IR 05000336/2007004

IR 05000336-07-004 and 05000423-07-004, on 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007, Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 and Unit 3;, Post-Maintenance Testing Inspection

ML073050271
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/31/2007
From:	Powell R J NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Christian D A Dominion Resources Services
Powell R J, RI/DRP/610-337-6967
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML073050271 (40)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 October 31, 2007Mr. David A. ChristianSr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glenn Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000336/2007004 AND 05000423/2007004

Dear Mr. Christian:

On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2007, with Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Raymond J. Powell, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-336, 50-423License Nos.:DPR-65, NPF-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000336/2007004 and 05000423/2007004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:see next page Mr.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000336/2007-004, 05000423/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Millstone PowerStation, Unit 2 and Unit 3; Post-Maintenance Testing.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water" during restoration of the "B" turbine plant component cooling water (TPCCW) heat exchanger on August 28, 2007. Specifically, following maintenance that left the heat exchanger shell in a partially drained condition, Dominion did not fill and vent the heat exchanger in accordance with OP 3330B. This resulted in two of the three TPCCW pumps receiving an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Loss of the remaining TPCCW pump would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within three minutes per plant procedures. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-07-09057. Corrective actions included revising OP 3330B to require the fill and vent section be used following maintenance to ensure the TPCCW side of the heat exchanger is completely full of water, and revising the work planning procedure to request operations work planning provide restoration packages for all applicable work orders. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performanceattribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's failure to implement the fill and vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger conditions, could potentially have led to the loss of all TPCCW pumps and required operators to manually trip the reactor. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by performing a Phase 1 evaluation in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work practices component, because Dominion did not implement proper procedures for the restoration of the "B" TPCCW heat exchanger. H.4(b) (Section 1R19)

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusUnits 2 & 3 operated at or near 100 percent through out the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01).1Seasonal Site Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors performed a review of severe weather preparations during the onset ofthe hurricane season to evaluate the site's readiness for seasonal susceptibilities. The inspectors reviewed selected equipment, instrumentation, and supporting structures to determine if they were configured in accordance with Dominion's procedures and that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) and compared the analysis with procedure requirements to ascertain that procedures were consistent with the UFSAR. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 intake structures, service water systems, intake structure traveling screens and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2System Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the readiness of the Unit 2 service water system for extremeweather conditions, specifically, hurricanes, high winds, high tides, and other severe weather events. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and walked down the system to determine if the service water systems, including instrumentation and supporting structures, were configured in accordance with Dominion procedures and that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the system. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Partial System Walkdowns (Four Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the correct system alignment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of each system to determine if the critical portions of selected systems were correctly aligned, in accordance with these procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position checks, and verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. The following systems were reviewed based on their risk significance for the given plant configuration:Unit 2*"C" High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system while "B" HPSI out for plannedmaintenance on August 7, 2007; and*"B" Enclosure Building Filtration System (EBFS) while the "A" train was out forplanned maintenance on August 14, 2007.Unit 3*"B" EDG while "A" EDG out for planned maintenance on July 18, 2007; and*"A" High Pressure Safety Injection (SIH) system while "B" SIH out for plannedmaintenance on August 28, 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S)

a. Inspection Scope

(Two Samples)The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2Safety Injection System (SIS) and Unit 3 Containment Recirculation Spray System (RSS). The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the systems to determine if critical portions, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned, in accordance with procedures, to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability.The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders todetermine if the deficiencies significantly affected the SIS and RSS system functions. In addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the system engineering staff and reviewed the condition report (CR) database to determine if equipment alignment 3Enclosureproblems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed duringthe inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

(Twelve Samples)The inspectors performed walkdowns of fire protection areas during the inspectionperiod. The inspectors reviewed Dominion's fire protection program to determine the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to assess Dominion's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors then compared the existing conditions of the areas to the fire protection program requirements to determine if all program requirements were being met. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The fire protection areas reviewed included:Unit 2*Auxiliary Building 480 Volt MCC B51 and B41A (Fire Area A-13);*Auxiliary Building Railroad Bay Area (Fire Area A-14B);

• Enclosure Building Filtration System EBFAS Equipment Area (Fire Area A-14D);

• Diesel Generator Room A (Fire Area A-15);

• Diesel Generator Room B (Fire Area A-16); and

• Auxiliary Building Hallway/Storage Area/Hot Tool Crib (Fire Area A-19).Unit 3*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 24'-6"Elevation (Fire Area AB-6, Zone A);*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 43'-6"Elevation (Fire Area AB-6, Zone A);*West Service Water Cubicle, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area CSW-4);

• Control Building, Cable Spreading Area, 24'-6" (Fire Area CB-8);

• Control Building, East Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-2); and

• Control Building, West Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4Enclosure.2Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)Unit 2The inspectors observed personnel performance during a fire brigade drill onSeptember 14, 2007, to evaluate the readiness of station personnel to fight fires. The drill simulated a fire in the Unit 2 'A' DC Switchgear Room. The inspectors observed the fire brigade members using protective clothing, turnout gear, and self-contained breathing apparatus and entering the fire area. The inspectors also observed the fire fighting equipment brought to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment was available to effectively control and extinguish the simulated fire. The inspectors evaluated whether the permanent plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire area and whether hose usage was adequately simulated. The inspectors observed the fire fighting directions and communications between fire brigade members. The inspectors also evaluated whether the pre-planned drill scenario was followed and observed the post drill critique to evaluate if the drill objectives were satisfied and that any drill weaknesses were discussed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06).1Internal Flooding Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the flood protection measures for Unit 3 equipment in thesafety-related "A" and "B" service water pump cubicles. This review was conducted to evaluate Dominion's protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, the internal flooding evaluation and related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5Enclosure.2External Flooding Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors evaluated Dominion's preparation for, and protection from, the effects ofexternal flooding conditions for Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and applicable procedures to determine the readiness of protection for applicable safety-related structures, systems, and components. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the Unit 2 turbine, auxiliary, and EDG rooms to determine the adequacy of the floodgates, flood doors, temporary equipment, and removable flood planks to perform their design function. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed recent Dominion inspection results, including floodgate inspections, to determine whether previously identified deficiencies had been entered into Dominion's corrective action program for resolution.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.7A)Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 "B" EDG service water heat exchanger.

Theinspectors observed the as-found condition of the heat exchanger once it was opened to determine whether any adverse fouling concerns were appropriately addressed. The inspectors reviewed the results of the inspections performed in accordance with Dominion procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inspection results against the acceptance criteria contained within the procedure to determine whether all acceptance criteria had been satisfied. The inspectors also reviewed the UFSAR to evaluate whether heat exchanger inspection results were consistent with the design basis. The inspectors determined whether adverse conditions identified by Dominion were appropriately entered into Dominion's corrective action program. The inspectors also reviewed Work Order (WO) M2 06 07171, "B EDG Clean service water heat exchanger and inspect expansion joints," and WO M2 0510019 "B EDG 18 Month 100 percent eddy current testing tubing examination."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

6Enclosure1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q)Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

(Two Samples)The inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification trainingprovided to operators for Unit 2 on August 28, 2007, and Unit 3 on August 28, 2007.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of communications; ability to take timely actions; prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms; procedure use; control board manipulations; oversight and direction from supervisors; and command and control. Crew performance in these areas was compared to Dominion management expectations and guidelines as presented in OP-MP-100-1000, "Millstone Operations Guidance and Reference Document." The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control board configurations. The inspectors also observed Millstone evaluators discuss identified weaknesses with the crew and/or individual crew members, as appropriate.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

(Three Samples)The inspectors reviewed three samples of Dominion's evaluation of degradedconditions, involving safety-related structures, systems and/or components for maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors reviewed work practices that may have contributed to degraded system performance, Millstone's ability to identify and address common cause failures, the applicable maintenance rule scoping document for each system, the current classification of these systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2), the applicable system (a)(1) performance evaluation, and the adequacy of the performance criteria and goals established for each system, as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed recent system health reports and/or discussed system performance with the responsible system engineer. The specific samples are listed below:Unit 2*CRAC (a)1 Action Plan; and*DC Breakers Testing and Maintenance.

7EnclosureUnit 3*Emergency Safeguards Facility (ESF) Building Ventilation (HVQ) System (a)1Action Plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

(Nine Samples)The inspectors evaluated online risk management for emergent and planned activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs to determine if concurrent planned and emergent maintenance or surveillance activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with out-of-service components. The inspectors evaluated whether Dominion took the necessary steps to control work activities, minimize the probability of initiating events, and maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Dominion's risk management actions during plant walkdowns. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and adequacy of scheduled and emergent maintenance risk assessments for the following maintenance and testing activities:Unit 2*"A" instrument air compressor unavailable due to planned maintenance on July 19, 2007;*"B" EDG starting air tank unavailable due to planned maintenance for the doublecheck valve replacement on July 23, 2007;*Containment and enclosure building heating and ventilation maintenance during"A" EDG maintenance on August 8, 2007;*Dominion's response to rising power operated relief valve (PORV) temperaturesduring the time period of August 15 -20, 2007;*Dominion's response to an unexpected indication during surveillance testing ofReactor Protection System (RPS) matrix logic circuitry on September 7, 2007;

and*Dominion's response to pressurizer back-up heater failures during the timeperiod of September 1-21, 2007. Unit 3*"A" EDG jacket water cooling heat exchanger unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on July 20, 2007;*TDAFW system unavailable due to emergent maintenance on August 19, 2007; and*TDAFW and "B" quench spray system (QSS) unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on August 23, 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

(Six Samples)The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations. The inspectors evaluated theoperability determinations against the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability." The inspectors also discussed the conditions with operators and system and design engineers, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the following evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions:Unit 2*CR-07-07926, Six tubes recommended for plugging in X53B, EDG lube oil heatexchanger on July 26, 2007;*CR-07-02246 B CRAC exhaust fan damper leaks by air causing fan to rotatebackwards on August 30, 2007; and*CR-07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the pressurizer PORV's onSeptember 11, 2007.Unit 3*CR-07-08539, Pressure test not performed after Class I valve replacement;*CR-07-08565, "C" component cooling water (CCP) heat exchanger coversuspended over "A" CCP pump; and*CR-07-08599, Feedwater isolation trip valves closing capability degraded.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17A)

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors reviewed a permanent plant modification on Unit 2 B EDG outputbreaker 15G-13U-2 closing coil. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area and reviewed the UFSAR, licensing and design basis documents, and the engineering disposition. These reviews were conducted to determine whether

(1) the modified components remained consistent with the assumptions indicated in the design basis documents,

(2) system availability, reliability, and functional capability were maintained, and

(3) any unrecognized conditions that significantly affected risk or could place the plant in an unsafe condition were introduced as a result of the modifications.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were determined.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

(Eight Samples)The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test (PMT) activities to determine whetherthe PMT adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to evaluate consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TSrequirements. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following maintenance activities and their post-maintenance tests were evaluated:Unit 2*"B" EDG operability test following various preventive maintenance tasks and lubeoil heat exchanger tube plugging on July 24, 2007 (WO M2-06-07171); *Doble Testing on the 4.16KV breaker for "C" service water (SW) Pump followinga design change to wiring involving the power switch on August 21, 2007 (WO's M2 04-12276, 03-08727, 04-07956); and*Repair of "B" TPCCW heat exchanger tube leak.Unit 3*"B" service water strainer inspection and repairs on July 16, 2007(WO M3-07-10233);*"A" EDG jacket water cooling heat exchanger tube plugging on July 18, 2007(WO M3-07-09476);*Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil leak repairs on July 23, 2007(WO M3-07-08384);*High pressure safety injection (SIH) to cold leg check valve (WO M3-06-00145);

and*"A" EDG testing following completion of an engine overhaul onSeptember 11, 2007 (SP 3646A.1, "Emergency Diesel Generator A Operability Test," Revision 17).

b. Findings

Introduction:

A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water," during restoration of the "B" TPCCW heat exchanger on August 28, 2007. Specifically, Dominion did not fill and vent the heat exchanger in accordance with OP 3330B following maintenance that left the heat exchanger shell in a partially drained condition. This resulted in two of the three TPCCW pumps receiving an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Plant 10Enclosureprocedures would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within threeminutes had the third TPCCW pump tripped.Description: On August 8, 2007, Dominion identified a tube leak originating from the "B"TPCCW heat exchanger. Dominion prepared a work package to identify and repair the source of the leak. On August 27, Dominion personnel began work on repairing the TPCCW heat exchanger. A leaking tube was identified near the bottom of the heat exchanger, and the leak rate was estimated to be approximately one half gallon per minute at that time. Dominion successfully completed the repairs to the heat exchanger on August 28. During restoration of the heat exchanger, when operators opened the "B" TPCCW heatexchanger discharge isolation valve, the "C" TPCCW pump immediately tripped on low suction pressure. The "B" TPCCW pump, which was in standby, also received an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure, preventing the pump from starting. The "A" pump, which was running, did not receive a trip signal and remained in operation.

Heat loads on the TPCCW system at full power require at least two pumps to be in service. The plant operated with only one TPCCW pump running for approximately five minutes, during which time lube oil temperatures increased and a generator bus duct cooling system high temperature alarm was received. Operators were able to restart the "B" TPCCW pump within five minutes, which provided sufficient cooling to the TPCCW system. Dominion's investigation determined that the TPCCW side of the heat exchanger hadbeen slowly draining through the failed tube since August 8, when the heat exchanger was first isolated. Restoring the "B" TPCCW heat exchanger while in a substantially drained condition resulted in two of the three TPCCW pumps receiving automatic trip signals on low suction pressure, and could have potentially also led to a trip signal beingsent to the only remaining TPCCW pump. The performance deficiency is that Dominion failed to implement procedure OP 3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling TPCCW Heat Exchanger(s)", when required by heat exchanger conditions following maintenance to repair a tube leak.Analysis: As a result of not implementing OP 3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling TPCCW HeatExchanger(s)," Dominion restored the "B" TPCCW heat exchanger while in a substantially drained condition, which resulted in the "B" and "C" TPCCW pumps receiving automatic trip signals on low suction pressure. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's failure to implement the fill and vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger conditions, could potentially have led to the loss of all TPCCW pumps and required operators to manually trip the reactor. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with IMC0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations." The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available.

11EnclosureThe performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of HumanPerformance, Work Practices, in that Dominion did not implement proper procedures for the restoration of the "B" TPCCW heat exchanger. H.4(b)]Enforcement: Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiencydid not involve a violation of regulatory requirements because the TPCCW system is not safety-related equipment. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-07-09057). Corrective actions include revising the work planning procedure to request Operations Work Planning provide restoration packages for all applicable work orders, and revising OP 3330B to require the fill and vent section be used following maintenance to ensure the TPCCW side of the heat exchanger is completely full of water. Because this finding does not include a violation of regulatoryrequirements and is of very low safety significance (Green), it is identified as FIN05000336/2007004-01, Failure to Perform Fill and Vent of TPCCW Heat ExchangerResulted in Loss of Two TPCCW Pumps.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

(Seven Samples)The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether the testingadequately demonstrated equipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the intended safety-related function. The inspectors attended pre-job briefs, reviewed selected prerequisites and precautions to determine if they were met, and observed the tests to determine whether they were performed in accordance with the procedural steps. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the applicable test acceptance criteria to evaluate consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and TS requirements and that the applicable acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following surveillance activities were evaluated:Unit 2*On July 19, 2007, "A" containment spray pump and check valve IST;*On July 27, 2007, "C" high pressure core spray check valve IST;

• On September 25, 2007, Diesel Fire Pump M7-7 monthly operabilitydemonstration; and*On September 28, 2007, "C" service water pump IST test.Unit 3*Reactor protection set cabinet II operational surveillance test (SP 3443B21);*On August 8, 2007, Service water relief valve 3SWP*RV94A; and

• On August 24, 2007, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*P2 operational readiness test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

12Enclosure1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

(Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications to evaluate if the temporarymodifications adversely affected the function of the associated safety systems. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and their associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the UFSAR and TS determine whether the modifications affected system operability or availability. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. Unit 2*Disconnect of faulted pressurizer back-up heaters in order to restore remainingheater on the breakers to operation on September 20, 2007 (DCN DM2-00-0185-07).Unit 3*Temporary removal of the 'A' control building air conditioning booster pumpcheck valve 3SWP*V010 (DM3-00-0238-07).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.Emergency Preparedness1EP2Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the licensee'sANS. During this inspection, the inspector interviewed site Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff responsible for implementation of the ANS testing and maintenance. CRs pertaining to the ANS were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The inspector reviewed the licensee's original ANS design report to ensure compliance with those commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspector also interviewed EP staff to gain an understanding of the new ANS plans for Millstone. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

13Enclosure1EP3Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System(71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)A review of Millstone's ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process fornotifying the ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and to ensure timely facility activation. The inspector reviewed procedures, CRs, and call-in drills associated with the ERO notification system and drills. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the training records for a sample of ERO members. The inspector also verified that the EP department staff were receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan.

Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, the latest Emergency Plan Revisionwas implemented based on Dominion's determination, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. The inspector conducted a sampling review of the Emergency Plan changes, and all changes to EALs, to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes.

Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports to assess the licensee'sability to evaluate their performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs initiated from January 2006 to September 2007 from drills, self-assessments, and audits for 2006 and 2007 required by 50.54(t). Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06)Combined Functional Drill

a. Inspection Scope

(One Sample)The inspectors observed the conduct of a Unit 2 licensed operator training emergencyplanning drill on August 29, 2007. The inspectors observed the operating crew performance at the simulator and the emergency response organization performance at the site emergency operations center. The inspectors evaluated the classification, notification and protective action recommendations for accuracy and timeliness.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of Dominion's evaluators to adequately address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)

a. Inspection Scope

(Nine samples)During the period September 24-28, 2007, the inspectors conducted the followingactivities to evaluate the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring instrumentation, and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program, relative to maintaining and issuing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Implementation of these programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and Dominion's procedures. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify area radiation monitors that are installedin Millstone Units 2 and 3 for the protection of workers, and reviewed the calibration procedure and current calibration records for selected instrumentation, including the Unit 2 spent fuel area monitors (RM-8139/8142/8156/8157), the Unit 3 spent fuel pool area monitors (3RMS-RIY08/36) and the Unit 3 containment area monitors (RE-01/02/03). The inspector discussed with the Instrument and Control (I&C)supervisor the monitoring system health report and instrument reliability trends. The inspector reviewed the operating procedure and current source activities/dose ratecharacterizations for the Shepherd Model 89 instrument calibrators (Serial Nos. 9155 &

9068). The inspector observed a technician perform safety interlock testing on the calibrator prior to using it.

15EnclosureThe inspector reviewed the calibration records for selected survey instruments andcontamination monitors including the small article contamination monitors (SAM 9 & 11),personnel contamination monitors (ARGOS-4A/B), electronic dosimeters (SeimensMk2), and various portable survey instruments (FH40TC, RO-2A, RO-20).The inspector reviewed the relevant procedures and observed a technician performing acalibration validation on electronic dosimeters and calibrate portable radiation survey instruments (RO-2A & RO-20).The inspector observed a technician performing daily functional checks on a variety ofcontamination monitors and survey instruments located in Units 2 and 3 including SAC-4, SAM-11, ARGOS 4A/B, CM-11, RM-14, Ludlum 177, BC-4, and Teleprobes.

The inspector reviewed the procedure and quality control records associated with performing the instrument daily functional checks, including air sample counting equipment and gamma spectrometers.The inspector reviewed recent contamination sampling (10 CFR 61 data) results forUnits 2 and 3 to determine if the instrument calibration sources used were representative of the radioisotopes found in the plant source term.The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regardingthe maintenance and issuance of SCBA to emergency response personnel. Training and qualification records were reviewed for licensed operators from each of the five operating shifts at each unit and for selected response personnel who would wear SCBAs in the event of an emergency. The inspector, with the assistance of Fire Protection technicians, physically inspectedthree SCBAs staged for use in each control room, two SCBAs staged for use in the Unit 3 turbine building, and two SCBAs staged in the Unit 2 Technical Services Area.

Maintenance and regulator test records were reviewed for selected SCBAs. The inspector also evaluated whether the air used to fill the SCBAs met the Grade D quality criteria of the Compressed Gas Association.The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for assuring quality in the radiationmonitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs by reviewing self-assessments (MP-SA-06-56/69/74/79), Nuclear Oversight audits (Nos.05-06, 06-04/08, 07-06), and 21 CRs related to these program areas. The inspector determined if problems were identified in a timely manner, that an extent of condition and cause evaluation were performed, previous radiation surveys remained valid, and corrective actions were appropriate to preclude repetitive problems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

16Enclosure4.OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151).1 Cornerstone: Initiating Events

a. Inspection Scope

(Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed Dominion submittals for the PIs listed below to verify theaccuracy of the data reported during that period. The PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used to verify the basis for reporting each data element.

The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs and monthly operating reports, and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant licensing and engineering personnel. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the

.Unit 2Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours.Unit 3*Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2Emergency Planning Cornerstone (3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

(Three Samples)The inspector reviewed data for the EP PIs: Drill and Exercise Performance, ERO DrillParticipation; and ANS Reliability. The inspector reviewed supporting documentation from drills and tests from April 2006 to June 2007 to evaluate the accuracy of the reported data. The acceptance criteria used for the review were NEI 99-02.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance 17Enclosureissues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered intoDominion's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new CR and attending daily management review committee meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Sample: Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Leakage

(One Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by Dominion to evaluate and correct severalinstances of valve leakage that impacted SIT accumulator water levels and/or boron concentration over the past several years of operation. The inspectors reviewed CRs related to SIT accumulator leakage, the completed evaluations, and associated corrective actions to assess the performance history and effectiveness of Dominion's actions. The inspectors conducted interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors also reviewed procedures, data and drawings. b.Assessments and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspectors concluded that Dominion hadadequately evaluated and corrected the various individual valve leakage issues.

However, the inspectors noted that engineers and operators were challenged by the multiple system/valve leaks over the last several years. In particular, operator actions were necessary to frequently fill the affected SIT accumulators or to depressurize an associated accumulator fill header (via a temporary modification). Engineers and operators also developed and executed troubleshooting plans to identify leaking components. Although the past problems have not resulted in rendering the SIT accumulator or related emergency cooling systems inoperable, continued leaks represent challenges to plant equipment and staff. Dominion management acknowledged the concerns related to the continuing challenges, and discussed some of their ongoing and planned efforts to broadly address and evaluate additional proactive measures to prevent further leakage problems, including an inter-discipline review of the potential leakage paths and scenarios.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn September 14, 2007, the EP inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.On September 28, 2007, the radiation protection inspector presented the inspectionresults to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspector confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection.

18EnclosureOn October 10, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the overall inspection results toMr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection. ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

A. PriceSite Vice PresidentA. Jordan Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance

R. Griffin Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

D. AtwoodFire Protection Instructor

M. BrooksSenior Radiation Protection Technician

T. ClearyLicensing Engineer

K. CollinsFire Protection Technician

C. DibiasiChemist

S. DubickiFire Protection Technician

J. FirmamRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility

T. Gilbert Emergency Preparedness

T. GleasonRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility

W. GormanSupervisor Instrumentation & Control

J. HochdorferSupervisor, Water Treatment

N. HunterSenior Radiation Protection Technician

J. KunzeSupervisor Nuclear Operations Support

J. LaineManager Radiation Protection/Chemistry

P. Luckey Manager, Emergency Preparedness

S. Mazzola Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

E. ReimanFire Protection Technician

S. TurowskiSupervisor HP Technical Services

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and

Closed

05000423/FIN-2007004-01FINFailure to Perform Fill and Vent of TPCCW HeatExchanger (Section 1R19)

A-2Attachment

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP 3215, Rev. 007-06, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"OP 2271B, Rev. 000-02, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"

AOP 3579, Rev. 016-00, "Severe Weather Conditions"

AOP 2560, Rev. 010-03, "Storms, High Winds and High Tides"

SP 3665.2, Rev 008-02, "Intake Structure Condition Determination"

SP 2615, Rev. 006-01, "Flood Level Determination"

COP 200.6, Rev 002-01, "Storms and Other Hazardous Phenomena (Prep and Recovery)"Work OrdersM2 06 07806 Screen Wash Spool replacement Upstream of 2-TS-4

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresOP 2308

HPSI System Valve Alignment, Facility 2OP 2314 Enclosure Building Filtration System Alignment

OP 3306, Containment Recirculation Spray System

OP 3308, High Pressure Safety InjectionCondition ReportsCR-07-02301, Two broken bolts found on 3RSS*MOV23BCR-07-02946, Broken bolts on 3RSS*MOV23C

CR-07-04382, Water discovered in "D" RSS piping

CR-06-05621, P43B Containment Spray pump exhibits Increased vibration

CR-06-06690, A Containment Spray pump vibration measurement not in normal limitWork OrdersM2-05-05854 A Containment Spray pump seal leakage, CR-05-05149

Drawings25203-26015 Piping & Instrument Diagram LP and HP Safety Injection System and Pumps Other DocumentsUFSAR Section 6.7 Enclosure Building Filtration SystemOperability Determination

MP3-005-07, Rev. 2

2007 Qtr 1 System Health Report for Containment Recirculation Spray System

Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 9Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area

AB-6, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area

CSW-4, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area

AB-1, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area

HR-1, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area

MSV-1, March 1998

A-3Attachment

Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProceduresSP 2665 Building Flood Gate Inspections, Revision 005-01AOP-2560 Storms, High Winds, and High Tides, RevisionCondition ReportsCR 07-08486

MP2 Gate 1 Gouge in Seal GasketCR 07-08487 MP2 Gate 2 Seal Gasket Coming Off Top Left of Door

CR 07-08488 MP2 Gate 5 Seal Gasket Coming Off Angle Iron

CR 07-08489 MP2 Gate 6 Seal Gasket has Gouge

CR-07-08571, A SWP cubicle west floor drain plugging

CR-07-08385, A Service Water pump cubicle floodingOther DocumentsUnit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Change 8MP3 Service Water Pump Cubicle Internal Flooding Evaluation, Calculation 01-ENG-01884M3

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramOther DocumentsCycle 07-5 Simulator Progress Review Exam #1LORTS E55, Rev 000-02, Operational Exam 55Section 1R12:

Maintenance EffectivenessCondition ReportsCR-04-07801, 3HVQ*ACUS1B did not auto start as expectedCR-05-00143, HVQ*ACUS1A tripped due to compressor pressure high

CR-05-07540, Low freon charge on 3HVQ*ACUS1B

CR-05-10244, During leak checks on 3HVQ*ACUS1B an additional 30 lbs of freon were added

CR-05-11408, 3HVQ*ACUS1A tripped unplanned LCO entry

CR-05-11752, Freon leaking from SWP*PV113B2

CR-05-11760, Configuration management lost on 3SWP*PV113B1 and 3SWP*PV113B2

CR-06-06088, Unplanned LCO refrigerant leak found at threaded joint on 3HVQ*ACUS2B

CR-06-08651, Performing running checks on 3HVQ*ACUS2B found refrigerant leak

CR-07-04036, Investigation of 125 VDC EC Breaker trip devices

CR-06-00443, Blown Fuse,

CR-06-07115, Positive pressure in control room

CR-07-01620, MRFF on Interface Board

CR-07-01659, As found Program did not match VTM or DM2S-0265-96

CR-06-03722, Charcoal Filter Failed Efficiency Testing

CR-07-07929, 2-HV-207 Damper Failure

CR-06-10614, 1-2" gap below fan discharge damper 206B

CR 01-009042 New

EC-1 Devices failed

CR 03-10390 New

EC-1 Device failed as found testing

CR 03-07156 Left pole failed short time testing

CR 03-10929 Breaker failed testing

CR 05-13883 High failure rates of

EC-1 devices

CR 06-07999 Breaker Failed all but 1 LTA, device leaking oil

A-4AttachmentCR 06 10100 Breaker Failed Testing

CR 07-04801 All DC AKR Breakers PM'd during 3R11 Failed as Found over current testing.Drawings25203-30023 Single Line Diagram 125 VDC System- Turbine Battery25203-30024 Single Line Diagram 125 VDC Emergency and 120 VAC Vital System

212-30076 One Line Diagram 125VDC and 120 VAC Distribution System-CMPSTOther DocumentsMaintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation for the ESF Building Ventilation (HVQ) SystemSP-M3-EE-269 Revision 3, Electrical Design Criteria Unit 3 Electrical Distribution System Calculation

PA-085-082-00812GE MP2 125V DC Coordination Study Revision 3

DM2-02-0444-05 Modification for the Control Room Ambient Temperature

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProceduresMP-13-PRA-FAP01.1, "Performing (a)(4) Risk Assessments"DNAP-2000, "Dominion Work Management Process"

MP-14-OPS-GLD600, "Plant Status and Configuration Control"

OP 23332B, "Unit 2 Instrument Air System"

M2-05-00069, "Unit 2 'A' Instrument Air Compressor"

M2-05-04047, "Containment and Enclosure Building H&V Unit Fan Discharge Damper"

OP3322, Auxiliary Feedwater SystemCondition ReportsCR-07-08729, Unplanned LCO, failure of stroke time test of 3FWA*HV32A during performanceof SP 3622.8-012

CR-07-08730, Unplanned LCO, failure of stroke time test of 3FWA*HV32B during performance of SP 3622.8-012

CR-07-08731, Unplanned LCO, failure of stroke time test of 3FWA*HV32C during performance of SP 3622.8-012

CR-07-08732, Unplanned LCO, failure of stroke time test of 3FWA*HV32D during performance of SP 3622.8-012

CR-07-08793, Air pockets identified in FWA system pipingOther DocumentsPlan of the Day and EOS Risk evaluation for 'A' EDG maintenance(Work Week 0729)MNPS-3-UFSAR, Millstone Unit 3 UFSAR

Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsCondition ReportsCR-07-08599, 3FWS*CTV41's closing capability against main feedwater pump shutoff pressuremay be degradedCR-07-08565, The "C"

CCP HX end cover is suspended over the operable "A" CCP pump

CR-07-08359, 0 Section XI pressure test not performed after replacement of CL1 valve3RCS*V106 for upstream weldCR-07-02246 2-HY-206B, The exhaust fan discharge damper, appears to be leaking by air,causing Fan 31B to rotate backwards.

A-5AttachmentCR-07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the new MP2 presssurizer PORVsOther DocumentsOperability Determination

MP3-014-07, 3FWS*CTV41's closing capability against mainfeedwater pump shutoff pressure may be degradedOperability Determination

MP3-013-07, ASME Section XI Pressure Test not Performed afterReplacement of CL 1 ValveOperability Determination

MP2-014-07, Potential failure scenario for the new MP2 presssurizerPORVsDM2-01-0146-06

RC-404 Tailpipe temperature indicator

TI-114 High Temperature Alarm Setpoint Change

Section 1R17: Permanent Plant ModificationsCondition ReportsCR-07-09362 White light on breaker A407 "C" Service Water Pump" is DimCR-03-02501

CR-07-09572Work OrdersM2-07-07133M2-04-12270 4.16 KV & 6.9 KV Circuit breaker Closing Coil ModificationDrawings25203-32013 Sheet 6, Service Water Pump MP5B25203-32007 Sheet 32, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters

203-32007 Sheet 33, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters

203-32007 Sheet 34, Pressurizer Back-up HeatersOther DocumentsDesign Change Notice

DM2-00-0283-04, 4.16 KV & 6.9 KV Circuit breaker Closing CoilModification Design Change Notice

DM2-00-0185-07, Temporary plant change required to disconnect failed pressurizer back-up heaters

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingProceduresSP 3626.13, "Service Water Heat Exchangers Fouling Determination"SP 3622.1, "Auxiliary Feed Pump 3FWA*P1A Operational Readiness Test"

MP 3750AA, "Service Water Strainer Maintenance"

CMP 795, "Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging"Condition Reports07-05627, 07-07655, 06-11755

Work OrdersM3-07-08384, M3-06-12743, M3-03-06351, M3-05-11224, M3-07-10233, M3-07-09476

A-6AttachmentDrawingsEM-130B, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System P&ID"2275.002-014-016, "MDAFW Oil Piping"

2179-EM-133D, "Service Water System"

2179-EM-116A, "Emergency Diesel Generator 'A" Lube Oil & Cooling System"Other DocumentsClearance # 3C12-FWA01-0001Clearance # 3C12-EGS01-0007"

03-5006289, "Areva Tubesheet Sleeving Data Sheet for 'A' EDG Jacket Water Cooling HeatExchanger"

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProceduresSP 3443B21-0041, "Protection Set Cabinet

II Operational Test Data Sheet"SP 2612B, "C" Service Water Pump Tests, Rev. 010-02

SP 2606A, Containment Spray Pump Operability and Inservice Testing, Facility 1, Revision

013-02

SP-2604BO-001, "C" HPSI Pump and Check Valve IST, Rev 000-00Condition Reports07-07602, 07-07630, 07-07627CR-07-08350, 3SWP*RV94A failed as found lift testWork OrdersM3-06-11784, M3-07-10123,M3-06-12681, A RSS Heat Exchanger Relief Valve 3 year PMDrawingsMillstone Unit 2 Inservice Test Program for Pumps and Valves, Rev. 7, Change 16

Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsDrawings25212-26933, "Service Water System"Other DocumentsDM3-00-0238-07, "Temporary Removal of the Control Building Air Conditioning Booster PumpCheck Valve 3SWP*V010"50.59 Screening for Check Valve 3SWP*V010

TMOD

PROTO-FLOW computer model for service flow with Check Valve 3SWP*V010 TMOD1

Service Water Pump 2A Discharge Check Valve Design Bases DocumentSection 1EP2: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation"Alert and Notification Systems, Millstone Nuclear Power Station and Haddam Neck Plant," April

1984MP-26-EPA-FAP08, "Public Alerting System Administration," Rev. 002-02, 8/30/06

MP-26-EPA-FAP09, "Public Alerting System Test and Maintenance," Rev. 002-03, 8/1/07

MP-26-EPA-FAP10, "Public Alerting System Test and Repair," Rev.000

A-7AttachmentLetter from Dominion to Connecticut DEP, "2006 Siren System Changes," February 7, 2007Maintenance Logs 2006 & 2007

Sample of Corrective Actions related to the sirens

Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and AugmentationSystemCall in Drill Records for 2006 & 2007SERO Position List and Personnel

TPD-7.2.12 "Emergency plan Training (EPLAN) Training Program Description," Rev. 21

TQ 1 "Personnel Qualification and Training," Rev. 007-02

MP-26-EPI-FAP07 "Notifications and Communications," Rev. 005

MP-26-EPA-FAP01 "Management Program for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness,"Rev.002-03Sample of Student Qualification Matrix

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan ChangesMP-26-EPA-FAP02, "Decrease in Effectiveness 10CFR 50.54(q) Determination," Rev. 001MP-26-EPA-FAP06, "Emergency Plan Change Process," Rev. 002Review NumbersMP-07-28MP-07-10MP-07-04MP-07-08

MP-07-01MP-07-25

MP-06-60MP-07-23

MP-06-53MP-07-22

MP-06-48MP-07-21

MP-06-47MP-07-21

MP-06-46MP-07-15

MP-06-41MP-07-12

MP-06-38MP-07-14

MP-06-30MP-07-13

MP-06-15MP-06-01

Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness WeaknessesSample of

EP Related CRs from January 2006 - September 2007"EP Assessment of 04/25/07 Unusual Event" All CRs related to the 04/25/07 Unusual Event

50.54(t) Audits from 2006 and 2007

Sample of EP self-assessments from 2006 and 2007Drill Reports:

CFD 07-01,

CFD 07-02,

CFD 07-03,

CFD 06-01,

CFD 06-02,

CFD 06-03, CFD06-04,

CFD 06-05,

CFD 06-06,

CFD 06-07, CFD 06-08

Section 1EP6: Drill EvaluationOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Training Drills

CFD 07-04

A-8Attachment

Section 2OS3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective EquipmentProcedures:RPM 1.3.7, Rev 7Lost, Off-Scale, or Questionable DosimetryRPM 1.3.14, Rev 7Personnel Dose Calculations and Assessments

RPM 1.6.4, Rev 4Siemens Electronic Dosimetry System

RPM4.1.6, Rev 4HD-29A,

HD-66A, and

AVS-28A Air Sampler Calibration

RPM 4.3.7, Rev 4RO-20 Dose Rate Meter Calibration

RPM 4.6.6, Rev 4Electronic Dosimeter Calibration Verification & Response Check

RPM 4.6.12, Rev 2PCM-1B Contamination Monitor Calibration

RPM 4.6.24, Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Calibration

RPM 4.6.26, Rev 0Eberline Personnel Monitor

PM-7 Calibration

RPM 4.7.3 Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Operation

RPM 4.7.8, Rev 7Whole Body Counting System Operation

CP 2801/3801Rev 0Abacos Plus Whole Body Counting System Maintenance

RPM 4.8.1, Rev 6Measuring the Radiation Intensity of the J. L. Shepard Calibrator

RPM 4.8.11, Rev 7Response Checking Whole Body Contamination Monitors

RPM 4.8.14, Rev 5Instrumentation Quality Assurance Program

RPM 4.8.9, Rev 9Source Checking Health Physics Instruments

SFP 24, Rev 3Inspection & Inventory of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

FPI18, Rev 8Site Fire Protection Emergency Response Vehicle EquipmentInspectionIC 3490B10, Rev 6Calibration and Functional Test for Kaman Science AreaRadiation MonitorCondition Reports

04-08430, 04-08493, 04-09221, 04-10790, 04-01095, 05-01957, 05-02974, 05-06283,

05-06941, 05-09428, 05-13711, 06-00894, 06-02421, 06-03004, 06-07494, 06-09584,

06-10204, 06-11210, 06-12054, 06-12096, 06-12121Department Self-AssessmentsMP-SA-06-56, Portal Monitor and Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration ChecksMP-SA-06-69, Respiratory Protection Equipment for Emergency Response

MP-SA-06-74, Review of Portable HP Instrument Calibration ProceduresNuclear Oversight Audits05-06, RP/PCP/ Chem Programs06-04, Fire Protection Program

06-08, Radiological Protection and Process Control Program

07-06, Radiological Protection, Process Control Program, and ChemistrySCBA's Inspected:Pack Nos. 077,110, 021, 112, 084, 035, 434, 032, 039

Instrument Calibration Verification & Response Checks:Electronic Dosimeters: Nos. 64745, 66620, 63693, 15501, 7051ARGOS 4A/B: Nos. 121, 123, 095

SAM-11 Nos. 498, 493, 494, 495, 135

A-9AttachmentBC-4: Nos. 804, 805, 800, 1022Gamma Spectrometers: Nos. 07, 08, 15, 16SAC-4: Nos. 879

Ludlum 177: Nos,

208754,

208750,

208766

Ludlum 2241: Nos.

195206, 21374

Teleprobes: Nos. 454, 169

RO-2 Nos. 1206, 2870, 2885, 350Other:Unit 2 and Unit 3 Student Qualification/Training Status Records for SCBA training

2007 2 nd Quarter Radiation Monitoring System Health ReportsARGOS-4AB &

SAM-11 Response to Unit 3 Plant Mix Evaluation

2007 Annual Validation of J. L. Shepherd Calibrators Nos. 9068, 9155Section 4OA1 - Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationOther DocumentsMP2 Cycle 17 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007MP3 Cycle 10 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007

ERO Drill Participation PI data, April 2006 - June 2007

Public Notification System PI data, April 2006 - June 2007

DEP PI data, April 2006 - June 2007Section 4OA2 -

Identification and Resolution of ProblemsProceduresSP 3608.4, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 005-01SP 3610A.3, RHR System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 007-01

MP-16-CAP-FAP01.1, Condition Report Screening and Review, Rev. 008-04Completed TestsSP 3610A.3-001, RHR System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train A, 7/13/07, 7/27/07SP 3610A.3-003, RHR System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train B, 7/27/07

SP 3608.4-001, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train A and Common Header, 7/13/07, 8/10/07SP 3608.4-003, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train B,

7/27/07, 8/27/07Drawings12179-EM-113A, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 2612179-EM-113B, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 32

2179-EM-112A, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 44

2179-EM-112B, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 21

2179-EM-102A, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 1, Rev. 26

2179-EM-102B, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 2, Rev. 21

2179-EM-102D, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 4, Rev. 18

2179-EM-102E, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 5, Rev. 21

A-10AttachmentOther DocumentsSystem Health Report, Safety Injection Accumulators, 2

nd Quarter 2007Condition Reports05-14026, 06-01813, 06-03781, 06-04097, 06-08164, 06-09518, 07-00792, 07-05639, 07-

08553

LIST OF ACRONYMS

3R11Unit 3 refueling outageADAMSAgencywide Documents Access and Management System

ANSAlert and Notification System

AOPabnormal operating procedure

ASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers

CCPcomponent cooling water

CFRCode of Federal Regulations

CRcondition report

CRACcontrol room air conditioning

DEPDrill and Exercise Performance

DRPDivision of Reactor Projects

DRSDivision of Reactor Safety

EALEmergency Action Level

EBFSenclosure building filtration system

EDG emergency diesel generator

EP Emergency Preparedness

EROEmergency Response Organization

ESFengineered safety features

HPSIHigh Pressure Safety Injection

I&CInstrumentation and Control

IMCinspection manual chapter

MRmaintenance rule

NEINuclear Energy Institute

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

OAOther Activities

PARSPublicly Available Records System

PIperformance indicator

PMSpreventive maintenance tasks

PMTpost maintenance testing

PORVpower operated relief valve

QSSquench spray system

RECOreasonable expectation of confirmed operability

RPSreactor protection system

RSSrecirculation spray system

SAMsmall articles monitor

SCBAself-contained breathing apparatus

SDPsignificance determination process

SIHhigh pressure safety injection system

A-11AttachmentSISsafety injection systemSITsafety injection tank

SORCsite operations review committee

SWservice water

TDAFWturbine-driven auxiliary feedwater

TPCCWturbine plant component cooling water

TStechnical specification

UFSARupdated final safety analysis report

WO work order