NL-09-108, Submittal of Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples

Submittal of Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples

ML092330110
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/10/2009
From:	Robert Walpole Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-09-108
Download: ML092330110 (2)

Text

Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 r ,,Buchanan,

,tr.-* N.Y. 10511-0249 Tel (914) 734-6700 Robert Walpole Licensing Manager 914-734-6710 August 10, 2009 NL-09-108 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples Indian Point Unit Number 3 Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this letter is to submit a report pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.7.

Two channels of Core Exit Thermocouples (CET), each channel consisting of two CETs in the same train, are required by TS 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1, for each reactor quadrant. Each reactor quadrant is considered a separate function. CET K-13 is in reactor quadrant IV, Train A, and is required to satisfy the function of Post Accident Monitoring. CET R-10 is in reactor quadrant IV, Train A, and is also required to satisfy the function of Post Accident Monitoring. These CETs were declared inoperable on July 1 and July 3, 2009, respectively, and TS 3.3.3, Condition B was entered. The 30 day allowed outage time expired on July 31 and August 2,.

2009. TS 3.3.3, Condition B requires a report in 14 days pursuant to TS 5.6.7. The report is to outline the alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument to operable status.

• Alternate method of monitoring Quadrant IV Train A has one operable qualified CET and Train B has two operable qualified operable CETs. With the single channel failure of Train B in quadrant IV there are additionally 5 non qualified operable CETs, that for non accident conditions, can help to provide indications for unit stabilization, cool down and channel check capability for the one operable qualified Train A CET P13.

• Cause These failures were entered into the IPEC Corrective Action Program in CR-IP3-2009-02964. Troubleshooting and evaluation of the failure has identified that an electrical fault is present somewhere in the Containment Building in the cabling between a connection panel

NL-09-108 Docket 50-286 Page 2 of 2 and the connection at the Reactor Vessel Head. However, the precise nature of the fault is not determinate at this time. The boundary described above is not accessible during power operation and as such further investigation as well as repair is not practical at this time.

0 Plans and schedule for restoring Repair plans have been entered into the IPEC Corrective Action Program in CR-IP3-2009-03041, CA-001. Work Orders 200238 and 200239 have been issued and coded as a Forced Outage activity to be implemented in the first Forced Outage of sufficient duration.

If an opportunity does not present itself, repairs will be implemented no later than the next Refueling Outage in the spring of 2011.

There are no new commitments being made in this submittal.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Licensing Manager.

Sincerely, RW/sp cc: Mr. John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager, NRC NRR Mr. Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I NRC Senior Resident Inspectors Office Mr. Francis J. Murray, Jr., President and CEO, NYSERDA Mr. Paul Eddy, New York State Dept. of Public Service