in detail in the
- respec ti ve repor t cections. In general, the licensee's programs i for development and tmpimentation of TS appear to be functioning. The TS were definitively measureable and, although still under development, were found compatible with the FSAR, SER, and the as-built plant.
No significant plant configuration problems were identified.
One frequent problem encountered during the plant. visual Page 45
General Conc l u si on s inspections was the absence. accuracy or presentation of equipment 1abel1ing and identification.
The licensee has completed a human f actors design review of the c on t r ol room, resulting in ongoing correction of identification def i ci enc ies therei n. In other plant areas, much equipment was g p' yet to be 1abel1ed. ber e err oneous or damaged 1abels. or was i nc on s i s t en t l y labelled with respect to the color convent 1Lns applied to engineered safety feature b st " g r e e rs ,
purple, yellow). Addi t i onal review of this matter by NRC RI once construction act1'.1tles decrease is recommended.
In depth review of the TS applicable to this inspection found the need for edi tori al and technical Improvement. In a number ht '- "
of cases, inappropriste or incorrect footnote referenceL e tables, and tent "equired edi t or i al cor cont ai nment isolation s stem TS table legends #i ncs.c.t-ic strumen t adt .g.i on TS appli cabt 1i tv and irequency footnotes, diesel gener at or TS foatnotes and te..t. etc. g) L_. ( G em t . i )
L (L de g, in se.eral areas. the specift:it, af < TSs reautre/g, 1moro.ement. 4 See comments herein regarding RCIC manual Initiation inoperability (section 2.0). Standby L1 auld Centrol Stcrage Tant-Heater Sure111 ance criterta (Sectton 2.l'). handling of pr eop er r. t l on al test c cnJ a rmat i on of TS criteria t. Sect 10n 2.10).
Few ca:en cf inappropriate TS provisions were identified. Most of those i nvel' ed 3 need for additional specificity cr consistency with atne" TS provi:1cns or the Standard TS.
Enamples includet acticn On high reacter pressure (Section 2.(9), increased zur . ei ll ance actions with an inaperable containment vacuum bres,er (2ection 2.2). etc.
Only one case was ident:fted invniving a disagreement between T5 and a plant modificaticn. Pe'. i s i on s to TS and the FSAR are necessary to ref l ec t changes in containment isolation valve and penetration assignments as descr1 Ped in Section 2.2. A- -
b in most cases, the licensee's interim operating and sur .'ei l l anc e procedures agree favcracly ulth the FSAR and TS. The principal area of disagreement involved the revision of crocedures to incorporate recent changes in TS and IST program r equi rement a .
parameters and acceptance criter1a. Although numeroun discrepancies were identified, the licensee's management controla appear adequate based on the program for a full procedure review and update prior to licensed operation.
Similarly, recent TS chenges are not reflected in the preoperational test procedures. This can result in two problems. First, affected equipment may require adjustment of netpoints or operating ranges to be consistent with TS. Second, a meticulous review of preoperational test methods and resultu Page.46
General Conc l u si ons appears necessary prior to permitting a preoperational test to be "creditted" toward TS Sureillance Pequirement satisfaction.
This was discussed with and ac t,nowl edged by 11censee _ personnel who indicated that nlans in the above regard are under development but incomplete at the time of inspection.
None of the specific discrepancies identified would have h' a d a material negative impact on cafety of operation and did not indicate orogrammatic nor systemic problems, t
Page 47
l SECTION 4.0 APPENDICES l
l- 1.0..........
1.1.......... INSPECTIOtt PLAN l
i L'. O - 2 . 1 ! . . . PERSONS CONTACTED ItlEPECTIOrl DATA SHEETS Page 48
Nine Mile Point - 2
'.' n s p e c t i on . Pl an Page 1 APPENDIX 1.0 3
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 - INSPECTION PLAN VERIFICATION OF AS-BUILT CONDITIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND FSAR/SER OBJECTIVES:
Conduct, on a sampling basis, reviews and i nspec ti ons of as-buil t safety rel ated systems, structures. and components in order tot determine whether the Tec hn i c al Specificattens and FSAP/SEP are compatible wtth the NMP-2 as-built plant, and to detsrmine whether Technical Spec t f i c ati cn r equi remen t s ara def a ni t 1.el y measurabl e.
General Scope The facillt, d e s c r i p t i o r. s .
informaticr, operating charac ter i st i c s. and related found in tne FSAR. SER and the proposed Technical Specificaticos (TS) will be compared to corresponding licensee drawings. c'credures. and actual plant hardware tc ectatlich whether the as-built ccnfiguration of the systems, structures and components 1I compatible with the safety analyses and propcsed (TS).
Concurrent uith the abo.e. the TS will be e aluated to con f i rm that the per-forman:e criterta and requirements estabitshed by the TS can be definiti'.ely measured or determined, i . e. that the means and methods to establish conformance with the TS requirements are responsive.
! - nen ai t i '. e. and sufficiently definitive to actually establish the required level of conformance.
l_
Particular emchasi s wi l l be given to the efficacy of surveillance tests and i nservice t ests establi sned by the Itcensee to demonstrate i
con f ormanc e wi th TS and the reautrements of ASME EtP'.8 Section XI and iOCFFSO 55a. .
l In general, the systems, structures, and components to be reviewed will include a sample of the following:
l l High Pressure Core Spr ay l
Associated Systems Dedicated Diesei
Nine Mile Point -
0 Inepection Plan Page 2 Low Pressure Core Spray Residual Heat Pemoval Containment Spray Emergency Service Water Containment Isolation Systems b Valves Standby Liqutd Control System Reactor Protection System Vital AC Power & Emergency Diesel Generators Yttal DC Power Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Automatic Depressuri:ation System
-Standby Gas Treatment System (or equiv.)
Radiation Monitoring Gener al Instrumentation & Controls Inspection Items Documents:-
Tec hni c al Specifications Final Saf ety Analysi s Report Safety - Evaluation Report and Supplements sur,ei11 ance/ Test Procedures Pr eop er a t i on al Test Procedures Inser',1ce Test Procedures Normal. Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures Process & Instrumentation Diagrams Elementary. Logic, and Loop Drawings Fabrication and Installation Dr awi no s Equipment Technical M anu al s Inspection Tasts:
1. Identify the TE applicable to the subject systems and- select a sample of requirements (Limiting Conditions for Operaticn.
Surveillance Requirements, etc.) for inspection. Review the corresponding sections of the FSAR and SER.
2. Obtain applicable as built (or Approved for Construction) PtIDs.
Elementary Diagrams. Loop and Logic Diagrams, etc. for the subject nystems. Select areas of inspection by identifying (red lintr.g) portions of each drawing. Develop a listing of spectitc equipment items uithin the system area which are subject to the TSs.
3. Yerify for sel ected portions of each system that:
1) the proposed TS adequately reflect the system configuration depleted by the drawings, t
2) the drawings match the information provided in the FSAR and F
Nine Milo Point - 2 Inspection Plan Page 3 SER. and
3) the proposed TS are consi stent wi th the FSAR commitments and SER- cencl us i ons.
Confirm that the system configuration and equipment will support definitive measurement or determination of conformance with TS per f ormance cri teri a and requirements 4.- Develop a checklist of items for field verification during system and orocedure walkdowns.
5. Identify and obtain the operating, surveillance and other portinent licensee procedures applicable to the system areas and TS being reviewed. Working from the drawings and T55 to the procedures, confirm thatt
1) the crocedure (s) adequately addres s the selected eautement and TS reaut rements i denti fied in the FEAR and SERs,
2) procedures accurately r e f l ec t the installed tas-built) hardware conf iguration and c ond i t i cr. . snd
3) the test and or operating methods 3 e e *. the T3 or F ? AR.' 5 E R reauteements, csmattments and e n s ' ,' c s
. (re leu actual performance data where practical).
i. Include procedure field verification itemt in checl.!!st for E, stem and procedure walkdowns.
7. Conduct an i n 01 an t walLdoun of subject 5 stems to .ertfv the results of the document revi ews confirm tr at t
1) the as built hardware configuration catches the information obtained from the document review.
2) the installed nardware is adequat el y addressed in the procedures and TS,
3) the licensee's test and cperating methods are bppropriate to the actual equipment, and
4) the equipment configuration and features pro ide for definitive determination or measurement of conformance with the TS. 5
8. Review the licensee's program for correlating TS requirements to procedures and procedure revi sion needs, design change Impact upon TS and TS implementing procedures, planning and scheduling of surveillance testing, etc.
-~
p
I i
Nine Mile Point -2 Inspection Plan Page 4 Technical Review Report Outline Cover Sheet Table of Contents Executive Summary introduction Purpose of Inspection Bact: ground and General Scope General Evaluation Criteria General Evaluation Methods 2
Evaluation - By System for Each System Reviewed Sc oper ?- Evaluation Criteria References (Listed in Appendices)
Discussion Findings and Observations Concl u si ons Gener 31 Cc'nclus1ons
/$pendices Licensee Personnel Contictec Documents Reviewed ( D ,- S ,> s t e m )
4 4
APPENDIX 1.1 REVIEW OF NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 2 TECHNNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED DURING INSPECTION The inspection team met held di scu ssi ons with and inspected plant systems with numerous licensee personnel. Listed below are the I t c onsee cont ac t r, who me t er i al l y participated in the inspection and entrance or e:: i t meetings.
NAME_ T!TLE R. ABPOT STATION SUFERIflTENDENT R. ALLEN TEST ENGINER (SWEC)
W. BAKER NMPC SPECIAL PROJECTS P. BEERS TEST ENGIflEER (SWEC)
T. DUMGARTffER S1TE OA SUPERVISOR (SWEC)
J. BUNYAN LEAD ELECTRICAL ENGINEER R. CPANDALL TEST ENGINEER J. DEMIfJEY HMPC SPEC!AL PROJECTS G. DOYLE DE SUPVR NOA OPERATIONS J. DRAVE . ST AFJ UF - SPECIAL FROJECTS W. DREWS
TECHfl! AL SUPEF INTENDEtlT P. EDDY fP' PUELIC SERY!CE COMMISSION D. FADEL ASST. FROJECT ADVISORY E!!GR.
M. FALISE SUPT.- MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE D. FEEYE STAFTUP ENGINEER J. GALLAGHER E!TE LICENS!NG ENGINEER (SWEC)
J. GATES STARTUP SUPERVISCR - ECCS G. GILMER STARTUP ENGirlEER D. GRIMSBO TEST GROUP SUPEY! SOP D. HELMS tlSSS OPERATIONS SUPT. (GE)
C. HICKS TEST GROUP SUPERYlSOR M. J Of f E S STATION OPERATIOf1S SUPT.
L. MASSAMATIS STARTUP MANAGER E. LLEIN MANAGER OF PROJECT ENGINEERING K. IOPC: NMFC LICENSING R. MATLOCI: DEPUTY PROJECT DIRECTOR P. MATURSE PRINCIPAL ItC ENGINEER R. MAWHINNEY STARTUP ENGINEER (SWEC)
J. McCARTHY STARTUP ENGINEER 1:. McDERMOTT TEST ENGIrlEER (SWEC)
T. McMAHON TEST ENGINEER G. MOYER STATION SHIFT SUPERY!SOR R. PAO PROJECT ENGINEER M. RAY MGR, SPECIAL PROJECTS E. SCHROEDER SPECIAL PROJECTS BUPYR. (SWEC)
B. SCOTT SYSTEM ENGINEER W. STECLER TEST ENGINEER (SWEC)
A. VERLING ENGINEER R. WARREN SURVEILLANCE COORDINATOR W. YEAGER MANAGER OF ENGINEERING
A. . ~s APPENDIX 2.O GENERAL REFERENCES In addition to the specific inspection and review items discussed elsewhwere herein the admin trative procedures and Emergency C-Oper ati ng Procedures l i sted[ bel ow were reviewed and used throughout the inspection for the evaluation of the licensee's various programs for TS i mp l emen t a t i on :
GE STARTUP TEST SPECIFICATIONS. REVISION O GE PREOPERATIOrlAL TEST SPECIFICATIONS, REVISION O INSERYlCE TESTING PLAN / FOR PUMPS AND YALYES. NMP 2 Q--
ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURES (APs):
(iP-3.0 ASSUPANCE OF SAFETY, REVISIOtl O 4 AP-7.7.1 COrlTROL OF EQUIPMENT MARKUPS. REY!SION 1 AP-0.7.2 FLACEMENT OF JUMF EPS OR E'LOClS OR LIFTING LEADS, R E'.'l S I O N I AP-8.2 SUFVEILLANCE TESTING AtlD Ifl5F ECT I Ctl F POGPAM.
REVISION O A P - 3 . "' IriSERVICE INSPECT!Orl AND T F.5 7 IllG F POGRAM. PEYlSION :'
STARTUP ADN!N [STRA T!YE F ROCEDURES (SAPS)
SAP-104 INTERIM OF EPAT ING F ROCEDUF ES. REY!SION 2 SAP-!:S IrlTERIM SL!R'.'E I LL ANC E PROCEDURES. RE','I S I ON O EMERGENCY OPERATING FPOCEDUPES (EOPs). FE'/!SION 0:
EOP-1 EOP DEVELOPMENT 2 EOP YERIFICATION 3 EOP YALIDAT!ON 4 EOP WRITER'S GUIDE RL RPY WATEP L E '.'E L CONTROL RP RPY PRESSUPE CONTFOL RO RPV REACTIVITY CONTROL SPT SUFFRESSION POOL TEMPEPATUPE CONTROL DWT DRYWELL TEHRERA1URE CONTROL PCP PFIMARY CONTAINMENT PPESSUPE CONTPOL i SPL SUPPRESSIOf! FOOL LEYEL CONTROL SCT REACTOR BUILDING TEMPERATURE CONTPOL SCR PEACTOR DUILD!tlG RADIATION COrlTROL SCL FEACTOR EUILDING LEYEL CONTFOL
! RR RAD!OACTIYITY RELEASE CONTROL l C1 LEYEL RESTORATION l C2 EMERGENCY RPY DEPRESSURIZATION C5 STEAM COOLING C 'l COOLING WITHOUT LEVEL C5 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN COOLING C6 RPY FLOODING C7 LEVEL / POWER CONTROL
{
L
Data Shoots Page 1 APPENDIX 2.1 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TEJHN LCA_L SPEC IF {C AT I ONS:
2. 2.1 , PEACTOR FROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS 3/4.0.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATIOtJ 3/4.8.4.4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ELECTRICAL PCWER MONITORING (RPS LOGIC) 3/4.8.4.4.2 REACTOR PRO TECTION SYSTEM ELECTRICAL POWER MOf fl TORI NG (SCPAM SOLENOID YALVES)
FSAR REFEREtlCES: 7.2 NFC SER PEFEFEriCES_L '.2 DJCUMENTS RFA'I1WED:
NUMBER TITLE FEYISION SO'E166TY RPE ELEf'E'JT ARY DIAGRAMS. 3: - 24 24 732E170A RPS - IED. SH 2 6 POT-97 RPS PRECPERATIONAL TEST O POT-28 flUCLEAP EDILER INSTRUMENT FFEOP TEST O IOP-97 PPS ItJTERIN CPERATIfJG PROCEDURE O ISP-ISC-RZOO INSTRUMENT RESFOSNE TIME TEST OF RX SCRAM DRAFT
( '.'E S E E L WATER LEYEL)
.ISP-RPS-R200 TUFEINE COrlTFOL VAL *.'E F AST CLOSUFE SCRAM O RESPONSE TIME ISP-ISC-R101 REAClOR STEAM DOME PRESSLIFE HIGH CALIERtl O I SF'-_ I 3C-MOO i FEACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE MONTHLY FUNCT TEST O s
l I
l 1
Data Shcrts i Perre O APPENDIX 2.2 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET PRIMARY CONTAINMENT & SUPPORT SYSTEMS JCHNICAL T SPECIFICATIONS:
3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAlfWENT INTEGPITY 3/4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEALAGE 3/4.6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCl:S 5/4,6.1.5 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER 3/4.6.1.6 D/W L S/C INTERNAL PPESSUPE 3/4.6.1.7 DRYWELL AVERAGE-AIR PPESSURE 3/4.6.1.3 D/W L S/C PUFEE SYSTEM
-1. 0. 5 ItJSERVICE If1SCEOTION t TESTING 3/4.6.O DEPRESSUFI:AT!ON SYSTEMS 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION YALYES 3/4.6.7 FRIMARY CONTAINMENT IEOLATION YALES 0/4.7.1 PEACTOC FROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FEAR REF_F PENCE S : 6. 2. 4, 6. 0. 6 ff C SGP FEFERENCESL 6. O QQg[tjf MT S PEY LEWE D:
NUMEEG TITLE FEYI? ION OEP-CNT-SA000 A I PLOCl: OPERADI.!TY TEST
. DRAFT 151-01 If1 SERVICE IllSPECTICN FROGRAM 11/25/85 ISSUE OPS-CNT-MOO 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION YEP!F. DPAFT IOP-50 DRvWELL COOLING INTERIM OF EF AT I!!G PROC. O IOP-Y9 PRIMAPAY CONTAINMENT INTEFIM OPCR. PROC. 1 OSP-ISC-MOOO nevWELL YACUUM BREAVER OPERABILITY TEST DRAFT OPS-CPS-ROO1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE YALYE POSITION O INDICATOR YERIFICATION FS6 ;-? O- 1 FLOW DIAGRAM - CONTAINMENT LUG MONITOPING 6 LSK-33-1ALB CONTAINMENT LUG MOtlITORItJG LOGIC DI AGRAM S FSK-22 & 20 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE FLOW DIAGRAM 5 LSF.-CC-23B PRIMARY CONTAINMENT-PURGE LOGIC DIAGRAM 7 FSI: 15A' B GAS TREATMEtiT SYSTEM FLOW DIAGPAM 5
- FSK- 1 M REACTOR BLDG YENTLN SYSTEM FLOW DIAGRAM 6 ESK-?HYR12 REACTOR BLDG VENTLN SYSTEM ELEMEtlTARY DIAGR. O OSP-HYR-DOO1 REACTOR BLOG VEf1TLN SYSTEM VALVE OPERABILITY O TEST OSP-CNT-MOO 3 REACTOR BLOG INTEGRITY VERIFICATION DRAFT IOP-81 CONTAINMENT LiG mot 11TORING INTERIM OPERATING 1 PROCEDURE P300P PRIMARY CONTAINMEtlT VACUUM RELIEF VALVES 1
. . - .~. ..... . _ - -- - -. -. - _ - . . . . . .-.-. . - . . . . . . - - .
1 Data Shouts Page ;
s SPECIFICATION ESP-RPS-R100 OPERAT ING CYCLE RPS Y1TAL EUS POWER MONITOR -DRAFT CHANNEL CAL 1BRATION 0SP-CHT-000 PRlMARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK SEAL LEAKAGE RATE DRAFT TM 3:130-0 W . 1, WOOLEY CO. - OPERATION t MAINTENANCE O INSTRUCTIOt15 - AIFLOCU ESK-?PS-00 t PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM 7
-06 POT-35 RCIC PPEOPERAT IOfJAL TEST O OSP-CPS-DOO! PRIMARY CON TAINMEf f r PURGE VALVE OPERABILITY DRAFT TEST IOP-83 PP! MARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM =!NTERIM -0 OPERAT!NG FROCEDURE '
POT-87 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEt1 PREOP TEST o FSE-0-1A-1C MAIN _ STEAL FLOW DIAGRAM YAP!OUS 2558-E-1101 - MS!Y ELEMENTAFY DIAGRAM' K 05:0-C-t100 MSIY GENL t10TES. LEGEND. DETAILS E 0540-E-1101 MSIY ELEMENTAPY DIAGRAM- G 0540-E-1100 MSIY GEt1L NOTEE. LEGEND. DETAILS D BO? E l -'? T Y FF9 ELEMEllTAFY DIAGRAM. SH-? -
O S P-t1S S-M OO ! M31 Y FAF, T !fik C) EPC ISE TEST L FUNCTiti TEST DRAFT Gr PPS MSIV CLO3UFE ISP-RPS-R1O' OPERA 1ING CYCLE CAL!DR UF RX SCRAM Otl MSlY DRAFT CLOSUPE INSTF. CHANNEL 3 l:
i l
l.
I
, , , ... m.__. ,,- -, ,--< - +.. ~ - - - - - - - - -
Data Sheett Page 4 APPENDIX 2.3 INSPECT 1ON REPORT DATA SHEET PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM '
T1QHN_! CAL SPEgIFICATIONS:
3/4.6.3 FFIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATlON VALVES >
TABLE ?. 6.7.-1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 0/4.6.1.4 M51Y SEALING SYSTEM FJAR REFE_RELLCgl.L 5.4.5 6. O 3 NRC ?EP F,JEEPENCESt_ 6.O.4 DOCUMENTSlEYIEt1ED2 (4LMEEP T1.T,LE FEY I ? ! Ori SO?E152TY flWCLEAR STEAM SUFPLY SHUTO W IYITEM YARIOUS ELEMENTARY DIAGPAM, SH 1-15 ESU-111SCOO1-4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATIOfI LOGIC D! AGF AM5 YAR!OUS DEP-15C-C5001 RCIC VALVE OFEPAEILITY TEST O FSh-15-1 FIPE PEOTECT!ON FLOW DIAGRAM. 54 0-N
, LSK-15-1.1 FIRE F FOTECT IOtl LOGIC DI AGRAM. 3H J -> ' O JOP-93 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INTERIM O OFERATING PPOCEDUFE P O T- S !. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION F REOF TEST 0 1
e 1
Data Sheets Page 5 APPENDIX 2.4 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET EECONDARY CONTAINMENT & SUPPORT SYSTEMS TEC QiflI C A_L SPEQ] FJ C AT I_OtJS
"/4.6.5.1 SECONDARY CONTAINt1ENT INTEGRITY
/4.6.5.2 AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAMPERS
7. / 4 . 6, 1. 7- STANDBY GAS TFEATMENT SYSTEM F3AR FEFERENCES 2 , 6.2.0, ?.4.2 NEG KEf1.EFAEEF11LCEnl. 6 2.!. 6.".12 Q_OG.UMENTS REY!DEDj_
NyttWR TITLE T .'1 ? I O N F I D 61 A ' D PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FURGE ! STANDBY GAS O TREATMENT (SBOTE)
I OP - 11 SERVICE WATER INTERIM OPERATING PROCEDURE o 1OP-1? INSTPUMENT A!R IN~EP!M OPERATING P6DCEDUPE O IOP-stO SBGTS INTERIM OC EC ATING F ROCEDURE O FSID 20.1.0 PEACTOP BUILDING .ENTL.N FLOW DIAGPAM, SH A-E VAC!OUS POT 61-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM PREOPERATIONAL TEST O OS P -GT S-f 0001 'iEGTS FUNCTIOrlAL TEST DRACT CSF-GTS-R001 SOGTS OPERABILITY TEST DRAFT OSP-GTS-MOO! SEGTS FUNCTIONAL TEST O OSP-GTS-R002 SBGTS POSITION INDICATION VERIFICATION O FS) : 15 CLufS FLOW DIAGRAM. SH A-H 2 L SI: 15 SBGTS LOGIC DIAGRAMS. SH A-H 2 E st. -? G T 9 SEGTS ELEMENTARY DIAGPAMS. 2H 1-5 7 EEi: "HYP12 REACTOR EUILDING .ENTLN ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM 9
IOP-S2 REACTOR DU I LD I NG '.'ENTLN INTERIM OFERATING PPOC. O OSP-CNT-M003 REACTOR BUILIDING INTEGRIUT VERIFICATION DRAFT OPS-GTS-DOO! SEGTS VALVE OPEFADILITY TEST O POT-OOO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT LEAK TEST O POT-11-2 EEGTS PFEOFERATICNAL TEST O OSP-HVR-0001 RX BLDG YENTLN SYS TEM YALVE OPERABIL I TY TESTT O l
l
Data Sheets Page 6 APPENDIX 2.5 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS J_F,CHN LL AL stEC I F I C AT I ONS :
3/4.7,1 PLANT SERYICE WATER SYSTEMS 3/4.7.9 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION FSAR REFEPfRICgit 9,2 -
U FiC,_ ,S,_E P R E C E P E N C E S , ?.2,1 DDGUMENTS cF3JXUgpi, UU.dllER T(TLE p;gyIg gn LSU-9-10 SWP LOGIC DIAGRAMS. SH A-AB 4 ESL-SSWP SWP DC ELEMENTARY D!AGRAMS. SH 1-12 4 ESK-6,SWP SWP AC ELEMENTARY DIAGRAMS. SH 1-12 2 FSK-9-10 SWP FLOW DIAGPAM. SH A-AL 4 OSP-SWP-MOO 1 SERVICE WATER YALVE POS I TION '.'ERIF ICAT ION O 10P-11 SWP IrlTERIM OFEFATING PFOCEDUFE O POT-11 SWP PREOPERATIONAL TEST PROCEDURE O PID-11-A SWP PtID. SH A-1 THRU 0-1 0 OSP-SWP-ROOO SWP VALVE POSITION INDICATOR YER!FICATION DRAFT OSP-SWP-0002 SWP PUMP OPEPAE'lLITY TEST DPAFT OSP-SWP-0001 SWP VALVE OPERABILITY TEST DRAFT t
Data Sheets Psqu 7 APPENDIX 2.6 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIF_ICATIONS:
3/4.7.4 FEACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLINC, 'RCIC)
/ 4 . C . 2 RCIC ISOLATION ACUTATION INSTRUMENTATION C./ 4 . 3. 5 . PCIC ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATIO;l FSAR REFJRENCESt 5.4.6. 6. 2. ' 15 (JFC SEP PEFER_EJCES1 5. 4. 6 DRGjJMENTS REVIEWED:
t!MtjE EP TITLE FEYIEIen FSK-27.4 RCIC FLOW DIAGRAM 7 OO7EI7CTY RCIC ELEMENTARY DIAGFAM, SH 1-1~ '24 PID-75A L B RCIC Pi:ID 'o IOP+35 FCIC It1TERIM OPEFATING PROCEDUCL Q POT-!5 RCIC F REOPERATIONAL TEST o OSP-!CS-ROOI RCIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST o OSP-ICS-CSOO1 RCIC '.%LVE OPERA 81 L ITY TEST o
'OSP-ICS-QOO1 FCIC PUMP AND YALVE OPERABILITY TEST AND 0 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TEST IEP-ISC-MOO 4 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST AND TFIP CAL OF Q ECCS/RCIC ACTUATION OF RX YESSEL LEVELS 1.2. AND 8 LCR-ILCICSO26 LOOP CALIEPATION REPORT - CST _ LOW LYL_INTEFLN O i
e
Data Sheet 1B Page 8 APPENDIX 2.7 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET AC SOURCES INCLUDING HPCS STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR IfCHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:
3/4.9.1 AC SOURCES ESAR REFEPENCESt. 8.7 NRC SER
REFERENCES:
8.3.1 QOC.UMENTS C _ PEYI EWED:
UUMBER T_J TJ.E F EY I E 1021 OPS-EGS-NOO1 DG OPERABILITY TEST, DIVISION 1/2 0 OSP-EGS-MOOO DE OFERABILITY TEET, DIVISION 7 0 POT-100B HPCS DIESEL GEf!EF ATOR PREOPERAT IONAL IEST 0 POT-100A-1 DIVISION 1 DIEEEL GEllERATOR PFEOPERATIONAL TEET 1 IOP-72 STANDBY AND EMEFGENCY AC DISTRIBUTION SYETkN O INTERIM OPEPATING PPOCEDUPL OSP-EGS-R001 DG ECCS START TEET DIYISIOrt 1.- 2 0 OSP-EGF-M001 DG FUEL OIL STOPAGE TANK WATEP ACCUMULATIOf f CF 0 OSP-EGA-0001 DG AIR START SYSTEM YALVE OPERABILITY TEST 0 OSP-EGF-DOO1 DG FO TRANSFER FYMP AND VALYE OPERABILITY TEST 0 OSP-EGS-Rn02 DG 21 HOUR RUN AND LOAD REJECTION TEST DIV 1/2 DRAFT IOP 't 1-*.3 KY/4.16 KY/iOGY AC POWEP DISTRIBUTION O OSP-EGS-R007 DG LOSS OF OFFSI'E POWER WITH fl0 ECOS TEST DRAFT DIVISION 17 2 OSP EGS-6005 DG ECCS START TEST DIVISION 2 DPAFT EE-1R-S 4160 YAC ONE LINE DIAGRAM. EMERGENCY BUS 8 CENStSUG102(-Y)
EE-1BN-! ONE LINE DIAGRAM, LOW VOLTAGE POWER DISTRIBUTION '.
EE-10-9 4160 VAC ONE LINE DIAGRAM. EMERGENCY BUS 9 CENS*SWG101(-G)
EE-1CA-6 ONE LINE DIAGRAM. EMERGENCY AND YITAL BUS 6 j POWER DISTRIBUTION l EE-12-9 600 VAC ONE LINE DIAC; RAM, EMERGENCY EUS 9 I
2EJS*US1 R< US2. CONTROL BLDG RM A .tc B EE-1C-10 MAIN ONE LINE DIAGPAM. 4,16 UV AUX XFMR 10 I. NORM 4.16 1~Y A 600 Y SYS I EE-M01A-2 PLANT MASTER ONE LINE DIAGRAM. NORMAL 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION, SH 1 l EE-ID-10 MAIN ONE LINE DIAGRAM, EMERGENCY 4.16 V.V t- 10 l 600V SYS EE-1A-7 MAIN ONE LINE DIAGRAM, GENERATOR !< MAIN XFMR 7 l
l. .
1
1 Data Shoots Page -9 APPENDIX 2.8 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET DC POWER SYSTEMS TECHN I C AL SPE C I F,.LC A T ! ONS_1 3/4,8.2 DC SOURCES FSAR REFERENCK_EI 9.3,2 t4PC SQ_Fif,EELLC151 8.3.O DJ.1 CME *,LM.1-23'.LCWE.9Jt, tLUttP_EP TITL L ___ _ RE'LI.?lOS
!OP-74A EMERGEf1CY DC DISTRIEUTION INTERIM OPER- O.
ATING PFOCEDL*E I OP ~' A NORMAL DC DISTRIBUTION INTER!M OPERATING O '
PROCEDUPE IOP-74B HPCE 125 VDC SYSTEM INTERIM OFEF ATING F POC. O POT 4 - 1 105 VDC EMERGENCY DISTRif PRF0F TEST 3 DPS-BYS-0001 DIY 1/11.'!!! EATTERY FEFFCPMANCE DI3CHAPGE DRAFT TEST ESP-DYS-00002 OUAPTEFLY BATTEPY SURVEILLAflCE TEST O ESF-BYS-WQO! 125 VDC WEEKLY BATTERY SURYEILLANCE TEST O EE-CN-9 125 YDC ONE LINE DIAGPAM EMEPGENCY SWGR 9 8~ E - 1 C M - 9 SAME-AS ABOVE 9 EE-lEP " 125 VDC ONE LINE DIAGFAM NDPMAL SWGR 7 EE-1BH-3 ONE LINE DIAGRAM, LOW VOLTAGE POWER DISTRN O EE-1CA-6 ONE LINE DIAGRAM. EMER t YITAL EUS, POWER DISTRN 6 e
Data Sheets Page 10 APPENDIX 2.9 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET ONSITE POWER DISTRIDUTION LG.Q!?QCAL SPECIFICATIONS _t 3/4.3.0 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION FSAP REFERENCG_h 8.3 NRC SER REFEPENCEE_ 9.0 pfQCEENTS REVIEWED:
NUMBER TITLE FEVIF103 EE-1A-7 MAIN ONE LINE DIAGRAM. GENERATUR ' MAIN XFMR 7 EE-10-10 MAIN ONE LINE-DIAGRAM. EMER. -1. 16 * ~Y ? - 600Y 10 EE-M01 A-:: PLANT MASTER ONE LINE DIAGRAM, NORMAL. FOWER 2 DISTRIBUTION. SH 1 EE-1C-10 MAIN ONE LINE DIAGRAM. 4.16 l',Y AUX XFNR. 10 NOPM 4.16 }LY '
600 Y SYS EE- 1 :' o 600 V ONE LINE D I /.G . EMER BUS DE 'It 2E ! '
LS: 9 CONTFOL BLDG FM A L B. EL 261' O" POT-!OOA DIY 1 DG PREOPERATIONAL TEST 1 IOP-71 15.3 KV/4160 V/600 Y AC POWEF FISTRIBUTION O INTERIM OPERATING PROCEDURE EE-1R-9 4160 V ONE LINE DIAG EMER BUS IN3tSWGF103(-Y) 8 EE-1BH-3 ONE LINE DIAGRAM. LOW YOLTAGE POWER DISTR 3 EE-10-9 4160 Y ONE LINE DI AG EMER BUS 2 ENS tEWGR101 (-G) ?
^
EE-1CA-6 ONE LINE DIAGRAM. EMERGENCY AND VITAL BUS -6 POWER DISTRIBUTION O
Data Sheets .
Fage 11
1 APPENDIX 2.10 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET '
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TJCHN IC AL SPEC I FR AT I ONS:
3/4.5.1 ECCS SYSTEMS - OPERATING 3/4.5.2 ECCS SYSTEMS - SHUTDQk" 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION PNE MUMEjtifJION 3/4.3.0 ECCS ACTUATION I NS T F;tr'ENT A T I ON 3/4.4.2 SAFETY RELIEF VAL'.ES FSAR REFEoENCES: 5.2. 6.3 (ALL). 7. 0.1. L .1, 15 NPC SER Rt.ZEP_EUC11L 6. 3, 7, 3 DOCUMENTE PEVIEWED:
- f.'UM P E;R TITLE _ %V!c!ON CSU-57-4 HPCS FLOW DIAGRAM. SH A-C 7 E-;'7E 127 2 T Y HPCS ELEMENTARY DIAGFAM. SH 1-7 (GE) 21 TECH MANUAL BORG WARNEF. BVRON JACISON DIV._HPCS PUMP -
ESK-6C HPCS ELEMENTARY D AGRAM, SH 1-5 (SWEC) e IOP-23 HPCS INTERIM OPERATING FROCEDURES 2
- IOP-100,1 HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR INTERIM OFER. PROC. O PDT-33-1 HPCS PREOPERATIONAL TEST 1
?!.31E3?2AF HPCS PROCESS DI AGF AM 4 CPS-CSH-DOO2 HPCS PUMP AND YALYE OPERABILITY TEST O OPS-CSh-DOO1 HPCS VALVE OPERABILITY TEST O LRC-IL2CHSOO4 LOOP CALIBRATION REPORT - SUPPRESSION POOL 0 '
HIGH LEVEL ISP-CSH-H201 ECCS INSTRUMENT RESPONSE TIME - DW HIGH PRESS DFAFT
- !SP-CNS-R100 REMOTE SD PANEL CHANNEL CAL - CST LEVEL DRAFT ISP-USC-R104- ECCS/RCIC ACTUATION ON RX VESSEL LO-LO-LO DPAFT LEVEL 2 AND HIGH LEVEL 8 FGK-32-8.O SRV FLOW DIAGRAM, SH A-D 3 SO7E155TY ADS ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM. SH 1-5 (GE) 21 E422- 1000 NUCLEAP BOILER SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CONTROL VARIOUS DIAGRAM. SH 1-5
- ICP-04 ADS AND SPV INTERIM OPEPATING PROCEDUPE O
. POT-34 ADS PREOPERATIONAL TEST DRAFT ISP-ADS-MOO 5 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF ACCUMULATOR DF AFT BACKUP COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM LP ALARM
-Data Sheets Page 12 h,
, APPENDIX 2.11 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM f
TECHN[ PAL SPEQJFICAT!ONSL 0/4.5.1 ECCS SYSTEMS - OPERATING 3/4.5.2 ECCS SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION AOTUATION INSTPUMENTATIM 7/4. 7. 3 ECCS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATIrN 3/4.4.?.1 RHR - HOT 3HIJT DOWN 7/4.4.9.2 RHR - COLF SHUTDOWN -
3/4.6.2.1 SUPPRESSI1N POOL
"/4.6.0.2 SUPPRESSI)H POOL % v D R Y W tiL L SPRAY d/4.h.2.3 SUPPPES?.ON POOL COOLING E_SAR PEFEPENW5_L S.4.6.1.1. 5.4.7 i . 2. 2. 6.0.2 2.4 ".0.1.1
/.4.l. . 1 5 . 2 . '>
NF.C SER R E FE R E NM9_I, % 4 . ' . i.2.1. 6,2,2. d.7 OppuMENT3 REVIEWED:
NUMEgP TITLE PEYlE!ON 731E990AF RHR FUNCTIONAL CONTROL DI AGnA.1 SH1-5 6 FSV-27-7.0 RHR FLOW DIAGRAM, SH A-N VARIOUS IOP-31 RHR INTERIN OPERATING PROCEDURE O POTe :1 R.HR FREOPERATIONAL TEST- 0 SO7E!?OTY RHR ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM. SH1-23 25 OSP-PHS-DOO4 RHR LOOP A FUMP AND '/ALVE C2EPABILITY ? O SYSTEM INTEGRITY TEST OPS-RHS-DOO3 SAME AS ABOYE - LOOP B O ISP-RHS-R112 CHANNEL CALIBRATION - SUPPRESS 1ON POOL TEMP O OSF-PHS-CSOO2 RHR LOOPS B & C COL SHUTDOWN VALVE TEST O
-OSP-RMS-MOO 1 RHR DISCH PIPING F.ILL (LPCli AND VALVE LINEUP O VERIFICATION AND CHK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST
, ISP-ISC-R101 CALIBRATION - STEAM DOME PRSSURE HIGH & O -
RHR ISOLATION INSTRUMENT CHANNELS ISP-ISC-MOO 1 MONTHLY FUNCT TEST & TRIP UNIT CAL OF STEAN O DOME PRESSURE
j. OPS-RHS-OOO2 RHR LOOP B YALVE OPERABILITY TEST O
, ISP-RHS-M014 MONTHLY FUNCT TEST & TRIP UNIT CAL OF LFCI O PUMP DISCH PRESS-HIGH PERMISSIVE ISP-RHS-R116 CALIBRATION OF ADS, LPCI & LPCS ACTUATION O UN DW PRESSUAE HIGH LCR-ILORHSOCO INJECTION VALVE MOV-20A DIFF PRESS INTERLOCK 1
)
LOOP CALIBRATION REPORT
- _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ = . _
Data Sheots Page 13 LCR-ILOFHSO35 RHR HX (STEAM CONDENSltlG MODE) STEAM GUF PLY 1 F FESCU;E CONTROL LOOP C AL I DR AT ION F1EF ORT LCR-ILOCM5000 Surf RESSION FOOL LEVEL LOOP CALIBRN REPORT OFS-RHS-DOO! O DTFLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF HIGH/ LOW F FESEUFE DRAFT INTERLOCR FOR STEAM CONDENSING MODE BYPASS ISF -hHS-MOO 7 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL lEST OF RHS SDC EUCTION DRAFT
' F RE SSUF E INSTRUMENTS OFS=FHS-FOO! Di / 0 ECCS FUNCTIONAL TELT DReSF T t
1.
f 1
Data Shooto Page 14 APPENDIX 2.12 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET LOW PRCSSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM TEHN!CE SF EC ElC AT I Q1)SL 3/4.5.1 ECCS SYSTEMS - CFERATING 3/1.5.2 ECCS SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN 3/4.5.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION
/4.0.0 ECCS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.5.0 ECCS - SUPPRESSION POOL ESftraggrSynts.L s. 5. 7.3. 15 ttEC_GER DEfd%ECESL 6. - . 7 :. 15 QQ.CMENT S RE_Y!11!ED:
!A!MJ5ft - T I TLE C fu LEJJ)B FSU-07-5 LF CS FLOW DI AGRA*. SH A-D 9 OO7E171TY LPCS ELEMENTARY D I ASR At1. SH 1-7 24 PID-00-0 LPCS PSID 2 IOP-30 LFCS INTERIM OFE ATING PROCEDURE O POT-72 LPCS PREOPERATIC'!AL TEST I ESP-F.HS-MQ15 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST - LPCI AND LPCS FUMP DPAFT AUTO START TIME DEL AY F.ELAY ISP-CSL-R201 INSTFl^OlT PEEPCNSE TIME OF LPC1/LPCS INIT DRAFT ON R', ,JW WATEF. LEYEL 1EP-FHS-MOO 6 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST AND TRIF L'fl! T C AL DRAFf OF LPCI AND LFCE ACTUATION ON DW PRESS HI
-!SC-MOOO MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF LPC1/LPCS YALVE DPAFT PERMISS!YE INSTC'UMENT CHANNELS CSL-POO1 DIY 1 ECCS FUNCTIONAL TEST DFAFT o
ObP-CSL-0001 LPCS YALYC OPERAEILITY TEST O OSP-CSL-M001 LPCS DISCHAPGE FILL AND YALVE LillEUP YERIF 0 AND CHECK YALYE OPERADILITY TEST OSP-CSL-CS001 LPCS COLD SHUTDOWN VALY2 OPERABILITY TEST O OSP-CSL-OQO2 LFCS PUMP AND YALVE OPERABILITY AND SYSTEM O INTEGRITY TEST
't 9
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j Data Sheets Page 15 APPEND!X 2.13 INGFICTION REPORT DAT A GHEET STANDDY LIQUID CONTRDL SYSTEM
-If,GjdtilfAL 3 PEC j F LG A_T10LJEL 3/4.1.5 ST AtJDBY LIOUlD CONTROL SYSTEM E5_AE__OfLCEErlg.C_S.L T.4.1.2, 9.0.5 tRC_JCf__ hedge?t1CE $.L 9. 3. 5. 7.6.1.?
0 9.C W ?ll.I f c E X J E W E.p_t LMif:EP - T I RL_ _ _
FEV171Qtl FSK *.0-16 SPLC FLOW DIAGRAM. EH A-D 907E1atTr'- 4 5ELC ELEMENTARY D1AGFAM. EH !-4 20 P!D-OLA-1 SDLC F ' !D 914E559 EELC FUNCTIONAL CONTROL DIAGRAM 1
IOP-56 SPLC INTEP!M GrERATING PF;OCEDURE 1
10F-OiB 0 POT-26 FEDUNDNAT FEACTIYlTY COrlTF OL I DF- O SDLC F REOF ERATIONAL TEST O OSP-SLG-OOOO SELC MOY OPEPADILITY TEST 05P-SLS-MO91 O SDLC EXPLOS!YE VALVE CON 1!NUITY CHECE AND 0 s
k 4
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ML20066H284

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