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| | issue date = 05/25/1979 | | | issue date = 05/25/1979 |
| | title = Letter Reporting a 05/18/1973 Occurrence of a Pressure Transient within the Reactor Coolant System Due to the Closure of Certain Air Operated Valves in the Reactor Coolant Letdown System - Indian Point Unit 2 | | | title = Letter Reporting a 05/18/1973 Occurrence of a Pressure Transient within the Reactor Coolant System Due to the Closure of Certain Air Operated Valves in the Reactor Coolant Letdown System - Indian Point Unit 2 |
| | author name = Caldwell W E | | | author name = Caldwell W |
| | author affiliation = Consolidated Edison Co of New York, Inc | | | author affiliation = Consolidated Edison Co of New York, Inc |
| | addressee name = O'Leary J F | | | addressee name = O'Leary J |
| | addressee affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) | | | addressee affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| | docket = 05000247 | | | docket = 05000247 |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:William E. Caldwe.r. | | {{#Wiki_filter:William E. Caldwe.r. |
| * | | Vice~~sident |
| .** ..., Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc. 4 Irving Place, New York. N Y 10003 -Telephone (212) 460-5181 e f-lle. 9y . * .... ....... *** .,. ...... .I" ** May 25, Re*: -Indian Point Unit No. 2 FacLlity Operating License DPR-26 Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director Directorate of Licensing U.S Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 | | ,~*>-'' .** ..., |
| | f-lle. 9y. |
| | e |
| | .... ....... ~ *** .,. . . . . . . .I" ** |
| | Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc. |
| | 4 Irving Place, New York. N Y 10003 |
| | -Telephone (212) 460-5181 May 25, Re*: -Indian Point Unit No. 2 FacLlity Operating License DPR-26 Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director 50-247 Directorate of Licensing U.S Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 |
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| ==Dear Mr. O'Leary:== | | ==Dear Mr. O'Leary:== |
| 50-247 The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-5 is provided*pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1 of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 .. On Friday, May 1973, the Reactor Coolant System was in the process of being heated up in order to ;conduct a hydrostatic te'st. At the time, four :.reactor coolant pumps were in service with Reactor Coolant_ System ditions of approximately 440 psig, 1300F, -1980 ppm boron and all control rods inserted.
| | |
| The reactor had not yet been brought to ini tia-1 criticality. | | The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-5 is provided*pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1 of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 .. |
| At 0552 hours, a pressure transient within the Reactor Coolant System was experienced due to the closure of certain air operated valves in the reactor coolant letdown sys.tern. | | On Friday, May 18~ 1973, the Reactor Coolant System was in the process of being heated up in order to ;conduct a hydrostatic te'st. At the time, four :.reactor coolant pumps were in service with Reactor Coolant_ System con-ditions of approximately 440 psig, 1300F, -1980 ppm boron and all control rods inserted. The reactor had not yet been brought to ini tia-1 criticality. |
| The reactor coolant pumps and charging .pump were shutdown any further pressure --creases. | | At 0552 hours, a pressure transient within the Reactor Coolant System was experienced due to the closure of certain air operated valves in the reactor coolant letdown sys.tern. The reactor coolant pumps and charging |
| Closure of the valves resulted i.n Reactor Coolant System increasing to approximately J 575 psig. An investigation. | | .pump were shutdown _:to:pf.ev~nt any further pressure in- |
| revealed that moisture in \ an air supply line at the refrigerant dryer of the Instrument Air system had frozen. The alternate dryer was placed in service with subsequent*re-establishment .of the proper pressure-within the Instrument Air System. Reactor Coolant pressure was then. returned to normal. DOCKETED USA EC / | | --creases. Closure of the valves resulted i.n Reactor Coolant System pre~sure increasing to approximately 575 psig. An investigation. revealed that moisture in \ |
| '.; ...... * \ . ,.;--*** '* lft Mr.J0hn F. O'Leary May 25, 1973 Investigation as to the cause of the freeze-up disclosed that the suction service* valve to the refrigerant com-
| | J an air supply line at the refrigerant dryer of the Instrument Air system had frozen. The alternate dryer was placed in service with subsequent*re-establishment |
| - | | .of the proper pressure-within the Instrument Air System. |
| had .neen.backseated to eliminate | | Reactor Coolant Syste~ pressure was then. returned to normal. |
| *gland* leaka*ge. | | DOCKETED USA EC |
| Backseating of this valve, however, als.o resulted in isolation of the low suction pressure shutoff controller for the compressor and this caused .it to remain in v*ice allowing moisture in the air line to and eventually | | / |
| *interrupt the air supply:. To prevent recurrence, a relo6ation of the sure controller tap to a -point directly on*the suction .of the compressor is to be accomplished. | | |
| This will allow backseating of the valve to prevent 'freon leakage along the stem, without affecting the. control. | | \ lft Mr.J0hn F. O'Leary May 25, 1973 Investigation as to the cause of the freeze-up disclosed that the suction service* valve to the refrigerant com- |
| .. In the interim, signs have at the dryers prohibiting full-backseating of the subject va*lves while the compressor is in service-. | | ~<=*=-cc- - ~presser had .neen.backseated to eliminate *gland* leaka*ge. |
| The sa*fety implications of this occurrence are not *sidered significant.* | | Backseating of this valve, however, als.o resulted in isolation of the low suction pressure shutoff controller for the compressor and this caused .it to remain in ser-v*ice allowing moisture in the air line to *~reeze, and eventually *interrupt the air supply:. |
| There was no damage inc:;_urred to any system* or component nor wa*s there any* reason to .any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude-. | | To prevent recurrence, a relo6ation of the suction*pres-sure controller tap to a -point directly on*the suction |
| The pressure limitation of 500 psig, coolant temperatures less than 220°F, .is imposed only as a means for* providing additional conservati'sin in the application.of fracture*toughness co:r:icepts. | | .of the compressor is to be accomplished. This will allow backseating of the valve to prevent 'freon leakage along the valv~. stem, without affecting the. control. syst~m . .In the interim, signs have be~n*installed at the dryers prohibiting full-backseating of the subject va*lves while the compressor is in service-. |
| The limit also includes the effects of fast neutron .exposure* | | The sa*fety implications of this occurrence are not con- |
| | *sidered significant.* There was no damage inc:;_urred to any system* or component nor wa*s there any* reason to e,x:- |
| | ~ect .any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude-. The pressure limitation of 500 psig, at-coolant temperatures less than 220°F, .is imposed only as a means for* providing additional conservati'sin in the application.of fracture*toughness co:r:icepts. The limit also includes the effects of fast neutron .exposure* |
| which would occur over a two year period of operation. | | which would occur over a two year period of operation. |
| In light *of the above, it is considered that the safety of the faci.li ty was riot *comprised by this occur.re:q.ce. | | In light *of the above, it is considered that the safety of the faci.li ty was riot *comprised by this occur.re:q.ce. |
| .. Very' truly yours, '' ' ' ... .. .}-: cc '."" Mr. | | .. Very' truly yours, |
| *:P o' Rei).iy., '*.* *** | | .}- : |
| * t ' ' "' * * | | cc '."" Mr. Jaine~ *:P ~ o' Rei).iy., |
| * c -Regufatoiy**aper*atio"ns-*}} | | '*.* *** |
| | * t ' ' "' |
| | * * |
| | * c -Regufatoiy**aper*atio"ns-*}} |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24240A1692024-09-18018 September 2024 Cy 2023 Summary of Decommissioning Trust Fund Status IR 05000003/20240022024-08-0606 August 2024 NRC Inspection Report 05000003/2024002, 05000247/2024002, 05000286/2024002 PNP 2024-030, Update Report for Holtec Decommissioning International Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program Rev. 3 and Palisades Transitioning Quality Assurance Plan, Rev 02024-08-0202 August 2024 Update Report for Holtec Decommissioning International Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program Rev. 3 and Palisades Transitioning Quality Assurance Plan, Rev 0 ML24171A0122024-06-18018 June 2024 Reply to a Notice of Violation EA-24-037 ML24156A1162024-06-0404 June 2024 Correction - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML24151A6482024-06-0303 June 2024 Changes in Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Assignments for Some Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000003/20240052024-05-21021 May 2024 And 3 - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2024005, 05000247/2024005, 05000286/2024005, 07200051/2024001, and Notice of Violation ML24128A0632024-05-0707 May 2024 Submittal of 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-24-009, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20232024-04-29029 April 2024 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2023 ML24116A2412024-04-25025 April 2024 Annual Environmental Protection Plan Report ML24114A2282024-04-23023 April 2024 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-24-007, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations – Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)2024-03-29029 March 2024 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations – Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) ML24080A1722024-03-20020 March 2024 Reply to a Notice of Violation EA-2024-010 IR 05000003/20240012024-03-20020 March 2024 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2024001, 05000247/2024001, and 05000286/2024001 (Cover Letter Only) ML24045A0882024-02-22022 February 2024 Correction to the Technical Specifications to Reflect Appropriate Pages Removed and Retained by Previous License Amendments ML24053A0642024-02-22022 February 2024 2023 Annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Report and Fatigue Management Program Data Report IR 05000003/20230042024-02-22022 February 2024 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023004, 05000247/2023004, 05000286/2023004, and 07200051/2023004 and Notice of Violation ML24011A1982024-01-12012 January 2024 ISFSI, Notice of Organization Change for Site Vice President ML23342A1082024-01-0909 January 2024 – Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan ML23353A1742023-12-19019 December 2023 ISFSI, Emergency Plan, Revision 23-04 L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 ML23326A1322023-12-0505 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 67, 300 & 276 to Implement the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Plan ML23339A0442023-12-0505 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 68, 301 and 277 Regarding Changes to Implement the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Physical Security Plan ML23338A2262023-12-0404 December 2023 Signed Amendment No. 27 to Indemnity Agreement No. B-19 ML23356A0212023-12-0101 December 2023 American Nuclear Insurers, Secondary Financial Protection (SFP) Program ML23242A2772023-11-30030 November 2023 NRC Letter Issuance - IP LAR for Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Licenses and PDTS to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from SFPs ML23338A0482023-11-30030 November 2023 ISFSI, Report of Changes to Physical Security, Training and Qualification, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and ISFSI Security Program, Revision 28 ML22339A1572023-11-27027 November 2023 Letter - Indian Point - Ea/Fonsi Request for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E IR 05000003/20230032023-11-21021 November 2023 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023003, 05000247/2023003, 05000286/2023003, and 07200051/2023003 ML23100A1252023-11-17017 November 2023 Letter and Enclosure 1 - Issuance Indian Point Energy Center Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemption for Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance Indemnity Agreement ML23100A1172023-11-17017 November 2023 NRC Response - Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Letter with Enclosures Regarding Changes to Remove the Cyber Security Plan License Condition ML23050A0032023-11-17017 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Indian Point Unit 2 License Amendment Request to Modify Tech Specs for Staffing Requirements Following Spent Fuel Transfer to Dry Storage ML23100A1432023-11-16016 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemption Concerning Onsite Property Damage Insurance (Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, 50-286) L-23-012, Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point2023-11-13013 November 2023 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point ML23064A0002023-11-13013 November 2023 NRC Issuance for Approval-Indian Point EC Units 1, 2 and 3 Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme Amendments ML23306A0992023-11-0202 November 2023 And Indian Point Energy Center, Notification of Changes in Schedule in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7) ML23063A1432023-11-0101 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Holtec Request for Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Part 50 ML23292A0262023-10-19019 October 2023 LTR-23-0211-RI Thomas Congdon, Executive Deputy, Department of Public Service, Chair, Indian Point Decommissioning Oversight Board, Letter Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection and Office of the Inspector General Report-RI ML23289A1582023-10-16016 October 2023 Decommissioning International - Registration of Spent Fuel Casks and Notification of Permanent Removal of All Indian Point Unit 3 Spent Fuel Assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pit ML23270A0082023-09-27027 September 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23237A5712023-09-22022 September 2023 09-22-2023 Letter to Dwaine Perry, Chief, Ramapo Munsee Nation, from Chair Hanson, Responds to Letter Regarding Opposition of the Release and Dumping of Radioactive Waste from Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Into the Hudson River ML23242A2182023-09-12012 September 2023 IPEC – NRC Response to the Town of New Windsor, Ny Board Certified Motion Letter Regarding Treated Water Release from IP Site (Dockets 50-003, 50-247, 50-286) ML23250A0812023-09-0707 September 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23255A0142023-08-31031 August 2023 LTR-23-0211 Thomas Congdon, Executive Deputy, Department of Public Service, Chair, Indian Point Decommissioning Oversight Board, Letter Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection and Office of the Inspector General Report IR 05000003/20230022023-08-22022 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000003/2023002, 05000247/2023002, 05000286/2023002, and 07200051/2023002 ML23227A1852023-08-15015 August 2023 Request for a Revised Approval Date Regarding the Indian Point Energy Center Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML23222A1442023-08-10010 August 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23208A1642023-07-26026 July 2023 Village of Croton-on-Hudson New York Letter Dated 7-26-23 Re Holtec Wastewater ML23200A0422023-07-19019 July 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23235A0602023-07-17017 July 2023 LTR-23-0194 Dwaine Perry, Chief, Ramapo Munsee Nation, Ltr Opposition of the Release and Dumping of Radioactive Waste from Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Into the Hudson River 2024-09-18
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEARNL-18-039, LER 2018-001-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2 Re Penetration Indications Discovered During Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspection2018-05-21021 May 2018 LER 2018-001-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2 Re Penetration Indications Discovered During Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspection 05000286/LER-2017-0042017-12-20020 December 2017 Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Loss of Field, LER 17-004-00 for Indian Point Unit 3, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Loss of Field ML17252A8662017-09-0909 September 2017 Letter Regarding a 04/26/1977 Occurrence Concerning Failure of Number 22 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve to Close to a Manual Signal Initiated by the Control Room Operator - Indian Point Unit No. 2 05000247/LER-2015-0012017-08-29029 August 2017 Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size that Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment, LER 15-001-02 for Indian Point, Unit 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size that Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment 05000286/LER-2017-0032017-08-29029 August 2017 Condensate Storage Tank Declared Inoperable Per Technical Specification, LER 17-003-00 for Indian Point, Unit 3, Regarding Condensate Storage Tank Declared Inoperable Per Technical Specification NL-17-107, LER 15-001-02 for Indian Point, Unit 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate fo2017-08-29029 August 2017 LER 15-001-02 for Indian Point, Unit 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for 05000247/LER-2017-0032017-08-23023 August 2017 Technical Specification Violation of Section 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation, LER 17-003-00 for Indian Point Unit 2, Regarding Technical Specification Violation of Section 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation 05000247/LER-2017-0012017-08-22022 August 2017 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Levels Caused By Main Boiler Feedwater Pump Turbine Low Pressure Governor Valves Failed Closed, LER 17-001-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2 Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Levels Caused By Main Boiler Feedwater Pump Turbine Low Pressure Governor Valves Failed Closed 05000247/LER-2017-0022017-08-22022 August 2017 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Inoperable for Longer Than the Allowed Technical Specification Completion Time Due to Failure of Complete Restoration Following Calibration, LER 17-002-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2 Regarding Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Inoperable for Longer Than the Allowed Technical Specification Completion Time Due to Failure of Complete Restoration Following Calibration 05000286/LER-2017-0022017-08-0909 August 2017 Manual Isolation of Chemical and Volume Control System Normal Letdown to Stop a Valve Leak Resulted in an Exceedance of Technical Specification 3.4.9 Condition A Limit for Pressurizer Level, LER 17-002-00 for Indian Point, Unit 3 re Manual Isolation of Chemical and Volume Control System Normal letdown to Stop a Valve Leak Resulted in an Exceedance of Technical Specification 3.4.9 Condition A Limit for Pressurizer Level 05000286/LER-2017-0012017-07-13013 July 2017 Single Flow Barrier Access Point Found Unbolted, LER 17-001-00 for Indian Point, Unit 3 Regarding Single Flow Barrier Access Point Found Unbolted 05000247/LER-2016-0102017-02-28028 February 2017 Safety System Functional Failure Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Through Wall Defect in a Service Water Supply Pipe Elbow to the 24, Fan Cooler Unit, LER 16-010-01 for Indian Point 2 Regarding Safety System Functional Failure Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Through Wall Defect in a Service Water Supply Pipe Elbow to the 24 Fan Cooler Unit 05000247/LER-2016-0022017-02-28028 February 2017 Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) Due to 480 VAC Bus Undervoltage Condition and Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) While in Cold Shutdown, LER 16-002-01 for Indian Point, Unit 2 Regarding Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) Due to 480 VAC Bus Undervoltage Condition and Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) While in Cold Shutdown NL-16-108, LER 15-001-01 for Indian Point 2 Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Conta2016-09-29029 September 2016 LER 15-001-01 for Indian Point 2 Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Contai 05000286/LER-2015-0052016-09-14014 September 2016 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip Caused by the Trip of 345kV Main Generator Output Breaker 3 due to a Failure of South Ring Bus 345kV Breaker 5, LER 15-005-01 for Indian Point 3 RE: Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip Caused by the Trip of 345kV Main Generator output Breaker 3 due to a Failure of South Ring Bus 345kV Breaker 5 05000286/LER-2015-0042016-09-14014 September 2016 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip Caused by a Failure of the 31 Main Transformer, LER 15-004-01 for Indian Point Unit No. 3 Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip Caused by a Failure of the 31 Main Transformer 05000286/LER-2015-0072016-09-0606 September 2016 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Water Levels Caused by a Miss- Wired Circuit Board in the Main Feedwater Pump Speed Control System, LER 2015-007-01 for Indian Point, Unit 3 Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Water Level Caused by a Miss-Wired Circuit Board in the Main Feedwater Pump Speed Control System 05000286/LER-2015-0062016-08-0808 August 2016 Technical SpecificatiOn Prohibited Condition Due to Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves Discovered Outside their As-Found Lift Setpoint Test Acceptance Criteria, LER 15-006-01 for Indian Point Unit No. 3 Regarding Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves Discovered Outside Their As-Found Lift Setpoint Test Acceptance Criteria 05000286/LER-2014-0042016-08-0101 August 2016 Automatic Reactor Trip as a Result of Meeting the Trip Logic for Over Temperature Delta Temperature during Reactor Protection System Pressurizer Pressure Calibration, LER 14-004-01 for Indian Point Unit 3, Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip as a Result of Meeting the Trip Logic for Over Temperature Delta Temperature During Reactor Protection System Pressurizer Pressure Calibration 05000247/LER-2016-0042016-05-31031 May 2016 Unanalyzed Condition due to Degraded Reactor Baffle-Former Bolts, LER 16-004-00 for Indian Point 2 re Unanalyzed Condition Due to Degraded Reactor Baffle-Former Bolts 05000247/LER-2016-0052016-05-25025 May 2016 Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to a Surveillance Requirement Never Performed for Testing the Trip of the Main Boiler Feedwater Pumps, LER 16-005-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to a Surveillance Requirement Never Performed for Testing the Trip of the Main Boiler Feedwater Pumps 05000247/LER-2016-0012016-05-0202 May 2016 Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by One Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its As-Found Lift Set Point Test Acceptance Criteria, LER 16-001-00 for Indian Point 2 RE: Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by One Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its As-Found Lift Set Point Test Acceptance Criteria 05000247/LER-2015-0042016-02-18018 February 2016 Safety System Functional Failure Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Flawed Elbow on the 21 Fan Cooler Unit Service Water Motor Cooling Return Pipe, LER 15-004-00 for Indian Point 2 Regarding Safety System Functional Failure Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Flawed Elbow on the 21 Fan Cooler Unit Service Water Motor Cooling Return Pipe 05000286/LER-2015-0082016-02-11011 February 2016 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip as a Result of a Fault on 345 kV Feeder W96 Tower Lines Caused by Pre-Existing Degraded Insulator, LER 15-008-00 for Indian Point, Unit 3, Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine-Generator Trip as a Result of a Fault on 345 kV Feeder W96 Tower Lines Caused by Bird Streaming 05000247/LER-2015-0032016-02-0303 February 2016 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure, LER 15-003-00 for Indian Point, Unit 2, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure NL-15-124, LER 15-001-00 for Indian Point 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Cont2015-10-0909 October 2015 LER 15-001-00 for Indian Point 2, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Conta NL-13-166, Report on Inoperable Gross Failed Fuel Detector2013-12-20020 December 2013 Report on Inoperable Gross Failed Fuel Detector NL-13-038, Event Report for Discovery of a Condition That Prevented Immediate Protective Actions to Avoid Exposures to Radiation from Byproduct Material2013-02-19019 February 2013 Event Report for Discovery of a Condition That Prevented Immediate Protective Actions to Avoid Exposures to Radiation from Byproduct Material NL-12-060, Submittal of Report on Inoperable Gross Failed Fuel Detector2012-04-26026 April 2012 Submittal of Report on Inoperable Gross Failed Fuel Detector ML1101906402010-11-0909 November 2010 Event Notification Report; Subject: Power Reactor Indian Point Unit 2 NL-09-108, Submittal of Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples2009-08-10010 August 2009 Submittal of Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples ML0509600412004-12-17017 December 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - IP-2 Grid Loop ML0509600512004-12-17017 December 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - IP-3 Grid Loop NL-03-136, LER 03-03-00 for Indian Point Unit 3 Regarding Automatic Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to Fault in 345kV Generator Output Breaker 32003-08-21021 August 2003 LER 03-03-00 for Indian Point Unit 3 Regarding Automatic Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to Fault in 345kV Generator Output Breaker 3 ML0209104352002-03-19019 March 2002 LER 98-001-01 for Indian Point Unit 3 Re Potential Failure or Inadvertent Operation of Fire Protection Systems, Caused by Personnel Error in Design ML17252A8951979-05-25025 May 1979 Letter Reporting a 05/18/1973 Occurrence of a Pressure Transient within the Reactor Coolant System Due to the Closure of Certain Air Operated Valves in the Reactor Coolant Letdown System - Indian Point Unit 2 ML17252A8461974-02-19019 February 1974 Letter Regarding Performance of a Surveillance Test PT-M2 Reactor Coolant Temperature Analog Channel Functional Test - Delta T Overtemperature and T Overpower - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8481974-02-19019 February 1974 Letter Regarding a February 1, 1974 Occurrence Where Both Door of the 80 Foot Elevation Personnel Air Lock to the Containment Building Were Inadvertently Open at the Same Time for a Period of About Thirty Seconds - Indian Point Unit. 2 ML17252A8471974-02-0808 February 1974 Letter Regarding an Occurrence on 1/25/1974 at the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Reactor Was Brought Critical in Preparation for Placing the Plant Back in Service Following Completion of Repairs Associated with No. 22 Steam Generator Feedwater Li ML17252A8491974-02-0606 February 1974 Letter Regarding an Occurrence Where Both Doors of the 80 Foot Elevation Personnel Air Lock to the Containment Building Were Inadvertently Opened at the Same Time for About Thirty Seconds - Indian Point Unit 2 ML17252A8501974-02-0505 February 1974 Letter Regarding an Occurrence Where a Slight Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient Was Experienced in the Course of Placing a Reactor Coolant Pump in Service - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8511974-02-0101 February 1974 Letter Regarding an Inspection of All Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors (Snubbers) Located in the Vapor Containment Was Performed and Two Did Not Meet the Established Criterion for Operability - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8521974-01-31031 January 1974 Letter Regarding an Occurrence Where the Reactor Was Brought Critical Preparatory to Placing the Plant Back in Service Following Completion of Repairs Associated with the 11/13/1973 Feedwater Line Break Incident - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8591974-01-28028 January 1974 Letter Regarding an Occurrence 01/23/1974 Where a Slight Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient Above the Technical Specifications Limit Was Experienced in the Course of Placing a Reactor Coolant Pump in Service - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8721974-01-18018 January 1974 Letter Regarding Analysis of Results of Monthly Periodic Surveillance Test PT-M11 (Steam Line Pressure Analog Channel Function Test) Indicated That One of the Low Steam Line Pressure Bistables Associated with High Steam - Indian Point Unit ML17252A8761973-12-28028 December 1973 Letter Regarding 12/17/1973 Analysis of the Results of Periodic Tests and Calibration Checks Relating to Pressurizer Level Indicated a Setpoint Drift - Indian Point Unit 2 ML17252A8771973-12-18018 December 1973 Letter Regarding a 12/17/1973 Analysis of Results of Periodic Tests and Calibration Checks Relating to Pressurizer Level Indicated a Setting for One of the Bistables Was Above the Technical Spec. Limit - Indian Point Unit 2 ML17252A8791973-12-0303 December 1973 Letter Regarding a 11/18/1973 Occurrence Relating to the Discovery of the Erroneous Setting for 1 of the Bistables Associated with Low Pressurizer Safety Injection Required by the Technical Specifications - Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8781973-11-30030 November 1973 Letter Providing Supplemental Information Concerning the 11/13/1973 Incident at Indian Point Unit No. 2 ML17252A8821973-11-19019 November 1973 Letter Concerning a 11/16/1973 Occurrence Regarding Periodic Tests and Calibration Checks Indicating the Setting for 1 of the Bistable Device Was Below the Technical Specification Requirements - Indian Point Unit 2 2018-05-21
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Text
William E. Caldwe.r.
Vice~~sident
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Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York. N Y 10003
-Telephone (212) 460-5181 May 25, Re*: -Indian Point Unit No. 2 FacLlity Operating License DPR-26 Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director 50-247 Directorate of Licensing U.S Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545
Dear Mr. O'Leary:
The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-5 is provided*pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1 of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 ..
On Friday, May 18~ 1973, the Reactor Coolant System was in the process of being heated up in order to ;conduct a hydrostatic te'st. At the time, four :.reactor coolant pumps were in service with Reactor Coolant_ System con-ditions of approximately 440 psig, 1300F, -1980 ppm boron and all control rods inserted. The reactor had not yet been brought to ini tia-1 criticality.
At 0552 hours0.00639 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.126984e-4 weeks <br />2.10036e-4 months <br />, a pressure transient within the Reactor Coolant System was experienced due to the closure of certain air operated valves in the reactor coolant letdown sys.tern. The reactor coolant pumps and charging
.pump were shutdown _:to:pf.ev~nt any further pressure in-
--creases. Closure of the valves resulted i.n Reactor Coolant System pre~sure increasing to approximately 575 psig. An investigation. revealed that moisture in \
J an air supply line at the refrigerant dryer of the Instrument Air system had frozen. The alternate dryer was placed in service with subsequent*re-establishment
.of the proper pressure-within the Instrument Air System.
Reactor Coolant Syste~ pressure was then. returned to normal.
DOCKETED USA EC
/
\ lft Mr.J0hn F. O'Leary May 25, 1973 Investigation as to the cause of the freeze-up disclosed that the suction service* valve to the refrigerant com-
~<=*=-cc- - ~presser had .neen.backseated to eliminate *gland* leaka*ge.
Backseating of this valve, however, als.o resulted in isolation of the low suction pressure shutoff controller for the compressor and this caused .it to remain in ser-v*ice allowing moisture in the air line to *~reeze, and eventually *interrupt the air supply:.
To prevent recurrence, a relo6ation of the suction*pres-sure controller tap to a -point directly on*the suction
.of the compressor is to be accomplished. This will allow backseating of the valve to prevent 'freon leakage along the valv~. stem, without affecting the. control. syst~m . .In the interim, signs have be~n*installed at the dryers prohibiting full-backseating of the subject va*lves while the compressor is in service-.
The sa*fety implications of this occurrence are not con-
- sidered significant.* There was no damage inc:;_urred to any system* or component nor wa*s there any* reason to e,x:-
~ect .any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude-. The pressure limitation of 500 psig, at-coolant temperatures less than 220°F, .is imposed only as a means for* providing additional conservati'sin in the application.of fracture*toughness co:r:icepts. The limit also includes the effects of fast neutron .exposure*
which would occur over a two year period of operation.
In light *of the above, it is considered that the safety of the faci.li ty was riot *comprised by this occur.re:q.ce.
.. Very' truly yours,
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cc '."" Mr. Jaine~ *:P ~ o' Rei).iy.,
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- c -Regufatoiy**aper*atio"ns-*