ML17266A489

Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Fsar.Info Will Be Incorporated in Future Amend

ML17266A489
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	08/19/1981
From:	UHRIG R E FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	EISENHUT D G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-81-362, NUDOCS 8108250481
Download: ML17266A489 (310)

Text

DOCKET05000389.

NOTES!'EGULATORYWNFORMAT IONISTRIBUTION S-EM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBRi8108250481 DOC~DATE;!81/08/19NOTARIZED;:

NOFAGILi050'89 st+Lucie-PlantiUnit2'E,FloridaPowerLL'ight>>coB.'UTHB NAME'~AUTHORAFFILIATION UHRIGpR,K','loridaPower-LLightCo~'ECIP~NAMKIRECIPIENT AFFIL>>IATION KiISKNHUT'~D.G, DivisionofLicensing SUBJECTForwards-responsetoNRC,requestforaddiinfo.re>>FSAR~;I'nfo willbe.incorporated infuture'mend;.

DISTRIBUTIo NCODESBOO>>0COPIESRECEIVED:LTR LEN'CL'IZE::'g-ITLKl:"

PSAR/FSAR AMDTSandRe.latedCorrespondence RECIPIENT'Di'ODE'/NAMEl ACT>>ION~'/O'ICENSNGLICIBR¹3LAINTERNALi:

ACCIDEVAL'R26'HKM ENGBR'lCOREPERPBR10,EMRGPRPDEV35EQUIP,QUALBR13>>GEOSCIENCES 28.HYD'/GEOI BR30~ILE)06LIC'UALBR32!MECH.ENGBR18OELDPOAKRSYSBR19QABR21>>REACSYSBR23>>SIT'NALBR24COPIESLiTTRENCL>1-01011111>>1113?2223>>311111.01111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME L>>IC'R¹)BCNKRSESr.VS 04AUXSYS'R27CONTSYSBR09EFF,TRSYSBR12'MRGPRPLIC36.FEMA~REPDIV39HUMFACTENG40ILCSYSBR16L'IC'UIDBR33MATL>>ENGBR17MPAOPLilCBRPROC/TSTREV20RAS8R22'EGF"01TRUCTENGBR25COPIESLTTR'-ENCL>>101111111~331111'110.-1111111111>>EXTERNALi:

ACRS"NRC'ORENT'IS41>>161602!111=1LPDRiNSIC03051111L/Hahb~T;TOiTAL'UMBER>>

OFCOPIES'EQU1RED::

L>>TTR62'NCL<57 nq4~i~s~n~iq'14nI"'IrrIq~'~gh~,i71yf4ryli4/1I.'ill'ly9gqIllyqIq'y1Iql If%OX529100MIAMI,FL33152r,QFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYAugust19,1981L-81-362OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:

Nr.DarrellG.Eisenhut, DirectorDivisionofLicensing U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Dearttr.Eisenhut:

+ci/gRe:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389FinalSafetyAnalysisReportReuestsforAdditional Information AttachedareFloridaPower8LightCompany(FPL)responses toNRCstaffrequestsforadditional information whichhavenotbeenformallysubmitted ontheSt.LucieUnit2docket.Theseresponses willbeincorporated intotheSt.LucieUnit2FSARinafutureamendment.

Verytrulyyours,RobertE.UhrigVicePresident AdvancedSystems8Technology REU/TCG/cf Attachments cc:J.P.O'Reilly,

Director, RegionII(w/oattachments)

HaroldF.Reis,Esquire{w/oattachments) poolg/~z;:lkJP>tt8i0825048i 8i0819PDRADOCK05000389A,...POBPEOPLE...

SERVINGPEOPLE

• 1~E'1If1~/';'l).p-"

Attachments toL-81-362A.Information onECCSpumpNPSHrequested byN.Rubinon8/3l/8l.B.Revisedresponses to492.7,492.9and492.15C.Additional information suppliedinresponseto490.1D.DraftwriteuponCEAEjectionwithLossofOffsitePower.E.Revisedresponseto440.1,440.5,440.9,440.14,440.25,440.39,440.41and440.44F.DraftTechnical Specification forsteamgenerator inspec'tion 3/4.4.6G.Revisedresponseto251.8and251.10.H.MEBreviewmeetinglistofconfirmatory items.I.Revisedresponses to420.3,420.4,420.14,420.54and420.56J.Neetingminutesandcommitments from8/11/81meetingonpreservice inspection.K.FlordiaPower5LightCompanypositiononfeedwater hamnertesting.L.Recordofconversation andcommitments made.withtheAccidentEvalua-tionBranch(MaltPasedag)on8/18/81.H.Documentation andproposedFSARrevisions toincorporate additional underground cabledata.N.St.LucieUnit1(proposed St.LucieUnit2)designcriteriatobeusedforreevaluation ofthemasonrywallsperSEBquestion220.370.Revisedresponseto430.498108250481

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Pt-PvPa+Ps+Pe-Pi-Pvwhere:Pt~pressureatpumpsuctioncenterline Pv~vaporpressureofpumpedwaterPa~airpressurePs=steampressurePe~elevation pressureP,.~Headlossduetofrictioninthesuctionpiping.,'igOTE!Znatcorho~q.

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0 e492.7.(4.4.3.1)

Apparentinconsistencies areshownforcoolantconditons.

Pleaseexplainormakecorrections.

Theseinconsistencies areasfollows:Table1.3-1indicates thatthetotalflow-rate inthereactorvesselis139.4x10~lb/hrwhileTable4.9-10indicates thatthevalueis139.5x106lb/hr;Table4.4-10indicates'hat thereactorflowrateperloop(hotleg)andsteamgenerator primaryside(tubeside)is61x106lb/hr.Table1.3-1alsoshowsavalueof61x10lb/hrastheflowratethroughthesteamgenerator

{tubeside).Whenthisvalueismultiplied bytw~forthetwoflowloops,thetotalflowrateequals122x10lb/hrshowninTable4.4-10forthetotalflowthroughthereactor;Thecoolantoutlettemperature islistedas597.6FinTable,4.4-10butappearstobegivenas596oF(548Fnominalinlet+48oFaveragerise)inTable1.3-1;~Resense4.2.Thevaluegivenforthereactorcoolantpumpflowis81,200GPH(324,800GPMforfourpumps)inTable4.4-10andTable1.3-1fortheratedcapacityofthecoolantpumps.Thisislessthantheminimumflowvalueof369,947GPHshownin'Table4.4-1;A'Iso,usingtheaverageinletcoolantdensityof47.0Ib/ft3isgiveninTable4.4-10theconversion tolb/hrflowislessthanthevalueof139.5x10lb/hrgiveninTable4.4-10forthetotalfourpumpflowthroughthereactor.Thetotalflowrateis139.4x10lb/hr.Thetypographical errors6inTable4.4-7,4.4-10,5.1-1,and5.1-3havebeencorrected.

The122x10lb/hrflowrateisbasedupontheminimumdesignreactorcoolantflowrateof324,800gpm.Thisminimumdesignflowisfourtimestheminimumpumpdesigncapacity.

The139.4x10lb/hrisbasedupontheminimumallowable reactorcoolantflowrateof369,947gpm.Theminimumallowable flowrateisdefinedasthelowerflowratelimitontheexpectedflowrateprobability distribution belowwhichtheactualflowratehasonlyafivepercentchangeofexisting.

Thisminimumallowable flowisusedfotthethermalmarginanalyses.

3.Thecoreexitaveragecoolanttemperature is598Fandthereactorvesseloutlettemperature is596oF.Corrections havebeenmadetoTables1.3-1,4.4-10,5.1-1,and5.1-3andtoFigure4.4-10"Theminimumdesignflowrateforthereactorcoolantpumpsis324,800gpm,whiletheminimumallowable reactorcoreflowrateis369,947gpm,asdiscussed initem2ofthisresponse.

/M/

0SL2FS~hRTABLE1.3-1(Cont'd)ItemPrincialDesinParameters nftheReactnrCoolantSstemOperating

pressure, psig0cetr'y+IQPISH~actnrinletfemperature>

FOPCh,'reactor ndelertemperature, FNumbernfloopsDesignpressure, psig~~2,2355482'85St.LurieUnit2Reference Section5.15.)5.I5.15.1'anOnofreUnits2and32,235553611.2.2,485hNO22,235553.5612.52,485St~LucieUnit12,235539.7595.72,485DesignTemperature>

FeHydrostatic testpressure(cold),psigPrincialDesinParameters oftheReactorVessel6503>110'~5.15.16503,110650/3,1106503,110Haterial~Designpressure, psigDesigntemperature, FOperating

pressure, psigInsidediameterofshell,in.Outsidediameteracrossnoxsles>in.SeeTable5,232,485650.2>2351722535,24.44.45.35.3SeeTable5.2-22>4856502>235172253Sh533>GradeB~ClassI,lowalloysteel,internally cladwithType304austenitic SS2,48565021235157238Sh533,GradeB,Class1,lowalloysteel,internally cladwithType304austenitic SS2,4856502,235172253Overallheightofvesselandenclosure head,ft-in.totopofCEDMnosxleHinimumcladthickness, in.PrincialDesinParameters oftheSteamGenerators NumberofUnits41-103/81/85.35.35.4~43-6-1/21/8"43-4-1/61/841-11-3/4 5/16

SL2-FSARTABLE4.4-7.RCSFLOWRATES FlowPathTotalRCSflowCorebypass'low CoreflowHotlegflowColdlegflow~Flow(ibm/hr)139.P'105+x10l134.3x1069.)fx10634.x10Qs-*T'inlet~548F4,446

(

SL2-FSARTABLE4.4-10REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMCONPONENT THER.'fAL ANDHYDRAULIC DATA~CooanentDataReactorVesselRatedcorethermalpower,MWtDesignpressure, psia,Operating

pressure, psia2560.25002250Designtemperature, FCoolantoutlet'emperature F650,$46~gt..Coolantinlettemperature Coolantoutletstate'otal, coolantflow,ibm/hr'oreaveragecoolantenthalpyInlet,Btu/lb'utlet, Btu/lbeAveragecoolantdensityInlet,Ib/ft33Outlet,lb/ft548Subcooled 139;fx1054561047.043.4SteamGenerators Numberofunitsg~h~t',t+'~~side{tubeside)Designpressure/temperature; psia/FOperating

pressure, psiaInlettemperature, FOutlettemperature, FFlowrate,10lb/hr2500/6502250Rh'-45gg548~-61Designpressure/temperature, psi;a/FOperating pressure/temperature, psia/F(warranted)

To)alsteamflowpergenerator, 10lb/hrSteamquality,1000/550815/520.3

~5.60399.84.4-52 TABLE4.4-10(Cont'd)~ComonentPipesize(insidediarneter),in.HotlegSuctionleg(coldleg)Discharge leg(coldleg)Designpressure/temperature, psia/POperating pressure/temperature, psia/FHotlegColdleg.a.Fullpowerconditions Data4230302500/6502250/Sem250/5484,4<<54 SL2-FSARTABLE5.1-1DESIGNPARAMETERS OFREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMDesignThermalPower,Mwt(Including netheatadditionfromRCP's)2570ReactorCoolantFlowRate,O~~fe~ColdLegATemperature, F+~1a~WAverage~'Fempe rapture,:

.Fi.'-.I~.C)(erafi'~HotLeg+Temper8ture, Flb/hrNormalOperating Pressure(psia)ThermalPower,Btu/hrtk.signPressure, psia'esxgn Temperature (exreptPressurizer),

FPressurizer DesignTemperature, F8.77x102500650700'f6139.x10548.572/~MS9c22505.1-3 4

6059hot58057R.570ALAJ'I560I-I550OCEDLCJ540averagecold548.532530'5200'550STEANGEt/ERATOR POWER,~75looFLORIDAPOWER8LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT2TEMPERATURECONTROLPROGRAMFIGURE4.4-)0

Parameter SL2PSARTABLE5.1-3PROCESSDATAPOINTTABULATION SOCn2A1RCP2hlR.VeRCP2A2peuuuutitee

~xidintOutlet~xidointOutletS.ue2BlRCP281RCP282~xsdointoutletoutletDataPointPigures5.1-3and5.1-4Pressure, psiaTeaperacure, PAassPlowRace,iblnr2250653234223722962277.372)(S46372d774E69.7]{x!0 34.6/x!O139.4)xlO 22962237548372+74.6/x!O69.7+16229654822955485S3>>9)bid.348)PI06Voluaecric PlowRace,gpss191985092,5003839700'929500.191985092~50092~500lAsdl863e8Ono (D

uestionInSubsection 7.2.1.1.2.4, AnalogCoreProtection Calculators, youstatethatanalogcomputers provideinputtothermalmargin/low pressuretrip,.thelocalpowerdensitytrip,andthehighpowertrip.'oufurtherstatethatacalculated lowpressurelimitrelatedtodeparture fromnucleateboilingratio{DNBR)isdetermined usingpresetcoefficients asafunctionofthemeasuredcoldlegtemperature, axialoffset,andthehigherofthethermalpowerorneutronfluxpower.Thiscalculated lowpressurelimitisaninputtothethermalmargin/low pressuretrip.Providethefunctional relationship ofthelowpressuretripsetpointandtheaboveparameters; anddescribeh'owthesefunctions areobtained.

Provideinformation toindicatethesimilarity oftheAnalogCoreProtection Calculator usedforSt.LucieUnit2tothatusedinSt.Lucie1.St.LucieUnit1iscurrently underreviewforthenextcyclereloadsinceastatistical combination ofuncertainties (SCU)isproposedinconjunction oothcalculations usedintheAnalogCoreProtection Calculator.

IsthissameapproachplannedforSt.LucieUnit2currently orfor,futurecycles?Answer(~eepe+p~e)

rAnswer9'72'Ia)Thefunctional relationship forthelowpressuretripsetpointis:Pvar=e~A1~gR1g~TC+gwhere:P=calculated lowpressurelimit,varT'measuredcoldlegtemperature,

<~p,p=scfq:+cNP;i4s)C=functionofaxialshapeindex(seeattachedfigure),gR1=functionofthehigherofthethermalpowerorneutronfluxpower.'heattachedfiguresshowA1,gRI,a,8andyforSt.LucieUnit1~2560MWt.AtpresentthesearethetargetsforSt.LucieUnitII.Thisanalysisiscurrently underwayaspartoftheSt.LucieUnitIITechnical Specification effort(+~

g~~~(~~Q>~.-fAgeneraldiscussion ofthemethodology usedtogeneratetheThermalMargin/Low Pressure(TM/LP)LSSSiscontained inCENPD-199-P "C-ESetpointMethodology,"

withfurtherinformation available in"Response toFirstRoundquestions ontheStatistical Combination ofUncertainties Program,Part1andPart3(CEN-124(B)-P."

PerNRCrequest,C-Eiscurrently updatingCENPD-199 PforfinalNRCreviewandapproval.

-b)Theattachedfunctional diagramsfortheSt.LucieUnit1(FSARFigure7.2-14)andtheSt.LucieUnit2(FSARFigure7.2-5)ThermalMargintripsshowthatthesecalculators arefunctionally identical.

c)Application ofstatistical combinations ofuncertainties forSt.LucieUnitIIisnotnowplannedforthefirstorfuturecycles;however,itmaybeappliedinfuturecyclesafterNRCapproval.

1.40'l.30A11,201.101.00~O.G(Ii!I~IIIIIjI.O.n~~Iljji.IYIllii'IilII(VJ}IANDpT"'P-1)GSxO"VA))t~~+~0I~~4I'.:II)i~~~~~04~~~~I~~~~~~04~~~~~~~~~~~to0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\~~~I'~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~I'~~II~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~0~!~+14.13xTIN-7586:.::~~ll~~'Ii',!+jjiI'Ii!Il~.~l~~~~~~~~!IJ.i[)iItt~lI~~~~~~I~Ij!jIlliI!)I'~~~~IjjijlIl!IIll',!.')IlI~~slI~I)II'.II!!:ill:I~I)~~2QII)II~~I',!lll!IIlllIsill,I~.!I).TINCOIIE~I)~Iieet.r'.IINLIII(!,IIi'i')Ii!..IIl)I~~~[i([I'iriI)I~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~))I:..:I.~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~ETTE)'A)&4~~~I~~~~a~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~k4~~~4~~~~~)IllII~~.II)i)Ill:::I:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~I~)',I[li:!I1)IiIIIIA025'lI~~~II'I,.~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~4M~~~~~~~~~I~I~t'~~~~~~~~~~~)~I~I~~~~~~~ill::.:Iill!Ill,lIlI~)I~~~F2'~0.20.2O.nlll!ljjlji:,li!Iii)iii.il!.:jill'il'::

'lt'EB'E'"'XO)tDNB1~~~I~~~~~4~)~~;,lt:;I:~I~~~~~I~~~~~~~~.'::I~III'Ililt~~~~It:I)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~;tt)~~~~~~).llIII'IO.GAXIALGI)A)'EINDEX,Ylt2I~IFIGURE2.2-3n)ermalMargin/Low PressureTripSetpoint~Part1(YIVersusA1)~~I~'I~~

~0VfHEBEtA>xQR1QosN~'ND'>~><~1765xQow++14.13T<<-75861.00.541.0==-=0.80.60.40.320.2OA0.60.8FRACTIONOFRATEDTHERMALPOY(ER1.0ThermalMargin/Low PressureTripStoointPart2(Fraction ofRATEDTHER.'ilAL POi')ERVersusQR1)ST.LUCIE-Ui'lITg,~~~.o~~

0 0cnW2.cg0~fQ~0A0z0'U"UCYIV0I0'CPiPSCIL)AXIALOFFSETYICAL~TC+KCB3~S3{RPSCIP)

PTCALS3:FLOYDDEPENDENT SETPOINT5=LECTORSV~ITCHINRPSCIPPOSITIONS

-I.4PUMiPS2.3PUMPS3.2PUMPS-OPP.LOOPS4.2PUMPS-LOOPl5.2PUMPS-LOOP2PiPSCIP)~'0Q-QRI]~~~asAXIALFUNCTION~DNBCAL~PvCa(CONTB"LO'>>')CEAFUNCTIONS"(RPSCIP)~34~i3VARP{ABOVE)MAXSELMINTRIPPRETRIPP=PRIMARY0"i.c<UgETRIPUNIT7ALARM:-PRETRIPTP.IP:P<PTPIPCALCULATION:

VARDNB~CALWHERETCALTC+KCB,Q~MAX(O,B)TRIPVAR'IN'RETRJP'RP 0

Cyz~0D'UI&~0ClXKCQPSCI?)2CALT'c'"c'XIAL OFFSETY3',~2~S3(RPSCIP)

~TCAXS3:FLOWDEPENDENT SETPOINTSELECTORSWITCHlNRPSCIPPOSITIONS-l.4PUMPS2.3PUMPS3.2PUMPS-OPP.LOOPS4.2PUMPS-LOOPI5.2PUMPS-LOOP2'I'PSCIP)

QQRI)~wee~~lQAXIALFUNCTIONQRlQONSCAI.NQDNa5-(RPSCIP)'VA..(CONT.8ELOW)CEAFUNCTION~42I3'PVAR'(A8OVE)MINMAXSEl.TRIPPRETRIPIOOP=PRIMARYPP.ESSURE TRIPUNIT7ALAPA:PRETRIPTP.IP:P<PTPIPCALCU.l.ATION:

VARDNSPCALWHERCALC+C8'RIPŽX~VARMIN)PRETRIPTRIP

~~uestionInSubsection 7.2.1.1.2.4, AnalogCoreProtection Calculators, youstatethatanalogcomputers provideinput.tothermalmargin/low pressuretrip,thelocalpowerdensitytrip,andthehighpowertrip.Youfurtherstatethatacalculated lowpressurelimitrelatedtodeparture fromnuc1eateboilingratio{DHBR)isdetermined usingpresetcoefficients asafunctionofthemeasuredcoldlegtemperature, axialoffset,andthehigherofthethermalpowerorneutronfluxpower.Thiscalculated lowpressurelimitisaninputtothethermalmargin/lou pressuretrip.~)provide thefunctional relationship ofthe'lowpressuretripsetpointandtheaboveparameters; anddescribeh'owthesefunctions areobtained.

lo)Provideinformation toindicatethesimilarity oftheAnalogCoreProtection Calculator usedforSt.LucieUnit2tothatusedinSt.Lucie1.St.LucieUnit1iscurrently underreviewforthenext'cyclereloadsincea~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~statistical combination ofuncertainties (SCU)isproposedinconjunction c)withcalculations usedintheAnalogCoreProtection Calculator.

IsthissameapproachplannedforSt.LucieUnit2currently orforfuturecycles?AnswerTheAnalogCoreProtionCalculator usedznStLuc.ieni't2iit2isfunctionally identical tothatused>tLucie.Unitl.SONjTheStatistical Combination o+ncertinties(methodology canbeappliedtoSt,LucieUnit2.d'C'elisnot~Wrrelyemployedz howauar>If~~f4c.JC.dc4L+ea~4&gC~(wasa>4'~W2y+4ffd/a, eSL-2RoundOneuestions492.15(15.0)Providejustification forusingtheMacbethcorrelation intheCHFcorrelation forChapter15transients.

Dotheapplicability rangesofthecorrelation coverallexpectedconditions?

~Resonse:TheMacbethcorrelation (Ref.I)isusedonlyforthedetermination ofDNBRduringthepost-trip returntopowerportionofthemainsteamlinebreak(NSLB)transients presented inAppendix15AoftheFSAR.('lotsofDNBRversustimeforthesetransients havebeenfurnished intheResponsetoguestion440.14).ForallotherChapter15tran-sientstheCE-Icorrelation isusedintheTORCcode(References 2and3)tocalculate DNBR.Fordetermination ofDNBRduringthepost-tripreturntopowerportionofNSLBtransients themethodsappliedbyLee(Ref.4)areemployedinordertousethethcbethcorrelation forrodbundlestopredictburnoutasafunctionofaxialheight,accounting fornon-uniform axialheatflux.=Macbethdemonstrated thatfiveparameters werenecessary forcorrelation ofcriticalheatflux(CHF)dataforrodbundleswithverticalupflow:massflux,G;inletsubcooling, hH;pressure, P;heateddiameter, dh,andchannellenght,1.Howeverthechannellengthiseliminated fromthecorrelation byapplication ofLee'smethodtopredictCIIFasafunctionofaxialheight.Todetermine applicability, theheightatwhichminimumDNBRoccursiscomparedwiththechannellengthsfortheexperiments fromwhichMacbethdrewhisdata.ThedatausedfortheMacbethrodbundlecorrelations withverticalupflowhasarangeof'aluesforGoffrom0.18to4.1millionlbm/hrft2(Ref.5).Theuniformity ofthecorrelation oftheCHFdataforrodbundlesasafunctionofGoverthisrangeandthedataandcorrelations forCHFinheatedtubesgiveconfidence toextendthelowerendoftherangeofapplicability oftherodbundlecorrelation toatleast0.09x106Ibm/hrft~.(TheMacbethcorrelations forheatedtubesarebasedondatafor0.01<Gx10-6<7.8lbm/hrft2.)TherangeofvaluesofhHuponwhichtherodbundlecorrelations isbasedis-150<hH<380BTU/lbm(Ref.5).TherodbundlesfromwhichtheCHFdatawasobtainedhadvaluesofdhbetween0.113and0.902inchesandlengthsof.from17to72inches(Ref.1).Thedatausedfortherodbundlecorrelations isallfor1000psia.Howeverapplication ofMacbeth's correlations forheatedtubesindi-catesthatusingthecorrelation developed for1000psiaatlowerpressures producesvaluesforDNBRwhichareconservative.

Further,othercorrelations forrodbundles,suchasthoseofBowring(Ref.6),yieldavariation inDNBRoftheorderof10$aspressurevariesfrom500to1000psiafortherangeofGandhHofinterest.

Thisisofthesameorderastheuncertainty inMacbeth's correlation andismuchsmaIlerthanthemargintoDNBcalculated forthepost-trip returntopowerportionoftheMSLBtransients presented intheFSAR.

Table492.15suomerizes theaboveapplicability rangesandcomparesthemwiththevaluesof'heparameters obtainedfortheMSLBtransients presented inAppendix15AoftheFSAR.Theapplicability rangescoveralltheexpectedconditions forthepost-trip returntopowerportionoftheseMSLBtransients.

References:

l.Macbeth,R.V.,"AnAppraisal ofForcedConvection Burn-outData,"Proc.Instn.Mech.Enrs,Vol.180,Pt3c,pp37-50,1965-66.2."TORCCode-AComputerCodeforDetermining theThermalMarginofaReactorCore,"CENPD-161-P, July1975,Proprietary Information.

3."TORCCode-Verification andSimplified ModelingMethods,"

CENPD-206-P, January1977,Proprietary Information.

4.Lee,D.H.,"AnExperimental Investigation ofForcedConvection Burn-outinHighPressureWater-Part IV,LargeDiameterTubesatAbout1600psia,"A.E.E.W.ReportR479,1966.5.Macbeth,R.V.,"Burn-out Analysis-Part5:Examination ofPublished WorldDataforRodBundles,"

A.E.E.W.ReportR358,1964.6.Bowring,R.W.,"ANewMixedFlowClusterDryoutCorrelation forPressures intheRange0.6-15.5!IN/m2(90-2250psia)-ForUseinaTransient Blowdcr~~n Code,"IMechEConference Publications 1977-8,pp175-182,1977,

~~Table492.15-1Comparison ofapplicability rangesforMacbethCHFcorrelation forverticaluplfowinrodbundleswithvaluesobtainedfortheMSLBtransients presented inAppendix15AoftheSL-2FSAR.AParameter G(106ibm/hrft2)hH{BTU/ibm)

P(Psia)dh(inches)(inches)RangeofAvailability 0.09-4.1-150-380500-1000.113-.90217-72RangeofValuesObtainedforMSLBsDuringPost-trip ReturntoPower.*0.09-.3.0(.16)'I00-250{244)545-960(956)0.47122-33(26)***Valuesinparenthesis arethoseforminimumDNBRpredicted.

• • HeightatwhichminimumDNBRispredicted tooccur.

Highburnupperformance experience, asdescribed inSubsection

'iaspovidedevidencethatthefuelwillperformsatisfactorily underdesignconditions.

Thecurrentcoredesignbasesdonotincludeaspecificre-quirement fortestingofirradiated fuelrods.However,thefuelassemblydesignalloi:sdisassembly andreassembly tofacilitate suchinspections, shouldtheneedarise.-Afuelrodirradiation programhasbeendeveloped to.evaluate theperform-anceoffuelroddesignedforuseinthe16x16fuelassembly.

Thepro-gramincludestheirradiation ofsixstandard16x16assemblies, twoeachfor1,2,and3cycles,respectively, ntheArkansasNuclearOne-Unit2reactor(ANO-2).Eachssemblywillcontainaminimumof50precharacter-ized,removablrodsdistributec withintheassemblytoobtainaspectrumofexposurelevelsforevaluation purposesintheinterimandterminalexaminations.

Interimexamination ofallsixassemblies isplanneddur'ngrefueling shutdowns aftereachcycle.Th'eANO-2fuelrcdandspecificcompcnents ofthefuelrcdshavereceivedadetailedpre-characterization.

Theprogramcallsforsubstantial clad-dingcharacterization toincludemchanicalproperties, texture,hydrideorientation andoutofreactorlowstrainratebehavior.

InadditiontotheIDandODdiiensionaldatanormallyobtainedonthecladtubingmaterial, aminimumof300fuel'rodswillbemeasuredtoobtainasloadeddimensions.

Sufficientfuelrodswillbeprofiledtoobtaindiameterandovalitymeasurements suchthatchangesintheseparameters canbetrackedbysimilarmeasurements duringinteriminspections.

Also,arandomselec-tionofappro..im"tely 100UOpelletsfromeachlotper.batchusedvillbecharacterized dimensionality andthedensitydistribution villbedeter-mined.Aboutonehalfofthesepelletswillbeplacedinknownaxiallocaticns inselectedfuelrodswliiletheremainder willbesetasideasarchives.

izedrodswillberemovedfromthereactcrateachrefueiing andmovedtothespentfuelpoolforleaktesting(iffailedfuelisinthecore)andforvisua1.inspection.

Thelengthofthea"semblyandperipheral rod"willbemeasured.

Duringtheshutdown, atargetof20pre-charactPrized rod"perbatchwillhescheduled forexamination andmPasurement.

Atsometime~aftertherefueling outage,pre-characterized'ods retainedindischarged assemblies willbemeasured.

Atargetof100rodswillb"edditesterlaftPPaclishutdni.w.

8+A-ostirradiation aeLsurvLllagZ,~nce~gramforStLucie=Knit 2is,beingYeplanned.Spec'~erequirements th~P.pl"nvillJe-'determined bhsedontheresultsftheANO-2Dr"an.~liow'.acr F!~24~r:irrontlv~lanstowhentheoui~assemblics apl~re-.ovo<l friztheDreOldDlac.dPwintespentfuelstor-gi.pool.s>n.3(,I%seesApoolsidenondestructive examination villbemadeduringeachofthePfirstthreerefuelingSat ANO-2.Tnesix16x16asseiablies withcharacter-

SL2-FSAR4.2.1.5Surveillance Prorra4.2.1.5.1

~~~~Requirements forSurveillance andTestingof'rradiated FuelRodsHighburnupperformance experience, asdescribed inSubsection 4.2.3hasprovidedevidencethatthefuelwillperformsatisfactorily underdesignconditions.

Thecurrentcoredesignbasesdonotincludeaspecificre-quirement fortestingofirradiated fuelzods.However,thefuelassemblydesignallowsdisassembly andreassembly tofacilitate suchinspections,

~shouldtheneedarise.Afuelrodirradiation programhasbeendeveloped toevaluatetheperform-anceoffuelroddesignedforuseinthe16x16'fuelassembly.

Thepro-gramincludestheirradiation ofsixstandard16x16assemblies, twoeachfor1,2,and3cycles,respectively, intheArkansasNuclearOne-Unit2reactor(ANO-2).Eachassemblywillcontainaminimumof50precharacter-ized,removable rodsdistributed withintheassemblytoobtainaspectrumofexposurelevelsforevaluation purposesintheinterimandterminalexaminations.

Interimexamination ofallsixassemblies isplannedduringrefueling shutdowns aftereachcycle.TheANO-2fuelrodsandspecificcomponents ofthefuelrodshavereceivedadetailedpre-characterization.

Theprogramcallsforsubstantial clad-dingcharacterization toincludemechanical properties, texture,hydrideorientation andoutofreactorlowstrainratebehavior.

InadditiontotheIDandODdimensional datanormallyobtainedonthecladtubingmaterial, aminimumof300fuel.rodswillbemeasuredtoobtainasloadeddimensions.

Sufficient fuelrodswillbeprofiledtoobtaindiameterandovalitymeasurements suchthatchangesintheseparameters canbetrackedbysimilarmeasurements duringinteriminspections.

Also,a.randomselec-tionofapproximately 100UOpelletsfromeachlotperbatch'used willbecharacterized dimensionality andthedensitydistribution willbedeter-mined.Aboutonehalfofthesepelletswillbeplacedinknownaxiallocations inselectedfuelrodsWiletheremainder wi)lbesetasideasarchives.

Apoolsidenondestructive examination willbemadeduringeachofthe'~~firstthreerefuelingSat ANO-2.Thesix16x16assemblies withcharacter-izedrodswillbexemovedfromthereactorateachrefueling andmovedtothespentfuelpoolforleaktesting(iffailedfuelisinthecore)andforvisualinspection.

Thelengthoftheassemblyandperipheral rodswill.bemeasured.

Duringtheshutdown, atargetof20pre-characterized rodsperbatchwillbescheduled forexamination andmeasurement.

Atsometimeaftertherefueling outage,pre-characterized rodsretainedindischarged assemblies willbemeasured.

Atargetof100rods.willbeeddycurrenttestedaftereachshutdown.

Z<~sg7-gY~~R:&1&~qApost~xrradiatpdn fuelsurveysanceprogramo-a~~~~,planned.

Sacr'.Eic requireme~ts oftheplanwild~bedetermined busdon,.theresuloftheANO-2program.However~+PSL currently pfanStoper-~~~~~fonotAtiiospootioZ<pre~ram Qc~sYcJck rool<ocroio3-CzinitcorewhenthWfuel.assemble,are removedfrt'ecorean~laced~oe:.spentfuel;-storage pool."=-".-.=ma'~L4,2-30 Apostirradiation fuelsurveillan'ce programfor54lucre4+/isplanned.,Thisprogramshallconsistofavisualinspection ofaminimumofsix.irradi-atedassemblies priortoreplacement oftheReactorVesselHeadateachofthefirstthreerefueling outages.Thesixassemblies inspected shallcon-sistoftwoassemblies of'eachfueltypeandwillbefromcorelocations whicharenonadjacent.

Visualinspections shallconsistofviewingthetopandsidesofeachfuelassemblyviaanunderwater TVCameraorPeriscope.

Thevisualinspection willincludeobservation withspecialattention togrossproblemsinvolving claddingdefects,spacergriddamageandothermajorstructural abnormalities.

Nospecialmeasurement devicesfortheseaffectsareintendedtobeprovidedfor'hisvisualinspection.

Ifmajorabnormalities aredetectedduringthisvisualinspection orifplantinstrumentation indicates grossfuelfailures,"

thefuelvendorwillbein-formedandfurtherinspections shallbeperformed.

Depending onthe'ature oftheobservedcondition, furtherexamination couldincludefuelsipping,singlerodexamination, andotherexaminations.

The16x16fueldesignen-.ab)esreconstitution.

Individual fuelrodsandotherstructural components maybeexaminedandreplaced, ifrequired.

Underunusualcircumstances, de-structive examination ofafuelrodmayberequiredbutthiswouldnotbeaccomplished onsiteorduringtherefueling outage.TheNRCshallbecontacted regarding grossfuelfailuredetec'ted byplantin-'strumentation ormajorabnormalities observedduringthepostirradiation in-.spections described above.Thepostfuelirradiation fuelsurveillance programshallbecontinued fol-'owing thefirstthreecyclesofoperation ofSf:Lu;.el';$

~,Sixassemblies shallbevisuallyinspected duringeachrefueling outage,notnecessarily priortoreplacement ofthereactorvesselhead.Thevisualinspection shallconsist.ofviewingthetopsandsidesofeachfuelassemblyviaanunderwater TVcameraorperiscope.

Thevisualinspection willincludeobser-vationwithspecialattention togrossproblemsinvolving

.cladding defects,spacergriddamage,andothermajorstructural abnormalities.

TheNRCwillbenotifiedofmajorabnormalities notedasaresultoftheseinspection activities.

15.C.3CEAEjectionwithLossofOffsitePower.~~~~~The.following CEAejectioncaseswererequested tpower:I(1)CEAejectionwithcontrolelementhuigblowdownintocontainment.

,banlj'zedwithoutoffsiteuptureandsubsequent rapidII(2)CEAejectionwherethecontrolelementhousingdoesnotruptureandtheprimarysystemleakstothesecondary systemthroughleaksinthesteamgenerator tubes.-TheanalysisofaCEAejectionwitharapidblowdownintocontainment ispre-sentedinSection15.4.5.1.

Thisanalysisalsoassumedafailureofthe4.16KYbustofasttransferfollowing turbinetrip.Themainimpactofthisistheassumption thatthecondenser isunavailable foronehour.TheanalysisofaCEAejectionwherethehousingdoesnotruptureisdiscussed inthis'section.

Thiscasewasanalyzedwithoutoffsitepower.Figures15.C.3-1and15.C.3-2arethepressureversustimecurvesforprimaryandsecondary sidepressures, respectively.

Table15AC.3-1presentsinformation associated withradiological releasecalculations.

Table15.C.3-1CEAEjectionwithLossofOffsitePowerRadiological ReleaseInformation l.SteamReleasedtoAtmosphere DuringCooldown(ibm)0-2hours:NSSYs':ADVs74400'51000EntireEvent;NSSVsADVs2.FuelPinFailure(/)(SeeSection15.4.5.1) 3.PrimaryIodineConcentration Basedon9.5%FailedFuel(pCi/gm).

4.Secondary IodineConcentration

.BasedonTech.Spec.Limits(pCi/gm).

5.Decontamination FactorforSteamGenerator IodineTransport 6.TwoExclusion BoundaryThyroidDosefromSecondary Releases(Rem).744005720009.58.3x1031016.7 0

gazooI+OPgaoeizOdlcOop-sn)g,5FC'nMbX

10501000.~~KD0~KQUJI~950900850~~~~~~~~8007500100200.300TIME,SFCONOS500\~~~~~~~~~FLORIDAPO>U5R8LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT2STEAMGEH.PRESSUREij'S.TIME

XP5+L78"Gsppnce+

~+a'I)g~(g(NIOnthebasisofexperience, thehTvalueof100'FusedintheanalysisislargerthananyhTthatmightbeexpectedduringplantoperation.

DuringRCScooldownusingtheshutdowncoolingsy'tem,coolantcirculation withthereactorcoolantpumpsservestocoolthesteamgenerator tokeepthetemperature difference betweenthereactorvesselandthesteamgenerator minimal.aSteamdumpsareusedtoreducesteamgenerator secondary fluidtobelow220'F.Ifthesteamgenerator wereheldat220'Fandthereactorvesselwerecooledtotherefuelinq temperature, thesteamgenerator

-reactorvesselATwouldstillbelessthan'l00'F.Infact,procedures willdirecttheoperatortomaintaintheh,Tbelowapproximately 20F.QLTOPtransients havenotbeenanalyzedforthesimultaneous startup.ofmorethanonereactorcoolantpump(RCP).Suchoperation isprocedurally

.precluded, sincetheooeratorstartsonlyoneRCPatatimeandasecondRCPisnotstarteduntilsystempressureisstabilized.

Additionally, thereisanLTOPtransient alarmthatshouldindicatethatapressuretransient isoccurring andthatasecondRCPshould'notbestarted.TheresultsoftheanalysesprovidedinFigures5.2-24and5.2-25showthattheuseofthePORYsprovidesufficient pressurereliefcapacitytomitigatethemostlimitingLTOPeventsidentified above.~l<<l>fgCJiSr'rrL.

ATechnical Specification willbewrittentorequire~mfa.o~~r~f2~5-'~RAifthebTexceeds100F.However,asmentioned above,administrative procedures willensurethatthehTismaintained belowapproximately 20F.Also,aTechnical Specification willbewrittentoensurethatappropriate actionistakenifonePORVisoutofserviceduringtheLTOPmodeofoperation.

J

'L2-FSARecapabi)itytodetermine heatremoval,coo)downrate,shutdowncoolingflow,amdthecapability todetect.degradation inthef)oworheatremovalcapacity.

Theinstrumentation providedfortheSDCSconsistsof:e1)Temperature measurements

-Shutdowncoo)ingheatexchanger inletandthetemperature oftheshutdowncoolingf)owtothe)owpressureheader.A).1temperatures areindicated inthecohtrolroom.Theshutdowncoolingheatexchangers'nlet temperature, andthelowpressureheadertemperatures "arerecordedtofaci)itate control'f theReactorCoolantSystemcoo)downrate.2)PressureHeasurement.s

-LPSIheaderpressureandshutdowncoolingheatexchanger inletpressure.

Thesepressures areindicated inthecontrolroom,and,whenusedwiththe).ow-pressure pumpperformance curves,provideanieanal>>ternatemeansofmeasuring systemflowrate.

3)PlowHeasurements

-Totalshutdowncoolingflowratexsmeasuredbyflowindicator/control)ers FIC-3301and3306.Theinstiumentation isdiscussed furtherin5e4.7.2.3 Overpressure ControlSections7.4and7.6.'ction againstoverpressure oftheSDCS~~~~~~rlocks.Adescription ofreliefvalvessection6.3.2.2.6.1.

isprovidedbyreliefvalvesandisprovidedbelowandinSub-TherearesixreliefvalvesintheSDCSsuctionlines.Thesevalvesaresizedtoprotectthecomponents andpipingfromoverpressure duetothermalexpansion ofthefluid.ValvesV-3482andV-3469haveasetpressureof2485psigandacapaci:ty

'offivegpm.Relieffluidfromthesevalvesiscollected inthequenchtank.Theseva)vesarelocatedinSectionsE-4andD>>5ofCEP&IDE-13172"310-131 andaredeeienedto1974AS>E,SectionNBGuelity GroupA(~eeF~ure.ValvesV<<3483andV-3468haveasetpressureof335psigandacapacityof155gpm.Relieffluidfromthesevalvesiscollected inaholduptankintheMast.eHanagement System.ThesevalvesarelocatedinSectionsD-7andD-6ofCEP&IDE-13172-310-131 andaredesignedto1974ASHE,SeCtionBC,GuelityGroupB(zaep;~are.'4y/S)~5e4-24Inadditiontoprotecting thecomponents andpipingfromoverpressure duetothethermalexpansion ofthefluid,valvesV-366andto'otectthecomponents andpip-ngfromoverpressure duetoaresizeto'roecsandressurizer inaverendrtentstartingofthechargi'ng pumps,HPSIpumps,anpedacaac1theaters,Thesevalveshaveaset.pressureof335psiganapy2300m.Relief'fIuidcol)ected fromthesevalvesiscollected gpm.exethotainmentsump.ThesevalvesarelocatedinSectionsC-6>dD-6ofCEP&IDE-13172-310"131 andaredesignedto1974ASeconSHEYC(to1975summeraddenda)QualityGroupBMhencalcu)ating SectionothecapacityofvalvesV-3666andV-3667,thecap.styoes<~F'q~03-l<)~Amendment No.4,(6/81)

SL2-FSAR9Vo(e(~$8~TMo-manual~cefa 1eJ~~.ovineRCSdepressurization iscarriedonormallyaftertheSITsareeither.isolatedordcpressurized.

~PrimaryBorationandInventory MakeupTheSt~LucieUnit2designincorporates threesafetygradechargingpumps(SeismicCategory,oeIASMECodeClass2),redundant safetygradechargingpumpi"iCategoryIASMECodeClass2boricacidmae-upans),numdeliverredundant chargingpumpsuctionpaths,andredundant chargingpumpeverypaths.Thechargingpumpsandallrelatedautomatic controlvalvesareconnected tovitalpowerifthenormalpowersupplysystemshouldfail,'xcept 1V-2504hargingpumpsuctionfrom,theRMT.Duringtheboronlantcooldown, thechargingsystemboratestheRCStocoldshutdownoronconcentration and.accommo aesd.dtthereactorcoolantshrinkage, takingsuctionfromeithertheboricacidmakeuporrefueling watertanks.Theminimumamountofstoredorcacsoudbiidlutionthatismaintained ineitherboricacidtank'issufficient tobringtheplanttoasafeshutdowncondition.

Thecapability oftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)toborateandtomakeupisnotcompromised bystoppingletdownflow.Ananalysisofborationwithoutletdownhasbeencompeteanhb1tedandisconfirmed inFSARSubsection 9.3.4.3.Asinglefailureofoneemergency powertrainwouldleaveatleastonechargingpumpoperaeonblthotheremergency powertrain.Onechargingpumpstillalowsteo111hRCStobeboratedtoacoldshutdownboronconcentration thetwohoursthattheplantisinitially heldathotstandby,evenwithouttheletdownsystemoperable.

Thus,thechargingsyswithinthetwooursae.sstemsatisfies thesinglefailurecriteria.

SeeFSARSubsection 9.3.4formoreinformation.

4.Secondary tfakeupDuringcooldown, theauxiliary feedwater system(ASS)andatmospheric dumpvalvesprovie.ameanson'brigthereactorcoolantsystemtemperature downtotheshutdowncoolingsystementrytemperature-Theauxiliary feedwater

~pump(s)arestartedandthesafetygradeauxiliary feedisolation valves,~5-09-9,-10-11,-12,areopenedfromthecontrolroom.Theauxiliary feedwater systemisdesignedsuchthatnosingleactivefailurecoupledwithalossofoffsitepower,preventsplantcooldown.

Afailuremodesandeffectsanalysisi.sprovidedinthe.St.LucieUnit2FSARTable10.4.3.TheAPTScontainsonesteamdrivenandtwomotordrivenauxiliary feedwater bi,tlfiapableofmaintaining theRCSinhotstandby.Also,thesteamdrivenoreitherofthemotordrivenauxiliary feedwater pumpsiscapableofdelivering enoughfeedwater condensate foraplantcooldown.

TheAPTSisdesignedtosafetygraderequirements

{SeismicCategoryISafety13AS'KCdSectionIII).Eachofthemotordrivenauxiliary feedwater

~pumpsutilizeaClasslEacsafetyrelatedpowersupplyandtheturbinedipumptrainreliesstrictly-ondcpowersupply.Xfthemotordrivenauxiliary h.5.4-28eAmendment No.4,(6/81)

)

SL2-FSAR+9o(NCHPOSITIONepreoperational andinitialstart'uptestprogramshallbeinconformance withRegulatory Guide1.68'heprogramforPHRsshallincludetestswithsupporting analysisto(a)confirmthatadequatemixingofboratedwateraddedpriortoorduringcooldowncanbeachievedundernaturalcirculation conditions andpermitestimation ofthetimesrequiredtoachievesuchmixing,and"(b)confirmthat'hecooldownundernaturalcirculation conditions canbeachievedwithi'nthelimitsspecified intheemergency operating procedures.

Comparison withperformance ofpreviously testedplants'fsimilardesignmaybesubstituted forthesetests.RESPONSE:

Thepreoperational andstartuptestprogramswillconformtheRegulatory Guide1,68(R2).Boronmixingundernaturalcirculation conditions, willbedemonstrated inaprototypical testattheSanOnofreNuclearGeneration

~50>MS~1g~~~4oFHtt's$4'IVY~a~/~i~e4"cpothlc.4Mc.W~'i2.Ps8PAnaturalcirculation testandsimulator trainingwillbeperformed forSt.LucieUnit2todemonstrate thecapability ofcoolingtheplanttoshutdowncoolingsysteminitialconditions withinseveralhoursunderminimumcoolingcapability.

AdetailedplanwillbereportedtotheNRCinaforthcoming FSARamendment.

St.LucieUnit1submittals totheNRCconcerning NaturaliculationcooldownhavebeenreviewedwithresPecttoth'eiraPPlicability toStrhueieUnit2.XtisFPL'sopinionthatthesuheittals providedtothe'istaffforUnit1aredirectlyapplicable toUnit2.Insummary,Unit2willreviseemergency operating procedures toreflectamorestringent cooldownratethantheexisting75F/hrrate.However,itisourpositionthatthemorestringent cooldownrateisnotrequiredtoprecludesafecooldownorplantshutdown.

All,evaluations completed byourNSSSUendor(C-E)concurwithouriiThStLucieUni,t2responsetotheabovequestionisaddressed in30FPL'letters L-80-343datedOctober17,1'980andL-80-431datedDecember1980.5.4-28nAmendment No.4,(618'1)

PucsL'>.<>r>

440.5Provic)o<letails<>>>t)realr>>msa>>clir>dicatior>s w)richwoul<liriformthu<>)>orate>rs t:hat:aSDCsuet:ionli>>eir;o-lationvalve)rawclosedwhiletheplanti.ir>sh<<Lclowr>

cooling.Istherear>ycommor>failurewhichwouldre.-sult:i>>hot:hvalvesbeingclosedwhileinslruLdowrr coolinc)~ItlhenLPSI)>sm)>miniflowisolation valv<<sarec3oscddurir>gsl>ut:down

<:oolir>g, whatworrldpr<.vor>t pumpclamageiFaprcssuretransie>>C weret.ooccurwhichcausesRCSpressure:

toexccc.dLPSIdeadheadpressure?

Nher>t:heplantisintheSDCSmode,isthc:reanysir>gluFailurewhichwouldc:a0sethesuctionofbothSDCp>>mpstobuswitchedfromthehotlegpipingtothedrysumps?Respor>se:

TheSDCis'olation valvesareV-3480,-3481,-3651,and-3652.Chenanyofthesevalvesareclosed,alightisdisplayed onapanelintherontrolroom.ValvesV-3480and-3481areir>linewithLPSIpump2A.ValvesV-3651and-3652areinlinewithLPSIpump2B.Valves.V-3652 a>>d-3481areon<.lectrical TrainA.ValvesV-3651ar>d-3480areonelectrical TrainB.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthereisacrossconnectbetweer>thetwoLPSIpumpt:rains.Thiscrossco>>>>cctissituatedbetween,thetwoisolation valv<<soneachtrain.Thiscrossconnectpipi>>gisopenedandclosedviavalveV-3545.Powerissuppliedtothevalvefromeithercl<<c:-tricalTrainAorBviathc.swir>gBus.Thiscrosscor>neetvalvecanbeopenedfromtheco>>trolroomandalsofromaloc:alcontrolstation.Openandclosedpositions arc.shownbycorresponding liglrts.Theselicrhtsarepowered.fromelectrical BusA.Ir>adc)ition, thereisa0-100";indication fort)>isvalvepowc:redfromclcctrica)

BusB.Thrrs,ifoneofthevalvesfailedoxifoneofthedieselger>erators Failed,therewouldstillhconefunctioning LPSIpumptrain.Forexample,ifvalveV-3481failedclosed,thepil>inglinetoLPSIpump2Awouldnolongerbeopc.nrhowever,t:helinetoLPSI)><>mp2AwouldsLillbeoper>a>>dopera)>le'.

Asasecond<<xamplerclu<.tri<ral TrainAfailed-t:hediesel<3er>erator failedt:ostart-thesevalve:sV-3652andV-3481wouldnotopen.Fl<.ctri-.

calTrair>BisfuncLionalar>disus<<dtoopc>>LheSDCcrossconr>ec:t valve(V-3545).tinterflow:-throught.heLPSI)>ump2Atrair>(u)>tot:hecrosscon>>ccLpoirrt),flowsthro>>ght:hecrosscc>r>>>e<<t.

pipir>ga>>dintothe),PSIp<<mp2Bpipingtrain,thussupp)yir>g LPSIpump2Bwiththenecessary flow.

e/~/z(Thereisnr>s>>><i)cfbi)u>'ewhichprevorits SDCentryandth<rcisiiosi>><))efailurewhichclosesbothv>ivesi>>asiii<iletrai>>orpruveiits onevalvefrombci>>g<:lo.,cd.

Thesecondt>artofthisouc.tioriaddresses thesi,tu;itioii whu>>theLPSIpumpminiflowisolation valvesareclosed(di<ri>>qtheshutd<iwn'cooling mode)aridapres-suretrinsient o<><<ursintheRCSwhichexceedstheLPSIpumpdeadheadpressure.

rFortheShutdownCoolingMode,theLPSIpumpsuctionisalignedtothehotlegoftheRCS.TheflowCromthedischarge sideofthepumpgoesintothecoldlegoftheRCS.Duetothisarrangement, theLPSIpumpwouldnotbedeadheaded byanRCSpressuresurge.Reliefvalvesintheshutdowncoolingsuctionlinespreventisolation ofthelineforanycredibleoverpressure events.ThereisnosinglefailurethatwouldcausebothoftheLPSIpumpstobealignedtothedrysumpduringtheShutdownCoolingMode.TheSt.LucieUnit2hasanum-beroffeaturesincorporated initsdesignwhichpre-cludesthis.ForthyLPSXpumpstobealigned.intheaccidentconfi-gurationsitedinthequestion, thewatersupplyfromtheRCSwouldhavetobecutoffandthepathfromthecontainment sumptotheLPSXpumps,wouldhivetobeopen.Aninadvertant RASwo>>ldopen-theisolation valvesfromthecontainment sump(I-MV-07-2 AandB).However,anRASalsoturnsofftheLPSIpumpsanddoesnotclosetheSDCsuctionisolation valves.ValvesV-3444andV-3432,oneineachline,areclosedduringshutdowncoolingandmustbcopenedtoaligntheLPSXpumpstoadrysump.'I7g<existingdesignpermitsasa>>glefailureoftheAorBbatterytocloseasuctionvalveineachtrainnftheshutdowncoolingsystem.7~~<>QP;gg,P~P~/g<+>Ol/~VAw(+-35+5)uzi/fbmd+Pa.iM50g4imhs44rc.+~~/y 0/

('gr'IOfthepossiblesingleactivecomponent failuresf'rtheSt.Lucie2Plant,onlytwocanimoactthepotential forpost-trip returntopowerandconsequent possibledegradation infuelperformance:

(a)'reofamainsteamisolation valvetocloseonactuation ofinsteamisolation signal{MSIVfa(lllure) and(h)failureofhighpressuresafetyinjection (HPSI)pumporfailureofonePSIpumpandonelowpressuresafetyinjection (LPS!)pump(thetercasebeingpossibleonlyifoffsitepowerisunavailable).

heonlysignificant impact'hesesinglefailurescanhaveisontentialpost-trip degradation infuelperformance.

Table440e9-1showsthemaximumpost-trip reactivities, coreaveragepowers,andcoreaverageheatfluxeswithanassumedMSIVfailureandwithanassumedHPSIporn~orHPSIpumpplus'LPSI pumpfailure,asappropriate, for6.36ft~mSLBs.Casesarepresented forSLBsinitiated atfullpowerandatzeropower,withandwithoutlossofoffsitepower.Forcaseswithlossofoffsitepower,failureofoneHPSIpumpplusoneLPSIpumpisseentopresentthegreatestpotential forpost-trip degradation infuelperformance.

Therefore thiswasthesinglefailureassumedforthecaseswithlossofoffsitepowerwhicharepresented inAppendix15AoftheFSAR.Forcaseswithoffsitepoweravailable (noreactor'coolantpumptrip)theimpactofthetwopossiblesinglefailuresisnearlyidentical.

Theanalysespresented inAppendix15AoftheFSARassumedaMSIVfailureforcaseswithoffsitepoweravailable sincethisfailureyieldsslighltyhighercoreaverageheatfluxes.Noconclusions wouldbechangedbyassuming, instead,oneHPSIpumpfailureforthesecases.{15.A)Forthelargesteamlinebreak(SLB)eventspresented inApoendix15Atheconcernisthepossibiliby ofdegradation infuelperformance duringpotential post-trip returntopower.Pre-tripfueldegradation

.forSLBeventsisaddressed inSection15.1.(Seetheresponsetoguestion440.80(a)).

Radiological releasesforSLBeventsareboundedbytheLF-3eventtobe.presented inSection15.1.5.1.

Thereisnoapproachtothe110"ofdesignpressurecriterion duringSLBevents.

(9 TABLE440.9-1EFFECTOFSINGLEFAILUREOFMSIVORONEHPSIPUMPORONEHPSIPUMPPLUSONELPSIPUMPONMAXIMUMPOST-TRIP REACTIVITY, COREAVERAGEPOWER,ANDCOREAVERAGEHEATFLUXFOR6.36FT2MAINSTEAMLINEBREAKS.AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OFAUXILIARY FEEDHATER ISASSUMED.MAXIMUMPOST-TRIP:INITIALPOWERLEVELFF-SITEPOWERSINGLEFAILUREREACT/VITY('106p)COREAVERAGECOREAVERAGEPOyiERHEATFLUX(XOFFULLXOF2570MH)POgERVALUFULLLOSSOFAVAIL-ABLENEHPSIANDONELPSIPUMPMSIVtONEHPSIPUMPMSIV+0.003-0.05-0.3'0.38.36.810.410.28.511.2ZEROLOSSOFAVAIL-ABLENEHPSIANDONELPSIPUMPMSIVONEHPSIPUMPMSIV+0.3+0.1-0.5-0.50.81.6X101.1X101.1X101.00.41.41.5 01 3mr-IC.5'u.if~n,w-g//9(F/SL-2RoundOneuestions440.14Oneofthekeyparameters inLOCAanalysesispeakcladtemperature.

{15.0)Fornon-LOCAtransients, minimumDNBR(departure fromnucleateboilingratio)isofprimaryimportance.

Forthosetransients analyzedinSection15oftheFSAR,providegraphical outputoftheDNBRasafunctionoftime.~Resense:DHBRplotsareprovidedforeventswhichshowaDNBRdecreasing belowitsinitialvalueforallsectionsofChapter15.15.1.2.115.1.4.315.1.5.3A-~2rs-a,s-3(~~g~ar.scd)Hoeventoreventcombination minimumDHBRlessthan1.19.attachedFigure15.1.2.1-13 FSARFigure15.1.1.3-9'FSARFigure15;1.5.3-9 attachedFigure15A-l.lsattachedFigure15A-+5peal'Jpp'm~&dlrppc Jb..PAlgRzc~Micorea8.addressed inSection15.2resultsina15.2.1.115.2.1.215.2.2.115.2.2.215.2.3.215.2.5.2DNBRremainsabove3.0.NodecreaseinDHBR.DHBRremainsabove3.0.attachedFigure15.2.2.2-12.

attachedFigure15.2.3.2-12 attachedFigure15.2.5.2-21 Eventspresented inSection15.3oftheSt.LucieUnitHo.2FSARwhichinitiateadecreaseinreactorcoolantpumpflowratearelossofoff-si'tepower(15.3.2.3),

andonepumpresistance toforcedflowwithalossofoffsitepowerasaresultofturbinetrip(15.3.4,3).

Graphical outputofDNBRversustimeforthelossofoffsitepowereventispre-sentedasFigure15.3.2.3-1 intheFSAR.Fortheonepumpresistance, toforcedfloweventwithalossofoffsitepowerasaresultofturbinetrip,=graphical outputofDNBRversustimewillbeforwardedby.theendofAugust,1981(seeresponsetog440.11).15.4.1.315.4.2.315.4.2.415.4.3.115.4.4.215.4.4.315.4.5.1'5.4.5.3 FSARFSARFSARNinimumDNBRisattachedattachedFigure15.4.1.3-7 Figure15.4.2.3-7 NodecreaseinDNBRFigure15.4.3.1-8 greaterthanfor15.4.4.3.

Figure15.4.4.3-8.Figure15.4.5.1-11..

Tobesubmitted withanalysi;Therearenoeventsin15.5forwhichtheNBRdecreases belowtheinitialvalue.{15.6)TheeventsanalysedinSection15.6ofSt.LucieUnitNo.2FSAR,whichresultinadecreaseintheRCSinventory aresteamgenerator tube

SL-2ROUNDONEUESTIONS;440.25(15.3.3)Provideadetailedanalysisontheconsequences ofaRCPshaftseizureevent.Justifyselection oflimitingsinglefailures.

Thetimeattemperature studieswhichjustifyyourclaimsofpeakcladtemperature beinglimited'to1300oFarenotacceptedbythestaff.Inassessing fuelfailures, anyrodwhichexperiences aDNBRoflessthan1.19mustbeassumedfailed.Confirmthattheresultsoftheanalysismeettheacceptance criteriaofSRP15.3.3.(2).

Provideyourassump-tionsonflowdegradation duetothelockedrotorinthefaultedloop,andreference appropriate studieswhichverifytheseassumptions.

Alsoprovideasimilaranalysisforthelockedrotoreventpresented insection15.3.4.1, andshowthatacceptable consequences result.~ResenseThemostseveresinglefailureinconjunction withtheRCPshaftseizureeventisthelossofoffsitepoweronturbinetrip,asdiscussed intheresponseto440.9.ResultsshowaminimumDNBRof0.36at3.6seconds,resulting in13Kofthefuelrods'experiencing DNB(seetheresponseto440.11).The2-hourthyroiddoseassuming13Ãfailedfuel'sapproximately 30remsandthepeakRCSpressureis'lessthanorequalto2694psia(seetheresponseto440.8).~W+s-W:~d<p~:4.~i.~

gg)~~(~kgc.Theflowcoastdowns whichwereusedintheanalys'is oftheonepumpresistance toforcedflowarepresented inFigures440.25-1and440.25-2.

Theseizedshaftisassumedtoinstantaneously stopattime0.0withtheseizedrotor'ctingonlyasaresistance toflow.Thiscoastdown wasgenerated usingtheCOASTcodeasdocumented inCENPD-98(seeReference 1).

Reference:

1.'CoastCodeDescription",

CENPD-98, April2,1973.AchangetotheFSAR,Appendix15.C.3willbesubmitted inSeptember 1981.

440.41Identifytheplantoperating conditions underwhichcertainautomatic safetyinjection signalsareblockedtoprecludeunwantedactuation ofthesesystems.Describethealarmsavailable toalerttheoperatortoafailureintheprimaryorsecondarsstemduringthisphaseofoperation andthetimeavailable tomitigatetheconsequences ofsuchanaccident.

~ResonseWhiletheplantisinpoweroperation, thesafetyinjection signalsmaynotbeblocked.Duringtheinterimphase,whileRCSpressureisbeingreducedtore-fuelingmode,itbecomesnecessary topartially blocktheSIAS.Asafetyinjection blockisprovidedtopermitshutdowndepressurization oftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)withoutinitiating safetyinjection.

Thisblockisaccomplished manuallyafterpressurizer pressurehasbeenreducedandaper-missivesignalisgenerated bytheEngineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System.Thisblockingprocedure isunderstrictadministrative control;blockandblockpermissive isa'nnunciated andindicated inthecontrolroom.Itisnotpossibletoblockabove'apresetpressure:

ifthesystemisblockedandpressurerisesabovethatpoint,theblockisautomatically removed.Theblockcircuitcom-plieswiththesinglefailurecriterion inIEEE279-1971.

TheSIASblockremovesonlythepressurizer pressuresignalfromtheSIAStriplogic.Thehighcontainment pressuretransmitters stillremainindirectcon-nectionwiththetriplogic.Shouldaneventoccurwherebythecontainment pressureissufficiently raised,highcontainment pressurealarmssoundonRTGB-206andtheSIASisinitiated automatically, regardless ofthepressurizer signalblock.TheTechnical Specifications willpermitblockageof'heSIASinplantmodes5and6,whiletheshutdowncoolingsystemisinoperation.

Inthesemodespro-tectionagainstoverpressurization oftheReactorCoolantandShutdownCoolingSystem,'duetoaspuriousactuation oftheHPSI,isprovidedbyreliefvalvesV-3666andY-3667intheSDCsuctionlines.FSARTables7.5-1and10.4-5in-dicatesthedisplayinstrumentation andtheiralarms~4:~h<available totheoperatortoestablish primaryandsecondary systemconditions.

~CDuringcoldshutdownorrevueingmodes~and6)shouldalossofcoolantoccur,levelguagesinthecontainment andcavitysummandthesafeguards roomsumpwithalarmswouldalerttheoperatorofsuchanaccident.

Duringtheplantcooldown, operatoractionisrequiredtocontinually monitortheS.G.secondary waterlevelandfeedwater flow.Becauseofthistheoperatorisa&areofthesecondary systemconditions.

Duringarefueling, forspecificmaintenance tasks,itisexpectedthatsomeinstrumentation willbeinoperable.

Administrative procedures willassurethattheoperatorwillbeabletoassessthestatusoftheprimaryandsecondary sys-emsforthespecificsituations.

HoFSARchangeisrequired.

440.44Areportedeventhasraisedaquestionrelatedtotheconservatism ofNPSHcalculations withrespecttowhethertheabsoluteminimumavail-ableNPSHhasbeentakenbythestaffasafixednumbersuppliedthroughtheapplicant byeitherthearchitect engineerorthepump"-manufacturer.

Sinceanumberofmethodsexistandthemethodusedcanaffectthesuitability orunsuitability ofaparticular pump,itisrequested thatthebasisonwhichtherequiredNPSHwasde-terminedbebranded(i.e.,test,Hydraulic Institute Standards) foralltheECCSpumpsincluding thetestinginaccuracies beprovided.

~Res'onseTherequiredNPSHoftheSt.LucieUnit2ECCSpumpsisconfirmed bytest.Thehighpressuresafetyinjection pumpsaresuppliedbyBingham-Hillamette Co.Thesepumpsaretestedinaccordance withtheASNEPowerpestCode8.2(cen-trifugalpumps).SimilarpumpswerealsosuppliedforSt.LucieUnitl.EachoftheSt.LucieUnit1pumpswerealsotestedfortheNPSHre-quired.Theresultsshow(seefollowing table)littlevariancebetweenpumpsforsimilarflow.q7e,HP>Xla~~a~arePuwf~dsspradwo-o4'P~fd n~eAo~$;ue;O%J~r<+ro~.'heLPSIpumpsaresuppliedbyIngrsol-Rand.

TheNPSHcharacteristic iscon-'irmed bytest.BothoftheSt.LucieUnit2LPSIpumpsweretested.TheHydrualic Institute Standards wereusedforthytests.+~mf~~QJ~gijVP5$wf~prswr~~iaJp'Y, J~rn.L,.-~.

NPSHTESTRESULTSFORST.LUCIEUNITS1AND2St.LucieUnit1HPSIPumsf200113j/200114ICI200115 St.LucieUnit2HPSIPumsGPH'NPSHft64019.7640,19.964019.6$14210014(sparepump).f14210015 Ii'14210016 64063163919.919.019.4St.LucieUnit2LPSIPumsII1076149 f1076150TheNPSHvs.flowcurvesforinFigures6.3-3a,6.3-3b,6.45CC"sPfi~>s&CLta~a'ggloyf.Iqf3$'oc(5-,~3000.13qCao300011.0=4~/+0/7~theSt.LucieUnit2HPSIandLPSIpumpsareshown3-4a,and6.3-4b.Hpg~~~Lp~~'.-4~.7-t(

440.39IdentifyallECCSvalvesthatarerequiredtohavepowerlockedout;(6,3)confirmtheyareincludedundertheappropriate Technical Specifications, withsurveillance requirements listed.s~ResonseTheECCSvalvesthatarerequiredtohavepowerlockedoutarelisted"below.TheTechnical Spcification sectionoftheSt.Lucie-2FSARiscurrently beinggen-erated.Surveillance requirements forthesevalveswillbelisted.0V-3614,V-3624,V-3634,Y-3644-SITIso1ation Valves."Ponerrackouttomotorrequiredwhenpressurizer pressuregreaterthan700'psig."~~V-3613,Y-3623,V-3633,V-3643-SITVentValves.Powertothoseval'vesisremovedinthecontrolroomduringnormaloperation.

NoFSARchangeisrequired.

REACTORCOOL>>3rrS.ST-,~3STE>>MGc."lFRATOPS LJHITZ3(G CO,'(OITZOt<

FOROP+RATIO,'J

.3.4.6Eachsteamgenerator shallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1,2,3and4.ACTION:Mithoneormoresteamgenerators inoperable, restoretheinoperable

.generator(s) toOP""itABLE statuspriortoincreasing Tabove200~F.avgSURVEILLANCE REOUIRBIEHTS 4.4'.6.0Eachsteamgenerator shallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbyperformance ofthefollowing augmented inservice.

inspecionprogramandtherequirements ofSpecification 4.0.5.4..4.6~1SteamGenerator SampleSelection andInspection

-Eachsteam.generator shallcedetarminea OPERABL:-

duringsnutccImoyselecting and-inspe~cting at.leas.theminimumnumberofsteamgenerators specified in.TDle4.4"1.4.4.6.2SteamGenerator TubeSampleSelecticn andInsoecicn-Thesteam.generator tu"eminimumsamplesie,inspec-ion resul-classification, andthecorresponding actionrequiredshallbeasspecified inTable4.4"2.The-inservicinspection cfsteangenerator tubesshallbeperformed atthefr'equencies specified inSpecifica ion4.4.6.3andtheinspec.ed tubesshall:beverified=acepablepertheacceptance criteriaofSpecfication4.4.6.4.Thetubesselectedforeachinsc~icainspection shallincludeatleast3Xcf.thetotalnumberoftubesinallsearngenerators; thetubesselectedfo-theseinspections shallbeselectedonarandombasisexcept:'a4)thereexpe'rience insimilar'lan+m withsimilarwaterchemisryindicates criticalareastobeinspec-ed, thenatleast50ofthetubes'inspected shallbefromthesecriticalareas.b.Thefirstsampleoftubesselectedfcreachinservice inspection (subsequent othepreservice inspection) ofeachsteamgenerator shallinclude:-C~Sh3/44"10Og01lcSO

/

REACTORCOOLANTSYSTE.'1-SVRVEILlAt(CE REOVIREHEHTS (Continued)

Co.Allnonplugged tubesthatpreviously haddetectable wallpenetratiors (greaterthan20~).2.Tubesinthoseareaswhereexperience hasindicated potential prob1ems.3.Atubeinspection (pursuant toSpecification 4.4.6.4.a.8) shallbeperformed oneachselectedtube.Ifanyselectedtubedoesnotpermitthepassageoftheeddycurrentprobeforatubeinspection,'i'.this shallberecordedandanadjacenttubeshallbeselectedandsubjected toatubeinspection.

Thetubesselectedasthesecondandthirdsamples(ifrequiredbyTable4.4-2)duringeachinservice inspection maybesubjected toapartialtubeinspection provided:

2.Thetubesselectedforthesesamplesincludethetubesfromthoseareasofthetubesheetarraywheretubeswithimperfections werepreviously found.-Theinspections includethoseportionsofthetubeswhereimperfections werepreviously found.Theresultsofeachsampleinspection shallbeclassified intooneofthefollowing threecategories:

Cate~os'"2 InsectionResults=Lessthan5Ãofthetotaltubesinspected aredegradedtubesandnoneoftheinspected tubes'redefective..

Oneormoretubes,butnotmoreChan1Ãofthe'otaltubesinspected aredefective, orbetween,SXand10Ãofthetotaltubesinspected aredegradedtubes.'"3Norethan10~ofthetotaltubesinspected aredegradedtubesormorethan1Ãoftheinspected tubesaredefective.

Note:Inallinspections, previously degradedtubesmustexhibitsignificant (greaterthan10~)furtherwallpenetrations tobeincludedintheabovepercentage calculations.

3/44"11OCroa'-'

\0 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTE."1S SUILLANC"P."U~ReMc'O'S Continued 4.4.6.3InsnecionFreouencies

-Theaboverequiredinservice inspections ofsteamgenerator

-uaessnailoeperformed atthefollowing frequencies:

a.b.cThefirstinservice inspection shallbeperformed after6ffectiveFullPowerMonthsbutwithin24calendermonthsofinitialcrit"kality.Subsequent inservice inspections shallbeperformed atintervals ofnotlesshan12normorethan24calendarmonthsafterthepreviousinspection.

Iftwoconsecuzive inspections following serviceunderAVTconditions, notincluding thepreservice inspection, resultinallinspection resultsfallingintotheC-1categoryorifwoconsecutive inspcionademons"atethatpreviously observeddegradation hasnotcontinued andnoadditional degradation hasoc"urred, theinspection intervalmaybeextendedtoamaximumofonceper40months.Ifthe.resultsoftheinservice inspecionofasteamgenerator conducted inaccordance wihTable4.4"2at40monthintervals fallintoCategoryC-3,theinspection

,requency shallbeincreased toatleast.onceper20months.Theincreaseininspection frequency shallapplyuntilthesubsequent inspections satisfyhecri.eriaofSpecification 4.4.6.3.a;theintervalmaythenbeextendedtoamaximumofonceper40months.lAdditional, unscheduled inservice inspections shallbeperformed oneachsearngenerator inaccordance wi.hthefirssampleinspecionspecified inTable4.4-2duringtheshutdownsubsequent toanyofthefollowing cond-itions:

1.Primary"to-secondary tubesleaks(notincluding leaksoriginating fromtube-to"tube sheetwelds)inexcessof.helimitsofSpecification 3.4.7.2.2.3.Aseismicoccurrence greaterthantheOperating BasisEarthquake.

rAloss-of-coolant accidentrequiring actuation oftheengineered safeguards.

4.Amainsteamlineorfeedwater linebreak.3/44-12

-t00 REACTORCGOLAHTSYSTEM0dSURYEILLAHCE REOUIREHEHTS Continued 4.4.6.4Acceptance Criteriaa.Asusedin'hisSpecification 2.Imoerfection meansanexception to'hedimensions, finishorcontourofatvbefromthatrequiredbyfabrication drawingsorspecifications.

Eddy-current testingindications below20~ofthenominaltubewallthickness, ifdetectable, maybeconsidered asimperfections.

~0iI-Idgeneralcorrosion occurring oneitherinsideoroutsideofatube.3.5.'.8.~PPthanorequalto20Ãofthenominalwallthickness causedbydegradation.

K~diuPaffectedorremovedbydegradation.

Oefectmeansanimperfection ofsuchseveritythatitexceedstheplugginglimit.Atubecontaining adefectisdefective.

~P1ILIthetubesnailberemovedfromserviceandisequalto(40)~"ofthenominaltvbewallthickness.

'nserviceable describes thecondition ofatubeifit'leaksorcontainsadefectlargeenoughtoaffectitsstructurai integrity intheeventofan,Operating 8asisEarthquake, aloss-of-.

coolantaccident, orasteamlineorfeedwater linebreakasspecified in4.4.6.3.c, above.ITubeInspection meansaninspection ofthesteamgenerator tubefromthepointofentry(hotlegside)completely aroundthe'-bendtothetopsvpportofthecoldleg.Preservice Inspection mieansaninspection ofthefulllengthofeachtuneineacns-earngenerator performed byeddycvrrenttechniques priortoservicetoestablish abaselineValuetobe-determined inaccordance withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.121,Augvst.1976.SF~L.~c.,g3/44"13OCT01loeO It REACTORCOOLANTS'(ST="HD~~EILi&HCcREOUIREH""!ITS (CcntinuedI b.econdition ofthetubing.Thisinspecionshallbeperformed fl7.4priortoinitialPOWEROPERATION usingtheequipment andtechniques expec-edtobeusedduringsuosequent inservice inspections.

Thesteamgenerator shallbedetermined OPERABL~aftercompleting thecorrspondingactions(plugalltubesexceeding theplugginglimitandalltubescontaining through"eall cracks)requiredbyTable4.4"2.4.4.6.5Renorte-0b.Following eachinservice inspection ofsteamgenerator tubes,thenumberoftubespluggedineachsteamgenera-'or shallbreportedtotheCormnission within15days..Thecompleteresultsofthesteamgenerator tubeinservice inspection shallbesubmitted totheCommission inaSpecialReportpur'suant toSoecification 6.9.2~sithin12monthsfollowing com-pletionoftheinspection.

ThisSpecialReportshallinclude:1..Numberandextentoftubesinspected.

2.3.Locationandpercentofeall-thickness penetration foreachindication ofanimperfecion.eEdentificationoftubesplugged.cResultsofsteamgenerator tubeinspecionswhichfallintoCategoryC"3andrequirepromptnotification ofheCommission shallbereportedpursuanttoSoeciication6.9.1priortoresumption ofplantoperation.

The~!rittenfolio~upof4hisreportshallprovideadescription ofinvestigations conduc4ed todetermine causeofthetubedegradation andcorrective measurestakentopreventrecurrence.

~'l44"14 00 TABLE4;4-]lglNIiYiUM NUMBEROFSTEAI'4GEQEQATOPS TOQE.INSPECTED DURINGINSERVICE iflSPPCT)ON 0Prescrvlce Inspection NoYesNo.ofSteamGenerators perUnitTwoThreeFourTwoThreeFourFirstln-rvicaInspection Second5Subsequent Inscrvlce Inspections AllOne>OneTwoOna2TwoOne3TableNota'.Ion:

1.Theinscrvica Inspection maybelimitedtoonesteamgenerator onarotatingscheduleencompassing 3N'IolthetubesIwhcreNisthcnun>bcrofstcamgenerators Intheplan!)IftheresultsofthefirstorpreviousInspections indicatethatallstcamgenerators areperforming inalikemanner.Notethatundersomecircumstances, theoperating conditions Inoncormorestcamgenerators maybetoundtobemorascvcrethanthoseinotherstcamgenerators.

Undersucltcircum.stancestiresanrplesequencesltallbemodifiedtoInspectthemostscvcreconditions.

2.Titcotl>crsteamgenerator notinspected duringthefirstinscrvice Inspection shallbeinspected.

Thethirdandsubsequent:

inspections shouldfollowtl>cInstructions described in1above.3.Eacl)oftheothertwosteamgcncrators notinspected duringthefirstinservlce Inspections shallbaInspected duringthesecondandthirdinspections.

Thafourthandsubsequent inspections shallfoltowtlteinstructions described in1above.~CDnI 0

TABLE4.$-2n)STSAMPLEINSPECYfON STEAMGENERATOR TUB'EINSPECTION 2NDSAMPLEINSPECTION 3RDSAMPLEINSPECTION SampleSleeAeiultActionRmtufrcdResuitActionflcqulrcd ResultActionAcquiredAmlnhnumofSTubesperS.G.C-IC-2C-3NonePlugdclcctlvo tubesendInspecteddltlonal 2StubesIntlilsS.G.InspectalltubesInthisS.G.,plugde-fectivetubasandInspect2StubosIneacliotli<<rS.G.Proniptnotlllcatlon toNRCpursuanttosl>cclllcatlon 6.0.lN/AC-IC-2C-3AllotherS.G.saroC-lSomeS.G.sC-2butnoadditional S.G.araC-3Adilitional S.G.IsC-3NonoPlllgdefective tubesendInspectadditional 4StubasIntlilsS.G.PerformactionforC-3resultofflrsl.sampleNonePerformactiontorC-2resultofsecondsaniploliispcctelltubesIncadiS.G.andplugdefectlvo tubes.Proniptnotlllcatlon toNRCpursuanttospecifleetlon6.0.lC-1C-2C-3N/AN/AN/AN/AN/A'/APlugdefective tiibcsPerformaciionforC-3resultoffirstsiWliplaN/AN/AN/AN/A.3N~V/heroNIsthonund)erof'stcamgen<<rators lnthoUnit,andnlsthonumberofsteamgcncrators lnspcctcd duringenInspcctlon

<DCDCD zs>.IProvideaconservative demonstration forPressurizer ManwayNuts(NumberC-5364)andPressurizer tlanwayStuds{NumberC-5365)thatthematerialwhentested.at40"Forlowerwillmeetorexceed25milslateralexpansion.

LowerboundCVNcurvesforSA-193Gl'.8-7andSA-540Gr.B-24materials areconsidered acceptable methodsforextrapolating theCVNimpactdatafromthetesttem-peratureto40'F.Inaddition, demonstrate thatthemetallurgical

.condition ofthematerials usedto'generate thelowerboundcurvesforSA-193Gr.B-7andSA-540Gr.B-24materials areequivalent to'hemetallurgical condition oftheSL-2material.

Thiscanbeac-complished byproviding theheattreatment informa'tion forthematerialusedtogeneratethelowerboundcurvesandforSL-2Pressurizer HanwayStudsandNuts.Reply:A.CVNdataforSA-193Gr.B-7aregiveninTable251.g-l.Sincefullcurvesarenotrequiredforthismaterial, testingoverarangeoftemperatures isnotnormallydone.Resultsfor.thepressurizer manwaynuts,codeno.C-5384,were:~Tem'F+10+10+10Ft-lbs5325'lIShear804060oilsLat.Ex.331827't10'F,twospecimens metthemilslateralexpansion require-ment,25mils,whileone.didnot.Sincetwospecimens exhibited over50%shear,thisisthecenterofthetemperature rangeinwhichthetoughness increases rapidlywithtemperature.

Bytestingat-atemperature 30'Fhigher.-40'F,C-Eexpectsthatall:specimens wouldexhibit75-100%shear.Fromthedatapre-sentedinTable251.8-1,C-Eexpectsinexcessof25milslateralexpansion at75Kshear.Heattreatment forcodeno.5364isgivenbelow;heattreatment dataforTable251.g-lisgiveninTable251.$-2.C-Efeelsthateachoftheseheattreatments producesimilarmetallurgical structures inthisalloy.AustenitizedTemperedStressRelieved1550'F,oilquenched1000F7hsprowl~d.k~)~4i4,5>gk~eeg.~-(.t*4'l~~~s~.i,.4~.l~7u'F.~l>>l<<4vifii

~'51.PThematerials survei1'lance programusessix'specimen capsulesthatshouldcontainreactorvesselsteelspecimens ofthelimitingbasematerial, weldmetalandheat-affected-zone material.

Todemonstrate compliance withAppendixf{,10CFRPart50,provideatablethatin-cludesthefollowing information foreachspecimen:

l.Actualsurveillance material; 2.Originofeachsurveillance specimen(basemetal:heatnumber,plateidentification number;weldmetal:weldwire,heatoffillermaterial, production weldingconditions, andplatematerialusedtomakeweldspecimen);

3.Testspecimenandtype;4.Chemicalcomposition ofeachtestspecimen.

Providethe.location, leadfactorandwithdrawal timeforeachspeci-mencapsulecalculated withrespecttothevesselinnerwall;I0Reply:Table251.$-1lis'tstherequested information.

TheweldandHAZspecimens areproducedusingthesameweldprocedure asisusedtoweldthevessel.TheHAZspecimens are1/2weldmetal,and.1/2limitingbasemetal,plat'e, H-605-1.Theweldmetalspecimens areproducedbyweldingplatesM-605-2andM-605-3together.

1CVlSio4

'Thesurveillance capsulewithdrawal scheduleforSt.LucieUnit2wasestablished inaccordance with10CFR50,AppendixH,paragraph II.C.3(b).

Thefirstcapsu'leisscheduled forwittidrawal whentheencapsulated basemetal'aterialisconservatively estimated toexhibitareference temperature shiftof50'F.Thisispredicted tooccurafterapproximately oneeffective fullpoweryear(EFPY)whichcorresponds i:oaneutronfluenceofabout1.3x1018n/cm2 (E>ltleV).

Thesecondandthirdcapsulesarescheduled forwithdrawal after12and24EFPY,respectively.

Asignificant advantage willresultfromwithdrawal ofthefirstsur-veillance capsuleafter1EFPY,becauseitwillprovideanearlyindication ofthevalidityofthereactorvesselfluenceandreference temperature shiftpredictions.

usedtosetthevesseloperating limits.Actualdosimetry andshiftmeasurements willthenbeavailable forprojecting radiation inducedchangesinthetougnness properties ofthevesselbeltlinematerials.

\Thiswithdrawal scheduleisconsistent withtheobjectives ofASTHE185-79(Standard Practicef'rConducting Surveil'lance TestsforLight-Water CooledNuclearPowerReactorVessels)and10CFR50,AppendixH:-"...toverifythe'nitialpredictions ofthesurveillancematerial'response totheactualradi-\jationenvironment..."

and"....todetermine theconditions underwhichthevesselcanbeoperatedwithadequatemarginsofsafetyagainstfracture.

0COHPTRNZTORY.XTQKSL-2-81-700 Page1ofPMQRKSOuestion435-Completion o6Z;sysrznetric LoadingAnalya&ECCBPiping<<EE/8EECCSPip&a@Supports6Restraints

-11/3ECKBHs-lJ,/BEReactoXnternols

-12/81Fuel->f82guestion435mpreviously car%'ed-s"HeetingOpenResponse" duetot1:e.fec~,

Chat&formation concerning ovalityttesMllssing.on I/3]/83.enovslitydiagramantheappropriate description waspovidedCoHx'eVNerses>>~aestionf3fi-Ve"ification oftnefunctional capability ofC1sss263austenitic pipebendendelbows.additional infoaaatioa onfaultedallomblestressesforbolts.BeerevisedresponseCoQuestion, f41.1(b)ResponsetoQuestionNE.3.(b)hasbeenrevisedtoreflee"theadditional in-fo~ation~~cautionfii2-Justification ofsufficien" nsrginagainstbucklingfailureforanycase~here~eexceed2/'3ofcriticalbucMXng,stressorvhreEbasco'sXncreaseFactorviolatestheconditions oftheresponsetoQueaUon40>>l(a)(2)

.Questionpi9-providearesponse{cispartoflg'Qon1stores'tion onperiodicleaktestingofprim~rycoolantpressureisolation valves.{{caution ASS"Cgtoarrangeea{ecting, todiscussthestatusofscLucreUntc2withreapecccoche8Gfg.ed~ster ringevencrecentlyexperienced acSONGS.i-""'"eventprnbabdldty ofoccurence forasmallfeedvacer linebreakshouldberevievedbytheNRCProba&i3,istic Revie~Group<oracceptance.

Theoutcomeofthatrevuecanaffeceitefn8339/3O/81Peek.of9/21/8EHRCtorespondRoT.iceneee "NRC"toreviewresponses toReactorSystemsbranchQuestion440.8E(Z)

(tMsresponseisattachedtoQuestion8553.'

COB"1PRAZOR'ST'ZlMSTRZSPNiSEDATETQNRCPageZoiREMI'KKSI~~Oostion956-XRBullets79-02-Pxovidedesigncz'itexia an6sarpleCG1cl1LatiGEL,

+caption841.L(c-CompareTable'.9-5withthel.eadingtaMesofSection,3.8.3aa4identffynayareaewherediapezity betvaenAXSC.andASK'.Oupportrequfrerenta ateeigaificant.81'25/81PLelhaiasry

<<nbaOndeaf,'gpgivettoBooBoaaekon?jpiIII4lVIIvI~I4'jI~1I4)4I4.>I4I;J$..)~\ctiteriajBL,~g~I'I,~12:!4~&.~VV8::IVV~I4I)1I-I

Question41.1JustifytheuseofSRSSforcombination ofSSPlandSSFOintheflu)tedCanditiane b)Providethefaultedal3,ozablo stressesforhalts.CompareTable3.9-5withtheloadingtablesofSectian3.8.3.Definet:hematerials forvhichalla~sbles aregiveninT'ablesofSection3.8.3.Resoonsea)Wherethefundamental frequency ofthepipingsystemisbeyondtheresonantretfonofthesupportlnS structu-.e thaSSEwillbccombinedfnt'efolloufnS manner:SSEA'K'~+SSEh Mherethepipingfundamental frequency isnotbeyondthestructural resonantregiontheSSEvillbecombinedinthefo11cn"bing manner:SSE=lSSEXt+ISSSDl>)Faultedallo~13.es forboltsateestablished as1.6XAXSl:allo>>wbles (noanal).HatcrfclA-925AISCAllowable TensileStress40KsiAllo@able tensilestressPorFaultedCondition 64Ksi,gOf.Ult93JZjte 53K(gll1lldie}61K(1l(818dias)Requirements forcomponent supports'axe addressed inSection3.8.3.Anyareasvheredisparity betvcenAXSCandAS>$supportrequirements issigniHcsnt villbeMsntified.

This~illbsperformed sotbatgoverning loadingcasesaddressorenvelopetheloadingcasesgiveninTable3.9-5.A11ovamestressesarebasedonSection1.5ofAISCvhichinturnarebasedonASTHmaterialvalues.AISCfactorsofsafetyvaryfrom1.67ta2.0onyieldstrength.

i,~edevelopment offactorsofsafetyisdocumented intheCmrmentary totheA'LSCCode; sl 420e3tLualification ofContro~lS stemsIEInformation Notice79-22Operating reactorlicensees wereinformedbyIEInformation Notice79-22,issuedSeptember 19,1979,thatcertainnon-safety gradeorcontrolequipment, ifsubjected totheadverseenvironment of.a~highenergylinebreak,couldimpactthesafetyanalysesandtheadequacyoftheprotection functions performed bythesafetygradeequipment.

Intheattachment tothisEnclosure thereisacopyofIEInformation Notice79-22,andreprinted copiesofanAugust30,1979Westinghouse letterandaSeptember 10,1979PublicServiceElectricandGasCompanyletterwhichaddresses thismatter.Operating Reactorlicensees conducted reviewstodetermine whethersuchproblemscouldexistatoperating facilities.

Weareconcerned'that asimilarpotential mayexistatlightwaterfacilities nowunderconstruction.

Youare,therefore, requested toperformareviewtodetermine what,ifany,designchangesoroperatoractionswouldbenecessary toassurethathighenergylinebreakswill.notcausecontrolsystemfailurestocomplicate theeventbeyondyourFSARanalysis.

Providetheresultsofyourreviewsincluding allidentified problemsandthemannerinwhichyouhaveresolvedthemtoNRPbyJuly6,1981.Thespecific"scenarios" discussed intheabovereferenced Westinghouse letteraretobeconsidered asexamplesofthekindsofinteractions whichmightoccur.Yourreviewshouldincludethosescenarios, whereapplicable, butshouldnotnecessarily belimitedtothem.Applicants withotherLHRdesignsshouldconsideranalogous inter-actionsasrelevanttotheirdesigns.Re~sense:Areviewofpotential controlsysteminteractions duringhighenergypipebreakshasbeenconducted forSt.LucieUnit2.ThereviewisbasedontheCombustion Engineering (C-E)genericrevieweffort.Thereviewconsidered boththespecificsystemslistedinIEInforma-tionNotice79-22andothernon-safety systemswhichcouldpossiblyinteractwithsafetygradesystems.

I, t.Ppciy.Unit2(Ihstrfment~atio ndontrolSays~krmnch+uestions)

Despitethelowprobability ofahighenergylinebreakagenericreviewhasbeenperformed ofthirteencontrolsystemsinvolving'four accidents scenarios whichencompass thespectrumofpostulated highenergybylinebreaks.Amatrixwasestablished ofthehighenergylinebreaksandcontrolfunctions (Attachment 1).Inthetimeavai'lable, thematrixwasreducedtoincludeonlythosesystemsandeventswhichrequir'efurtherevaluation.

Ageneraldescription oftheprocedure usedtoreducethismatrixislistedbelow:I.Aninitialreviewofeachpostulated ControlFunctionfailureforeachpipebreakwascompleted andservedasthebasisforconsideration.

Hhereapostulated failurecouldpotentially increasetheseverityofahighenergypipe,break,thefollowing criteriawereemployedtoresolvetheconcern:Isthepostulated ControlFunctionfailuremodecredible7 2.IstheControlFunctionEquipment (Sensor,Cable,etc.)qualified tooperateproperlyinthepostulated environ-ments3.Mherethepostulated ControlFunctionfailureiscredible, coulditsimpactpotentially affecttheconclusions pre-sentedintheSAR?Considerations such.asMaximumControlFunctioncapabilities, anddelayed,butproperoperatoractionwereemployedinthiseffort.Inseveralcases,mostnotiblythePORVfailureintheopenposition, nospecificfailuremechanism hasbeenidentified.

Theonlymannerforsuchafailuretooccurwouldbeforpo~ertobeinadvertently appliedtothevalvesolenoidandnotberemoved.Partoftheshorttermrecomendations istoevaluatewhetherornotafailuremechanism ofthistypeiscredible.

Thepotential adverseimpactofhighenergypipebreaksonreactorcoolantpumpswasconsidered.

Boththeseizedshaftandthesimultanteous threeorfourpump'lossoffIowweree1iminated fromconsTderat>on basedondudgement thatthesefailuresarenotcon-sideredcrediblewithinthetimeframelimitedbyoperatoraction'(30minutes)duetoenvironmental impactalone.Theimpactofotherpotential

'lossofflowevents(e.g.,oneortwopumplossofflow)during.highenergypipebreakswasreviewedanditwasjudgedthattheresulting rapidreactortripwassufficient toensurethattheconclusions oftheSARwouldnotchange.

0 ucigUnjt2(&54rGlne~~n ContAhysChmWrw5&~estions)

Attachment 2detailsspecificevent/interactions scenarios anddefinesspecificshorttermrecoranendations

~hichhavebeenestablished, on.agenericbasis,tominimizetheprobability andimpactofthepostulated events.Thisattachment alsodiscusses potential longtermalternatives whichhavebeenidentified onagenericbasis.TheresultsofareviewoftheC-Egenericevaluation appliedtotheSt.LucieUnit2designarealsoprovidedinAttachment 2.Theseresultsarediscussed afterthegenericshortandlongtermrecoomendations foreachpostulated eventaddressed.

8asedontheseresultstheitemsshownonthegenericmatrix(Attachment 1)havebeeneliminated.

Therefore nodesignchangesarenecessary toassurethathighenergylinebreaksdonotcausecontrolsystemfailurestocomplicate eventsbeyondtheFSARanalysisforSt.LucieUnit2.

CONTROLFUNCTIONS ANDEVENTSControlFunctions Considered Pressurizer LevelPressurizer PressurePowerOperatedReliefValves8BlockValves;ReliefandClosureReactorCoolantFlow(RCPs)RodPosition(RRS,CEINCS)BoronConcentration (BoronControlSystem)Feedwater Flow(FHRS)SteamFlowtoTurbine(TGCS)SteamBy-PasstoCondenser (SBCS)SteamDumpstoAtmosphere UpstreamofHSIVsSteamDumpstoAtmosphere Downstream ofHSIVsSteamGenerator Blowdown(SGBS)SafetyInjection TankDepressurization/Isolation Thelistedfunctions wereevaluated in'conjunction withthefollowing events:SmallSteamline RuptureInsideContainment SmallSteamline RuptureOutsideContainment LargeSteamline RuptureInsideContainment LargeSteamline RuptureOutsideContainment SmallFeedlineRuptureInsideContainment SmallFeedlineRuptureOutsideContainment LargeFeedlineRuptureInsideContainment LargeFeedlineRuptureOutsideContainment'mall LOCAInsideContainment SmallLOCAOutsideContainment LargeLOCARodEjectionICJUL24SN 00

~~'~~~~~I~~.~C~~~~C~~IsI~Ie~~~~o~~~~~~~

ATTACHMENT 2DESCRIPTIONS OFREMAINING EVENTSANDCONTROLFUNCTIONS I.Assessment ofControlSystemFailuresonSteamLineBreakEventgg~~~A.SequenceofEventsforGenericSARSteamLineBreakatFullPowerinsideorOutsideContainment Double-ended steamlinebreakoccurs2.Reactortriponlowsteamgenerator pressure3.HSISinitiates toisolatethesteamgenerators 4.RCStemperature decreases duetoexcessive steamremoval5.Totalreactivity increases duetomoderator cooldowneffect6.HSIVsclose7.Pressurizer empties8.Lowpressurizer pressureinitiates SIAS9.MFIYsclose10.Safetyinjection boronreachescore11.Affectedsteamgenerator empties,terminating cooldowneffect,thetransient reactivity reachespeakanddecreases gradually

'duetoboroninjection 12.*Limitedornopost-trip return-to-power 13.NofuelinDNBB.SteamLineBreakWithPORYControlSstemFailure1.Significant Interaction Effects:a.Increased Containment Pressureb.AstuckopenPORVincombination withasteamlinebreakhasnotbeenanalyzed.

2.Assumptions a.Steamlinebreak(largebreakinsidecontainment forItem1.Aabove,anysizeorlocationforItem1.Babove).b.Inadvertently PORVsopenandremainopenc.PORYBlockvalvealsofailstoclosewhenrequiredd.Initialcondition:

fullpower3.Itmustbeemphasized thatnomechanism hasbeenidentified forthePORVtoinadvertently openandremainopensinceitssignaltoopencomesfromsafetygradeequipment andtheGarrettvalvesandsolenoids arequalified foranenvironment inexcessof400'F.

4.SequenceofEvents5:;fa.Largesteamlinebreakoccursinsidecontainment.,

gg~~~b.Reactortripoccursonsteamgenerator lowpressurewithin$98i5seconds.c.Shouldtheadverseenvironment causethePORVto'nadvertently openandthenremainopen,thefollowing stepsmayalsooccur.Itshouldbenotedthatnomeachnism hasbeenidenti'fied whichwo'uldcausethistooccur.d.SteamfromPORVfillsquenchtankandburstsrupturediskreleasing steamtothecontainment andcuasingadditional containment pressurization.

e.MassremovalviaPORVcausesadditional voidformation withinthereactorcoolantsystem.5.Actionsa.Shortterm:l.Utilities continuetoinvestigate qualification levelsandlocationofpowercablestoPORYsandPORYblockvalvestoassesscredibility ofthisfailuremode..2.Ensureoper'ators takeactiontoshutPORVandPORVblockvalveifPORVfailsopen.b.Longterm:1.Completeassessment ofPORVsandblockvalves.Dependent ontheresultsofthatassessment a.upgradeenvironmental qualification levelofPORVsandblockvalves;orb.performdetailedanalysisofeventifrequired.

6.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2C-Ehasnotidentified afailuremechanism relativetothisconcern.Furthermore, thissystemprovidesinputtotheReactorProtective Systemand,assuch,issafety-grade andpost-LOCA qualified.

Medonotbelievethis itemisapplicable toSt.LucieUnit2.C.SteamLineBreakHithFeedwater FlowControlSstemFailure1;Significant Interaction Effectsa.Steamgenerator filling-causingpotential, pipingstructural problems2.Assumptions a.Smallsteamlinebreakinsidecontainment thatdoesnotcauseanirwediate reactortrip 0

b.Feedwater flowexceedssteamflowduetofailureofsteamgenerator levelinstrument, indicating flowc.SARconservatism Inooperatoractionwithin30minutes'.SequenceofEventsa.Smallsteamlinebreakoccurswhichdoes:notcauseaniomediate reactortrip5g~b.Steamgenerator levelinstrument fails,causinganincreaseoffeedwater f'lowinexcessofsteamflowc.Steamgenerator beginsCofillcausingincreased moisturecontentofsteamd.Ifnooperatoractionoccursundefined pipingstructural problemscouldresult.e.Itshouldbeemphasized thatthiseventcanbeprevented bypromptoperatoraction.Safetygradesteamgenerator levelinstrumentation exists,enablingcomparison withcontrolgradelevelinstruments ofthefeedsystem.4.Actiona.ShorttermEnsuretheoperatorisawareofthispotential, interaction

,.sothathemaytakepromptcorrective actionshouditoccurb.LongtermAssesstheneedofupgrading steamgenerator

'levelindi-cationtothefeedwater'control systemii.AssesstheneedtoinsCallasafetygradehighsteam,generator levelalarm5.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2Theconcerninthisareaassumesafailureinastea'mgenerator levelinstrumentcausing theFHRStosupplyfeedwater inexcessofsteamdemand,therebyfillingtheaffectedsteamgenerator potentially leadingtoexcessive moisturecarryover.

TheSt.LucieUnit2designincorporates adesignfeatureChatautomatically closesthefeedwater regulating valvesatthehighsteamgenerator levelandtripstheturbineandmainfeedwater pumpsatthehigh-high level.Theinstrumentation transmitting thesignalisafourchannelsystemwithportionsqualified towithstand theadverseenvironment.

Thoseportionsnotqualified willnotbeexposedtotheadverseenvironment.

Metherefore concludethatthisconcernisnotapplicable toSt.LucieUnit2.

flan-a, D.SteamLineBreakHithFailureofHainSteamPathsDownstream ofMSIV'sl.Significant Interaction Effects'INa.Increasepost-trip return-to-power 2.Assumptions a.Largesteamlinebreakinsidecontainment b.HSIVonunaffected steamgenerator failstoclose.Thissequenceofeventsispertinent onlyifthisassumption ismade.c.Downstream ofNSIV'smainsteampathsfailopend.Initialcondition:

fullpowere.SARconservatisms endofcyclecoreii.themostreactiveCEAstuckoutRL2<$81iii.steamblowdownthroughsteamlinebreakI3.Thenumberoffailureswhichmustoccurduringthiseventaresignificant.

Firsttheremustbethelargebreak.ThentheHSIVontheoppositesteamgenerator mustfailtoclose.Thereisastuckrodonreactortrip.Thensteampathsdownstream oftheHSIV'smustbeaffected.

Theseincludeturbinecontrolvalvesandsteamdumpandbypassvalves.Theprobability ofthiseventoccurring ismuchlessthan10-6perreactoryear.4.SequenceofEventsa.Largesteamlinebreakinsidecontainment b.Reactortriponlowsteamgenerator pressuretripsignalc.HSIVonunaffected steamgenerator failstocloseonHSISd.Hainsteampathsdownstream ofHSIVopenorfail,tocloseduetocontrolsystemmalfunction causedbyadverseenvironemnt following largesteamlinebreak.e.Openmainsteampathsincreasethesteamblowdownandincreasemoderator cooldowneffectwhichaddspositivereactivity tocore.Apost-trip return-to-power ismoresevereundertheseconditions.

0 5.Actionsa.,Shortterm'j~0<2<<g8)shouldasteamlinebreakoccur,ensureoperatortakesactiontoisolateallalternate steamflowpathsii.determine whetherthiseventwarrantsfurtherconsideration, inlightoflowprobability ofallconsequential failureswhichmustoccurfortheeventtobesignificant b.Longtermi.*utilities investigate environmental qualificatjonlevel ofthesystemsinvolvedii.upgradequalification levelofaffectedequipment ifthis'sdetermined tobenecessary 6.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2Thesystemswhichmustfailinordertoopenthemainsteampathdownstream oftheMSIVaretheturbinegenerator controlsystem(TGCS)andsteambypasscontrolsystem(SBCS).ReviewoftheSt.LucieUnit2designshowsthattheTGCSandSBCSwouldnotbeexposedtotheadverseenvironment.

However,theTaveinputtotheSBCS.generated bytheRRScouldgeexposedtotheaccidentenvironment.

TheTaveinputthough,isusedonlytoblockinitiation ofaquickopeningsignalandcannotcausetheSBCSvalvestoopen..Aquickopeningsignalwouldnotbegenerated duetothelowsteamflowandpressureinputstotheSBCSsothe'alves wouldremainclosed.l<etherefore concludethatthisisnotapplicable toSt.LucieUnit2.E.SteamLineBreakwithAtmos hericDumValveControlSstemFailure1.Significant Interaction r~a.Post-accident controlled cooldownh2.Assumptions a.Steam.linebreakoutsidecontainment andupstreamofHSIVb.Atmospheric dumpvalvesonoppositesteamlineopenandremainopen*,c.SARconservatism nooperatoractionwithin30minutes3.SequenceofEventsa.Asteamlinebreakoutsideofcontainment butupstreamoftheNSIVoccurs*Thefailuremechanism identified fsafa'i,lure oftheinputsignalsthatwouldcausethevalvetoopenifoperating intheautomatic mode.Althoughnooperatoractionisassumedfor30minutespromptoperatoractiontoshuttheopenvalvewouldmitigateanyeffectsofthisevent.

b.Reactortriponlowsteamgenerator pressurec.Atmospheric dumpvalvesupstreamofHSIV'sopenandremainopenduetocontrolsystemfailurep'2joperateatmospheric dumpvalvesinmanualde,or4.Actionsa.Shorttermd.'Ifnooperatoractiontakesplacetherewouldbe,thepotential fordry-outanddepressurization ofbothsteamgenerators e.Failuretoshutatmospheric dumpvalvescouldinhibitacontrolled plantcooldownbylimitingtheabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedpumpstodelivertothesteam'generator(s)

~Qensureoperatorshutsatmospheric dumpvalvesonsteam'iineuntilcontrolisassuredJUL2<~98b.Longtermi.Continueinvestigation

.todetermine ifthisfailuremechanism isplausible Iupgradeatmospheric dumpvalvecontrolsystemtowith-standtheadverseenvironment, ifrequired8~>>'<Appal>

~valuation forSt.LucieUnit2i'0sp~&/Aevi'~~~gy

~~Ac,<j.p~~~~g heatmospheric dumpvalvesarelocatedupstreamof,themainsteamisolation valvesatSt.LucieUnit2,andthepostulated failureinthisareawouldbeavalidconcernwerethesystemtobeintheautomatic modeduringpoweroperations.

However,"*~consistent withtheanlaysesintheFSAR,thissystemismaintained inthemanualmodeduringnormaloperationsA Mebelievethismethodofoperation adequately addresses any'oncern inthisarea.'I.Assessment ofImactofControlSstemFailuresonFeedLineBreakEventand~EAA.SARFeedLineBreakr1.SequenceofEventsa.f4infeedlinebreakoccursdownstream ofreverseflowcheckvalve,discharging mainfeedandsteamgenerator fluidb.RCSheatupduetolossofsubcooled feedflowc;Reactortripoccursonsteamgenerator lowwaterlevelorhighpressurizer pressure.

Turbinetripoccursonreactortrip.

'0 d.RapidRCSheatupandpressurization duetolossofheattransferastherupturedsteamgenerator emptiesIe.Depressurization oftherupturedsteam'enerator initiates HSISandisolatestheintactgenerator f.RCSpressurization terminates withopeningofpr'imaryrelief/safetyvalvesanddecreasing coreheatfluxg.RCScooldownbegins,'ontrolled bythemainsteamsafetyvalvesh.Auxiliary feedisinitiated automatically orbyoperatoraction8.FeedLineBreakWithRCSInventorControlFailure1.Significant Interaction Effect.a.Increased RCSpressurization duetoliquidfilledpressurizer 2.Assumptions a.Smallfeedlinebreakinsidecontainment b.Adverseenvironment, impactspressurizer levelinstrument causingindication tofaillowwhichcausesthecontrolsystemtoincreaseinventory (andpressurizer level)c.Initialconditions 102Ãpowersteambypasscontrolsysteminmanualmodebeginning-of-cycle coreparameters d.Analysisconserva'tisms nooperatoractionforat1east30minutesii.nocreditforsteamgenerator lowwaterleveltripinrupturedunituntilemptyiii.heattransferinrupturedsteamgenerator instantaneously terminated onemptyingiv.failureofthefeedlinereverseflowcheckvalve,ifggp~48~thebreakoccursupstreamofthevalveIq

s'$~ting3.SequenceofEventsa.Feedlinebreakincontainment b.Hainfeedspillsfrombreakc.Adversecontainment environment causespressurizer level'indication tofaillowcausingRCSinventory toincrease(d."Reactortripoccursonsteamgenerator lowwaterlevelonhighpressurizer pressure.

Turbinetripsonreactortripe.RCSheatupresultsfromrapiddecreasein,SGheattransferduetolossoffluidfromtherupturedsteamgenerator f.Pressurize reliefand/orsafetyvalvesopeng.Potential forpressurizer tofillwithliquidexistsduetohighlevelinpressurizer priortoheatup.Relief/safetyvalvereliefcapacityreducedbyliquiddischarge h.Extentofincreased RCSpressurization isdependent ontimeofpressurizer fillingrelativetotherapidheatup4.Actionsa..Shortterm'lertoperatortothispotential failuremode,sothatpromptcorrective actioncanbetakenb.LongtermPerformplantspecificanalysestodetermine upperlimitallowable forpressurizer levelwhichisconsistent withthemaximumrateoflevelincreaseandthemaximumRCSexpansion duringthepotentially

.rapidheatupassociated withfeedlinebreaksupgradepressurizer levelinstrumentation 5.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2TheC-Econcernpostulates thefailureofapressurizer levelinstrument inthecontrolsystem,which.intheabsenceofoperatoraction,causesthepressurizer tofill,therebyallowingthereactorcoolantsystemtogosolid.Asdiscussed inourresponsetoIEBulletin79-01,thelevelinstruments arepost-LOCA qualified.

Wetherefore donotbelievethereisaconcerninthisarea.

C

'blC.FeedLineBreaklilithPORYControlFailureSignificant Interaction Effectsa.AfailedopenPORII'incombination withafeedlinebreakhasnotbeenanalyzed2.Assumptions n.Feedlinebreakinidecontainment b.PORV's.inadvertently openandremainopenc.PORVblockvalvealsofailstoclosewhenrequiredd.Rooperatoractionuntil20minutes3.PORYwouldnotbeexpectedtoremainopenduetoactuation malfunction sinceGarrettvalvesandsolenoids arequalified

'ortemperatures.

inexcessof400'F4.SequenceofEventsia.Feedlinebreakoccursinsidecontainment b.Steamgenerator fluidand/ormainfeedspillfrombreakc;RCSheatupandpressurization resultsfromlossoffeedflowd.PORVopensonhighpressureandfailstorecloseduetoadverseenvironment e.Reactortripoccursonhighpressurize pressure.

Turbinetripsonreactortripf.RCSdepressurization occursifPORY'sfailtorecloseg.HassremovalviaPORYcausesvoidformation withinRCSh.Feedlinebreakincombination withafailedopenPORVhasnotbeenanalyzed5.Actionsa.Shorttermutilities investigate.

qualification levelandlocationof.powercablestoPORV'sandPORVblockvalvestoassesscredibility ofthisfailuremodeensureoperators takeactionstoshutPORV'sandPORVblockvalves,shouldthisfailureoccur

b.LongtermCompleteassessment ofPORV'sandblockvalves.Dependent onresultsofthatassessment

.A.upgradeenvironmental qualification levelofPORV'sandblockvalves,orB.performdetailedanalysisofevent,ifrequired6.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2C-Ehasnotidentified afailuremechanism relativetothisconcern.Furthermore, thissystemprovidesinputtotheReactorProtective Systemand,assuch,issafety-grade andpost-LOCA qualified.

Wedonotbelievethisitemisapplicable toSt.LucieUnit2.D.FeedLineBreakWithFeedwater ControlFailure1.Significant Interaction Effectsa.Overfilling ofthesteamgenerator(s) causingpotential structural problems2.'Assumptions a.Smallfeedlinebreakinsidecontainment b.Feedcontrolinautomatic modec.Adverseenvironment causessteamgenerator levelindica-tiontofaillowwhichcausesthefeedcontrolsystemtoincreasefeedflowabovethesteamflowd.No'operator actionfor30minutes3.SequenceofEventsa.Asmallfeedlinebreakoccursinsidecontainment b.'ainfeedspillsfrombreakc.Steamgenerator levelinstrument failsindicating lowandcausesincreased feedflowinexcessofsteamflowd;Steamgenerator beginstofillcausingincreased moisturecontentofsteame.Ifnooperatoractionoccursundefined structural problemscouldresult 0th pgf.Itshouldbeemphasized thatthisevenCtl~.~nbypromptoperatoraction.Safetygradelevelinstru-mentation existstocompare'to controlgradeinstruments.

Thefeedsystemcanthenbecontrolled manually4.Actionsa.ShorttermueL24Ig~ensuretheoperatorisawareofthepotential failuremodesothehemaytakepromptcorrective action,shoulditoccurassesstheneedtoinstallsafetygradehighsteamgenerator levelalarm5.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2hTheconcerninthisareaassumesafailureinasteamgenerator levelinstrument causingtheFWRStosupplyfeedwater inexcessofsteamdemand,therebyfil'lingtheaffectedsteamgenerator potentially leadingtoexcessive moisturecarryover.

TheSt.LucieUnit2designincorporates asafetygradedesignfeaturethatautomatically closesthefeedwater regulating valvesatthehighsteamgenerator levelandtripstheturbine'andmainfeedwater pumpsatthehigh-high level.Theinstrumenta-tiontransmitting thesignalisafourchannelsystemwithportionsqualified towithstand theadverseevnironment.

Thoseportionsnotqualified willnotbeexposedtotheadverseenvironment.

Hetherefore concludethatthisconcernisnotapplicable toSt.LucieUnit2.E.FeedlirieBreakHithAtmospheric SteamDumpControlFailure1.Significant Interaction Effectsa.Controlled plantcooldown2.Assumptions a.Feed'linebreakoutsidecontainment anddownstream ofreverseflowcheckvalveb.Adverseenvironment impactstheatmospheric steamdumpcontrolonunaffected steamgenerator causinganun-controlled steamreleaseupstreamoftheHSIV'sc.Nooperatoractionuntil30minutes**Thefailuremechanism identified isafailureoftheinputsignalsthatwouldcausethevalvetoopenifoperating intheautomatic

'ode.Althoughnooperatoractionisassumedfor30minutes,prompt.-operatoractiontoshuttheopenvalvewouldmitigateanyeffectsofthisevent.

2p~$3.SequenceofEventst.a.Feedlinebreakoccursoutsidecontainment downstream ofcheckvalveb.Steamgenerator fluidand/ormainfeedspill:frombreakc.Reactortripoccursonsteamgenerator lowwaterlevelorhighpressurizer pressure.

Turbinetripoccursonreactortrip~+><<ss<d.Steamgenerator pressureincreases following turbinetripe.Environment couldcauseatmospheric dumpvalvesupstreamofNSIVinunaffected steamgenerator toopenandremainopenf.Ifnooperatoractiontakesplacetherewouldbeapotential fordryoutanddepressruization ofbothsteamgenerators 9.Depressurization ofbothsteamgenerators maylimittheabilityoftheauxilairy feedpumpstadelivertothesteamgenerator(s) 4.Actionsta.Shorttermoperateatmospheric steamdumpvalvesinthemanualmode.'orensurethattheoperatorisawareofthispotential

'interaction sothatpromptcorrective actioncanbetakenb.Longtermcontinueinvestigation tode'termine ifthisfailuremechanism isplausible upgradeatmospheric dumpvalvecontrolsstemenvirmentalqualification ifrequired:,

.'~>~~c"l~5.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2~P'."+.4"<~"'~r/'Theatmospheric dumpvalvesarelocatedjYsS;rehN othemain.steamisolation valvesatSt.LucieUnit2,andthepostulate

'.failureinthisareawouldbeavalidconcernwerethesystemtobeintheautomatic modeduringpoweroperations.

However,consistent withtheanalysesintheFSAR,thissystemismaintained inthemanualmodeduringnormaloperations.

Webelievethis-method ofoperation adequately addresses anconcerninthisarea.

jap~~I!IPttFfftfRR~ltSt~0iHih~EBreakEventsPiesc.Adverseenvironment resultsinalowindicated powerlevelfromtheex-coresensorinputtotheReactorRegulating SystemcausingCEAstobewithdrawn 3.Sequenceofeventsa.Highenergypipebreakinsidecontainment ofasmallenoughsizewhereinwiediate reactortripdoesnotoccurb.Controlgradeex-coresensorindication fails'lowduetoadverseenvironmental

.impactc.Reactorregulating systemcausesCEAstobewithdrawn d.Reactorpowerexceedsthepowerpreviously assumedduringthetransient e.Reactortripoccursduetohighenergypipebreakatconditions notconsidered inpresentanalyses4.Actionsa.ShorttermA.CEApositionmalfunctions dueto.steamandfeedlinebreaksandCEAejectionJOt.2)@8)1.Significant interaction effect:a.Potentially higherreactorpowerlevelspriortoreactortripthanpresently analyzed2.Assumptions a.Smallhighenergypipebreakinsidecontainment b.Reactorregulating systeminautomatic modeplacethecontrolelementdrivesysteminmanualii.Modifyemergency procedures tostatethattheoperatorshouldnottakeanycontrolactionbaseduponreactorpowerasmeasuredbythecontrolgradeex-coredetectors duringhighenergypipebreaksb.Longtermf.-evaluate theconsequences oFsmallhighenergypipebreaksincontainment withCEAwithdrawl, ifrequiredifrequired, upgradetheenvironmental qualification levelofthecontrolgradeexcoredetectorsystem

6.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit29dgTheC-Econcernregardingcontrolrodwithdrawal withtheReactorRegulating System(RRS)inautomatic controlisconsidered valid.However,consistent withtheanalysesintheFSAR,tAs-syst~~~nta.ized-in-the-manual-mode during-normalmperaiions.

Nebelievethismethodofopera-tionadequately addresses anyconcerninthisarea.Qe~~3(cyoJu)if(drawJ.+A'~oft><<~"~'6f$aS(~~Lyc6'scencosyI4u<7es<~~4cvtt,d'ya~M s~<(~M<<<~~+C~~~.<~~'~~@<..4~'v<<-<->>7

~"<'~~g,(g~I-Selec,4~),

((.g 8.SmallBreakLOCAMithCEAControlSystemHalfunctio f,IJ(f\~1.Significarit interaction effects>PL,"y"4(98]a.Potential existsforincreasing power.Thiswouldcausepressuretoremainabovelowpressurizer pressuretripforalonger'period thanpreviously assumed2.Assumptions a.SmallbreakLOCAinsidecontainment b.CEAcontrolsysteminautomatic modec.Adverseenvironment impactsCEAcontrolsystemorrelatedsensorsresulting inconsequential failure.d.ControlsystemcausesCEAtowithdrawe.StandardLOCAlicensing assumptions 3.Sequenceofeventsa.SmallbreakLOCAoccursinsidecontainment b.CEAcontrolsysteminautomatic modec.Adverseenvironment causedby.rupturepotentially causesexcorepowerindication toindicatelowpowerleveld.SliouldCEAsbegintowithdraw, themagnitude oftheover--powerexcursion priortoscramwouldbeincreased.

ThiscouldproduceahigherprimarysystempressurewhichcouldthendelayreactortripandSIASandresultinhigher-peakcladtemperature 4.Action,,a.ShorttermPlacethecontrolelementdrivesysteminmanualModifyemergency procedures tostatethattheoperatorshouldnottakeanycontrolactionbaseduponreactorpowerasmeasuredbythecontrolgradeexcoredetectors duringaLOCA.b.LongtermEvaluatetheconsequences ofasmallbreakLOCAwithCEAwithdrawal, andifrequiredupgradetheenvironmental qualification levelofthecontrolgradeexcoreinstrumentation

tss5.Evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2/PITheC-Econcernregarding controlrodwithdrawal withthe~84Q0~ReactorRegulating System(RRS)inautomatic controlisconsidered valid.However,consistent withtheanalysesintheFSAR,thH-system-is-mHntainedN~~anuaMed~uring

..normal-,operations.

Hebelievethismethodofoperation adequate1y addresses anyconcerninthisarea.',~~c.we/~>d<<~gyLNRS~si'.SmallBreakLOCAwithSITIsolation Yialfunction

$A1.Significant interaction effectsW~'-'~0<,Ž~g~aas+-t'DklYD4JDsa.Potential existsforinjection ofnon-condensible gas'ntotheRCS.Thiscouldcauseproblemswithnaturalcirculation andheattransferinthesteamgenerators shouldthegascollectthere.~--p,-'zz7F44<'edgesd.NIQd2.Assumptions a.SmallbreakLOCAinsidecontainment b.Adverseenvironment impactssafetyinjection tank(s)isolation resulting inconsequential failure.c.Operatorcannotisolatethesafetyinjection tank(s)d.StandardLOCAlicensing assumptions 3.Sequenceofeventsa.SmallbreakLOCAoccursinsidecontainment b.Adverseenvironment causedbyrupturedisablesSITisolation mechanism c.OperatorisunabletoisolatetheSIT(s)andnon-condensible gas(nitrogen covergas)enterstheRCS.Ad.Possibility existsfordegradednaturalcirculation flowand/orbuildupofgasesinthesteamgenerators causingheatupofRCS.'4.Action.a.,ShorttermInstructoperatorthatthepossibility ofgasformation existsifSITsarenotisolated.

IdentifydrainlinesthatcouldbeusedtodraintheSITsandtheirqualification levels b.LongtermEvaluateoptionsforproviding anothermeansofise1ating theSITsandrevisethedesignasnecessargPL P4I@5.Evaluation forSt.Lucie2Thevalvesandinstrumentation andcontrolsystemsareenvironmentally qualified towithstand theadverseenvironment.

Backupmeans'arealsoavailable tode-.pressurize theSITsandtherebypreventnon-condensible gasesfromenteringtheRCS.

.

420.4ControlSystemFaflursTheanalysesrapor;ad'fn Chapter15oftheFSARarfntendedtcdemons.ratetheacauacyGsaaiysystemsinmiigatingan"ici."ated Operational occurrences andaccicents.

BoshCongressandACRSnaveraisedaaissuefnhisarea.Ccmmissicner Ahear.".e hasrasgoncad toCongressregardngthisissue(~=ertcattacho~nt tcthisenclosure) andpartofhisresponsereferredtocontrolsys-;amrevieus:obeperi'armed inconnections eithOLlicensing.

irisedontheconserjative assumptions madeindei'icing theseChapter16desfgn-basis eventsandthedetailedreviewoftheanalysesbythestaff,ftislikelythattheyadequately boundtheconsequences of'Sfnglecontrolsystemfailures.

'Yeprovideassuranco thatthedesignbasfs~antanalysesadequately--

boundothermorefundarrental crediblefailuresyouararequested topMYfdethe.following information:

(1)Identifythosecontrolsystemswhosefailureormalfunction couldseriously impactplantsafe~.(2}Indfcatwhich,ffany,of~controlsystemsfdenstiffed fn(1)lacefvepouerfromcommonpowersourcs.Thepowersourceconsidered shouldfnc'.ucaallpouersourcesunosafailurormalfunction couldlea'dofailureormalfurc.icn of;orethanonecontrolsystemandshculdextendto"heefactsofcascading powerlossesduetcthefailureofhigherlevel',dfstrfbution panelsandloadcnters.~a3).Tndfcatawhich,ffany,ofthecontrolsys.msidentified fn.0)-receive;.input signalsfromcoamonsensors.Tnesensorsconsidered shouldinclude,butshouldnotnessrilybelimitedto,cca-.,cnnydraulic headerscrimpul.salinesfeedingpressure, tamper@tora, levelorothersignalstotwoormore.controlsystms.-(4)Providefust'ffcatfcn thatanysimultaneous mal,unctions ofthecontrolsystemsunidntifiedin(2)and(3)resulting fromfailuresor7al.unc.fons oftheapplicable ccr;...on pcwersourceorsensorare"oundaabyheanalysesinChaptarl~and>Auldnotrequireac-ionorrsponsabeycnd.hecapability ofoperators orsafetysys.ms,s.

~Resonse:.(1)Thecontrolsystemswhosefailureormalfunctionmayimpactplant,safety'areshownbelow:FEElNATER REGULATIHG SYSTEMTURBINE-GENERATOR CONTROLSYSTEMSTEAMBYPASSCONTROLSYSTEMADVCONTROLSYSTEf1BORONCONTROLSYSTEM'IREACTORREGULATING SYSTEf1CONTROLELEMENTDRIVEMECHAHISf4 CONTROLPRESSURIZER PRESSURECONTROLSYSTEMPRESSURIZER LEVELCONTROLSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTPUMPSPOWEROPERATEDRELIEFVALVESSTEAMGENERATOR BLOMDOHNSYSTEM(2)E(4)Thecontrolsystemsidentified in(1)that,receivepowerfromcommonpowersourcesareidentified below.Theeffectoflosingthepowersourcesandanevaluation ofplantresponsearealsoprovided.

Theresultsofthisevaluation providejustification

~thatanysimultaneous malfunctions ofcontrolsystemsidentified herein,resulting fromcowmenpowersupplymalfunctions areboundedbytheanalysisofChapter15andwouldnotrequireactionorresponsebeyondthecapability ofoperators orsafetysystems.

420.4(2)II(4)ImactofLossofCornnonPowerSourcesLossof120VACfromPowerPanel220I,Thispowerlosswillimpactthepressurizer:level controlsystem(PLCS),thepressurizer pressurecontrolsystem(PPCS),thereactorregulating system(RRS),theboroncontrolsystem(BC6),andthesteambypasscontrolsystem(SBCS).Specifically, thePLCSwilllosecontrolpower,assumingtPeselectorswitchisonthatchannel(itwillbeunaffected ifontheotherchannel).

Theletdowncontrolvalvewillgotoitsfailclosedpositionaridthechargiogpumpswillremainpowered,andavailable formanualcontrol.ThePPCSwilllosecontrolpower,assumingtheselectorswitchisonthatchannel.Thepressurizer sprayvalvewillgotoitsfailclosedpositionandthepressurizer heaterswillremainpoweredandavailable formanualcontrol.Addition-,

allythelow-lowlevelautomatic cut-offofthepressurizer heaterswilllosecontrolpower.TheRRSwilllosepowerassumingtheselectorswitchisonthatchannel(it.will.beunaffected ifontheotherchannel).

Thecontrolelementassemblies willremainintheirpositionpriortothepowerloss.TheBCS.willnotcompletely belost.Thereactormakeupwaterflowcontroller

)silllosepowerwiththeboricacidflowcontroller unaffected.

Theletdownlinewillbeaffectedwiththetemperature elementsfortheregenerative andletdownheatexchangers losingpower,.howevertheletdownlinewillbeiso-latedbytheletdowncontrolvalvesmentioned previously.

TheSBCSwillnotreceiveaTy.veinputfromtheRRSwhichmaycausetheturbinebypassvalvestoremainclosed.Secondary pressurereliefandRCSheatremovalcontrolcanbeaccomplished throughthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandatmospheric dumpvalves.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

ThelossofthePLCS,PPCS,RRS,BCS,andSBCSduetolossof'20VACfrompowerpanel220'willnotseriously impactplantsafety.Thereactorcouldfunctionforatimewithoutoperatoractionbeforeareactortripwouldresult(mostlikelyonhighpressurizer pressure).

Theoperatorcanchoosetoselectthe N

otherchannelforcorrectoperation ofthePLCS,PPCS,andRRS.Howevermnualcontrolofthechargingpumps,pressurizer heaters,auxiliary sprays,andturbinebypassvalvesisavailable.

Theoperatorwillstillhavecontroloftheboricacidflowtothechargingpumpsandhecanchoosetoaligntherefueling watertanktochargingifnecessary.

.IQg~/yg~'~gi'6VCStnC/+un@'QB/}

BÃCcS'JinSec'.6+nr~.J-.z.2Joe.nels'/x Jccn~~'+~//~++<46Pn/'s,~.P.2c2$$cc~egAlga~&44~Pcpgcu/A/~oaqIsJra.+4,nipi~*r~~/e~v'~ps4e~gHz)~sots+preckg/arenn,4g4f'<~ssccr oui-~c:dc/><+varipr+re~g/+qi"ear.$r6ij0+<~j4~id~

Lossof120VACfromPowerPanel221Thispowerlosswillimpactthepre~wurizer levelcontrolsystem(PLCS).thepressurizer pressurecontrolsystem,(PPCS) andthereactorregulating system(RRS)',theboroncontrolsystem(BCS),andthesteanbypasscontrolsystem(SBCS).Specifically, thesameimpactaswiththelossof120VACfrompowerpanel220willoccurwiththefollowing exceptions:

Thereactormakeupwaterflowcontrolwillremainpowered,howevertheboricacidflowcontroller willlosepower.Additionally thetemperature elementontheletdownheatexchanger controlling thecomponent coolingwatercontrolvalvewilllosepower.ThevolumecontroltanklevelinputstotheBCSwilllosepower.Alsothestationalarms(annunciators) willtransferto125YDCpower.Evaluation'of PlantResponseTherewillbenoseriousimpacttoplantsafetyfortheeventpresented above.Intheabsence'ofoperatoractionthereactorwouldeventually trip(onhighpressurizer pressure).

However.,

theOperatorwouldbealertedtosuchaneventduetoincorrect pressurizer pressurelevelindications inthecontrolroom.Hemaychoosetoswitchtheredundant channelforcorrectoperation ofthePLCS,PPCSandRRS.However,manualcontrolofthechargingpumps,pressurizer heaters,andauxiliary spraysisavailable.,

Theoperatorcanalsobypasstheboricacidflowcontroller andprovideboratedwaterdirectlytothecharginpumpsoraignterefueling watertank.7"~Ad4<l4<<~sfolP>lS~t.ownoeo/~an~(8~@~plj+.3/i>-ge4gqrQ,Lossof480V]CC2A6non-essential ortionTheimpactoflosingthismotorcontrolcenter(MCC)issimilartothelossof120VACfrompowerpanel220,sincepowerpanel220receivespowerfromthisHCC.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

Theplantresponseforlossofpowerpanel.220 (120VAC)applies.

Lossof480YtiCC286non-essential ortionTheimpactoflosingthisHCCissimilartothelossof120YACfrompowerpanel221,sincepowerpanel221receivesitspowerfromthisHCC.Cvaluation ofPlantResponse:

'heplantresponseforlossofpowerpanel221(12CVAC)applies.Lossof120VACVITALPANEL2A1hislossofpowerwillimpactthefeedwater regul<lting system(FHRS),steambypasscontrolsystem(SBCS)andtheturbinegenerator controlsystem(TGCS).Specifically, intheFWRScontrolpowertooneregulating valveandbypassvalvewillbelost.Additionally, mainsteamflowinputtotheSBCSfromtheFMRSisnottransmitted fromonechannel.Theturbinerunbackmechanism willbewithoutpower.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

Thefeedwater regulating systemwillstillcontroloneregulating

'ndbypassvalve.Thelossoftheturbinerunbackfunctionisbackedvpbyinstr~mentation on120VACvitalPanel2Bwhichwillrunbacktheturbineinrespo'nse tothedecreased feedwater flow.Shouldtherunbacknotoperateproperly, areactortripmayresultonlowsteamgenerator pressure.

Manualoperation oftheatmospheric dumpvalvesandauxiliary feedwater isavailable.

ShouldtheSBCSoperateproperlyorreactortripnotoccurtheplantwouldstabilize atadecreased powercondition.

8CLSb/aj60g 0F~4<5ihN+4~7I4SCCQOQ+,Q,/Q8O4chOXKisC'~e~c~1'O.f4a~alys.~inSecAo.e:gy.gass~~ciI+ibine+Ip4lln~cJ<y0r~~pSsG4of$z,g@~f~~+r~~i'>s'~<%net+64snueriJ'+6rafeardZ~p~~g6~nygnsgr~su/$igpy/-cd'/Prmy~@5gpondy'~w4Ar4<<c',~JAlqg~A.iydcACSyes~c.7&inp/toc~dr'p,)4r A'~~~s/e~~gp~ss8cohoa~s'd'r'w>~hilda>"wP'</o~ica/Pons'cgu<~<<445cgnnri'grAsso/lQ8v'Acpl7glpqg~Z.g8chic.snoreSI~~ha.pPep~46OncFV/V&CPe~6

120VACVitalPanel2BThislossofpowerwillimpactthefeedwater regulating system(FHRS),steambypasscontrolsystem(SBCS),andtheturbinegenerator controlsystem(TGCS).'pecifically, intheFNRScontrolpowertooneregulating valveandonebypassvalvewillbelost.Additionally, controloftheSBCSwouldbelost.TheTGCSwouldremainfunctional, butwouldsufferalossofthebackuptotheturbinerunbackfunction.

Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

TheFMRS.willstillcontroloneregulating andonebypassassvalve.TheSBCSwillbewithoutcontrolpowetandtheturbinewouldrunbackinresponsetodecreased feedwater flow.Shoulditnotrunbackareactortripmayresultonlowsteamgenerator pressure.

re.Theauxiliary feedwater andatmospheric dumpvalvesareavailable forRCSheatremoval.Shouldareactortripnotbegenerated anewsteyadstateatadecreased power4(Pc/c4(cth.~i&t4+PspsC/~v/f4levelwouldoccur.7~eoac.l~>'c~-38')4I)&Wjsscgna~s5~Lossof120VACVitalPanels2Aand28ThispowerlosswillimpacttheRIRS,SBCS,and.pTGCS.Secifically, feedwater andsteambypasscontrolwouldbelostandtheturbinerunbackmechanism wouldlosepower.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

,Areactortripon'lowsteamgenerator levelwillresult.Automatic actuation ofauxiliary feedwater andopeningofthemainsteamsafetyvalveswillrel:ievesecondary systempressure.

Theatmphatmoshericdumpvalvesand'auxi18ary feedwater willbeusedtocontrolRCSheatremoval.Lossof125VOC.Bus2ABThispowerlosswillimpac~elltheRRS,thePPCSandtheTGCS.Specifically, controloftheRRSandPPCS,bothchannels, wouldbedisabled.

Theturbinetripsolenoids andgenerator underfrequen yclockoutrelayswouldbedisabled.

Theturbinetripsolenoids andgenerator underfrequency lockoutrelayswouldbewithoutpower{f{failedclosed)~ance/gis/'Fw/onlOs'rnulf0ace.(emn&e/4<4~4'8.3fyOSS4'tn8ocJzTnis5ccna~l~.nnulpsis<<&cd+~/~2.4E~ssum4'c/ogr/l~~J'*v~'/~4%AoF'MA~4.ne&.'p.4l~4~rrCJCC>>dg+4Hd.yg/'-cAwf~~io(dg/c~l(n>>w<gm~cwg.F'4>>4~I~~W

VUIEvaluation ofPlantResponse:

TheCEAswouldremaininthepositiontheywere-inbeforethepowerlossandcouldbecontrolled throughtheCEDHCSbytheoperator.

l(ithoutthePPCS,pressurecontrolwouldbemaintained bymanualcontrolofthechargingpumpsandletdownandaU.xiliary spray.Shouldareactortripresult,theturbinewouldnottripelectrically butwouldbetrippedautomatically onamechanical overspeed trip.Ifrequiredthemainsteamisolation valveswouldcloseisolating theturbineandmaintaining RCSheatremovalfunctions.

9T4II/esso+~F&gkeQo~~"~~)'-~(~sp~4enp.3,Q.Q/pcs>,d5ggsca~r~8../Q/p.>5j~p/4Ac'Pks~4+~>+~c~l'~~+~'opspos~I"cS4r~o(~~Vg/o~~n4~isor~!~~y'pj'c5pgcgs8C5P'gyqkgc'J/I/cia'*np

/deolo)Ic)bCrCrV~e,L~as~>prggAC/Y,S/$~~~~NA/pe4,4,oAPrA~~~<Ca.

.84.ImactofFailureinComnonSensorsThecontrolsystemsidentified in(1)thatreceiveinputsignalsfromcommonsensorsareidentified below.Oescriptions of,theeffectofthemalfunctions onthecontrolsystemsandanevaluation ofplantresponseandbackupsystemavailability arealsoprovided.

Prudentengineering judgmentbasedonknowledge ofsystemdesignandtransient analysiswasusedtodevelop'thesedescriptions.

Theresultsofthisevaluation providejustification thatanysimultaneous malfunctions ofcontrolsystemsidentified herein;resulting fromcommonsensormalfunctions areboundedbytheanalysesofChapter15andwouldnotrequireactionorresponsebeyondthecapability ofoperators orsafetysystems.ftalfunction ofPressurizer PressureSinalfailslowtotheRRSandPPCSIf.malfunction causesalowpressurizer pressursignaltobe,trans-@])mitted,thepressurizer heaterswouldturnon~hepressurizer sprayswouldshutoff+an4-0 h~11,apgi~W~+~Evaluation ofPlangresponse:

dSyydunkr'h~rdh.;~AT>4all~iThereactoruouid]tnP onhighpressurizer pressure/

tt1tdd-dttt1manuallyandcontrolpressurewiththechargingandletdownsystems.andauxiliary sprays.Shouldthereactornottrip,becausetheappropriate tripsetpoints werenotreachedbytheaffectedparameters

~(pressure andpower),anewsteadystatewouldbereached.Operator,actioncouldmaintainpoweroperation untilthesensorcouldberepairedq~LpAg'Csonario~~c~Ipp4agafpsrsgg~$prgre,gdl,pGLjhu'4c~rpDcw7P~S/rdr'd 4r.rPrgz/ae~pryrrrrtISdtrli5~Drrss~r.A'>fgzbe~c~awrJr,~dsl~D@Sr'gee4'rSk5rrhr4+rart

,t'q~Qtl~0Malfunction ofPressurizer PressureSinalfailshihtotheRRSandPPCSIfthemalfunction causesahighpressurizer signaltobetransmitted, thepressurizer sprayswouldcomeonandthepressurizer heaterswouldbede-energized.

TheRRSwouldadjusttherodsinresponsetothehighpressuresignaltherebydecreasing reactorpower..fEvaluation ofPlantResponse:

+~@,~<4"g+

6'1stThereactorwouldtriponAloupressurizer

pressure, andaSIASmayresult.Theoperatorcouldclosethesprayvalvesandusethechargingandletdownsystemsandauxiliary spraytocontrolpressure.

Shouldthereactornottripduetoaffectedparameters notreachingthetripsetpoints, anewsteadystatewouldbereached.Operatoractioncouldmaintainpoweroperation untilthesensorcouldberepaved.Malfunction ofPressurizer LevelSinalfailslowtothePLCSandPPCSIfmalfunction causesalowpressurizer levelsignaltobetransmitted, thechargingflowwouldincreaseandletdownflowwoulddecrease.

Thepressurizer heaterswouldbede-energized ifalowenoughsignalwastransmitted.'valuation ofPlantResponse:

Increasing prasurizrlevelwouldbeidentified bytheoperatoronCf.~C@ffleveliud~cetic Cn)alarminthecontrolroom.Iianuaicontrolofthechargingandletdownsystemscouldpreventtheoverfilling ofthepressurizer a}}dprecludeareactortriponhighpressurizer pressure.

y~'gz~~>+>~boun)edQqP~eP'em/4lorylhyeve~legyp/r'ri2giMalfunction ofPressurizer LevelSinalfailshihtothePLCSandPPCSI'fmalfunction causesahighpressurizer levelsignaltobetransmitted, thechargingflowwoulddecreaseandletdownincrease.

N'~lf"p~r/g(f4gg+r+/p0A/ocJ/~4ri3<r'rt'sSore~cJo~(gpneYi.n7y4('~ih~,A~~8A~z-.yA~~g~~/Wc,~o~~noWr~(pJygs>+QRl'ps'gy

('gAp(/j4t)Chic/+/Cw'I/.4/4/Is4>1anyplIn<ergzysgk~7(<ig~cn~/pxrJ'FWb/oej4.pc6~'lIcil41<>/+C'nSechCnrE.4.g.(goanJJ4a~o~rSc'/imari~--Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

Adecreasing pressurizer levelmayleadtoapossiblereactortripIIonlowpressureandSIASiftheoperator.doesnotintervene.

TheSIASwouldisolateletdownandchargingwouldbeavailable torestorepressurizer level.Operatorcouldavert'areactortripandSIASthrough.manualcontrolofchargingandletdownbasedonlevelindication

'ncontrolroom.Malfunction ofFirstStaeTurbinePressureSinalfailslowtotheRRSIfthemalfunction causesalowpressuresignaltobetransmitted theRRSwillinsert theCEAstoproduceaTavecommensurate withthelowpressuresignal.ThisTaveoutputsignalistransmitted totheSBCSaffecting itsoperation.

Evaluation"of PlantResponse:

ThereducedheatoutputfromtheRCS~duetotheinserting oftheregulating CEAsreducesthesteamflowtotheturbine..

TheSBCSreceivesalowTavesignalfromtheRRSsothevalveswillnotopen.Areactor.tripwouldoccuronlowsteamgenerator pressurewithapossibleMSIS.Themainsteamsafetyvalvesandatmospheric dumpvalvesareavailable forcontrolling RCSheatremoval.Malfunction ofFirstStaeTurbinePressureSinalfa'ilshihtotheRRSIfthealfunctian causesahighpressuresignaltobetransmitted~the RRSPmwithdrawregulating CEAstoproduceaTavecommensurate withthehighpressuresignal.4865'I'~QO(CcWOEPF7~$Olg4~7/gJ4~~0/Sg,i',g40(egg4/>~<++>c2dog0A~spy~ge(orcorpr$/J4r4cicnCrC~Sry QyI-e<<p)ASSCC4&~r~CcPrgq~/',~~<~~<C-r4'$A./6/n0$54gcfp/rssy~gyQgh(ssJd~Ae7CI'ediYPKcSgc'S~4j4,/no.~/~jp~~~gQre/~Fipcj+ill~Tubed(44pl'+Jpggw)sp$og/(Ega%/yyJfgg~r

yg~~>~,>>~</uJ~y'A~t~~~i/'~cd~w p/sI5(+st//JtrsPe~/eJS')gayAi'SeVe~dW<~/+nodDC(<~AStareS~C4an64~+a/A6,C+k~H('/I jV2CZ,~A/Cvl//damdan@'C/Cy

)4Qppsan5'H.Wci'e4C<r'tEvaluation ofPlantResponse:

Theicreased~eatoputfomtheRCSdutowithdrawgtheegultingCEAsincreastheteamowto~hetuine.heSSreceveshiTavesignalomtRRS.Amistchbween,,aveapresureitheeamheerasmeasurdbyeSBCopen/thetrbinypas/valve.Theeningoftheevalvssenantomat'cwi~drawproibittohecorol.elmentrivechaniconolsstestopp'ngCwithdral.eopeatornmanllyowernerosorswittotheotherRRSchanneltresuastablendition.Malfunction ofMainSteamFlowSinalfailslowtotheFMRSandSBCSIfthemalfunction causesalowsteamflowsignaltobetransmitted, themFHRSwillreducefeedwater flowandtheSBCS'meropentheturbinebypassvalves.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

Themismatchbetweenfeedwater flowandturbinedemandwouldproduceareactortriponlowsteamgenerator level.Theauxiliary feedwater systemandmanualcontroloftheSBCSoratmospheric dumpvalvesisavailable toachieveastabilized plantcondition.

T4Zsa/~Ab~d~/taipeiyhi.5'4047IA~8CjrOn/S.4a'.8~dtaadS4isS'<tmggs/dna<aSyHO'Sst/seamerSr((recc'nasl/s

~yoldeQngl'on&/ir<'prQ/casa.+/rapDm4)4/srecur<,pwas/assg~Malfunction ofMainSteamFlowSinalfailshihtotheFIIRSandSBCSIfthemalfunction causesahighsteamflowsignaltobetransmitted, w'(Il.mt theRNSwillincreasefeedwater flowandtheSBCSmay<opentheturbinesvpa-,s~e~~a-w~p~.Evaluation ofPlantResponse:

Thesteamgenerator level.wi'11increaseandthee-may-be-a steamtrill)Ml~ct.~.

g""pd~l~"N~p71operatorcouldmanuallycontroltheFURSandSBCSbasedonsteamgenerator levelandpressureindications inthecontrolroom.Shouldtheoperatornottakeactionahighsteamgenerator levelsignalwouldclosethefeedwater regulating valvesandtriptheturbine.Areactortrip

onturbinetripwouldfollowwithactuation ofauxiliary feedwater onsteamgenerator lowlevelsignal.Auxiliary feedwater andmanualoperatton oftheSBCSoratmospheric dumpvalvesprovideamechanism for;RCSheai;removaltostabilize theplant.rncrcchQpgnFC+plccJ44'*t P4~cue<~is-.1~tgg~~'5~~~~,~.fh<<~/ySIsinI>~f.3.IQSSWACS~maxi'a~~>ncrC~epqQ+Mcr'locoace6giRlgreIn4I-QrE'sAirmaxi'aiea,s.>40"84spn(Le7I'gnowe/ASpu<A'7W+wnyiCcg>A,~/klc046k,/*Ill'-gPDIcAJgUPgo~n~~c4c'p,'~g+g~d,ice6-~psaysg~.erich~lg<</a~AnDgrpJzgpsAa~SLqrrylecsc2/winshe~s~>~$ua/~a~o~pZg

Coo+onLines/Sensors 13172-310-110 Rev.103/4-RC-127 Ins.P,T,L,FPDT-1121CPDT-1124'ZPDT-1124YPProcess/Sachet SSIndication On1yIndication On1y1-RC-104PT-1104PT-1102(C)SS1-RC>>?05PT-1103PT-1108PT-1102(A)PT-1100(X)LT-1105LT-1110XSIndication OnlySPIndication OnlyPKS1-RC-130'T-1110V'T-1100YPT-1102(B)PT-1107PT-1105SIndication On)yS1-RC-107PT-1106PT-1102(0)S2998-6-074 Sh'.1SG2811-1"-l51-108 LT-9023ALT-9021SPindicates

Co@nonTaEns.PT.LFPPl"ocess/Sachet'

,2998-6-079 Sh.1SG2AII-1"t51-100LT-9013A.LT-9011'E-I"lSI-101I-I"MSI-102PT-8013ALT-9013ALT-9011PT-8013BLT-9013BSSS.I-1"f4SI-103LT-9013BE-1"l61-104'T-8013CPT-8113D-9013CSSindication SE-I"NSI-104LT-9013LSI-I"t61-106PT-8013DLT-9005LT-9013DLT-9113LT-9012SPSSindicatePI-1"HSI-116LT-9012LY-9013I-1"f51-107LT-9005LT-9013DPS

Ins.PTLFPProcess/Safet SLT-9021LT-9023APT-8023APindicates, SSPT-8023BLT-9023BS'.SLT-9023BSPT-8023LPT>>8123LT-9023CSSindication SLT-9023CPT-80230LT-9006LT9023LT-9022.LT-9123SPindicates

$tPPindicates LT-9123LT-9022,Pindicates Pindicates.

LT-9023LT-9006SPindicates

ImactofFailureofConmonInstrument LineorTaTheattachedTableidentifies theComonLine/Tapforprotection channelandcontrolchannels(ormultiplecontrolchannels) thatareservingmultiple--channels.

Thistablehasbeenreviewedandthoselinesortapswhichweredetermined tobelimitingintheireffectonplantresponse're identified below.Theeffectoflosingprotection channelsduetoasinglefailureonacommninstrument lineortap,asidentified intheresponsetoquestion420.06doesnotdefeatrequiredprotection systemredundancy.

Therefore theeffectoflosingpnotection channelsisnotaddressed here.Descriptions oftheeffectofthemalfunctions onthecontrolsystemsandanevaluation ofplantresponseandbackupsystemalailabi'lity arealsoprovided.

Prudentengineering judgement

..basedonknowledge ofsystemdesigndand transient analysiswasusedtodevelopthesedescriptions.

Theresultsofthisevaluation providejustification thatanysimultaneous malfunctions of-controlsystemsidentified herein,resulting

~~~~~~fromcordoninstrument lineortapmalfunctions areboundedbytheanalysisofChapter15andwouldnotrequireactionorresponsebeyondthecapability ofoperators orsafetysystems.Pressurizer PressureSinalPT-1100XandPressurizer LevelSinalLT-1110'TI-RC.III SystemsaffectedareI'P8;PPCS,PLCS,andSBCSEvaluation ofPressureSinalandLevelSinalFailinLowduetoInstrument 74OamaeonP'lantResonse:d'fmalfunction causesalowpressureandlevelsignaltobetransmitted,

.thepressurizer heaterswouldturnon~,hepressurizer sprayswoulddecreaseflow.T4e-R~e~~4yM~

4he~~emes~eg~e 1T.N~pl~&"-RBcc5&~tff~~H~~i

~~n~pew~IA~dddp.TRPCC~IddIddincreasecharging.

Duetotheincreaseincharging>

andpressurizer heatingthereactormaytriponhighpressurizer pressure,~

I'OIRIIRP~

~kipddTRpI;IICyId

mntationfromwhichtoevaluateeventprogress; Manualcontrolofcharging, atttaspheric dumpvalvesandauxiliary sprays,withouttheuseofPLCS,PPCS,andSBCSwillbringtheplanttoastablecondition.

I4.P+~>>tf)geafi'e/e IASl943sueg6g/5gc/fridnS//rer//flr~6'nrl>'r e//W<<ncr'erEvaluation ofPressureSinalandLevelSinalFailinHihduetoInstrument TaDamaeonPlantResonse.::Ifmalfunction causedahighpressureandlevelsignaltobetransmitted, thepressurizer heaters,wouldde-energize, thesprayswouldincreaseflow.TheRRSwouldadjustrodsinresponsetothehighpressuresignaltherebydecreas-ingreactorpower.TheSBCSwouldreceivealowerTaveinputduetothedecreaseinreactorpowerandnotopentheTBVs.ThePLCSwouldircreaselet-'ownanddecreasecharging.

Alowpressurizer pressuresituation wouldoccurleadingtoapossiblereactortripandSIASonlowpressureoranewsteadystateatlowerpowerandpressure.

Theoperatorhassafetygradeinstrumentations fromwhichtoevaluateeventprogress.

Isolation ofletdownonSIASorbytheoperatorandmanualcontrolofchargingwithpressurizer sprayi<~>solation willbringtheplanttoastablecondition withoutusingthePLCS,PPCS,andSBCS.Evaluation ofPressure" Sinal'.FailinHihandLevelSinalFailinLowduetoInstrument TaDamaeanPlantResonse:TheplantresponseissimilarforthePPCS,RRS,andSBCSasdiscussed aboveforthepressuresignalfailinghigh.ThePLCS,howeverwouldincreasecharging('fanddecreaseletdown.,

Theincreaseinchargingandpressurizer sprayflowwithnopressurizer heatersmayleadtoalawpressurecondition orasteadily!increasing pressurizer level.Theoperatorhas,safetygradeinstrumentation Ifromwhichtoevaluateeventprogress.

thnualcontrolofchargingandturningoff.pressurizer sprayswillbringtheplanttoastablecondition.

'7$c,~nMski<4oe"Qe-j/cssfere'eig~a/f eqmcfg~vcl gpfm/@/li/pfPi~L wj/Q/lP/P/9gd@h+P/0+

/'/'*+/pyq~~pr+ssurv~ow/cg/pcgvgg7wary~Gcu/er/enc/eg nper@re/cr~~n//V(c'p-/~geerre/nA'nn

)Aters49ovt:rpr/ssur/2'~grcv//;

Sic%fggrg~ggpjgc/pc~grpI'@I84r88 offri7PQ,pl.Q4~OJ/4e,+bpenrwpoFa/+nen.rc/frrrc/eee>>ki/eence/nnen'(Sec//cn/e$.Z/)Q/~V,/go~qgp,WF4gji0IS0wCw/pg<SGenkggC+2 8pprHisJCCharoa+A'edrA~<~ooQ~+'P~o~onom~e~~Croendlong4ooG.y~~'II"a/m>eDHgoo14I"P0/enoFo(G.Qowwo8/r'estv4/~d'GAt'6f'l(o'SSCdO'O1AOID.Idaoo]0/'CS/4o'C AMjPSonCCWr(Is'd~/76AAsp44+++lISd'<>n7J~n4/neo.n7oo'nsooc~bn/s'.c',QoSDNz+s-IIII'P~ÃIFIFIIdl1di~IFili 818duetoInstrument TaDama~eonPlantResonse:Asdiscussed intheevaluation forbothsignalsfailinglowthePPCS~~~and SBCSresponseissimilar.ThePLCS,howeverwouldincreaseletdownanddecreasechargihg.

,-~.~.r,888'FFIIA~~~~Iw~muve.Theoperatorcanmanuallycontrol'charging toincreasepres-surizerrlevelandisolateletdownflow.The,plantcanbebroughttoastablecondition throughoperatoractionandmanualcontrolofthePPCS,PLCS,~andS8CS.IPressurizer PressureSinalPT-1100YandPressurizerLevelSinalLT-1110Y~TaI-RC-130.

PThesystemsaffectedandtheevaluation ofplantresponsearethesameasthosedescribed aboveforpressurizer pressuresignal(PT-llOOX) andpres-surizerlevelsigna'i(LT-1110X)--

SteamGenerator LevelSinal.LT-9021andLT-9011TaI-1"NSI-108.SystemaffectedistheRlRSEvaluation ofLevelSinalsFailinLowduetoInstrument TaDamaeon~PlIIIfthemalfunction causesalowsteamgenerator levelsignaltobesentfrombothtransmitters thentheflo'wcontrolvalvewouldopentaincreaselevelforbothsteamgenerators.

Asfeedwater flowincreased theB(RSwouldnoteamismatchbetweenmain,steamandfeedwater flow.Thiswouldclosetheflowcontrolvalvetomatchfeedwater andsteamflow.Anoscillation oftheflowcontrolvalvewithinc&easing steamgenerator levelresultsleadingtoahighsteamgenerator levelsignalbeingsentfromthereactorprotection systemtoclosethecontrolvalvesandtriptheturbine.Shouldthecontrolvalvesnotcloseandturbinenottriptheoperatorcouldtakemanualactiontoclosethevalvesorstopthefeedwater pumps.Finallyahigh-high steamgenerator levelsignalwouldclosethefe'edwater pumpdischarge valvesshouldtheaboveactionsnotoccr.~~luwyc4 fMMa-f/>c'y~Ur+/4&+Iw)fr/rf<)k>II'/ISgnac-pn~oodnnn rIIonIdopi'lvknr

/jIo'.IooFMIn f/oooa'uo/anfox/ul~nIpcdo.oQgEvaluation ofLevelSinalsFailinHihduetoInstrument TaDamaeon~PIfthemalfunction causedahighsteamgenerator levelsignaltobesentfrombothtransmitters thentheflowcontrolvalvewouldclosetodecreaselevelforbothsteamgenerators.

Asfeedwater flowdecreased theFHRSwouldnotea5@<.,

et, mismatchbetween'main steamandfeedwater flow.Thiswouldopentheflow1controlvalvetomatchfeedwater andsteamflow.Anoscillation oftheflow'controlvalvewithdecreasing steamgenerator levelresults,leadingto'areactortriponlowsteamgenerator level.Auxiliary feedwater wouldbeautomatically 1actuated.toaccountfortheinsuH'icient eedwaerflow.i~~~'>~"0"4-/age/lP'gjhff.cf~8r-zEs.g.(PauzAPAis,deicero694$54fP<~+~~>+~+</~~<~'4'~s

>'vantihnotOneLevelGial.iaslinIi5andneLevelSinalFailinLowduetoInstrument TaDamaeonPlantResonse:,Onesteamgenerator wo'uldexperience adecreasing levelduetoclosingofthecontrolvalveonreceiptofthefailedhighlevelsignal.Theothersteamgenerator wouldexperience anincreasing levelduetoopeningofthecontrolvalveonreceiptofthefailedlowlevelsignal.Theresultwouldbeeitherareactortriponlowsteamgenerator leveloraclosureofthecontrol.valveonhighpsteamgenerator levelwithaturbinetrip.Additionally, theoperatorcantakeappropriate action(manualreactbrtripwithauxiliary feedwater actuation) basedonsafetygradesteamgenerator levelinstrumentation.

Qi'yjdfgsiSS m~b'av~~eepapja'dj ug)y~a~~)sSteamGenerator LevelSinals'LT-9005andLT-9012Tal-l"-NSI-106 SystemaffectedistheFWRSEvaluation ofLevelSinalsFailinLowduetoInstrument TaDamaeonPlant~Resonse:Hiderangesteamgenerator levelwillindicatealowlevelcondition ononesteamgenerator.

Theoperatorwillstillhavesafetygradesteamgenerator

.levelindications torelyon(onesafetychannelofthefoursafetycharm'els willalsobelost.foithatsteamgenerator).

Additionally, onthesamesteamgeneratoYtfijgfnst'cementation andcontrolof.thefeedwater bypassvalvesendsasignaltoopenthevalveandactuatesalowlevelalarminthecontroltroom.Howeversince,aturbinetrip,signalisnotpresentitwillnotopenthevalve.,Forconservati,sm itisassumedtoopenincreasing flowtothesteamgenerator.

TheintactportionoftheFWRSonthatsteamgenerator willseetheincreased levelandclosetheregulating valveenoughtomain'tain level.Shouldthisregulating valvecontrolworkimproperly~a highsteamgenerator'evel willcauseclosureofthefeedwater regulating valvesandturbinetrip.Theoperatorcanuse.theauxiliary feedwater systemtomaintainadequateinventory intheaffectedsteamgenerator andmaychoosetomanuallytriptheplantbasedonsafetygradeinstrumentation readingsconflicting withprocessinstrumentation andcontrolactions.-]$d.dld4sfiqvjy j5jmoupsdscE pci+i1d+nmlma5~+F~~v>~f/~~dmvmffff-P~55c+i'mn.

l~~/uIfubj"E~mi55uw&'Pi~@"~<1,~+~~Ž~~ii~fpmr+ilull~Q~F~g~~

Evaluation ofevelSinalsPailinHihduetoInstrumentation Ta~DaaaeonPlantResonse:Hiderangesteamgenerator levelIilli'ndicate ahighlevelcondition ononesteamgenerator.

Theoperatorwi11stillhavesafetygradesteamgenerator levelindications torelyon(onesafetychannelofthefoursafetychannelsivillalsobelostforthatsteamgenerator).

Thecontrolandinstrumentation forthebypassvalve>villseethehighlevelsignalandactuateahighlevelyla'larminthecontrolroom.Theoperatorbasedonsafetygradeinstrumentation willseenormallevelbecausetheFHRSvalvesarenotactingimproperly.

However,duetoerronouslevelsignalshemaytakemanualcontroloftheRJRSandeventually tripthereaCtorusingauxiliary feedwater tocontrolsteamgenerator inventdry.

Evaluation ofOneLevelSinalFailinHihandOneLevelSinalFailinLou<OnetoInstrusent TaOamaeonPlantResense:~~~~~~~~~~~~~Hiderangesteamgenerator levelindication doesnotcontrolasystemandtheoperatorwillcompareittosafetyrelatedinstrumentation toascertain thetruereading.Failureoftheinstrumentation andcontrolofthefeedwater bypassvalveis~~+br+discussed previously.

SteamGenerator LevelSinalsLT-9006andLT-9022Tal-l"MSI-114Thesystemsaffectedandevaluation ofplantresponsearethesameasforsteamgenerator levelsignalsLT-9005andLT-9012forinstrument tap1-1"tlSI-106.

Condenser StoraeTankLevelSinal.sLT-12-llA andLT.-12-11B Theothercontrolchanneltransmitters shavingacommontapnotidentified inthetableare'theCondensate StorageTankleveltransmitter LT-12-11A and118.Individual rootvalvesandexcessflowcheckvalvesareaddedtoensurethatinstrument lineruptureinonechanneldoesnotaffecttheotherchannel.Theonly,failure.affecting bothchannelsisthebreakofthetap.Fordiversity, bnsafetyrelatedlevelswitchesprovidelowlevelalarmsonthesafetyannunciators.

SincethefunctionofLT-12-11A and118isonlyindication andalarmandsincealarmbackupisprovidedatapfailure.wouldnotcausesystem.actions,requiredtobeanalyzedbyChapter15oftheFSAR.t

0803M-4420.14(7.2)Thereactorprotection system(RPS)includestwotripinputs(turbinetripandlossofcomponent coolingwatertrip)whichareclassified asnotbeingrequiredforreactorprotection.

Itisthestaff'sposition(BTPXCSB26)thatallreactortripinputstotheRPSarerequiredtomeetthedesignrequirements ofIEEE279withoutexceptions Thisincludestheentiretripfunctionfromthesensortothefinalactuateddevices'SAR Chapter15showsthattheaccidentanalysistakscreditforreactortriponturbinetrip.FSARSubsection 7.2.2.2.11 statesthattheturbinetripistakenfromnon-Class XEhydraulic oilpressureswitches.

Theuseofnon-Class IEswitchesisnotacceptable.

Also,itisnotclearthatthecomponent coolingwatertripmeetstherequirements ofXEEE-279.

Therefore, provideadescription oftheseandothersuchRPSinputswithrespecttotheirconformance toBTPICSB26.Thisdesigndescription shouldbesupported withelectrical schematics, logicdiagrams, pipingandinstrument

drawings, testprocedures andtechnical specifications.

sponoeTheChapter15accidentanalysisdoesnottakecreditforreactortriponturbinetriptomitigatetheresultsofanyevent.Thisissostatedinnote7toTable15.0-7.Thesequenceofeventsanalysespresented inChapter15recognize thatsuchatripexistsandmayoccur.FortheIncreased Feedwater Flow(withfailuretoachieveafasttransferata4.16kVbus)eventpresented inSubsection 15.1..2',itwasmoreadversetotripthereactoronturbinetrip.Thiswasdonetoincreasethecooldownforthisincreased heatremovalevent.Thiseventisdiscussed intheresponsetoQuestion420.11,~/,IMhouggthapvoa:reps at/notraq~sMa~wgr~azeqyg gq>cQpis~Cia,XEaccoacwipt~&ERg2V9.

~+&oint.on,e:vic6~Ad,$c4-t~irine~tr.~ptits-to~Efie-RPS

-accordance-wi

~gu3.atpCy'6Qp~li:U gf.:9420.14-1

a-LossofCCWTripFour(4)flowtransmitters FT-14-15A,B,C aDarelocatedontheCCNcommonreturnheadertomonitorCCWflowfromtheRCP's.Thesefour(4)transmitters arepoweredfromredundant ClasslEpowersupplies(MA,MB,MC6MD)andarephysically andelectrically separated inaccordance withtheRG1.75.CCWflowoutoftheRCP'sarecontinuously monitored anddisplayed onRTGBoard206inthecontrolroom.Upondetection oflossofCCWfromtheRCP'sanalarminthecontrolroomwillalerttheoperatoraboutthelowflowcondition sothatapropercorrective actioncanbetakenimmediately.

Xfflowisnotreestablished in10minutestheRPSisactuatedtotripthereactor.ThetestswitchesarealsoprovidedontheRTGBoard206toenabletestingtheindicator-bistable.

PleaserefertotheCWDsheet206(2998-B-327) forthecompletecircuit.hecomponent coolingwatertripmeetstherequirements ofIEEE-279-71asdescribed intheFSARChapter7.2.

Isolation devices(rated2000V)areprovidedfortheturbinetripinputstotheRPSinaccordance withRG1.75andareroutedasdescribed belowsuchthattherearenocredibleeventsthatcancompromise thefunctionoftheRPS.GeneralTheturbinetripinputcablesareterminated atTB'A'ocated atthenorthendoftheTurbineGenerator BuildingpedestalandareroutedtoEL43.00oftheReactorAuxiliary Building(directly undertheReactorProtection SystemCabinet).

Eachofthefourcablesareroutedinitsowndedicated conduittheentirelengthandisuniquelyidentified NMA,NMB,NMC,NMD.Noothercableispermitted toberoutedwiththesecables.1Thecablesconcerned a~identified asfollows:ChannelNMA20710U(NMA)ChannelNMB20710V(NMB)ChannelNMC20710W(NMC)ChannelNMD'0710X(NMD)~SecificCableRoutinTB'A'slocatedatthenorthendoftheTurbinepedestalatEL.62.00.

Eachcableisroutedinitsownembeddedconduitinthepedestalanddownthepedestalleg.Theconduitsexitthepedestallegandrunembeddedtoanelectrical manholesasfollows:-MH256-ForCables20710U(NMA)and20710W(NMC)-MH257-ForCables20710V(NMB)and20710X(NMD)Insidemanhole256,cables20710Uand20710Wareroutedintheirownflexibleconduitonoppositesidesofthemanholefromthewesttotheeastwalls.Highvoltagecables,6.9kVand4.16kVareroutedinthismanhole,howevertheflexiblecondui.ts areroutedinsuchamannersoastomaintainaminimumseparation of18inchesfromallhighvoltagecables.Thisseparation isreducedto12inchesatthewestfaceforadistanceof6inches,astheflexibleconduitconvertstoanembeddedconduit.Insidemanhole257,cables20710Vand20710Kareroutedintheirownflexibleconduitonoppositesidesofthemanholefromthewesttothenorthwalls.Againaswasthecasefrommanhole256,high'oltage cablesofthe4.16kVand6.9kVclassareroutedwithinthemanhole.However,theflexibleconduitsareroutedinsuchamannersoastomaintainaminimumseparation of24inchesfromallhighvoltagecables.

Eachmanholealthoughnonsafetyrelatedandtherefore categorized asnonseismiccategoryI,isdesignedsimilarto,ie.rebaretcaseismicmanholesuchthatduringaseismicevent,MH256orMH257willbehavesimilartoaseismically designedmanholeandwillnotfail.Itmustbenotedthatthe4.16kVand6.9kVcablesaredesignedwithmetallicleadsheathsandallcableisclassIEqualified, meetingtherequirements ofIEEE383.ThecablesexitthemanholesintheirownembeddedconduitsandareroutedintotheReactorAuxiliary Buildingbasementwheretheyenterpullboxes.

,Fromeachpullbox,thecablesareroutedintheirownseparateandindepen-dentconduitsupthewestReactorAuxiliary Buildingwalltotheisolation boxesmountedunderEL62.00gustbelowtheRPScabinet.Fromtheisolation boxes,theclassIEcables20710H-(MA) 20710JMB)20710K(MC)and20710C(MD)areroutedintheirownconduitsandentertheirrespective sectionsoftheRPSCabinet.Onthebasisofthespecialtreatment ofthesecables,beyondtherequirements ofRG1.75,asdescribed above,wecanseenocredibleeventwherecablesofhighvoltage(6.9kVand4.16kV)cancomeincontactwiththeturbinetrip'cablestotheRPS.TurbinetripinputstotheRPSareproperlyisolatedthroughseparate-mountedisolation relaybox.Therelay-box isaNEMA4typecon-struction, withadequatemountingandphysicalseparation designthatmeetIEEE-344-1975 andRG1.75requirement.

pry,cfd'heisolation relayisAgastatEGPtypewhichhabeenqualified toXEEE-323-l974..

Asdescribed intheattachedsystemcontrolreport,@he'Mw9.eel='a~x~~4bz~'he EGPtyperelay~atleast2000volt,RMSisolation fromthecoilsidetothecontactside.

0 OnOctober30,1980,SystemsControlconducted.43al:eel.r~

testsontwoAgastatEGPrelayswhichareIEEE-323prequalified typerelays,Thefirstrelay,described hereafter as"TestVehicleNl,"wasatypeEPG1001,serialnumber80411508, andwitha120VAC,60HZcoil.Thesecondrelay,described hereafter as"TestVehicle12<"wasatypeEPGD001,serialnumber80411510, andwitha125VDCcoil.Thetestwasdividedintotwoparts."Inpartone>>bothrelaysweresubjected toupwardsof5,000VDCandtheleakagecurrentmeasured.

AHipotronics series300HipotandMegohmeter, lastcalibrated onMarch18,1980,wasusedtosupplythevoltageandmeasuretheleakagecurrent.EachtestvehiclewasattachedtoatypeCR0095socketandproperlyseatedinplacewithtypeCR0155lockingstraps.(SeetheattacheddatasheetonAgastatsocketsandstraps).Therelaysandsocketswerethenmountedona2x6woodboard.Thetestwaseffectedbyattachi.ng thehotleadfromtheHipotandMegohmeter toonesideoftherelaycoilwhilethegroundleadwasconnected tooneotthecontactconnections.

Thevoltagewasthenincreased fromzerotoeither5,000voltsoruntiltheHipotandMegohmeter automatically.

shutitselfdownwhentheleakagecurrentexceeded5.5milliamperes.

Thevoltagewasthenreducedtozeroandthegroundleadattachedtoanothercontactconnection andthetestrepeated.

Nhenallthecontactconnections hadthuslybeentested,theHipotandMegohmeter hotleadwasconnected totheothersideofthecoilandthewholeseriesoftestsrepeated.

Duringautomatic

shutdown, thehighestattainable voltagewasrecorded.

Attachedpleasefindthedataresultsfromtheabovedescribed tests.P~Inviewoftheabove,wemustconcludetheAgastatGPtyperelaywillqualifytothespecified 2,000voltsRMSisolation.

Inaddition, themanufacturer guarantees a2,000voltRMSisolation fortheAgastatrelay.

TestVehicleP2EGPDOOIRelayS/N80411510125VDCCoilConnections BetweenTerminals VoltageAC(RMS)DCCurrentACDC84to82~84toT284toM284toR284toR484toM484toT484to8384toT384toM384toR384toRl84toMl84toTl84toBl5,0005,0004,2004)3004,0003,9004,2005,0005)0004,2003,9003)6003,6004,400not+~tested5,0005,0005)0005,0005,0005,0005)0005)0005,0005,0005)0005,0005,0005,000not"~tested100ua1000aeoua100ua.IOua.IOua.095ua.095ua.120ua.115ua.IIOua.090ua.IiOua.115ua.105va.120ua.120ua..115uaBltoTlBltoMlBltoRlBltoR3BItoM3BltoT3Blto83BltoT4BltoM4BItoR4BltoR2BltoM2BltoT2Blto82Bito844,4003)5003,5003,9003,9005,0005,0004,2004,0004,2004,5004,3005,000,5)000not""tested5,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005)0005,0005,0005,000',0005,0005)000not~~testod120ua100ua120ua110ua.I30ua.125ua.120ua.IIOua.105ua.100ua.095ua.105ua.120ua.125ua.095ua~095ua.IOOua.IIOua~'ndicates currentexceeded5.5milllamporos 84toSlrefgre~+

0

~~TestVehicle/llFGPIOOIRelayS/N804ll508l20VAC/60H;.ColiConnections BetweenTerminals Voltage.AC(RMS)DCCurrentAcDCC84to8284toT484toM284toR284toR484toM484toT484to8384toT384toM384toR384toRl84toMl84toTl84toBlBltoTlBltoMlBItoRlBltoR3BltoM3BltoT3Blto83BltoT4BltoM4BltoR4BltoR2BltoM2BltoT2Blto82Blto845,0005,0004,3004,3004,2004,3004,3005,0005,0004,0003,9003,8003,8004,500noW>tested4,4003,8003>8004,IOO4,0005,0005,0004,5003>9004,0004,2004,0005,0005,000not+4,testedhh5,0005,0005>0005,0005>0005,0005>0005,0005>0005,0005>0005,0005,0005,000not"~tested5,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,0005,000notW<tested120ual20ual20ual20uaI20ual20ua/$20ual20ua.055ua.065ua.065ua.060ua.070ua.075ua.065ua.050ua.060ua.050ua.050ua.065ua.065ua.070ua.060ua.065ua.060ua.050ua.055ua.060ua.045ua.055ua.075ua.070ua.060ua.060ua.065ua.055ua~+IIndicated currentexceeded5.5millfamperes p<4.8IreL~ycoQh1~~

uestionNo.0.54FSARSubsection 7.6.3describes additional systemsre-quiredforsafety.Overall,theFSARinformation suppliedtodatedoesnotsufficiently describetheinstrumentation andcontrolsassociated withmostofthesesystems.There-fore,pleaseprovidethefollowing information:

a.Identifyanddescribetheinstrumentation and'controls associated witheachsystemlistedbelow:Fuelpoolcoolingandpurification

.systemProcessandeffluentradiological monitoring andsamplingsystemContainment vacuumreliefsystemShieldbuildingventilation systemb.Foreachinstrument andcontrolidentified in(a)~above,designate whethertheequipment isClass,1Eornon-Class 1E.c.Foreachsystemlistedin(a)above,discussthequalification criteriaappliedtoitsassociated instrumentation andcontrols.

Asaminimum,youarerequested toincludeforeachsystem,adis-cussionofhowtheinstrumentation andcontrolsforthatsystemconformstotherequirements ofIEEE279-1971, IEEE308-1974, IEEE323-1974, andIEEE344-1975.

~Reeonsa8)I)FUELPOOLCOOLINGANDPURIFICATION SYSTEMThefuelpoolinstrumentation

.systemisdescribed in"Section9.1.3.2.4.

Atabulation oftheinstrument

~~channelsxsincludedxnTable9.17.II)PROCESSANDEFFLUENTRADIOLOGICAL MONITORING ANDSAMPLINGSYSTEMTheradiation

'monitoring systemiscomposedofthreeprocess,seveneffluent, fortyonearea,andfourinplantairbornemonitors.

Tabulations ofthesemonitorsaregiveninTables11.5-1,12.3-2,and12.3-3.III)CONTAINMENT VACUUMRELIEFSYSTEMTheinstrumentation providedforthissystemisinaccordance withtherevisedFigure3.8-8andcontainsthefollowing equipment:

-PDT-25-1A (lB)withitselectronic PDIS-25-lA (lB)isinterlocked withpCV-25-7(8) byenergizing SE-25-10(ll) toopenFCV-25-7(8) whenthedifferential pressurebetweenthecontainment andannulusreaches-9'5",H20+0.25"H20PDIS-25-1A(lB) alsopro-

videsindication ontheHVCBforgPrangeof--25"H20to+25H20.-PDT-25-'13A(13B) withitselectronic PDS-25-13A{13B) isinterlocked withFCV-25-7(8) bydeenergizing SE-25-10(ll) tocloseFCV-25-7(8) whenthedif-.'-'ferential pressurereaches-7.75"H20.-PDIS-25-llA(11B) provideslocalfullrangeindication andahighalarmontheHVCBat11.5"H20.-PDT-25-15A(15B) withitsPDI-25-15A(15B) provides.fullrange{-25"H20to25"H20)indication ontheHVCB.IV)SHIELDBUILDINGVENTILATION SYSTEMTheShieldBuildingVentilation SystemisR,AE5FSystemandislistedinSection7.3oftheFSAR.TheSBVSswitchcve<

fromFuelHandlingBuildingistheonlyportionofthissystemlistedinSection7.6.Qg@5PQQisdescribed inSection6.2.3.2oftheFSAR.Theinstrumentation requirements areprovidedinSection6.2.3.5andTable6.2-51oftheFSAR.b)I-Tc(legf-7('g<Qi'p'Gs egggQ1'YliM~i~~~~'o

~'"'"~~&P~Soli'~aVgri'$h4e~5ys/~~~II-Teassuntmonitorsaretheplantstack,asdescribed insubsection 11.5.2.2.8, andtheECCSexhaustmonitors, asdescribed insubsection 11.5.2.2.10.

TheClasslEareamonitorsincludethefours]QSand6spentfuelpoolmonitors, aswellastwopost-accident monitors.

Allthesemonitorsaredescribed insubsection 12.3.4.1.4.

TheClasslEin-plantmonitorsincludethecontainment atmospheremonitors, asdescribed insubsection 12.3.4.2.3.1, thecontrolroomairintakemonitors, described insubsection 12.3.4.2.3.2, andtheECCSexhaust,monitors, asdescribed insubsection 12.3.4.2.3.3.

rIIIŽAllPDT's;PDIS's;PDS'sand.PDI'sdiscussed initema)aboveareClass1E.IV-Instrumentation andcontrolsdiscussed aboveforSBVSsystemareClasslE.Alarmsareahnoun<ta~on non-safety annunciation windowSthroughproperisolation devices.v>

c)XHEE323-19'/4 ANDIHEE344-1975I-jigQ~IE'/nSQ~J-Wmidc,~<'b~

~i<~l~"ibTubal<j'<Alo7ECt"9z3-'79a+9<<oH7>Xr-AllClass1Einonitors arecjualifi.ed toXEEE323-1974andIEEE344-1975.

XXX-Allpressuretransmitters listeQinitema)abovearequalified toIEEE34'4-,1975 andXEEE323-1974intheenvironment inwhichtheyoperate.Theremotemountedindicators andbistables aremountedontheseismically qualxfied HVCBinthecontrolroom.'lIV-Allcontrolsandinstrumentations forSBVSisqualified toIEEE32-1974apdXEEEp4g-l)7$T'4~~o~i+twdi~+0<S~IO[>S~4l+~ŽpgIEEE279-1971KeuheNe.EdigM<ca(Lf P.c[>Pi+~/nT<Q~/eThefourcontainment areasradiation monitorswhichinputintothe&$5MEAe55ISXEEE279-1971similarly withtheESPASasdescribed inScti.3.1.2oftheFSAR.C~There@i,amenfIEEE79-1971for'gAectffieds I/5fE'~N'Ey'egiue4Q mWefy'~e.

<<sfr~plefsfg apF7itabldke C~.uSdthisinstrumentation isnotpartofaprotection system.However,theintentofthedesigncriteriacontained thereinhasbeenappliedinthedesignofthesesystemstothefollowing extent:4.1-GeneralFunctional Requirements Thesafetyrelatedinstrumentation fortheabovesystemsisdesigneQtoprovidemonitoring andactuation asapplicable duringnormaloraccidentconditions.

Theinstrument performance characteristics, responsetimesandaccuracyareselectedforcompatibility fortheparticular function.

4.2-SingleFailureCriterion.

Thisisfunctionally identiCZ~to thatdescribed inSubsection 7.4.2.2.4.3-QualityControlofComponents andNodulesSeeChapter174.4Equipment Qualification Theinstrumentation andcontrolsforthesesystemsmeettheequipment qualification requirements.

discussed inSections3.10and3.11.SUL34')98)sIs/i 4.5-ChannelXntegrity The"ChannelIntegrity" isfunctionally identical tothatdiscribed inSubsection 7.3.2.1.2.

4.6-ChannelXndependence Thechannelindependence isfunctionally~'denti~

tothatdescribed inSubsection 7.3.2.1.2.

4.7.-"ControlandProtection SystemInteraction" Noportionofthesesystemsisusedforbothcontrolandprotection.

4.8-"Derivation ofSystemXnputs"Themonitoring signalsfortheabovesystemsareadirectmeasurement ofthedesiredvariables.

4.9-"Capability forSensorChecks"Themonitoring sensorsarecheckedbycomparing themonitored variables ofredundant channelsorbyob-servingtheeffectsofintroducing andvaryingasub-stituteinputtothesensorsimilartothemeasuredvariable.

4.10-"Capability forTestandCalibration" XEEE338-1971andRegulatory Guide1.22,"Periodic TestingofProtection SystemActuation Functions" 2/72(RO)providesguidanceforthedevelopment ofprocedures, equipment anddocumentation ofperiodictesting.Themeasurement signalsrequiredfortheabovesystemshavethecapability ofbeingtestedandcalibrated underthedesignrequirements ofthesystem.4-11-"ChannelBypassorRemovalfromOperation" Anyoneofthechannelsmaybetested,calibrated, orrepairedwithoutdetrimental effectsontheotherchannels.

4.12-,,"Operating Bypasses" Thereareno"Operating Bypasses" forthesesystems.4.13-"Indication ofBypasses" Adiscussion ofbypassandinoperable statusindication isprovidedinSubsection 7.5.1andalistingofin-operableorbypassedcomponents iscontained inTable73-104.14-"AccesstoIleansforBypassing" Thissectionisnotapplicable.

'i,vO<a<ms<

I 4.15-"Multiple Setpoints" Thissectionisnotapplicable.

4.16-"Completion ofProtective ActionOnceitisInitiated" Thissectionisnotapplicable.

4;.17-"ManualInitiation" Manualinitiation ofthecomponents inthesesystemsisavai.'lable, 4.18-"AccesstoSetpointAdjustments, Calibration, andTest,Points"Thissectionisnot,applicable.

4.19-"Xdentification ofProtective Actions"Thissectionisnotapplicable.

QJ(oo~lyQyLks~'QJlGn.Is~*p,(~~c~veaW(%vcrAY~~QnhlA6++~goo4.20-"Xnformation Readouts" Themonitoring andcontrolchannelfqr~esesystemsareindicated inthecontrolroom+'%~+it~'

~"&~4.21-"SystemRepair"Replacement orrepairofcomponents canbeaccomplished inreasonable timewhenthesystemsarenotactuated..

Outageofsystemcomponents forreplacement orrepairarelimitedbytheTechnical Specifications.

li4.22-"Identification" Safetyequipment anQcablesassociated withthesesystemsareuniquelyidentified.

XEEE308-1971TheStLucieUnit2FSARiscommitted toRegulatory Guide,1.32 Rev.0whichaddresses IEEE308-1971.

Forafurtherdiscussion ofXEEE308-1971refertoFSARSection8.3.1.2.AllclasslEelectrical components areelectrically andphysically separated inaccordance withRegulatory Guide1.75asdiscussed inFSARSection8.3.1.2.Electrically redundant, andphysically independent, powersuppliestotheabovesystems,electrical com-.~ponents,andtothesafetyrelatedpowerpanelsthatprovidepowertocontrolandinstrumentation devicesareprovided.

C'

IAllClasslEelectrical systemcomponents areuniquelyidentified inaccordance withFSARSection8.3.1.3.Thefuel*pool purification pumpisanon-safety pumpandassuchisphysically independent andelectrically separated fromClass1Ecomponents.

SL2-FSARh)PipingandValves~~AllthepipingintheFuelPoolSystemisstainless steelwithmostlyweldedconnections throughout..

AllthevalvesintheFuelPoolSystemarestainless steeel,atleast150poundclass.9.1.3.2.4 Instrumentation Requirements Atabulation ofinsrumentchannelsisincludedinTable9.1"79.1.3.2.4.1 Temperature Instrumentation a)Fuelpooltemperature indications areprovidedlocallyandhightemperature alarmsareactuatedinthecontrolroomtowarntheoperatorofasystemmalfunction.

Twoseparateinstrument channelsareusedduetotheimportance ofpreventing thefuelpoolwaterfromboilingresulting inalossoffuelpoolwater..)FuelPoolHeatExchanger InletTemperature:

Localindication ofthefuelpoolheatexchanger inlettemperature (tubeside)isprovided.

Thisindication, inconjunction withtheheatexchanger outlettem-peratureandcomponent coolingwatertemperature, servesasameasureoffuelpoolheatexchanger performance.

FuelPoolHeatExchanger OutletTemperature:

Localindication ofthefuelpoolheatexchanger outlettemperature (tubeside)ispro-vided.9.1.3.2.4.2 PressureInstrumentation a)FuelPoolPumpDischarge Pressure:

Thedischarge pressureofeachfuelpoolpumpisindicated locally.FuelPool'Pumps Discharge HeaderPressure'%Adischarge headerpressureswitchforthefuelpoolpumpsservestoactivatealowpressurealarminthecontrolroomtowarntheopera-torofsystemmalfunction.

c)FuelPoolPurification PumpSuctionPressureSuctionpressuretothefuelpoolpurification pumpisindicatpd locally.Thisindication,"

inconjunction withthefuelpoolpurifi-cationpumpdischarge pressuregageservesasameasureoffuelpoolpurification pumpperformance.

FuelPoolPurification PumpDischarge Pressureindicated

JU<s<~Discharge pressureofthefuelpoolpurification pumpislocally.

SL2-FSARe)FuelPoolPurification FilterandFuelPoolionExchanger DiCferen-~~~~~tialPressureDifferential presureofthefuelpoolpurification filterandthefuelpoolionexchanger areindicated locally.Periodicreadingsoftheseinstruments indicateanyprogressive loadingoftheunits.9.1.3.2.4.3 LevelInstruments a)Fuel1'oolWaterLevelThefuelpoolwater,levelismonitored bytworedundant levelswitches.

Theseswitchesactuatehighorlowalarmsinthecontrolroomtowarntheoperatorofsystemmalfunction.

Twoseparatelevel"'nstrument channelsareusedduetotheimportance ofmaintaining fuelpoolwaterlevel.9.1.3.3~EgretEvalua".lua Withone-third ofacorebatch,whichisassumedtohaveundergone finiteirradiation ofthreeyears,placedinthespentfuelpoolsevendaysafterreactorshutdownandsixpreviousannualrefueling batches,theheatload's12.48x10BTU/hr.Undertheseconditions, withonefuelpoolpumpoperating andthefuelpoolheatexchanger inservice,thespentfuelpooltemperature doesnotexceed125F.Duringafullcoreunloading, itisassumedthatonefullcoreisplacedinthefuelpoolsevendaysafterreactorshutdown.

One-third ofacorefromapreviousrefueling isassumed'to havebeenstoredinthespentfuelpoolfor90dayswithsixpreviousannualbatches.Theresultant.

)eatloadfromonefullcozeandsevenannualrefueling batchesis2.99x10BTU/hr,themaximumheatloadinthefuelpool.Undertheseconditions, boththefuelpoolpumpsareinservicetolimitthemaximumfuelpoolwatertemperature to150F.Withonefuelpoolpumpinoperable, thefuelpoolequilibrium temperature is160F.Allconnections tothefuelpoolaremadesoastoprecludethepossibility ofsiphondrainingofthefuelpool.Anyleakagefromthefuelpoolcool-ingsystemisdetectedbyreduction inthefuelpoolinventory.

Makeuptothefuelpoolisfromtherefueling watertank.Makeupinventory tothefuelpoolisprovidedinSubsection 9.1.3.3.1

~Duringaccidentconditions, theFuelPoolCoolingSystemisisolatedfromtheComponent CoolingWaterSystem.lfowever, multiplesources(seismic, andnon-seismic) ofmakeupwaterexistnsdiscussed inSubsection 9.1.3.3.1.

Thepurification loopnormallyrunscontinuously duringfuelpooloperation Comaintainthefuelpoolwaterpuri.tyandclarity.ltispossibletooperatethepurification systemwitheitherthefuelpoolionexchanger orfuelpoolfilterbypassed.

Localsamplepointsareprovidedtopermitana-lysisoffuelpoolionexchanger andfuelpoolfilterefficiencies.

9.1-13

2-FSARTABLE9.1-7FUELPOOLSYSTEHINSTRUMENTATIOH InstruantIdentification

ÃuaberTI"4420TI-4421TI-4404TI-4405SystcnPar~ter6LocationFuelPoolTemperature FuelPoolTemperature FuelPoolHeatExchanger InletTeslpfuelPoolHeatEXChanger OutletTerip.LocalControlitsslsIndication hlaraControllessIRoonHiHiInatruisent

~RCCC0-200F0-200F0-200F0-200FHomalOperating

~RcsC120-150P120-150F120-150F108"128FInstrune~RCC'JCC+4F+4PASSIN~IELS-4420LS-4421Pl-4402FuelPoolMaterLevelfuelPoolMaterLevel'FuelPoolPuapZBDischarge Hi6LoHi6Lo0-60psig40-50psig+1"Cla5SIC+199CpnbSI~+1.2psiNcmlfPI-Ii401Pl-4411PS-49403P1-4412PDI-4415FuelPoolPunp2ADischarge PressureFuelPoolPurification PvilipSuctionPressuri~Fu>>lPoolPiupDiscliargc ll,ad>>rI'ressur>>

FuelVcipl.Purification Pu:.2)!.'C..scharg>>

Pres..ure Fi'i'lPs)22~Pu'rLf'LestiisnFill.cr')ifI>>r>>ntial Pressure0-60psig0-25psig0-100psig0-30psid40-50psig+1.2psiIilrbl+5-10psig+.5psiId40-50psig+1psig{(~IF95-90psiis2psiiCis2+'I5-30paid+.6psiPDI-4416Fuel9"olionExr'.Rn:9:.er DiI!iirin'a'IPr"2.222I:0-30psid7-10psid+.6psidlifeIE

PJ5GiVTmI Q~<y.-..smsmmmvazau;~mrs.~~

~+tn~PDM'1A00'4X~FC4t9'lPOTs,5-(9WOrtZ<<~f~r-8~TZS.t54~IFV.tb7POT'H>tI1MI'~-V, T.II,IPCC25lWIO4Z.DI:V~Ã 0/oh2585te4XKVtf.'5GNHVIIIAlAQ&OM~a~D!'A5oQ>f'ig.A.CIQIIC.b!6.

POISP>-IV&XPC%%5-ff3'WS25-IO~4.PC'lfCG0Q~~~~i.~iT.DCV.$j7hf0AY'.I-KVy~QSIR-ACCMI4VLATO f~r1~mL,1.r4+-.X-qVO-Iaefa.

FOROAT5UDYaQO5>rHyGF<<(~I)M95-.1OFn~X-PclI-26-1-~~gg-II1t:5.-.-fC4<<

"~r<<IlII'PrIPC"".A~:atO0;-6IIA<I~!I'.,Frt>G<5tbI4C.IbtWO FOS~HII+IQQ f~4AQ7g-05III.WQ'Q'QJA~.R,O Igr=MA$3.~~X?-p.p5 iNw9AOKKmfllAicoI:ICOmfmIITI0t~oA<<-IIIfTiIgeXC~AN>g'XvhfKKVK.z-y-t5-c~

X-X-ZG-tlat FL4lKXgClf.gy'll PSOD>IK4~54CON%7;RTf7CHttlt45i8ALDDTLS~IDD~I+4F-..-'f~.rO CNNVf.DPIRTENT~CTl04Qy-geFClf<<'ZS'7FC$-c.p+5...err;~.

E.>C6C5I'llIsaa.teax.F'c4-t'$'-8

~"KS.WPi.fmtZ~CV-C",4.

~<<<EVhfaIIIINi

~~f'.LIE1rf V4,LV.X.FCV-2$-7Fe4Pt-P'Cg@QPIJ@VCR.

SL2-FSARvalveisopenedautomatically whentheannulusdifferential pressurereachesonein.wgnegative.

Thecheckvalveinthecoolingline-isdesignedtohaveapressuredropofnotmorethan2.5in.wgandtoo"..nat1.4in.wgnegativetoprovidevacuumcontrolinthesystemandtoallowoutsideairtocoolthefilters.TheSBVSisalsointerconnected tothespentfuelpoolareaexhaustduct.Uponreceiptofahigh-high radiation signalinthefuelpoolarea,theexhaustairisdirectedtotheSBVSfiltration units.Thec'"toroperatedbutterfly valvesI-FCV-25-30 and31openandtheexhaustfansstartautomatically.

ThemotoroperatedvalvesI-FCV-25-32 and33clos.tnisolatethe,annulus=;

Althoughafuel.handlingaccidentinsidthconcurrent withaLOCAisnotconsidered adesignb"isevent,aCi.'~Soverrides theFuelHandlingBuildinghigh-high radiation signalainitiates thedepressurization oftheShieldBuildingannul".TheFu.lHandlingBuildingVentilation Systemisfurtherdiscussed inSub"etio.~.4.2.EachoftheSBVSintaketrainsisalsoconnected totheContinuous Con-tainment/Hydrogen PurgeSystem.Thisconnection, manuallyin'.tiated fromthecontrolrocm,provideshydrogenpurgecapability whilemini.:.iz-ingoffsiteradiological consequences.

TheContinuous Containment/Hydrogen PurgeSystem.description isprovidedinSubsection 9.4.8.8.BothSBVSsubsystems areautomatically startedbyaCIASorhigh-high radiation signalfrantheFuelHandling'uilding.

Onecanbemanuallyshutdownandplacedinthestandbymode.Thestandbysubsystem auto-matically restartsiftheoperating subsystem shouldfail.Thcrosscon-nectionvalveisopenedfromthecontrolroomtoassureairflowthrou:hthefailedsystem.Detectors inthecharcoalbedsannunciate tempr"..""".-.:

exceeding 200F.6.2.3.3DesinEvaluation 6.2.3.3.1 Performance Requirements andCapabilities Eachofthetwofullc-pacityEan-filter trai..softheShieldBu'entilation System,alongwiththeShieldBuilding, aredesignedtofulfilltheperfonnance requir'ements statedinthedesignbasesinSubsection 6.2.3,1.TheanalysisoftheEunc'tional capability oft'.;"S3VStoi:,:)re."s

".andmaintainauniformnegativepre."2."withinth"Sh=!":.annulusisperformed Eorthe9.02E-doublecnddsu:tion1s3::breakLOCAusin~tholiATFHPTcomputerco'ed=si1';1inThedescription oEthedevelopment ofthepipebreakmassandreleaserateandthecontainmntinitia1conditions arecontain:..l in"section6.2.1.Anyadditional initialconditions orchangesEre~t':.o.=.listedinSubsection 6.2.1arecontai>>cd inT-~6.2-49.T)is:.transfercoeEicientsareappliedwhetherthesurfacetemperature cxccdstheannulusatmosphere ortheannulusatmo""her" t..:iaratu:.u"x.'"!st!:::surfacetemperature.

JULpygg6'-47A SL2-FSAR6.2.4COllTAIhMCtlT ISOLATIO"

,SYSTEMThecontainment ieolation systemprovidesthemeansofisolating fluidsys-temsth-.tpassthroughcont=~"..-...cnt pcnctrations suchthatanyradioactivity the.1.r-ybereleasedintotheccntainment atmosphere following apostulated designbasisaccident(DEA')isconfined.

Thereisnoo~eparticular rv;."':";

co:..1."etc conlasl>>neifolation, butisolation designisprovideda1'plyin-::

-".cecr-'terico;..-.;;on topenetrations inmanydifferent fl<<idsystems.6.2.4.1DesignL'cesTnedesignbasesgo;crning thecontainment isolation systemarediscussed below.valvesI,.cttherenuxxeme~,l.s ofmanufatu.c.sstandardc"Bu1.terf1yValves".asI6.2.4.1.1 Conditions Requiring Containment Isolation Thccontsinl-ent isolation valvesaredesignated seismicCategoryIandde>>signedtoAS[KCode,SectonIIIandequalityGroup8requirements.

Con-tainmcntisolation valvesaredesignedtoensureleak-tightncss andrc.liability ofoperaton.Containment isolation globe,checkandgatevalvesmeettherequirements ofmanufacturers sta:ldards MSS-SP-61>

"Hydrostatic TestingofSteelValves"andcontainment isolation butterfly iiAA~'SS-SP-67 Automatic initiation ofacontainment isolation actuation signal(CIAS)occurswhenahighcontainment pressureof5pcigor,ahighcontainment radiation levelgf10R/hrisdetected.

Thisprovidesdiversity ofparameters sensedfor.theinitiation ofcontainment isolation.

b)TheCIASclosesfluidlinepenetration isolation valvesnotrequiredforoperation oftheEngineered SafetyFeatures.

c)Thecontainment isolation systemisdesignedsuchthatnosingleac-.tivefailure(inconjunction withlossofoffsitepower)couldresultinoffsitedosesordosestooperators inthecontrolroominexcessof10CFR100andGDC19,respectively.

d)Themainsteamandfcedwater valvescloseonMSISandthevalvesfor'hecomponent coolingwaterforthereactorcoolantpumpmotorscloseonSIAS(seeSection7.3andSubsection 6.2.4.3.2).

6.2.4.1.2 CriteriaforIsolation ofFluidSystemPenetrating theContainment Ia)Thecontainmcnt isolation provis'ons forthefluidsystempcnetrations (excluding theESFsystems)aredesignedinaccordance withGeneralDesignCriteria54;55,.56and,57(refertoTable6.2-52).Excep-tionstoGDCprovisions arediscussed inSubsection 6.2.4.3.6.2-52goal11'.

SHIELDBUILDING@SL2-FSARTABLE62-51VENTILATION SYSTENINSTRUHENTATION APPLICATION

.?I2~SstemParameter

&Lnratinnhnaulus/atansphere pressurediffcrenrial Fuelpnnlarea/atchsphere prcssurediEferential LnralCna<rnlReIndirarinn AlaredCnnrrnlIIHi-LnHi-LnCnntrnlRnna~Rdrrdinhutnnctir CnntrnlFunrtinnEaergices fand<crhargc dampercRnrnrandrepu-laresflnvrnpreddctvalueandeaergi=enutsidernnliagairvalveEnergizes Eandicrhargc dampermnrnrandregu-laresflnvrnpresetvalueandeacrgiaenurside'nnling airvalve'nstrument Rcnce-lntn+30in,-ll20-10rn+30in.H20-1tn-3in.H20-1tn-3ia.H20Instrument hrrurcry+1.0X+1.0X,3~hirflnvremperct'ure dnvnstreasnfdemiaterInlettemperature Upstreamnffiltertrain*0250F0-250F40-111F40177F+2.0X+2.0X5.Demistcr&ElertrirHearersdifEerential pressure6dhirflnvtemperature dnvn-strccmnf30Kvhearingcnil0250F40-177F+2.0X78.9.Prc-HEPAfilterdiEfereatial prcssureAfter-HEPA Eilterdifferent'ial presddure hirElnvcRniature dnvasrrcam nfHEPAfilterHiHi0-10iaH200-10ia.H200-100X1tn3ia.H201tn3inH2050-10X+1.0X+1.0Xo2.0X10Chcrrnclcdsnrbcrdifferential pressureindiratnr llCharrnalcdRRnrbcr rwper~rure l2,hirflnvtemperature dnvn>>streamnErharrnaladcnrbcra Hi0-lOia,H200-250F0-250F1tn1.15in.+1.0XH20+2.0X40-'I77F40-117F+2OX Sl.2-FSAR TA51E6.2-51(Cnnt'd)Snremparamerer 6Lclrnrinn Indicurinn.CRRnrrnlRralR*,AlarmCRRnrm)II**.CnnrrnlRncRa~aar*alaAutnmarir CcRnrrnlFvncrinnInarrument

~RR"EHnrma1Operating

~aarInatru-ent

~arrarhirflnvdnvnatruam nifan~~nrhirflnMnffiltertrainKnergiaea idlefantnRRrarratlcRvflnvandalarma0-10,000.

cfee6000cfaPiltertraindifferential presaureCrnaa-rnnnec't flnuenntrnlvalvepnairinn015in.H204tn8ia.~.+1.0XH0OutaidecnnlingairflnutnntrnlvalvepnritinnSbieldbuildingaurtinnvalvepnaitinnFuelhandlingbuildingauctinnvalvepnsitinnPurgediachargevalvepnaitinn

~>~~~s-""'""'20.56PositionCe8ofRegulatory Guide1.45statesthat"leakagedetection systemsshouldbeequippedwithprovisions toreadilypermittestingforoperability andcalibration duringplantoperation".

Discusshoweachofthesystemsdescribed in.Subsections 5.2.5.1.1 thru5.2.5.11complywiththeaboveposition.

~ResesseAsrecommended byPositionC.8'fRegulatory Guide'1.45,thethreeseparateunidentified leakagedetection methodsutilizedonSt.Lucie-Unit2are(1)sumplevelandflowmonitoring, (2)airborneparticulate radioactivity monitoring, (3)airbornegaseousradioactivity monitoring.

('gTheContainment Atmosphere Radiation Monitoring Systemwnichincludestheairborneparticulate andgaseousradioactivity measurements haveradioactive checksourcesforthedetermination oftheoperability ofeachoftheradiation channelsduringfullpoweroperation.

Calibration canalsobeperformed duringpoweroperation intheReactorAuxiliary Buildingat19.5ftelevation.

Theinstrumentation forthethirdmethodofleakdetection, sumplevelandflowmonitoring, cannotbetestedandcalibrated duringplantoperation duetothelocationoftheequipment (insideContainment Building)

~However,acomparison withthereadingsoftheothertwomethodsdescribed aboveprovidestheoperatorwithsufficient information todetermine channelinoperability ormalfunction.

/ITie~ik~'~g'I,'///eb'K<1+e~<>Gal+kl/(XdMPlfl//bs/e/bestbsd'Me~+sA~Žp(~<efJ'gn~JtJLgg~Ib,1's'4"(420.56-1 PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION Re:PSIMeetingbetweenFPLandNRC8/ll/81Pursuanttotneabovereferenced meetingFlordiaPower5Lighthasagreedtothefollowing:

l.AmeetingbetweenFPLandNRCtoaddressRegulatory Guide1.150'obeheldon,orbefore,10/I/81,2.Anarrative description ofwhatwillbedoneforReactorvesselinspection by9/I/81,3.Aprocedure, forinformation only,ForReactorvesselinspection byweekof11/I/81,4.'heultrasonicxamination procedure willbechangedby8/15/81toincludethefollowing:

"Examiners willrecordallcrack-like indications regardless ofamplitude" "P.1pld1hP-71~di~P+ontheestimated numberofweldstobeinspected usingSectionXI,1977edition,Summer78Agenda,ASMECodeselectedcriteriaforclass2pipingonorbefore8/31/81,6.Toprovideasummaryofallweldsatlocations wheretnestressesundertheloadingsresulting fromnormal.and upsetplantcondi-tionsascalculated bythesumofequations 9and10inNC-3652whichexceed0.8(1.2Sh+Sa)onorbefore9/31/81,7.Ph-71~i~711pl11h7-mentedISIrequirements ofSRPsections3.6.1and3.6.2orjustifyexceptions takenbyFPL,8.Touse,asguidance, theweldreliefrequestprocedures outlinedinBandCoftheattachment, 9.By8/31/81provideanestimateofPSIareasthatmayrequirereliefrequests, 10.ProvideacopyofthePre-Service Ins~ection

~SosnmrtoNRC'sB.J.Crowley(RegionI~I.

~r 121.13TheASHECode,SectionY!.1977Editionwi:hAddend~throughtheSummer1978Addendaspecifies useofAppendixIIIofSect~on):Iforferri.icpipingwelds.Ifthis:r".Jirement isnotapplicable (forexample,foraustenitic pipingwelds),ultrasonic examination isrequiredtobeconducted inaccordance withthe2plicable'equi Section".,asamendedbyI~'A-222.DiscussyourAr.icle5of'ection V,asamendedby'.LA-2232.

cationforanyalternaivesusedsuhasSectionrementsofArticle5ofcriteriaforapolyingProvideatechnical justifi-XI,AppendixIII,Supplement 7forauszenitlc pipingweldsanc"icusssthefollowing:

All..difications per.-;.itted'y Supplement 7.b.Yeh""sofassu.in"adequateexamination sensitivity'ver therequiredexar,'ination volume.c.hethccsofqualifving theprocedure forexamination throughtheweld(ifco.-.delete examination istobeconsidered forexaminations conducted wi+l.onlyonesidaccess).Whenus'-"~poendixIIIofSectionX'.forinservice examination ofeitherfer.-.=ic

-aus=eni.ic oipineweld=-hefollowing shouldbeincorporated:

d.A.v-.=f:-r>I="in"1caior.,"-careen:oDACorgreater,discovered snou.-xot-..=o=t'<examination ofoipinewellesoradjacentbasemetalmaterials berecorde'ndinves:ig-.edbyaLevelIIofLevelIIIexaminerextentnecessary toce-.-e..-..ine theshape,identify, andlocationre.lector.

Tne';.Ia~v~shouldevaluat=.htake,correc.ive actionforthedispo-ofanyindication rvsti".ated andfoundtobeotherthangeo-.-..e=r'."al ormetallur"'calinnature.

ThePS:r"gra-.'ouidincludethefollowing information:

A)ForASHECodeClass1and2co-.,ponents, providea.ablesimilartoIMB-2600andIWC-2600confinnino thateitherth~entireSectionXIpreservice exa;..ination wasperfor,.ed ontnecor.:""nnorreliefisrequested withatechnica'1 justification suppor='."..c yourconclusion.

~B)Wherereliefisrequested f".pressureretainin" weldsinthereactorvessel,identifythespeciicweldsthatdidnotreeivea100+pre-serviceultrasonic examira:-'cr.

ar"estimatethe>:=antcftheexaminatior.

thatwasper;-"r.-.:ed.

.C)hherereliefis'requested forpipingsystemweld=-(=xamination CateooryB-~,C-F,andC-G),"rovidealistofth=specificweldsthatdidnotreceiveacompleteSectionXI-preservice xamination including adiawingoriscretric iden.i-.ication number,sy=-'.=;,'eld number,andphvsicalconiguration,

.g.,pipetonozzle;:eld, etc.Estimatetheextento-.thepreserv'.ce

=xa.-.,ina ionthatwa:-."~rformed.

Whenthorvolumetric ex=-.,-.nation was".erfor;-..ed fromonesi-=oftheweld,discusswhe"hertheen-.-'rewelcv-'u-.andthehea:=e"=="'"n=

(HfZiandbasehietalor.-.'".efarsideo-,theweldwereexa.-...'.:ed.

S:=-tetheprimaryreason.hatas=="ificexa-.ira.ion isi;..oractical, e.g.,supportorcc.-..p,"-

nentrestric-s ac=ess,.itingpreventsadequateultrasonic couplingononeside,cc-...""n ntoco-...".onent widpreventsv:-.=-sonicexamination, etc.Indica'=="..'lterna-.i;=

orsupp;-.,e".ital exa-..irations performed andmethods(s:

.".abricaionoxamination.

IOnpage2ofyourprogramdescription, regarding ClassIIexaminations, you'havefailedtoincludetherequirement fromTableIHC-2500-1 ofthe77Code,S-78Addendato-includein-theweldsselectedforexamination "allweldsatlocations wherethestressesundertheloadings, resulting fromnormalandUpsetplantconditions as.calculated bythesumof,Eqs."9and10inNC-3652exceed0.8{1=-.2'pa)."

ExplaintheaboveandsubmitarequestforreliefifallS-78Addendarequirements arenotfollowed.

2)3)ProvidesampleresultsofPSIUT.examination including resultsofinevestigating causesof'ltrasonic rejectives andrepairresults.Tocompleteourreview,itwouldbehelpfultohaveyourprocedures forautomated examinations.

Inparticular, submityour,plans,schedule, andprocedure forimp'lementing Regulatory Guide1.150forreactorvesselweldPSI.Discussyourplansforcompliance withaugmented ISIofStandardReviewPlans6.6,3.6.1and3.6.2..,(~j5)InParagraph 4.1.2ofyourgeneralNUTprocedure youindicateaminimumofonLevelIIinacrewofLevelI'sorLevelITrainee's.

Yourexampleexamination resultsaresignedboth'byaLevelIIandLevelI.Sinceyourprocedures involvedevaluation ofindications astogeometric ornon-geometric, itwouldbegoodpracticetohaveatleastoneLevelIIdirectlyperforming orobserving eachexamination.

Pleaseexplainyouractualpractices.

InExhibit1ofyourprogramdescription, youhavea30"to12"joint'hich utilizesa12"calibration blocks.Providejustification fornotalsousinga30"block.

FLORDIAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANY'S POSITIONONFEEDWATER 1MSIERTESTING1.St.Lucie81&82Feedwater pipingisnotonlysimilar,itisessen-tiallyidentical.

-Isometrics ofbothunitswerecomparedandthedifferences aremeasurable infractions.

Forexample,thehorizon-talsectionsofpipingenteringthestreamgenerator, whicharethesections'ofpipingmostlikelytoexperience waterhammerareallequalinlength(2feed),withonsectiononUnitf/1being3/8"shorterthanonUnit//2.St.Lucie1performed feedwater hammertestingbydrainingthefeed-ringforupto2hoursandthenmanuallyinitiating auxiliary feed-.water.Thisdrainingofthefeedringisconsidered theworstcasetotransient and,sinceithasbeenperformed onanidentical unit,willnotberepeatedhere.2.Three(3)testswillverifythattheAuxiliary Feedwater Systemwillperformitsdesignfunction.

a~Aux.FeedPumpInitialRun.Thistestisarecirculation from/totheCondensate StorageTanktoinitially run.intheequipment.

b.C~Auxiliary Feedwater FunctionandEndurance Test.Thistestwillbeperformed priortoandduringHotFunctional Testingtocheckoutsystemoperation, toverifythemanufacturers endurance run.Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Initiation.

C.1.Objective.'.Toverifyauxfeedau'toinitiation b.Toverifytheabsenceofwaterhammerstothefeedwaterpipingduringautoinitiation.

C-2InitialConditions

'a~b.c~ReactorCoolantSystematnormal,no-loadoperating temperature andpressure.

SteamGenerator Secondary Sideatnormalno-loadoperating temperature andpressure.

Maintaining SteamGenerator levelswithmanualaux.feedwater control.C-3TestOutlinea~b.csStationanoperatorincontainment tolistenforanysymptomsofwaterhammer.StopfeedingSteamGenerators ReturnAuxiliary Feedwater toa"NormalStandby"lineup.

C.3(cont.)d.e.AllowSteamGenerators todrain.WhentheAux.,Feed-waterActuation Signaloccurs,observeproperoperations ofAutomatic Aux.Feedwater initiation (ie.pumpsstart,valvesopen,steamgenerator levelsrise)-FeedSteamGenerators todesiredlevelsResumeManualAux.FeedtoSteamGenerators Visually'examine pipingexternaltotheSteamGenera-torsforeffectsofwaterhammer.Theadditionoftheautomatic activation featureensuresthatthesteamgenerators willnotbesubjected toalongperiodofsteamingdown,suchashappenedatTMIandwastestedfoxonSt.Lucie//1.Xnstead,thesystemwillactivateattheactualtimeitwouldintheeventofanaccident.

Thisisconsistent withthetestbeingpex-formedattheSanOnofre2&3unitsaftertheixfeedingmodification.

3.Pi'pingvibration willbemonitored duringthevaxious phasesofstart-up.Xnaccordance withtheFPLapprovedvibration monitoring program.4..Becauseofthefollowing reasons:a)ThePipingarrangement forbothunitsisalmostidentical, Eb)Extensive Feedwatex Hammertestingwasperformed onSt.LuciefIl(5separatetestsatvarioussteam-down internals upto2hours)andnoresultant Feedwater Hammer,c)TheSt.LucieI2Pxeoperational TestProcedure willverifyauto-maticinjection, whichwillbetheworstcondition forUnit/I2,d)Anoperatorwillbestationed tospecifically monitorforFeed-waterHammer:,FloxdiaPower6Lightfeelsthatouxpresentproposedprogramadequately demonstrates thatSt.Lucie//2will.notencounter anyFeedwater HammerproblemsandhopesthissatisfystheNRCBranchposition.

Regarding questions raisedbyWalterPasedag(Radiological AnalysisBranch,SectionAccidentEvaluation Branch)onthehydrazine additivesyst:emandTSPlocatedinsidecon-tainment, theapplicant, willrevisetheFSAR,asnecessary, viaamendment to,document thefollowing:

1-Aminimumof,2hoursofhydrazine willbestoredforcontinuous injection ataratethatwillinsureaminimumconcentration of50ppmisavailable atthespraynozzles.2-Aslongasdosesareacceptable intheapplicable por-tionsoftheReactorAuxiliary

Building, thereisthecapability topermit,therefilling thehydrazine, tank.3-AquantityofTSPwillbe10acatedinsidecontainment suchthatthewaterpostaccidentwillhaveaminimumpHof7.0.P4.-TheTSPbasketdesignwillbesuchthataninadvertant containment spraywillnotdissolvetheTSP.5-TheTSPbasketswillbelocatedinthevicinityofthe*ECCSsumpanddesignedsuchthataflowofwaterwilldissolvetheTSPwithinthebaskets.

SL2-FSARtI6.5.2COH'fAINlEN'f SPRAYSYS'fEH/IODINE RE"lOVALSYS'fl;H(CSS/IRS)

TheContainment SprsySystem(CSS)isprovidedtoperfnrmthedrralfrrnc-tinnsofremovingheatandfissionprodrrcts fromapost-accident contain-mentatmosphere.

Theheatrein>valcapability oftheCSSisdiscussedinSubsection 6.2.2.Thefissionproductremovalfrrnction ir.carriednrrtbytheIodineRemovalSystem(IRS),nperating inconjunction withtireCon-tainmentSpraySystem.TheIRSremnvesradio-indines fromthecnntainrnent atmosphere fnllowing aloss-of-coolant accidentbyaddingcontrolled amn'untsofhydrazine tocontainment spraywater.6.5.2.]~DecinBhCehThedesignbasesfortheCSS/IRSasafissionproductremovalsystemareasfo1l.ows:a)Tnprovidecapability fnrthefissionproductrcrubbing ofthecontainment atmcspherefol.lowing aDBA-LOCAsuchthatnffsitednses,anddnsestonperators inthecnntrolronm,arewithintheguide-linesof10CFR100andGDC19respectively.

Theradioactive materialreleaseassumptions ofRegulatory Guide1.4"Assumptions UsedfnrEvaluating thePntential Radiological Consequences ofaLnssofCnnlantAccidentforPMRS",6/74{R2)areusedindetermining systemcapability.

Theradioiodine andnoblegasactivityinventory inthecnntainment atmnsphere following aDBA-LOCAisgiveninSection15.6.b)Tnmaintainaminimumhydcc;ntainment spraynnzzlespercentbyweightindemiToachieveacontainment rpraychemicalmixeswithrazinecnncentratinn of50-65ppmatthebasednnastoragecnncentration of.neralized water.7~sumppitbetween7.0and7.5afteralltetheavailable waterinventory.

h/~hthh'"~0~hh4.d)Elemental hTnperformitsfunctionfollowing aLOCA>assumingasingleactivecomponent failurecoincident withlnssofnffsitepower.BedesignedtnseismicCategoryI,QualityGroupBstandards asapplicable.

Tnremoveelemental andparticulate indineswiththefnllowingmini-mumfi~~)orderremcval.cnefficients (inaccordance withHUREG/CR-009hIodineForm'irstOrderRemovalCrefficient

-110hnursParticulate

,'-~""-~,~0.45hnurshTnmeetiodineremnvalrequirements basedonaneffective spraycoveragenf85percentofthecontainment freevolume.6.5-6 e0 Sl.2-FSAR Toperformitsfunctionunderthepostaccidentenvironmental conditions specified inSection3.11.Toprovidesystemmaterials whicharecompatible withfluidche;nistry.TheContainment Spray/Iodine Rem<valSystemsaredesignedtoQualityGroupBandseismicCategoryIrequirements inaccordance withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.26,"QualityGroupClassifications andStandards forWaterSteanandRadioactive WasteContaining Components ofNuclearPowerPlants",2/76(R3)andRegulatory Guide1.29,"SeismicDesignCl.assifi-cation",(R2),respectively.

p'4F,F6.5.2.2.1DesignDescription

',~FBoththeCSS/IRSconristoftwoindependent andredundant loops.EachCSSloopismadeupofaspraypump,shutdowncoolingheatexchanger, piping,val.ves,headers,andnozzles.Connected toeachCSSloopisanindependent trainoftheIodineReraovalSysteaconsisting nfaconstantvolumemeteringpump,soLennid-operated isolationvalve,IRStankandassociated pipingandvaLves.TheflowdiagramsfortheCSSandIRSappearasFigure6.2-41.ThedesigndataforIRScomponents isshowninTable6.5-2.SimilardatafortheCVSSisgiveninTable6.2-38.,4Ir4F-.4~44CV~~F\I~ThedesignoftheIRSisbasedontheadditionofhydrazine tothecon-tainmentspraywaterataratethatensuresaminimumhydrazine concentra-tionof50ppmatthespraynozzlesaBasedontheoffsitedoselimitsasdefinedin10CFR100, andaspraycoverageof85percentoEthetotalcontainment netfreevolume,hydrazine additionproceedsforaperiodofappraxiipstaty g'rpiautas.

/8<Aconstantvon~iydrazine additionpumpisselectedforsystemsimpli-ficationandeaseofoperation.

Overtheentirerangeofsprayflowratestheconcentration ofhydrazine irnolessthan50ppraandnogreaterthan65ppm.Uponreceiptofacontainment sprayactuation signal(CSAS)the.solenoid-operated isolation valvesopenandthehydrazine pumpsstart.Hydrazine i.xnjcedintothesuctionsideofeachcontainment spraypumpatarateo-'gallonsperminute(gpra)untilalowlevelswitchinthehydrazine staetanksiraultaneously stopsthepumpsandclosesthesolenoidvalves.Thesystenisdesignedtobefullyautnraatic yetiscapablenfLocal-manual control.4sIo.gitsA<<sa.renc~~b4~W~

pofi'~cfWW4>/lv'I'~8't4:p,9<~e.4~~p4Iip*p'~reW'~l'~Ly>sy'~6k..Oninitiation nftheCSAS,thecontainraent spraypumpstrikesuctionfromtherefueling watertank(RMT)andsprayboratedwaterdirectlyintothecontainment atmosphere AlowleveLintheRWTisreachedinapproxiraately 20minutes(seeSubsection 6.2.2).Alowlevelswitchinitiates therecirculation actuation signal(RAS)transEerring containment spraysuctiontothecontainment sump.Spraywaterinthesumpisbufferedwithtrisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP)6.5-7 SJ.2"YSARmodes<<ndeffectsan<<Lysishasbeenrpadeon<<11activecomponents oftheIrdineRernov<<lSystemtosin'wthatasaminimumthereis<<v<<il<<ble one100percenthydrazine sprayadditivesubsystem afteranysingleactivefailure.Forafailuremodesandeffects<<n<<lysisoftheContain!nent SpraySystensee6.2-41'.5.2.3.1 TheoryofIodineRemovalbyContainment SprayThesprayremovalcon~tant~,Eoriodineisevaluated usingthemodelsdescribed inNUREG/CR-009

~Themodelassumesabal.ancebetweeniodineenteringandleavingthecontainment atmosphere withfirstorderremovalproducedbythespray.TheresuLtingequation, asgiveninNUREG/CR-009, fortheremov<<Lrateis:A~LEHwhere'acHVViodineremovalrate~hrsprayflowrate,Et/hrabsorption efficiency equilibrium partition coefficient3 netfreevolumeofcontainment, ftTheabsorption efficiency, E,isevaluated byusingthestagnantEiLmmodel.Furtherguidanceonthedetermination ofthisparameter isgivenbyParsiyandhasbeenfollowedinthisevaluation.

Theparameters usedinthecalcu-lationaregiveninTable6.5>>5.Forelemental.

iodine,aremovalco-efficient of37hrhasbeencalculated.

However,inordertoaccountforre-evolution ofiodine,creditistakenforsprayrernovaLuntil.theinitialiodineconcentration hasbeenreducedbyafactorof100.Further,intheevaluation ofthepost-LOCA offsitedoses,theasssumption ismadethat50percentoftheinitialairborneiodineinstantaneously platesout.Consequentl y,theremoval.ratesforelemenfaL andparticulate iodineusedintheLOCAdosecalculations are10hrand'0.45hr,respective l.y.6.5.2.3.2'pray andSumpMaterpHHistoryThepHoELiquidsolutions thatarerecirculated withinthecontainment foiiowing adesignbasis~ccidentisstabilized atapproximately 7.0to7.5ThepHismaintained withtheuseoftrisodium phosphate dodecahdrste(TSP)whichisstoredinnineopenbasketsLocatedinth8contarnment

..ump.EachbarketisapproximateLy threeft.bythreeft.byoneft.Theareconstructed ofstainless steelwithmeshscreensides>and-ope~py Boratewaterfromthecontainment spraydissolves theTSPandthusraisethepMixingisachievedasthesolutioniscontinuousLy recirculated fromthesumptothespraynozzles.Thespraywaterdissolves'the TSPwithinthreehoursfollowing CSAS.Approximately one-third oftheTSPdissolves duringtheinjecticnmade~Fordetailsofflowpathstothesump,seeSubsection YtC.>IN=0"Cd6.2,2.'An-++PID(ls4+I)Jn.s!Qr>>~ilbr)s~c(>>~I>>tl+%wrrlaJyQe'ta)lt calztohl~~~<$

~>>IIaa'td>>ss~lve.

44l~sp6.5-9 SL2"FSARTABLE6.5"2IODINEREMOVALSYSTEMCOMPONENTS tlydrazine St~oraeTankr'Volume,gallons"Mi'nimum:

LiquidVolume,gallonshDesignTemperature, FDesignPressure, psigOperating Temperature, FOperating

Pressure, psigFluidMatrrialCode80~8).201007.%f10.byweighthydrazine solutionwithnitrogen(N)covergas31%4SSASMEXII,CodeClass2B-HdrazinePums~-~~rerrr~Js~rrwwdSuQuantityTypeCapacity, gpmDischarge

Pressure, psigDesignTemperature, FOperating Temperature, FNPSHn,ftofwaterFluictMaterialCodeRatingSolenoidValvesQuantitySize,inche"sTypeDesignPressure, ps15DesignTemperature, FANSIClassEndConnection PipeScheduleMaterialFluidOperatorCode2PositiveDisacgrant,Metering3s0maximum12010030QXlyweighthydrazine solution304SSASMEIII,CodeClass2480VACr~.2.1/2Globe120600SW80s304SS)Z~yweighthydrazine solution125Vdc*solenoidASMEIXI0CodeClass20*125V,DC6.5-19Amendment No.0,(12/80)

SL2"l'SARTABLE6.5-3CONTAIN!1ENT SPRAYANDSPRAYAOI)ITIVE I'LOPRATESTheflovratesforthecontainment sprayandsprayadditiveflovratesaregivenforthefollowing threecases:Case1:Hinimumsafeguard flow,minimuminjection (i.e.,onecontainment spraypump+oneHPSIpump+oneLPSIpump)withlossofoffsitepowerandonedie"elgenerator failure.Case2:Maximumsafeguard flov(i.e.,twoHPSIpump+twoLPSIpumps)andsinglefailureofonecontainment spraypump,(i.e.,onlyonecontainment spraypumpoperating) withoffsitepoweravailable.

'Case3:Maximumsafeguard flov,maximuminjection (i.e.,twocontainment spraypumps+twoHPSIpumps+twoLPSIpumps)vithoffsitepoweravailable.rCaseTotalTotal.Total>Safeguard SystemContainment SprayAdditiveHydrazine Addition~Oeral.ion RodeSrettlou(m)ttlou(~m)Time(minutes) 0Injection LongTermRecirculation 280035603.583.5802Injection LongTermRecirculation 280035603.583.583Injection56007.1620LongTerm7120716ggQRecirculation

• BasedonRATatminimumTechSpeclevelandrunoutflowsforHPSI,LPSIandCSpumps.Thecontainment sprayflovof2800gpmincludesaminimumrecirculation flovof150gpmrequiredduringtheinjection phase.I3'tss4~'Vs1s~e~*'k'\e~~'g,~,6,5-21Amendment No,3~(6/81)

FLORIDAPOMER6LICHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEUNIT2DOCKET50-389ENVIRONMENTAL DATAFORUNDERROUNDCABLEEXPOSEDTOMET/DRYNNVINNrNNNTU I.~TeeofCablesUs.dInUnderroundDuctss~c(l44wocablevendorssupplycablesforus>inunderground ducts.TheyaretheOkoniteCompany.and SheKeriteCompany~,Okonitesupplies5KV&.15KVpowercabledKaritesupplies600Vpower,controlandinstruaeetation cable~.('.RL.rs]:~PP)s'~C~~~dgCC.'&-~The5KVand15KVpowercablesareinsulated withunfilled, crosslinkedpolyethylene, wrappedwithanextrudedlayerofsemiconducCing insulation shieldmaterialcompatible withtheinsulation, andcoveredwithaleadsheathandaheavydutyoverallneoprenejacket.The600Vpowercablesare'nsulated withahightemperature Keriteinsulation (HTK)andcoveredwithblackheavydutyflameresistant (FR)jacket.The600Vcontrolcablesareinsulated withKeriteflameresistant (FRII)insulation andcoveredwithheavyflameresistant (FR)jackets.'he600Vinstrumentation cablesconsistsoftwistedpair'edshieldedandunshielded cables.'Unshielded cablesconsistoftwistedpairswithKeriteflameresistant (FRII)insulation coveredwithanextrudedpolymerlayerandhavinganoverallflameresistant (FR)jacket.Shieldedcablesinaddition'o theabovehaveadrainwirewitheachpairindirectcontactwithalumimummylartape.Eachshieldedpairisseparated byglassmylarCape.Coaxialcablesareconstructed withaRockbestos FirewallIIIPolymerLDfirstinsulation, radiation crosslinkedcellularmodifiedpolyolefin orradiation crosslinkedmodifiedpolyolefin secondinsulation,'overed with(atincoatedcoppershieldandaradiation crosslinked,noncorrosive, Iflameretardant modifiedpolyolefin overalljacket~Thesecablesareratedforcontinuous serviceupto110C.I XI.TestDataVendordata(Keriteend>0konite qualification oftheircablesexposedforyouruse.regarding theenvironmental toawet/dryenvironment areattachedInadditiontotheabove,aprocedure wasdeveloped onStLucieUnit-1totestcertainunderground cablesto'onfirm theirfunctionability.

Thefol'lowing isabriefsynopsisofthisUnit1procedure.

Atleast-onceper18months,duringshutdown, byselecting onarotatingbasisatleastthree(3)cables,onefromswitchgear tointakecoolingwatermotor,onefromswitchgear tocomponent coolingwatermotorandonefromswitchgear todieselgenerator aretestedwitha2500VDCmegger.Controlcablesthatareassociated witheachoftheabovemotorsanddieselgenerptors aretestedwith1000VDCmegger.ThethreesparecablesareDCpro%<tested at25,000voltsandmeasuredforleakagecurrentat30secondsintervals for10minutes.Allreadingsmustmeettechnical specification 4.8.1.1.3, Ifanyinstalled sparecablefailstheHitPottest,theNRCwillbenotifiedandcorrective actiontakepertechnical specification 4.8.1.1.3.

AttachedarecopiesofactualtestdatatakenatStLucieUnit1

~a~s0Peference Ifff383Parag~rah2.3.3.2Pg.2(tSaoiplesAthroughEiveretheiioally, agedinacirculating airovenfor168hoursat150"Ctosimulate40yearinstalled lifeat75'C.III.gsference IEEE383ParaELraph 2.3.3.3SamplesAthroughEifIeresubsequently'subjected inairtogamma~Ilradiation fromacobalt-60 sourceatarateof0.5x10radsperhourtoacumulative dosageof2x10rads.8IV.Reference IEEE38~3para~rah2.4(TestingforOperation DuringDesignBasssfventInordertodemonstrate serviceability ofFire>rail IIIcoaxialhAga~~constructions duringandafteraLOCA,theagedandirradiated samplesIMeresubjected totheLOCAprofile'for combinedPWR/BWRasspecified inIEEE323,Fig.Al.Ouring'this entireprofilethesampleshada600voltrmsvoltageappliedbetweentheinnerandouterconductors, theV.electrics andthesplicedsample(Saoiples AthroughE).onlyexception being'whenleadsvieredisconnected toprovideforinsula-.'ionresistance measurements.

..-":.-:.'-';...*;

Reference IEEE383Para~rah2.3.3.4Aftercompletion ofLOCAUiefo11oiving vvasaccomplished:

=~~1l..Insulation Resistance Wasoieasured afterthe'autoclave.

Mls~,sopenedandtemperature returnedtoambient..

~..2.Sampleswereremovedfromautoclave andwrappedona40Xmandrel(10inchdia.).3.Whilestillwrappedo>>theBOXmandrel,adielectric testWas-performed Wherea60cycleroisvoltagegasappliedbetiveenthe..inner andouterconductors oftheco1xialconstructions foroneminute.The'estvoltagewas2000voltsforthesoliddielectrics, thecellulardi-~t~~~a-Nes1Phrhl LthVh~h1<<~%WVEWf%~hueeh\h%1%H~tIPa~\,~~eh1eler&hhatl

%lthlla~ht~el~h.h~~hY 0

Pg.34.Theinsulation resistairce wasmeasuredwhiletiresampleswerestillwrappedonthemandrel.5.The'entire mandrelwiththecablesstillwrappedthereon'as thenimmersedinwaterandthevoltagewithstand testwasagainapplied.6.Aftertheimmersion andvoltagetestsofthepreceding para-graph,samples"A"through"E"inclusive were'made into40Xcoilsandputintoa200'F100>>relativehumidityenvironment.

Sincethisen'-vironment was.notprovidedbytheautoclave, thetestvoltagewasnotappliedduringtjristestperiod.Afteroneyearinthedescribed environment, allsampleswere4subjected toaninsulation resistance testandthenimmersedinwater.Adielectric testwasthenperformed wherea60cyclermsvoltagewasappliedbetweentheinnerandouterconductors ofthecoaxialcon-structions foroneminute.Thetestvoltagewas2000voltsforthesoliddielectrics, thecellulardielectrics andthesplicedsample(SamplesAthroughE).Allsamplespassedthistest.Performance ofthepreviously described tests,indicates thatboththecellularandsoliddielectric coaxialconstructions willbeservice-~~~-/'ablefortheirintendedpurposebothduringandafteraLOCAwhichmayhappen"anytimeduringtire40yearlifeofthe,generating station.Reference lFEEPa~ra~rahP..5(FlameTests)-Althoughpassageoftheverticalcabletraytestof1FEE383isnotarequirement forcoaxial,triaxial aridspecialinstrumentation cable,Aockbestos, nevertheless, subjected tireASS6-102cabletoandsuccessfully passedthistest.Note:Rockbestos believesthatmostcablesinitsadverseservicecoaxialcableproductlinewillpassthisverticalcabletr~ytest,butasoftlrisdateother.cableshavenotbeensubjected tothistest.~~~~~'"~4H~~\)<mVSa.~+~..<;~'e5&lfrryyy:~~i

~rig\assn;~as,%i~!vrmce r<\s~~pvma.~arra<rr qrewe+n.as~i<sswreewrmraeeee arrhs~~.~v 0

~gPg.4QgCFATIFIED CONCLUSION FirewallIIIcoaxialconstructions utilizing eithersolidor-cellular dielectric materials havesuccessfully withstoodthetests.andconditions inthepreceding pages.Therefore, wecertifythattheywillfunctionforatleasttheirnodalintendedapplications.

inanuc1ear40yearsingenerating plant,including conditions ofLOCAtestingand200megarads.ofcumulative radiation dosageoccurring during40yearlifeoftheplant.theexpected:~XilgvGeoygeS.BuettnerTechnical Oirector~z~~~':,',.KennethJ.Ginnotti:..'~TestEngineer'

~sISTATEOFCONNECTICUT; COUNTYOFNEWHAVEN.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethisj~Q~dayof~~~~1979.'

.~','~~~~~i"~'I1~0'

~~~~+t'UC[EAP, ElfVlROlillNTALSCRVICECYCLEREPORT(r;ESCR)ReportPreparedforEbascoServ,ices Inc.l9RectorSt.t(e>vYork,N.Y.l0006Re:FloridaPower5LightCo.EbascoSpec2ll-73St.LuciePlantUnitP2Hutchingson Island,Fla.-.q1\1VS%SPrReportPrepared~b:"-.':4-::"":"=::.:-:-'":-."

~-':~.::.'."~-..,"-

..";;r~~;",;:

TheAockbestos Co.".,"'*Newlfzven,Ct.06504Hayl5,1980Rev.III's-~~~',q)qasee')'t)1 eat,~stL~qiPypsgp~<+go~Wf(f1 P5$'~t~rrrw.

PP,"%QQ;tg.+iiZC55~+~+w~04i~%+iV

.h5%TQQQ

~~ae'~6.eAccc1ursteaMaterAbsorptionTest(lnsulition)Ref:Para.G.I.l.dRockbcstos hasperformed long(ermvlaterabsorption testingonRSS6-102corewhichusesasolid,cross-linked polyolcfin dielectric.

MaterTeuperature

-90'CContinuous Energized Voltape-600VAC60HzDurati'on ofTest-26weeksResults-ReportedinAppendix"D"Accelerated MaterAbsorption Test(Jacket)Ref:Para.6.l.l.eTestswereconducted onthejacketmaterials usedontheRockbestos

-coaxialconstructions according toICOSAS-19-81Para.6.9.3.There-suitswereOs58milligrams persquareinchandarewellwithinthere-~~quired20.0mil1igramrequirement.

t~I~~~s.'r'ssla~rrHoistureResistance Ref:Para.6.l.l.fnTheRockbestos Companyhasperformed accelerated moistureresistance itests.forcontinuously wetandalternately wetanddryconditions withs/,goodresultsonitsFirewall1.11instrument cables.ThesetestsnormallyIutilizeairovensandasteainautoclave.

Sinceitisnecessary to"pot"thepenetration oftheautoclave, it'isnotfeasibletousethismethodoftestingforcoaxialconstructions.,

ltshouldbcnotedhercthatthe'.'s~s'Firewal1ll1instrunlentation cablestested'utilize flameretardedcross"1inl'ed.polyolefin

compound, asdothcjacketsofourcoaxialconstructions.

'r~~~~~r~~s~~s~1~~~~~

0

'r~~~7.Coaxialcablefunctions asanintegralunit.Thejacketisusedtokeepthenioistuie frowntlieinteiiorofthecable.Whilelongtermmoisturetestsoncoreinsulation willservetoshowthecablewillmaintainvoltageandIRcharacteristics, itmustberenieinbered thatcoaxialcablesaredesignedtobebasically dry.Therefore, theouterjacketisveryiniportant.

Toprovethejacketintegrity

.overandabovetherequirements ofref.para.6.1.l.band6.1.1.eRockbestos putasampleofjacketedcablein75"CwaterandmeasuredIRfrominnerconductor tofirstQiI,I'L'~it'~'4~~5~~~~,'~E,shield.Aftersixinonthsthesampleshowsaninsulation resistance of720gigohmsfor20ft.'hesampletestedwasRockbestos RSS6-208Cwiththeouterjacketandaluininum sheathremoved.Themoistureresistance oftheconstruction, including wetanddry,isfurtherdemonstrated bytheairovenaging,autoclave sprayconditions andhumidityenvironment, asdocuinented inthequalification report(Appendix 8).AlsoattachedasAppendix"F"isdatapreviously reportedbyRockbestos onitsFirewallIIIcross-linked polyolefin asfurthersupportinodata.'Electrical Characteristics

.'..:".',:

"::"'"~-'."~fRef:Para.6.l.l.gTtieelectrical cfiaracteristics shownonourRSSdrawingsforI~~cablestobesuppliedonthisorderwerederivedusingtestmethodsofMIL-C-170.

aSincethattimetlIL-C-17E hasbeenissued;andwhileitjsmorecomplexandinmanycasesunworkable, testingisstillaccomplished' according toHJL-C-170.

J*=Sincethecables.usedfornucleargenerating stationsare.60IQz~~orless,testingtoeitherthe"0"or"f"revisionshouldnotcon-stituteanyIirob1enis.

~~i<PFeV>1>Cr~gICJ""BT(OV"IB}'".8cCh.'E$T..ECO.nrvIsIIrrr<IrCl.'.ILBO COIII'OIIATION October14,1975ROCKBI':S I'OS'ltOI)UC'I'S 0ll0cnosSI'ICS r*AKCAIVESVI1E?22?roncnoss.

econw900?I~I404)449I96II'ABATISI800I?<ICA5ioASCOServices, inc.21McstStreetRoom1310thewYork,tlY10006Attn:Ir.DennisCronin-cloPhilgobileRECEDEDERq:Firewallill-FloridaPower6Light----<-..ST-,-LuC1C-2

---

:---.:'-.~Qt;T2-':CTSinquiryFLO-211I8

.CerroProposal20-3113inquiryFLO-2lII9 CerroProposal20-3II4~~~~r4Gentlemen, FurthertoourlettersofAugust18,1975andSeptember 26,1975,wcareFurnishing

~~~~additional information onthetestswehaveperformed andnotingchangesinouroriginalproposedprogram.Thepurposeofthetestwastomeasuretheeffectsofdifferent environments onthe':Firewall Illcableofferedinourproposal."

llighlyaccelerated testprocedures wereusedtoobtainmeaningful'esults lnareasonably shortperiodoftime.~l'Samplesweresubjected tothefollowing:

'1~r.Samplel.-Continuously Dry:Samplewas'placedlnanairovenfor360hoursandmeasuredatregularintervals forchanges'n IA,'SlC,andPo~erFactor.,Sample2.-Continuously Met.:Samplewasplacedinastcamautoclave at'II2Cand40PSIG.Thetestonthi'ssamplewasterminated after,260hoursbecau=eo'lectricai failure,Thcsameelectrical measurements wercperformed.

Sample3'llernatcly Met6DrySamplewasplaced'inasteaIAau'toelaveat1I2Cand~IOPSIGfor16hours,1houratroomtemperature, 6hoursinanairovenat121C,1houratroomtemperature andthen'thecyclerepeated.

Thctestwascontinued for360hourswiththesamemeasurements beingmadeatregularintervals.

Theresultsofthesetestsaresho'wnontheattachedchart.Samples.l 03wereelectrically soundaftercompletion oFthetestprogram.~~~~

A\(IJp$'vvlJVCE~lJPJCV0IV<50H0fCEBROCOBPOBA'I IONCGHzlHlll~~

ALilt(4iQEBASCOServices~lnc,~~oAlcnOctober14~1975rAoc,2CUponconpletion oftheprogram,anadditional testwasperformed onsample0'3,tode;erinine if,anychangev~ouldoccuronthesampleifitwereplacedinacontinuously dryenvironment.

Thesamplewasplacedinanovenat121Cfor115hoursandtheresultsareasFollows:lRSicPowerFactor45000MegohmsH33.80Youwillnote,thisaccelerated dryingcycle'caused thesampletoreturntoitsapproximate origina)value.Franthistestprogram,itcanbeconcluded thatacontinuously wetenvironment isthemostsevere,thealternately wetanddryisthenextmostsevereandthecontinuously

'dry'isthcleasts'evere.Thissupportsyearsofactualexperience onmanytypesoFinsulation usedinactualfieldinstallations.

~~~~~~~1tshouldberemembered, thateachofthetestsdescribed;'ar exceedconditionswhichwouldbeexperienced innormaloperation andwereconducted specifically tomeasuredifferences inseverity, ofenvironmental exposurers..

• ln'ourletteroF9/2ol/5,wefurnished testresultsonourFirewallillcablesthathavebeenimmersedinwateratboth75oCand90CFor,longperiodsoftime.Acomparison canbeeasi'lydrawntotheperfonnance of.Butylandotherearliervintageinsulations thathavedemonstrated anabilitytoperformforforty(40)yearsInactualservice.Thesetestresultsclearlyshow,the.vastlysuperior.performance ofFirewallill,permitting aconclusion tobereached,thattheendlifeofthisinsulation shouldfarsurpassexperiences obtainedoncablesthat'havehad"actual 40yearservicelife.Rockbestos Products'I'.R.Postma~C'~~~F.AP/gwcc:Wm.Thuc~W~~,~~'<~~~~>'aN)'pi~pi'~y gq'~'~~"w~i:cay">)~'~t~~spi,~gg

~~+yg~<loÃl'lpT~7$

+~g>'ts~&-~'v 6Y77P pdCi~B,,S~.OS,,i.l>>..4

.<L..-...,,,-,-P.,JC,))..>,Pi...i

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~......<p<tij'....~~...:.,j~~'a~."~fbi~)'lil"]:/1~g'L~~~~~~q(IsL+0Ol~0)~l~~~~~~~~~tJ~~~~~~~~~~~I

npv~reft'"rv44%av4~~VNvvnvr,'.',:.)r..-."'7')':')a")'l)I)4'vt'")I.~t.<<i'SL2-FSARe)Emergency Core'ooling Sy"ternpipingIcontrolroddrivemechanisms fuelassemblies andspacer-grids 1.9.4reactorinternals reactorcavityshieldvallssecondary shieldvallsI.LOWTEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP)Lowtemperature overpressure protection willbpberovidedviatheinstalla-tionofpower-operate x'ee'vavedlif'ves{PORVs)qualified forbothsaturated desteamandliquidreeservce.dlifrvice.ThePORVswillbesizedtoaccommoatewa1thepressuretransient assocaet.soci~tedwithaControlled RodWithdraws d1{tt1lowpressuresetpoint) tomitigatethepressuretransient resulting fromeitheraspuriousinitiation ofsafetynginection,1trtwithanexcessive temperature difference sisdescribed betweentheRCSandthesteamgener'atox'.

Thefi'naldesignisdescreinSubsection 5.2-6.Corresponding transients analyseswillbeprovidedinSection15.8earlyin1981.1.9.51HDROLOGICAL DATAecion2.4.additional information forPutchinsen XslandAsdiscussed inSection..aibeingevaluated ontheseparatesub)ectsofurtereaon2~4willbefie1dpossiblepotablewelllocations.

Anamendment toSectkoonoraboutMarch1981incorporating therelevantinformation.

01.9.6UNDERGROUND CABLEREVIEWKeriteinsuaepowe1tedposerandcontrolcableshaveb'eenrevievedal))~approved jpbtheNRCforunderground vet/dryenvironmental qualificat onxovv4)nwl)o aaderdroand tneer44en a4)vbytleamandmenn-ot~bov" Feb".ca~98&

.~Atlc~5%8~$

~3,tl.4,1.9.7ENVIRONMENTAL ANDSEXSHICQUALXFICATION 0CLASSlEEQUIPMENT 0(10)-1978theNRCissuedaletterrequesting additional ioalinformation ns3.10and3.11havebeenonClasslEequipment qualification.

Sectionsdinformation onseismicandenvironmenta organized toprovidetherequeste<<

foqualification testresults.11ovever, atthedateoftendering tieualification testsummax'ies andreportsofresultsares,'eceived.

Therefore, amendments stillbeinggenex'ated andhavenotyetbeenreceve~etoSections3.10and3.11villbefiledperiodically inordertoprovie'ultsofrelevantanalysesthenecessary information andalsotoprovideresusoewhenavailable

~Peramemorandum andorderissuedonMay23,'9231980,,theNRChasorderedapplicants foroperating licensestomb.etqm~tthereuirements off10aA4n SL2-FSARintegrated radiation exposurecombining 40yearsnormal.operation andtherequired'termoffunctionalityduringthepostdesignbasisaccident(DBA)period(upto1year).Tables3.11-1presentthedesignparameters forradiation foreachspecified environmental condition

~Thenormaloperations exposuredoseforequipment iseitherderivedmoreexplicity franthedesignsourcetermspresented inChapterlltakingaccountofequipment arrangement andshielding configuration, nrbasedonthemaximumdoserateanticipated fortheradiation zoneinwhichtheequipment isgenerally located.SeeSection12.3andthezonaldosemapsonFigures12.3%through12.3-12.Forequipment inlowerradiationzones(I&IE)thecumulative 40yearexposureisconservatively takenas10Rads.ForZonaVequipment withafewexceptions, (theCVCSionexchanger, spentresintank,spentfueltransfertubeandvolumeccntroltank)thedoserateis100R/hr.'ortl>eaforementioned

~~exceptiona,thedesigndose'rateishigherthan100R/hr.TheDBAexposuredoseaffecting ESFsystemsandassociated safetyrelatedcenponents isdependent onequipment location.

TheDBAconsidered forthecontainment, ReactorAuxiliary,Turbine,andDieselGenerator ouilaings isthep~~)ulation ofaLOCAinaccordance withtherecommendations nfTID-14B44andRegulatory Guide1.4,"Assumptions UsedforEvaluating the3Potential Radiological, Consequences ofaLossofCoolantAccidentforPressurized PaterReactors",

June1974(R2).TheDBAaffecting equipment intheFuelHandlingBuildingisbasedonthepostulation ofafuelIiandling acciden'to Thefeworganic,materials thatexistwithinthecontainment arediscussed inSubsection 6,1.2.Theradjatinn exposuredoseratesgiveninTable3.11"1isbasedongammaradiation exposure.

Etisrecognized thatthebetaenergyreleasefromnoblegasesisasmuchas2.5tip'~greaterthanthegammaenergyreleasewithin30dayspostaccident.

Howeverarepresentative cablegeometryinsidecontainment hasprotective coversheathing theinsulation layerandanoverallcoveroffireprotective Flamemastic orequivalent.,

Therefore theintegrated betaradiation doseforaoneyearpostaccidentperiodislessthan10percentoftheintegrated gammaradiation doseoverthesameperiod.Thiscomparison includestheconservative assumption ofconparingeffective 2.2Nevbetaswitheffeet've2,2~fevgammasandassumesaspherical cloud,radius40ft,ofairbornenuclides.

Othercnnponents insidecontainment areconsidered sufficiently shieldedfrombetaradiationsinceitiseffectively attenuated byonlyafewmillsthickness ofmetal.Therefore basedontheaforementioned discussion betaradiation isnotconsidered anenvironmental qualificatinnproblem.~~/pc>fogQ~P~3.11.6SUBMERGED CABLES~'afetyrelatedcableslocatedoutdoorsthatcoulbesubmerged inwaterarequalified foroperability undersubmerged cnditions..

P~:~<~v;r~j<'0:0i~Pok;4.Cp~y)~Ke>'4.Cp~ym(4.~<~4+~~4~r.~4~(~.~g~~&/ovaryw~t<~t~'k~s4ws~L~fl<(i~~'<</~"~+~~~f,~i<VS.C.I3.11-5

+<F4<<+~~,!'~<<dWdi>.'<<~/~BC l'AQCLPCV~NWXdWNA%%4QNACWJAMP&hNCÃr<<KAJrdlQ~&hgMVCCf40 fZ'dr,lQBMF<RCVI<WAiM~

\'Lrr~<<'r*SI2-FSARSECTIONF11:NFERENCES(1)D6Vassalo,(HRC) lettertoDr.,REUhrig(FPL),"Environmental andSeismic(/ualificationnfClassIEEquipment" datedJuly-28,1978.(2)DryREUhrrig(FPL)letterL-78-334toDBVassalo(NRC)datedOctober16,1978.(3)JJDiNunnn,"PDAnderson, REBakerandRLK~terfield, "Calculation ofDistanceFactorsforPowerandTestReactor'Sites,"TED-14844, USAEC,March23,1962.I(4)1976ANSPaper:"In-containment Radiation Environments following theNypothetical.LOCA(LMR)."Cr)y,Kr-v4j(>->'<<3

>W<<>.<-'5-3Vg4DF'<<<<'~<~Ct>d~)

~W8-~~+i/,m f.(d)pggd;0t>>)-l<<A4-Rt-6'0b>~I'Agk>>-c.)4+MPr~u<<+>/W<<~.~~g'PI.',w'II~~.F11-6P

FLORIDAPOWERANDLIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEUNITNO.1DESIGNCRITERIARE-EVALUATION OFCONCRETEMASONRYWALLS&rearedBReviewedBArovedBDateOriginalR1<2/7/8G

TABLEOFCONTENTS1.0'.0ItemINTRODUCTION APPLICABLE CODE~Pae3.04.0MATERIAL$

-LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS 5.0ANALYSISANDDESIGN5,1"GENERAL6.07.05.2DYNAMICANALYSIS5.3STATICANALYSISALLOWABLE STRESSESANALYTICAL PROCEDURE F1UNREINFORCED WALLS-REEVALUATED BYCOMPUTER7.2REINFORCED WALLS-RE-EVALUATED BYC(NPUTER15l7'71723No.TablesIOADCOMBINATION TABLEFORCATEGORYIMASONRYWALL6ALLOWABLE STRESSINUNREINFORCED MASONRYALLOWABLE STRESSINREINFORCED MASONRYMASONRYWALLSSECTIONPROPERTIES 19 rt,e 0IFI'RODUCTION Thedesigncriteriacontained hereinisapplicable tosafety-related con-cretemasonrywallsaswellasnon-safety relatedconcretemasonrywallswhosefailurecouldadversely affectthesafetyrelatedsystemsandcom-ponentsintheirproximity inaNuclearPowerPlantfacilityandestablishes thedesignrequirements forevaluation ofthestructural adeauacyofexistingconcretemasonrywalls.Thescopeofthiscriteriacoversallmasonrywallsinproximity toorhavingattachments fromsafety-related pipingorequipment Isuchthatwallfailurecouldaffectasafety-related system.Safetyrelatedequipment orsubsystems tobeconsidered asattach-mentsorinproximity tothewallsshallinclude,butarenotlimitedto,pumps,valves,motors,heatexchangers, cabletrays,cable/conduit, HVACductwork, electrical

cabinets, instruments andcontrols.

2eoAPPLICABLE CODESANDGUIDELINES 2.1Thefollowing codesshallbeusedforthere-evaluation ofmasonrywalls,subjecttoclarifications contained inthecriteria.

CodeTitleACI531-79AmericanConcreteInstitute "Building CodeRequirements forConcretemasonryStructures" AISCAmericanInstitute ofSteelConstruction "Specification fortheDesign,Fabrication, andErectionofStructural SteelforBuildings" ACI318-77AmericanConcreteInstitute "Building CodeRequirements forReinforced Concrete"

2.'2Guidelines Recommended Guidelines fortheReassessment ofSafetyRelatedConcreteMasonryWalls,PreparedbyOwnersandEngineering FirmsInformal'lGrouponConcreteMasonryWalls,October6,1980.3'MATERIALS Thematerials whichhavebeinspecified intheprojectspecifications anddrawingsshallbeused.4,0LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS 4.1LoadsDescriCionTheloadsaregroupedintothefollowing categories:

(a)normalloads(b)severeenvironmental loads(c)extremeenvironmental loads(d)abnormalloadsThedetaileddescription oftheseloadsisasfollows:(a)NormalloadsNormalloadsarethoseloadsthatareineffectduringnormalplantoperation andshutdownconditions.

Forthewalls,theyincludethefollowing:

(1)DeadLoad(D)Deadloadincludestheweightofthewall,andanystructures orequipment supported bythewall.(2)LiveLoad(L)Liveloadsincludealltemporary loadingsthatactonthewall,bothintheplaneandoutoftheplaneofthewali'

4.1LoadssrsA(Cont'd){3)ThermalLoad(T)0Thesearethermaleffectsloadingsonthewallduring'--norma)operating orshutdownconditions, andshallbebasedon.themostcriticaltransient orsteadystate..condition.

'(4).PipeReactionLoad(R),Tjiis,is.

the.~'eactionofpipessupported bythe-'~-'wall duringinformalmperating orshutdowncondition,

,~v,-='a'n8 shall'-beibased=:on th'e'most criticaltransient

--':sg--,',or'f6ady etatetco'ndit'ice;<i

...{b).%ever'eEnvironmental

'Loads',~.;-'.\Qev'ereenvironmental 1oads.axethoseloadsthatcouldinfre-rfs-guen'eely-Se-"encos4ntered durin~tlieplantlife.Includedin==-.-41);;-fr~ind

&ad:.{8)---:.:'.g:-;..~=,:.-'-'~"-'...

Tlirt"hsIte~~gsfjjn:Qesgs.:"shod jpejifiedfor

,the.'-site of~;;.":=';~,the..plant=

=-:-.Xtis-applicable only'to'thosewallsfor2=.:",.~";.R~".~;;.+-.."

~+.~which~gFdes3.oql:-"iN,'spec i'fiepp':~~-'~~';.'-:.

~='-':..-":(2)<<.Seismxc'Load',-'P-."".=):..'.~~"-.'..

'*'"-",..-",.Q=;::"';=.~(i f-For".,

jiasonr'yf wal1sgag'uilhings foxwhich'dynamic.'.-:=',~-'"":=",'~-".;";4n'alvsess.are performe8:-':"

'.'--:--.,-:Tt'i's's th'e"load g'ednegated bytheoperating

.basis='~.'--:~',~~'-..=-:,~:

';:=.;:,~;;jYrthqiiqke'COBB).'sŽpe'cfXi'ed,;

feartfiesite.ofthe'lant,

.".-:-~-~x

'4'>>-".~p~s::;-s""

=.-"'.-'and'ge'velopEZ:.for.':t4'0>'~ill.

~Is-th)dynamics"-'Analyses

.'.-"..',-'"-".-.'..-,-,,~.-'m

.-',,'-'--

petformq'd'or'-%lie:bgi4cf5 ng.;;-.-'Zn-pl aiie.and'ut>>of-plane'"=:--"::r.

K;=,':.':,g~".,;:.;..'~:6:..">.>>=4-',.'=-,::..=..ljadfngs

'".-'and.4>4.efCdirt'sof:I)terai:.Bisplacements ofjj'a.gl"ends rerla7'iye "t'o-'each "oth~areWonsideied.

v,.~~,tr',mwe~~s,,i,~,'d,s~~.~..

LoadsDoso~rition(Cont'd).

(ii)Formasonrywallsinbuildings forwhichearthquake loadingsaredeveloped fromempirical equations:

Unlessnotedotherwise, thisistheloadduetoearthquake calculated toactonthewallaccording totheprovisions oftheapplicable buildingcodeorstandard, (c)ExtremeEnvironmental LoadsEstremeenvironmental loadsarethoseloadswhicharecrediblebuthighlyimprobable.

Theyinclude:(1)SeismicLoad(F)eqsForseismicCategory1buildings, andthosenon-seismic Category1buildings forwhichtheloadisspecified, thisistheloadgenerated bythesafeshutdownearthquake (SSE)specified forthesiteoftheplant,anddeveloped asdescribed forseismicload(F)~ego(2)TornadoLoad(W)Ifatornadoevent,orsimilarhigh-intensity windpheno-menonisspecified forthesite'ftheplant,thisistheloadgenerated bytheevent.,Itincludesloadsduetowindpressure, barometric pressuredropsbetweentheexteriorandinteriorsidesofthewall,andimpactloadingsduetowindgenerated missiles.

Theseloadsareapplicable onlytothosewallsforwhichthisloadisspecified.

(RL

AbnormalLoadsIAbnormalloadsareloadssuchasthosegenerated bythefailureofhighenergypiping,orequipment failurewhichgenerates missiles.

Thiscategoryofloadsincludesthefollowing:

(1)PressureLoad(P)Thisisthepressureequivalent staticloadwithinthemasonr'ywallcompartment causedbyfailureofhighenergypipingorequipment.

Theloadincludesanappropriate dynamicloadfactordetermined byanalysis, orbasedonempirical data.IRi(2)ThermalLoad(T)Thisisthethermalloadunderthermalconditions generated bytheabnormalevent,andincludesTeffects.0-(3)ReactionForce(R)aThisisthepipereactionunderthermalconditions generated bythepostulated pipebreak,andincludesReffects.Theload0shalltakeintoaccountanychangetoRduetoredistribution ofpipereactions causedbydiscontinuities inthepipeduetothebreak.(4)PipeLoad(Y)Thisistheequivalent staticloadonthewallgenerated bythereactionoftheescapingfluidonthebrokenhigh-energy pipeduringthepostulated pipebreak,andincludesanappropriate dynamicloadfactortoaccountforthedynamicnatureoftheload.(5)JetImpingement (Y)Thisist'e)etimpingement equivalent staticloadonthewallgenerated bythepostulated pipebreak,andincludesanappropriate dynamicloadfactortoaccountforthedynamicnatureoftheload.

0 (d)AbnoarulLoads(Cont'd)(6)MissileLoad(Y)Thisloadisthemissileimpactequivalent staticloadonthewallgenerated byequipmcnt orpipefailure,andincludesanappropriate dynamicloadfactortoaccountforthedynamicnatureoftheload,4.2LoadCombinations SeismicCategoryIorotheraffectedmasonrywallsshallbere-evaluated fortheloadsasgiveninTable1.TABLE1LoadCategoryLOADCOMBINATION TABLEFORCATEGORYICONCRETEMASONRYWALLYrBValueY]tforAllowable DLTRWPWFeqoRFeqsYmT0QataaStresses(Note1NormalXXXXSevereEnvironmental (1)SevereEnvironmental (2)XXXXXXXXXXExtremeEnvironmental (1)ExtremeEnviron"mental(2)AbnormalXXXXXXXXXXXXX'UUAbnormal/Severe Environmental UAbnormal/Extreme Environmental XXXXXXU'Note1ValuesforSandUarespecified inTable2and3forunreinforced andreinforced masonry,respectively..

Table2;Allowable StressesinUnreinforced tlasonryDescription

• Al1owableY1axinum(psi)(p>>)Al1owable(psi)t'oaximum (ps'i)Compressive Aial(1)FlexuralBearingOnfullareaOnone-third areaorlessShearFlexuralmembersShearwalls1TensionNormaltobedjointsHollowunitsSolidorgroutedParalleltobedjoints(4)HollowunitsSolidorgroutedGroutCoreCollarjointsShearTension0.22f'.33f'.25f'.

375f'.1Jf0.9P'.6Jm,1.0Jm1.0Jm1.6/m2.6P,'000 12009001200503425405080'4"m""m0.62f'.95f'~7m1.350.83m1.67P1.67/m2.6Jm,4.2/f'000300022503000755162.67841341212 0

40tes(l)(2)(3)(4)toTable2:h3Thesevaluesshouldbemultiplied by(l-'4>))ifthewa.lrasasignificant verticalload.Usenetbeooecareawiththesestresses.

Forstackedbond-construction usetw.-thirdsofthevaluesspecifieC.

Forstackedbondconstruction usetwo-thirds ofthevaluesspci=ie"'or tensionnonraltothebeCjointsintheheadjointsof.stackedbondconstruction.

Table3:Allowable StressesinPeinforced MasonryDescription Al1owablet1aximum(psi)(psi)Al1owableMaximum(psi)(psi)Compressive AxialFlexura1BearingOnfullareaOnone-third areaorless0.22f'.33f'.25f'.375f'000120090012000.44f'.85f'.62f'.95f'000240018002400ShearFlexuralmembersShearHalls(~)MasonryTakesShearM/Vd+1M/Yd~0Reinforcement TakesShearM/Vd)>1M/VdOReinforcement BondPlainBars~DeformedBarsTensionGrade40'Grade60JointMireCompression 1.1Jf'9J'm2OJfm5074751206014020,00024,000.5F,30,0000.4F17f'5'612312518080186~60-9Fy0.9F0.9F0.9F

otstoTable3:(1)Thesevaluesshouldberiultiplied by(1-(--))i'hewallhasasign',icaritverticalload.(2)Thissressshouldbeevaluated usingthee'fective areashownir,figurebelowexceptasnotedinPar.7.2.1(a).w'sor6lOiSpacingffwhichever illr'SSlprtvnnrnlfbonrfI~v/r~yrr:r r~':r'.ri.rr~Arrrlr'i

~~~~~~~~a~~~~Aresassvmesfeffecsive infleavralcompression, forcenormalloface(3)Netbeddedareashallbeusedwiththesestresses(4)ForYi/Vdvaluesbetween0and1interpolate betweenthevaluesoivenfor0andl.

0 ANAI.YSIS AN)DESIGN,General5.1.1Concretemasonrywallsshallbere-evaluated according toworkingstressdesignprinciples.

5.1.2TheResponseSpectrumMethodshallbeusedforestablishment ofseismiceffectsonmasonrywali'.2Ib""""5.2.1FreuencAnalsis-SectionCrackinConsideration Frequency analysisshallbeperformed usingeithercomputerorhandcalculation inordertodetermine theout-of-plane frequencies ofmasonrywalls.Theuncracked behaviorandcapacities o'fthewallsshallbeconsidered forunreinforced walls.Forreinforced walls,bothcrackedanduncracked be-Jhaviorandcapacities ofthewallsshallbeconsidered.

5.2.2Uncracked SectionFortheuncracked sectionoftheunreinforced masonrywall,theequivalent momentofinertiashallbeobtainedfromatransformed sectionconsisting oftheblock,mortar,cellgroutandwherepresent,coreconcrete.

Fortheuncracked reinforced wall,thereinforcement areashallalsobetrans-formedincalculating themomentofinertia.

5.2.3.CrackedSection~~Xftheappliedmoment(Ma)exceedstheuncracked momentcapacity(Hcr),thewallshallbeconsidered tobecracked.Theequivalent momentofinertia(Ie)ofthereinforced crackedwallsshallbecomputedasfollows:where,McrIUncracked momentcapacity=Mcr=fr(-),Ma~AppliedmaximummomentonthewallI~Momentofinertiaofthetransformed sectionastdescribed inPar.5.2.2.IcrMomentofinertiaofthecrackedsectionModulusofruptureTensilestressdefinedinTable2formortarorgroutifthemasonryJointisassumedtobecracked.Distanceofneutralplanefromtensionface5.2.4MethodofFreuencAnalsisForthemasonrywall,whichissubJecttoseismicloadonlyandhasnolargeopenings, thestandardexpressions forsingledegreeoffreedomsystemscanbeusedforcomputing thenaturalfrequency ofthewall.ForothertypesofwallssubJected todifferent typesofloads,afiniteelementmodelshallbeused.One-waybehaviorcanbeassumediftheaspectratio,h/1(heighttolength)islessthan0.5;otherwise two-waybehaviorshouldbeassumedforthewallwithfour-side support.

5.2~5Damp~inThecriticaldampingvaluestobeusedshallbeasfo11ows:A.Forreinforced andunreinforced uncracked wallsuse2%forOBEandSSE.B.Forreinforced crackedwallsuse4%forOBE,7%forSSE.5,2.6BoundaConditions

,Boundary conditions forconcretemasonrywallsshallbeselectedwithregardtotherelativestiffness ofthemasonrywallstotheir\suppo'rts andalsotothestructural detailswhichprovidetheinter-facebetweenthewallandsupports.

Theguidelines fortheselection andqualification ofboundaryconditions are:A,SileSuort-Asimplesupportcondition maybeassumedatthetoporsidesofamasonrywallifsheartransferacrossthejointcanbedemonstrated underallloadingcondi.tions; however,no momenttransferisexpected.

Thesheartransfermaybeaccomplished byeithermechanical methods(embedments, dowels,masonryties,supportangles,etc.),orbywedgingactionofthemasonrywallwithitssupports.

Aplainmortarjointonthebottomsupport(bedjoint)mayprovidethenecessary sheartransferiftheshearfrictionconceptcanbejustified asfollows:V~NQwhere:V~shearresistance ofmortarjointN~forcenormaltothebedjoint(netdownwardload)~~u~,coefficient offriction, 1.0forconcrete, 0.8formortarRlplacedagainsthardenedconcrete, and0.7forcon-creteagainststructural steel.Aplainverticalmortarjointatsidesofthewallisnotquali-,fiedasasimplesupport.

0 5.2.75~2~8.5.2.9B.Fixed~Suport-Fixedsupportconditions maybeassumedpro-Ividedthe)ointcantransfertheflexuralstressestothesupport.Poisson's RatioPoisson's ratioequalto0.2isappropriate forbothreinforced andnon-reinforced concretemasonrywalls'eismic acceleration shallbeselectedfromeitherthefloorresponsespectrumatthebottomofthewall,orthefloorresponse\spectrumatthehigherelevation, whichever yieldsthemaximumresponsewiththefrequency determined inPar.5.2.4.ModalParticiationForhandcalculation, seismicacceleration shouldbe,increased byafactorequalto1.05toaccountfortheparticipation ofhighermodesforout-of-plane flexuralcalculations.

Whenthelowestfundamental frequency determined inPar.5.2.4isgreaterthan33hertz,thefactorisunity.5,2.10Interstorv DriftEffectsIn-planeorout-of-plane interstory displacements shallbeobtainedfromtheoriginalbuildingstructure dynamicanalysis.

Themaximumdiiferential displacement duetoout-of-plane driftshallbeappliedatthetopsupportofthewallinstaticanalysis.

'\

Sta~ticAnalsisandSerosaEvaluation 5.3.1StressCombination Stressesduetoin-planeloadsandout-of-plane loadsshallbecombinedusingthesquarerootofthesumofthesquaresmethod(SRSS).5.3.2Multi-theWallsIndividu'al wythesofamultiplewythewallshallbe,assumedtoactindependently undertheactionofseismicloadsunlessbondedbyreinforcement, boltingorotherdevicesthattrans-fershearatthewytheinterface.

5.3.3Attachment InertialLoadsStressesduetoattachment loadsshallbecombinedwithwallinertialloadsusingtheabsolutesummethod.Blockpulloutshallbecheckedlocally.5.3s4In-PlaneStrainDuetoInterstor DriftIn-planeeffectsmaybeimposedonmasonrywallsbytherelativedisplacement betweenfloorsduringseismiceventsasdescribed inPar.5;2.10.However,thewallsdonotin-tendtocarryasignificant partofthebuildings storyshear.Thestrainacceptance criteriashallbeusedforin-planestorydriftwhileareasonable marginremainsforoutofplaneloading.<<15-

Thegrossshearstrainisdefinedtobe:Y-+{whereg=strainrelativedisplacement betweentopandbottomofwallHheightofwall.Thepermissible in-planeshearingstrainsare:=0.0001forunconfined wallsuY=0.001forconfinedwallscTheabove.valuesshallbeusedfornormalandsevereen-vironmental loadcombinations.

Forotherloadcombinations, thestrainsshallbemultiplied by1.67.Anunconfined wallisattachedononeverticalboundaryanditsbase.Aconfinedwallisattachedinoneofthefollowing ways:(a)onallfoursides;(b)onthetopandbottomofthewall(c)onthetop,bottomandoneverticalsideofthewall(d)onthebottomandtwoverticalsidesofthewall.

Allowable Stresses6.1GeneralThevaluesgiveninTable2shallbethestressallowable forunreinforced masonry.The,valuesgiveninTable3shallbethestressallowable forreinforced masonry.ThevaluesofSgiveninbothtablesshallbeusedforNormalandSevereEnvironmental loadcombinations, whereasthevaluesofUshallbeusedfor.otherloadcombinations, asindicated inTable1,Wherethebendingduetoout-of-plane inertialloading-causesflexuralstressesinthewalltoexceedthedesignallowables, thewallcanbeevaluated bythe'ArchingAnalysis'or theunreinforced crackedwallsandbythe'Yield-Line Theory'r'EnergyBalanceTechnique'or thereinforced crackedwalls.7.0ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE 7.1Unreinforced Walls-Re-evaluated bComuter7.1.1FiniteElementModelforFreuencAnalsis(a)Dividethewallintoquadrilateral, rectangular ortri-angularplateelements.

Aminimummeshsizeof4x1isrequiredforonewaybehaviorand4x4isrequiredfortwowaybehavior.

Thenumberofelementsshouldbeincreased whereopeningsandhighstressconcentrations arepresent.Thecapacities oftheelementsshouldinclude17"

7.1.1FiniteElement1fodelforFr~euenc~

An~elsis(Cont'd)(a)bothout-of-plane bendingandin-planeshear.ANSYSpro-gramSTIF43orSTIF63willsatisfytheserequirements.

Theaspectratiooftheelement(longsidetoshortside)shallnotexceed3.]7~~P~gZCIzzF-rd8/~g.r~g)c//I/rIC>>burghSt!Fc(b)Theweightsofattachments (W.andW2)shallbeconsidered 1asmassesuniformly distributed overtheareaswheretheat-tachments arelocated.Theinputsofthemassesatthenodalpoints(9,10,14,13)mayusegeneralized masselements(STIF21inANSYSProgram).

(c)Defineeachelementandnodalpointlocation.

Inputmaterialproperties Ex,Ey,+xy,P(x,P(y,fasexplained intheANSYSmanual.Anequivalent thickness oftheplateelement(t)shallbeeobtainedforhollowblockwallssuchthatthesamemomentofinertiacanbekept.SeeTable4fort.Theequivalent densityoftheelement(fz)shall'lso beobtaineddhchthatthetotalweightremainsthesame."18-TABLE4-lNSONRYWALLSSECTIONPROPERTIES 3'M'I.ir"BLOCKWALLDIMENSIONS EUIVALENTTHICKNESS NominalDesigntswUnreinforced 12btT=87-5/81-1/417-1/23~815.31439.936.89610129-5/81-3/81-1/87-1/24.817.06876.818.67711-5/81-1/21-1/87-1/25.818.811503.4510.384Forblockwallsfilledwithmortar,theactualthickness ofthewallsmaybeusedfortheelement.(d)Twodynamicdegreesof freedom(UZandROTX)shouldbeassignedtoeachnodalpointexceptatthe-boundary=where thenumberofdynamicdegreeoffreedomwillbereducedtoone(ROTX),ifitissimplysupported or0ifitisfixed.'(e)Inputothernecessary datatoperformMode-Frequency analysisfortheuncracked wall.(f)Selectseismicacceleration eitherfromthefloorresponsespectrumatthebottomofthewallorthefloorresponsespectrumatthehigherelevation, whichever yieldsthemaximumresponsewiththefre-quencydetermined fromtheabove.A251ofthefrequency rangeshallbeconsidered duetovariations ofmasonrymaterialandotherfactors.-19" 7.1,2StaticAnal~sis(a)Prepareinputloadings, i.e.dead,live,seismic,equipment loads,etc.andapplytothesamemodel.Concentrated loadsshallbeappliedtothenodalpoints,(b)Thedeadweightofthewallcanbegenerated automatically in.thecomputerifthadensity(f)hasbeeninputinrthedata.(c)Seismicloadscanbeappliedstatically byusingapressureloadwhichisequaltotheproductofdeadweightandtheacceleration coefficient selectedfromPar.7;1.1(f).(d)'heoutofp-lan-einterstory driftofthewalldueto~R!differential displacements'etween thetwofloorsofthebuildingdynamicanalysiswillalsobeinputaspartoftheseismicloadsinthemodelbydefiningnewdisplace>>

mentatthetopboundary.

(e)LoadswillbecombinedintheStaticAnalysisaccording to'heloadcpmbinations specified inPar.4.2.Themaximumbendingmomentoftheelement(Ma)shallb'ecomparedwiththemomentcapacityoftheuncracked section(Mcr).(f)IfMa(Mcr,i.e.sectionuncracked, allotherallowables shallbechecked.IfMa>Mcr,thesectioniscracked.AnArchingAnalysisshallbeperformed.

7,1,3Archin~Anal~sis (a)Thebehaviorofthecrackedwallmaybeconsidered asthatofathreehingedarchwithhingesformedatmidspan,topandbottomsupports.

Ifagapexistsatthetopofthewall,agappedarchingactionshouldbeassumed,otherwise, arigidarchingisassumedforanalysisas'llustrated inFig.l.(b)Thereacti'ons ofthethree-hinged wallcanbesolvedbyconsidering arigidbodyinequilibrium asshowninFig.2.(c)Thecompressive stressoftheblockshallbeassumedasarectangular stressdistribution overadepth'a'ssumed equalto't'ftheblockwall.Itsmagnitude sshallbelessthan0.85f'm.(d)Thedeflection ofthemidspancanbedetermined bythemethodofvirtualworkassumingthatarchmembersareanalogous tocompression membersinatruss.Thecal-culateddeflection shouldnotbemorethan0.3t,where't'sthethickness ofthewall.(e)Checkfrictionshear,localstressesandcomparewiththeallowables asstatedinthedesigncriteria.

~~~~~1IrglDDlJICO'Ll/ACE(LLC 1I~11t,OAD)MCVVTiVTlTI~INlAOII>CgalCAIICDIIIOII<<Flgt'1~Stetch111ustretl~

theDifferences lnlotionSetrccnklyldandGappedkrchl<.5~>>flaHRlCIDklCNIMCClrltgIIYIIIMCfly.2,freeSodaDiagramShmlnyForceslnk15ldandCoppedArchly.<<22>>

7.2Reinforced 4'alls-Re-evaluated b~C~omuter(a)Theeffective widthofwall,asdetermined bySec.9.4.6.1ofACI531canbeusedasthewidthoftheelementin"hehorizontal direction.

IfDUR-0-VAL reinforcement isprovidedforstackbondwalls,theeffective widthofthereinforced unitscanbeincreased tothesameamountasthatusedforrunningbondwalls.(b)Sameasunreinforced.

(c)Sameasunreinforced exceptasnotedbelow:Theequivalent thickness oftheelementforarein-forcedwallfilledwithmortarscanbeobtainedasfollows:i)Findtransformed sectionareabymultiplying thereinforcing bararea(A)by(n-l),wherenisthe8modularratioequaltoE/E.smii)Findthemomentofinertiaofthecrosssectionaboutitscentroid(usuallyatcenter),Im+s.iii)EquateI(=-bt)toI13e12em~is~Solveforte.(d)to(f)Sameasunreinforced.

7',2StaticAnalsis(a)to(e)Sameasunreinforced.

(f)Sameasunreinforced exceptIfMa>Mcr,thesectioniscracked.Acrackedsectioniteration procedure shallbefollowed, asdescribed inPar.7.2.3."23" t

7.2.3CrackedSectionIteration Findtheequivalent momentofinertia(I)asstated"inPar,5.2.3ofthedesigncriteria.

Themomentofinertiaofthecrackedsection(I)shallbecrobtainedfromthetransformed sectionconsisting ofthereinforcement areainthetensionsideandcompressive areaoftheconcreteblockandanyfilled-in material(i.e.'mortar orcellgrout),(b)Findtheequivalent thickness oftheelementbyequating1bt=I.Solvefor.t312e'e(c)Rerunthefrequency andstaticanalysisusingthesameinputdataexceptequivalent densityandthickness oftheelement,andsheararea(tensionareashouldbededucted).

(d)Themomentcapacityofthecrackedsection,Mcap(~fA)d)shouldbecomparedwiththeappliedssmoment(Ma).IfMa<Mcap,checkcompressive stressofthemasonryandallotherallowables andverifythecracksize.(e)IfMa0Mcap,thewallcanbeevaluated bythe'Yield-Line Theory'ased onmechanisms ofcollapsewhichisanalogous totheplasticdesignmethodforsteelframes.7.2.4AnalsisbYield-Line Theo~~Thedescription oftheevaluation ofawallbythe'Yield-Line Theory'an befoundinthetextbook,

'DesignofConcreteStructures'y GeorgeMinter.

00 7.2.4Aeel~~sis bYield-Line The~os(Csee'd.)

Ifthe'eflection exceedsthreetimestheyielddeflection, i.e.ductility ratio>3,theresulting displacement shallbemultiplied byafactorof2andadetermination madeastowhethersuchfactoreddisplacements wouldadversely impactthefunctionofsafety-related systemsattachedand/oradjacenttothewali'heevaluation andjustification ofthewallsinthiscategorywillbeperformed onawall-by-wall basis."25-

SL2-1'SAR uestionNo.430.49Provideadiscussion oftheinservice inspection programforthrottle-stop, control,reheatstopandinterceptor steamvalvesandthecapability fortestingessential components duringtur-binegenerator systemoperation.

(SPR10.2,PartIII,Items5and6.)~ResonseTheturbinethrottle/stop, reheatstopandinterceptor willbetestedonaweeklybasis.Thesevalvesconstitute allvalvesrequiredtopreventoverspeed intheunlikelyeventofaMSIVfailuretoclose.490.49-1 i~'\0~4