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| {{#Wiki_filter:}} | | {{#Wiki_filter:David Lew From: John White Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 6:14 PM To: John Boska; Thomas Nicholson; Bo Pham; James Noggle Cc: David Lew; Darrell Roberts; Diane Screnci; Eugene Cobey; Marsha Gamberoni; Marc Dapas;Marjorie McLaughlin; Neil Sheehan; Samuel Collins |
| | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | Executive Summary'of Energy GW Characterization Report Attachments: |
| | ExecutiveSummary GW final.pdf Synopsis of Entergy's Executive Summary (attached): |
| | Investigation traced the contamination to two separate structures, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool. There is no evidence of any release form Unit 3. Primary nuclides of interest are Tritium and Strontium-90; others include, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, and Nickle-63. |
| | Contaminated groundwater cannot migrate North, East, or South; but only West to the Hudson River. Radiological, assessments have consistently indicated that releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory requirements. |
| | Primary nuclide found in the Unit 2 plume is Tritium. The release is attributable to historic damage to Unit 2 SFP liner in 199Q, which was subsequently detected and repaired in 1992; and a weld imperfection in the Transfer Canal liner, detected in September and repaired in December 2007. To the extent possible, the Unit 2 liner has been tested and repairs completed. |
| | A containment box remains installed at a leakage point in the pool wall discover in August 2005. All identified Unit 2 leakage points have been addressed. |
| | Notwithstanding, contaminated, water still likely exists between the stainless steel linier and concrete wall. Accordingly, additional leakage cannot be ruled out. However, data indicates that such continuing leakage is small and has little impact on groundwater. |
| | Unit 1 plume is characterized .by Strontium-90 due to legacy leakage from the spent fuel pools. Currently, all pools are drained, excepting the West Pool which still contains spent fuel. While the previous owner identified the leakage in the 1990's, and was managing the leakage by collecting it from a re-configured footing drain, the groundwater investigation determined that the management was not fully successful in collecting all of the leakage as evidenced by investigation findings that revealed contamination in the groundwater near Unit 1. In response, a program to reduce the concentration of radio nuclides in the Unit 1 West Pool water by enhanced demineralization was initiated in April 2006.Planned fuel removal and pool draining will completely eliminate this source by the end of 2008.Groundwater contamination is, and will remain, limited to the Indian Point Energy Center property, due to the hydrogeologic conditions that affect groundwater behavior. |
| | Because of the nature and age of the releases, groundwater contaminant migration rates, and interdiction by Energy to eliminate and control releases, the groundwater contaminant plumes have reached maximum spatial extent and should decrease over time.Long term groundwater monitoring is ongoing; and network of multi-level groundwater monitoring installations has been established. |
| | Groundwater testing is performed quarterly. |
| | In addition to groundwater samples, Energy obtained various off-site samples of environmental media, including off-site wells, reservoirs, and the Hudson River. Energy also participated in a fish sampling program with NRC and New York DEC. Sample analysis by al! parties did not detect any radioactivity in excess of environmental background. |
| | It is believed that the remediation strategy will results in decrease of plume concentrations, over time. The continue monitoring of groundwater is expected to demonstrate that trend and confirm that the leaks have been terminated. |
| | The interdiction to eliminate or reduce releases have been accomplished; the nature and extent of contamination is known; contaminant plumes have reached maximum extent; and the single receptor, the Hudson River, is monitored with radiological assessments that have consistently demonstrated that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits, and pose no threat to public health and safety.1 |
| | |
| | EXECUTIVE |
| | |
| | ==SUMMARY== |
| | This report presents the results of a two-year comprehensive hydrogeologic site investigation of the Indian Point Energy Center (Site) conducted by GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc. (GZA). The study was initiated in response to an apparent release of Tritium to the subsurface, initially discovered in August of 2005 during Unit 2 construction activities associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Project. These investigations were subsequently expanded to include areas of the Site where credible potential sources of leakage might exist, and encompassed all three reactor units.Ultimately, these investigations traced the. contamination back to two separate structures, the Unit 2 and Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs). The two commingled plumes, resulting from these SFPs releases, have been fully*characterized and their extent, activity and impact determined. |
| | The two primary radionuclide contaminants of interest were found to be Tritium and Strontium. |
| | Other contaminants, Cesium, Cobalt, and Nickel, have been found in a subset of the groundwater samples, but always in conjunction with Tritium or Strontium. |
| | Therefore, while the focus of the investigation was on Tritium and Strontium, it inherently addresses the full extent of groundwater radionuclide contamination. |
| | The investigations have further shown that the contaminated groundwater can not migrate off-property to the North, East or South. The plumes ultimately discharge to the Hudson River to the West.Throughout the two years of the investigation, the groundwater mass flux and radiological release to the Hudson River have been assessed. |
| | These assessments, along with the resulting Conceptual Site Model, have been used by Entergy to assess dose impact. At no time have analyses of existing Site conditions yielded any indication of potential adverse environmental or health risk. In fact, radiological assessments have consistently shown) that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits.SOURCES OF CONTAMINATION As stated above, the investigations found that the groundwater contamination is the result of releases from the Unit 2 and the Unit 1 ,SFPs. Our studies found no evidence of any release from Unit 3.The predominant radionuclide found in the plume from the Unit 2 SFP pool is Tritium. The releases were due to: 1) historic damage in 1990 to the SFP liner, with subsequent discovery and repair in 1992; and 2) a weld imperfection in the stainless steel Transfer Canal liner identified by Entergy in September 2007, and repaired in December 2007. To the extent possible, the Unit 2 pool liner has been fully tested and repairs have been completed. |
| | The identified leakage has therefore been eliminated and/or controlled 6'y Entergy. Specifically, Entergy has: 1) confirmed that the damage to the liner associated with the 1992 release was repaired by the prior owner and is no longer leaking; 2) installed a containment system (collection box) at the site of x.. |
| | the leakage discovered in 2005, which precludes further release to the groundwater; and 3) after an exhaustive liner inspection, identified a weld imperfection in the Transfer Canal liner that was then prevented from leaking by draining the canal. The weld was then subsequently repaired by Entergy in mid-December 2007. Therefore, all identified Unit 2 SFP leaks have been addressed. |
| | Water likely remains between the Unit 2 SFP stainless steel liner and the concrete walls, and thus additional active leaks can not be completely ruled out. However, if they exist at all, the data indicate they must be small and of little impact to the groundwater. |
| | The Unit 1 plume is characterized by Strontium from legacy leakage of the Unit 1 fuel pools. At present, the Unit 1 pools have been drained with the exception of the Unit I West Fuel Pool which still contains spent fuel. This West Pool leaks water under the fuel building and is responsible for the Unit I Strontium groundwater plume discovered in 2006. Prior to that time, the previous owner had identified leakage from the West Fuel Pool in the 1990's and was managing the leakage by collecting it from a re-configured footing drain that surrounded the fuel building. |
| | However, based on the groundwater investigation, it has been determined that the pool leakage management program was not successful in collecting all of the leakage. As a result, uncollected contaminants released from the Unit, I Spent Fuel Pools, past and present, have been observed during the groundwater investigation effort at various locations near the site of Unit 1. In response to the finding that the leak collection system was not functioning as believed, Entergy promptly initiated a program to reduce the concentration of radionuclides in the Unit 1 West Pool's water, beginning in April 2006, via enhanced demineralization water treatment. |
| | The planned fuel removal and pool draining will completely eliminate this release source by year end 2008.EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION The groundwater contamination is, and will remain, limited to the Indian Point Energy Center property, because the migration of Site contaminants is controlled by groundwater flow, which, in turn, is governed by the post-'construction hydrogeologic setting. Plant construction required reduction in bedrock surface elevations and installation of foundation drains. These man-made features have lowered the, groundwater elevations beneath the facility, redirecting groundwater to flow to the West towards the Hudson River; and not to the North, East or South. Because of the nature and age of the releases, groundwater contaminant migration rates, and interdictions by Entergy to eliminate/control releases, the groundwater contaminant plumes have reached their maximum spatial extent and should now decrease over time.LONG-TERM MONITORING Long term groundwater monitoring is ongoing; a network of multi-level groundwater monitoring installations has been established at the facility.These "wells" are located down gradient of, and in close proximity to, both existing and potential release locations. |
| | Groundwater testing is performed quarterly on the majority of these wells, with the rest remaining on standby to provide added detail, if required. |
| | The resulting information is provided on a yearly basis to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The information is used to assess changes in groundwater relative to dose impact assessment and to detect future releases, should they occur.In addition to the groundwater samples from the network of monitoring wells, Entergy obtained various off-Site samples of environmental media including off-Site wells, reservoirs and the Hudson River. In addition, Entergy participated in a fish sampling program. with the NRC and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC). |
| | None of the samples analyzed, including the samples split with regulatory agencies, detected any radioactivity in excess of environmental background levels.GZA believes that the recommended remediation technology discussed below will cause the concentrations of radionuclides in the groundwater plumes to decrease over time. The continued monitoring of groundwater is expected to demonstrate that trend and support the conclusion that the identified leaks have been terminated. |
| | However, GZA expects that contaminant concentrations will fluctuate over time due to natural variations in groundwater recharge and that, a potential future short term increase in concentrations does not, in and of itself, indicate a new leak. It is further.emphasized that the groundwater releases to the river are only a small percentage of the regulatory limits, which are of no threat to public health PROPOSED REMEDIATION GZA has recommended the following corrective measures to Entergy, which they are implementing: |
| | 0 Repair the identified Unit 2 Transfer Canal liner weld imperfection (completed December 2007).0 Continue source term reduction in the Unit I West Pool via the installed demineralization system (ongoing until completion of No. 3 below).* Remove the remaining Unit I fuel and drain the West Pool (in-process). |
| | * Implement long term groundwater monitoring (in-process). |
| | The proposed remediation technology is source elimination/control (Nos. 1 and 3 above) with subsequent Monitored Natural Attenuation, or MNA.MNA is a recognized and proven remedial approach that allows natural processes to reduce contaminant concentrations. |
| | The associated monitoring is intended to verify that reductions are occurring in an anticipated manner. The Indian.Point Energy Center Site is well suited for this approach because: 1)interdictions to eliminate or reduce releases have been made; 2) the nature and extent of contamination is known; 3) the contaminant plumes have reached their maximum extent;' and 4) the single receptor of the contamination, the Hudson River, is monitored, with radiological assessments consistently demonstrating that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits, and no threat to public health or safety.}} |
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24036A0162024-02-0101 February 2024 NRC Email - Acknowledge and Accept the Indian Point Energy Center Request to Be Removed from NRC Headquarters Operation Officer (Hoo) Morning Authentication Code Calls ML23341A2002023-12-0707 December 2023 Email - Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 – Implementation Notice of Amendment No. 67, 300 and 276 to Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Plan (Ioep) ML23332A0802023-11-0808 November 2023 Email from State of New York on the Revised License Amendment for Indian Point Energy Center ISFSI Only Emergency Plan ML23331A9542023-11-0808 November 2023 Email - State of New York Comments on the Revised License Amendment for Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 Technical Specification Changes Reflecting Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel ML23325A1632023-11-0808 November 2023 State of New York Comments on the Revised License Amendment for Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 Technical Specification Changes Reflecting Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel ML23144A3382023-05-25025 May 2023 Dawn Giambalvo of Jersey City, New Jersey Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3422023-05-25025 May 2023 Peter Duda of Pearl River, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3452023-05-25025 May 2023 Adam Kahn of Monsey, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3502023-05-25025 May 2023 Dan Kwilecki of Montebello, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3392023-05-25025 May 2023 David Morris of New City, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3442023-05-25025 May 2023 Peggy Kurtz of Rockland County, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23136B1622023-05-15015 May 2023 Town of North Salem, County of Westchester, New York Board Resolution Letter Regarding Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23109A0632023-04-17017 April 2023 Email Acceptance Review for IP2 and IP3 Amended Facility License and Technical Specification to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from Spent Fuel Pits ML23055A1112023-02-23023 February 2023 Alyse Peterson Email- NYSERDA No Comments on Indian Point Unit 2 - Regarding Holtec License Amendment Request to Revise Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications and Staffing Requirements with Spent Fuel Transfer to ISFSI (Dockets 50-24 ML23049A0032023-02-14014 February 2023 NRC Acceptance Email to Holtec for License Amendment Request for Approval of New ISFSI-Only Emergency Plan and Associated EAL Scheme ML22313A1682022-11-0909 November 2022 NRC Response to Updates to the Proposed Amended IP2 Master Trust ML22308A0912022-11-0303 November 2022 Email Acknowledgement for IP2 and IP3 Amended Facility License and Technical Specification to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from Spent Fuel Pits ML22276A1642022-09-29029 September 2022 New York State Revised Draft EA Response E-Mail ML22271A8492022-09-28028 September 2022 E-Mail Transmitting Revised Indian Point Exemption Draft EA ML22269A3452022-09-22022 September 2022 Email Objection to Holtec IP2 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Facility Unit 1 and 2, EPID L-2022-LLA-0072 ML22259A1992022-09-0202 September 2022 Acceptance for License Amendment Request to Modify Staffing Requirements Following SFP Transfer to Dry Storage ML22265A0142022-08-31031 August 2022 Email Acknowledgement for Amended and Restated Holtec IP3 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Facility Unit 3 ML22242A2592022-08-19019 August 2022 E-mail from K. Sturzebecher, NRC, to B. Noval, HDI, Acknowledgement for Amended and Restated Holtec IP2 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Facility Unit 1 and 2 ML22228A1332022-08-0909 August 2022 Acknowledgement for License Amendment Request to Modify Staffing Requirements Following SFP Transfer to Dry Storage ML22215A0432022-08-0101 August 2022 E-Mail Transmitting NYS NSA Exemption Comments & Draft EA Review Completion ML22208A0292022-07-19019 July 2022 E-Mail Transmitting Indian Point Exemption Draft EA ML22168A0072022-06-16016 June 2022 Acceptance Review for License Amendment Request to Revise License Condition to Eliminate Cyber Security Plan Requirements ML22112A0102022-04-21021 April 2022 Acceptance Review: Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) Concerning Indian Point Energy Center Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML22112A0122022-04-21021 April 2022 Acceptance Review: Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) Concerning Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance for Indian Point Energy Center ML22103A2432022-04-13013 April 2022 E-mail - Request for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme for Permanently Defueled Condition for Indian Point Energy Center ML22104A0342022-04-13013 April 2022 E-mail from Z. Cruz, NRC to J. Fleming, Holtec - Request for Additional Information Related to Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and Part 50 Appendix E for Indian Point Energy Center ML22038A2572022-02-0707 February 2022 E-mail from Z. Cruz, NRC, to J. Fleming, HDI - Acceptance Review: License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme to Address Permanently Defueled Condition for Indian Point Energy Center ML22035A1862022-02-0404 February 2022 E-mail to J. Fleming, Holtec, from Z. Cruz Perez, NRC - Acceptance Review: Exemption Requests from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV for Indian Point Energy Center ML22028A1032022-01-28028 January 2022 E-mail Dated 1/28/2022, Transmittal of Draft Safety Evaluation for Proposed License Amendment Revision to Licensing Basis to Incorporate the Installation and Use of of New Auxiliary Lifting Device ML22038A1592022-01-24024 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) 2021 IPEC Annual Sturgeon Impingement Report ML22006A0442022-01-0505 January 2022 Email from Z Cruz to J Fleming Request for Additional Information - HDI Indian Point Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report ML21337A2952021-12-0303 December 2021 Subsequent Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Revise Licensing Basis for New Auxiliary Lifting Device (E-mail Dated 12/3/2021) ML21335A3692021-12-0101 December 2021 Acceptance Review: Indian Point Energy Center - Exemption Request from 10 CFR Part 20 App G Section Iii.E ML21266A2972021-08-18018 August 2021 8/18/2021 E-mail from H. Specter to R. Guzman Public Comments to NRC, Indian Point Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting on July 29, 2021 ML21225A5012021-08-0909 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Shinnecock Indian Nation Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21224A3032021-08-0909 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A6142021-08-0909 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Tuscarora Nation Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A5682021-08-0909 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band of Mohican Indians Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A4252021-08-0909 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A3142021-08-0606 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Oneida Indian Nation Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A4402021-08-0606 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Onondaga Nation of Wisconsin Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A5352021-08-0606 August 2021 Email from NRC to the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21225A5462021-08-0606 August 2021 Email from NRC to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe Announcing the IPEC PSDAR Public Meeting on August 18, 2021 ML21266A2942021-07-25025 July 2021 E-mail from Paul Blanch to NRC (N. Sheehan, D. Screnci) Public Comments to NRC, Indian Point Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting, July 29, 2021 ML21197A2002021-07-16016 July 2021 (E-mail 7/16/2021) NRC Staff Assessment and RAI Closeout HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program and Indian Point Energy Center Quality Assurance Program Manual 2024-02-01
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML22013A7062022-01-13013 January 2022 Investigation Report of LLRW Shipment Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML21056A0782021-04-0707 April 2021 Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Initial and Updated Decommissioning Funding Plans for Indian Point ISFSI (Docket: 72-51) NL-21-006, Relief Request IP3-ISI-RR-16, Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-513-4 Inspection Requirement2021-02-10010 February 2021 Relief Request IP3-ISI-RR-16, Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-513-4 Inspection Requirement ML20259A2172020-09-14014 September 2020 Commitment Change Summary Report ML20260H0722020-06-18018 June 2020 IP-RPT-14-00013, Revision 3, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3, Consequences of a Postulated Fire and Explosion Following the Release of Natural Gas from the New Aim 42 Pipeline Near Ipec ML20122A1052020-05-27027 May 2020 Letter from Margaret M. Doane to John B. Rhodes, Chair and Executive Officer, Ny State Public Service Commission: Response to Ny State Public Service Commission Regarding Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Near Indian Point Nuclear Power Pl ML20100F6352020-04-0808 April 2020 Expert Team Final Report NL-19-073, Request for Relaxation of Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2019-10-22022 October 2019 Request for Relaxation of Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) ML19252A3182019-09-0909 September 2019 Entergy to NRC, IPEC Weekly Sturgeon Monitoring Report for Week of Sept 2, 2019 NL-19-061, Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements2019-06-13013 June 2019 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements ML19114A0742019-04-22022 April 2019 Entergy to NRC, IPEC Weekly Sturgeon Monitoring Report for Week of April 15, 2019 NL-19-012, Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program2019-04-15015 April 2019 Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program ML18098A0882018-04-0606 April 2018 Fracture Mechanics Assessment of Embedded Flaw Repair Acceptability NL-18-021, Indian Point, Unit 2, Fracture Mechanics Assessment of Embedded Flaw Repair Acceptability2018-04-0606 April 2018 Indian Point, Unit 2, Fracture Mechanics Assessment of Embedded Flaw Repair Acceptability NL-20-066, Engineering Report IP-RPT-11-00032, Revision 5, Licensing Report on the Inter-Unit Transfer of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Indian Point Energy Center2017-12-19019 December 2017 Engineering Report IP-RPT-11-00032, Revision 5, Licensing Report on the Inter-Unit Transfer of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Indian Point Energy Center ML17349A1562017-12-0808 December 2017 Risk Impact of One-Time Extending the ILRT Interval Associated with the Proposed Technical Specification Changes ML17279A2472017-10-0606 October 2017 2017 Annual Assessment Meeting Written Comments Compilation ML17222A2392017-10-0404 October 2017 NRC Response to Request for Deferral of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic and Flooding Hazard Reevaluations ML17289A6552017-10-0202 October 2017 Attachment 6 to NL-17-115, Revised HI-2094289, Licensing Report on the Inter-Unit Transfer of Spent Fuel at the Energy Center, Revision 9 NL-17-122, Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report, March 26, 2015 to May 18,20172017-09-28028 September 2017 Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report, March 26, 2015 to May 18,2017 ML17096A2122017-03-23023 March 2017 Entergy Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-16-00078, Indian Point RAI CLI-16-07 SAMA Cost-Benefit Sensitivities Rev. 1 (March 23, 2017) NL-17-020, License Renewal Application - Revisions to Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan2017-02-0606 February 2017 License Renewal Application - Revisions to Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan ML17096A2112017-01-0404 January 2017 Entergy Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-16-00077, Indian Point RAI CLI-16-07 MACCS2 Sensitivities, Rev. 0 (Jan 4, 2017) ML16280A2282016-09-19019 September 2016 Indian Point 2 Technical Requirements Manual NL-16-109, Indian Point 2 Technical Requirements Manual2016-09-19019 September 2016 Indian Point 2 Technical Requirements Manual NL-16-109, HI-2094289, Licensing Report on the Inter-Unit Transfer of Spent Fuel at the Indian Point Energy Center.2016-09-19019 September 2016 HI-2094289, Licensing Report on the Inter-Unit Transfer of Spent Fuel at the Indian Point Energy Center. ML16250A2762016-09-13013 September 2016 Evaluation of Impacts to Proposed Critical Habitat for the Atlantic Sturgeon for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 Proposed License Renewal NL-16-083, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Containment Area Radiation Monitor (R-26) High Range, Indian Point Unit Number 32016-08-0101 August 2016 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Containment Area Radiation Monitor (R-26) High Range, Indian Point Unit Number 3 ML18115A0592016-06-28028 June 2016 After Action Report/Improvement Plan, Drill Date June 28, 2016 ML17052A2662015-10-0202 October 2015 Sturgeon Mobile Tracking for the New Ny Bridge at Tappan Zee NL-15-128, Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/01/2013 and 03/25/2015, And/Or Utilized in Support of the UFSAR Update2015-09-28028 September 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/01/2013 and 03/25/2015, And/Or Utilized in Support of the UFSAR Update NL-15-118, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Train B, Indian Point Unit 32015-09-0303 September 2015 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Train B, Indian Point Unit 3 NL-15-099, Submittal of 2014 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes Report2015-07-30030 July 2015 Submittal of 2014 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes Report NL-15-072, 2015 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements2015-06-18018 June 2015 2015 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements NL-15-030, Revised 10 C.F.R. 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared in Response to the Algonquin Incremental Market Natural Gas Project2015-04-0808 April 2015 Revised 10 C.F.R. 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared in Response to the Algonquin Incremental Market Natural Gas Project NL-15-029, Summary of Analysis Results Based on Corrected Format 2 Data Files Dated March 20152015-04-0606 April 2015 Summary of Analysis Results Based on Corrected Format 2 Data Files Dated March 2015 ML15062A2002015-02-19019 February 2015 NET-300067-01, Revision 1, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point, Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels. (Non-Proprietary) NL-15-013, Re-Submittal of Netco Report NET-300067-01, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels, for NRC Review and Approval2015-01-28028 January 2015 Re-Submittal of Netco Report NET-300067-01, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels, for NRC Review and Approval ML15061A2772014-12-31031 December 2014 WCAP-17954-NP, Revision 0, Indian Point Unit 3 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation. NL-14-152, Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From...2014-12-22022 December 2014 Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From... ML14329A1952014-11-0404 November 2014 NET-300067-01, Rev. 0, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels NL-14-115, 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report for Indian Point, Units 1 and 2 April 1, 2012 to March 19, 20142014-09-18018 September 2014 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report for Indian Point, Units 1 and 2 April 1, 2012 to March 19, 2014 ML14304A7012014-09-16016 September 2014 Reliability Needs Assessment ML15166A0702014-08-31031 August 2014 Algonquin Incremental Market (Aim) Project, Phase 2 Acoustic Survey for Indiana Bats (Myotis Sodalis) and Northern Long-Eared Bats (Myotis Septentrionalis), August 2014 NL-14-110, Third Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-12-049 Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events2014-08-27027 August 2014 Third Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-12-049 Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events NL-14-071, Indian Point, Unit 2 - Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 3 of 52014-06-0505 June 2014 Indian Point, Unit 2 - Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 3 of 5 NL-14-071, Indian Point, Unit 2 - Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 2 of 52014-06-0505 June 2014 Indian Point, Unit 2 - Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 2 of 5 ML14168A0592014-06-0505 June 2014 Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 1 of 5 ML14168A0602014-06-0505 June 2014 Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 2 of 5 ML14168A0612014-06-0505 June 2014 Seismic Walkdown Report Update, Enclosure to NL-14-071 - Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-12-00037, Rev 1. Part 3 of 5 2022-01-13
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARML22013A7062022-01-13013 January 2022 Investigation Report of LLRW Shipment Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML20260H0722020-06-18018 June 2020 IP-RPT-14-00013, Revision 3, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3, Consequences of a Postulated Fire and Explosion Following the Release of Natural Gas from the New Aim 42 Pipeline Near Ipec ML20122A1052020-05-27027 May 2020 Letter from Margaret M. Doane to John B. Rhodes, Chair and Executive Officer, Ny State Public Service Commission: Response to Ny State Public Service Commission Regarding Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Near Indian Point Nuclear Power Pl NL-19-073, Request for Relaxation of Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2019-10-22022 October 2019 Request for Relaxation of Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) ML19252A3182019-09-0909 September 2019 Entergy to NRC, IPEC Weekly Sturgeon Monitoring Report for Week of Sept 2, 2019 NL-19-061, Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements2019-06-13013 June 2019 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements ML19114A0742019-04-22022 April 2019 Entergy to NRC, IPEC Weekly Sturgeon Monitoring Report for Week of April 15, 2019 NL-19-012, Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program2019-04-15015 April 2019 Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program ML17279A2472017-10-0606 October 2017 2017 Annual Assessment Meeting Written Comments Compilation ML17222A2392017-10-0404 October 2017 NRC Response to Request for Deferral of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic and Flooding Hazard Reevaluations NL-17-020, License Renewal Application - Revisions to Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan2017-02-0606 February 2017 License Renewal Application - Revisions to Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan NL-16-083, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Containment Area Radiation Monitor (R-26) High Range, Indian Point Unit Number 32016-08-0101 August 2016 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Containment Area Radiation Monitor (R-26) High Range, Indian Point Unit Number 3 NL-15-128, Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/01/2013 and 03/25/2015, And/Or Utilized in Support of the UFSAR Update2015-09-28028 September 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/01/2013 and 03/25/2015, And/Or Utilized in Support of the UFSAR Update NL-15-118, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Train B, Indian Point Unit 32015-09-0303 September 2015 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for an Inoperable Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Train B, Indian Point Unit 3 NL-15-099, Submittal of 2014 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes Report2015-07-30030 July 2015 Submittal of 2014 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes Report NL-15-072, 2015 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements2015-06-18018 June 2015 2015 Form OAR-1 Owners Activity Report for Inservice Inspection and Repairs and Replacements NL-15-030, Revised 10 C.F.R. 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared in Response to the Algonquin Incremental Market Natural Gas Project2015-04-0808 April 2015 Revised 10 C.F.R. 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared in Response to the Algonquin Incremental Market Natural Gas Project NL-15-013, Re-Submittal of Netco Report NET-300067-01, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels, for NRC Review and Approval2015-01-28028 January 2015 Re-Submittal of Netco Report NET-300067-01, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels, for NRC Review and Approval NL-14-152, Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From...2014-12-22022 December 2014 Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From... ML14329A1952014-11-0404 November 2014 NET-300067-01, Rev. 0, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Credit for Inserted Neutron Absorber Panels NL-14-115, 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report for Indian Point, Units 1 and 2 April 1, 2012 to March 19, 20142014-09-18018 September 2014 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report for Indian Point, Units 1 and 2 April 1, 2012 to March 19, 2014 ML15166A0702014-08-31031 August 2014 Algonquin Incremental Market (Aim) Project, Phase 2 Acoustic Survey for Indiana Bats (Myotis Sodalis) and Northern Long-Eared Bats (Myotis Septentrionalis), August 2014 NL-14-110, Third Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-12-049 Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events2014-08-27027 August 2014 Third Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-12-049 Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events ML14141A5402014-05-0909 May 2014 Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendations 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML14071A1832014-04-0101 April 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident NL-14-042, Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi.2014-03-31031 March 2014 Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi. NL-14-043, Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.2014-03-31031 March 2014 Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima. ML14071A1982014-03-20020 March 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14015A4172014-01-30030 January 2014 Staff Summary of the Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspections for the Spring 2013 Refueling Outage ML14304A7512013-12-13013 December 2013 Unit 3 Coastal Zone Management Act Consistency Certification, Vol. II of III, Supplemental Information Regarding NYSDEC Record, Part 8 of 9 NL-13-133, 10 CFR 71.95 Report on Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Conditions for Radwaste Model 8-120B Cask Vent Port Leak Test Hold Time2013-10-0202 October 2013 10 CFR 71.95 Report on Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Conditions for Radwaste Model 8-120B Cask Vent Port Leak Test Hold Time ML13221A4172013-07-26026 July 2013 LTR-13-0662 - Susan Lerner, Common Cause New York Ltr Provides a Copy of Generating Influence, Entergy'S Political Spending and the Battle Over the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. ML14304A7522012-12-31031 December 2012 Unit 3 Coastal Zone Management Act Consistency Certification, Vol. II of III, Supplemental Information Regarding NYSDEC Record, Part 9 of 9 ML12346A3432012-11-20020 November 2012 Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Page D-69 of 203 Through End ML12346A3422012-11-20020 November 2012 Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Cover Through Page C-288 of 434 NL-12-167, Indian Point, Unit 2, Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Cover Through Page C-288 of 4342012-11-20020 November 2012 Indian Point, Unit 2, Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Cover Through Page C-288 of 434 NL-12-167, Indian Point, Unit 2, Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Page D-69 of 203 Through End2012-11-20020 November 2012 Indian Point, Unit 2, Enclosure to NL-12-167 Seismic Walkdown Report - Page D-69 of 203 Through End NL-12-136, 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2) Report, Listing and Summary of Changes, Tests and Experiments2012-10-0101 October 2012 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2) Report, Listing and Summary of Changes, Tests and Experiments NL-14-002, Enclosure - NL-14-002, SAMA Engineering Project Cost Estimates Prepared by RCM Technologies2012-09-20020 September 2012 Enclosure - NL-14-002, SAMA Engineering Project Cost Estimates Prepared by RCM Technologies NL-12-009, Enclosure 1 to NL-12-009, Holtec International Licensing Report HI-2094289, Revision 52012-01-11011 January 2012 Enclosure 1 to NL-12-009, Holtec International Licensing Report HI-2094289, Revision 5 ML12040A3102012-01-11011 January 2012 Enclosure 1 to NL-12-009, Holtec International Licensing Report HI-2094289, Revision 5 ML11280A1212011-09-28028 September 2011 License Renewal Application - Completion of Commitment #30 Re Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Plan NL-11-094, Request for Relief Request 14 - Code Case N-770-1 Weld Inspection Frequency Extension2011-08-0303 August 2011 Request for Relief Request 14 - Code Case N-770-1 Weld Inspection Frequency Extension NL-10-109, CFR 50.59(d) Report Listing and Summary Report of the Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/20/2008 and 04/12/20102010-10-12012 October 2010 CFR 50.59(d) Report Listing and Summary Report of the Changes, Tests and Experiments Implemented Between 04/20/2008 and 04/12/2010 ML1012704392010-05-0505 May 2010 Y020100187 - List of Historical Leaks and Spills at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ML11299A1752010-02-0808 February 2010 Lr Hearing - Indian Point Task I Report - Deliverable (Redacted Version) ML0936410942009-12-30030 December 2009 Preliminary Power Authority of the State of New York, Indian Point No. 3, Nuclear Power Plant, Systems Interaction Study. Volume II ML0926401772009-08-28028 August 2009 Environmental Science and Engineering NL-09-095, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report for Calendar Year 2008 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes2009-07-21021 July 2009 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report for Calendar Year 2008 Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Changes ML0905407042009-01-0909 January 2009 American Radiation Services, Inc. Laboratory Analysis Report No. ARS1-08-02367, Revised 01/09/2009 2022-01-13
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David Lew From: John White Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 6:14 PM To: John Boska; Thomas Nicholson; Bo Pham; James Noggle Cc: David Lew; Darrell Roberts; Diane Screnci; Eugene Cobey; Marsha Gamberoni; Marc Dapas;Marjorie McLaughlin; Neil Sheehan; Samuel Collins
Subject:
Executive Summary'of Energy GW Characterization Report Attachments:
ExecutiveSummary GW final.pdf Synopsis of Entergy's Executive Summary (attached):
Investigation traced the contamination to two separate structures, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool. There is no evidence of any release form Unit 3. Primary nuclides of interest are Tritium and Strontium-90; others include, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, and Nickle-63.
Contaminated groundwater cannot migrate North, East, or South; but only West to the Hudson River. Radiological, assessments have consistently indicated that releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory requirements.
Primary nuclide found in the Unit 2 plume is Tritium. The release is attributable to historic damage to Unit 2 SFP liner in 199Q, which was subsequently detected and repaired in 1992; and a weld imperfection in the Transfer Canal liner, detected in September and repaired in December 2007. To the extent possible, the Unit 2 liner has been tested and repairs completed.
A containment box remains installed at a leakage point in the pool wall discover in August 2005. All identified Unit 2 leakage points have been addressed.
Notwithstanding, contaminated, water still likely exists between the stainless steel linier and concrete wall. Accordingly, additional leakage cannot be ruled out. However, data indicates that such continuing leakage is small and has little impact on groundwater.
Unit 1 plume is characterized .by Strontium-90 due to legacy leakage from the spent fuel pools. Currently, all pools are drained, excepting the West Pool which still contains spent fuel. While the previous owner identified the leakage in the 1990's, and was managing the leakage by collecting it from a re-configured footing drain, the groundwater investigation determined that the management was not fully successful in collecting all of the leakage as evidenced by investigation findings that revealed contamination in the groundwater near Unit 1. In response, a program to reduce the concentration of radio nuclides in the Unit 1 West Pool water by enhanced demineralization was initiated in April 2006.Planned fuel removal and pool draining will completely eliminate this source by the end of 2008.Groundwater contamination is, and will remain, limited to the Indian Point Energy Center property, due to the hydrogeologic conditions that affect groundwater behavior.
Because of the nature and age of the releases, groundwater contaminant migration rates, and interdiction by Energy to eliminate and control releases, the groundwater contaminant plumes have reached maximum spatial extent and should decrease over time.Long term groundwater monitoring is ongoing; and network of multi-level groundwater monitoring installations has been established.
Groundwater testing is performed quarterly.
In addition to groundwater samples, Energy obtained various off-site samples of environmental media, including off-site wells, reservoirs, and the Hudson River. Energy also participated in a fish sampling program with NRC and New York DEC. Sample analysis by al! parties did not detect any radioactivity in excess of environmental background.
It is believed that the remediation strategy will results in decrease of plume concentrations, over time. The continue monitoring of groundwater is expected to demonstrate that trend and confirm that the leaks have been terminated.
The interdiction to eliminate or reduce releases have been accomplished; the nature and extent of contamination is known; contaminant plumes have reached maximum extent; and the single receptor, the Hudson River, is monitored with radiological assessments that have consistently demonstrated that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits, and pose no threat to public health and safety.1
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report presents the results of a two-year comprehensive hydrogeologic site investigation of the Indian Point Energy Center (Site) conducted by GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc. (GZA). The study was initiated in response to an apparent release of Tritium to the subsurface, initially discovered in August of 2005 during Unit 2 construction activities associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Project. These investigations were subsequently expanded to include areas of the Site where credible potential sources of leakage might exist, and encompassed all three reactor units.Ultimately, these investigations traced the. contamination back to two separate structures, the Unit 2 and Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs). The two commingled plumes, resulting from these SFPs releases, have been fully*characterized and their extent, activity and impact determined.
The two primary radionuclide contaminants of interest were found to be Tritium and Strontium.
Other contaminants, Cesium, Cobalt, and Nickel, have been found in a subset of the groundwater samples, but always in conjunction with Tritium or Strontium.
Therefore, while the focus of the investigation was on Tritium and Strontium, it inherently addresses the full extent of groundwater radionuclide contamination.
The investigations have further shown that the contaminated groundwater can not migrate off-property to the North, East or South. The plumes ultimately discharge to the Hudson River to the West.Throughout the two years of the investigation, the groundwater mass flux and radiological release to the Hudson River have been assessed.
These assessments, along with the resulting Conceptual Site Model, have been used by Entergy to assess dose impact. At no time have analyses of existing Site conditions yielded any indication of potential adverse environmental or health risk. In fact, radiological assessments have consistently shown) that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits.SOURCES OF CONTAMINATION As stated above, the investigations found that the groundwater contamination is the result of releases from the Unit 2 and the Unit 1 ,SFPs. Our studies found no evidence of any release from Unit 3.The predominant radionuclide found in the plume from the Unit 2 SFP pool is Tritium. The releases were due to: 1) historic damage in 1990 to the SFP liner, with subsequent discovery and repair in 1992; and 2) a weld imperfection in the stainless steel Transfer Canal liner identified by Entergy in September 2007, and repaired in December 2007. To the extent possible, the Unit 2 pool liner has been fully tested and repairs have been completed.
The identified leakage has therefore been eliminated and/or controlled 6'y Entergy. Specifically, Entergy has: 1) confirmed that the damage to the liner associated with the 1992 release was repaired by the prior owner and is no longer leaking; 2) installed a containment system (collection box) at the site of x..
the leakage discovered in 2005, which precludes further release to the groundwater; and 3) after an exhaustive liner inspection, identified a weld imperfection in the Transfer Canal liner that was then prevented from leaking by draining the canal. The weld was then subsequently repaired by Entergy in mid-December 2007. Therefore, all identified Unit 2 SFP leaks have been addressed.
Water likely remains between the Unit 2 SFP stainless steel liner and the concrete walls, and thus additional active leaks can not be completely ruled out. However, if they exist at all, the data indicate they must be small and of little impact to the groundwater.
The Unit 1 plume is characterized by Strontium from legacy leakage of the Unit 1 fuel pools. At present, the Unit 1 pools have been drained with the exception of the Unit I West Fuel Pool which still contains spent fuel. This West Pool leaks water under the fuel building and is responsible for the Unit I Strontium groundwater plume discovered in 2006. Prior to that time, the previous owner had identified leakage from the West Fuel Pool in the 1990's and was managing the leakage by collecting it from a re-configured footing drain that surrounded the fuel building.
However, based on the groundwater investigation, it has been determined that the pool leakage management program was not successful in collecting all of the leakage. As a result, uncollected contaminants released from the Unit, I Spent Fuel Pools, past and present, have been observed during the groundwater investigation effort at various locations near the site of Unit 1. In response to the finding that the leak collection system was not functioning as believed, Entergy promptly initiated a program to reduce the concentration of radionuclides in the Unit 1 West Pool's water, beginning in April 2006, via enhanced demineralization water treatment.
The planned fuel removal and pool draining will completely eliminate this release source by year end 2008.EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION The groundwater contamination is, and will remain, limited to the Indian Point Energy Center property, because the migration of Site contaminants is controlled by groundwater flow, which, in turn, is governed by the post-'construction hydrogeologic setting. Plant construction required reduction in bedrock surface elevations and installation of foundation drains. These man-made features have lowered the, groundwater elevations beneath the facility, redirecting groundwater to flow to the West towards the Hudson River; and not to the North, East or South. Because of the nature and age of the releases, groundwater contaminant migration rates, and interdictions by Entergy to eliminate/control releases, the groundwater contaminant plumes have reached their maximum spatial extent and should now decrease over time.LONG-TERM MONITORING Long term groundwater monitoring is ongoing; a network of multi-level groundwater monitoring installations has been established at the facility.These "wells" are located down gradient of, and in close proximity to, both existing and potential release locations.
Groundwater testing is performed quarterly on the majority of these wells, with the rest remaining on standby to provide added detail, if required.
The resulting information is provided on a yearly basis to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The information is used to assess changes in groundwater relative to dose impact assessment and to detect future releases, should they occur.In addition to the groundwater samples from the network of monitoring wells, Entergy obtained various off-Site samples of environmental media including off-Site wells, reservoirs and the Hudson River. In addition, Entergy participated in a fish sampling program. with the NRC and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC).
None of the samples analyzed, including the samples split with regulatory agencies, detected any radioactivity in excess of environmental background levels.GZA believes that the recommended remediation technology discussed below will cause the concentrations of radionuclides in the groundwater plumes to decrease over time. The continued monitoring of groundwater is expected to demonstrate that trend and support the conclusion that the identified leaks have been terminated.
However, GZA expects that contaminant concentrations will fluctuate over time due to natural variations in groundwater recharge and that, a potential future short term increase in concentrations does not, in and of itself, indicate a new leak. It is further.emphasized that the groundwater releases to the river are only a small percentage of the regulatory limits, which are of no threat to public health PROPOSED REMEDIATION GZA has recommended the following corrective measures to Entergy, which they are implementing:
0 Repair the identified Unit 2 Transfer Canal liner weld imperfection (completed December 2007).0 Continue source term reduction in the Unit I West Pool via the installed demineralization system (ongoing until completion of No. 3 below).* Remove the remaining Unit I fuel and drain the West Pool (in-process).
- Implement long term groundwater monitoring (in-process).
The proposed remediation technology is source elimination/control (Nos. 1 and 3 above) with subsequent Monitored Natural Attenuation, or MNA.MNA is a recognized and proven remedial approach that allows natural processes to reduce contaminant concentrations.
The associated monitoring is intended to verify that reductions are occurring in an anticipated manner. The Indian.Point Energy Center Site is well suited for this approach because: 1)interdictions to eliminate or reduce releases have been made; 2) the nature and extent of contamination is known; 3) the contaminant plumes have reached their maximum extent;' and 4) the single receptor of the contamination, the Hudson River, is monitored, with radiological assessments consistently demonstrating that the releases to the environment are a small percentage of regulatory limits, and no threat to public health or safety.