Information Notice 1989-80, Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80:       POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL


FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING IN HIGH-PRESSURE
STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING


COOLANT INJECTION PIPING
IN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION
 
PIPING


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
      All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
      This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro- blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valves


notice is being provided to alert addressees
in a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCI


to potential
system during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients


pro-blems resulting
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider


from failure of high-pressure
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


coolant injection((HPCI)
==Description of Circumstances==
valves in a boiling-water
:
 
      On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature was
reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater
 
into the HPCI system during operation
 
of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
con-tained in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating
 
at power, temperature
 
was greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load was caused by feedwater
 
leaking through uninsulated
 
===HPCI piping to the condensate===
storage tank. During power operation, feedwater
 
temperature
 
is less than 350 0 F, and feedwater
 
pressure is approximately
 
1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con-densate storage tank is prevented
 
by the injection
 
check valve; the injection valve, or the discharge
 
valve on the auxiliary
 
cooling water pump. The injection valve and the injection
 
check.valve
 
are shown in Attachment
 
1.On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased
 
suffi-ciently to raise the temperature
 
between the injection
 
valve and the HPCI pump discharge
 
valve to 275 0 F and at the discharge
 
of the HPCI pump to 246 0 F.Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature
 
gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded


that feedwater leaking through the injection
greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load


valve was flashing and displacing
was caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensate  0
      storage tank. During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 350 F,
      and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con- densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injection


some of the water in the piping with steam. This conclusion
valve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injection


was confirmed
valve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.


by closing the pump discharge
On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi- ciently to raise the temperature    between the injection valve and the HPCI 0
      pump discharge valve to  2750 F and  at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 246 F.


valve and monitoring
Pressure in the HPCI piping  was  47  psia. On the basis of the temperature


the temperature
gradient and the pressure  in  the  piping,  the licensee concluded that feedwater


of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature
leaking through the injection  valve    was flashing and displacing some of the


decreased
water in the piping with steam.      This  conclusion was  confirmed by closing the


to ambient.:891127000
pump discharge valve and  monitoring    the temperature  of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature decreased    to ambient.
o j, ''@
IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 Accessible


portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe supports were found near the injection
:891127000
  o j,                                                           ''@


valves. Concrete surfaces near the support attachment
IN 89-80
                                                              December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe


points were spalled.The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable
supports were found near the injection valves. Concrete surfaces near the


on October 23, 1989, and notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing
support attachment points were spalled.


a review under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection
The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, and


valve, closed the normally open discharge
notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing a review under 10
CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closed


valve, and will use the discharge
the normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarily


valve temporarily
as the injection valve.


as the injection
Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated that


valve.Temperature
less significant leakage was occurring.
 
measurements
 
on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated
 
that less significant
 
leakage was occurring.


Discussion:
Discussion:
The event at Dresden is significant
The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for water


because the potential
hammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for


existed for water hammer or thermal stratification
steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI


to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI piping downstream
piping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of two


from the injection
feedwater pipes.


valves would cause loss of one of two feedwater
The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with water


pipes.The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated
hammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concrete


with water hammers. Nevertheless, loosening
surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that


of the pipe supports, damage to concrete surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump tests or valve manipulations.
water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump


Temperature-monitoring
tests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation on


instrumentation
the piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak. NRC


on the piping near the injection
Information Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer


valves was useful in detecting
events at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other references


the leak. NRC Information
mentioned in this notice.


Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer events at other facilities.
Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is related


Attachment
to three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for


2 lists these and other references
issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. These


mentioned
events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. In


in this notice.Concern for potential
all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system


thermal stratification
through closed valves in an emergency coolant system. Thermal stratification


in the HPCI piping is related to three events in pressurized-water
of water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations of


reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements
the interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal


to that bulletin.
fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of welds


These events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors.
and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration of the piping


In all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system through closed valves in an emergency
between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency cooling


coolant system. Thermal stratification
system is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. The


of water in the piping of the emergency
licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at the


coolant system and fluctuations
next scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.


of the interface
During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pump


between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected
existed because the discharge valve was normally open. Events have occurred


zones of welds and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration
in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.


of the piping between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency
Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary ''-$ '


cooling system is approximately
'4, IN 89-80
                                                            December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the


like the configuration
staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees


of the piping at Dresden. The licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically
develop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to


at the next scheduled
ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify


outage to determine
steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.


whether detectable
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


damage has occurred.During the event at Dresden, the potential
completed.


for steam bindingv the HPCI pump existed because the discharge
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


valve was normally open. Events have occurred in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


feedwater
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project


pumps.Because the NRC staff was concerned
manager.                                 I


about the availability
*        e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec


of the auxiliary
Division of Operational Events Assessment


''-$ '
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
'4, IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater
 
pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
 
of an accident, the staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop Procedures
 
for monitoring
 
the temperature
 
of the pump discharge
 
to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
 
of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional


information
Technical Contacts:  Eric W. Weiss, AEOD


as more inspection
(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR


and analysis is completed.
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


This information
2. Referenced Generic Communications


notice requires no specific action or written response.
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


If you have any questions
I


about the information
_  ,  r


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
1.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
A      B


NRR project manager. I* e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec Division of Operational
5/1 1/89  140 F  180 F


===Events Assessment===
7/18 /89  175 F  220 F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
10/23/89    248 F  275 F


Contacts:
c
Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
INJECTION


Line 2. Referenced
VALVES


===Generic Communications===
D I SCHARGE
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices I
VALVE            B


_ , r 1.5/1 1/89 7/18 /89 1 0/23/89 A 140 F 175 F 248 F B 180 F 220 F 275 F c INJECTION VALVES D I SCHARGE VALVE B FEEDWATER A FPC I PUMP TEST RETURN*(DRESDEN 2 -HIGH-PRESSURE
FEEDWATER


COOLANT INJECTION
A


LINE ul 0 C- +VD (D oFr a to c-, CD (D CO O CD CX)o -1 CDM..0
FPC I                TEST RETURN
Attachment


2 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 REFERENCED
PUMP


===GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS===
*(
1. NRC Information
                                                                            VD (D


Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events," September
ul  0  oFr C-+
                                                                                a CO


19, 1985.2. NRC Information
CD (D  to Oc-,
                                                                                CD CX)
              DRESDEN 2 - HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINE              o  -1  CDM


Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater
..


Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater
0


System Integrity
Attachment 2 IN 89-80
                                                          December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS


and Water Hammer Damage," January 1, 1986.3. NRC Information
1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"
  September 19, 1985.


Notice No. 87-10, "Potential
2. NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves


for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.4. NRC Information
Causes    Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"
  January 1, 1986.


Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication
3. NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer During


of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm
Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.


Globe Valves," April 18, 1988.5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary
4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage


Feedwater
Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"
  April 18, 1988.


Pumps," October 29, 1985.6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected
5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"
  October 29, 1985.


to Reactor Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement
6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor


1, June 24, 1988; Supplement
Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.


2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement
Attachment 3 IN 89-80
                                                        December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


3, April.11, 1988.
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


Attachment
Information                                    Date of


3 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
Notice No.      Subject                        Issuance  Issued to


NOTICES Information
89-79          Degraded Coatings and          12/1/89  All holders of OLs


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 89-79 89-56, Supp. 1 89-78.89-77 Degraded Coatings and Corrosion
Corrosion of Steel                      or CPs for LWRs.


of Steel Containment
Containment Vessels


Vessels Questionable
89-56,          Questionable Certification    11/22/89  All holders of OLs


===Certification===
Supp. 1        of Material Supplied to                 or CPs for nuclear
of Material Supplied to the Defense Department


by Nuclear Suppliers Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride
the Defense Department                  power reactors.


===Cylinder Valves Debris in Containment===
by Nuclear Suppliers
Emergency


Sumps and Incorrect
89-78.          Failure of Packing Nuts        11/22/89  All NRC licensees


===Screen Configurations===
on One-Inch Uranium                      authorized to possess
Biofouling


Agent: Zebra Mussel Falsification
Hexafluoride Cylinder                    and use source material


of Welder Qualifications
Valves                                  and/or special nuclear


for Contractor
material for the heating, emptying, filling, or


Employees Clarification
shipping of uranium


of Trans-portation
hexafluoride in 30-
                                                        and 48-inch diameter


===Requirements===
cylinders.
Applicable


to Return of Spent Radiopharmacy
89-77          Debris in Containment          11/21/89  All holders of OLs


Dosages from Users to Suppliers Potential
Emergency Sumps and                      or CPs for PWRs.


===Overpressurization===
Incorrect Screen
of Low Pressure Systems 12/1/89 11/22/89 11/22/89 11/21/89 11/21/89 11/20/89 11/7/89 11/1/89 All holders of OLs or CPs for LWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized


to possess and use source material and/or special nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or shipping of uranium hexafluoride
Configurations


in 30-and 48-inch diameter cylinders.
89-76          Biofouling Agent:  Zebra      11/21/89  All holders of OLs


All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers
Mussel                                  or CPs for nuclear


and distributors
power reactors.


of radiopharmaceuticals
89-75          Falsification of Welder        11/20/89 All holders of OLs


for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.
Qualifications for                      or CPs for nuclear


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-76 89-75 89-74 89-73 OL = Operating
Contractor Employees                      power reactors.


License CP = Construction
89-74          Clarification of Trans-        11/7/89  All manufacturers


Permit
portation Requirements                  and distributors of


IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater
Applicable to Return of                  radiopharmaceuticals


pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
Spent Radiopharmacy Dosages              for medical use, from Users to Suppliers                  nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.


of an accident, the staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop procedures
89-73          Potential Overpressurization    11/1/89  All holders of OLs


for monitoring
of Low Pressure Systems                  or CPs for nuclear


the temperature
power reactors.


of the pump discharge
OL = Operating License


to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
CP = Construction Permit


temperature
IN 89-80
                                                              December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the


and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees


of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
develop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to


information
ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify


as more inspection
steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.


and analysis is completed.
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


This information
completed.


notice requires no specific action or written response.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


If you have any questions
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


about the information
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
manager.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:  Eric W. Weiss, AEOD


Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger (301)Woodruff, NRR 492-1180 Attachments:
(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


Line 2. Referenced
2. Referenced Generic Communications


===Generic Communications===
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


EAB: NRR*RWoodruff:db
EAB: NRR       IRB:AEOD        TECH EDITOR    EAB:NRR        PM:PD32:NRR


11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII
*RWoodruff:db *EWeiss          *RSanders      *PBaranowsky  *BSiegel


*WShafer 11/13/89 IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR*CHaughney
11/12/89       11/14/89       11/15/89      11/1§/89        11/15/89 C:PB1:RIII    C:EAB:NRR       C:OGCB:NRR    D:06A.


11/15/89 TECH EDITOR*RSanders 11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR
*WShafer      *CHaughney      *CBerlinger    CERossi DO


*CBerlinger
11/13/89      11/15/89        11/22/89      11/;1/89


11/22/89 EAB:NRR*PBaranowsky
I


11/1§/89 D:06A.CERossi DO 11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR
NRCIN 88-xx


*BSiegel 11/15/89 I NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 monitoring
November x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at less


the temperature
than saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.


of the pump discharge
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


to ensure that it is at less than saturation
completed.
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
 
information
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.


No specific action or written response is required by this information
No specific action or written response is required by this information


notice. If you have questions
notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the


about this matter, please call one of the technical
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
appropriate regional office.


of the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:  Eric W. Weiss, AEOD


Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:  1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS EAB:NRR*RWoodruff:db
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII
EAB:NRR        IRB:AEOD      TECH EDITOR    EAB:NRR        PM:PD32:NRR


*WShafer 11/ /89 CONCURRENCE
*RWoodruff:db  *EWeiss                        PBaranomsky    BSiegelrP


IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/ /L6 TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PBaranomsky
11/ /89        11/  /L6                       11/15/89        11115189 Ko


11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR
C:PB1:RIII                                    D:DOEA:NRR


BSiegelrP 11115189 Ko D:DOEA:NRR
*WShafer                                      CERossi


CERossi 11/ /89 1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A
11/ /89                       1 /WY/89        11/ /89 Doc: 299A


4.1.d NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 temperature
4.1.d


of the pump discharge
NRCIN 88-xx


to assure that it is at less than saturation
November x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less than


temperature
saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.


and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


information
completed.
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.


No specific action or written response is required by this information
No specific action or written response is required by this information


notice. If you have questions
notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the


about this matter, please call one of the technical
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
appropriate regional office.


of the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi. Director


regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   Eric W. Weiss, AEOD
 
Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High Pressure Coolant Injection


Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR


Notices EAB:NRR RWoodruff:db
(301) 492-1180
Attachments: 1. Dresden 2 - High Pressure Coolant Injection Line


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Revision as of 02:31, 24 November 2019

Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
ML031190089
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 12/01/1989
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-080, NUDOCS 8911270002
Download: ML031190089 (9)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL

STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING

IN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

PIPING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro- blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valves

in a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCI

system during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature was

greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load

was caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensate 0

storage tank. During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 350 F,

and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con- densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injection

valve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injection

valve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.

On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi- ciently to raise the temperature between the injection valve and the HPCI 0

pump discharge valve to 2750 F and at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 246 F.

Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature

gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded that feedwater

leaking through the injection valve was flashing and displacing some of the

water in the piping with steam. This conclusion was confirmed by closing the

pump discharge valve and monitoring the temperature of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature decreased to ambient.

891127000

o j, @

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe

supports were found near the injection valves. Concrete surfaces near the

support attachment points were spalled.

The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, and

notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing a review under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closed

the normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarily

as the injection valve.

Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated that

less significant leakage was occurring.

Discussion:

The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for water

hammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for

steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI

piping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of two

feedwater pipes.

The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with water

hammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concrete

surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that

water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump

tests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation on

the piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak. NRC

Information Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer

events at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other references

mentioned in this notice.

Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is related

to three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for

issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. These

events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. In

all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system

through closed valves in an emergency coolant system. Thermal stratification

of water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations of

the interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal

fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of welds

and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration of the piping

between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency cooling

system is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. The

licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at the

next scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.

During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pump

existed because the discharge valve was normally open. Events have occurred

in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary -$ '

'4, IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager. I

  • e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I

_ , r

1.

A B

5/1 1/89 140 F 180 F

7/18 /89 175 F 220 F

10/23/89 248 F 275 F

c

INJECTION

VALVES

D I SCHARGE

VALVE B

FEEDWATER

A

FPC I TEST RETURN

PUMP

  • (

VD (D

ul 0 oFr C-+

a CO

CD (D to Oc-,

CD CX)

DRESDEN 2 - HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINE o -1 CDM

..

0

Attachment 2 IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"

September 19, 1985.

2. NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves

Causes Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"

January 1, 1986.

3. NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer During

Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.

4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage

Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"

April 18, 1988.

5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"

October 29, 1985.

6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor

Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.

Attachment 3 IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

89-79 Degraded Coatings and 12/1/89 All holders of OLs

Corrosion of Steel or CPs for LWRs.

Containment Vessels

89-56, Questionable Certification 11/22/89 All holders of OLs

Supp. 1 of Material Supplied to or CPs for nuclear

the Defense Department power reactors.

by Nuclear Suppliers

89-78. Failure of Packing Nuts 11/22/89 All NRC licensees

on One-Inch Uranium authorized to possess

Hexafluoride Cylinder and use source material

Valves and/or special nuclear

material for the heating, emptying, filling, or

shipping of uranium

hexafluoride in 30-

and 48-inch diameter

cylinders.

89-77 Debris in Containment 11/21/89 All holders of OLs

Emergency Sumps and or CPs for PWRs.

Incorrect Screen

Configurations

89-76 Biofouling Agent: Zebra 11/21/89 All holders of OLs

Mussel or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

89-75 Falsification of Welder 11/20/89 All holders of OLs

Qualifications for or CPs for nuclear

Contractor Employees power reactors.

89-74 Clarification of Trans- 11/7/89 All manufacturers

portation Requirements and distributors of

Applicable to Return of radiopharmaceuticals

Spent Radiopharmacy Dosages for medical use, from Users to Suppliers nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.

89-73 Potential Overpressurization 11/1/89 All holders of OLs

of Low Pressure Systems or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB: NRR IRB:AEOD TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PM:PD32:NRR

  • RWoodruff:db *EWeiss *RSanders *PBaranowsky *BSiegel

11/12/89 11/14/89 11/15/89 11/1§/89 11/15/89 C:PB1:RIII C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR D:06A.

  • WShafer *CHaughney *CBerlinger CERossi DO

11/13/89 11/15/89 11/22/89 11/;1/89

I

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at less

than saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments: 1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB:NRR IRB:AEOD TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PM:PD32:NRR

  • RWoodruff:db *EWeiss PBaranomsky BSiegelrP

11/ /89 11/ /L6 11/15/89 11115189 Ko

C:PB1:RIII D:DOEA:NRR

  • WShafer CERossi

11/ /89 1 /WY/89 11/ /89 Doc: 299A

4.1.d

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less than

saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments: 1. Dresden 2 - High Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

EAB:NRR IRB:AEOD TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PM:PD32:NRR

RWoodruff:db EWei S PBaranowsky BSiegel

11/11189 11/1 /89 11/1ST/89 11/ /89 11/ /89

3BM tricpkoa~

C:PB1:RILI~ C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

WShafer-Cd,' CHaughney CBerlinger CERossi

11/13/89 11/ /89 11/ /89 11/ /89


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