05000247/LER-2015-001, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment

Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment

ML15292A217
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	10/09/2015
From:	Coyle L Entergy Nuclear Operations, Indian Point
To:	Document Control Desk
References
NL-15-124 LER 15-001-00
Download: ML15292A217 (7)

LER-2015-001, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size That Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2472015001R00 - NRC Website

text

SEntgy Lnawrnc Poinnryl Cete 450e BieroaidwaynGS Lawrence Coyle Site Vice President NL-1 5-124 October 9, 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk 11545 Rockville Pike, TWFN-2 F1 Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report # 2015-001-00, "Technical Specification (TS)

Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size that Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment" Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 DPR-26

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (ENO) hereby provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-001-00. The attached LER identifies an event where there was a Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition due to not meeting Containment integrity as a result of a Containment Fan Cooler Unit motor cooler service water return pipe defect whose leakage could result in post-LOCA air leakage out of containment in excess of that allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.1 (Containment) which requires leakage rates to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This condition was recorded in the Entergy Corrective Action Program as Condition Report CR-IP2-2015-3550.

NL-15-124 Page 2 of 2 There are no new commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Manager, Regulatory Assurance at (914) 254-6710.

Attachment: LER-201 5-001 cc:

Mr. Daniel H. Dorman, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I NRC Resident Inspector's Office Ms. Bridget Frymire, New York State Public Service Commission

Abstract

On August 11, 2015, during operator investigations inside the reactor containment

building, a through wall leak was discovered on the 24 Fan Cooler Unit (FCU) motor cooler service water (SW) return line.

The leak was in a 2 inch copper-nickel pipe near a welded joint upstream of containment penetration SS.

The leak was located within the ASME Section XI Code ISI Class 3 boundary and estimated to be approximately 2 gpm.

Since the pipe flaw was through wall and was located within the ASME Section XI

boundary, it exceeded the flaw allowable limits provided per IWD-3000.

The weld leak was evaluated and determined to meet the structural requirements of ASME Code Case N-513-3.

The condition was determined to have no impact on SW cooling safety function or adverse impact on piping structural integrity.

The pipe is part of a closed loop system inside containment and is required to meet containment integrity.

An engineering evaluation was performed to determine the potential air leakage out of containment based on the observed SW leakage into containment.

This evaluation concluded that the leaking defect could result in post-LOCA air leakage out of containment in excess of that allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.1 (Containment) which requires leakage rates to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

The apparent cause was corrosion.

The immediate corrective action was to install an engineered clamp over the pipe defect.

The clamp is being monitored daily and UT monitoring will be performed every 90 days until the pipe is repaired.

The pipe will be repaired or replaced in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI Code by the next refueling outage in 2016.

The event had no significant effect on public health and safety.

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Current analysis for SW pipe failures are postulated to be limited to small through-wall leakage flaws as SW is defined as a moderate energy fluid system.

The SW leak would eventually drain to the containment sump.

The containment sumps have pumps with sufficient capacity to remove excessive leakage.

The impact of the pipe flaw was evaluated for containment free volume in-leakage per the limits of TRM 3.4.D.

The leak did not and is not expected to exceed the TRM 3.4.D limit.

The pipe leak was just upstream of outboard containment isolation valve SWN-71-4A.

An evaluation of the leak concluded that it did not result in any structural, flooding, or spraying condition that would adversely impact the capability of SSCs to perform their safety function.