ML18151A580
| ML18151A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1996 |
| From: | Bowling M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | Sheron B NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| 96-284, NUDOCS 9606200036 | |
| Download: ML18151A580 (71) | |
Text
-* e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 June 13, 1996 Dr. Brian W. Sheron Serial No.96-284 Division of Engineering, NRA NLOS/GDM R1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50-280 Washington, D.C. 20005 License No. DPR-32
Dear Dr. Sheron:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 RISK-BASED INSERVICE INSPECTION PILOT PROGRAM In our letter dated April 8, 1996 (Serial No.96-158), we indicated that we would provide technical support to the NRC to facilitate the development of a regulatory guide and participate in a risk-based. ISi pilot program. We also. provided a schedule for the submittal of certain information to support these efforts. Pursuant to this schedule, the preliminary system scope and piping segment definitions for the Surry Unit 1 risked-based ISi program are provided in the attachments. Three sets of drawings (Classification Boundary Drawings & Weld/Support Isometrics) are also included for your information and use.
If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. E. W.
Throckmorton, Supervisor - ISi/NOE Programs, at 804-273-2125.
Very truly yours,
/#-;J,,~7 M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Attachments*
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cc: (w/o drawings) rDocumeoLGontroLDJ@D U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. M. W. Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. T. Pietrangelo Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street NW Suite 400 Washington, D. C. 20006-3708
RISKED-BASED INSERVICE.INSPECTION PILOT PROGRAM REC'D W/LTR DTD 06/13/96 .... 9606200036
- NOTICE -
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.. NOTICE -
ATTACHMENT 1 Surry Power Station Unit 1 Risk-Based lnservice Inspection (ISi)
Pilot Program The preliminary system scope and piping segment definitions for the Surry Unit 1 risked-based ISi pilot program have been developed. The scope and definitions were determined consistent with the methodology described in WCAP-14572, "Westinghouse Owners Group Application Of Risk-Based Methods To Piping lnservice Inspection Topical Report." The systems and _piping segments to be included in the risked-based ISi program are provided in Attachments 2 and 3, respectively._ This information should be considered as preliminary due to the feedback and iterative processes used for the development of the scope and definitions consistent with the risk-based methodology. Final system scope and piping segment definitions will be provided in our final program submittal.
System Scope Definition Section 3.2, "Scope Definition," of WCAP-14572 provided the three system selection criteria as follows:
- All Class 1, 2 and 3 systems currently within the ASME Section XI program
- Piping systems modeled in the PSA
- Various balance of plant fluid systems determined to be of importance (consistent with system determinations made for the implementation of the Maintenance Rule)
The systems included in the risk-based ISi pilot program were selected based on these criteria.
System Scope Exclusions The systems or portions of systems identified below were evaluated and excluded from system scope consideration in the risk-based ISi pilot program based on the following:
- Instrument Air (Compressed Air)
The current Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to be used for the risk-based ISi program was derived from the Surry Individual Plant Examination (IPE) 1 previously submitted to the NRC. In the PSA models, the Instrument Air (IA) system is divided into independent outside and inside containment subsystems. Loss of inside containment IA will not result in an automatic reactor trip, but could require a manual trip. This would be considered a long term effect and would be categorized by the PSA as a _
1
- loss of feedwater (T2) transient. The only important function that would be disabled by a loss of inside containment instrument air is pressurizer spray, however, pressurizer spray is a non-safety-related control function. The safety-related pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORV) are air operated, and have compressed air bottles that serve as a backup to the inside containment IA system.
Loss of outside containment IA is functionally equivalent to a loss of Feedwater transient with the addition of loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) supply to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier. The steam generator PORVs are also disabled by this event. Additionally, the loss of outside containment IA, in combination with additional systems, is treated as a contributor to the Loss of RCP Seal C_ooling initiating event (T4). However, the frequencies associated with these events are not significant contributors to the loss of Feedwater or CCW events.
The Surry PSA model does not consider the loss of the IA system a significant contributor to total risk, and consequently a fault tree model was not developed to address this condition. This conclusion was based on the following: 1) compressed air bottles are provided for the pressurizer PORVs, and 2) the supply of IA can easily be recovered by re-routing air flow or by using portable air bottles. Further, the ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class.
A similar conclusion was reached during implementation of the maintenance rule
- where certain systems have been included in a functional sense only. For example, the functional requirement of the IA system is to supply air at 90 psig. The performance of individual components within the IA system is not monitored, only the system function is monitored. Therefore, as long as the failure of an IA component does not cause the loss of the IA system function, it is not considered an IA failure by the maintenance rule. Furthermore, the system is a low pressure system having a design pressure of only 100 psig.
The frequency of loss of IA is derived from NUREG/CR-54722. Our determination that the loss of the IA system is not significant is supported by the conclusions of NUREG/CR-5472 which include the following:
"1. The IA system contribution to the total core melt frequency is generally much lower than that of frontline safety systems, and significantly lower at BWRs than at PWRs.
- 2. The total risk cannot be significantly reduced by modifications or reliability improvements to the IA system."
Also based on the NUREG/CR-5472 findings, problems related to IA have been primarily caused by contamination and human error during operations/maintenance activities, and the effects are more often characterized as misfunctions rather than malfunctions, i.e., the IA system often introduces a problem rather than fails to function .
- Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the IA system is a low risk, low safety significant system and need not be included in the risk-based ISi pilot program.
2
Fire Protection System The Surry PSA does not take credit for the fire protection system as an accident mitigation system. As a conservatism, the operation of the fire protection system was not credited in the PSA that addresses the effects of fire, and is generally not credited in the Appendix R safe shutdown analyses. The ASME Code requirements for this system are limited to the containment penetrations, and the rest of the system is designated as non-safety class. Therefore, the fire--protection system is not considered risk significant.
Certain sections of this system, however, are routed through the Auxiliary Building and have been assessed in the PSA model as having the potential to cause significant damage by causing flooding in the Auxiliary Building. These sections of the fire protection system which contribute to the internal flooding hazard are potentially risk significant and are included in the risk-based inservice inspection program. These sections of piping will be evaluated as part of the "indirect effects" portion of the methodology. The remaining piping segments in the system need not be considered.
Containment Penetration Piping The ASME Code currently includes containment penetration piping as safety-class piping, even if the balance of the system is non-safety class. These non-safety class systems were excluded from the pilot project system scope based upon their system non-safety-class designation and their exclusion from the PSA model system scope.
Furthermore, the safety-class portion of piping penetrating containment is assured of structural integrity through the separate 10 CFR 50 Appendix J testing program in conjunction with Code pressure testing requirements.
Piping Segment Definition The combination of the piping associated with the current ASME Section XI inservice inspection program and the piping associated with the active components in the PSA model form the basis for inclusion of systems in the risk-based ISi program. Once these systems have been selected, the list is presented to an "expert panel" which consists of personnel who previously served on the Maintenance Rule working group, engineering and ISi personnel. The expert panel, using knowledge gained from the Maintenance Rule effort, makes the final determination of which systems are included within the scope of the risk-based ISi pilot program, and which systems are excluded.
Once the systems to be included in the program are determined, the systems' piping is divided into defined segments. A segment is initially defined based on Vie direct consequences of a pipe failure. In general, the section of pipe for which a catastrophic failure would result in the same direct consequence is defined to be a segment.
Consequence, as used here, means the impact on a fluid system, and is generally the loss of a system or train of a system. The magnitude of the consequence can later be evaluated by relating the segment to a component in the PSA model. A motor-operated or air-operated valve, or check valve can be credited for isolation of the pipe 3
failure, and therefore typically forms one boundary of a segment. The consequences for a segment are also defined with and without operator action. The operator action generally defines whether isolation of the failed pipe section is possible. The consequence associated with operator action usually determines the pipe segment.
As a result, there are typically many segments with the same consequence if no operator action is assumed, but different consequences for assumed operator action.
Other aspects of piping systems can also affect segment definition. Changes in pipe diameter or material properties may define a segment boundary. Since piping is typically arranged in networks, it is also necessary to address flow splits. In most PSAs, it is assumed that a significant loss of flow due to diversion would not resu_lt from a pipe break that is less than one third the diameter of the main pipe section (NUREG/CR-2815). However, this assumption has not been adopted for the purposes of pipe segment definition in the risk-based ISi pilot program. Potential flow diversions were considered for lines as small as one inch in diameter if the section of pipe is included in a system that is covered by the program.
Attachment 3 provides the initial pipe segment definitions for 17 systems. Surry Unit 1 as-operated piping and instrumentation diagrams were used to define the segments.
Segment names use a system identifier, and segment numbers start at the fluid source and continue through system termination. Segments are numbered such that parallel train A and train B pipe sections have contiguous numbers whenever possible. Thus, the segments for each system were defined in a consistent manner.
Segment definition is an iterative process concerning the determination of the consequences and the identification of any potential operator recovery actions. Also, the consideration of indirect effects has the potential to refine the segments defined in Attachment 3.
REFERENCES
- 1. Virginia Electric and Power Company, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Individual Plant Examination, Final Report, Surry Units 1 and 2," August 1991.
- 2. NUREG/CR-5472, "A Risk-Based Review of Instrument Air Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," January 1990.
- 3. NUREG/CR 2815, "Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," Revision 0, January 1984.
- 4
ATTACHMENT 2 Preliminary System Selection For Surry Unit 1 System Description IPE Section XI
- 1. AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater3 Yes Yes
- 2. BD - Slowdown (S/G) Yes Yes1 ,2
- 3. cc - Component Cooling - Yes Yes2
- 4. CH - Chemical & Volume Control4 Yes Yes2
- 5. CN - Condensate Yes Yes2.
- 6. cs - Containment Spray Yes Yes
- 7. CW - Circulating Water Yes Yes2
- 8. EE - Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Yes No
- 9. FC - Fuel Pit Cooling6 No Yes1
- 10. FW - Feedwater3 Yes Yes2 11 . MS - Main Steam Yes Yes2
- 12. RC - Reactor Coolant Yes Yes2
- 13. RH - Residual Heat Removal Yes Yes
- 14. RS - Recirculation Spray Yes Yes
- 15. SI - Safety lnjection5 Yes Yes
- 16. SW - Service Water Yes Yes2
- 17. VS - Ventilation? Yes Yes1 ,2 Notes:
1- System is exempt from current ASME Section XI examination requirements [i.e.,
volumetric, surface, visual (VT-3)], but is included for pressure testing.
2- Portions of this system are not included in the Section XI ISi program.
3- Surry combines the feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems on the system drawings.
4- Portions of the chemical & volume control system work in conjunction with high head safety injection.
5- Includes high head, low head, and the passive accumulator portions of safety injection.
6- Important during shutdown.
7- Cooling water to control room HVAC .
ATTACHMENT 3
- Preliminary Piping Segment Definition For Surry Unit 1
=*~====*=====* Surry Unit 1 Segment Definitions 05-Jun-96 FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION Auxiliary Feedwater AFW-001 From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to turbine Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 153 driven pump P-2 on turbine driven pump P-2 line AFW-002 From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 168 driven pump P-3A on motor driven pum P-3A line AFW-003 From Emergency Condensate Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Emergency CST Storage Tank to manual valve 183 driven pump P-3B on motor driven pum P-3B line AFW-004 From manual valve 153 and Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to turbine Loss of Turbine driven pump P-2 manual valves 283 and 154 and driven pump P-2 check valve 144 through turbine driven pump P-2 to CVI42 AFW-005 From manual valve I 68 and Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Motor driven pump P-3A manual valves 284 and 169 and driven pump P-3A check valve 159 through motor driven pump P-3A to CV157 AFW-006 From manual valve 183 and Loss of Emergency CST and all flowpaths to motor Loss of Motor driven pump P-3B manual valves 285 and 184 and driven pump P-3B check valve 174 through motor driven pump P-3B to CVl72 AFW-007 From check valve 142 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and turbine driven pump P- Loss of Turbine driven pump P-2 valves 235, 141, 236, and 140 and 2 train check valve 628 AFW-008 From check valve 157 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and motor driven pump P- Loss of Motor driyen pump P-3A valves 238, 156, 237, and 155 and 3A train check valve 629 Page I of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION AFW-009 From check valve 172 to manual Loss of Emergency CST and motor-driven pump P- Loss of Motor driven pump P-3B valves 240, 171,239, and 170 and 38 train check valve 630 AFW-010 From manual valves 235 and 141, Loss of all aux feed flow Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three 238 and 156, and 240 and 171 aux feed pumps and MOV 260A to check valve 138 AFW-011 From manual valves 236 and 140, Loss of all aux feed flow Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three 237 and 155, and 239 and 170 aux feed pumps and MOV 2608 to check valve 133 AFW-012 From check valves 628,629, and Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed None 630 to manual valve 631 on full flow recirc line AFW-013 From check valve 138 to check Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three valve 136 aux feed pumps AFW-014 From check valve 133 to check Loss of Emergenc.*y CST and all aux feed Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three valve 131 aux feed pumps (includi/ng crosstie from other unit)
AFW-015 From check valve 136 and check Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three valve 309 to MOVs 151E, 151C crosstie from other unit) aux feed pumps (including crosstie from other unit) and 151A AFW-016 From check valve 131 and check Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including Loss of one line of aux feed flow from all three valve 310 to MOVs 151F, 151D, crosstie from other unit) aux feed pumps (including crosstie from other unit) and 151B AFW-017 From MOVs 151F and 151E to Loss ofEmergency CST and all aux feed (including Loss of all aux feed flow to SG IA check valve 27 crosstie from other unit)
AFW-018 From MOVs 151D and 151C to Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including Loss of all aux feed flow to SG 1B check valve 58 crosstie from other unit)
AFW-019 From MOVs 151B and 151A to Loss of Emergency CST and all aux feed (including Loss of all aux feed flow to SG l C check valve 89 crosstie from other unit)
- AFW-020. From check valve 27 and 10 to Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IA Feedline break and loss ofaux feed flow to SG IA
- SGlA Page 2 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION
- c:c=c.=c=.=================================
FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION AFW-021 From check valve 58 and ..i I to Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG 1B Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG 1B SGlB AFW-022 From check valve 89 and 72 to Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IC Feedline break and loss of aux feed flow to SG IC SGlC AFW-023 From manual valves 279 and 282 Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all to manual valves 283, 284, and aux feed pumps three aux feed pumps 285 AFW-024 From manual valves 280 to Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three Loss of emergency makeup tank auxiliary manual valves 282 and 294 aux feed pumps feedwater booster pump P-4B train AFW-025 From manual valve 277 to Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three Loss of emergency makeup tank auxiliary manual valves 279 and 293 aux feed pumps feedwater booster pump P-4A train AFW-026 From emergency makeup tank to Loss of emergency makeup tank flowpath to all three Loss of emergency makeup tank to all three aux manual valves 277 and 280 aux feed pumps feed pumps AFW-027 From fire main manual valve 185 Loss of fire main connection to all three aux feed Loss of fire main connection to all three aux feed to manual valves 154, 169 and pumps pumps 184 and check valves 149, 164, and 179 AFW-028 From MOVs 160A and l60B to Loss of water supply from opposite unit auxiliary Loss of water supply from opposite unit auxiliary check valves 309 and 310 (from feedwater system feedwater system opposite unit aux feed system)
AFW-029 From Manual valve 150 from Loss of makeup from condensate to emergency Loss of makeup from condensate to emergency conedensate makeup and manual condensate storage tank and emergency makeup tank condensate storage tank and emergency makeup valve 631 and manual valve 276 tank and manual valves 146 and 609, 161 and 608, and 176 and 607 emergency condensate storage tank AFW-030 From Check valve 144 and 149 to Loss of turbine driven aux feed pump oil cooler Loss of turbine driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 146 and 609 AFW-031 From Check valve 159 and 164 to Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 161 and 608 Page 3 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION
====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION AFW-032 From Check valve 174 and 179 to Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler Loss of motor driven aux feed pump oil cooler manual valves 176 and 607 Total number of segments for Auxiliary Feedwater = 32 Chemical and Volume Control CH-001 Discharge of VCT between l-CH- A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is MOV- l l 15C at flow reducer after isolated) isolated) manual valve l-CH-203, I-CH- N: Loss ofCVT N: Loss ofCVT 204 (Normally closed manual valve), l-CH-173 (check valve), l-CH-RV-1209 (normally closed)
CH-002 Piping used for CVT level A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is measurement and indication isolated) isolated)
N: Loss ofCVT N: Loss of CVT CH-003 Discharge of CVT between I-CH- A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is A: None (During actuation of SI, this portion is MOV-1 l 15C, l-CH-MOV-1 l 15E isolated) isolated)
N:Loss ofCVT N: Loss of CVT line to charging pumps (closure of 1-CH-MOV-l1I5C is required)
CH-004 Discharge of CVT between, I-CH- A: None If SI signal is generated (MOV-1381, A: None /
MOV-l l 15E, l-CH-230 (Check MOV-1 l 15C/E and MOV-1373 will close). IF SI is N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, loss of Recirc.
valve), l-CH-MOV-1373, 1-CH- not generated (e.g. ATWS), check valve 1-CH-230 line for Charging pumps. (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-RV-1382B, l-CH-238 (Normally prevents back flow of water to the damaged section 1381, 1-CH-MOV-1 ll5C or I 115D, and 1-CH-closed manual Valve), 1-CH-239 N: Loss ofCVT, loss of Charging injection to RCP MOV-1373 is required)
(Normally closed manual Valve), seals and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps l-CH-241 (Normally closed manual Valve), l-CH-MOV-1381 CH-005 To charging pumps suction from A: Could result in loss of Unit 1 RWST outside A: None RCP seals between Containment containment. N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, (Closure of 1-and 1-CH-MOV 1381 N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP CH-MOV-1370 and l-CH-MOV-1381 or closure seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps of 1-CH-HCV-1303NB/C and l-CH-MOV-1381 is required)
Page 4 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITITr=======F=AI=L=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
SEGMENT ID. SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CH-006 To charging pump suction from A: Could also result in loss of Unit 1 RWST inside A: None RCP seals between Containment, Containment. N: Loss of Charging for RCP seals, (Closure of l-l-CH~HCV-l303A, l-CH-HCV- N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP CH-MOV-1370 and l-CH-MOV-1381 or closure 1303B, l-CH-HCV-1303C, l-CH- seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps of l-CH-HCV-1303A/B/C, 1-CH-HCV-1307 HCV-1307 (normally closed) and 1-CH-MOV-1381 is required)
CH-007 To charging pump suction from A: Could also result in loss of Unit 1 RWST inside A: None RCP seals between, l-CH-HCV- Containment. N: Loss of charging for R CP seals 1303A, l-CH-HCV-1303B, l-CH- N: Loss of CVT, loss of charging injection for RCP HCV-1303C, l-CH-HCV-1307, seals, and loss of recirc. line to the charging pumps and RCP Case CH-008 To RCP seals between pump case A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST A: Small LOCA for 1-RCP-P-IA check valve l- inside Containment N: Small LOCA, (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1370 is CH-324 N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST required) if the event results in R WST injection via charging pumps.
CH-009 To RCP seals between pump case A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST A: Small LOCA for 1-RCP-P-IB check valve l - inside Containment N: Small LOCA, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 is CH-334 N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST required) if the event results in RWST injection via charging pumps.
CH-010 To RCP seals between pump case A: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST A: Small LOCA for 1-RCP-P-IC check valve 1- inside Containment N: Small LOCA, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 is CH-350 N: Small LOCA and potential loss of Unit 1 RWST required) if the event results in RWST injection via charging pumps.
Page 5 of 62
=*c::======*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CH-011 Seal injection path, between I -CH- A: Loss of Unit I RWST inside Containment, loss Al: If l-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of l-CH-324 containment of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect A2: If 1-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of N: Loss of CVT injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
NI: If l-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required),
N2: If l-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of I-CH-MOV-1287 A/B/C is required)
CH-012 Seal injection path, between 1-CH- A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST inside Containment, loss Al: If 1-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of I-CH-334 containment of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of MOV-1370 or I-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect A2: If 1-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of N: Loss of CVT injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Nl: If 1-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required),
N2: If I-CH-278 is opeh, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
CH-013 Seal injection path, between 1-CH- A: Loss of Unit l RWST inside Containment, loss Al: If I-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of l-CH-350 containment of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of MOV-1370 or 1-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect A2: If I-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of N: Loss of CVT injection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of I-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Nl: If l -CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of I-CH-MOV-1370 or 1-CH-HCV-1186 is required)
N2: If 1-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of 1-CH-MOV-1287A/B/C is required)
Page 6 of 62
'======= ===*====
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT
==
FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CH-014 Seal injection path, between A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST Al: If l-CH-278 is closed, none, (Closure of l-CH-containment l-CH-HCV-1186, cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required) normally closed l-CH-278 pumps cross connect N: Loss of CVT A2: If l-CH-278 is open, loss of alternate path of iajection to Cold and Hot legs, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-I287A/B/C is required)
NI: If l-CH-278 is closed, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals. (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 or l-CH-HCV-1186 is required),
N2: If l-CH-278 is open, total loss of Charging pump supply to RCP seals, and loss of alternate charging path (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1287 A/B/C is required)
CH-015 Normal seal cooling path, A: Loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, A: None between l-CH-MOV-1370, I-CH- and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: Loss of normal path of charging pumps to the HCV-1186 N: Loss ofCVT RCP seals, (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1370 and l-CH-HCV-1186, or any other combination that isolates this line, is required)
CH-016 Alternate "charging" path A: Small LOCA outside containment A: None between l-CH-FCV-1160 N: Small LOCA outside containment N: Loss of alternate charging path, (Closure of l-containment RC-1556A/B/C is required) I CH-017 Alternate "charging" path A: Small LOCA inside containment A: None between containment, l -RC-P- N: Small LOCA inside containment N: Loss of alternate charging path, (Closure of l-HCV-l 556A/B/C RC-1556A/B/C is required)
CH-018 Normal charging path between l- Al: None (if emergency boration is not required) A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
CH-MOV-1289B, l-CH-MOV- A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency 1289A boration is required) boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation) N: Loss of normal charging path, (Closure of l-CH-1289B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
CH-019 Normal charging path between l- Al: None (if emergency boration is not required) A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
CH-MOV-1289A containment Al: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency boration is required) boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation) N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of l-CH-I289B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
Page 7 of 62
=*======*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CH-020 Normal charging path between A 1: None (if emergency boration is not required) A: None (if emergency boration is not required) containment Regen. HEX (l-CH- A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency E-3) boration is required) boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation) N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of l-CH-1289 A or B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
CH-021 Normal charging path between Al: None (if emergency boration is not required) A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
Regen. HEX (l-CH-E-3), l-CH- A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency HCV-13IOA, l-CH-HCV-1311 boration is required) boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation) N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of l-CH-1289A or B (or any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
CH-022 Normal charging path between l- A 1: None (if emergency boration is not required) A: None (if emergency boration is not required)
CH-HCV-13 IOA, l-CH-312 A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency A2: Loss of emergency boration (if emergency (check valve) boration is required) boration is required)
N: Loss ofVCT (and BAT ifit is in operation) N: Loss of normal charging path, (closure of l -
CH-1289 A or B *cor any other valve isolating the normal path only) is required)
CH-023 Normal charging path between l- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None 1 CH-HCV-1311, l-CH-313 (check Nl: If l-CH-HCV-1311 is open, loss of VCT (and N: Loss ofVCT/BAT tb Auxiliary Spray header, valve) BAT if it is in operation) (closure of l-CH-I289A or B (or any other valve N2: If l-CH-HCV-1311 is closed, loss ofVCT/BAT isolating the normal path only) is required) supply to Aux. Spray header CH-024 Letdown path between l-CH- A: None (this section is isolated) A: None LCV-1460A, 1-CH-LCV-I460B N: Small LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A is required)
CH-025 Letdown path between l-CH- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None LCV- l 460B! 3x2 Reducer before N: Small LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-Regen. HEX 1460A or 1460B is required)
CH-026 Letdown path between 3x2 A: None (This section is isolated) A: None Reducer before Regen. HEX, N: Medium LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-Regen. HEX 1460A or 1460B is required)
Page 8 of 62
FAILURE EFFECdT::::=======F=AIL=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION
=--------~--=-=------.- - - - - - - -
CH-027 Letdown path between Regen. A; None (this section is isolated) A: None HEX and 3x2 Reducer on the N: Medium LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-discharger of side of the Regen. 1460A or 1460B is required)
HEX CH-028A Letdown path be{ween 3x2 A: None (This section is isolated) A: None (This section is isolated)
Reducer on the discharger of side N: Small LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-of the Regen. HEX, l-CH-RV- 1460A or 1460B is required) 1203, l-CH-HCV-1142, l-CH-TV-1204A CH-028B Letdown path between l-CH-TV- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None (This section is isolated) 1204A containment N: Small LOCA inside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of 1-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B or 1204A is required)
CH-029 Letdown path between l-CH-RV- Al: None (if PRT is not in operation) Al: None (if PRT is not in operation) 1203, 3x4 Reducer between CH A2: Potential Medium LOCA (if PRT is in A2: Potential Medium LOCA (if PRT is in and RC designated headers operation) operation)
N: None (Pressurizer Relief Tank is not in N: None (Pressurizer Relief Tank is not in operation) operation)
CH-030A Letdown path between A: None (This section is isolated) A: None containment, 1-CH-TV-1204B N: Small LOCA outside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, or TV-1204A is required)
CH-030B Letdown path beyween I-CH-TV- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None 1204B, Non-Regen HEX N: Small LOCA outside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
CH-031 Letdown path between Non- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None Regen HEX, l-CH-PCV-1145, l- N: Small LOCA outside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-CH-164 (Normally closed manual 1460A, 1460B, TV-I204A, or 1204B is required) valve)
CH-032 Letdown path between 1-CH-PCV A: None (This section is isolated) A: None 1145, l-CH-164 (Normally closed N: Small LOCA outside Containment N: Loss of letdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-manual valve), l-CH-TCV-1143, 1460A, 1460B, '.fV-1204A, or 1204B is required) l-CH-RV-1209 Page 9 of 62
====:j*!=::=====*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CH-033 Letdown path between l-CH- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None TCV-1143, l-CH-478 (Check N: Small LOCA outside Containment N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-valve) 1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
CH-034 Letdown path between l-CH-478 A: None (This section is isolated) A: None (Check valve), Mixed bed N: Small LOCA outside Containment Note that the N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-Deminerlizer (lA) l-CH-68, 1- Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this 1460A, l460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required)
CH-l (Normally closed manual segment after check valve l-CH-478. Thus, during Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header valve) low power operation, the consequences of rupture in joins this segment after check valve 1-CH-478.
this segment may be different. Thus, during low power operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
CH-035A Letdown path between Mixed bed A: None (This section is isolated) A: None Deminerlizer IA, l-CH-24 N: Small LOCA outside Containment. Note that the N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-(Normally closed manual valve), Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this 1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required).
l-CH-HCV-1244, l-CH-17 segment after check valve l-CH-478. Thus, during Note that the Reactor Cavity Purification header (Manually closed valve), l-CH-18 low power operation, the consequences of rupture in joins this segment after check valve 1-CH-478.
(Manually closed valve), l-CH-55 this segment may be different. Thus, during low power operation, the (Manual closed valve), l-CH-22 consequences of rupture in this segment may be (Check valve) different.
CH-035B Mixed bed Deminerlizer l-CH A: None (This section is isolated) A: None lB line for letdown path from l - Nl: if normally closed valves are not open, none. Nl: if normally closed valves are not open, none.
CH-24 (manual closed valve), l- N2: if normally closed valves are opened, small N2: Loss of letdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-CH-68 (manual closed valve) LOCA outside Containment 1460A, 1460B, 1204A, or 1204B is required)
CH-036 Letdown path between l-CH- A: None (This section is isolated) A: None HCV-1244, VCT, l-CH-FCV- N: Small LOCA outside Containment Note that the N: Loss ofletdown path (closure of l-CH-MOV-ll 14B Reactor Cavity Purification header joins this 1460A, 1460B, TV-1204A, or 1204B is required) segment after check valve l-CH-478. Thus, during low pmver operation, the consequences of rupture in this segment may be different.
CH-037 Lines connecting Deborating A: None A: None Deminerlizers to the letdown path N 1: If isolation valves are closed, no significant NI: If isolation valves are closed no significant (drawing l 1448-FM-088A) consequence (loss of deborating capability) consequence (loss of deborating capability)
N2: If isolation valves are not closed potential N2: No significant consequence (loss of LOCA deborating capability) (there are many different ways to isolate this path)
Page JO of 62
*'=======
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CH-038 Boric Acid supply line between I - A: Loss of emergency boration A: Loss of emergency boration CH-MOV-1350, l-CH-84, 1-CH- N: Conservatively, loss ofVCT/BAT N: None 88 CH-039 All other Boric Acid supply lines A: Conservatively, loss of emergency boration A: None N: Conservatively, loss ofCVT/BAT N: None CH-040 All other piping to VCT A: None (they are isolated) A: None N: Conservatively, loss of CVT/BAT N: None Total number of segments for Chemical and Volume Control = 43 Circulating Water CW-001 Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River
- Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lA to the intake CW-002 Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lB to the intake CW-003 Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from l -CW-P-1 C I I
to the intake CW-004 Water supply from River to the Loss of one train of makeup water from the River Loss of one train of makeup water from the River intake structure from 1-CW-P-lD to the intake CW-005 Condenser 1-CN-SC-lA CW Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA supply header from intake condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat condenser, loss of SW supply header to recirc.
structure to the intersection of 96"- exchangers (1-RS-E- lB and 1C), loss of SW supply spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and IC)
WC-1-10 with i 48"-WS-1-10 to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) (Closure of 1-SW-IOlB is required) common suction header.
CW-006 Condenser 1-CN-SC-lA CW Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA supply header from intake condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (1-CC-E- condenser (Closure of l-SW-MOV-l02A is structure to the intersection of 96"- lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control required)
WC-2-10 with 42"-WS-13-10 Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P- lOB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps).
Page 11 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CW-007 Condenser 1-CN-SC-lB CW Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB, loss Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB supply header from intake of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E- condenser, loss of one SW supply header to recirc.
structure to the intersection of 96"- IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E- lB and 1C)
WC-3-10 with 48;'-WS-2-10 Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction (Closure of 1-SW-lOlAis required) header.
CW-008 Condenser 1-CN-SC-IB CW Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB supply header from intake condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (1-CC-E-structure to the intersection of 96"- lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control WC-4-10 with 42"-WS-12-10 Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P- IOB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser, loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-IOB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps). (Closure of 1-SW-MOV-102B is required)
CW-009 Condenser discharge from Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOA condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106A is exchangers (1-RS-E- IB and 1C), loss of SW supply required) to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (l-BC-E-1AIB/C) common suction header.
CW-010 Condenser discharge from Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOB condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (1-CC-E-lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control .
Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-l OB, 2-SW-P-IOB (charging pump SW pumps) .Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-
- IA condenser (Closure of 1-CW-MOV-106B is required)
CW-011 Condenser discharge from Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB, loss Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC- IB condenser to 1-CW-MOV-IOOC of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( 1-RS-E- condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106C is IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing required)
Cooling HEX~ (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header.
Page 12 of 62
=:=:i*-======*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CW-012 Condenser discharge from Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lB condenser to 1-CW-MOV-lOOD condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (l-CC-E-lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P-lOB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lB condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106D is required)
CW-013 Condenser discharge from 1-CW- Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IA MOV-lOOA to discharge canal condenser, loss of cooling to recirc. spray heat condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106A or -
exchangers (1-RS-E-lB and IC), loss of SW supply lOOA is required) to the Bearing Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-lA/B/C) common suction header.
CW-014 Condenser discharge from 1-CW- Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA MOV-lOOB to discharge canal condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (1-CC-E-lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to l-SW-P-10B, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps).Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lA condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106B or -
lOOB is required)
CW-015 Condenser discharge from 1-CW- Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-lB, loss Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB MOV-lOOC to discharge canal of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E- condenser (Closure of 1-CW-MOV-I06C or -IOOC IB and IC), loss of SW supply to the Bearing is required)
Cooling HEXs (1-BC-E-IA/B/C) common suction header.
CW-016 Condenser discharge from 1-CW- Loss ofone CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB MOV-l OOD ;to discharge canal condenser, loss of SW to CCW HEXs (1-CC-E-lA/B/C/D), loss of SW to the Control Room/ESWGR chillers, loss of suction header to 1-SW-P- l OB, 2-SW-P-lOB (charging pump SW pumps)Loss of one CW supply header to 1-CN-SC-IB condenser (Closure of l-CW-MOV-106D or -
lOOD is required)
Total number of segments for Circulating Water= 16 Page 13 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT FAILUR)l: EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION Component Cooling Water CC-OOlA From CCW Surge Tank to CCW Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units pumps supply header up to the following intersection points:, 6"-
CC-20-151 and 18"-CC-17-121, 6"-CC-22-151 and 18"-CC 121, 6"-CC-222-151 and 18"-CC-14-121, 6"-CC-22-151 and 18"-
CC-15-121, ceck valve l-CC-547 CC-OOlB Assorted of2" and 1.5" diameter Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units connected to the CCW surge tank CC-OOlC From unit 1 and 2 SG blowdown None (no backflow possible and supply header from None (no backflow possible and supply header coolers and Condensate system the CCW system to SG sample coolers too small to from the CCW system to SG sample coolers too from check valve l-CC-893 and cause flow diversion or inventory deletion (See small to cause flow diversion or inventory deletion normally closed man. vlv. l-CN- 11448-FM-72C, sht 2, E5) (See 11448-FM-72C, sht 2, E5) 600 to check valve l-CC-547 CC-002 CCW pumps supply header from Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units intersection point with the following pipes: 18"-CC-17-121, 18"-CC-16-121, 18"-CC-14-121, 18"-CC-15-121, upto the following valves: l-CC-554, l-CC-560, l-CC-566, l-CC-575 CC-003 Supply header to 1-CC-P-IA from Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-554 to the pump CC-004 Supply headFr to 1-CC-P- lB from Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-560 to the pump CC-005 Supply header to 1-CC-P-lD from Loss ofCCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-566 to the pump Page 14 of 62
='*========'*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-006 Supply header to l-CC-P-1 C from Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units manual valve l-CC-575 to the pump CC-007 Discharge header from CCW Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units pumps IA and 1B from the pumps upto CCW HEX common header 18"-CC-224-121 and normally closed manual valve 1-CC-573 CC-008 Discharge header from CCW Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units pumps 1D and 1C from the pumps upto CCW HEX common header 18"-CC-224-121 and normally closed manual valve l -
CC-572 CC-009 Discharge header of CCW pumps If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss of If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss between normally closed manual CCW to both units. of CCW to both units.
valves: l-CC-573, l-CC-572, l-CC-589, l-CC-590, CC-010 Inlet piping to CCW HEXs IA Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units and 1B from intersection point with I8"-CC-227-I21 and normally closed manual valve l -
CC-589 to the body of HEXs.
CC-011 Inlet piping to CCW HEXs 1C Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units and ID from intersection point with 18"-CC-229-121 and normally closed manual valve l -
CC-712 to the body of HEXs.
Page 15 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION
=====*
FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-012 Discharge header of lA and 1B Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs from the body of HEXs to: normally closed manual valve I-CC-588, normally open manual valve l-CC-606, and intersection with the following pipes: 12"-CC-27-121, 18"-CC-10-121, 18"-CC-8-121 CC-013 Discharge header of 1C and lD Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs from the body of HEXs to: normally closed manual valve l-CC-595, normally closed manual valve l-CC-608, normally closed manual valve I-CC-600, normally closed manual valve 2-CC-606 and intersection with the following pipes: 18"-CC-7-121 and 18"-CC-9-121.
CC-014 Crosstie piping for the outlet of Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units CCW HEXs between manual I valves: l-CC-558 (normally '
closed), 1-CC-595 (normally closed), 1-CC-606 (normally open), 2-CC-606 (normally closed)
CC-015A CCW discharge header to Misc. Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Boron Evaporator components from intersection of 18"-CC-235-121 and 12"-CC-27-121 to the following: I~CC-322 (normally closed manual valve), l-BR-TCV-111B, 1-BR-TCV-l llA, I-BR-TCV-109B, 1-BR-TCV-109A Page 16 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION I '=============* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-015B CCW discharge header to Misc. Loss of CCW to both units Loss of CCW to both units Boron Evaporator components from I-BR-TCV-11 IB, I-BR-TCV-11 IA, I-BR-TCV-109B, I-BR-TCV-109A, to 2-CC-369 (normally closed manual valve), 1-CC-TCV-105, intersection of 12"-
CC-33-121 with 18"-CC-17-121 CC-016A Supply line to RHR HEX A from Loss of CCW to both unit Loss of CCW to both units the intersection of 24"-CC-235-121 and 18"-CC-8-121 to containment CC-016B Supply line to RHR HEX A from Loss of CCW to both unit inside of the Unit I Loss of CCW to both unit inside of the Unit 1 containment to normally closed containment containment manual valve l-CC-178 CC-017 RHR IA supply and discharge If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-lA If valves are If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-lA If valves piping from normally closed open, loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems are open, loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems manual valve l-CC-178 to normally closed manual valve l -
CC-181 CC-018A RHR 1A HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 If manual valve l-CC-181 is closed, loss of 1-RH-from normally closed I-CC-181 Containment E-lA (Closure of I-CC-TV-I09A is required) If to Unit 1 containment penetration manual valve I-CC-181 is open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment CC-018B RHR IA HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems If manual valve I-CC-181 is closed, loss of 1-RH-from Unit I containment E-IA (Closure of I-CC-TV-109A is required) If penetration to l-CC-TV-109A manual valve I -CC-181 is open, loss ofunit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment CC-019 RHR IA HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems from l-CC-TV-I09A to CCW pumps supply header upto the intersection of the following pipes 18"-CC-16-121 and 18"-CC
- 121 Page 17 of 62
SEGMENT ID
~====-=====*
SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-020A CCW supply line to RHR 1B Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems HEX from intersection of 24 "-CC-235- l 2 land 18"-CC-10-121 to the intersection of 18 "-CC- I 0-121 line with the following pipes 10"-
CC-89-121, 10"-CC-81-121, 14"-
CC-67-121 and Unit I Containment Building CC-020B CCW supply line to RHR lB Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 HEX from Unit 1 Containment containment) containment)
Building to l-CC-182 (normally closed manual valve) and the intersection of 18 "-CC-10-121 with 3"-CC-248-151 CC-020C CCW for pipe penetration cooling Loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems (inside unit 1 coils from the intersection of 18"- containment) containment)
CC-10-121 with 3"-CC-248-151 to the intersection of 18"-CC 121 with 3"-CC-249-151 I
CC-021 RHR lB supply and discharge If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-IB. If valves are If valves are closed, loss of 1-RH-E-IA. If valves piping from normally closed open, loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems are open, loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems manual valve l -CC-182 to normally closed manual valve l -
CC-185 CC-022A RHR lB HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 If manual valve l-CC-185 is closed, loss of 1-RH-from normally closed l-CC-185 Containment E- lB (Closure of l-CC-TV-109B is required). If to Unit l containment penetration manual valve l-CC-185 is open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit l Containment CC-022B RHR lB HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems If manual valve l-CC-185 is closed, loss of 1-RH-from Unit I containment E- lB (Closure of l-CC-TV-109B is required). If penetration to l-CC-TV-109B manual valve l-CC-185 is open, loss of unit l and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Containment Page 18 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-023 RHR 1B HEX discharge piping Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems from l-CC-TV-109B to CCW pumps supply header upto the intersection of 18;'-CC-17-121 with the following pipes 10"-CC-101-121, 6"-CC-85-151, 8"-CC-78-151, 14"-CC-70-121, 8"-CC-314-151, 3" dia. pipe from pipe penetrations cooling coils, 18"-
CC-19-121.
CC-024 CCW to IA and 1B RCPs from Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems intersection of 10"-CC-89-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto the Unit 1 Containment CC-025 CCW for the IA RCP from Unit I Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems inside the unit I Loss of Units I and 2 CCW systems inside the containment penetration I-PEN- Containment Unit I containment PN-18 to: l-PEN-PN-25 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the I-RC-P-IA RCP), I-CC-TV-120A CC-026 CCW pipe on the 1-RC-P- IA Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (l-PEN-PN-25) to l-CC-TV-I05A CC-027 CCW pipe on the INIB/IC RCP Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems discharge path from 1-CC-TV-105 A/B/C to the intersection of 10"-CC-101 7121 with 18"-CC 121 pipe CC-028 CCW pipe on the Unit I RCPs Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to the unit I RCPs (closure of 1-CC-thermal barrier discharge paths containment TV- l 40A and l-CC-TV-140B is required) from 1-CC-TV-140A to the Unit I Containment (l-PEN-PN-110)
Page 19 of 62
====1.
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION I !:========* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-028A CCW pipe on the discharge of Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to the unit I RCPs (closure of l -CC-Unit 1 RCPs from l-CC-TV- containment TV- l 20A, l-CC-TV-120B, l-CC-TV-120C, and l-120A/B/C (RCP lNlB/lC CC-TV-140A is required) discharge) to l-CC-TV-140A CC-029 CCW pipe on the Unit 1 RCPs Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to the unit 1 RCPs (closure of l -CC-thermal barrier discharge paths containment TV- l 40A and l-CC-TV-140B is required) from the Unit 1 Containment ( l -
PEN-PN-110) to 1-CC-TV-140B CC-030 CCW for the 1B RCP from the Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit Unit 1 containment penetration 1- Containment I* Containment PEN-PN-17 to: l-PEN-PN-27 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the 1-RC-P-lB RCP), l-CC-TV-l 20B CC-031 CCW pipe on the 1-RC-P-lB Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (l-PEN-PN-27) to l-CC-TV-105B CC-032 CCW to the Unit 1 IC RCPs from Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit land 2 CCW systems intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto the Unit 1 Containment and intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 with 8"-CC-75-151 (pipe to reactor containment air recirc.
cooler)
CC-033 CCW for the 1C RCP from the Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Unit 1 containment penetration l-PEN-PN-16 to: l-PEN-PN-26 (includes CCW piping on the supply and discharge headers of the 1-RC-P-IC RCP), l-CC-TV-120C Page 20 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CC-034 CCW pipe on the l-RC-P-IC Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems discharge path from the containment penetration (1-PEN-PN-26) to l-CC-TV-I05C CC-035 CCW to the Unit I Fuel Pit Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Coolers, Non Regen. HEX and Seal Water HEX from the intersection of 14"-CC-67-121 pipe with 18"-CC-10-121 pipe upto: the intersection of 10"-CC-81-121 with 3"-CC-39-151, the intersection of 14"-CC-70-121 with 18"-CC-17-121, the intersection of 14"-CC-70-121 with 3"-CC-42-151, 2-CC-403 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-405 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-429 (normally closed manual valve), 2-CC-431 (normally closed manual valve), l-CC-740 (normally closed manual valve), 1-CC-1288 (normally closed manual valve)
CC-036 CCW to Misc. component from Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss on Unit I and 2 CCW systems the intersection of3"-CC-39-151 with 14"-CC-67-121 to the intersection of 3"-CC-42-151 with 14"-CC-70-121 Page 21 of 62
SEGMENT ID t:==::=====*=====*
SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-037 CCW to Excess Letdown HEX, Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Primary Drain Cooler, RHR pumps seal cooler.s and other Misc. components from the intersection of supply header (6 "-
CC-105-151) with 18"-CC 121 to the intersection of discharge header (6"-CC-207-151) with 18"-CC-17-121 including the following normally closed manual valves: l-CC-122, l-CC-118, l-CC-116, l-CC-112.
CC-038 CCW to 1-RH-P-lA seal cooler Loss of 1-RH-P-lA (Note that even if valves are Loss of 1-RH-P-lA (Note that even if valves are between the following normally open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this closed manual valves l-CC-122, segment will not disable the CCW system (See segment will not disable the CCW system (See l-CC-118 assumption 1)) assumption 1))
CC-039 CCW to 1-RH-P-lB seal cooler Loss of 1-RH-P-lB (Note that even if valves are Loss of 1-RH-P-IB (Note that even if valves are between the following normally open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this open it is assumed that a pipe rupture in this closed manual valves 1-CC-116, segment will not disable the CCW system (See segment will not disable the CCW system (See 1-CC-112 assumption 1)) assumption 1)) i CC-040 CCW to Unit l reactor Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems containment air recirc. cooler from the intersection of8"-CC 151 with 10"-CC-81-121 to 1-CC-TV-IOIA CC-041 CCW for Unit 1 reactor Loss of Unit l and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
containment air recirc. cooler coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOIA and l-CC-from 1-CC-TV-lOlA to: Unit I HCV-101B is required)
Containment penetrations (l-PEN-PN-9 and l-PEN-PN-11), l-CC-SOV-102A (normally closed)
Page 22 of 62
=='*t======== '======*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-042 CCW for Unit 1 reactor Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
containment air recirc. cooler I - Containment coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and 1-CC-VS-E-2A from Containment HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-llOA is required) penetrations l-PEN-PN-11 to penetration l -PEN-PN-14 CC-043 CCW for Unit 1 reactor Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
containment air recirc. cooler l - Containment coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOIA and 1-CC-VS-E-2B from Containment HCV-lOIB (or 1-CC-TV-llOB is required) penetrations l -PEN-PN-10 to penetration l-PEN-PN-12 CC-044 CCW for Unit 1 reactor Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
containment air recirc. cooler l - Containment coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-IOlA and 1-CC-VS-E-2C from Containment HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOC is required) penetrations l-PEN-PN-13 to penetration l-PEN-PN-09 CC-045 CCW for the neutron shield tank Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
cooler (1-NS-E-lA) from the Containment coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and l-CC-intersection of 2" -CC-106-151 HCV-101B (or l-CC-TV-1 lOA is required) with 6"-CC-78-151 to l-CC-FCV-l 12A CC-046 CCW for the neutron shield tank Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss ofCCW to 1-NS-E-lA (closure of l-CC-FCV-cooler 1-NS-E-lA from l-CC- Containment 112A and l -CC- l l 2B is required)
FCV-112A to l-CC-112B, normally closed man. vlv l-CC-884, normally closed man. vlv l-CC-935 CC-047 CCW for the neutron shield tank If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss of If valves are closed, none. If valves are open, loss cooler 1-NS*E- lA from normally Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit I ofCCW to 1-NS-E-IA (closure of l-CC-FCV-closed man. vlv l-CC-884, Containment 112A and l-CC-112B is required) normally closed man. vlv l-CC-935, to normally closed man. vlv l-CC-885, normally closed man.
vlv l -CC-936 Page 23 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION CC-048 Discharge of CCW for the Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems inside the Unit 1 Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
neutron shield tank cooler l-NS- Containment coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and 1-CC-E-1 A from l-CC-FCV-l 12B to HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOA) is required) the intersection of 2 "-CC-111-151 with 6"-CC-78-151 CC-049 CCW for the neutron shield tank If all valves are closed, none. If l-CC-FCV-l 13A/B If all valves are closed, none. If l-CC-FCV-cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally are open, loss of unit 1 and 2 CCW systems l 13A/B are open, loss of CCW to 1-NS-E- lB closed man. vlv l-CC-885, (closure of l-CC-FCV-l 13A/B is required) normally closed man. vlv l-CC-936, to Normally closed l-CC-FCV-l 13A, Normally closed l-CC-113B CC-050 CCW for the neutron shield tank Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOIA and 1-CC-closed 1~cc-FCV-l 13A to the HCV-lOlB (or l-CC-TV-1 lOC) is required) intersection of 2"-CC-312-151 with 6"-CC-80-151 CC-051 CCW for the neutron shield tank Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
cooler 1-NS-E-lB from normally coolers (closure of 1-CG-HCV-lOlA and 1-CC-closed l-CC-FCV-113B to the HCV-lOlB (or 1-CC-TV-l lOC) is required) intersection of 2"-CC-313-151 with 6"-CC-80-151 CC-052 Discharge of CCW for Unit I Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of CCW to reactor containment air recirc.
reactor containment air recirc. coolers (closure of 1-CC-HCV-lOlA and 1-CC-coolers and neutron shield tank HCV-lOlB is required) coolers from Containment penetration seals l-PEN-PN-13, 12 14 to 1-CC-HCV-lOlB I-CC-HCV-102B (normally closed)
CC-053 Discharge of CCW for Unit 1 Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems reactor containment air recirc.
coolers and neutron shield tank coolers from l -CC-HCV-101B and the intersection of 8 11 -CC 151 and 18"-CC-17-121 Page 24 of 62
~-======*=====
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CC-054 CCW to Instrument Air Loss of Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Compressor HEXs from the intersection of l.5"-CC-501-151 with 8"-CC-75-151 upto the HEXs CC-055 Discharge path of CCW to Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Instrument Air Compressor HEXs from HEXs to the intersection of 1.5"-CC-506-151 with 8"-CC 151 CC-056 CCW for Misc. Boron Stripper Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems subcomponents from the intersection of8"-CC-32-I51 with 18"-CC-235-121 to: the intersection of 8 "-CC-314-15 I with 18"-CC-17-121, l-CC-632 (normally closed man. vlv), l-CC-625 (normally closed man. vlv), 2-CC-635 (normally closed man.
vlv), 2-CC-635 (normally closed man. vlv)
Total number of segments for Component Cooling Water= 65 Condensate CN-001 From condenser hotwell to 1-CN- Loss of 1-CN-P-lA Depending on the location of the break, may be P-lA pump discharge check valve able to isolate the pump.
l-CN-62 CN-002 From condenser hotwell to 1-CN- Loss of 1-CN-P-IB Depending on the location of the break, may be P- IB pump discharge check valve able to isolate the pump.
l-CN-50 '
CN-003 From condenser hotwell to 1-CN- Loss of 1-CN-P-lC Depending on the location of the break, may be P-1 C pump discharge check valve able to isolate the pump.
1-CN-38 CN-004 Discharge header for the Loss of condensate system Loss of condensate system condensate pul!lps Page 25 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION
==========* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CN-005 Balance of the condensate system Loss of condensate system Depending on the location of the break, can lose the condensate system or one train.
CN-006 I 1/2 to exhaust hood spray Not in operation except during turbine startup Bypass can be used.
evolutions or light turbine loading.
CN-007 Level control valves 1-CN-LCV- Loss of condensate makeup and eventual loss of Depending on the location of the beak 102A,B to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA condensate. 1) Downstream of l-CN-LCV-102A loss of low volume makeup
- 2) Downstream of l-CN-LCV-102B loss oflow volume makeup CN-008 Emergency condensate storage Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate tank to Emergency condensate storage tank. storage tank.
make-up tank and I-CN-150 CN-009 Condensate storage tank supply to Loss of condensate makeup and eventual loss of Loss of normal makeup to emergency condensate emergency condensate storage condensate. storage tank.
tank to l-CN-150 CN-010 l-CN-TK.-3 to valves at suction of Loss of emergency supply of AFW through the Loss of emergency supply of AFW through the AFW pumps(l-FW-283, 1-FW- booster pumps booster pumps 284, and l-FW-285)
Total number of segments for Condensate = 10 Containment Spray CS-001 RWST flow to CS pump 1B from Loss of Unit 1 RWST outside Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Tank to: 1-CS-MOV-lOOB CS-002 RWST flow to CS pump IA from Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment Tank to: 1-CS-MOV-lOOA CS-003 RWST flow to Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss Spray pump 1B from 1-CS-MOV- ofLHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc.
lOOB to normally closed manual (Function Hl))Loss of Train B of Unit I CS valve l-CS-15, 1-CS-MOV-IOIC (Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-lOOB is (normally closed), l-CS-MOV- required) 10 ID (normally closed)
Page 26 of 62
===:l*======== =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CS-004 RWST flow to Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss Loss of Train A of Unit I CS (Operator action to Spray pump IA from 1-CS-MOV- of LHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA is required)
IOOA to normally closed manual (Function HI))
valve I-CS-8, 1-CS-MOV-lOlA (normally closed), 1-CS-MOV-IOIB (normally closed)
CS-005 R WST flow to Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss Loss of Train B of Unit I CS (Operator action to Spray pump 1B from: 1-CS-MOV- of LHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. close 1-CS-MOV-IOOB is required) 101 C (normally closed), 1-CS- (Function HI))
MOV-lOID (normally closed) to:
Containment Penetration CS-006 R WST flow to Containment Loss of Unit I RWST outside Containment (i.e. loss Loss of Train A of Unit l CS (Operator action to Spray pump IA from 1-CS-MOV- ofLHSI (Function D3), CS, RS, LH Recirc. close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA is required)
IOlA (normally closed), 1-CS- (Function Hl))
MOV-IOIB (normally closed) to:
Containment Penetration CS-007 Flow to spray nozzles from Loss of Unit 1 RWST water to (See assumption 3): Loss of Unit I CS, Train B (Operator action to penetration seal to check valve l- LHSI (function D3), CS close 1-CS-MOV-lOOB or 1-CS-MOV-IOlC/D is CS-127 required)
CS-008 Flow to spray nozzles from Loss of Unit I RWST water to (See assumption 3): Loss of Unit I CS, Train A (Operator action to penetration seal to check valve l - LHSI (function D3), CS close 1-CS-MOV-lOOA or 1-CS-MOV-lOlA/B is CS-105 required)
CS-009 CS flow to spray nozzles between Loss of Unit I RWST water supply to LHSI Loss ofCS(Operator action to close 1-CS-MOV-check valve 1-CS-127 and l -CS- (function D3) CS lOOA/B or 1-CS-MOV-IOIA/B/C/D is required) 105 CS-010 CS flow test lines between Loss of.Unit 1 RWST Loss of CS (1-CS-MOV-normally closed manual valves 1- lOOA/B must be closed)
CS-8/ l 5 and manual, normally closed manual valve 1-CS-18.
CS-011 CS flow test lines between None (See assumption/assertion No. 8)None (See normally closed manual valves l- assumption/assertion No. 8)
CS-18 and the RWST tank.
Page 27 of 62
=*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION I ~====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION CS-012 Flow from Refueling Water None (See assumption 6)None (See assumption 6)
Chemical Addition Tank CS-013 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153)
CS-014 Flow from CS piping to the None (See assumption 4)None (See assumption 4) containment sump (2.5"-CS 153)
CS-015 Flow from RWST to the closed Loss of Unit 1 RWST Loss of Unit 1 RWST valve l-CS-27 CS-016 The remaining portions of the None (See assumption lO)None (See assumption 10)
RWST cooling unit piping not covered in segment 1CS-11 (i.e.
excluding the section between the RWST and the normally closed isolation valve l-CS-27)
Total number of segments for Containment Spray= 16 Emergency Core Cooling ECC-000 From RWST to CV l-SI-410 (to Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of RWST outside containment CVCS) to CV l-SI-46B (LPI) and CV l-SI-46A (LPI)
ECC-001 Cold leg loop I from CV l-Sl-241 Loss ofRWST inside containment Loss of injection and recirculation to one cold leg and CV l-SI-235 to CV l-SI-79 from HHI and LHI ECC-002 Cold leg loop 2 from CV l-SI-242 Loss ofRWST inside containment Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg and CV l-SI-236 to CV l-SI-82 from HPI and LPI ECC-003 Cold leg loop 3 from CV l-SI-243 Loss ofRWST inside containment Loss of Injection and recirculation to one cold leg and CV l-SI-237 to CV l-SI-85 from HPI and LPI ECC-004 Hot leg LPI CV l-SI-228 and CV Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI l-SI-229 and HPI l-SI-226 and Trains A and B Trains A and B SI-227 to CV SI-239, SI-238, SI-240 Page 28 of 62
====l*!:::===--==-=--====== FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION ECC-005 Hot leg loop I CV Sl-239 to CV Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation Loss of Hot Leg Recirculation from LPI and HPI SI-91 from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Trains A and B ECC-006 Hot leg loop 2 CV SI-238 to CV Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation SI-88 from LPI and HPI Trains A and B from LPI and HPI Trains A and B ECC-007 Hot leg loop 3 CV SI-240 to CV Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation Loss of Injection to one Hot Leg on Recirculation SI-94 from LPI and HPI Trains A and B from LPI and HPI Trains A and B Total number of segments for Emergency Core Cooling= 8 Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil EE-001 5,000 barrel tank to 20,000 gal. None. The underground tanks together provide a None. The underground tanks together provide a tank including recirc. seven day supply of fuel oil. seven day supply of fuel oil.
EE-002 20,000 gal. tank, l-EE-TK-2A, to None. The ready fuel oil supply train is lost but the None. The ready fuel oil supply train is lost but the valve l-EE-1, the ready fuel standby train starts automatically. standby train starts automatically.
pumps and the 500 gal aux fuel oil tanks EE-003 20,000 gal. tank, 1-EE-TK-2B, to None. The standby fuel oil supply train is lost but None. The standby fuel oil supply train is lost but stand by fuel pumps to 500 gal. the ready train starts automatically. the ready train starts automatically.
tanks I EE-004 Cross connect between 1-EE-TK- No consequences. Normally isolated. If in use, the None if manual valves are closed. Othenvise, lA and lB, bypass for underground tanks would would still be available backup fuel supply limited to one underground underground tanks. based on the hydraulics tank.
EE-007-1, -2, -3 Injector header Loss of one diesel generator Loss of one diesel generator.
EE-5-lA,B, 2A,B, 3A 500 gal. tanks to base tanks. None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an but the opposite pump will supply base tank when EDG but the opposite pump will supply base tank level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S). when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S).
EE IA,B, 2A,B, 3A Base tank to injector header, 'A' None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an EDG None. Loss of one train of fuel oil supply to an pump motor driven (secondary but the opposite train will supply base tank when EDG but the opposite train will supply base tank source), 'B' pump engine driven level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S). (SDBD- when level falls below setpoint (NCRODP-8-S).
(primary source) SPS-EG refers to the de Motor-Driven pump as a backup on page 3-9)
Total number of segments for Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil =7 Feedwater System Page 29 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WIT OPERATOR ACTION I t=:====~*~
UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION FW-001 From Feedwater Heaters to 18 X Loss of Main Feedwater Loss of Main Feedwater 24 reducer.
FW-002 24" Feedwater supply line upto Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW 18" supply hearders to the FW pumps (includes header from HP FW heater drain pumps)
FW-003 18" header to FW pump B Loss of MFW Loss ofMFW between 24" header l-FW-112 FW-004 18" header to MFW pump A Loss of MFW Loss ofMFW between 24" header l-FW-127 (check valve)
FW-005 14" recirc. header to Condenser Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW FW-006 Feedwater Pump A discharger Loss of MFW Loss ofMFW pump A (closure of l-FW-MOV-header between l-FW-127 (check 150A is required) valve) l-FW-MOV-150A FW-007 Feedwater Pump B discharger Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW pump B (closure of l-FW-MOV-header between l-FW-112 (check 150A is required) valve) l-FW-MOV-150B FW-008 Feedwater header from 1-FW- Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW MOV-150A, l-FW-MOV-150B up to I-FW-MOV-154A, l-FW-MOV-154C, l-FW-MOV-154B FW-009 Feedwater header to SG A from 1- Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of l-FW-MOV-154A to 1-FW-FCV- FW-MOV-154A is required) 1478 FW-010 Feedwater header to SG C from 1- Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of I-FW-MOV-154C to l-FW-FCV- FW-MOV-154C is required) 1498 FW-011 Feedwater header to SG B from 1- Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator B (closure of I-FW-MOV-154B to l-FW-FCV- FW-MOV-154B is required) 1488 Page 30 of 62
~*~====*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION FW-012 Feedwater header to SG A from I- Loss ofMFW Loss of MFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of l -
FW-FCV-1478 to l-FW-12 FW-MOV- I 54A is required)
FW-013 Feedwater header to SG A from 1- Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of l-FW-FCV-1498 tci l-FW-74 FW-MOV-154C is required)
FW-014 Feedwater header to SG A from 1- Loss ofMFW Loss of MFW to Steam Generator B (Closure of l -
FW-FCV-1488 to l-FW-43 FW-MOV- I 54B is required)
FW-015 Feedwater header to SG A from Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator A (Closure of l-from l-FW-12 (check valve) to l- FW-MOV-154A is required)
FW-10 (check valve)
FW-016 Feedwater header to SG C from Loss ofMFW Loss of MFW to Steam Generator C (Closure of l-from l-FW-74 (check valve) to 1- FW-MOV-154C is required)
FW-72 (check valve)
FW-017 Feedwater header to SG A from Loss ofMFW Loss ofMFW to Steam Generator B (Closure of I-from l-FW-43 (check valve) to 1- FW-MOV-154B is required)
FW-41 (check valve) I I
FW-018 Feedwater header to SG A from Loss ofMFW Loss of AFW. Loss ofMFW and AFW to SG A (closure of I-FW-from l-FW-10 (check valve) to Loss of AFW to SG IA (Orifice in th eAFW line MOV154A, I-FW-MOV-151E, and l-FW-MOV-SGIA will prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the 151F is required) other two SGs)
FW-019 Feedwater header to SG C from Loss of MFW Loss of AFW Loss of MFW and AFW to SG C (closure of 1-FW-from l-FW-72 (check valve) to Loss of AFW to SG lB (Orifice in th eAFW line will MOVl 54C, I-FW-MOV-151A, and l-FW-MOV-SGlC prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the other 151B is required) two SGs)
FW-020 Feedwater header to SG B from Loss of MFW Loss of AFW Loss ofMFW and AFW to SG B (closure of I-FW-from l-FW-41 (check valve) to Loss of AFW to SG IA (Orifice in th eAFW line MOVl54B, I-FW-MOV-151C, and 1-FW-MOV-SG 1B will prevent blowdown of the AFW headers to the . 15 ID is required) other two SGs)
Total number of segments for Feedwater System = 20 High Head Safety Injection Page 31 of 62
=*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERA TOR ACTION I ===========*
UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION HHI-001 From RWST to suction of A: Loss of Unit I RWST. A: Loss of Unit I RWST charging pumps, between: check N: None N: None valve l-SI-410 and check valve l-SI-25 HHI-002 Form RWST to suction of A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps, between check cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps RWST cross connect to Unit I HHSI (charging) valve l-SI-25, l-SI-TV-102A, I- N: During normal operation this section of the pumps S1-TV-102B, 1-CH-MOV-115D, piping is isolated from the main supply header to the N: During normal operation this section of the l-CH-MOV-l 15B Charging pumps thus its rupture will not impact the piping is isolated from the main supply header to CVT supply to the charging pumps . the Charging pumps thus its rupture will not impact the CVT supply to the charging pumps HHI-003 From R WST to suction of A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of preferred path of Unit I and 2 RWST charging pumps, between: 1-CH- cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps supply line to the Charging pumps and loss of one MOV-l 15D, I-CH-MOV-l 15B, I- N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pump A of the two low head safety injection supply lines to CH-MOV-1267A, 1-CH-MOV- the charging pumps. (Closure of the following 1269A, I-CH-MOV-1270A, I-SI- MOVs would be required: I-CH-MOV-115D, I-MOV-1863B, check valve I-CH- CH-MOV-115B; 1-CH-MOV-1267A, 1-CH-MOV-227, check valve 1-CH-230 1269A, 1-CH-MOV-1270A, 1-SI-MOV-1863B)
N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps (No operator action can1reduce the direct impact of this scenario during normal at power operation)
HHI-004A From RWST to charging pump A A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump A.
(feed and discharge), between: 1- cross connect to Unit I Charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the CH-MOV-1267A, I-CH-MOV- N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps following MOVs would be required:l-CH-MOV-1267B, I-CH-256 (check valve), 1267A, I-CH-MOV-1267B)
I-CH-258 (check valve)
HHI-004B Discharge of charging pump A, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump A.
between: I-CH-256 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the 1-CH-MOV~1275A N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps following MOVs would be required:I-CH-MOV-1267A, I-CH-MOV-1267B, 1-CH-MOV-1275A)
HHI-004C Discharge of charging pump A, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump A.
between:I-CH-258 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of N: Loss of charging pump A (Closure of the I-CH-MOV-1286A, I-CH-MOV- Unit 2 Charging pumps cross connect to Unit I. following valves is required: I-CH-MOV-1267 A, 1287A N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps I-CH-MOV-1267B, I-CH-MOV-1286A, I-CH-MOV-1287A)
. Page 32 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION HHl-005A From RWST to charging pump B A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump B.
(feed and discharge), between: l- cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the CH-MOV-1269A, l-CH-MOV- N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps following MOVs would be required: l-CH-MOV-l269B, l-CH-267 (check valve), 1269A, l-CH-MOV-1269B) l-CH-265 (check valve)
HHl-005B Discharge of charging pump B, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump B.
between: l-CH-265 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the l-CH-MOV-1275B N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps following MOVs would be required: l-CH-MOV-1269A, l-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-1275B)
HHl-005C Discharge of charging pump B, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump B.
between: l-CH-267 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the l-CH-MOV-1286B, l-CH-MOV- Unit 2 Charging pumps cross connect to Unit 1. following valves is required: l-CH-MOV-l269A, 1287B N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps l-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-l286B, l-CH-MOV-1287B)
HHI-006A From RWST to charging pump C A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of charging pump C.
(feed and discharge), between: l- cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump C CH-MOV-1270A, l-CH-MOV- N: Loss of CVT and BAT to the charging pumps Closure of the following MOVs would be required:
l270B, l-CH-276 (check valve), 1-CH-MOV-1270A, 1-CH-MOV-1270B) l-CH-274 (check valve)
HHI-006B Discharge of charging pump C, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Charging pump B.
between: l-CH-274 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 charging pumps. N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the l-CH-MOV-1275C N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps following MOVs would be required: l-CH-MOV-1269A, 1-CH-MOV-1269B, l-CH-MOV-l275B)
HHI-006C Discharge of charging pump C, A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of charging pump B.
between: l-CH-276 (check valve), cross connect to Unit 1 Charging pumps, and loss of N: Loss of charging pump B (Closure of the l-CH-MOV-1286C, l-CH-MOV- Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect to Unit 1. following valves is required: I-CH-MOV-1270A, 1287C, l-CH-728 (normally N: Loss ofCVT and BAT to the charging pumps l-CH-MOV-1270B, I-CH-MOV-1286C, l-CH-closed man. 'vlv) MOV-1287C)
HHI-007 To Recirc/Seal Water between 1- A: Loss of Unit I RWST and loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of Recirc. for Charging pumps CH-MOV-1275C, 1-CH-MOV- cross connect to Unit 1 N: Loss ofRecirc. for Charging pumps (thus loss 1275B, l-CH-MOV-1275A, I-CH- N: Loss ofCVT and BAT of charging pumps)
MOV-1373 (Closure of the following valves is required l-CH-MOV-1275C, l-CH-MOV-1275B, l-CH-MOV-l275A, l-CH-MOV-1373)
Page 33 of 62
--*c====== =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION HHI-008 To Normal Charging/Injection to A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of normal paths for HHSI and seal Cold and Hot Legs/Seal between: cross connect to Unit I, and loss of Unit 2 charging cooling.
l-CH-MOV-1286A, 1-CH-MOV- pumps cross connect. N: Loss of normal path of Charging and seal 1286B, I-CH-MdV-1286C, 1-CH- N: Loss ofCVT and BAT cooling (Closure of the following valves is MOV-1867C, l-CH-MOV- required: l-CH-MOV-1286A, l-CH-MOV-1286B, 1867D, l-CH-MOV-1289A, l- l-CH-MOV-1286C, l-CH-MOV-1370)
CH-MOV-1869B, l-CH-MOV-1370 HHI-009 To Alternate Charging/Injection A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST Al: When l-CH-278 is closed; loss of alternate to Cold and Hot Legs/Seal cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging paths for HHSI and seal cooling (Closure of the Injection between: 1-CH-MOV- pumps cross connect. following valves is required l-CH-MOV-1287 A, l -
1287A, l-CH-MOV-1287B, 1-CH- N: Loss ofCVT and BAT CH-MOV-1287B, l-CH-MOV-1287C)
MOV-1287C, l-CH-FCV-1160, l- A2: When l-CH-278 is open; loss of Unit 1 CH-MOV-1842, l-CH-MOV- RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1869A, l-CH-278 (Normally 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross closed valve providing an connect alternate path for seal cooling) Nl: When l-CH-278 is closed; loss of alternate Charging path and seal cooling path via Charging pumps (Closure of the following valves is required l-CH-MOV-1287A l-CH-MOV-1287B l-CH-MOV-1287C) ' / '
N2: When l-CH-278 is open; loss CVT and BAT (loss of all charging and charging pump supply to the RCP seals)
HHI-010 To normal injection paths to Cold A: Loss of Unit I RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to cold legs.
legs between l-CH-MOV-1867D, cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1867C/D is required) l-CH-MOV-1867C, Containment pumps cross connect N: None (isolation valves are closed)
N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-011 To normal injection paths to Cold A: Loss of Unit l RWST inside containment, loss of A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to cold legs.
legs between Containment, l-SI- Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1867C/D is required) 225 (Check valve) Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (isolation valves are closed)
N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
Page 34 of 62
FAILURE EFFECT WITH FAILURE EFFECT WITH SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERATOR ACTION OPERA TOR ACTION HHl-012 To Cold legs between l-SI-225 A: Loss of Unit 1 R WST inside containment, loss of A: Loss of all HHSI to cold leg. (Closure of l-CH-(check valve), l-SI-224 (check Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of MOV-1867C/D is required) valve), l-SI-235 (check valve), l- Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (isolation valves are closed)
SI-236 (check valve), l-SI-237 N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal (check valve) operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-013 Alternate injection path to Cold A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST A: Loss of alternate path of HHSI to cold legs legs between l-CH-MOV-1842, cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of Unit 2 charging (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1842 is required}
Containment pumps cross connect. N: None (isolation valves are closed)
N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-014 Alternate injection path to Cold A: Loss of Unit 1 RWST inside containment, loss of A: Loss of alternate path of HHSI to cold legs legs between Containment l-SI- Unit 2 RWST cross connect to Unit 1, and loss of (Closure of l-CH-MOV-1842 is required) 224 (Check valve) Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect N: None (isolation valves are closed)
N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-015 Normal injection path to hot legs Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is open, loss of A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to hot legs between l-CH-MOV-l869B, containment sump inventory. (closure ofMOV-1869B is required)
Containment A2: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is closed, none. N: None (during normal operation this line is N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal isolated) operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-016 Normal injection path to hot legs Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is open, loss of normal A: Loss of normal path of HHSI to hot legs between Containment, l-CH-226 path of HHSI to hot legs. (closure ofMOV-1869B is required)
Al: If l-CH-MOV-1869B is closed, none. N: None (during normal operation this line is N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal isolated) operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-017 Alternate injectinopath to hot legs Al: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is open, loss of A: Loss of alternate pathof HHSI to hot legs from l-CH-MOV-1869A to containment sump inventory (closure ofMOV-1869A is required)
Containment A2: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is closed, none N: None (during nornial operation this line is N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal isolated) operation and this section is isolated)
HHI-018 Alternate injectinopath to hot legs Al: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is open, loss of alternate A: Loss of alternate pathof HHSI to hot legs from Containment to check valve path of HHSI to hot legs (closure ofMOV-1869A is required) l-CH-227 A2: If l-CH-MOV-I869A is closed, none N: None (during normal operation this line is N: None (Isolation valves are closed during normal isolated) operation and this section is isolated)
Page 35 of 62
===1*!:====== =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Total number of segments for High Head Safety Injection = 24 Low Head Safety Injection LHI-001 From CV l-SI-46B to CV l-SI-47 Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss ofLPI Train B (close MOV1862B)
(from sump) to CV l-SI-50 (pump discharge)
LHI-002 From CV l-SI-46A to CV l-SI-56 Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss ofLPI Train A (close MOVI862A)
(from sump) to CV l-SI-58 (pump discharge)
LHI-003 Containment sump to MOV Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train B Loss of Recirc from LPI Train B 1860B LHI-004 Containment sump to MOV Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train A Loss of Recirc from LPI Train A 1860A LHI-005 Containment sump MOV 1860B Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train B Loss of Recirc from LPI Train B to CV SI-47 LHI-006 Containment sump MOV 1860A Loss ofRecirc from LPI Train A Loss of Recirc from LPI Train A to CV SI-57 LHI-007 Train BCV SI-50 to HPI suction Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of LPI Train B and HPI from Train B SI-MOV-1863B, RWST recirc CV SI-53, Hot leg inject SI-MOV-1890B and Cold leg inject SI-MOV-1864B LHI-008 Train A CV Sl-58 to HPI suction Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of LPI Train A and Recirc for both LPI & HPI S1-MOV-1863A, RWST recirc CV Sl-61, Hot leg inject SI-MOV-1890A and Cold leg inject SI-MOV-1864.A LHI-009 Cold leg inject from SI-MOV- Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of both trains of LPI injection to cold legs 1864A and SI-MOV-1864B to SI-MOV-1890C LHI-010 Cold leg injection from SI-MOV- Loss of RWST outside containment Loss of both trains of LPI injection to cold legs 1890C to CV SI-241, SI-242, and
. SI-243 Page 36 of 62
l*t======*==
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION LHI-011 Hot leg MOY 1890B to CV 228 Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train B Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train B LHI-012 Hot leg MOY 1890A to CV 229 Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train A Loss of Hot Leg Recirc from LPI Train A LHI-013 Recirc to R WST from Train B Loss of RWST outside containment Loss of LPI Train B from CV SI-53 to SI-MOV-1885B LHI-014 Recirc to RWST from Train A Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of LPI Train A from CV SI-61 to SI-MOV-1885A LHI-015 Recirc to RWST from Train B Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss ofRWST recirc on LPI Train B from SI-MOV-1885B to SI-MOV-1885C LHI-016 Recirc to RWST from Train A Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss of R WST on recirc on LPI Train B from SI-MOV-1885A to SI-MOV-1885D LHI-017 Recirc to RWST from Trains A Loss ofRWST outside containment Loss ofRWST recirc on LPI Trains A and B and B from SI-MOV-1885C and SI-MOV-1885D to RWST Total number of segments for Low Head Safety Injection= 17 Main Steam MS-001 From SG 1-RC-E-IA to MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply containment penetration l-PEN- to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW PN-73 MS-002 From SG 1-RC-E-IB to MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply containment penetration 1-PEN- to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW (closure of l -
PN-74 MS-NRV-10 IB is required)
MS-003 From SG l -RC-E-1 C to MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply header MSLB inside containment, loss of one supply containment penetration l-PEN- to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW PN-75 Page 37 of 62
=1*1=======~ '========*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION MS-004 Steam line from containment MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply penetration to MS trip valve l - header to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW MS-TV-101 A including the intersection of 30"-SHP-1-601 with the following: 4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-22-601, 6"-SHP 601 MS-005 Steam line from containment MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply penetration to MS trip valve l- header to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW MS-TV-10 IB including the intersection of 30"-SHP-2-601 with the following: 4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-23-601, 6"-SHP 601 MS-006 Steam line from containment MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply penetration to MS trip valve l- header to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW MS-TV-10 IC including the intersection of30"-SHP-3-601 with the following: 4"-SHP 601, 30"-SHP-24-601, 6"-SHP 601 MS-007 Steam line from MS trip valve l - MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment (closure of l-MS-TV-MS-TV-10 lA to the MS non- header to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this 10 IA is required. This is an automatic isolation return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOlA event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOlA is not action) including the intersection of 30"- automatically tripped)
SHP-1-601 with 6"-SHP-45-601 MS-008 Steam line from MS trip valve l- MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment (closure of l-MS-TV-MS-TV-10 lB to the MS non- header 'to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this 101B is required. This is an automatic isolation 1
return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOlB event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOlB is not action) including the intersection of 30"- automatically tripped)
SHP-2-601 with 6"-SHP-46-601 Page 38 of 62
=*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WIT-T========F=A=IL=U=RE==E=F=FE=C=T=W=I=T=H====~
OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION MS-009 Steam line from MS trip valve l - MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment (closure of 1-MS-TV-MS-TV-101 C to the MS non- header to the turbine driven AFW (Note that this 10 IC is required. This is an automatic isolation return valve 1-MS-NRV-lOlC event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOlC is not action) including the intersection of 30"- automatically tripped)
SHP-3-601 with 6"-SHP-47-601 MS-010 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlA MSLB _outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply bypass line from the intersection header to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW of6"-MS-45-601 with 30"-MS 601 up to normally closed manual valve l -MS-84 MS-011 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlB MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply bypass line from the intersection header to the* turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW of 6"-MS-46-601 with 30"-MS 601 up to normally closed manual valve l-MS-116 MS-012 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOIC MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply bypass line from the intersection header to the turbine driven AFW header to the turbine driven AFW of6"-MS-47-601 with 30"-MS 601 up to normally closed manual valve l-MS-155 MS-013 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlA MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment. (closure of l-MS-TV-bypass line from normally closed header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this 10 IA is required. An automatic isolation action) manual valve l -MS-84 to the event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOIA is not intersection of6"-MS-45-601 automatically tripped) with 30"-MS-1-601 MS-014 MS trip valve 1-MS-TV-IOlB MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment. (closure of 1-MS-TV-bypass line from normally closed header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this lOIB is required. An automatic isolation action) manual valve 1-MS-116 to the event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-IOIB is not intersection of6"-MS-46-601 automatically tripped) with 30"-MS-2-601 MS-015 MS trip valve l-MS-TV-101 C MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment. (closure of l-MS-TV-bypass line from normally closed header to the turbine driven AFW. (Note that this 101 C is required. An automatic isolation action) manual valve 1-MS-155 to the event will only occur if 1-MS-TV-lOIC is not intersection of6"-MS-47-601 automatically tripped)
. with 30"-MS-3-601 Page 39 of 62
=*'========*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION MS-016 MS line from the MS non-return MSLB outside containment with blow dmm of all MSLB outside containment (closure of 1-MS-TV-valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIA to the SGs (See assumption 3). lOlNB/C is required. An automatic isolation main header action)
MS-017 MS line from the MS non-return MSLB outside containment with blow down of all MSLB outside containment (closure of l-MS-TV-valve 1-MS-NRV-lOIB to the SGs (See assumption 3). 10 INB/C is required (An automatic action))
main header MS-018 MS line from the MS non-return MSLB outside containment with blow down of all MSLB outside containment (closure of 1-MS-TV-valve l-MS-NRV-10IC to the SGs (See assumption 3). lOlNB/C is required. An automatic isolation main header action)
MS-019 MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11 -SHP-22-601 with 30 11 -SHP-l-60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS-020 MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11 -SHP-23-601 with 30 11 -SHP 60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS-021 MS header to MS safety and relief MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply MSLB outside containment, loss of one supply valves from the intersection of header to the turbine driven AFW pump header to the turbine driven AFW pump 30 11 -SHP-24-601 with 30 11 -SHP 60 I to the intersection of the header with 6 11 and 4" headers to the safety and relief valves MS-022 SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header for the Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump from the pump. (Line break outside containment) (See pump. (Line break outside containment) (See intersection of header with 30 11 - assumption 4) assumption 4)
SHP-1-601 to l-MS-182 (check valve)
Page 40of 62
==1.
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WIT OPERATOR ACTION I ~===~*
T FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION MS-023 SG 1-RC-E- lB MS header for the Loss of one MS supply header to the IDAFW pump. Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump TDAFW pump (Line break outside containment) (See assumption 4) pump. (Line break outside containment) (See from the intersection of header assumption 4) with 30"-SHP-2-601 to l-MS-178 (check valve)
MS-024 SG 1-RC-E-lC MS header for the Loss ofone MS supply header to the TDAFW pump. Loss of one MS supply header to the TDAFW TDAFW pump from the (Line break outside containment) (See assumption 4) pump. (Line break outside containment) (See intersection of header with 30"- assumption 4)
SHP-3-601 to l-MS-176 (check valve)
MS-025 SG 1-RC-E-lA MS header to Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat decay heat removal valve from the valve. (Line break outside containment) removal valve. (Line break outside containment) intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to check valve l-MS-NRV-102A MS-026 SG 1-RC-E- lB MS header to Loss of one MS header to the decay he~t removal Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat decay heat removal valve from the valve. (Line break outside containment) removal valve. (Line break outside containment) intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to check valve l-MS-NRV-102B MS-027 SG 1-RC-E- l C MS header to Loss of one MS header to the decay heat removal Loss of one MS supply header to the decay heat decay heat removal valve from the valve. (Line break outside containment) removal valve. (Line break outside containment) intersection of the header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to check valve 1-MS-NRV-102C MS-028 MS common header to decay heat Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal Loss of all MS headers to the decay heat removal removal valve from l-MS-NRV- valve. (Line break outside containment) valve. (Line break outside containment) 102AJB/C to the normally closed vlv l-MS-118 Page 41 of 62
===:l*t========*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION MS-029 SG 1-RC-E- lA headers to the MSLB outside containment. MSLB outside containment.
safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP 601 to the safety valves l-MS-SV-105A, l-MS-SV-102A, l-MS-SV-l03A, l-MS-SV-104A, 1-MS-SV-IOlA MS-030 SG 1-RC-E-IB headers to the MSLB outside containment. MSLB outside containment.
safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP 601 to the safety relief valves l-MS-SV-105B, 1-MS-SV-102B, 1-MS-SV-103B, 1-MS-SV-104B, 1-MS-SV-IOIB MS-031 SG 1-RC-E-l C headers to the MSLB outside containment. MSLB outside containment.
safety valves from the intersection of the headers with 30"-SHP-24-601 to the safety reliefvalves 1-MS-SV-I05C, l-MS-SV-102C, 1-MS-SV-103C, l-MS-SV-104C, 1-MS-SV-lOlC MS-032 Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump Loss of steam to the ID AFW pump IDAFW pump from check valves l-MS-182, l-MS-178, and l-MS-176 to normally closed l-MS-197, l-MS-PCV-102B, 1-MS-PCV-102A, 1-MS-10, l-MS-8, l-MS-270, and steam trap l-MS-ID-9.
Page 42 of 62
==='*'=====*=====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION MS-033 Common MS supply header to the Loss of MS to the TDAFW pump Loss of steam to the TD AFW pump TDAFW pump from normally closed l-MS-PCV-102A, l-MS-10, l-MS-PCV-102B to l-MS-TV-120, steam trap l-MS-TD-1, l-MS-340 (normally closed), l-MS-342 (normally closed), l-MS-347 (normally closed), l-MS-345 (normally closed), and steam trap l-MS-TD-2 MS-034 Common MS supply header to the Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump Loss of steam to the TDAFW pump TDAFW pump from l-MS-TV-120 to Turbine Drive MS-035 SG 1-RC-E-lA header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) header with 30"-SHP-22-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIA MS-036 SG 1-RC-E-lB header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) header with 30"-SHP-23-601 to 1- I MS-RV-IOIB MS-037 SG 1-RC-E-1 C header to its MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not MS pipe rupture outside containment but it is not PORV from the intersection of the assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) assumed to result in a plant trip (see assumption 1) header with 30"-SHP-24-601 to 1-MS-RV-lOIC MS-038 The remaining portions of the MS MSLB outside containment MSLB outside containment lines down to 6" diameter pipes Total number of segments for Main Steam= 38 Reactor Coolant RC-001 Reactor vessel to Loop 1 isolation Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident valve 1-RC-MOV-1590 RC-002 Reactor vessel to Loop 2 isolation Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1592 Page 43 of 62
RC-003 SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Reactor vessel to Loop 3 isolation FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION Large loss of coolant accident FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Large loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-MOV-1594 RC-004 From l-RC-MOV-1590 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E- lA RC-005 From l-RC-MOV-1592 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator 1-RC-E-lB RC-006 From l-RC-MOV-1594 to steam Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident generator l-RC-E-lC RC-007 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lA Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lA RC-008 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lB Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lB RC-009 From steam generator 1-RC-E-lC Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident to RCP 1-RC-P-lC RC-010 From RCP 1-RC-P-lA to 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1591 I
RC-011 From RCP 1-RC-P-lB to 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1593 RC-012 From RCP 1-RC-P-l C to 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1595 RC-013 From Loop 1 1-RC-MOV-1591 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-014 From Loop 2 1-RC-MOV-1593 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-015 From Loop 3 l-RC-MOV-1595 to Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident reactor vessel RC-016 SI from CV 1-SI-91 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident 1 hot leg RC-017 SI from CV l-SI-88 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident
- 2 hot leg Page 44 of 62
==l.
SEGMENT ID
=
SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITIT========F=AI=L=U=RE==E=F=F=E=C=T=W=I=T=H=====
OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION RC-018 SI from CV l-SI-94 to RCS Loop Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident 3 hot leg RC-019 From Loop 3 hot leg to pressurizer Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident RC-020 From Loop I hot leg to l-RH- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1700 RC-021 From Loop I isolation valve I -RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1590 to l-RC-MOV-1591 RC-022 From Loop 2 isolation valve I -RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1592 to l-RC-MOV-1593 RC-023 From Loop 3 isolation valve 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident MOV-1594 to l-RC-MOV-1595 RC-024 From tee on 8"-RC-l l-2501R to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Loop 1 cold leg RC-025 From tee on 8"-RC-I2-2501R to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident Loop 2 cold leg RC-026 From tee on 8"-RC-13-250 IR to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant ac.cident Loop 3 cold leg '
RC-027 Loop I drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-11 RC-028 Loop 2 drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-50 RC-029 Loop 3 drain line from hot leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident valve l-RC-82 RC-030 RCS drain header from valves 1- No impact, segment between normally closed valves No impact, segment between normally closed RC-11, l-RC-HCV-1557A, l-RC- valves 50, l-RC-HCV-1557B, l-RC-82, l-RC-HCV-1557C to l-RC-107 RC-031 Loop 1 drain line from cold leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident l-RC-HCV-1557A Page 45 of 62
RC-032 SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION Loop 2 drain line from cold leg to FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION Small loss of coolant accident FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION Small loss of coolant accident I-RC-HCV-1557B RC-033 Loop 3 drain line from cold leg to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident I-RC-HCV-l 557C RC-034 Loop 1 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-035 Loop 2 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-036 Loop 3 cold leg 3 11 capped line Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-037 Loop 1 fill header from 1-RC- Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556A to cold leg RC-038 Loop 2 fill header from 1-RC- Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556B to cold leg RC-039 Loop 3 fill header from I-RC- Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident HCV-1556C to cold leg RC-040 Letdown line from Loop I cold Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident leg to l-CH-LCV-1460A I
RC-041 SI from CV l-SI-79 to Loop 1 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-042 SI from CV l-SI-82 to Loop 2 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-043 SI from CV 1-SI-85 to Loop 3 Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident cold leg RC-044 Pressurizer spray from Loop 1 Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident cold leg to l'-RC-PCV-1455A RC-045 Pressurizer spray from Loop 3 Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident cold leg to l-RC-PCV-1455B RC-046 Accumulator injection from CV 1- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SI-109 to Loop I cold leg RC-047 Accumulator injection from CV 1- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant ~ccident SI-130 to Loop 2 cold leg Page 46 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION
~====*FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION RC-048 Accumulator irtjection from CV 1- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SI-147 to Loop 3 cold leg RC-049 Charging from CV l-CH-430 to Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident Loop 2 cold leg RC-050 Reactor vessel head vent from Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident vessel to 1-RC-SOV-lOOAl and 1-RC-SOV-l OOB I RC-051 Pressurizer spray header from 1- Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident RC-PCV-1455A&B to pressurizer RC-052 Pressurizer to safety valve I-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551A RC-053 Pressurizer to safety valve 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551B RC-054 Pressurizer to safety valve 1-RC- Large loss of coolant accident Large loss of coolant accident SV-1551C RC-055 From safety valve loop seals to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident pressurizer !
RC-056 From pressurizer safety valves 1- No impact without additional failures No impact without additional failures RC-SV-1551A,B,C and PORVs l-RC-PCV-1456 and l-RC-PCV-1455C to pressurizer relief tank RC-057 From pressurizer to PORV block Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident valves l-RC-MOV-1535 and l-RC-MOV-1536 RC-058 From block valve 1-RC-MOV- Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident 1535 to PORV l-RC-PCV-1456 (if operator closes MOV-1535, event terminated)
RC-059 From block valve 1-RC-MOV- Medium loss of coolant accident Medium loss of coolant accident (if operator closes 1536 to PORV l-RC-PCV-1455C MOV-1536, event terminated)
RC-060 From tee on 4"-RC-15-1502 to Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident blind flange (line I l/2"-RC-105-1502)
Page 47 of 62
====l*=======~
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION RC-061 Auxiliary pressurizer spray line Small loss of coolant accident Small loss of coolant accident from CV l-CH-313 to tee on 4' line Total number of segments for Reactor Coolant = 61 Recirculation Spray RS-001 12"-RS-8-153 header from None None Containment sump to Containment penetration RS-002 12"-RS-7-153 header from None None Containment sump to Containment penetration RS-003A From Containment penetration up Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS pumps to l-RS-MOV-155B RS-003B From l-RS-MOV-155B to Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS 1B pump (closure of l-RS-MOV-Containment penetration and 155B is required) manual valve l -RS-6 RS-004A From Containment penetration up Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS pumps to l-RS-MOV-155A RS-004B From 1-RS-MOV-155A to Loss of ORS pumps Loss of ORS IA pump (closure of 1-RS-MOV-Containment penetration and 155A is required) manual valve 1-RS-15 RS-005 Pipe section 12"-RS-24-153, cross Loss of water from containment sump (i.e. loss of Loss of water from containment sump (i.e. loss of connecting supply headers of ORS water for RS and LH Recirc. functions) water for RS and LH Recirc. functions) 2B and 2A pumps RS-006 NOT Designated to any portion NIA NIA RS-007 Pipe section between normally None None closed manual valve 1-RS-6 and ORS sump RS-008 Pipe section between normally None None closed manual valve 1-RS-15 and ORS sump Page 48 of 62
=*======= =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION RS-009 From containment penetration to Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See Loss of path B of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-spray nozzles for path B assumption 7) 155A or 1-RS-MOV-156B is required)
RS-010 From containment penetration to Degraded function of one of the two ORS paths (See Loss of path A of ORS (closure of l-RS-MOV-spray nozzles for path A assumption 7) 155A or l-RS-MOV-156A is required)
RS-011 All IRS-related piping sections Loss of path B of IRS Loss of path B of ORS from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX)
RS-012 All IRS-related piping sections Loss of path A of IRS Loss of path A of IRS from containment sump to the nozzles (path B) (Does not include SW lines to the RS HEX)
Total number of segments for Recirculation Spray = 14 Residual Heat Removal RH-002 RHR suction isolation valves, l - I) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 1) Loss ofRHR suction (Function W),
RH-MOV-1700 to l-RH-MOV- 2) Mode 3 large LOCA 2) Mode 3 large LOCA 1701 I
1 RH-003 RHR suction isolation valve, l- I Loss ofRHR suction (Function W), 1) Loss of RHR suction (Function W)
RH-MOV-1701 through both 2) Mode 3 Large LOCA 2) Mode 3 large LOCA pumps and both heat exchangers to valves l-RH-29, 1-RH-MOV-1720A and l-RH-MOV-1720B and intersections of the following headers 12"-RH-12-602 vs 2"-RH-3-602, 12"-RH-12-602 vs 3"-RH-14-602 RH-003A 2"-RH-3-60i header from the 1) Loss of RHR 1) Loss of RHR intersection of the header with 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-HCV-1142 RH-003B 3"-RH-14-602 header from the 1) Loss of RHR 1) Loss ofRHR
- intersection of the header with 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 2) Mode 3 small LOCA 12"-RH-12-602 to 1-RH-29 Page 49 of 62
===:j*'============= =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION RH-008 RHR supply to B hot leg from l - 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, 1) Mode 3 large LOCA, RH-MOV- l 720A to 12"-RC 2) Loss of RHR supply to B hot leg 2) Loss ofRHR supply to B hot leg 1502 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-IB (Isolation possible with 1-RH-MOV-1720A but not credible due to time limitation)
RH-009 RHR supply to C hot leg from l - I) Mode 3 large LOCA, I) Mode 3 large LOCA, RH-MOV-17208 to 12"-RC 2) Loss of RHR supply to C hot leg 2) Loss ofRHR supply to C hot leg 1502 3) Loss of SI accumulator 1-SI-TK-lC 3) Loss of SI accumulator I -SI-TK-1 C (Isolation possible with l-RH-MOV-1720B but not credible due to time limitation)
RH-010 Recirculation line 1 l/2"-RH 1) Mode 3 small LOCA Loss ofRHR (Function W) (By closing l-RH-602 2) Loss of RHR (Function W) per assumption 4 MOV-1720A, 1-RH-MOV-17208, l-RH-MOV-1700)
RH-011 Containment pentration 24 Normally both valves are closed so there are no Normally both valves are closed so there are no between l-RH-29 and l-RH-100 consequences. Loss of containment boundary if the consequences. Loss of containment boundary the path is open. path is open.
Total number of segments for Residual Heat Removal =8 S/G Blowdown BD-001 1-RC-E-IA to 1-BD-TV-lOOA 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be 1) 'A' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs)
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. no 2) Equivalent to steam line break inside reactor trip). containment.
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA 4) Loss of 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E- IA feedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lA 8D-002A Containment isolation valve l- I) Loss of containment integrity BD-TV-100A to Containment 2) Small steam line break inside containment with penetration 39 no reactor trip.
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA.
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lA.Loss of blowdown from 1-RC-E-lA Page 50 of 62
=:l*!======= ~====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION BD-0028 Containment penetration 39 to 1) Loss of containment integrity. Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA Containment isolation valve I - 2) Small steam line break outside containment with BD-TV-1008 no reactor trip.
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA BD-003 Everything beyond the outside I) Loss of containment integrity Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IA containment isolation valve 1-BD- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with TV- IOOB no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lA
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IA BD-004 1-RC-E- IB to 1-BD-TV- IOOC I) 'B' steam generator seconda1y side cannot be 1) 'B' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs) isolated in the event of tube rupture. (Function Qs)
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. no 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e.
reactor trip) no reactor trip).
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lB 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IB BD-005A Containment isolation valve 1- I) Loss of containment integrity 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB BD-TV- IOOC to Containment 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. no penetration 41 reactor trip)
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E- IB BD-005B Containment penetration 41 to 1) Loss of containment integrity Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB and 1-BD-TV-IOOD 2) Small steam line break inside containment(i.e. no reactor trip)
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-IB BD-006 Everything beyond the outside 1) Loss of containment integrity Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB containment'isolation valve 1-BD- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with TV-IOOD no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IB
- 4) Loss of feedwater to 1-RC-E- IB Page 51 of 62
*!=::====
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION BD-007 1-RC-E-lC to 1-BD-TV-IOOE 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be 1) 'C' steam generator secondary side cannot be isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs) isolated in the event of tube rupture (Function Qs)
- 2) Small steam line break inside containment with 2) Small steam line break inside containment with no reactor trip no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-IC 4) Loss offeedwater to 1-RC-E-lC BD-008A Containment isolation valve 1- 1) Loss of containment integrity Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC BD-TV- IOOE to Containment 2) Small steam line break outside containment with penetration 40 no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC BD-008B Containment penetration 40 1) Loss of containment integrity Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC between 1-BD-TV-IOOE and 1- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with BD-TV-IOOF no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC BD-009 Everything beyond the outside 1) Loss of containment integrity 1) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-lC containment isolation valve 1-BD- 2) Small steam line break outside containment with TV- IOOF no reactor trip
- 3) Loss ofblowdown from 1-RC-E-IC
- 4) Loss offeedwatrer to 1-RC-E-lC Total number of segments for S/G Blowdown = 12 Safety Injection Accumulators ACC-001 1-SI-TK-lA to l-SI-109, Loop 1 Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short cold leg. (Function D2) time available to determine the break location ACC-002 2"-SI-63-602 from 12"-SI Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short 1502 to l-SJq03, l-SI-HCV- (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location 1852Aand l-SI-104 Page 52 of 62
===:l*c:========== =====*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERA TOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION ACC-003 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-IA to No operator action assumed because of the short reducer in the lines to 1-SI-LT- time available to determine the break location 1920 and 1-SI-LT- I 922Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection (Function D2)
Accumulator drains to the level of the pipe break and into sump ACC-004 l"-SI-100-602 from 1-SI-TK-IA Loss of one accumulator:Accumulator inj ection No operator action assumed because of the short to I-SI-HCV-1853A and the line (Function D2)Accumulator depressurizes and time available to determine the break location from 1-SI-TK-IA to I-SI-RV- remains full 1858A ACC-005 l"-SI-11-602 from l"-SI-TK-IB Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short to I-SI-HCV-1851A (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location ACC-006 1-SI-TK-IB to I-Sl-130, Loop 2 Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short cold leg. (Function D2) time available to determine the break location ACC-007 2"-SI-65-602 from 12"-SI Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short 1502 to l-SI-125, I-SI-HCV- (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location 1852B and l-SI-123 I
ACC-008 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-IB to Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assuin.ed because of the short reducer in the lines to 1-SI-LT- (Function D2) Accumulator drains to the level of the time available to determine the break location 1924 and l-SI-LT-1926 pipe break and into sump ACC-009 l"-SI-97-602 from 1-SI-TK-IB to Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short l-SI-HCV-1853B and the line (Function D2) Accumulator depressurizes and time available to determine the break location from 1-SI-TK-IB to I-SI-RV- remains full 1858B ACC-010 l"-SI-12-602 from l"-SI-TK-IB Loss or"one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short to 1-S1-HCV-1851B (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location ACC-011 1-SI-TK-IC to I-SI-147, Loop 3 Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short cold leg. (Function D2) time available to determine the break location ACC-012 2"-SI-67-602 from 12"-SI Loss of one accul!lulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short 1502 to I-SI-142, 1-S1-HCV- (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location 1852C and l-SI-140 Page 53 of 62
l*I===
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE= EFFECT OPERATOR ACTION
= WITH ~=====*
UT FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION ACC-013 2" level taps from 1-SI-TK-lC to Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short reducer in the lines to I-SI-LT- (Function D2) Accumulator drains to the level of the time available to determine the break location 1928 and l-SI-LT-1930 pipe break and into sump ACC-014 l"-SI-99-602 from 1-SI-TK-lC to Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short l-SI-HCV-1853C and the line (Function D2) Accumulator depressurizes and time available to determine the break location from 1-SI-TK-lC to l-SI-RV- remains full 1858C ACC-015 l"-SI-61-602 from l"-SI-TK-lC Loss of one accumulator: Accumulator injection No operator action assumed because of the short to l-SI-HCV-1851C (Function D2) Accumulator drains to sump time available to determine the break location Total number of segments for Safety Injection Accumulators = 15 Service Water SW-001 From intake structure through 1- Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lA Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lA SW-P-lA to intake canal SW-002 From intake structure through 1- Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB SW-P-IB to intake canal SW-003 From intake structure through 1- Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lC Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IC SW-P-lC to intake canal I SW-004 From 1-SW-P-IA discharge Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IA Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IA through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure SW-005 From 1-SW-P-IB discharge Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IB through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure SW-006 From 1-SW-P-IC discharge Loss of pump 1-SW-P-lC Loss of pump 1-SW-P-IC through diesel cooler and shaft bearing oil cooler to intake structure Page 54 of 62
~*
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION I ========* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SW-007 From tee at 96"-WC-l-10 to Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC- IA, loss of Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, loss valves 1-CW-MOV-I06A, 1-SW- cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (1-RS-E- of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( 1-RS-MOV-103C, l-SW-MOV-I03D, IB, -1 C), and potential loss of cooling to bearing E- IB, -IC). Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-IOIB l-SW-MOV-10113 cooling heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB, -IC)
SW-008 From tee at 96"-WC-3-10 to Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IB, loss of Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IB, loss valves 1-CW-MOV-I06C, l-SW- cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers ( 1-RS-E- of cooling to recirc. spray heat exchangers (l-RS-MOV-I03A, l-SW-MOV-103B, lA, -ID), and potential loss of cooling to bearing E-1 A, -ID). Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-IOIA 1-SW-MOV-IOIA cooling heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB, -IC)
SW-009 From tee at 96"-WC-2-10 to Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA.
valves 1-CW-MOV-106B, l-SW- potential loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1- Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-I02A MOV-I02A, 1-SW-l l CC-E- lA, -IB, -IC, -ID), potential loss ofturbine building service water, loss of river water make-up pump l-SW-P-100 SW-010 From tee at 96"-WC-4-10 to Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-lA, Degraded cooling to condenser 1-CN-SC-IA, valves l-CW-MOV-I06D, l-SW- potential loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers (l- degraded cooling water supply to mechanical MOV-102B, blind flange@ 8x6 CC-E- lA, -lB, -IC, -ID), potential loss of turbine equipment room #3 and charging pump coolers.
reducer, and valves l-SW-500, 2- building service water, degraded cooling water Operator closes l-SW-MOV-102B SW-478, l-SW-264, l-SW-303, l- supply to ~echanical equipment room #3 and SW-302 charging pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump l-SW-P-100 SW-011 From 1-SW-MOV-I02A and - Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-IA and - Loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( I-CC-E-102B to 1-CC-E-IA, -IB, -IC, IB, loss of cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( 1-CC- l A, -lB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building and-ID E- IA, -IB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building service water, degraded cooling water supply to service water, degraded cooling water supply to mechanical equipment room #3 and charging mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump l-coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1-SW-P- SW-P-100. Operator closes valves l-SW-MOV-100 102A and -102B SW-012 From tee at 42" header to river Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC-IA and - Degraded cooling to condensers 1-CN-SC- IA and -
water makeup pump discharge IB, degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers ( 1- lB, degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers (1-check valve 2-SW-1303, and CC-E- l A, -IB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building CC-E-IA, -lB, -IC, -ID), loss of turbine building turbine bldg service water pumps service water, degraded cooling water supply to service water, degraded cooling water supply to (l-SW-P-4A, -4B) suction check mechanical equipment room #3 and charging pump mechanical equipment room #3 and charging valves (l-SW-403. 406) coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1-SW-P- pump coolers, loss of river water make-up pump 1-100 SW-P-100 Page 55 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SW-013 From 1-CC-E-lA, -lB, -IC, and- Potential degraded cooling to CCW heat exchangers Potential degraded cooling to CCW heat 1D to discharge tunnel (1-CC-E-lA, -lB, -IC, -ID) exchangers (1-CC-E-IA, -18, -IC, -ID)
SW-014 From 1-SW-MOV-lOlA and - Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat 101B to bearing coolers 1-BC-E- exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC), degraded cooling exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -lB,-lC). Operator lA, -lB, and -IC to condensers 1-CN-SC-lA and -lB, degraded closes valves 1-SW-MOV-lOIA and 101B.
cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers (l-RS-E-lA, -lB, -IC, -ID)
SW-015 From bearing coolers 1-BC-E- Potential degraded cooling to bearing cooling water Potential degraded cooling to bearing cooling lA, -lB, and -IC to discharge heat exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC) water heat exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -IB,-lC) tunnel SW-016 From valves l-SW-MOV-103A Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers 1-and -103B to l-SW-MOV-104A exchangers (1-BC-E-lA, -lB,-lC), degraded cooling RS-E- IA and -ID .. Operator closes valves l-SW-
, -104D, and blind flange at 1-SW- to condenser 1-CN-SC-lB, loss of cooling to recirc MOV-I03A and l03B REJ-53 spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E-IA and -ID, degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lB, and -IC SW-017 From valves l-SW-MOV-103C Loss of cooling to bearing cooling water heat Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchangers 1-and -103D to l-SW-MOV-104B exchangers (1-BC-E-IA, -18,-IC), degraded cooling RS-E- lB and -IC. Operator closes valves l-SW-
, -104C, and blind flange at l-SW- to condenser 1-CN-SC-l A, loss of cool fog to recirc MOV-103C and l03D REJ-53 spray heat exchangers 1-RS-E- lB and -1 C, degraded I cooling to 1-RS-E-lA, and -ID SW-018 From l-SW-104A to recirc spray Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS- Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-heat exchanger 1-RS-E-lA and E-lA, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-ID RS-E- IA. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104A valve l-SW-534 SW-019 From l-SW-104B to recirc spray Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS- Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-heat exchanger 1-RS-E- IB and E-lB, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lC RS-E- lB. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104B valve l-SW-535 i
- SW-020 From l-SW-104C to recuc spray Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS- Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger l -
heat exchanger l -RS-E-1 C and E- l C, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lB RS-E-1 C. Operator closes 1-SW-MOV-104C valve l-SW-536 SW-021 From l-SW-104D to recirc spray Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-RS- Loss of cooling to recirc spray heat exchanger 1-heat exchanger 1-RS-E- ID and E- ID, potential degraded cooling to 1-RS-E-lA RS-E- ID. Operator closes l-SW-MOV-104D valve l-SW-537 Page 56 of 62
=l.
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION l e=======* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SW-022 From recirc spray heat exchanger Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat 1-RS-E-lA to l-SW-MOV-l05A exchanger 1-RS-E-lD exchanger 1-RS-E-lD SW-023 From recirc spray heat exchanger Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat 1-RS-E-lB to l-SW-MOV-105B exchanger 1-RS-E-l C exchanger 1-RS-E-l C SW-024 From recirc spray heat exchanger Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat 1-RS-E-lC to l-SW-MOV-l05C exchanger 1-RS-E-lB exchanger 1-RS-E-lB SW-025 From recirc spray heat exchanger Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat Potential degraded cooling to recirc spray heat 1-RS-E-lD to 1-SW-MOV-105D exchanger 1-RS-E-lA exchanger 1-RS-E-lA SW-026 From l-SW-MOV-105A and - No impact No impact 105D to valve 1-SW-903 and discharge tunnel SW-027 From l-SW-MOV-105B and - No impact No impact 105C to valve 1-SW-902 and discharge tunnel SW-028 Drain lines from recirc spray heat No impact No impact exchangers 1-RS--E-IA, -IB, -
1C, -ID to locked closed valve l -
SW-206 SW-029 Unit 2 service water from valve 2- Potential degraded cooling water supply to control Potential degraded cooling water supply to control SW-476 to l-SW-500, 2-SW-307, and relay room chillers and charging pump coolers and relay room chillers and charging pump coolers and 2-SW-306 SW-030 From valves 1-SW-302 and l-SW- Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers 303 to 1-SW-265, 1-SW-311, 1- and charging pump coolers and charging pump coolers SW-321, ISW-261, 2-SW-441, 2-SW-331, 2-SW-306, and 2-SW-307 SW-031 From valve 1-SW-311 to CV 1- Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-315 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers and charging pump coolers chiller 1-VS-E-4A and CV 1-SW-316 Page 57 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION OPERA TOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION SW-032 From valve l-SW-321 to CV 1- Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-325 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers and charging pump coolers chiller l-VS-E-4B SW-033 From valve l-SW-331 to CV 1- Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers Loss of cooling to control and relay room coolers SW-335 and control & relay room and charging pump coolers and charging pump coolers chiller l-VS-E-4C and CV l-SW-336 SW-034 From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room Potential degraded cooling to control and relay l-VS-E-4A to CVs l-SW-315 and chillers l-VS-E-4B and -4C and to charging pump room chillers l-VS-E-4B and -4C and to charging l-SW-313 coolers pump coolers SW-035 From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room Potential degraded cooling to control and relay l-VS-E-4B to CVs l-SW-325 and chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4C and to charging pump room chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4C and to charging l-SW-323 coolers pump coolers SW-036 From control & relay room chiller Potential degraded cooling to control and relay room Potential degraded cooling to control and relay l-VS-E-4C to CVs l-SW-335 and chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4B and to charging pump room chillers l-VS-E-4A and -4B and to charging l-SW-333 coolers pump coolers SW-037 From CVs l-SW-313, -323, -266, Degraded strainer 1-VS-S- lA performance Degraded strainer l-VS-S-1 A performance 2-SW-333, and valve 2-SW-554 I I
to discharge tunnel header SW-038 From CVs l-SW-316, -326, -336 Degraded strainer 1-VS-S- lB performance Degraded strainer 1-VS-S- l B performance to CV l-SW-266 and valve 2-SW-344 SW-039 From valve l-SW-264 to valve l- No impact - normally closed valves No impact - normally closed valves SW-265 SW-040 From valve l-SW-267 to CV 1- Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and SW-113 and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-IOA) control and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-IOA)
SW-041 From valve l-SW-261 to CV l- Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and control Degraded flow to charging pump coolers and SW-108 and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-lOB) control and relay room coolers (fails pump 1-SW-p-lOB)
Page 58 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH UT OPERATOR ACTION I =======* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SW-042 From CV l-SW-113 tovalve I- Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers SW-269 and l-SW-171 (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB may have (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB may have cooling flow) cooling flow)
SW-043 From CV l-SW-108 to valve 1- Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers Loss of cooling to charging pump coolers SW- ll 8 and first valve back on (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA may have (intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA may have Unit 2 line 2"-WS-5-9107 cooling flow) cooling flow)
SW-044 From tee on 2"-WS-71-21X to Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA, degraded cooling to charging seal cooler 1-SW-E-lA, degraded cooling to cooler 1-SW-E-lA pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -
SC SW-045 From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate seal Loss of cooling to charging pump intermediate charging pump intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB, degraded cooling to charging seal cooler 1-SW-E-lB, degraded cooling to cooler 1-SW-E-lB pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C charging pump lube oil coolers l-CH-E-5A,°-5B, -
SC SW-046 From. charging pump Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil intermediate seal cooler I-SW-E- l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -SC l A to discharge header SW-047 From charging pump Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil coolers Degraded cooling to charging pump lube oil intermediate seal cooler 1-SW-E- l-CH-E-5A, -5B, -5C coolers l-CH-E-5A -513 -5C lB to discharge header SW-048 From tee on 2"-WS-71-21X to Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1- Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1-charging pump lube oil cooler l - CH-E-5A, degraded cooling to charging pump CH-E-SA, degraded cooling to charging pump CH-E-5A coolers 1-CH-E-SB, -SC, 1-SW-E-lA coolers l-CH-E-5B, -5C, 1-SW-E-lA SW-049 From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler l- Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler 1-charging pump lube oil cooler l - CH-E-5B, degraded cooling to the other charging CH-E-SB, degraded cooling to the other charging CH-E-5B pump coolers (1-SW-E-lA, -lB, l-CH-E-5A, -5C) pump coolers (1-SW-E-lA, -lB, l-CH-E-5A, -5C)
SW-050 From tee on 2"-WS-73-21X to Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler l- Loss of cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler l -
charging pump lube oil cooler l - CH-E-5 C, degraded cooling to charging pump CH-E-5C, degraded cooling to charging pump CH-E-5C coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-lB coolers l-CH-E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-lB SW-051 From charging pump lube oil Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers I-CH-E- Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-cooler l-CH-E-5A to discharge SB, -SC, 1-SW-E-IA E-5B, -5C, 1-SW-E-lA header Page 59 of 62
SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT WITHOUT OPERA TOR ACTION
=====* FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION SW-052 From charging pump lube oil Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers 1-SW-E- Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers 1-SW-cooler l-CH-E-5B to discharge lA, -IB, l-CH-E-5A, -SC E-lA, -IB, l-CH-E-5A, -SC header SW-053 From charging pump lube oil Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-E- Degraded cooling to charging pump coolers l-CH-cooler l-CH-E-5C to discharge 5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-IB E-5A, -5B, 1-SW-E-IB header SW-054 Charging pump cooler discharge No impact No impact header to valves l-SW-900, -902, -
903,-907,-908, -911,-913 and first valve back on Unit 2 line 2"-
WS-513-21X Total number of segments for Service Water= 54 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling FC-001 1-FC-P-lA header from Spent Loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of fuel pit inventory Fuel Pit to l-FC-11 (check valve)
FC-002 1-FC-P- IB header from Spent Loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of fuel pit inventol}'
Fuel Pit to 1-FC-35 (normally closed man. valve)
FC-003 1-FC-P-IB header from I-FC-35 If l-FC-35 is closed, none. If l-FC-35 is closed, none.
(normally closed man. valve) to 1- If l-FC-35 is open, loss of fuel pit inventory If l-FC-35 is open, loss of fuel pit inventory FC-9 (check valve)
FC-004 1-FC-P-lA discharge header from Loss of fuel pit inventory Loss of fuel pit inventory l-FC-11 (check valve) to spent fuel pit, l-FC-41 (normally closed man. vlv), I-FC-14 (normally closed man. vlv.), l-PG-54 (normally closed vlv.) and intersectin of 16"-FP-18-152 with 2.5"-FP-26-152 Page 60 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE EFFECT wA========F=AIL=u=RE==E=F=FE=C=T=W=I=T=H=====*
OPERATOR ACTION OPERATOR ACTION FC-005 1-FC-P-lB discharge header from If l-FC-41 is closed, loss of the standby spent fuel If l-FC-41 is closed, loss of the standby spent fuel l-FC-9 (check valve) back to l- pit pump. pit pump.
FC-41 (normally closed man. If l-FC-42 is closed, loss of fuel pit inventory If l-FC-42 is closed, loss of fuel pit inventory vlv.) including l-FC-14 (normally closed man. vlv)
FC-006 Purification headers from the Loss of purification headers (It is assumed that flow Loss of purification headers (It is assumed that intersection of 16"-FP-18-152 diversion via this path will not deplete the spent fuel flow diversion via this path will not deplete the with 2.5"-FP-26-152 to l-FC-1-1 pit inventory) spent fuel pit inventory)
(Fuel Pit Ion Exchanger), 1-FC-29, l-FC-73, 2-FC-73 FC-007 Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Loss of purification headers Loss of purification headers Ion Exchanger) to l-FC-3 (normally closed man. vlv.)
FC-008 Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit Loss of purification headers Loss of purification headers Ion Exchanger) to l-FC-2 (normally closed man. vlv.) and 1-FC-l (normally closed man. vlv.)
FC-009 Header from l-FC-1-1 (Fuel Pit If l-FC-1 is open, loss of purification headers. If 1-FC-l is open, loss of purification headers.
Ion Exchanger) normally closed If l-FC-1 is closed minimal impact (loss of PG water If l-FC-1 is closed mini'mal impact (loss of PG man. valves l-FC-1, l-PG-176, l- to the purification header, loss of purification header water to the purification header, loss of FC-29, 1-FC-71, 2-FC-71 to Unit 1 and 2 RWSTs. purification header to Unit 1 and 2 RWSTs.
Total number of segments for Spent Fuel Pit Cooling= 9 Ventilation VS-001 Makeup supply from check valve Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and None (Closure of l-VS-PCV-533 is required) l-VS-975 to l-VS-PCV-533 Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers (It is, conservatively, assumed that a pipe rupture in this section can drain the chilled water inventory)
Page 61 of 62
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SEGMENT ID SEGMENT DESCRJPTION FAILURE EFFECT WIT OPERATOR ACTION FAILURE EFFECT WITH OPERATOR ACTION VS-002 The remaining piping associated Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and Loss of Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms and with the l-VS-E-4A/B/C/D/E Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled chillers between l-PCV-533, l- Chillers BC-283 (make-up water from Bearing Cooling), l-VS-247 (normally closed cross-tie valve with the chillers supporting out heat loads)
Total number of segments for Ventilation= 2 Total number of segments 471 Page 62 of 62