ML20206U416: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20206U416 | |||
| issue date = 05/10/1999 | |||
| title = Insp Repts 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314-0424. Violation Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations | |||
| author name = | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000413, 05000414 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-413-99-10, 50-414-99-10, NUDOCS 9905250204 | |||
| package number = ML20206U413 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 7 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000413/1999010]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:; | |||
\ | |||
. | |||
. . . | |||
1 | |||
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION II | |||
Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414 | |||
License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52 | |||
. | |||
Report Nos.: 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10 | |||
Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation | |||
System: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 | |||
Location: 422 South Church Street | |||
Charlotte, NC 28242 | |||
Dates: March 14 through April 24,1999 | |||
Inspectors: D. Roberts, Senior Resident inspector | |||
R. Franovich, Resident inspector | |||
Approved by: C. Ogle, Chief | |||
Reactor Projects Branch 1 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
. | |||
Enclosure | |||
' | |||
9905250204 990510 | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000413 | |||
G PDR | |||
. | |||
.-. | |||
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | |||
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 | |||
NRC Inspection Report 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10 | |||
This specialinspection focused on the integrated efforts of the Catawba Nuclear Station staff to | |||
evaluate, determine the root cause of, and correct a licensee-identified configuration control | |||
problem affecting the Standby Shutdown System from December 16 through 29,1998. The | |||
report covers the resident inspection period from March 14 to April 24,1999. [ Applicable | |||
template codes and the assessment for items inspected are provided below.) | |||
Operations | |||
- | |||
An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee | |||
Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)] was identified concerning two | |||
mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System | |||
inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba units. | |||
(Section 02.1; [1 A - eel]) | |||
- | |||
Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the | |||
Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the | |||
NRC in the time period required. (Section O2.1; [1 A, 5A - POS]) | |||
- | |||
The licensee's procedures for operating the Standby Shutdown System during certain | |||
flood, power, fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection | |||
and perform their intended functions. Only minor enhancements were needed. | |||
Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these procedures and how to | |||
implement them. (Section O3.1; [1C,38 - POS)) | |||
- | |||
The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in Licensee Event Report (LER) i | |||
50-413/98-19 sufficiently developed human performance issues that resulted in the j | |||
mispositioned Standby Shutdown System breakers. The licensee adequately addressed | |||
possible contributing factors in its corrective action program. (Section 08.1; [5B - POS]) | |||
I | |||
; | |||
. | |||
- | |||
! | |||
. | |||
.c | |||
Report Details | |||
Summary of Plant Status | |||
During the period of this event (December 16 through 29,1998) both units were at | |||
approximately 100 percent reactor power. | |||
1. Operations | |||
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment | |||
O2.1 Standby Shutdown SystemlSSS) Inocerable Due to Personnel Error Durina Eauipment | |||
Restoration Process | |||
a. Inspection Scope (71707) | |||
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with LER 50413/98-19 | |||
(previously discussed in inspection Report 50-413,414/98-12), in which the SSS was | |||
determined to be inoperable for nearly two weeks because two circuit breakers in a SSS | |||
motor control center were misaligned. The inspectors discussed this issue with plant | |||
personnel, reviewed SSS operating and test procedures, reviewed the restoration | |||
procedure associated with SSS maintenance activities on December 16,1998, and | |||
reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions for restoring system operability. | |||
b. Observations and Findinas | |||
On December 29,1998, the licensee discovered that two breakers associated with the | |||
SSS were open when they should have been closed. The breakers were F02C, Motor | |||
Control Center 1EMXS Attemate Supply, and R03D, Motor Control Center 2EMXS | |||
Alternate Supply. With the two breakers open, the SSS was inoperable for Units 1 and | |||
2. The licensee determined that the two breakers had been in the incorrect position for | |||
13 days, which exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days before action to initiate | |||
a unit shutdown to Mode 3 (hot standby) was required within the following six hours. | |||
SSS Backaround information | |||
The SSS is a non-safety-related system that is used to cope with certain flood, power, | |||
fire, and security events in order to achieve and maintain hot standby condition for one or | |||
both units. The SSS is utilized for certain events that may result in the loss of normal | |||
reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection. This involves a time-critical task to provide | |||
sealinjection with the associated unit's standby makeup pump (which can be powered | |||
from 1SLXG using the SSS diesel) within 10 minutes in order to maintain RCP seal | |||
integrity. Some of the SSS loads are supplied from 1(2)EMXS, which is normally aligned | |||
to the A train 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) vital electrical bus. Procedure | |||
OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 41, directs operators | |||
to open breaker 1(2) F01 A associated with 1(2)EMXA, which is powered from 1(2) ETA | |||
(the A train 4160 VAC vital bus), and close breaker 1(2)F03A associated with 1SLXG, | |||
the auxiliary power supply, during postulated events. If power to 1SLXG is lost, the SSS | |||
diesel engine will be manually started to power the SSS loads, assuming the required | |||
breaker alignment is in place. The standby makeup pump suction and discharge | |||
isolation valves are powered from 1(2)EMXS. These valves are normally closed and | |||
would not be capable of opening and providing RCP sealinjection with breakers F02C | |||
and R03D open since they are in series with breaker 1(2)F03A, respectively. | |||
., | |||
2 | |||
To ensure that the time-critical task of providing RCP seal injection can be performed | |||
within 10 minutes, the licensee has procedurally minimized the number of breakers that | |||
need to be manipulated (only F01 A and F03A) to transfer power to 1SLXG. With no | |||
procedural steps provided to verify that the third breaker (F02C for Unit 1 and R03D for | |||
Unit 2) was closed, the ability to provide reactor coolant pump seal injection within 10 l | |||
minutes could not be ensured. | |||
Personnel Error Durino Eouioment Restoration Procedure Devetooment | |||
The licensee determined that breakers F02C and R03D had been left in the open | |||
position following preventive maintenance on December 16,1998. The normally closed | |||
breakers were tagged and placed in the OFF (open) position in support of the | |||
maintenance. Following completion of the maintenance activities, the tags were | |||
removed from the breakers, but the breakers were left in the OFF position in accordance | |||
with the system restoration procedure, Tag-Out 08-2811. The system restoration | |||
procedure incorrectly specified that the breakers be restored in the open position. The | |||
licensee determined that a senior reactor operator (SRO) who generated the restoration | |||
procedure assumed that, since the breaker was associated with an alternate power | |||
supply, then the normal position of the breaker was OFF. This SRO failed to reference | |||
applicable procedures to verify the normal breaker position. A second SRO reviewed | |||
and approved the tag-out procedure and missed the error. The misaligned breakers | |||
were identified and questioned by another operator on December 29,1998, who was | |||
performing an unrelated procedure validation walk-through. | |||
Operation Management Procedure (OMP) 2-18, Tagout Removal and Restoration | |||
Procedure, Revision 50, Step 6.2, Restoration / Partial Restore Record Sheet, item AA, | |||
states that equipment is to be normally returned to the position specified by a governing | |||
operating procedure checklist, the body of a goveming procedure, or as specified by the | |||
approving SRO based on plant conditions. The i.ispectors determined that the | |||
governing operating checklists for the two SSS breakers were not reviewed when the | |||
operators determined the required restored positions. Discussions with licensee | |||
personnel and review of assot nd Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) | |||
O-C98-4935, revealed that othen possible contributing factors included the fact that the | |||
restoration procedure did not reference OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, | |||
which specifies the normal operating positions of the breakers; and station drawings did | |||
not accurately depict the breakers' normal operating positions. The inspectors | |||
concluded that these contributors did not cause the human performance error when the | |||
clearance restoration procedure was being developed and approved by the SROs in | |||
support of the December 16,1998, maintenance activities. These items were, however, | |||
properly included in the licensee's corrective action program. | |||
Root Cause Determination | |||
The licensee determined that the root cause for this event was inadequate work | |||
practices. Operations personnel failed to follow the established practice of reviewing | |||
OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, to determine the correct normal (restored) | |||
position of breakers F02C and R03D. Based on the breakers' labels, operations | |||
personnel wrongly assumed that the normal position of the breakers was open. The | |||
inspectors concluded that the licensee's root cause determination, as well as its | |||
development of possible contributing factors in the corrective action program, was | |||
_ . | |||
. | |||
. | |||
3 | |||
comprehensive. Several short- and long-term corrective actions were specified to | |||
restore operability and prevent recurrence. These included specifying, in the equipment | |||
data base and locally at the breakers, that having them in the OFF (open) position would | |||
render the SSS inoperable. Other actions were taken to address the human | |||
performance issues. | |||
Safety Sianificance | |||
. | |||
The SSS is not considered safety-related. However, the SSS provides an alternate and | |||
independent means for maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown (for the SSS this is Hot . | |||
Standby [ Mode 3]) condition following certain loss of power, flooding, fire, and security | |||
events that result in the loss of normal RCP seal injection. These events are not , | |||
assumed to be concurrent with a design basis accident. Safe shutdown is achieved | |||
when: (1) the reactor is prevented from achieving criticality; and (2) adequate heat sink | |||
is provided to ensure reactor coolant system pressure and temperature design and | |||
safety limits are not exceeded. Upon a loss of normal RCP sealinjection, the SSS is | |||
placed in service and the associated unit's standby makeup pump is started to provide | |||
seal injection. This is to be accomplished within 10 minutes to ensure that significant | |||
RCP seal damage and a resultant small break loss of coolant accident do not occur. | |||
With breakers F02C and R03D in the wrong positions and not referenced in the SSS | |||
operating procedure, the SSS's ability to perform its intended safety function of | |||
maintaining RCP seal integrity could not be ensured. | |||
Reculatory Sianificance | |||
The inspectors concluded that the SSS was inoperable from December 16 through 29, | |||
1998, without appropriate actions being taken to restore operability within seven days or | |||
perform a plant shutdown within the following six hours as required by Technical | |||
Specifications (TS). [As of January 16,1999, following the licensee's conversion to | |||
improved TS, this requirement was transferred to the Selected Licensee Commitments | |||
(SLC) document (item 16.7-9), considered Chapter 16 of the Catawba Updated Final | |||
Safety Analysis Report.) The licensee's failure to restore SSS operabiity or perform a | |||
plant shutdown within allowed outage times is considered an apparent violation of | |||
previous TS 3.7.13. This is identified as apparent violation (eel) 50-413,414/99-10-01: | |||
Standby Shutdown System Inoperable in Excess of TS Limits Due to Mispositioned | |||
Circuit Breakers. | |||
c. Conclusions | |||
An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee | |||
Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)) was identified concerning two | |||
mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System | |||
inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba units. | |||
Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the | |||
Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the | |||
NRC in the time period required. | |||
j | |||
J | |||
. | |||
.. | |||
> | |||
4 | |||
03 Operations Procedures and Documentation | |||
O3.1 SSS Operatina Procedures and Plant Staff Knowledae - General Comments (71707) | |||
The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the operation of the SSS for loss of | |||
nuclear service water, loss of component cooling water, and station blackout events | |||
(i.e., events resulting in loss of normal RCP seal injection), and interviewed operations | |||
and security personnel responsible for implementation. One minor discrepancy was | |||
identified in OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 42. | |||
Procedural steps goveming the transfer to the SSS referenced a wrong structural | |||
' column identification number in describing a critical terminal box location. This item was | |||
communicated to station personnel for correction. | |||
Otherwise, the licensee's procedures for operating the SSS during certain flood, power, | |||
. fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection and perform | |||
their intended functions. Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these | |||
procedures and how to implement them. | |||
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (40500, 92901) | |||
- 08.1 - (Closed) LER 50-413/98-19-00: Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of | |||
Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by | |||
Personnel Error | |||
The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in this LER sufficiently developed human - | |||
performance issues that resulted in the mispositioned breakers. The licensee | |||
adequately addressed possible contributing factors in its corrective action program. | |||
Based on the inspectors' review of the subject event, as described in Sections 02 and | |||
' 03 of this inspection report, this LER is closed. | |||
V. Management Meetmgs | |||
X1 Exit Meeting Summary | |||
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at | |||
the conclusion of the inspection on May 3,1999. The licensee acknowledged the | |||
findings presented. No proprietary information was identifed. | |||
. | |||
e | |||
- . - - - - - - - - - - | |||
,.- | |||
. | |||
* | |||
..c | |||
5 | |||
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED | |||
Licensee | |||
R. Beagles, Safety Assurance Manager | |||
M. Boyle, Radiation Protection Manager | |||
S. Bradshaw, Safety Assurance Manager | |||
G. Gilbert, Regulatory Compliance Manager * | |||
R. Glover, Operations Superintendent | |||
P. Herran, Engineering Manager | |||
R. Jones, Station Manager | |||
G. Peterson, Catawba Site Vice-President | |||
F. Smith, Chemistry Manager | |||
R. Parker, Maintenance Manager | |||
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED | |||
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing | |||
Problems | |||
IP 71707: Plant Operations | |||
IP 92901: Followup - Operations | |||
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED | |||
Opened | |||
50-413,414/99-10-01 eel Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of | |||
TS Liro;ts Due to Mispositioned Circuit Breakers | |||
(Secuon O2.1) | |||
Qloped | |||
50-413/98-19-00 LER Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of | |||
Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due | |||
to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by Personnel | |||
Error (Section 08.1) | |||
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED | |||
CFR - - Code of Federal Regulations | |||
eel - | |||
Escalated Enforcement item (Apparent Violation) | |||
LER - | |||
Licensee Event Report | |||
NRC - | |||
Nuclear Regulatory Commission | |||
PIP - Problem Investigation Process | |||
RCP - | |||
Reactor Coolant Pump | |||
SLC - | |||
Selected Licensee Commitments | |||
SRO - | |||
Senior Reactor Operator | |||
SSS - | |||
Standby Shutdown System | |||
TS- - | |||
Technical Specification , | |||
VAC - Volts Attemating Current | |||
] | |||
! | |||
j | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 03:04, 6 December 2021
ML20206U416 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Catawba |
Issue date: | 05/10/1999 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20206U413 | List: |
References | |
50-413-99-10, 50-414-99-10, NUDOCS 9905250204 | |
Download: ML20206U416 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1999010
Text
\
.
. . .
1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414
.
Report Nos.: 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10
Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation
System: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Dates: March 14 through April 24,1999
Inspectors: D. Roberts, Senior Resident inspector
R. Franovich, Resident inspector
Approved by: C. Ogle, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
.
Enclosure
'
9905250204 990510
PDR ADOCK 05000413
G PDR
.
.-.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10
This specialinspection focused on the integrated efforts of the Catawba Nuclear Station staff to
evaluate, determine the root cause of, and correct a licensee-identified configuration control
problem affecting the Standby Shutdown System from December 16 through 29,1998. The
report covers the resident inspection period from March 14 to April 24,1999. [ Applicable
template codes and the assessment for items inspected are provided below.)
Operations
-
An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee
Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)] was identified concerning two
mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System
inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba units.
(Section 02.1; [1 A - eel])
-
Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the
Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the
NRC in the time period required. (Section O2.1; [1 A, 5A - POS])
-
The licensee's procedures for operating the Standby Shutdown System during certain
flood, power, fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection
and perform their intended functions. Only minor enhancements were needed.
Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these procedures and how to
implement them. (Section O3.1; [1C,38 - POS))
-
The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in Licensee Event Report (LER) i
50-413/98-19 sufficiently developed human performance issues that resulted in the j
mispositioned Standby Shutdown System breakers. The licensee adequately addressed
possible contributing factors in its corrective action program. (Section 08.1; [5B - POS])
I
.
-
!
.
.c
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
During the period of this event (December 16 through 29,1998) both units were at
approximately 100 percent reactor power.
1. Operations
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1 Standby Shutdown SystemlSSS) Inocerable Due to Personnel Error Durina Eauipment
Restoration Process
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with LER 50413/98-19
(previously discussed in inspection Report 50-413,414/98-12), in which the SSS was
determined to be inoperable for nearly two weeks because two circuit breakers in a SSS
motor control center were misaligned. The inspectors discussed this issue with plant
personnel, reviewed SSS operating and test procedures, reviewed the restoration
procedure associated with SSS maintenance activities on December 16,1998, and
reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions for restoring system operability.
b. Observations and Findinas
On December 29,1998, the licensee discovered that two breakers associated with the
SSS were open when they should have been closed. The breakers were F02C, Motor
Control Center 1EMXS Attemate Supply, and R03D, Motor Control Center 2EMXS
Alternate Supply. With the two breakers open, the SSS was inoperable for Units 1 and
2. The licensee determined that the two breakers had been in the incorrect position for
13 days, which exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days before action to initiate
a unit shutdown to Mode 3 (hot standby) was required within the following six hours.
SSS Backaround information
The SSS is a non-safety-related system that is used to cope with certain flood, power,
fire, and security events in order to achieve and maintain hot standby condition for one or
both units. The SSS is utilized for certain events that may result in the loss of normal
reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection. This involves a time-critical task to provide
sealinjection with the associated unit's standby makeup pump (which can be powered
from 1SLXG using the SSS diesel) within 10 minutes in order to maintain RCP seal
integrity. Some of the SSS loads are supplied from 1(2)EMXS, which is normally aligned
to the A train 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) vital electrical bus. Procedure
OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 41, directs operators
to open breaker 1(2) F01 A associated with 1(2)EMXA, which is powered from 1(2) ETA
(the A train 4160 VAC vital bus), and close breaker 1(2)F03A associated with 1SLXG,
the auxiliary power supply, during postulated events. If power to 1SLXG is lost, the SSS
diesel engine will be manually started to power the SSS loads, assuming the required
breaker alignment is in place. The standby makeup pump suction and discharge
isolation valves are powered from 1(2)EMXS. These valves are normally closed and
would not be capable of opening and providing RCP sealinjection with breakers F02C
and R03D open since they are in series with breaker 1(2)F03A, respectively.
.,
2
To ensure that the time-critical task of providing RCP seal injection can be performed
within 10 minutes, the licensee has procedurally minimized the number of breakers that
need to be manipulated (only F01 A and F03A) to transfer power to 1SLXG. With no
procedural steps provided to verify that the third breaker (F02C for Unit 1 and R03D for
Unit 2) was closed, the ability to provide reactor coolant pump seal injection within 10 l
minutes could not be ensured.
Personnel Error Durino Eouioment Restoration Procedure Devetooment
The licensee determined that breakers F02C and R03D had been left in the open
position following preventive maintenance on December 16,1998. The normally closed
breakers were tagged and placed in the OFF (open) position in support of the
maintenance. Following completion of the maintenance activities, the tags were
removed from the breakers, but the breakers were left in the OFF position in accordance
with the system restoration procedure, Tag-Out 08-2811. The system restoration
procedure incorrectly specified that the breakers be restored in the open position. The
licensee determined that a senior reactor operator (SRO) who generated the restoration
procedure assumed that, since the breaker was associated with an alternate power
supply, then the normal position of the breaker was OFF. This SRO failed to reference
applicable procedures to verify the normal breaker position. A second SRO reviewed
and approved the tag-out procedure and missed the error. The misaligned breakers
were identified and questioned by another operator on December 29,1998, who was
performing an unrelated procedure validation walk-through.
Operation Management Procedure (OMP) 2-18, Tagout Removal and Restoration
Procedure, Revision 50, Step 6.2, Restoration / Partial Restore Record Sheet, item AA,
states that equipment is to be normally returned to the position specified by a governing
operating procedure checklist, the body of a goveming procedure, or as specified by the
approving SRO based on plant conditions. The i.ispectors determined that the
governing operating checklists for the two SSS breakers were not reviewed when the
operators determined the required restored positions. Discussions with licensee
personnel and review of assot nd Problem Investigation Process report (PIP)
O-C98-4935, revealed that othen possible contributing factors included the fact that the
restoration procedure did not reference OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist,
which specifies the normal operating positions of the breakers; and station drawings did
not accurately depict the breakers' normal operating positions. The inspectors
concluded that these contributors did not cause the human performance error when the
clearance restoration procedure was being developed and approved by the SROs in
support of the December 16,1998, maintenance activities. These items were, however,
properly included in the licensee's corrective action program.
Root Cause Determination
The licensee determined that the root cause for this event was inadequate work
practices. Operations personnel failed to follow the established practice of reviewing
OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, to determine the correct normal (restored)
position of breakers F02C and R03D. Based on the breakers' labels, operations
personnel wrongly assumed that the normal position of the breakers was open. The
inspectors concluded that the licensee's root cause determination, as well as its
development of possible contributing factors in the corrective action program, was
_ .
.
.
3
comprehensive. Several short- and long-term corrective actions were specified to
restore operability and prevent recurrence. These included specifying, in the equipment
data base and locally at the breakers, that having them in the OFF (open) position would
render the SSS inoperable. Other actions were taken to address the human
performance issues.
Safety Sianificance
.
The SSS is not considered safety-related. However, the SSS provides an alternate and
independent means for maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown (for the SSS this is Hot .
Standby [ Mode 3]) condition following certain loss of power, flooding, fire, and security
events that result in the loss of normal RCP seal injection. These events are not ,
assumed to be concurrent with a design basis accident. Safe shutdown is achieved
when: (1) the reactor is prevented from achieving criticality; and (2) adequate heat sink
is provided to ensure reactor coolant system pressure and temperature design and
safety limits are not exceeded. Upon a loss of normal RCP sealinjection, the SSS is
placed in service and the associated unit's standby makeup pump is started to provide
seal injection. This is to be accomplished within 10 minutes to ensure that significant
RCP seal damage and a resultant small break loss of coolant accident do not occur.
With breakers F02C and R03D in the wrong positions and not referenced in the SSS
operating procedure, the SSS's ability to perform its intended safety function of
maintaining RCP seal integrity could not be ensured.
Reculatory Sianificance
The inspectors concluded that the SSS was inoperable from December 16 through 29,
1998, without appropriate actions being taken to restore operability within seven days or
perform a plant shutdown within the following six hours as required by Technical
Specifications (TS). [As of January 16,1999, following the licensee's conversion to
improved TS, this requirement was transferred to the Selected Licensee Commitments
(SLC) document (item 16.7-9), considered Chapter 16 of the Catawba Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report.) The licensee's failure to restore SSS operabiity or perform a
plant shutdown within allowed outage times is considered an apparent violation of
previous TS 3.7.13. This is identified as apparent violation (eel) 50-413,414/99-10-01:
Standby Shutdown System Inoperable in Excess of TS Limits Due to Mispositioned
Circuit Breakers.
c. Conclusions
An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee
Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)) was identified concerning two
mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System
inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba units.
Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the
Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the
NRC in the time period required.
j
J
.
..
>
4
03 Operations Procedures and Documentation
O3.1 SSS Operatina Procedures and Plant Staff Knowledae - General Comments (71707)
The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the operation of the SSS for loss of
nuclear service water, loss of component cooling water, and station blackout events
(i.e., events resulting in loss of normal RCP seal injection), and interviewed operations
and security personnel responsible for implementation. One minor discrepancy was
identified in OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 42.
Procedural steps goveming the transfer to the SSS referenced a wrong structural
' column identification number in describing a critical terminal box location. This item was
communicated to station personnel for correction.
Otherwise, the licensee's procedures for operating the SSS during certain flood, power,
. fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection and perform
their intended functions. Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these
procedures and how to implement them.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (40500, 92901)
- 08.1 - (Closed) LER 50-413/98-19-00: Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of
Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by
Personnel Error
The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in this LER sufficiently developed human -
performance issues that resulted in the mispositioned breakers. The licensee
adequately addressed possible contributing factors in its corrective action program.
Based on the inspectors' review of the subject event, as described in Sections 02 and
' 03 of this inspection report, this LER is closed.
V. Management Meetmgs
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on May 3,1999. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented. No proprietary information was identifed.
.
e
- . - - - - - - - - - -
,.-
.
..c
5
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Beagles, Safety Assurance Manager
M. Boyle, Radiation Protection Manager
S. Bradshaw, Safety Assurance Manager
G. Gilbert, Regulatory Compliance Manager *
R. Glover, Operations Superintendent
P. Herran, Engineering Manager
R. Jones, Station Manager
G. Peterson, Catawba Site Vice-President
F. Smith, Chemistry Manager
R. Parker, Maintenance Manager
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
Problems
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 92901: Followup - Operations
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-413,414/99-10-01 eel Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of
TS Liro;ts Due to Mispositioned Circuit Breakers
(Secuon O2.1)
Qloped
50-413/98-19-00 LER Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of
Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due
to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by Personnel
Error (Section 08.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CFR - - Code of Federal Regulations
eel -
Escalated Enforcement item (Apparent Violation)
LER -
Licensee Event Report
NRC -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PIP - Problem Investigation Process
RCP -
Reactor Coolant Pump
SLC -
Selected Licensee Commitments
SRO -
Senior Reactor Operator
SSS -
Standby Shutdown System
TS- -
Technical Specification ,
VAC - Volts Attemating Current
]
!
j