ML18151A580: Difference between revisions
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The only important function that would be disabled by a loss of inside containment instrument air is pressurizer spray, however, pressurizer spray is a non-safety-related control function. | The only important function that would be disabled by a loss of inside containment instrument air is pressurizer spray, however, pressurizer spray is a non-safety-related control function. | ||
The safety-related pressurizer operated relief valves (PORV) are air operated, and have compressed air bottles that serve as a backup to the inside containment IA system. Loss of outside containment IA is functionally equivalent to a loss of Feedwater transient with the addition of loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) supply to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier. The steam generator PORVs are also disabled by this event. Additionally, the loss of outside containment IA, in combination with additional systems, is treated as a contributor to the Loss of RCP Seal C_ooling initiating event (T4). However, the frequencies associated with these events are not significant contributors to the loss of Feedwater or CCW events. The Surry PSA model does not consider the loss of the IA system a significant contributor to total risk, and consequently a fault tree model was not developed to address this condition. | The safety-related pressurizer operated relief valves (PORV) are air operated, and have compressed air bottles that serve as a backup to the inside containment IA system. Loss of outside containment IA is functionally equivalent to a loss of Feedwater transient with the addition of loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) supply to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier. The steam generator PORVs are also disabled by this event. Additionally, the loss of outside containment IA, in combination with additional systems, is treated as a contributor to the Loss of RCP Seal C_ooling initiating event (T4). However, the frequencies associated with these events are not significant contributors to the loss of Feedwater or CCW events. The Surry PSA model does not consider the loss of the IA system a significant contributor to total risk, and consequently a fault tree model was not developed to address this condition. | ||
This conclusion was based on the following: | This conclusion was based on the following: | ||
: 1) compressed air bottles are provided for the pressurizer PORVs, and 2) the supply of IA can easily be recovered by re-routing air flow or by using portable air bottles. Further, the ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class. A similar conclusion was reached during implementation of the maintenance rule where certain systems have been included in a functional sense only. For example, the functional requirement of the IA system is to supply air at 90 psig. The performance of individual components within the IA system is not monitored, only the system function is monitored. | : 1) compressed air bottles are provided for the pressurizer PORVs, and 2) the supply of IA can easily be recovered by re-routing air flow or by using portable air bottles. Further, the ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class. A similar conclusion was reached during implementation of the maintenance rule where certain systems have been included in a functional sense only. For example, the functional requirement of the IA system is to supply air at 90 psig. The performance of individual components within the IA system is not monitored, only the system function is monitored. | ||
Therefore, as long as the failure of an IA component does not cause the loss of the IA system function, it is not considered an IA failure by the maintenance rule. Furthermore, the system is a low pressure system having a design pressure of only 100 psig. The frequency of loss of IA is derived from NUREG/CR-54722. | Therefore, as long as the failure of an IA component does not cause the loss of the IA system function, it is not considered an IA failure by the maintenance rule. Furthermore, the system is a low pressure system having a design pressure of only 100 psig. The frequency of loss of IA is derived from NUREG/CR-54722. | ||
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Segment names use a system identifier, and segment numbers start at the fluid source and continue through system termination. | Segment names use a system identifier, and segment numbers start at the fluid source and continue through system termination. | ||
Segments are numbered such that parallel train A and train B pipe sections have contiguous numbers whenever possible. | Segments are numbered such that parallel train A and train B pipe sections have contiguous numbers whenever possible. | ||
Thus, the segments for each system were defined in a consistent manner. Segment definition is an iterative process concerning the determination of the consequences and the identification of any potential operator recovery actions. Also, the consideration of indirect effects has the potential to refine the segments defined in Attachment | Thus, the segments for each system were defined in a consistent manner. Segment definition is an iterative process concerning the determination of the consequences and the identification of any potential operator recovery actions. Also, the consideration of indirect effects has the potential to refine the segments defined in Attachment | ||
: 3. REFERENCES | : 3. REFERENCES | ||
: 1. Virginia Electric and Power Company, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Individual Plant Examination, Final Report, Surry Units 1 and 2," August 1991. 2. NUREG/CR-5472, "A Risk-Based Review of Instrument Air Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," January 1990. 3. NUREG/CR 2815, "Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," Revision 0, January 1984 . 4 | : 1. Virginia Electric and Power Company, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Individual Plant Examination, Final Report, Surry Units 1 and 2," August 1991. 2. NUREG/CR-5472, "A Risk-Based Review of Instrument Air Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," January 1990. 3. NUREG/CR 2815, "Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," Revision 0, January 1984 . 4 | ||
* | * | ||
* ATTACHMENT 2 Preliminary System Selection For Surry Unit 1 System Description IPE Section XI 1 . AFW -Auxiliary Feedwater3 Yes Yes 2. BD -Slowdown (S/G) Yes Yes1 ,2 3. cc -Component Cooling -Yes Yes2 4. CH -Chemical & Volume Control4 Yes Yes2 5. CN -Condensate Yes Yes2. 6. cs -Containment Spray Yes Yes 7. CW -Circulating Water Yes Yes2 8. EE -Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Yes No 9. FC -Fuel Pit Cooling6 No Yes1 10. FW -Feedwater3 Yes Yes2 11 . MS -Main Steam Yes Yes2 12. RC -Reactor Coolant Yes Yes2 13. RH -Residual Heat Removal Yes Yes 14. RS -Recirculation Spray Yes Yes 15. SI -Safety lnjection5 Yes Yes 16. SW -Service Water Yes Yes2 17. VS -Ventilation? | * ATTACHMENT 2 Preliminary System Selection For Surry Unit 1 System Description IPE Section XI 1 . AFW -Auxiliary Feedwater3 Yes Yes 2. BD -Slowdown (S/G) Yes Yes1 ,2 3. cc -Component Cooling -Yes Yes2 4. CH -Chemical & Volume Control4 Yes Yes2 5. CN -Condensate Yes Yes2. 6. cs -Containment Spray Yes Yes 7. CW -Circulating Water Yes Yes2 8. EE -Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Yes No 9. FC -Fuel Pit Cooling6 No Yes1 10. FW -Feedwater3 Yes Yes2 11 . MS -Main Steam Yes Yes2 12. RC -Reactor Coolant Yes Yes2 13. RH -Residual Heat Removal Yes Yes 14. RS -Recirculation Spray Yes Yes 15. SI -Safety lnjection5 Yes Yes 16. SW -Service Water Yes Yes2 17. VS -Ventilation? | ||
Yes Yes1 ,2 Notes: 1 -System is exempt from current ASME Section XI examination requirements | Yes Yes1 ,2 Notes: 1 -System is exempt from current ASME Section XI examination requirements | ||
[i.e., volumetric, surface, visual (VT-3)], but is included for pressure testing. 2 -Portions of this system are not included in the Section XI ISi program. 3 -Surry combines the feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems on the system drawings. | [i.e., volumetric, surface, visual (VT-3)], but is included for pressure testing. 2 -Portions of this system are not included in the Section XI ISi program. 3 -Surry combines the feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems on the system drawings. | ||
4 -Portions of the chemical & volume control system work in conjunction with high head safety injection. | 4 -Portions of the chemical & volume control system work in conjunction with high head safety injection. | ||
| Line 308: | Line 308: | ||
Loss ofCS(Operator action to close lOOA/B or 1-CS-MOV-IOIA/B/C/D is required) | Loss ofCS(Operator action to close lOOA/B or 1-CS-MOV-IOIA/B/C/D is required) | ||
Page 27 of 62 | Page 27 of 62 | ||
=* I~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION CS-012 Flow from Refueling Water None (See assumption 6)None (See assumption | =* I~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION CS-012 Flow from Refueling Water None (See assumption 6)None (See assumption | ||
: 6) Chemical Addition Tank CS-013 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption | : 6) Chemical Addition Tank CS-013 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption | ||
: 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-014 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption | : 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-014 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption | ||
: 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-015 Flow from RWST to the closed Loss of Unit 1 RWST Loss of Unit 1 RWST valve l-CS-27 CS-016 The remaining portions of the None (See assumption lO)None (See assumption | : 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-015 Flow from RWST to the closed Loss of Unit 1 RWST Loss of Unit 1 RWST valve l-CS-27 CS-016 The remaining portions of the None (See assumption lO)None (See assumption | ||
: 10) RWST cooling unit piping not covered in segment 1 CS-11 (i.e. excluding the section between the RWST and the normally closed isolation valve l-CS-27) Total number of segments for Containment Spray= 16 Emergency Core Cooling ECC-000 ECC-001 ECC-002 ECC-003 ECC-004 From RWST to CV l-SI-410 (to Loss ofRWST outside containment CVCS) to CV l-SI-46B (LPI) and CV l-SI-46A (LPI) Cold leg loop I from CV l-Sl-241 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-235 to CV l-SI-79 Cold leg loop 2 from CV l-SI-242 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-236 to CV l-SI-82 Cold leg loop 3 from CV l-SI-243 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-237 to CV l-SI-85 Hot leg LPI CV l-SI-228 and CV l-SI-229 and HPI l-SI-226 and SI-227 to CV SI-239, SI-238, SI-240 Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of RWST outside containment Loss of injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HHI and LHI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Page 28 of 62 | : 10) RWST cooling unit piping not covered in segment 1 CS-11 (i.e. excluding the section between the RWST and the normally closed isolation valve l-CS-27) Total number of segments for Containment Spray= 16 Emergency Core Cooling ECC-000 ECC-001 ECC-002 ECC-003 ECC-004 From RWST to CV l-SI-410 (to Loss ofRWST outside containment CVCS) to CV l-SI-46B (LPI) and CV l-SI-46A (LPI) Cold leg loop I from CV l-Sl-241 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-235 to CV l-SI-79 Cold leg loop 2 from CV l-SI-242 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-236 to CV l-SI-82 Cold leg loop 3 from CV l-SI-243 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-237 to CV l-SI-85 Hot leg LPI CV l-SI-228 and CV l-SI-229 and HPI l-SI-226 and SI-227 to CV SI-239, SI-238, SI-240 Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of RWST outside containment Loss of injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HHI and LHI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Page 28 of 62 | ||
====l*!:::===--==-=--====== | ====l*!:::===--==-=--====== | ||
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An automatic isolation action) Page 39 of 62 | An automatic isolation action) Page 39 of 62 | ||
=*'========*=====* | =*'========*=====* | ||
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID MS-016 MS-017 MS-018 MS-019 MS-020 MS-021 MS-022 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIA to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIB to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve l-MS-NRV-10IC to the main header MSLB outside containment with blow dmm of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-22-601 with 30 11-SHP-l-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-23-601 with 30 11-SHP-2-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-24-601 with 30 11-SHP-3-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header for the Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump from the pump. (Line break outside containment) (See intersection of header with 30 11-assumption | FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID MS-016 MS-017 MS-018 MS-019 MS-020 MS-021 MS-022 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIA to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIB to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve l-MS-NRV-10IC to the main header MSLB outside containment with blow dmm of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-22-601 with 30 11-SHP-l-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-23-601 with 30 11-SHP-2-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-24-601 with 30 11-SHP-3-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header for the Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump from the pump. (Line break outside containment) (See intersection of header with 30 11-assumption | ||
: 4) SHP-1-601 to l-MS-182 (check valve) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required. | : 4) SHP-1-601 to l-MS-182 (check valve) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required. | ||
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment ( closure of l-MS-TV-10 INB/C is required (An automatic action)) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required. | An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment ( closure of l-MS-TV-10 INB/C is required (An automatic action)) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required. | ||
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ||
: 4) Page 40of 62 | : 4) Page 40of 62 | ||
==1. SEGMENT ID MS-023 MS-024 MS-025 MS-026 MS-027 MS-028 I~===~* FAILURE EFFECT WIT T FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header for the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from the intersection of header with 30"-SHP-2-601 to l-MS-178 (check valve) Loss of one MS supply header to the IDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ==1. SEGMENT ID MS-023 MS-024 MS-025 MS-026 MS-027 MS-028 I~===~* FAILURE EFFECT WIT T FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header for the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from the intersection of header with 30"-SHP-2-601 to l-MS-178 (check valve) Loss of one MS supply header to the IDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ||
: 4) SG 1-RC-E-lC MS header for the Loss ofone MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. TDAFW pump from the (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | : 4) SG 1-RC-E-lC MS header for the Loss ofone MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. TDAFW pump from the (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ||
: 4) intersection of header with 30"-SHP-3-601 to l-MS-176 (check valve) SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102A SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102B SG 1-RC-E-l C MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to check valve 1-MS-NRV-102C MS common header to decay heat removal valve from l-MS-NRV-102AJB/C to the normally closed vlv l-MS-118 Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | : 4) intersection of header with 30"-SHP-3-601 to l-MS-176 (check valve) SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102A SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102B SG 1-RC-E-l C MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to check valve 1-MS-NRV-102C MS common header to decay heat removal valve from l-MS-NRV-102AJB/C to the normally closed vlv l-MS-118 Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
Loss of one MS header to the decay he~t removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | Loss of one MS header to the decay he~t removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ||
: 4) Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | : 4) Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption | ||
: 4) Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | : 4) Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment) | ||
| Line 447: | Line 447: | ||
Loss of steam to the ID AFW pump Page 42 of 62 | Loss of steam to the ID AFW pump Page 42 of 62 | ||
==='*'=====*=====* | ==='*'=====*=====* | ||
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS-033 MS-034 MS-035 MS-036 MS-037 Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from normally closed l-MS-PCV-102A, l-MS-10, l-MS-PCV-102B to l-MS-TV-120, steam trap l-MS-TD-1, l-MS-340 (normally closed), l-MS-342 (normally closed), l-MS-347 (normally closed), l-MS-345 (normally closed), and steam trap l-MS-TD-2 Common MS supply header to the Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from l-MS-TV-120 to Turbine Drive SG 1-RC-E-lA header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS-033 MS-034 MS-035 MS-036 MS-037 Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from normally closed l-MS-PCV-102A, l-MS-10, l-MS-PCV-102B to l-MS-TV-120, steam trap l-MS-TD-1, l-MS-340 (normally closed), l-MS-342 (normally closed), l-MS-347 (normally closed), l-MS-345 (normally closed), and steam trap l-MS-TD-2 Common MS supply header to the Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from l-MS-TV-120 to Turbine Drive SG 1-RC-E-lA header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIA SG 1-RC-E-lB header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | : 1) header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIA SG 1-RC-E-lB header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to 1-MS-RV-IOIB SG 1-RC-E-1 C header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | : 1) header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to 1-MS-RV-IOIB SG 1-RC-E-1 C header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIC MS-038 The remaining portions of the MS MSLB outside containment lines down to 6" diameter pipes Total number of segments for Main Steam= 38 Reactor Coolant RC-001 RC-002 Reactor vessel to Loop 1 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve 1-RC-MOV-1590 Reactor vessel to Loop 2 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1592 Loss of steam to the TD AFW pump Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | : 1) header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIC MS-038 The remaining portions of the MS MSLB outside containment lines down to 6" diameter pipes Total number of segments for Main Steam= 38 Reactor Coolant RC-001 RC-002 Reactor vessel to Loop 1 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve 1-RC-MOV-1590 Reactor vessel to Loop 2 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1592 Loss of steam to the TD AFW pump Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | : 1) MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) I MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | : 1) I MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption | ||
: 1) MSLB outside containment Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Page 43 of 62 | : 1) MSLB outside containment Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Page 43 of 62 | ||
*-* FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION RC-003 Reactor vessel to Loop 3 isolation Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1594 RC-004 From l-RC-MOV-1590 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lA RC-005 From l-RC-MOV-1592 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lB RC-006 From l-RC-MOV-1594 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator l-RC-E-lC RC-007 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lA Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lA RC-008 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lB Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lB RC-009 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lC Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lC RC-010 From RCP 1-RC-P-lA to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1591 I RC-011 From RCP 1-RC-P-lB to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1593 RC-012 From RCP 1-RC-P-l C to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1595 RC-013 From Loop 1 1-RC-MOV-1591 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-014 From Loop 2 1-RC-MOV-1593 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-015 From Loop 3 l-RC-MOV-1595 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-016 SI from CV 1-SI-91 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident 1 hot leg RC-017 SI from CV l-SI-88 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident | *-* FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION RC-003 Reactor vessel to Loop 3 isolation Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1594 RC-004 From l-RC-MOV-1590 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lA RC-005 From l-RC-MOV-1592 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lB RC-006 From l-RC-MOV-1594 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator l-RC-E-lC RC-007 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lA Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lA RC-008 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lB Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lB RC-009 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lC Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lC RC-010 From RCP 1-RC-P-lA to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1591 I RC-011 From RCP 1-RC-P-lB to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1593 RC-012 From RCP 1-RC-P-l C to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1595 RC-013 From Loop 1 1-RC-MOV-1591 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-014 From Loop 2 1-RC-MOV-1593 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-015 From Loop 3 l-RC-MOV-1595 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-016 SI from CV 1-SI-91 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident 1 hot leg RC-017 SI from CV l-SI-88 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident | ||
| Line 469: | Line 469: | ||
NIA None None Page 48 of 62 | NIA None None Page 48 of 62 | ||
=====* =*======= | =====* =*======= | ||
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID RS-009 RS-010 RS-011 RS-012 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path B From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path A All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) Total number of segments for Recirculation Spray = 14 Residual Heat Removal RH-002 RH-003 RH-003A RH-003B RHR suction isolation valves, l -RH-MOV-1700 to l-RH-MOV-1701 RHR suction isolation valve, RH-MOV-1701 through both pumps and both heat exchangers to valves l-RH-29, 1-RH-MOV-1720A and l-RH-MOV-1720B and intersections of the following headers 12"-RH-12-602 vs 2"-RH-3-602, 12"-RH-12-602 vs 3"-RH-14-602 ' 2"-RH-3-60i header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-HCV-1142 3"-RH-14-602 header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-29 OPERA TOR ACTION Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption | FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID RS-009 RS-010 RS-011 RS-012 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path B From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path A All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) Total number of segments for Recirculation Spray = 14 Residual Heat Removal RH-002 RH-003 RH-003A RH-003B RHR suction isolation valves, l -RH-MOV-1700 to l-RH-MOV-1701 RHR suction isolation valve, RH-MOV-1701 through both pumps and both heat exchangers to valves l-RH-29, 1-RH-MOV-1720A and l-RH-MOV-1720B and intersections of the following headers 12"-RH-12-602 vs 2"-RH-3-602, 12"-RH-12-602 vs 3"-RH-14-602 ' 2"-RH-3-60i header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-HCV-1142 3"-RH-14-602 header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-29 OPERA TOR ACTION Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption | ||
: 7) Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption | : 7) Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption | ||
: 7) Loss of path B of IRS Loss of path A of IRS I) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 large LOCA I Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 Large LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of path B of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or 1-RS-MOV-156B is required) | : 7) Loss of path B of IRS Loss of path A of IRS I) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 large LOCA I Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 Large LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of path B of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or 1-RS-MOV-156B is required) | ||
Loss of path A of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or l-RS-MOV-156A is required) | Loss of path A of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or l-RS-MOV-156A is required) | ||
| Line 476: | Line 476: | ||
* 2) Mode 3 small LOCA Page 49 of 62 | * 2) Mode 3 small LOCA Page 49 of 62 | ||
===:j*'============= | ===:j*'============= | ||
=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID RH-008 RH-009 RH-010 RH-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION RHR supply to B hot leg from l -RH-MOV-l 720A to 12"-RC 1502 RHR supply to C hot leg from l -RH-MOV-17208 to 12"-RC 1502 Recirculation line 1 l/2"-RH 602 Containment pentration 24 between l-RH-29 and l-RH-100 Total number of segments for Residual Heat Removal = 8 S/G Blowdown BD-001 8D-002A 1-RC-E-IA to 1-BD-TV-lOOA Containment isolation valve BD-TV-100A to Containment penetration 39 OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-lC | =====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID RH-008 RH-009 RH-010 RH-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION RHR supply to B hot leg from l -RH-MOV-l 720A to 12"-RC 1502 RHR supply to C hot leg from l -RH-MOV-17208 to 12"-RC 1502 Recirculation line 1 l/2"-RH 602 Containment pentration 24 between l-RH-29 and l-RH-100 Total number of segments for Residual Heat Removal = 8 S/G Blowdown BD-001 8D-002A 1-RC-E-IA to 1-BD-TV-lOOA Containment isolation valve BD-TV-100A to Containment penetration 39 OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-lC | ||
: 1) Mode 3 small LOCA 2) Loss of RHR (Function W) per assumption 4 Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences. | : 1) Mode 3 small LOCA 2) Loss of RHR (Function W) per assumption 4 Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences. | ||
Loss of containment boundary if the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | Loss of containment boundary if the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | ||
no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA | no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA | ||
: 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity | : 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA. | : 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA. | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lA.Loss of blowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lA.Loss of blowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | ||
: 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB (Isolation possible with 1-RH-MOV-1720A but not credible due to time limitation) | : 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB (Isolation possible with 1-RH-MOV-1720A but not credible due to time limitation) | ||
I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator I -SI-TK-1 C (Isolation possible with l-RH-MOV-1720B but not credible due to time limitation) | I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator I -SI-TK-1 C (Isolation possible with l-RH-MOV-1720B but not credible due to time limitation) | ||
Loss ofRHR (Function W) (By closing MOV-1720A, 1-RH-MOV-17208, l-RH-MOV-1700) Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences. | Loss ofRHR (Function W) (By closing MOV-1720A, 1-RH-MOV-17208, l-RH-MOV-1700) Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences. | ||
Loss of containment boundary the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Equivalent to steam line break inside containment. | Loss of containment boundary the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Equivalent to steam line break inside containment. | ||
: 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | : 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | ||
: 4) Loss of feedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lA Page 50 of 62 | : 4) Loss of feedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lA Page 50 of 62 | ||
=:l*!======= | =:l*!======= | ||
~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID BD-0028 BD-003 BD-004 BD-005A BD-005B BD-006 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Containment penetration 39 to Containment isolation valve I -BD-TV-1008 Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOB 1-RC-E-IB to 1-BD-TV-IOOC Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOC to Containment penetration 41 Containment penetration 41 to and 1-BD-TV-IOOD Everything beyond the outside containment'isolation valve TV-IOOD OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Loss of containment integrity. | ~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID BD-0028 BD-003 BD-004 BD-005A BD-005B BD-006 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Containment penetration 39 to Containment isolation valve I -BD-TV-1008 Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOB 1-RC-E-IB to 1-BD-TV-IOOC Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOC to Containment penetration 41 Containment penetration 41 to and 1-BD-TV-IOOD Everything beyond the outside containment'isolation valve TV-IOOD OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Loss of containment integrity. | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) 'B' steam generator seconda1y side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) 'B' steam generator seconda1y side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | ||
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lB I) Loss of containment integrity | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lB I) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | : 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | ||
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB 1) Loss of containment integrity | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB 1) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | : 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | ||
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 1) Loss of containment integrity | : 1) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA | : 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA | ||
: 1) 'B' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | : 1) 'B' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. | ||
no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IB | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IB | ||
: 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Page 51 of 62 | : 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Page 51 of 62 | ||
==*!=::====== | ==*!=::====== | ||
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID BD-007 BD-008A BD-008B BD-009 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION 1-RC-E-lC to 1-BD-TV-IOOE Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOE to Containment penetration 40 Containment penetration 40 between 1-BD-TV-IOOE and 1-BD-TV-IOOF Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOF Total number of segments for S/G Blowdown = 12 Safety Injection Accumulators ACC-001 ACC-002 1-SI-TK-lA to l-SI-109, Loop 1 cold leg. 2"-SI-63-602 from 12"-SI 1502 to l-SJq03, l-SI-HCV-1852Aand l-SI-104 OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC | FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID BD-007 BD-008A BD-008B BD-009 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION 1-RC-E-lC to 1-BD-TV-IOOE Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOE to Containment penetration 40 Containment penetration 40 between 1-BD-TV-IOOE and 1-BD-TV-IOOF Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOF Total number of segments for S/G Blowdown = 12 Safety Injection Accumulators ACC-001 ACC-002 1-SI-TK-lA to l-SI-109, Loop 1 cold leg. 2"-SI-63-602 from 12"-SI 1502 to l-SJq03, l-SI-HCV-1852Aand l-SI-104 OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IC | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IC | ||
: 1) Loss of containment integrity | : 1) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC | ||
: 1) Loss of containment integrity | : 1) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC | ||
: 1) Loss of containment integrity | : 1) Loss of containment integrity | ||
: 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | : 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC Loss of one accumulator: | : 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC Loss of one accumulator: | ||
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Loss of one accumulator: | Accumulator injection (Function D2) Loss of one accumulator: | ||
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC | Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC | ||
: 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | : 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC | ||
: 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Page 52 of 62 | : 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Page 52 of 62 | ||
===:l*c:========== | ===:l*c:========== | ||
Revision as of 09:31, 25 April 2019
| ML18151A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1996 |
| From: | BOWLING M L VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | SHERON B W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| 96-284, NUDOCS 9606200036 | |
| Download: ML18151A580 (71) | |
Text
r I -* ---w e
- VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 June 13, 1996 Dr. Brian W. Sheron Division of Engineering, NRA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20005
Dear Dr. Sheron:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 Serial No. NLOS/GDM Docket No. License No. RISK-BASED INSERVICE INSPECTION PILOT PROGRAM 96-284 R1 50-280 DPR-32 In our letter dated April 8, 1996 (Serial No.96-158), we indicated that we would provide technical support to the NRC to facilitate the development of a regulatory guide and participate in a risk-based.
ISi pilot program. We also. provided a schedule for the submittal of certain information to support these efforts. Pursuant to this schedule, the preliminary system scope and piping segment definitions for the Surry Unit 1 risked-based ISi program are provided in the attachments.
Three sets of drawings (Classification Boundary Drawings & Weld/Support Isometrics) are also included for your information and use. If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. E. W. Throckmorton, Supervisor
-ISi/NOE Programs, at 804-273-2125.
Very truly yours, /#-;J,,~7 M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Attachments*
9606200036 960613 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G PDR n 0,. .\ i'\ *1 f:\ ,-* 'I \J _.. n ..... .. \.., f}Otf 1 't,
- cc: (w/o drawings) rDocumeoLGontroLDJ@D U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N. W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. M. W. Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. T. Pietrangelo Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street NW Suite 400 Washington, D. C. 20006-3708 . -.... -.,.-~~ ... ~.-=, .. -,-, .. cc-.. =**,*--z-F'C'**.--.--
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- RISKED-BASED INSERVICE.INSPECTION PILOT PROGRAM REC'D W/LTR DTD 06/13/96 .... 9606200036
-NOTICE -THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE INFORMATION
& RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH. THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUSTBERETURNEDTOTHE.
RECORDS &ARCHIVES SERVICES SECTION, TS C3. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.
.. NOTICE -
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ATTACHMENT 1 Surry Power Station Unit 1 Risk-Based lnservice Inspection (ISi) Pilot Program The preliminary system scope and piping segment definitions for the Surry Unit 1 risked-based ISi pilot program have been developed.
The scope and definitions were determined consistent with the methodology described in WCAP-14572, "Westinghouse Owners Group Application Of Risk-Based Methods To Piping lnservice Inspection Topical Report." The systems and _piping segments to be included in the risked-based ISi program are provided in Attachments 2 and 3, respectively._
This information should be considered as preliminary due to the feedback and iterative processes used for the development of the scope and definitions consistent with the risk-based methodology.
Final system scope and piping segment definitions will be provided in our final program submittal.
System Scope Definition Section 3.2, "Scope Definition," of WCAP-14572 provided the three system selection criteria as follows:
- All Class 1, 2 and 3 systems currently within the ASME Section XI program
- Piping systems modeled in the PSA
- Various balance of plant fluid systems determined to be of importance (consistent with system determinations made for the implementation of the Maintenance Rule) The systems included in the risk-based ISi pilot program were selected based on these criteria.
System Scope Exclusions The systems or portions of systems identified below were evaluated and excluded from system scope consideration in the risk-based ISi pilot program based on the following:
- Instrument Air (Compressed Air) The current Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to be used for the risk-based ISi program was derived from the Surry Individual Plant Examination (IPE) 1 previously submitted to the NRC. In the PSA models, the Instrument Air (IA) system is divided into independent outside and inside containment subsystems.
Loss of inside containment IA will not result in an automatic reactor trip, but could require a manual trip. This would be considered a long term effect and would be categorized by the PSA as a _ 1 --.. -, .. , I
- *
The only important function that would be disabled by a loss of inside containment instrument air is pressurizer spray, however, pressurizer spray is a non-safety-related control function.
The safety-related pressurizer operated relief valves (PORV) are air operated, and have compressed air bottles that serve as a backup to the inside containment IA system. Loss of outside containment IA is functionally equivalent to a loss of Feedwater transient with the addition of loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) supply to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier. The steam generator PORVs are also disabled by this event. Additionally, the loss of outside containment IA, in combination with additional systems, is treated as a contributor to the Loss of RCP Seal C_ooling initiating event (T4). However, the frequencies associated with these events are not significant contributors to the loss of Feedwater or CCW events. The Surry PSA model does not consider the loss of the IA system a significant contributor to total risk, and consequently a fault tree model was not developed to address this condition.
This conclusion was based on the following:
- 1) compressed air bottles are provided for the pressurizer PORVs, and 2) the supply of IA can easily be recovered by re-routing air flow or by using portable air bottles. Further, the ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class. A similar conclusion was reached during implementation of the maintenance rule where certain systems have been included in a functional sense only. For example, the functional requirement of the IA system is to supply air at 90 psig. The performance of individual components within the IA system is not monitored, only the system function is monitored.
Therefore, as long as the failure of an IA component does not cause the loss of the IA system function, it is not considered an IA failure by the maintenance rule. Furthermore, the system is a low pressure system having a design pressure of only 100 psig. The frequency of loss of IA is derived from NUREG/CR-54722.
Our determination that the loss of the IA system is not significant is supported by the conclusions of NUREG/CR-5472 which include the following:
"1. The IA system contribution to the total core melt frequency is generally much lower than that of frontline safety systems, and significantly lower at BWRs than at PWRs. 2. The total risk cannot be significantly reduced by modifications or reliability improvements to the IA system." Also based on the NUREG/CR-5472 findings, problems related to IA have been primarily caused by contamination and human error during operations/maintenance activities, and the effects are more often characterized as misfunctions rather than malfunctions, i.e., the IA system often introduces a problem rather than fails to function . Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the IA system is a low risk, low safety significant system and need not be included in the risk-based ISi pilot program. 2 I
- -~ .. --.-----.,--.~
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~** .* -;* ........ ',* .* * .. **. -.; **: .. *. Fire Protection System The Surry PSA does not take credit for the fire protection system as an accident mitigation system. As a conservatism, the operation of the fire protection system was not credited in the PSA that addresses the effects of fire, and is generally not credited in the Appendix R safe shutdown analyses.
The ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, and the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class. Therefore, the fire--protection system is not considered risk significant.
Certain sections of this system, however, are routed through the Auxiliary Building and have been assessed in the PSA model as having the potential to cause significant damage by causing flooding in the Auxiliary Building.
These sections of the fire protection system which contribute to the internal flooding hazard are potentially risk significant and are included in the risk-based inservice inspection program. These sections of piping will be evaluated as part of the "indirect effects" portion of the methodology.
The remaining piping segments in the system need not be considered.
Containment Penetration Piping The ASME Code currently includes containment penetration piping as safety-class piping, even if the balance of the system is non-safety class. These non-safety class systems were excluded from the pilot project system scope based upon their system non-safety-class designation and their exclusion from the PSA model system scope. Furthermore, the safety-class portion of piping penetrating containment is assured of structural integrity through the separate 10 CFR 50 Appendix J testing program in conjunction with Code pressure testing requirements.
Piping Segment Definition The combination of the piping associated with the current ASME Section XI inservice inspection program and the piping associated with the active components in the PSA model form the basis for inclusion of systems in the risk-based ISi program. Once these systems have been selected, the list is presented to an "expert panel" which consists of personnel who previously served on the Maintenance Rule working group, engineering and ISi personnel.
The expert panel, using knowledge gained from the Maintenance Rule effort, makes the final determination of which systems are included within the scope of the risk-based ISi pilot program, and which systems are excluded.
Once the systems to be included in the program are determined, the systems' piping is divided into defined segments.
A segment is initially defined based on Vie direct consequences of a pipe failure. In general, the section of pipe for which a catastrophic failure would result in the same direct consequence is defined to be a segment. Consequence, as used here, means the impact on a fluid system, and is generally the loss of a system or train of a system. The magnitude of the consequence can later be evaluated by relating the segment to a component in the PSA model. A operated or air-operated valve, or check valve can be credited for isolation of the pipe 3
- .. ,,.__ --~-:~** * .... *. *** **.,*. ~** . . . . .... ,.. . . *. '-* * .. failure, and therefore typically forms one boundary of a segment. The consequences for a segment are also defined with and without operator action. The operator action generally defines whether isolation of the failed pipe section is possible.
The consequence associated with operator action usually determines the pipe segment. As a result, there are typically many segments with the same consequence if no operator action is assumed, but different consequences for assumed operator action. Other aspects of piping systems can also affect segment definition.
Changes in pipe diameter or material properties may define a segment boundary.
Since piping is typically arranged in networks, it is also necessary to address flow splits. In most PSAs, it is assumed that a significant loss of flow due to diversion would not resu_lt from a pipe break that is less than one third the diameter of the main pipe section (NUREG/CR-2815).
However, this assumption has not been adopted for the purposes of pipe segment definition in the risk-based ISi pilot program. Potential flow diversions were considered for lines as small as one inch in diameter if the section of pipe is included in a system that is covered by the program. Attachment 3 provides the initial pipe segment definitions for 17 systems. Surry Unit 1 as-operated piping and instrumentation diagrams were used to define the segments.
Segment names use a system identifier, and segment numbers start at the fluid source and continue through system termination.
Segments are numbered such that parallel train A and train B pipe sections have contiguous numbers whenever possible.
Thus, the segments for each system were defined in a consistent manner. Segment definition is an iterative process concerning the determination of the consequences and the identification of any potential operator recovery actions. Also, the consideration of indirect effects has the potential to refine the segments defined in Attachment
- 3. REFERENCES
- 1. Virginia Electric and Power Company, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Individual Plant Examination, Final Report, Surry Units 1 and 2," August 1991. 2. NUREG/CR-5472, "A Risk-Based Review of Instrument Air Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," January 1990. 3. NUREG/CR 2815, "Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," Revision 0, January 1984 . 4
- ATTACHMENT 2 Preliminary System Selection For Surry Unit 1 System Description IPE Section XI 1 . AFW -Auxiliary Feedwater3 Yes Yes 2. BD -Slowdown (S/G) Yes Yes1 ,2 3. cc -Component Cooling -Yes Yes2 4. CH -Chemical & Volume Control4 Yes Yes2 5. CN -Condensate Yes Yes2. 6. cs -Containment Spray Yes Yes 7. CW -Circulating Water Yes Yes2 8. EE -Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Yes No 9. FC -Fuel Pit Cooling6 No Yes1 10. FW -Feedwater3 Yes Yes2 11 . MS -Main Steam Yes Yes2 12. RC -Reactor Coolant Yes Yes2 13. RH -Residual Heat Removal Yes Yes 14. RS -Recirculation Spray Yes Yes 15. SI -Safety lnjection5 Yes Yes 16. SW -Service Water Yes Yes2 17. VS -Ventilation?
Yes Yes1 ,2 Notes: 1 -System is exempt from current ASME Section XI examination requirements
[i.e., volumetric, surface, visual (VT-3)], but is included for pressure testing. 2 -Portions of this system are not included in the Section XI ISi program. 3 -Surry combines the feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems on the system drawings.
4 -Portions of the chemical & volume control system work in conjunction with high head safety injection.
5 -Includes high head, low head, and the passive accumulator portions of safety injection.
6 -Important during shutdown.
7 -Cooling water to control room HVAC .
- ... -.. -.,. ... -.-._----...-
.. -.----.-.--
-_,,-----~-~--~--. --~.-.,.>*.*.*, ' .. -.~,~-------:--:-*--:-
.,--; -ATTACHMENT 3
- Preliminary Piping Segment Definition For Surry Unit 1 *
=*~====*=====*
Surry Unit 1 Segment Definitions SEGMENT ID Auxiliary Feedwater AFW-001 AFW-002 AFW-003 AFW-004 AFW-005 AFW-006 AFW-007 AFW-008 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION 05-Jun-96 FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to turbine Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 153 driven pump P-2 on turbine driven pump P-2 line From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 168 driven pump P-3A on motor driven pum P-3A line From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 183 driven pump P-3B on motor driven pum P-3B line From manual valve 153 and manual valves 283 and 154 and check valve 144 through turbine driven pump P-2 to CVI42 From manual valve I 68 and manual valves 284 and 169 and check valve 159 through motor driven pump P-3A to CV157 From manual valve 183 and manual valves 285 and 184 and check valve 174 through motor driven pump P-3B to CVl72 Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to turbine Loss of Turbine driven pump P-2 driven pump P-2 Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor driven pump P-3A Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor driven pump P-3B Loss of Motor driven pump P-3A Loss of Motor driven pump P-3B From check valve 142 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and turbine driven pump P-Loss of Turbine driven pump P-2 valves 235, 141, 236, and 140 and 2 train check valve 628 From check valve 157 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and motor driven pump P-Loss of Motor driyen pump P-3A valves 238, 156, 237, and 155 and 3A train check valve 629 Page I of 62
===:*t======*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID AFW-009 AFW-010 AFW-011 AFW-012 AFW-013 AFW-014 AFW-015 AFW-016 AFW-017 AFW-018 AFW-019 AFW-020. SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION From check valve 172 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and motor-driven pump P-valves 240, 171,239, and 170 and 38 train check valve 630 From manual valves 235 and 141, Loss of all aux feed flow 238 and 156, and 240 and 171 and MOV 260A to check valve 138 From manual valves 236 and 140, Loss of all aux feed flow 237 and 155, and 239 and 170 and MOV 2608 to check valve 133 From check valves 628,629, and Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed 630 to manual valve 631 on full flow recirc line From check valve 138 to check valve 136 From check valve 133 to check valve 131 From check valve 136 and check valve 309 to MOVs 151E, 151C and 151A From check valve 131 and check valve 310 to MOVs 151F, 151D, and 151B From MOVs 151F and 151E to check valve 27 From MOVs 151D and 151C to check valve 58 From MOVs 151B and 151A to check valve 89 From check valve 27 and 10 to
- SGlA Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed Loss of Emergenc.*y CST and all aux feed Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including crosstie from other unit) Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including crosstie from other unit) Loss ofEmergency CST and all aux feed (including crosstie from other unit) Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including crosstie from other unit) Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including crosstie from other unit)
- Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IA Loss of Motor driven pump P-3B Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps None Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps (includi/ng crosstie from other unit) ' Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps (including crosstie from other unit) Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three aux feed pumps (including crosstie from other unit) Loss of all aux feed flow to SG IA Loss of all aux feed flow to SG 1B Loss of all aux feed flow to SG l C Feedline break and loss ofaux feed flow to SG IA Page 2 of 62
=*==========*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID AFW-021 AFW-022 AFW-023 AFW-024 AFW-025 AFW-026 AFW-027 AFW-028 AFW-029 AFW-030 AFW-031 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION **:c:c=c.=c=.=================================
From check valve 58 and ..i I to SGlB From check valve 89 and 72 to SGlC From manual valves 279 and 282 to manual valves 283, 284, and 285 From manual valves 280 to manual valves 282 and 294 From manual valve 277 to manual valves 279 and 293 From emergency makeup tank to manual valves 277 and 280 From fire main manual valve 185 to manual valves 154, 169 and 184 and check valves 149, 164, and 179 From MOVs 160A and l60B to check valves 309 and 310 (from opposite unit aux feed system) From Manual valve 150 from conedensate makeup and manual valve 631 and manual valve 276 and manual valves 146 and 609, 161 and 608, and 176 and 607 emergency condensate storage tank Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG 1B Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IC Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three aux feed pumps Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three aux feed pumps Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three aux feed pumps Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three aux feed pumps Loss of fire main connection to all three aux feed pumps Loss of water supply from opposite unit auxiliary feedwater system Loss of makeup from condensate to emergency condensate storage tank and emergency makeup tank From Check valve 144 and 149 to Loss of turbine driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 146 and 609 From Check valve 159 and 164 to Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 161 and 608 Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG 1B Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IC Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three aux feed pumps Loss of emergency makeup tank auxiliary feedwater booster pump P-4B train Loss of emergency makeup tank auxiliary feedwater booster pump P-4A train Loss of emergency makeup tank to all three aux feed pumps Loss of fire main connection to all three aux feed pumps Loss of water supply from opposite unit auxiliary feedwater system Loss of makeup from condensate to emergency condensate storage tank and emergency makeup tank Loss of turbine driven aux feed pump oil cooler Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler Page 3 of 62
====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID AFW-032 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION From Check valve 174 and 179 to Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 176 and 607 Total number of segments for Auxiliary Feedwater
= 32 Chemical and Volume Control CH-001 CH-002 CH-003 CH-004 CH-005 Discharge of VCT between MOV-l l 15C at flow reducer after manual valve l-CH-203, I-CH-204 (Normally closed manual valve), l-CH-173 (check valve), CH-RV-1209 (normally closed) Piping used for CVT level measurement and indication A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is isolated)
N: Loss ofCVT A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is isolated)
N: Loss ofCVT Discharge of CVT between I-CH-A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is MOV-1 l 15C, l-CH-MOV-1 l 15E isolated)
Discharge of CVT between, MOV-l l 15E, l-CH-230 (Check valve), l-CH-MOV-1373, RV-1382B, l-CH-238 (Normally closed manual Valve), 1-CH-239 (Normally closed manual Valve), l-CH-241 (Normally closed manual Valve), l-CH-MOV-1381 To charging pumps suction from RCP seals between Containment and 1-CH-MOV 1381 N:Loss ofCVT A: None If SI signal is generated (MOV-1381, MOV-1 l 15C/E and MOV-1373 will close). IF SI is not generated (e.g. ATWS), check valve 1-CH-230 prevents back flow of water to the damaged section N: Loss ofCVT, loss of Charging injection to RCP seals and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps A: Could result in loss of Unit 1 RWST outside containment.
N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps OPERATOR ACTION Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is isolated)
N: Loss ofCVT A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is isolated)
N: Loss of CVT A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is isolated)
N: Loss of CVT line to charging pumps ( closure of 1-CH-MOV-l1I5C is required)
A: None / N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, loss of Recirc. line for Charging pumps. (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1381, 1-CH-MOV-1 ll5C or I 115D, and MOV-1373 is required)
A: None N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1370 and l-CH-MOV-1381 or closure of 1-CH-HCV-1303NB/C and l-CH-MOV-1381 is required)
Page 4 of 62 SEGMENT ID. CH-006 CH-007 CH-008 CH-009 CH-010 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION To charging pump suction from RCP seals between Containment, l-CH~HCV-l303A, l-CH-HCV-1303B, l-CH-HCV-1303C, HCV-1307 To charging pump suction from RCP seals between, l-CH-HCV-1303A, l-CH-HCV-1303B, HCV-1303C, l-CH-HCV-1307, and RCP Case To RCP seals between pump case for 1-RCP-P-IA check valve CH-324 To RCP seals between pump case for 1-RCP-P-IB check valve l -CH-334 To RCP seals between pump case for 1-RCP-P-IC check valve 1-CH-350 FAILURE EFFECT WITITr=======F=AI=L=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION A: Could also result in loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment.
N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps A: Could also result in loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment.
N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST if the event results in R WST injection via charging pumps. A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST if the event results in RWST injection via charging pumps. A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST if the event results in RWST injection via charging pumps. A: None N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, (Closure of CH-MOV-1370 and l-CH-MOV-1381 or closure of l-CH-HCV-1303A/B/C, 1-CH-HCV-1307 (normally closed) and 1-CH-MOV-1381 is required)
A: None N: Loss of charging for R CP seals A: Small LOCA N: Small LOCA, (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1370 is required)
A: Small LOCA N: Small LOCA, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 is required)
A: Small LOCA N: Small LOCA, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 is required)
Page 5 of 62
=*c::======*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CH-011 CH-012 CH-013 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Seal injection path, between I -CH-324 containment A: Loss of Unit I RWST inside Containment, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: Loss of CVT Seal injection path, between 1-CH-A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment, loss 334 containment of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: Loss of CVT Seal injection path, between 1-CH-A: Loss of Unit l RWST inside Containment, loss 350 containment of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: Loss of CVT Al: If l-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
A2: If 1-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
NI: If l-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required), N2: If l-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of I-CH-MOV-1287 A/B/C is required)
Al: If 1-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of MOV-1370 or I-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
A2: If 1-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Nl: If 1-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required), N2: If I-CH-278 is opeh, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Al: If I-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of MOV-1370 or 1-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
A2: If I-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Nl: If l -CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of MOV-1370 or 1-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
N2: If 1-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Page 6 of 62 SEGMENT ID CH-014 CH-015 CH-016 CH-017 CH-018 CH-019 '==========*==========
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION Seal injection path, between containment l-CH-HCV-1186, normally closed l-CH-278 A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: Loss of CVT Normal seal cooling path, A: Loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, between l-CH-MOV-1370, I-CH-and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect HCV-1186 N: Loss ofCVT Alternate "charging" path between l-CH-FCV-1160 containment Alternate "charging" path between containment, l HCV-l 556A/B/C Normal charging path between CH-MOV-1289B, l-CH-MOV-1289A Normal charging path between CH-MOV-1289A containment A: Small LOCA outside containment N: Small LOCA outside containment A: Small LOCA inside containment N: Small LOCA inside containment Al: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation)
Al: None (if emergency boration is not required)
Al: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation)
Al: If l-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
A2: If l-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of iajection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of MOV-I287A/B/C is required)
NI: If l-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required), N2: If l-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1287 A/B/C is required)
A: None N: Loss of normal path of charging pumps to the RCP seals, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 and CH-HCV-1186, or any other combination that isolates this line, is required)
A: None N: Loss of alternate charging path, (Closure of RC-1556A/B/C is required)
I A: None N: Loss of alternate charging path, (Closure of RC-1556A/B/C is required)
A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss of normal charging path, (Closure of CH-1289B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of CH-I289B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
Page 7 of 62
=*======*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CH-020 CH-021 CH-022 CH-023 CH-024 CH-025 CH-026 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Normal charging path between containment Regen. HEX E-3) Normal charging path between Regen. HEX (l-CH-E-3), HCV-13IOA, l-CH-HCV-1311 Normal charging path between CH-HCV-13 IOA, l-CH-312 (check valve) Normal charging path between CH-HCV-1311, l-CH-313 (check valve) Letdown path between LCV-1460A, 1-CH-LCV-I460B Letdown path between LCV-l 460B! 3x2 Reducer before Regen. HEX Letdown path between 3x2 Reducer before Regen. HEX, Regen. HEX OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION A 1: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation)
Al: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation)
A 1: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation)
A: None (This section is isolated)
Nl: If l-CH-HCV-1311 is open, loss of VCT (and BAT if it is in operation)
N2: If l-CH-HCV-1311 is closed, loss ofVCT/BAT supply to Aux. Spray header A: None (this section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA inside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA inside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Medium LOCA inside Containment A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss of normal charging path, ( closure of CH-1289 A or B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of CH-1289A or B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required)
N: Loss of normal charging path, ( closure of l -CH-1289 A or B *cor any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
A: None 1 N: Loss ofVCT/BAT tb Auxiliary Spray header, (closure of l-CH-I289A or B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A or 1460B is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A or 1460B is required)
Page 8 of 62 FAILURE EFFECdT::::=======F=AIL=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION =--------~--=-=------.
CH-027 CH-028A CH-028B CH-029 CH-030A CH-030B CH-031 CH-032 Letdown path between Regen. HEX and 3x2 Reducer on the discharger of side of the Regen. HEX Letdown path be{ween 3x2 Reducer on the discharger of side of the Regen. HEX, l-CH-RV-1203, l-CH-HCV-1142, TV-1204A Letdown path between l-CH-TV-1204A containment Letdown path between l-CH-RV-1203, 3x4 Reducer between CH and RC designated headers Letdown path between containment, 1-CH-TV-1204B A; None (this section is isolated)
N: Medium LOCA inside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA inside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA inside Containment Al: None (if PRT is not in operation)
A2: Potential Medium LOCA (if PRT is in operation)
N: None (Pressurizer Relief Tank is not in operation)
A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment Letdown path beyween I-CH-TV-A: None (This section is isolated) 1204B, Non-Regen HEX N: Small LOCA outside Containment Letdown path between Regen HEX, l-CH-PCV-1145, CH-164 (Normally closed manual valve) Letdown path between 1-CH-PCV 1145, l-CH-164 (Normally closed manual valve), l-CH-TCV-1143, l-CH-RV-1209 A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A or 1460B is required)
A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A or 1460B is required)
A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of 1-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B or 1204A is required)
Al: None (if PRT is not in operation)
A2: Potential Medium LOCA (if PRT is in operation)
N: None (Pressurizer Relief Tank is not in operation)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, or TV-1204A is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-I204A, or 1204B is required)
A: None N: Loss of letdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, '.fV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
Page 9 of 62
====:j*!=::=====*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CH-033 CH-034 CH-035A CH-035B CH-036 CH-037 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Letdown path between TCV-1143, l-CH-478 (Check valve) Letdown path between l-CH-478 (Check valve), Mixed bed Deminerlizer (lA) l-CH-68, 1-CH-l (Normally closed manual valve) Letdown path between Mixed bed Deminerlizer IA, l-CH-24 (Normally closed manual valve), l-CH-HCV-1244, l-CH-17 (Manually closed valve), l-CH-18 (Manually closed valve), l-CH-55 (Manual closed valve), l-CH-22 (Check valve) Mixed bed Deminerlizer l-CH-1-lB line for letdown path from l -CH-24 (manual closed valve), CH-68 (manual closed valve) Letdown path between HCV-1244, VCT, l-CH-FCV-ll 14B Lines connecting Deborating Deminerlizers to the letdown path (drawing l 1448-FM-088A)
OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this segment after check valve l-CH-478.
Thus, during low power operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment.
Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this segment after check valve l-CH-478.
Thus, during low power operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
A: None (This section is isolated)
Nl: if normally closed valves are not open, none. N2: if normally closed valves are opened, small LOCA outside Containment A: None (This section is isolated)
N: Small LOCA outside Containment Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this segment after check valve l-CH-478.
Thus, during low pmver operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
A: None N 1: If isolation valves are closed, no significant consequence (loss of deborating capability)
N2: If isolation valves are not closed potential LOCA A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, l460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this segment after check valve 1-CH-478.
Thus, during low power operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required).
Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this segment after check valve 1-CH-478.
Thus, during low power operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
A: None Nl: if normally closed valves are not open, none. N2: Loss of letdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, 1204A, or 1204B is required)
A: None N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
A: None NI: If isolation valves are closed no significant consequence (loss of deborating capability)
N2: No significant consequence (loss of deborating capability) (there are many different ways to isolate this path) Page JO of 62
*'=======
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT SEGMENT ID CH-038 CH-039 CH-040 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION Boric Acid supply line between I -A: Loss of emergency boration CH-MOV-1350, l-CH-84, 1-CH-N: Conservatively, loss ofVCT/BAT 88 All other Boric Acid supply lines A: Conservatively, loss of emergency boration N: Conservatively, loss ofCVT/BAT All other piping to VCT A: None (they are isolated)
N: Conservatively, loss of CVT/BAT Total number of segments for Chemical and Volume Control = 43 Circulating Water CW-001 CW-002 CW-003 CW-004 CW-005 CW-006 Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lA to the intake Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lB to the intake Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from l -CW-P-1 C to the intake Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lD to the intake Condenser 1-CN-SC-lA CW supply header from intake structure to the intersection of WC-1-10 with 48"-WS-1-10 i Condenser 1-CN-SC-lA CW supply header from intake structure to the intersection of WC-2-10 with 42"-WS-13-10 Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and 1 C), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header. Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-lOB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps). FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of emergency boration N: None A: None N: None A: None N: None
- Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one train of makeup water from the River I I Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of SW supply header to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and IC) (Closure of 1-SW-IOlB is required)
Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA condenser (Closure of l-SW-MOV-l02A is required)
Page 11 of 62 SEGMENT ID CW-007 CW-008 CW-009 CW-010 CW-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Condenser 1-CN-SC-lB CW supply header from intake structure to the intersection of WC-3-10 with 48;'-WS-2-10 Condenser 1-CN-SC-IB CW supply header from intake structure to the intersection of WC-4-10 with 42"-WS-12-10 Condenser discharge from condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOA Condenser discharge from condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOB Condenser discharge from condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOC FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header. Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-IOB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to lA condenser, loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-IOB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps). (Closure of 1-SW-MOV-102B is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-IB and 1 C), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (l-BC-E-1AIB/C) common suction header. Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control . Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-l OB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps) .Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-* IA condenser (Closure of 1-CW-MOV-106B is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEX~ (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header. FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser, loss of one SW supply header to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and 1 C) (Closure of 1-SW-lOlAis required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106A is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106C is required)
Page 12 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CW-012 CW-013 CW-014 CW-015 CW-016 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Condenser discharge from condenser to 1-CW-MOV-lOOD Condenser discharge from MOV-lOOA to discharge canal Condenser discharge from MOV-lOOB to discharge canal Condenser discharge from MOV-lOOC to discharge canal Condenser discharge from MOV-l OOD ;to discharge canal Total number of segments for Circulating Water= 16 OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lB condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-lOB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to lB condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106D is required)
Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header. Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to SW-P-10B, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps).Loss of one CW supply header to lA condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106B or -lOOB is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lB, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-IA/B/C) common suction header. Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-l OB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to IB condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106D or -lOOD is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106A or -lOOA is required)
Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser (Closure of 1-CW-MOV-I06C or -IOOC is required)
Page 13 of 62 SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION Component Cooling Water CC-OOlA CC-OOlB CC-OOlC CC-002 CC-003 CC-004 CC-005 From CCW Surge Tank to CCW pumps supply header up to the following intersection points:, CC-20-151 and 18"-CC-17-121, 6"-CC-22-151 and 18"-CC 121, 6"-CC-222-151 and 18"-CC-14-121, 6"-CC-22-151 and CC-15-121, ceck valve l-CC-547 Assorted of2" and 1.5" diameter connected to the CCW surge tank From unit 1 and 2 SG blowdown coolers and Condensate system from check valve l-CC-893 and normally closed man. vlv. l-CN-600 to check valve l-CC-547 CCW pumps supply header from intersection point with the following pipes: 18"-CC-17-121, 18"-CC-16-121, 18"-CC-14-121, 18"-CC-15-121, upto the following valves: l-CC-554, CC-560, l-CC-566, l-CC-575 Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units None (no backflow possible and supply header from the CCW system to SG sample coolers too small to cause flow diversion or inventory deletion (See 11448-FM-72C, sht 2, E5) Loss of CCW to both units Supply header to 1-CC-P-IA from Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-554 to the pump Supply headFr to 1-CC-P-lB from Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-560 to the pump Supply header to 1-CC-P-lD from Loss ofCCW to both units manual valve l-CC-566 to the pump FAILUR)l:
EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units None (no backflow possible and supply header from the CCW system to SG sample coolers too small to cause flow diversion or inventory deletion (See 11448-FM-72C, sht 2, E5) Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Page 14 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CC-006 CC-007 CC-008 CC-009 CC-010 CC-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Supply header to l-CC-P-1 C from Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-575 to the pump Discharge header from CCW Loss of CCW to both units pumps IA and 1B from the pumps upto CCW HEX common header 18"-CC-224-121 and normally closed manual valve 1-CC-573 Discharge header from CCW Loss of CCW to both units pumps 1D and 1 C from the pumps upto CCW HEX common header 18"-CC-224-121 and normally closed manual valve l -CC-572 Discharge header of CCW pumps between normally closed manual valves: l-CC-573, l-CC-572, CC-589, l-CC-590, Inlet piping to CCW HEXs IA and 1B from intersection point with I8"-CC-227-I21 and normally closed manual valve l -CC-589 to the body of HEXs. Inlet piping to CCW HEXs 1 C and ID from intersection point with 18"-CC-229-121 and normally closed manual valve l -CC-712 to the body of HEXs. If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss of CCW to both units. Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss of CCW to both units. Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Page 15 of 62 SEGMENT ID CC-012 CC-013 CC-014 CC-015A =====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Discharge header of lA and 1B Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs from the body of HEXs to: normally closed manual valve I-CC-588, normally open manual valve l-CC-606, and intersection with the following pipes: 12"-CC-27-121, 18"-CC-10-121, 18"-CC-8-121 Discharge header of 1 C and lD Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs from the body of HEXs to: normally closed manual valve l-CC-595, normally closed manual valve l-CC-608, normally closed manual valve I-CC-600, normally closed manual valve 2-CC-606 and intersection with the following pipes: 18"-CC-7-121 and 18"-CC-9-121.
Crosstie piping for the outlet of Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs between manual valves: l-CC-558 (normally closed), 1-CC-595 (normally closed), 1-CC-606 (normally open), 2-CC-606 (normally closed) CCW discharge header to Misc. Loss of CCW to both units Boron Evaporator components from intersection of 18"-CC-235-121 and 12"-CC-27-121 to the following:
I~CC-322 (normally closed manual valve), l-BR-TCV-111B, 1-BR-TCV-l llA, I-BR-TCV-109B, 1-BR-TCV-109A Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units I ' Loss of CCW to both units Page 16 of 62 SEGMENT ID CC-015B CC-016A CC-016B CC-017 CC-018A CC-018B CC-019 I'=============*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CCW discharge header to Misc. Loss of CCW to both units Boron Evaporator components from I-BR-TCV-11 IB, I-BR-TCV-11 IA, I-BR-TCV-109B, I-BR-TCV-109A, to 2-CC-369 (normally closed manual valve), 1-CC-TCV-105, intersection of 12"-CC-33-121 with 18"-CC-17-121 Supply line to RHR HEX A from Loss of CCW to both unit the intersection of 24"-CC-235-121 and 18"-CC-8-121 to containment Supply line to RHR HEX A from containment to normally closed manual valve l-CC-178 RHR IA supply and discharge piping from normally closed manual valve l-CC-178 to normally closed manual valve l -CC-181 RHR 1 A HEX discharge piping from normally closed I-CC-181 to Unit 1 containment penetration RHR IA HEX discharge piping from Unit I containment penetration to l-CC-TV-109A RHR IA HEX discharge piping from l-CC-TV-I09A to CCW pumps supply header upto the intersection of the following pipes 18"-CC-16-121 and 18"-CC 121 Loss of CCW to both unit inside of the Unit I containment If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-lA If valves are open, loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both unit inside of the Unit 1 containment If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-lA If valves are open, loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems If manual valve l-CC-181 is closed, loss of E-lA (Closure of I-CC-TV-I09A is required)
If manual valve I-CC-181 is open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment If manual valve I-CC-181 is closed, loss of E-IA (Closure of I-CC-TV-109A is required)
If manual valve I -CC-181 is open, loss ofunit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Page 17 of 62 *., )I SEGMENT ID CC-020A CC-020B CC-020C CC-021 CC-022A CC-022B ~====-=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CCW supply line to RHR 1B Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems HEX from intersection of 24 "-CC-235-l 2 land 18"-CC-10-121 to the intersection of 18 "-CC-I 0-121 line with the following pipes 10"-CC-89-121, 10"-CC-81-121, 14"-CC-67-121 and Unit I Containment Building CCW supply line to RHR lB HEX from Unit 1 Containment Building to l-CC-182 (normally closed manual valve) and the intersection of 18 "-CC-10-121 with 3"-CC-248-151 Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 containment)
CCW for pipe penetration cooling Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 coils from the intersection of 18"-containment)
CC-10-121 with 3"-CC-248-151 to the intersection of 18"-CC 121 with 3"-CC-249-151 RHR lB supply and discharge piping from normally closed manual valve l -CC-182 to normally closed manual valve l -CC-185 RHR lB HEX discharge piping from normally closed l-CC-185 to Unit l containment penetration RHR lB HEX discharge piping from Unit I containment penetration to l-CC-TV-109B If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-IB.
If valves are open, loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 containment)
Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 containment)
I If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-IA.
If valves are open, loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems If manual valve l-CC-185 is closed, loss of E-lB (Closure of l-CC-TV-109B is required).
If manual valve l-CC-185 is open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit l Containment If manual valve l-CC-185 is closed, loss of E-lB (Closure of l-CC-TV-109B is required).
If manual valve l-CC-185 is open, loss of unit l and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment Page 18 of 62
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=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CC-023 CC-024 CC-025 CC-026 CC-027 CC-028 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION RHR 1B HEX discharge piping from l-CC-TV-109B to CCW pumps supply header upto the intersection of 18;'-CC-17-121 with the following pipes 10"-CC-101-121, 6"-CC-85-151, 8"-CC-78-151, 14"-CC-70-121, 8"-CC-314-151, 3" dia. pipe from pipe penetrations cooling coils, CC-19-121.
CCW to IA and 1B RCPs from intersection of 10"-CC-89-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems CCW for the IA RCP from Unit I Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems inside the unit I containment penetration I-PEN-Containment PN-18 to: l-PEN-PN-25 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the I-RC-P-IA RCP), I-CC-TV-120A CCW pipe on the 1-RC-P-IA Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (l-PEN-PN-25) to l-CC-TV-I05A CCW pipe on the INIB/IC RCP Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems discharge path from 1-CC-TV-105 A/B/C to the intersection of 10"-CC-101 7 121 with 18"-CC 121 pipe CCW pipe on the Unit I RCPs Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 thermal barrier discharge paths containment from 1-CC-TV-140A to the Unit I Containment (l-PEN-PN-110)
Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Units I and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to the unit I RCPs ( closure of TV-l 40A and l-CC-TV-140B is required)
Page 19 of 62
====1. SEGMENT ID CC-028A CC-029 CC-030 CC-031 CC-032 CC-033 I!:========*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CCW pipe on the discharge of Unit 1 RCPs from l-CC-TV-120A/B/C (RCP lNlB/lC discharge) to l-CC-TV-140A CCW pipe on the Unit 1 RCPs thermal barrier discharge paths from the Unit 1 Containment ( l -PEN-PN-110) to 1-CC-TV-140B Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 containment CCW for the 1B RCP from the Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Unit 1 containment penetration 1-Containment PEN-PN-17 to: l-PEN-PN-27 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the 1-RC-P-lB RCP), l-CC-TV-l 20B CCW pipe on the 1-RC-P-lB Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (l-PEN-PN-27) to l-CC-TV-105B CCW to the Unit 1 IC RCPs from Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto the Unit 1 Containment and intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 with 8"-CC-75-151 (pipe to reactor containment air recirc. cooler) CCW for the 1 C RCP from the Unit 1 containment penetration PEN-PN-16 to: l-PEN-PN-26 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the 1-RC-P-IC RCP), l-CC-TV-120C Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to the unit I RCPs ( closure of l TV-l 20A, l-CC-TV-120B, l-CC-TV-120C, and CC-TV-140A is required)
Loss of CCW to the unit 1 RCPs ( closure of l TV-l 40A and l-CC-TV-140B is required)
Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I* Containment Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit land 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Page 20 of 62 FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION CC-034 CCW pipe on the l-RC-P-IC Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (1-PEN-PN-26) to l-CC-TV-I05C CC-035 CCW to the Unit I Fuel Pit Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Coolers, Non Regen. HEX and Seal Water HEX from the intersection of 14"-CC-67-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto: the intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 with 3"-CC-39-151, the intersection of 14"-CC-70-121 with 18"-CC-17-121, the intersection of 14"-CC-70-121 with 3"-CC-42-151, 2-CC-403 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-405 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-429 (normally closed manual valve), 2-CC-431 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-740 (normally closed manual valve), 1-CC-1288 (normally closed manual valve) CC-036 CCW to Misc. component from Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems the intersection of3"-CC-39-151 with 14"-CC-67-121 to the intersection of 3"-CC-42-151 with 14"-CC-70-121 FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss on Unit I and 2 CCW systems Page 21 of 62 SEGMENT ID CC-037 CC-038 CC-039 CC-040 CC-041 t:==::=====*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION CCW to Excess Letdown HEX, Primary Drain Cooler, RHR pumps seal cooler.s and other Misc. components from the intersection of supply header ( 6 CC-105-151) with 18"-CC 121 to the intersection of discharge header (6"-CC-207-151) with 18"-CC-17-121 including the following normally closed manual valves: l-CC-122, l-CC-118, l-CC-116, l-CC-112.
CCW to 1-RH-P-lA seal cooler between the following normally closed manual valves l-CC-122, l-CC-118 CCW to 1-RH-P-lB seal cooler between the following normally closed manual valves 1-CC-116, 1-CC-112 CCW to Unit l reactor containment air recirc. cooler from the intersection of8"-CC 151 with 10"-CC-81-121 to TV-IOIA CCW for Unit 1 reactor containment air recirc. cooler from 1-CC-TV-lOlA to: Unit I ' Containment penetrations PN-9 and l-PEN-PN-11), SOV-102A (normally closed) OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of 1-RH-P-lA (Note that even if valves are open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this segment will not disable the CCW system (See assumption 1)) Loss of 1-RH-P-lB (Note that even if valves are open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this segment will not disable the CCW system (See assumption 1)) Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of 1-RH-P-lA (Note that even if valves are open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this segment will not disable the CCW system (See assumption 1)) Loss of 1-RH-P-IB (Note that even if valves are open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this segment will not disable the CCW system (See assumption 1)) i Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOIA and HCV-101B is required)
Page 22 of 62
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'======* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CC-042 CC-043 CC-044 CC-045 CC-046 CC-047 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION CCW for Unit 1 reactor containment air recirc. cooler I -VS-E-2A from Containment penetrations l-PEN-PN-11 to penetration l -PEN-PN-14 CCW for Unit 1 reactor containment air recirc. cooler l -VS-E-2B from Containment penetrations l -PEN-PN-10 to penetration l-PEN-PN-12 CCW for Unit 1 reactor containment air recirc. cooler l -VS-E-2C from Containment penetrations l-PEN-PN-13 to penetration l-PEN-PN-09 CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler (1-NS-E-lA) from the intersection of 2" -CC-106-151 with 6"-CC-78-151 to l 12A CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler 1-NS-E-lA from FCV-112A to l-CC-112B, normally closed man. vlv l-CC-884, normally closed man. vlv CC-935 CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler 1-NS*E-lA from normally closed man. vlv l-CC-884, normally closed man. vlv l-CC-935, to normally closed man. vlv l-CC-885, normally closed man. vlv l -CC-936 OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment OPERATOR ACTION Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-llOA is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOIA and HCV-lOIB (or 1-CC-TV-llOB is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOlA and HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOC is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and HCV-101B ( or l-CC-TV-1 lOA is required)
Loss ofCCW to 1-NS-E-lA (closure of l-CC-FCV-112A and l -CC-l l 2B is required)
If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss ofCCW to 1-NS-E-IA (closure of l-CC-FCV-112A and l-CC-112B is required)
Page 23 of 62 SEGMENT ID CC-048 CC-049 CC-050 CC-051 CC-052 CC-053 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Discharge of CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler E-1 A from l-CC-FCV-l 12B to the intersection of 2 "-CC-111-151 with 6"-CC-78-151 CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally closed man. vlv l-CC-885, normally closed man. vlv l-CC-936, to Normally closed FCV-l 13A, Normally closed CC-113B CCW for the neutron shield tank cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally closed 1~cc-FCV-l 13A to the intersection of 2"-CC-312-151 with 6"-CC-80-151 FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Containment If all valves are closed, none. If l-CC-FCV-l 13A/B are open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems CCW for the neutron shield tank Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally closed l-CC-FCV-113B to the intersection of 2"-CC-313-151 with 6"-CC-80-151 Discharge of CCW for Unit I reactor containment air recirc. coolers and neutron shield tank coolers from Containment penetration seals l-PEN-PN-13, 12 14 to 1-CC-HCV-lOlB I-CC-' ; ' HCV-102B (normally closed) Discharge of CCW for Unit 1 reactor containment air recirc. coolers and neutron shield tank coolers from l -CC-HCV-101B and the intersection of 8 11-CC-78-151 and 18"-CC-17-121 Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOA) is required)
If all valves are closed, none. If l-CC-FCV-l 13A/B are open, loss of CCW to 1-NS-E-lB (closure of l-CC-FCV-l 13A/B is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOIA and HCV-lOlB (or l-CC-TV-1 lOC) is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CG-HCV-lOlA and HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOC) is required)
Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and HCV-lOlB is required)
Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Page 24 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION CC-054 CC-055 CC-056 CCW to Instrument Air Compressor HEXs from the intersection of l.5"-CC-501-151 with 8"-CC-75-151 upto the HEXs Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Discharge path of CCW to Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Instrument Air Compressor HEXs from HEXs to the intersection of 1.5"-CC-506-151 with 8"-CC-78-151 CCW for Misc. Boron Stripper Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems subcomponents from the intersection of8"-CC-32-I51 with 18"-CC-235-121 to: the intersection of 8 "-CC-314-15 I with 18"-CC-17-121, l-CC-632 (normally closed man. vlv), l-CC-625 (normally closed man. vlv), 2-CC-635 (normally closed man. vlv), 2-CC-635 (normally closed man. vlv) Total number of segments for Component Cooling Water= 65 Condensate CN-001 CN-002 CN-003 CN-004 From condenser hotwell to 1-CN-Loss of 1-CN-P-lA P-lA pump discharge check valve l-CN-62 From condenser hotwell to 1-CN-Loss of 1-CN-P-IB P-IB pump discharge check valve l-CN-50 ' From condenser hotwell to 1-CN-Loss of 1-CN-P-lC P-1 C pump discharge check valve 1-CN-38 Discharge header for the Loss of condensate system condensate pul!lps Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Depending on the location of the break, may be able to isolate the pump. Depending on the location of the break, may be able to isolate the pump. Depending on the location of the break, may be able to isolate the pump. Loss of condensate system Page 25 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CN-005 CN-006 CN-007 CN-008 CN-009 CN-010 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERA TOR ACTION Balance of the condensate system Loss of condensate system I 1/2 to exhaust hood spray Not in operation except during turbine startup evolutions or light turbine loading. Level control valves 1-CN-LCV-Loss of condensate makeup and eventual loss of 102A,B to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA condensate.
Emergency condensate storage tank to Emergency condensate make-up tank and I-CN-150 Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate storage tank. Condensate storage tank supply to Loss of condensate makeup and eventual loss of emergency condensate storage condensate.
tank to l-CN-150 l-CN-TK.-3 to valves at suction of Loss of emergency supply of AFW through the AFW pumps(l-FW-283, 1-FW-booster pumps 284, and l-FW-285)
Total number of segments for Condensate
= 10 Containment Spray CS-001 CS-002 CS-003 RWST flow to CS pump 1B from Loss of Unit 1 RWST outside Containment Tank to: 1-CS-MOV-lOOB RWST flow to CS pump IA from Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Tank to: 1-CS-MOV-lOOA RWST flow to Containment Spray pump 1B from lOOB to normally closed manual valve l-CS-15, 1-CS-MOV-IOIC (normally closed), l-CS-MOV-10 ID (normally closed) Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss ofLHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. (Function Hl))Loss of Train B of Unit I CS (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOB is required)
OPERATOR ACTION Depending on the location of the break, can lose the condensate system or one train. Bypass can be used. Depending on the location of the beak 1) Downstream of l-CN-LCV-102A loss of low volume makeup 2) Downstream of l-CN-LCV-102B loss oflow volume makeup Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate storage tank. Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate storage tank. Loss of emergency supply of AFW through the booster pumps Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Page 26 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT =====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID CS-004 CS-005 CS-006 CS-007 CS-008 CS-009 CS-010 CS-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION RWST flow to Containment Spray pump IA from IOOA to normally closed manual valve I-CS-8, 1-CS-MOV-lOlA (normally closed), IOIB (normally closed) R WST flow to Containment Spray pump 1B from: 1-CS-MOV-101 C (normally closed), MOV-lOID (normally closed) to: Containment Penetration R WST flow to Containment Spray pump IA from IOlA (normally closed), MOV-IOIB (normally closed) to: Containment Penetration Flow to spray nozzles from penetration seal to check valve CS-127 Flow to spray nozzles from penetration seal to check valve l -CS-105 CS flow to spray nozzles between check valve 1-CS-127 and l -CS-105 CS flow test lines between normally closed manual valves 1-CS-8/ l 5 and manual, normally closed manual valve 1-CS-18. CS flow test lines between normally closed manual valves CS-18 and the RWST tank. OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss of LHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. (Function HI)) Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss of LHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. (Function HI)) Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss ofLHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. (Function Hl)) Loss of Unit 1 RWST water to (See assumption 3): LHSI (function D3), CS Loss of Unit I RWST water to (See assumption 3): LHSI (function D3), CS Loss of Unit I RWST water supply to LHSI (function D3) CS Loss of.Unit 1 RWST Loss of CS lOOA/B must be closed) None (See assumption/assertion No. 8)None (See assumption/assertion No. 8) OPERATOR ACTION Loss of Train A of Unit I CS (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA is required)
Loss of Train B of Unit I CS (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-IOOB is required)
Loss of Train A of Unit l CS (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA is required)
Loss of Unit I CS, Train B (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOB or 1-CS-MOV-IOlC/D is required)
Loss of Unit I CS, Train A (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA or 1-CS-MOV-lOlA/B is required)
Loss ofCS(Operator action to close lOOA/B or 1-CS-MOV-IOIA/B/C/D is required)
Page 27 of 62
=* I~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION CS-012 Flow from Refueling Water None (See assumption 6)None (See assumption
- 6) Chemical Addition Tank CS-013 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption
- 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-014 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption
- 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153) CS-015 Flow from RWST to the closed Loss of Unit 1 RWST Loss of Unit 1 RWST valve l-CS-27 CS-016 The remaining portions of the None (See assumption lO)None (See assumption
- 10) RWST cooling unit piping not covered in segment 1 CS-11 (i.e. excluding the section between the RWST and the normally closed isolation valve l-CS-27) Total number of segments for Containment Spray= 16 Emergency Core Cooling ECC-000 ECC-001 ECC-002 ECC-003 ECC-004 From RWST to CV l-SI-410 (to Loss ofRWST outside containment CVCS) to CV l-SI-46B (LPI) and CV l-SI-46A (LPI) Cold leg loop I from CV l-Sl-241 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-235 to CV l-SI-79 Cold leg loop 2 from CV l-SI-242 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-236 to CV l-SI-82 Cold leg loop 3 from CV l-SI-243 Loss ofRWST inside containment and CV l-SI-237 to CV l-SI-85 Hot leg LPI CV l-SI-228 and CV l-SI-229 and HPI l-SI-226 and SI-227 to CV SI-239, SI-238, SI-240 Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of RWST outside containment Loss of injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HHI and LHI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg from HPI and LPI Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Page 28 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID ECC-005 ECC-006 ECC-007 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Hot leg loop I CV Sl-239 to CV SI-91 Hot leg loop 2 CV SI-238 to CV SI-88 Hot leg loop 3 CV SI-240 to CV SI-94 Total number of segments for Emergency Core Cooling= 8 Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil EE-001 EE-002 5,000 barrel tank to 20,000 gal. tank including recirc. 20,000 gal. tank, l-EE-TK-2A, to valve l-EE-1, the ready fuel pumps and the 500 gal aux fuel oil tanks OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B None. The underground tanks together provide a seven day supply of fuel oil. None. The ready fuel oil supply train is lost but the standby train starts automatically.
EE-003 20,000 gal. tank, 1-EE-TK-2B, to None. The standby fuel oil supply train is lost but stand by fuel pumps to 500 gal. the ready train starts automatically.
EE-004 EE-007-1, -2, -3 tanks Cross connect between lA and lB, bypass for underground tanks. Injector header EE-5-lA,B, 2A,B, 3A 500 gal. tanks to base tanks. EE-6-IA,B, 2A,B, 3A Base tank to injector header, 'A' pump motor driven (secondary source), 'B' pump engine driven (primary source) No consequences.
Normally isolated.
If in use, the underground tanks would would still be available based on the hydraulics Loss of one diesel generator None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG but the opposite pump will supply base tank when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S).
None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG but the opposite train will supply base tank when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S). SPS-EG refers to the de Motor-Driven pump as a backup on page 3-9) Total number of segments for Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil = 7 Feedwater System FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation from LPI and HPI Trains A and B None. The underground tanks together provide a seven day supply of fuel oil. None. The ready fuel oil supply train is lost but the standby train starts automatically.
None. The standby fuel oil supply train is lost but the ready train starts automatically.
I ' None if manual valves are closed. Othenvise, backup fuel supply limited to one underground tank. Loss of one diesel generator.
None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG but the opposite pump will supply base tank when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S).
None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG but the opposite train will supply base tank when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S).
Page 29 of 62 SEGMENT ID FW-001 FW-002 FW-003 FW-004 FW-005 FW-006 FW-007 FW-008 FW-009 FW-010 FW-011 I t=:====~*~
FAILURE EFFECT WIT UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION From Feedwater Heaters to 18 X Loss of Main Feedwater 24 reducer. 24" Feedwater supply line upto Loss ofMFW 18" supply hearders to the FW pumps (includes header from HP FW heater drain pumps) 18" header to FW pump B Loss of MFW between 24" header l-FW-112 18" header to MFW pump A Loss of MFW between 24" header l-FW-127 (check valve) 14" recirc. header to Condenser Loss ofMFW Feedwater Pump A discharger Loss of MFW header between l-FW-127 (check valve) l-FW-MOV-150A Feedwater Pump B discharger Loss ofMFW header between l-FW-112 (check valve) l-FW-MOV-150B Feedwater header from 1-FW-Loss ofMFW MOV-150A, l-FW-MOV-150B up to I-FW-MOV-154A, l-FW-MOV-154C, l-FW-MOV-154B Feedwater header to SG A from 1-Loss ofMFW FW-MOV-154A to 1-FW-FCV-1478 Feedwater header to SG C from 1-Loss ofMFW FW-MOV-154C to l-FW-FCV-1498 Feedwater header to SG B from 1-Loss ofMFW FW-MOV-154B to l-FW-FCV-1488 Loss of Main Feedwater Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW pump A (closure of l-FW-MOV-150A is required)
Loss ofMFW pump B (closure of l-FW-MOV-150A is required)
Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of FW-MOV-154A is required)
Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of FW-MOV-154C is required)
Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator B (closure of FW-MOV-154B is required)
Page 30 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION FW-012 FW-013 FW-014 FW-015 FW-016 FW-017 FW-018 FW-019 FW-020 Feedwater header to SG A from I-Loss ofMFW FW-FCV-1478 to l-FW-12 (check valve) Feedwater header to SG A from 1-Loss ofMFW FW-FCV-1498 tci l-FW-74 (check valve) Feedwater header to SG A from 1-Loss ofMFW FW-FCV-1488 to l-FW-43 (check valve) Feedwater header to SG A from from l-FW-12 (check valve) to FW-10 (check valve) Feedwater header to SG C from from l-FW-74 (check valve) to 1-FW-72 ( check valve) Feedwater header to SG A from from l-FW-43 (check valve) to 1-FW-41 (check valve) Feedwater header to SG A from from l-FW-10 (check valve) to SGIA Feedwater header to SG C from from l-FW-72 (check valve) to SGlC Feedwater header to SG B from from l-FW-41 (check valve) to SG 1B Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW Loss of AFW. Loss of AFW to SG IA (Orifice in th eAFW line will prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the other two SGs) Loss of MFW Loss of AFW Loss of AFW to SG lB (Orifice in th eAFW line will prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the other two SGs) Loss of MFW Loss of AFW Loss of AFW to SG IA (Orifice in th eAFW line will prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the other two SGs) Total number of segments for Feedwater System = 20 High Head Safety Injection Loss of MFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of l -FW-MOV-I 54A is required)
Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of FW-MOV-154C is required)
Loss of MFW to Steam Generator B (Closure of l -FW-MOV-I 54B is required)
Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of FW-MOV-154A is required)
Loss of MFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of FW-MOV-154C is required)
Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator B (Closure of FW-MOV-154B is required)
I I Loss ofMFW and AFW to SG A (closure of MOV154A, I-FW-MOV-151E, and l-FW-MOV-151F is required)
Loss of MFW and AFW to SG C ( closure of MOVl 54C, I-FW-MOV-151A, and l-FW-MOV-151B is required)
Loss ofMFW and AFW to SG B (closure of MOVl54B, I-FW-MOV-151C, and 1-FW-MOV-. 15 ID is required)
Page 31 of 62
=* SEGMENT ID HHI-001 HHI-002 HHI-003 HHI-004A HHI-004B HHI-004C SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From RWST to suction of charging pumps, between: check valve l-SI-410 and check valve SI-25 Form RWST to suction of charging pumps, between check valve l-SI-25, l-SI-TV-102A, S1-TV-102B, 1-CH-MOV-115D, l-CH-MOV-l 15B From R WST to suction of charging pumps, between: MOV-l 15D, I-CH-MOV-l 15B, CH-MOV-1267A, 1-CH-MOV-1269A, I-CH-MOV-1270A, MOV-1863B, check valve I-CH-227, check valve 1-CH-230 From RWST to charging pump A (feed and discharge), between: 1-CH-MOV-1267A, I-CH-MOV-1267B, I-CH-256 (check valve), I-CH-258 (check valve) Discharge of charging pump A, between: I-CH-256 (check valve), 1-CH-MOV~1275A Discharge of charging pump A, between:I-CH-258 (check valve), I-CH-MOV-1286A, I-CH-MOV-1287A I===========*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of Unit I RWST. N: None A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps N: During normal operation this section of the piping is isolated from the main supply header to the Charging pumps thus its rupture will not impact the CVT supply to the charging pumps . A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pump A A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of Unit 2 Charging pumps cross connect to Unit I. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps A: Loss of Unit I RWST N: None A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit I HHSI (charging) pumps N: During normal operation this section of the piping is isolated from the main supply header to the Charging pumps thus its rupture will not impact the CVT supply to the charging pumps A: Loss of preferred path of Unit I and 2 RWST supply line to the Charging pumps and loss of one of the two low head safety injection supply lines to the charging pumps. (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
I-CH-MOV-115D, CH-MOV-115B; 1-CH-MOV-1267A, 1-CH-MOV-1269A, 1-CH-MOV-1270A, 1-SI-MOV-1863B)
N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps (No operator action can1reduce the direct impact of this scenario during normal at power operation)
A: Loss of Charging pump A. N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:l-CH-MOV-1267A, I-CH-MOV-1267B)
A: Loss of Charging pump A. N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:I-CH-MOV-1267A, I-CH-MOV-1267B, 1-CH-MOV-1275A)
A: Loss of Charging pump A. N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the following valves is required:
I-CH-MOV-1267 A, I-CH-MOV-1267B, I-CH-MOV-1286A, MOV-1287A) . Page 32 of 62 SEGMENT ID HHl-005A HHl-005B HHl-005C HHI-006A HHI-006B HHI-006C HHI-007 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From RWST to charging pump B (feed and discharge), between: CH-MOV-1269A, l269B, l-CH-267 (check valve), l-CH-265 (check valve) FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps Discharge of charging pump B, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST between: l-CH-265 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 charging pumps. l-CH-MOV-1275B N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps Discharge of charging pump B, between: l-CH-267 (check valve), l-CH-MOV-1286B, l-CH-MOV-1287B From RWST to charging pump C (feed and discharge), between: CH-MOV-1270A, l270B, l-CH-276 (check valve), l-CH-274 (check valve) A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of Unit 2 Charging pumps cross connect to Unit 1. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps Discharge of charging pump C, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST between: l-CH-274 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 charging pumps. l-CH-MOV-1275C N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps Discharge of charging pump C, between: l-CH-276 (check valve), l-CH-MOV-1286C, l-CH-MOV-1287C, l-CH-728 (normally closed man. 'vlv) A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect to Unit 1. N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps To Recirc/Seal Water between 1-A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST CH-MOV-1275C, 1-CH-MOV-cross connect to Unit 1 1275B, l-CH-MOV-1275A, I-CH-N: Loss ofCVT and BAT MOV-1373 FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of Charging pump B. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
l-CH-MOV-1269A, l-CH-MOV-1269B)
A: Loss of Charging pump B. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
l-CH-MOV-1269A, l-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-1275B)
A: Loss of Charging pump B. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the following valves is required:
l-CH-MOV-l269A, l-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-l286B, MOV-1287B)
A: Loss of charging pump C. N: Loss of charging pump C Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
1-CH-MOV-1270A, 1-CH-MOV-1270B)
A: Loss of Charging pump B. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
l-CH-MOV-1269A, 1-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-l275B)
A: Loss of charging pump B. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the following valves is required:
I-CH-MOV-1270A, l-CH-MOV-1270B, I-CH-MOV-1286C, MOV-1287C)
A: Loss of Recirc. for Charging pumps N: Loss ofRecirc.
for Charging pumps (thus loss of charging pumps) (Closure of the following valves is required MOV-1275C, l-CH-MOV-1275B, l275A, l-CH-MOV-1373)
Page 33 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID HHI-008 HHI-009 HHI-010 HHI-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION To Normal Charging/Injection to A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST Cold and Hot Legs/Seal between: cross connect to Unit I, and loss of Unit 2 charging l-CH-MOV-1286A, 1-CH-MOV-pumps cross connect. 1286B, I-CH-MdV-1286C, 1-CH-N: Loss ofCVT and BAT MOV-1867C, l-CH-MOV-1867D, l-CH-MOV-1289A, l-CH-MOV-1869B, l-CH-MOV-1370 To Alternate Charging/Injection A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST to Cold and Hot Legs/Seal cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging Injection between: 1-CH-MOV-pumps cross connect. 1287A, l-CH-MOV-1287B, 1-CH-N: Loss ofCVT and BAT MOV-1287C, l-CH-FCV-1160, l-CH-MOV-1842, l-CH-MOV-1869A, l-CH-278 (Normally closed valve providing an alternate path for seal cooling) To normal injection paths to Cold A: Loss of Unit I RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST legs between l-CH-MOV-1867D, cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging l-CH-MOV-1867C, Containment pumps cross connect To normal injection paths to Cold legs between Containment, l-SI-225 (Check valve) N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
A: Loss of Unit l RWST inside containment, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION A: Loss of normal paths for HHSI and seal cooling. N: Loss of normal path of Charging and seal cooling (Closure of the following valves is required:
l-CH-MOV-1286A, l-CH-MOV-1286B, l-CH-MOV-1286C, l-CH-MOV-1370)
Al: When l-CH-278 is closed; loss of alternate paths for HHSI and seal cooling (Closure of the following valves is required l-CH-MOV-1287 A, l -CH-MOV-1287B, l-CH-MOV-1287C)
A2: When l-CH-278 is open; loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect Nl: When l-CH-278 is closed; loss of alternate Charging path and seal cooling path via Charging pumps (Closure of the following valves is required l-CH-MOV-1287A l-CH-MOV-1287B l-CH-MOV-1287C)
' / ' N2: When l-CH-278 is open; loss CVT and BAT (loss of all charging and charging pump supply to the RCP seals) A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to cold legs. (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1867C/D is required)
N: None (isolation valves are closed) A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to cold legs. (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1867C/D is required)
N: None (isolation valves are closed) Page 34 of 62 SEGMENT ID HHl-012 HHI-013 HHI-014 HHI-015 HHI-016 HHI-017 HHI-018 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION To Cold legs between l-SI-225 (check valve), l-SI-224 (check valve), l-SI-235 (check valve), SI-236 (check valve), l-SI-237 (check valve) Alternate injection path to Cold legs between l-CH-MOV-1842, Containment Alternate injection path to Cold legs between Containment l-SI-224 (Check valve) Normal injection path to hot legs between l-CH-MOV-l869B, Containment Normal injection path to hot legs between Containment, l-CH-226 Alternate injectinopath to hot legs from l-CH-MOV-1869A to Containment Alternate injectinopath to hot legs from Containment to check valve l-CH-227 FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of Unit 1 R WST inside containment, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect. N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST inside containment, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is open, loss of containment sump inventory.
A2: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is closed, none. N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is open, loss of normal path of HHSI to hot legs. Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is closed, none. N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
Al: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is open, loss of containment sump inventory A2: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is closed, none N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
Al: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is open, loss of alternate path of HHSI to hot legs A2: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is closed, none N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION A: Loss of all HHSI to cold leg. (Closure of MOV-1867C/D is required)
N: None (isolation valves are closed) A: Loss of alternate path of HHSI to cold legs (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1842 is required}
N: None (isolation valves are closed) A: Loss of alternate path of HHSI to cold legs (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1842 is required)
N: None (isolation valves are closed) A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to hot legs (closure ofMOV-1869B is required)
N: None (during normal operation this line is isolated)
A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to hot legs (closure ofMOV-1869B is required)
N: None (during normal operation this line is isolated)
A: Loss of alternate pathof HHSI to hot legs (closure ofMOV-1869A is required)
N: None (during nornial operation this line is isolated)
A: Loss of alternate pathof HHSI to hot legs (closure ofMOV-1869A is required)
N: None (during normal operation this line is isolated)
Page 35 of 62
1*!:===
=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Total number of segments for High Head Safety Injection
= 24 Low Head Safety Injection LHI-001 LHI-002 LHI-003 LHI-004 LHI-005 LHI-006 LHI-007 LHI-008 LHI-009 LHI-010 From CV l-SI-46B to CV l-SI-47 Loss ofRWST outside containment (from sump) to CV l-SI-50 (pump discharge)
From CV l-SI-46A to CV l-SI-56 Loss ofRWST outside containment (from sump) to CV l-SI-58 (pump discharge)
Containment sump to MOV Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train B 1860B Containment sump to MOV Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train A 1860A Containment sump MOV 1860B Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train B to CV SI-47 Containment sump MOV 1860A Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train A to CV SI-57 Train BCV SI-50 to HPI suction Loss ofRWST outside containment SI-MOV-1863B, RWST recirc CV SI-53, Hot leg inject SI-MOV-1890B and Cold leg inject MOV-1864B Train A CV Sl-58 to HPI suction Loss ofRWST outside containment S1-MOV-1863A, RWST recirc CV Sl-61, Hot leg inject SI-MOV-1890A and Cold leg inject SI-MOV-1864.A Cold leg inject from SI-MOV-Loss ofRWST outside containment 1864A and SI-MOV-1864B to SI-MOV-1890C Cold leg injection from SI-MOV-Loss of RWST outside containment 1890C to CV SI-241, SI-242, and . SI-243 Loss ofLPI Train B (close MOV1862B)
Loss ofLPI Train A (close MOVI862A)
Loss of Recirc from LPI Train B Loss of Recirc from LPI Train A Loss of Recirc from LPI Train B Loss of Recirc from LPI Train A Loss of LPI Train B and HPI from Train B Loss of LPI Train A and Recirc for both LPI & HPI Loss of both trains of LPI injection to cold legs Loss of both trains of LPI injection to cold legs Page 36 of 62
l*t======*==
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION LHI-011 LHI-012 LHI-013 LHI-014 LHI-015 LHI-016 LHI-017 Hot leg MOY 1890B to CV 228 Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train B Hot leg MOY 1890A to CV 229 Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train A Recirc to R WST from Train B Loss of R WST outside containment from CV SI-53 to SI-MOV-1885B Recirc to RWST from Train A Loss ofRWST outside containment from CV SI-61 to SI-MOV-1885A Recirc to RWST from Train B Loss ofRWST outside containment from SI-MOV-1885B to SI-MOV-1885C Recirc to RWST from Train A Loss ofRWST outside containment from SI-MOV-1885A to SI-MOV-1885D Recirc to RWST from Trains A Loss ofRWST outside containment and B from SI-MOV-1885C and SI-MOV-1885D to RWST Total number of segments for Low Head Safety Injection=
17 Main Steam MS-001 MS-002 MS-003 From SG 1-RC-E-IA to containment penetration PN-73 From SG 1-RC-E-IB to containment penetration PN-74 From SG l -RC-E-1 C to containment penetration PN-75 MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train B Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train A Loss of LPI Train B Loss of LPI Train A Loss ofRWST recirc on LPI Train B Loss of R WST on recirc on LPI Train B Loss ofRWST recirc on LPI Trains A and B MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW ( closure of l -MS-NRV-10 IB is required)
MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW Page 37 of 62
=1*1=======~
FAILURE EFFECT WITH '========*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID MS-004 MS-005 MS-006 MS-007 MS-008 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Steam line from containment penetration to MS trip valve l -MS-TV-101 A including the intersection of 30"-SHP-1-601 with the following:
4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-22-601, 6"-SHP 601 Steam line from containment penetration to MS trip valve MS-TV-10 IB including the intersection of 30"-SHP-2-601 with the following:
4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-23-601, 6"-SHP 601 Steam line from containment penetration to MS trip valve MS-TV-10 IC including the intersection of30"-SHP-3-601 with the following:
4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-24-601, 6"-SHP 601 Steam line from MS trip valve l -MS-TV-10 lA to the MS return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOlA including the intersection of SHP-1-601 with 6"-SHP-45-601 Steam line from MS trip valve MS-TV-10 lB to the MS return valve 1 1-MS-NRV-lOlB including the intersection of SHP-2-601 with 6"-SHP-46-601 OPERATOR ACTION MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOlA is not automatically tripped) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header 'to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOlB is not automatically tripped) OPERATOR ACTION MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment (closure of l-MS-TV-10 IA is required.
This is an automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment (closure of l-MS-TV-101B is required.
This is an automatic isolation action) Page 38 of 62
=* SEGMENT ID MS-009 MS-010 MS-011 MS-012 MS-013 MS-014 MS-015 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Steam line from MS trip valve l -MS-TV-101 C to the MS return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOlC including the intersection of SHP-3-601 with 6"-SHP-47-601 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlA bypass line from the intersection of6"-MS-45-601 with 30"-MS-1-601 up to normally closed manual valve l -MS-84 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlB bypass line from the intersection of 6"-MS-46-601 with 30"-MS-2-601 up to normally closed manual valve l-MS-116 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOIC bypass line from the intersection of6"-MS-47-601 with 30"-MS-3-601 up to normally closed manual valve l-MS-155 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlA bypass line from normally closed manual valve l -MS-84 to the intersection of6"-MS-45-601 with 30"-MS-1-601 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlB bypass line from normally closed manual valve 1-MS-116 to the intersection of6"-MS-46-601 with 30"-MS-2-601 MS trip valve l-MS-TV-101 C bypass line from normally closed manual valve 1-MS-155 to the intersection of6"-MS-47-601 . with 30"-MS-3-601 FAILURE EFFECT WIT-T========F=A=IL=U=RE==E=F=FE=C=T=W=I=T=H====~
OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOlC is not automatically tripped) MSLB _outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the* turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOIA is not automatically tripped) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOIB is not automatically tripped) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOIC is not automatically tripped) MSLB outside containment (closure of 1-MS-TV-10 IC is required.
This is an automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW MSLB outside containment. (closure of l-MS-TV-10 IA is required.
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment. (closure of lOIB is required.
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment. (closure of l-MS-TV-101 C is required.
An automatic isolation action) Page 39 of 62
=*'========*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID MS-016 MS-017 MS-018 MS-019 MS-020 MS-021 MS-022 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIA to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIB to the main header MS line from the MS non-return valve l-MS-NRV-10IC to the main header MSLB outside containment with blow dmm of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MSLB outside containment with blow down of all SGs (See assumption 3). MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-22-601 with 30 11-SHP-l-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-23-601 with 30 11-SHP-2-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11-SHP-24-601 with 30 11-SHP-3-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header for the Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump from the pump. (Line break outside containment) (See intersection of header with 30 11-assumption
- 4) SHP-1-601 to l-MS-182 (check valve) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required.
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment ( closure of l-MS-TV-10 INB/C is required (An automatic action)) MSLB outside containment (closure of lOlNB/C is required.
An automatic isolation action) MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply header to the turbine driven AFW pump Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption
- 4) Page 40of 62
==1. SEGMENT ID MS-023 MS-024 MS-025 MS-026 MS-027 MS-028 I~===~* FAILURE EFFECT WIT T FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header for the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from the intersection of header with 30"-SHP-2-601 to l-MS-178 (check valve) Loss of one MS supply header to the IDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption
- 4) SG 1-RC-E-lC MS header for the Loss ofone MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. TDAFW pump from the (Line break outside containment) (See assumption
- 4) intersection of header with 30"-SHP-3-601 to l-MS-176 (check valve) SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102A SG 1-RC-E-lB MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to check valve MS-NRV-102B SG 1-RC-E-l C MS header to decay heat removal valve from the intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to check valve 1-MS-NRV-102C MS common header to decay heat removal valve from l-MS-NRV-102AJB/C to the normally closed vlv l-MS-118 Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of one MS header to the decay he~t removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. (Line break outside containment) (See assumption
- 4) Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal valve. (Line break outside containment)
Page 41 of 62
===:l*t========*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID MS-029 MS-030 MS-031 MS-032 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION SG 1-RC-E-lA headers to the safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP 601 to the safety valves l-MS-SV-105A, l-MS-SV-102A, l03A, l-MS-SV-104A, IOlA SG 1-RC-E-IB headers to the safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP 601 to the safety relief valves MS-SV-105B, 1-MS-SV-102B, 1-MS-SV-103B, 1-MS-SV-104B, 1-MS-SV-IOIB SG 1-RC-E-l C headers to the safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP-24-601 to the safety reliefvalves 1-MS-SV-I05C, MS-SV-102C, 1-MS-SV-103C, MS-SV-104C, 1-MS-SV-lOlC MSLB outside containment.
MSLB outside containment.
MSLB outside containment.
Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump IDAFW pump from check valves l-MS-182, l-MS-178, and l-MS-176 to normally closed l-MS-197, l-MS-PCV-102B, 1-MS-PCV-102A, 1-MS-10, l-MS-8, l-MS-270, and steam trap l-MS-ID-9.
MSLB outside containment.
MSLB outside containment.
MSLB outside containment.
Loss of steam to the ID AFW pump Page 42 of 62
==='*'=====*=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS-033 MS-034 MS-035 MS-036 MS-037 Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from normally closed l-MS-PCV-102A, l-MS-10, l-MS-PCV-102B to l-MS-TV-120, steam trap l-MS-TD-1, l-MS-340 (normally closed), l-MS-342 (normally closed), l-MS-347 (normally closed), l-MS-345 (normally closed), and steam trap l-MS-TD-2 Common MS supply header to the Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from l-MS-TV-120 to Turbine Drive SG 1-RC-E-lA header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIA SG 1-RC-E-lB header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to 1-MS-RV-IOIB SG 1-RC-E-1 C header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIC MS-038 The remaining portions of the MS MSLB outside containment lines down to 6" diameter pipes Total number of segments for Main Steam= 38 Reactor Coolant RC-001 RC-002 Reactor vessel to Loop 1 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve 1-RC-MOV-1590 Reactor vessel to Loop 2 isolation Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1592 Loss of steam to the TD AFW pump Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) I MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption
- 1) MSLB outside containment Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Page 43 of 62
- -* FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION RC-003 Reactor vessel to Loop 3 isolation Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1594 RC-004 From l-RC-MOV-1590 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lA RC-005 From l-RC-MOV-1592 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lB RC-006 From l-RC-MOV-1594 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator l-RC-E-lC RC-007 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lA Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lA RC-008 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lB Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lB RC-009 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lC Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lC RC-010 From RCP 1-RC-P-lA to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1591 I RC-011 From RCP 1-RC-P-lB to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1593 RC-012 From RCP 1-RC-P-l C to 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1595 RC-013 From Loop 1 1-RC-MOV-1591 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-014 From Loop 2 1-RC-MOV-1593 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-015 From Loop 3 l-RC-MOV-1595 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-016 SI from CV 1-SI-91 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident 1 hot leg RC-017 SI from CV l-SI-88 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident
- 2 hot leg Page 44 of 62
l. FAILURE EFFECT WITIT========F=AI=L=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H===
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION ===========
RC-018 RC-019 RC-020 RC-021 RC-022 RC-023 RC-024 RC-025 RC-026 RC-027 RC-028 RC-029 RC-030 RC-031 SI from CV l-SI-94 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident 3 hot leg From Loop 3 hot leg to pressurizer Large loss of coolant accident From Loop I hot leg to MOV-1700 Large loss of coolant accident From Loop I isolation valve I -RC-Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1590 to l-RC-MOV-1591 From Loop 2 isolation valve I -RC-Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1592 to l-RC-MOV-1593 From Loop 3 isolation valve 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1594 to l-RC-MOV-1595 From tee on 8"-RC-l l-2501R to Small loss of coolant accident Loop 1 cold leg From tee on 8"-RC-I2-2501R to Small loss of coolant accident Loop 2 cold leg From tee on 8"-RC-13-250 IR to Small loss of coolant accident Loop 3 cold leg Loop I drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-11 Loop 2 drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-50 Loop 3 drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-82 RCS drain header from valves 1-No impact, segment between normally closed valves RC-11, l-RC-HCV-1557A, l-RC-50, l-RC-HCV-1557B, l-RC-82, l-RC-HCV-1557C to l-RC-107 Loop 1 drain line from cold leg to Small loss of coolant accident l-RC-HCV-1557A Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant ac.cident
' Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident No impact, segment between normally closed valves Small loss of coolant accident Page 45 of 62
- FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION RC-032 Loop 2 drain line from cold leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident I-RC-HCV-1557B RC-033 Loop 3 drain line from cold leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident I-RC-HCV-l 557C RC-034 Loop 1 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-035 Loop 2 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-036 Loop 3 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-037 Loop 1 fill header from 1-RC-Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556A to cold leg RC-038 Loop 2 fill header from 1-RC-Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556B to cold leg RC-039 Loop 3 fill header from I-RC-Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556C to cold leg RC-040 Letdown line from Loop I cold Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident leg to l-CH-LCV-1460A I RC-041 SI from CV l-SI-79 to Loop 1 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-042 SI from CV l-SI-82 to Loop 2 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-043 SI from CV 1-SI-85 to Loop 3 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-044 Pressurizer spray from Loop 1 Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident cold leg to l'-RC-PCV-1455A RC-045 Pressurizer spray from Loop 3 Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident cold leg to l-RC-PCV-1455B RC-046 Accumulator injection from CV 1-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SI-109 to Loop I cold leg RC-047 Accumulator injection from CV 1-Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident SI-130 to Loop 2 cold leg Page 46 of 62 SEGMENT ID RC-048 RC-049 RC-050 RC-051 RC-052 RC-053 RC-054 RC-055 RC-056 RC-057 RC-058 RC-059 RC-060 ~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Accumulator irtjection from CV 1-Large loss of coolant accident SI-147 to Loop 3 cold leg Charging from CV l-CH-430 to Medium loss of coolant accident Loop 2 cold leg Reactor vessel head vent from Small loss of coolant accident vessel to 1-RC-SOV-lOOAl and 1-RC-SOV-l OOB I Pressurizer spray header from 1-Medium loss of coolant accident RC-PCV-1455A&B to pressurizer Pressurizer to safety valve I-RC-Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551A Pressurizer to safety valve 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551B Pressurizer to safety valve 1-RC-Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551C From safety valve loop seals to Small loss of coolant accident pressurizer From pressurizer safety valves 1-No impact without additional failures RC-SV-1551A,B,C and PORVs l-RC-PCV-1456 and l-RC-PCV-1455C to pressurizer relief tank From pressurizer to PORV block Medium loss of coolant accident valves l-RC-MOV-1535 and l-RC-MOV-1536 From block valve 1-RC-MOV-Medium loss of coolant accident 1535 to PORV l-RC-PCV-1456 From block valve 1-RC-MOV-Medium loss of coolant accident 1536 to PORV l-RC-PCV-1455C From tee on 4"-RC-15-1502 to Small loss of coolant accident blind flange (line I l/2"-RC-105-1502) Large loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident ! No impact without additional failures Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident (if operator closes MOV-1535, event terminated)
Medium loss of coolant accident (if operator closes MOV-1536, event terminated)
Small loss of coolant accident Page 47 of 62
====l*=======~
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID RC-061 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Auxiliary pressurizer spray line from CV l-CH-313 to tee on 4' line OPERA TOR ACTION Small loss of coolant accident Total number of segments for Reactor Coolant = 61 Recirculation Spray RS-001 RS-002 RS-003A RS-003B RS-004A RS-004B RS-005 RS-006 RS-007 RS-008 12"-RS-8-153 header from Containment sump to Containment penetration 12"-RS-7-153 header from Containment sump to Containment penetration None None From Containment penetration up Loss of ORS pumps to l-RS-MOV-155B From l-RS-MOV-155B to Containment penetration and manual valve l -RS-6 Loss of ORS pumps From Containment penetration up Loss of ORS pumps to l-RS-MOV-155A From 1-RS-MOV-155A to Containment penetration and manual valve 1-RS-15 Loss of ORS pumps Pipe section 12"-RS-24-153, cross Loss of water from containment sump (i.e. loss of connecting supply headers of ORS water for RS and LH Recirc. functions) 2B and 2A pumps NOT Designated to any portion NI A Pipe section between normally None closed manual valve 1-RS-6 and ORS sump Pipe section between normally None closed manual valve 1-RS-15 and ORS sump FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Small loss of coolant accident None None Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS 1B pump (closure of l-RS-MOV-155B is required)
Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS IA pump (closure of 1-RS-MOV-155A is required)
Loss of water from containment sump (i.e. loss of water for RS and LH Recirc. functions)
* =*==
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID RS-009 RS-010 RS-011 RS-012 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path B From containment penetration to spray nozzles for path A All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) All IRS-related piping sections from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX) Total number of segments for Recirculation Spray = 14 Residual Heat Removal RH-002 RH-003 RH-003A RH-003B RHR suction isolation valves, l -RH-MOV-1700 to l-RH-MOV-1701 RHR suction isolation valve, RH-MOV-1701 through both pumps and both heat exchangers to valves l-RH-29, 1-RH-MOV-1720A and l-RH-MOV-1720B and intersections of the following headers 12"-RH-12-602 vs 2"-RH-3-602, 12"-RH-12-602 vs 3"-RH-14-602 ' 2"-RH-3-60i header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-HCV-1142 3"-RH-14-602 header from the intersection of the header with 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-29 OPERA TOR ACTION Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption
- 7) Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See assumption
- 7) Loss of path B of IRS Loss of path A of IRS I) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 large LOCA I Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 Large LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION Loss of path B of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or 1-RS-MOV-156B is required)
Loss of path A of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-155A or l-RS-MOV-156A is required)
Loss of path B of ORS Loss of path A of IRS 1) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 2) Mode 3 large LOCA I 1) Loss of RHR suction 1 (Function W) 2) Mode 3 large LOCA 1) Loss of RHR 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 1) Loss ofRHR
- 2) Mode 3 small LOCA Page 49 of 62
:j*'==========
=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID RH-008 RH-009 RH-010 RH-011 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION RHR supply to B hot leg from l -RH-MOV-l 720A to 12"-RC 1502 RHR supply to C hot leg from l -RH-MOV-17208 to 12"-RC 1502 Recirculation line 1 l/2"-RH 602 Containment pentration 24 between l-RH-29 and l-RH-100 Total number of segments for Residual Heat Removal = 8 S/G Blowdown BD-001 8D-002A 1-RC-E-IA to 1-BD-TV-lOOA Containment isolation valve BD-TV-100A to Containment penetration 39 OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss of RHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-lC
- 1) Mode 3 small LOCA 2) Loss of RHR (Function W) per assumption 4 Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences.
Loss of containment boundary if the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA
- 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA.
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lA.Loss of blowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to B hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB (Isolation possible with 1-RH-MOV-1720A but not credible due to time limitation)
I) Mode 3 large LOCA, 2) Loss ofRHR supply to C hot leg 3) Loss of SI accumulator I -SI-TK-1 C (Isolation possible with l-RH-MOV-1720B but not credible due to time limitation)
Loss ofRHR (Function W) (By closing MOV-1720A, 1-RH-MOV-17208, l-RH-MOV-1700) Normally both valves are closed so there are no consequences.
Loss of containment boundary the path is open. 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Equivalent to steam line break inside containment.
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 4) Loss of feedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lA Page 50 of 62
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~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID BD-0028 BD-003 BD-004 BD-005A BD-005B BD-006 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Containment penetration 39 to Containment isolation valve I -BD-TV-1008 Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOB 1-RC-E-IB to 1-BD-TV-IOOC Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOC to Containment penetration 41 Containment penetration 41 to and 1-BD-TV-IOOD Everything beyond the outside containment'isolation valve TV-IOOD OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION 1) Loss of containment integrity.
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip. 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA I) 'B' steam generator seconda1y side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lB I) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB 1) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
no reactor trip) 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB
- 1) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA
- 1) 'B' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
no reactor trip). 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IB
- 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB Page 51 of 62
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FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT SEGMENT ID BD-007 BD-008A BD-008B BD-009 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION 1-RC-E-lC to 1-BD-TV-IOOE Containment isolation valve 1-BD-TV-IOOE to Containment penetration 40 Containment penetration 40 between 1-BD-TV-IOOE and 1-BD-TV-IOOF Everything beyond the outside containment isolation valve TV-IOOF Total number of segments for S/G Blowdown = 12 Safety Injection Accumulators ACC-001 ACC-002 1-SI-TK-lA to l-SI-109, Loop 1 cold leg. 2"-SI-63-602 from 12"-SI 1502 to l-SJq03, l-SI-HCV-1852Aand l-SI-104 OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IC
- 1) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC
- 1) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC
- 1) Loss of containment integrity
- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Page 52 of 62
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=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID ACC-003 ACC-004 ACC-005 ACC-006 ACC-007 ACC-008 ACC-009 ACC-010 ACC-011 ACC-012 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-IA to reducer in the lines to 1-SI-L T-1920 and 1-SI-L T-I 922Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to the level of the pipe break and into sump l"-SI-100-602 from 1-SI-TK-IA to I-SI-HCV-1853A and the line from 1-SI-TK-IA to I-SI-RV-1858A l"-SI-11-602 from l"-SI-TK-IB to I-SI-HCV-1851A 1-SI-TK-IB to I-Sl-130, Loop 2 cold leg. 2"-SI-65-602 from 12"-SI 1502 to l-SI-125, I-SI-HCV-1852B and l-SI-123 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-IB to reducer in the lines to 1-SI-L T-1924 and l-SI-LT-1926 l"-SI-97-602 from 1-SI-TK-IB to l-SI-HCV-1853B and the line from 1-SI-TK-IB to I-SI-RV-1858B l"-SI-12-602 from l"-SI-TK-IB to 1-S1-HCV-1851B 1-SI-TK-IC to I-SI-147, Loop 3 cold leg. 2"-SI-67-602 from 12"-SI 1502 to I-SI-142, 1-S1-HCV-1852C and l-SI-140 OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Loss of one accumulator:Accumulator inj ection (Function D2)Accumulator depressurizes and remains full Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to the level of the pipe break and into sump Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator depressurizes and remains full Loss or"one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Loss of one accul!lulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location I No operator action assuin.ed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Page 53 of 62
l*I=====
~=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION ACC-013 ACC-014 ACC-015 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-lC to reducer in the lines to I-SI-LT -1928 and l-SI-LT-1930 l"-SI-99-602 from 1-SI-TK-lC to l-SI-HCV-1853C and the line from 1-SI-TK-lC to l-SI-RV-1858C l"-SI-61-602 from l"-SI-TK-lC to l-SI-HCV-1851C Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to the level of the pipe break and into sump Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator depressurizes and remains full Loss of one accumulator:
Accumulator injection (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump Total number of segments for Safety Injection Accumulators
= 15 Service Water SW-001 SW-002 SW-003 SW-004 SW-005 SW-006 From intake structure through 1-Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lA SW-P-lA to intake canal From intake structure through 1-Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB SW-P-IB to intake canal From intake structure through 1-Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lC SW-P-lC to intake canal From 1-SW-P-IA discharge Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IA through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure From 1-SW-P-IB discharge Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure From 1-SW-P-IC discharge through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lC No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location No operator action assumed because of the short time available to determine the break location Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lA Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IC I ' Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IA Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IC Page 54 of 62
~* SEGMENT ID SW-007 SW-008 SW-009 SW-010 SW-011 SW-012 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From tee at 96"-WC-l-10 to valves 1-CW-MOV-I06A, MOV-103C, l-SW-MOV-I03D, l-SW-MOV-10113 From tee at 96"-WC-3-10 to valves 1-CW-MOV-I06C, MOV-I03A, l-SW-MOV-103B, 1-SW-MOV-IOIA From tee at 96"-WC-2-10 to valves 1-CW-MOV-106B, MOV-I02A, 1-SW-l l From tee at 96"-WC-4-10 to valves l-CW-MOV-I06D, MOV-102B, blind flange@ 8x6 reducer, and valves l-SW-500, 2-SW-478, l-SW-264, l-SW-303, SW-302 From 1-SW-MOV-I02A and -102B to 1-CC-E-IA, -IB, -IC, and-ID From tee at 42" header to river water makeup pump discharge check valve 2-SW-1303, and turbine bldg service water pumps (l-SW-P-4A, -4B) suction check valves (l-SW-403.
406) I========*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers IB, -1 C), and potential loss of cooling to bearing cooling heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB, -IC) Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IB, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( lA, -ID), and potential loss of cooling to bearing cooling heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB, -IC) Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, potential loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1-CC-E-lA, -IB, -IC, -ID), potential loss ofturbine building service water, loss of river water make-up pump l-SW-P-100 Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA, potential loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers CC-E-lA, -lB, -IC, -ID), potential loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to ~echanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump l-SW-P-100 Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-IA and -IB, loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( E-IA, -IB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1-SW-P-100 Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-IA and -IB, degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( 1-CC-E-l A, -IB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1-SW-P-100 Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( E-IB, -IC). Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-IOIB Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IB, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers E-1 A, -ID). Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-IOIA Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA.
Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-I02A Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-102B Loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( l A, -lB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump S W-P-100. Operator closes valves l-SW-MOV-102A and -102B Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-IA and -lB, degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1-CC-E-IA, -lB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1 -SW-P-100 Page 55 of 62
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'=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SW-013 SW-014 SW-015 SW-016 SW-017 SW-018 SW-019 SW-020 SW-021 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION From 1-CC-E-lA, -lB, -IC, and-1 D to discharge tunnel From 1-SW-MOV-lOlA and -101B to bearing coolers lA, -lB, and -IC From bearing coolers lA, -lB, and -IC to discharge tunnel Potential degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1-CC-E-lA, -lB, -IC, -ID) Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC), degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-lA and -lB, degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers (l-RS-E-lA, -lB, -IC, -ID) Potential degraded cooling to bearing cooling water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC) From valves l-SW-MOV-103A Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat and -103B to l-SW-MOV-104A exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC), degraded cooling , -104D, and blind flange at 1-SW-to condenser 1-CN-SC-lB, loss of cooling to recirc REJ-53 spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E-IA and -ID, degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lB, and -IC From valves l-SW-MOV-103C and -103D to l-SW-MOV-104B , -104C, and blind flange at REJ-53 From l-SW-104A to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lA and valve l-SW-534 From l-SW-104B to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-IB and valve l-SW-535 i
- From l-SW-104C to recuc spray heat exchanger l -RS-E-1 C and valve l-SW-536 From l-SW-104D to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-ID and valve l-SW-537 Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -18,-IC), degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-l A, loss of cool fog to recirc spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E-lB and -1 C, degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lA, and -ID Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger E-lA, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-ID Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger E-lB, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lC Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger E-l C, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lB Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger E-ID, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lA Potential degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1-CC-E-IA, -18, -IC, -ID) Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -lB,-lC).
Operator closes valves 1-SW-MOV-lOIA and 101B. Potential degraded cooling to bearing cooling water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB,-lC) Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E-IA and -ID .. Operator closes valves MOV-I03A and l03B Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E-lB and -IC. Operator closes valves MOV-103C and l03D I Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-IA. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104A Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lB. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104B Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger l -RS-E-1 C. Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-104C Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-ID. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104D Page 56 of 62
=l. SEGMENT ID SW-022 SW-023 SW-024 SW-025 SW-026 SW-027 SW-028 SW-029 SW-030 SW-031 l e=======*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION From recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lA to l-SW-MOV-l05A From recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lB to l-SW-MOV-105B From recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lC to l-SW-MOV-l05C From recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lD to 1-SW-MOV-105D From l-SW-MOV-105A and -105D to valve 1-SW-903 and discharge tunnel From l-SW-MOV-105B and -105C to valve 1-SW-902 and discharge tunnel Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lD Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-l C Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lB Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lA No impact No impact Drain lines from recirc spray heat No impact exchangers 1-RS--E-IA, -IB, -1 C, -ID to locked closed valve l -SW-206 Unit 2 service water from valve 2-Potential degraded cooling water supply to control SW-476 to l-SW-500, 2-SW-307, and relay room chillers and charging pump coolers and 2-SW-306 From valves 1-SW-302 and l-SW-303 to 1-SW-265, 1-SW-311, 1-SW-321, ISW-261, 2-SW-441, 2-SW-331, 2-SW-306, and 2-SW-307 Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers and charging pump coolers From valve 1-SW-311 to CV 1-Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-315 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers chiller 1-VS-E-4A and CV 1-SW-316 Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lD Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-l C Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lB Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lA No impact No impact No impact Potential degraded cooling water supply to control and relay room chillers and charging pump coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers and charging pump coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers and charging pump coolers Page 57 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SW-032 SW-033 SW-034 SW-035 SW-036 SW-037 SW-038 SW-039 SW-040 SW-041 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION From valve l-SW-321 to CV 1-Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-325 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers chiller l-VS-E-4B From valve l-SW-331 to CV 1-Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-335 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers chiller l-VS-E-4C and CV l-SW-336 From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room l-VS-E-4A to CVs l-SW-315 and chillers l-VS-E-4B and -4C and to charging pump l-SW-313 coolers From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room l-VS-E-4B to CVs l-SW-325 and chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4C and to charging pump l-SW-323 coolers From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room l-VS-E-4C to CVs l-SW-335 and chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4B and to charging pump l-SW-333 coolers From CVs l-SW-313, -323, -266, 2-SW-333, and valve 2-SW-554 to discharge tunnel header From CVs l-SW-316, -326, -336 to CV l-SW-266 and valve 2-SW-344 From valve l-SW-264 to valve SW-265 From valve l-SW-267 to CV 1-SW-113 From valve l-SW-261 to CV SW-108 Degraded strainer 1-VS-S-lA performance Degraded strainer 1-VS-S-lB performance No impact -normally closed valves Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-IOA)
Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-lOB)
Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers and charging pump coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers and charging pump coolers Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room chillers l-VS-E-4B and -4C and to charging pump coolers Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4C and to charging pump coolers Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4B and to charging pump coolers Degraded strainer l-VS-S-1 A performance I I Degraded strainer 1-VS-S-l B performance No impact -normally closed valves Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control and relay room coolers (fails pump p-IOA) Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control and relay room coolers (fails pump p-lOB) Page 58 of 62 SEGMENT ID SW-042 SW-043 SW-044 SW-045 SW-046 SW-047 SW-048 SW-049 SW-050 SW-051 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From CV l-SW-113 tovalve SW-269 and l-SW-171 From CV l-SW-108 to valve 1-SW-ll 8 and first valve back on Unit 2 line 2"-WS-5-9107 From tee on 2"-WS-71-21X to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB From. charging pump intermediate seal cooler l A to discharge header From charging pump intermediate seal cooler lB to discharge header From tee on 2"-WS-71-21X to charging pump lube oil cooler l -CH-E-5A From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to charging pump lube oil cooler l -CH-E-5B From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to charging pump lube oil cooler l -CH-E-5C From charging pump lube oil cooler l-CH-E-5A to discharge header I=======* FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB may have cooling flow) Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA may have cooling flow) Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA, degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB, degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1-CH-E-5A, degraded cooling to charging pump coolers 1-CH-E-SB, -SC, 1-SW-E-lA Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler CH-E-5B, degraded cooling to the other charging pump coolers (1-SW-E-lA, -lB, l-CH-E-5A, -5C) Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler CH-E-5 C, degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-lB Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers SB, -SC, 1-SW-E-IA Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB may have cooling flow) Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA may have cooling flow) Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA, degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -SC Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB, degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A,°-5B, -SC Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -SC Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A
-513 -5C ' ' Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1-CH-E-SA, degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-E-5B, -5C, 1-SW-E-lA Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1-CH-E-SB, degraded cooling to the other charging pump coolers (1-SW-E-lA, -lB, l-CH-E-5A, -5C) Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler l -CH-E-5C, degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-lB Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers E-5B, -5C, 1-SW-E-lA Page 59 of 62 SEGMENT ID SW-052 SW-053 SW-054 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION From charging pump lube oil cooler l-CH-E-5B to discharge header From charging pump lube oil cooler l-CH-E-5C to discharge header =====* FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers 1-SW-E-Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers 1-SW-lA, -IB, l-CH-E-5A, -SC E-lA, -IB, l-CH-E-5A, -SC Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-IB Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-IB Charging pump cooler discharge No impact No impact header to valves l-SW-900, -902, -903,-907,-908, -911,-913 and first valve back on Unit 2 line WS-513-21X Total number of segments for Service Water= 54 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling FC-001 FC-002 FC-003 FC-004 1-FC-P-lA header from Spent Loss of fuel pit inventory Fuel Pit to l-FC-11 (check valve) 1-FC-P-IB header from Spent Loss of fuel pit inventory Fuel Pit to 1-FC-35 (normally closed man. valve) 1-FC-P-IB header from I-FC-35 If l-FC-35 is closed, none. (normally closed man. valve) to 1-If l-FC-35 is open, loss of fuel pit inventory FC-9 (check valve) 1-FC-P-lA discharge header from Loss of fuel pit inventory l-FC-11 (check valve) to spent fuel pit, l-FC-41 (normally closed man. vlv), I-FC-14 (normally closed man. vlv.), l-PG-54 (normally closed vlv.) and intersectin of 16"-FP-18-152 with 2.5"-FP-26-152 Loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of fuel pit inventol}'
If l-FC-35 is closed, none. If l-FC-35 is open, loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of fuel pit inventory Page 60 of 62
===* SEGMENT ID FC-005 FC-006 FC-007 FC-008 FC-009 SEGMENT DESCRIPTION 1-FC-P-lB discharge header from l-FC-9 (check valve) back to FC-41 (normally closed man. vlv.) including l-FC-14 (normally closed man. vlv) Purification headers from the intersection of 16"-FP-18-152 with 2.5"-FP-26-152 to l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Ion Exchanger), 1-FC-29, l-FC-73, 2-FC-73 Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Ion Exchanger) to l-FC-3 (normally closed man. vlv.) Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Ion Exchanger) to l-FC-2 (normally closed man. vlv.) and 1-FC-l (normally closed man. vlv.) Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Ion Exchanger) normally closed man. valves l-FC-1, l-PG-176, l-FC-29, 1-FC-71, 2-FC-71 Total number of segments for Spent Fuel Pit Cooling= 9 Ventilation VS-001 Makeup supply from check valve l-VS-975 to l-VS-PCV-533 FAILURE EFFECT wA========F=AIL=u=RE==E=F=FE=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
OPERATOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION If l-FC-41 is closed, loss of the standby spent fuel pit pump. If l-FC-42 is closed, loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of purification headers (It is assumed that flow diversion via this path will not deplete the spent fuel pit inventory)
Loss of purification headers Loss of purification headers If l-FC-1 is open, loss of purification headers. If l-FC-1 is closed minimal impact (loss of PG water to the purification header, loss of purification header to Unit 1 and 2 RWSTs. Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers (It is, conservatively, assumed that a pipe rupture in this section can drain the chilled water inventory)
If l-FC-41 is closed, loss of the standby spent fuel pit pump. If l-FC-42 is closed, loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of purification headers (It is assumed that flow diversion via this path will not deplete the spent fuel pit inventory)
Loss of purification headers Loss of purification headers If 1-FC-l is open, loss of purification headers. If l-FC-1 is closed mini'mal impact (loss of PG water to the purification header, loss of purification header to Unit 1 and 2 RWSTs. None (Closure of l-VS-PCV-533 is required)
Page 61 of 62 .I
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FAILURE EFFECT WIT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SEGMENT ID VS-002 SEGMENT DESCRJPTION The remaining piping associated with the l-VS-E-4A/B/C/D/E chillers between l-PCV-533, BC-283 (make-up water from Bearing Cooling), l-VS-247 (normally closed cross-tie valve with the chillers supporting out heat loads) Total number of segments for Ventilation=
2 Total number of segments 471 OPERATOR ACTION Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers Page 62 of 62