|
|
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) |
Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | issue date = 09/16/1988 | | | issue date = 09/16/1988 |
| | title = Disabling of Diesel Generator Output Circuit Breakers by Anti-Pump Circuitry | | | title = Disabling of Diesel Generator Output Circuit Breakers by Anti-Pump Circuitry |
| | author name = Rossi C E | | | author name = Rossi C |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
Line 14: |
Line 14: |
| | page count = 8 | | | page count = 8 |
| }} | | }} |
| {{#Wiki_filter:IUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555September 16, 1988NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-75: DISABLING OF DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUTCIRCUIT BREAKERS BY ANTI-PUMP CIRCUITRY | | {{#Wiki_filter:I |
| | |
| | UNITED STATES |
| | |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| | |
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 16, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-75: DISABLING OF DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT |
| | |
| | CIRCUIT BREAKERS BY ANTI-PUMP CIRCUITRY |
|
| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors. | | : |
| | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power |
| | |
| | reactors. |
|
| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| :This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potentialproblems where the capability to either automatically or manually closediesel generator circuit breakers from the control room may be lost. Itis expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do notconstitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required. | | : |
| | This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential |
| | |
| | problems where the capability to either automatically or manually close |
| | |
| | diesel generator circuit breakers from the control room may be lost. It |
| | |
| | is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability |
| | |
| | to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar |
| | |
| | problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not |
| | |
| | constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response |
| | |
| | is required. |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances== | | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| :On June 5, 1988, operators at Browns Ferry Unit 3 were unable to reclose thediesel generator output breakers to the 4-kV shutdown boards from the controlroom during a loss-of-power/loss-of-coolant-accident (LOP/LOCA) test. Duringthe test, the output breakers connected the diesel generators to their respec-tive 4-kV shutdown boards after the LOP signal was generated; however, thebreakers tripped and remained open after receiving the LOCA signal. Operatorsdiagnosed the output breaker lockout problem using system electrical configu-ration drawings. An operator was sent to the 4-kY shutdown board to manuallytransfer output breaker control power to its alternate source. This momentarilyremoved power, enabling the breaker to close when the power was restored.On October 14, 1987, an operator at Wolf Creek Generating Station manuallytripped the output circuit breaker of the emergency diesel generator (EDG)from the control room. At the time, the EDG was supplying a vital bus. Whenthe operators tried to reenergize the vital bus from the still-operating EDG,they found that they could not close the EDG output breaker from the controlroom. The vital bus was finally reenergized from the offsite power supply.Through examination of the breaker control schematics the licensee laterfound that the EDG circuit breaker could be closed by cycling the EDG modeswitch at the EDG local control station.880920197 IN 88-75September 16, 1988 Discussion:The anti-pump circuit configuration will protect large breakers from rapidcycling and, under certain circumstances, will prevent breaker closure. AtBrowns Ferry Unit 3, a unique sequence of events, a LOP signal followed within6 seconds by a LOCA signal, led to the discovery of a design deficiency of thiscircuit configuration. Contacts from the undervoltage relay will seal in thebreaker anti-pump relay until the undervoltage condition on the 4-kV boardsclears.The circuit is designed such that following a LOP, the undervoltage conditionmust exist for at least 5 seconds and the diesel. must reach rated speed beforethe diesel generator output breaker will close on the bus. Once the breakerhas closed, the closure spring recharge motor and the breaker anti-pump relaywill be energized. A fully discharged closure spring requires 2 seconds forthe spring to be fully recharged. During this 2 second window the anti-pumpcoil will remain energized via contacts sensing spring position, and if anundervoltage condition exists on the 4-kY bus it will seal in and lock openthe breaker.During the Browns Ferry event, the EDG output breaker closed 5 seconds afterthe LOP signal, the undervoltage condition was eliminated, and the undervoltagerelay began its 5 second cycle to reset from the undervoltage condition. About1.5 seconds 1ater. the. LOCA-signaL-retr-ipped-the-breaker-and-created-another--undervoltage condition on the 4-kV bus. At this point, because the undervoltagerelay had not completed its reset cycle, the undervoltage relay remained in itsundervoltage state. Therefore, the undervoltage relay sealed in the still-energized anti-pump relay because the undervoltage condition occurred beforethe breaker charging spring was fully charged. Thus, the breaker could notbe closed from the control room either manually or automatically until controlpower was removed, which deenergized the anti-pump relay.The Browns Ferry licensee modified the breaker control logic to prevent the anti-pump relay from sealing in during a LOCA condition by adding a time-delay relayin the breaker trip coil circuitry. This relay will be energized by a LOCAsignal and its contact in the anti-pump coil seal-in path will open after a2-to 5-second delay to prevent anti-pump coil seal-in and breaker lockout.The Wolf Creek EDG output circuit breaker has automatic closing logic to closethe circuit breaker when the following five permissives are satisfied:(1) Both offsite circuit breakers are open'(2 The EDG mode switch is in the automatic mode.(3 Lockout relays are deenergized.(4 A 3-second time delay has elapsed.(5) The EDG has reached operating speed and voltage.This logic sends a constant close signal to the circuit breaker that keeps thebreaker's internal anti-pump relay energized as long as the logic permissivesare satisfied. The anti-pump relay prevents the circuit breaker from cyclingif attempts are made to hold the breaker closed against a valid trip signal.I', | | : |
| IN 88-75September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto-matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pumprelay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cyclingthe EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuitbreaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there-by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed byreturning the switch to the "auto' position, the circuit breaker's automaticclosing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in thecontrol room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from thecontrol room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of parallelingthe EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switchcan be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re-close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal"position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch.When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch,the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breakeranti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must putthe switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal"position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDGoutput- circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to otherbreakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakersand offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentiallysignificant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRCevaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technicalcontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Di rectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR(301) 492-0814Carl Schulten, NRR(301) 492-1192Fred Burrows, NRR(301) 492-0783Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
| | On June 5, 1988, operators at Browns Ferry Unit 3 were unable to reclose the |
| | |
| | diesel generator output breakers to the 4-kV shutdown boards from the control |
| | |
| | room during a loss-of-power/loss-of-coolant-accident (LOP/LOCA) test. During |
| | |
| | the test, the output breakers connected the diesel generators to their respec- tive 4-kV shutdown boards after the LOP signal was generated; however, the |
| | |
| | breakers tripped and remained open after receiving the LOCA signal. Operators |
| | |
| | diagnosed the output breaker lockout problem using system electrical configu- ration drawings. An operator was sent to the 4-kY shutdown board to manually |
| | |
| | transfer output breaker control power to its alternate source. This momentarily |
| | |
| | removed power, enabling the breaker to close when the power was restored. |
| | |
| | On October 14, 1987, an operator at Wolf Creek Generating Station manually |
| | |
| | tripped the output circuit breaker of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) |
| | from the control room. At the time, the EDG was supplying a vital bus. When |
| | |
| | the operators tried to reenergize the vital bus from the still-operating EDG, |
| | they found that they could not close the EDG output breaker from the control |
| | |
| | room. The vital bus was finally reenergized from the offsite power supply. |
| | |
| | Through examination of the breaker control schematics the licensee later |
| | |
| | found that the EDG circuit breaker could be closed by cycling the EDG mode |
| | |
| | switch at the EDG local control station. |
| | |
| | 880920197 |
| | |
| | IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 Discussion: |
| | The anti-pump circuit configuration will protect large breakers from rapid |
| | |
| | cycling and, under certain circumstances, will prevent breaker closure. At |
| | |
| | Browns Ferry Unit 3, a unique sequence of events, a LOP signal followed within |
| | |
| | 6 seconds by a LOCA signal, led to the discovery of a design deficiency of this |
| | |
| | circuit configuration. Contacts from the undervoltage relay will seal in the |
| | |
| | breaker anti-pump relay until the undervoltage condition on the 4-kV boards |
| | |
| | clears. |
| | |
| | The circuit is designed such that following a LOP, the undervoltage condition |
| | |
| | must exist for at least 5 seconds and the diesel. must reach rated speed before |
| | |
| | the diesel generator output breaker will close on the bus. Once the breaker |
| | |
| | has closed, the closure spring recharge motor and the breaker anti-pump relay |
| | |
| | will be energized. A fully discharged closure spring requires 2 seconds for |
| | |
| | the spring to be fully recharged. During this 2 second window the anti-pump |
| | |
| | coil will remain energized via contacts sensing spring position, and if an |
| | |
| | undervoltage condition exists on the 4-kY bus it will seal in and lock open |
| | |
| | the breaker. |
| | |
| | During the Browns Ferry event, the EDG output breaker closed 5 seconds after |
| | |
| | the LOP signal, the undervoltage condition was eliminated, and the undervoltage |
| | |
| | relay began its 5 second cycle to reset from the undervoltage condition. About |
| | |
| | 1.5 seconds 1ater. the.LOCA-signaL-retr-ipped-the-breaker-and-created-another-- |
| | undervoltage condition on the 4-kV bus. At this point, because the undervoltage |
| | |
| | relay had not completed its reset cycle, the undervoltage relay remained in its |
| | |
| | undervoltage state. Therefore, the undervoltage relay sealed in the still- energized anti-pump relay because the undervoltage condition occurred before |
| | |
| | the breaker charging spring was fully charged. Thus, the breaker could not |
| | |
| | be closed from the control room either manually or automatically until control |
|
| |
|
| Att"aantIN 88-75September 16, 1988Page I of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESNotice No. Subject Issuance88-74 Potentially Inadequate 9/14/88Perfornance of ECCS inPWRs During RecirculationOperation Following a LOCA88-73 Direction-Dependent Leak 9/8/88Characteristics ofContainment Purge Valves88-72 Inadequacies in the Design 9/2/88of dc Motor-Operated Valves88-71 Possible Environmental 9/1/88Effect of the Reentryof COSMOS 1900 andRequest for Collectionof Licensee RadioactivityMeasurements Attributedto That Event88-70 Check Valve Inservice 8/29/88Testing ProgramDeficiencies88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88Binding in HFA RelaysManufactured by GeneralElectric (GE)88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/24/88Supplement I Refurbished Valves88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88surizer Safety Valves withFilled Loop Seals UsingHydraulic Assist Devices88P67- -P-F Zfiiairy Fiedeaer Pump 8/Z2j88Turbine Overspeed TripFailureOL
| | power was removed, which deenergized the anti-pump relay. |
|
| |
|
| * Operating LicenseCP
| | The Browns Ferry licensee modified the breaker control logic to prevent the anti- pump relay from sealing in during a LOCA condition by adding a time-delay relay |
|
| |
|
| * Construction PermitIssued toAll holders of OLsor CPs for W and8&W-designei nuclearpower reactors.All holders of 0Lsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors, fuelcycle licensees,and Priority Imaterial licensees.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors._UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555OFFICIAL BUSINESSPENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300FIRST CLASS MAILPOSTAGE & FEES PAIDUSNRCPERMIT No. 0-57 IN 88-75September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto-matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pumprelay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cyclingthe EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuitbreaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there-by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed byreturning the switch to the "auto" position, the circuit breaker's automaticclosing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in thecontrol room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from thecontrol room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of parallelingthe EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switchcan be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re-close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal"position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch.When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch,the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breakeranti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must putthe switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal"position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDGoutput circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to otherbreakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakersand offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentiallysignificant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRCevaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technicalcontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR(301) 492-0814Carl Schulten, NRR(301) 492-1192Fred Burrows, NRR(301) 492-0783Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCEOFC *OEAB *Tech Ed *SL:OEAB *C:OEAB *D:DEST *C:OGCBNAME CSchulten BCalure PBaranowsky WLanning LShao CBerlinger e lDATE 9/7/88 7/28/88 9/7/88 9/7/88 8/24/88 9/8/88 9/(,f 88 IN 88-September , 1988 contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position. thecircuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in thecontrol room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker fromthe control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means ofparalleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the currentmodification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allowthe automatic circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification added acontact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and"pull to lock" positions of the control switch. When operators manually tripthe EDG circuit breaker from this control switch. the contacts open tointerrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump relay.If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the"pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" positioncompletes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDGoutput circuit breakers. the anti-pump circuit problem could also apply to otherbreakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers andoffsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.The information herein is being provided as an early notification of apotentially significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRCstaff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may berequested.No specific action or written response is required by this informationnotice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact any of thetechnical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriateregional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: James Lazevnick. NRR(301) 492-0814Carl Schulten. NRR(301) 492-1192Fred Burrows. NRR(301) 492-0783-e --- --:D: -NAME :CSchu Mn are :P aranowsky :WLan n :LShao :CBeri nger :ERossiDATE q 88 /8 :1/88 /88 :18188 /88OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
| | in the breaker trip coil circuitry. This relay will be energized by a LOCA |
|
| |
|
| IN 88-August .1988 contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position. thecircuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in thecontrol room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker fromthe control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means ofparalleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the currentmodification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pumping logic and allowthe automatic circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification added acontact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and"pull to lock" positions of the control switch. When operators manually tripthe EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open tointerrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pumping relay.If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the"pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" positioncompletes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDGoutput circuit breakers, the same problem could also apply to other breakersthat use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers and offsitesupply breakers to the emergency buses.The information herein is being provided as an early notification of apotentially significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRCstaff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may berequested.No specific action or written responses is required by this informationnotice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact either thetechnical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriateregional office.Charles E. Rossi. DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | signal and its contact in the anti-pump coil seal-in path will open after a |
| | |
| | 2-to 5-second delay to prevent anti-pump coil seal-in and breaker lockout. |
| | |
| | The Wolf Creek EDG output circuit breaker has automatic closing logic to close |
| | |
| | the circuit breaker when the following five permissives are satisfied: |
| | (1) Both offsite circuit breakers are open' |
| | (2 The EDG mode switch is in the automatic mode. |
| | |
| | (3 Lockout relays are deenergized. |
| | |
| | (4 A 3-second time delay has elapsed. |
| | |
| | (5) The EDG has reached operating speed and voltage. |
| | |
| | This logic sends a constant close signal to the circuit breaker that keeps the |
| | |
| | breaker's internal anti-pump relay energized as long as the logic permissives |
| | |
| | are satisfied. The anti-pump relay prevents the circuit breaker from cycling |
| | |
| | if attempts are made to hold the breaker closed against a valid trip signal. |
| | |
| | I', |
| | |
| | IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto- matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pump |
| | |
| | relay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cycling |
| | |
| | the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit |
| | |
| | breaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there- by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by |
| | |
| | returning the switch to the "auto' position, the circuit breaker's automatic |
| | |
| | closing logic closed the breaker. |
| | |
| | The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the |
| | |
| | control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the |
| | |
| | control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of paralleling |
| | |
| | the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch |
| | |
| | can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re- close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal" |
| | position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch. |
| | |
| | When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker |
| | |
| | anti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put |
| | |
| | the switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" |
| | position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses. |
| | |
| | It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDG |
| | |
| | output- circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to other |
| | |
| | breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers |
| | |
| | and offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses. |
| | |
| | The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentially |
| | |
| | significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRC |
| | |
| | evaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested. |
| | |
| | No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional |
| | |
| | office. |
| | |
| | Di rector |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0783 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
| | |
| | Att"aant |
| | |
| | IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 Page I of I |
| | |
| | LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
| | |
| | NRCINFORMATION NOTICES |
| | |
| | Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to |
| | |
| | 88-74 Potentially Inadequate 9/14/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Perfornance of ECCSin or CPs for Wand |
| | |
| | PWRs During Recirculation 8&W-designei nuclear |
| | |
| | Operation Following a LOCA power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-73 Direction-Dependent Leak 9/8/88 All holders of 0Ls |
| | |
| | Characteristics of or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | Containment Purge Valves power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-72 Inadequacies in the Design 9/2/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | of dc Motor-Operated Valves or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-71 Possible Environmental 9/1/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Effect of the Reentry or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | of COSMOS 1900 and power reactors, fuel |
| | |
| | Request for Collection cycle licensees, of Licensee Radioactivity and Priority I |
| | |
| | Measurements Attributed material licensees. |
| | |
| | to That Event |
| | |
| | 88-70 Check Valve Inservice 8/29/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Testing Program or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | Deficiencies power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Binding in HFA Relays or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | Manufactured by General power reactors. |
| | |
| | Electric (GE) |
| | 88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/24/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Supplement I Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | surizer Safety Valves with or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | Filled Loop Seals Using power reactors. |
| | |
| | Hydraulic Assist Devices |
| | |
| | _ |
| | 88P67- -P-F Zfiiairy Fiedeaer Pump 8/Z2j88 All holders of OLs |
| | |
| | Turbine Overspeed Trip or CPs for nuclear |
| | |
| | Failure power reactors. |
| | |
| | OL |
| | |
| | * Operating License |
| | |
| | CP* Construction Permit |
| | |
| | UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL |
| | |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POSTAGE & FEES PAID |
| | |
| | USNRC |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 PERMIT No. 0-57 OFFICIAL BUSINESS |
| | |
| | PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 |
| | |
| | IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto- matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pump |
| | |
| | relay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cycling |
| | |
| | the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit |
| | |
| | breaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there- by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by |
| | |
| | returning the switch to the "auto" position, the circuit breaker's automatic |
| | |
| | closing logic closed the breaker. |
| | |
| | The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the |
| | |
| | control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the |
| | |
| | control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of paralleling |
| | |
| | the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch |
| | |
| | can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re- close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal" |
| | position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch. |
| | |
| | When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker |
| | |
| | anti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put |
| | |
| | the switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" |
| | position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses. |
| | |
| | It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDG |
| | |
| | output circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to other |
| | |
| | breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers |
| | |
| | and offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses. |
| | |
| | The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentially |
| | |
| | significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRC |
| | |
| | evaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested. |
| | |
| | No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional |
| | |
| | office. |
| | |
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0783 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
| | |
| | *SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE |
| | |
| | OFC *OEAB Ed *SL:OEAB |
| | |
| | *Tech *C:OEAB *D:DEST *C:OGCB |
| | |
| | NAME CSchulten BCalure PBaranowsky WLanning LShao CBerlinger e l |
| | |
| | 9/(,f 88 DATE 9/7/88 7/28/88 9/7/88 9/7/88 8/24/88 9/8/88 |
| | |
| | IN 88- September , 1988 the |
| | |
| | contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position. |
| | |
| | circuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker. |
| | |
| | in the |
| | |
| | The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located from |
| | |
| | control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker |
| | |
| | of |
| | |
| | the control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means |
| | |
| | paralleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current |
| | |
| | allow |
| | |
| | modification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and |
| | |
| | breaker. The modification added a |
| | |
| | the automatic circuit to reclose the and |
| | |
| | contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" |
| | switch. When operators manually trip |
| | |
| | "pull to lock" positions of the control to |
| | |
| | the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch. the contacts open |
| | |
| | interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump relay. |
| | |
| | the breaker open. he must put the switch in the |
| | |
| | If the operator wishes to keep |
| | |
| | "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" position |
| | |
| | completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses. |
| | |
| | EDG |
| | |
| | It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only withto other |
| | |
| | circuit problem could also apply |
| | |
| | output circuit breakers. the anti-pump breakers and |
| | |
| | breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing |
| | |
| | offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses. |
| | |
| | a |
| | |
| | The information herein is being provided as an early notification byof the NRC |
| | |
| | potentially significant matter that is still under consideration |
| | |
| | be |
| | |
| | staff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may |
| | |
| | requested. |
| | |
| | No specific action or written response is required by this informationany of the |
| | |
| | notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact appropriate |
| | |
| | technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the |
| | |
| | regional office. |
| | |
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick. NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten. NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0783 |
| | -e - --- |
| | - :D: - |
| | NAME :CSchu Mn are :P aranowsky :WLan n :LShao :CBeri nger :ERossi |
| | |
| | DATE q 88 /8 :1/88 /88 :18188 /88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
| | |
| | IN 88- August . 1988 contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position. the |
| | |
| | circuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker. |
| | |
| | the |
| | |
| | The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in |
| | |
| | breaker from |
| | |
| | control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit |
| | |
| | the control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of |
| | |
| | paralleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current |
| | |
| | modification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pumping logic and allow |
| | |
| | the automatic circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification added aand |
| | |
| | contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" trip |
| | |
| | "pull to lock" positions of the control switch. When operators manually |
| | |
| | the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to |
| | |
| | interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pumping relay. |
| | |
| | If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the |
| | |
| | "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" position |
| | |
| | completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses. |
| | |
| | EDG |
| | |
| | It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with |
| | |
| | output circuit breakers, the same problem could also apply to other breakers |
| | |
| | that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers and offsite |
| | |
| | supply breakers to the emergency buses. |
| | |
| | The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a |
| | |
| | potentially significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC |
| | |
| | staff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may be |
| | |
| | requested. |
| | |
| | No specific action or written responses is required by this information the |
| | |
| | notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact either |
| | |
| | technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate |
| | |
| | regional office. |
| | |
| | Charles E. Rossi. Director |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| ===Technical Contact:=== | | ===Technical Contact:=== |
| James Lazevnick. NRR(301) 492-0814Carl Schulten. NRR(301) 492-1192Fred Burrows. NRR(301) 492-0783OFC _: T EOGCB :D:DOEAt "4i> -:-8{tjA---:-4og-yF---:---4----------------- :-----------NAME :CSchulten :B& lure :PB pnowsky :WLanni:LS :CBerlinger :ERossiDATE 1&/ : //88 F./ A1/88 1.V1.88 4f8 8 8DAT O F:I g/ECORD : / /88COPYOFFICIAL RECORD COPY
| |
|
| |
|
| NRC INFO NOTICE 88-XX. DIESEL GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLYCLOSEOFC :OEAB :Te h Ed :SL:OEAB :C:OEAb :L:SELB :C:OGCB :D:DUEANAME :CSchulten lure :PBaranowsky :WLanning :FRosa :CBerlinger :ERosslDATE : / 88 /88 : I /88 / /88 : / /88 : / /88OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | | ===James Lazevnick. NRR=== |
| | (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten. NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 492-0783 T EOGCB :D:DOEA |
| | |
| | OFC _: |
| | t -:-8{tjA---:-4og-yF---:---4-----------------:----------- |
| | "4i> |
| | :ERossi |
| | |
| | NAME :CSchulten :B& lure :PB pnowsky :WLanni:LS :CBerlinger |
| | |
| | : //88 F./ A1/88 .1.V8 8 4f8 8/88COPY 8 DATE1&/O F:I 1 g/ECORD : / |
| | DAT |
| | |
| | OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
| | |
| | TO AUTOMATICALLY |
| | |
| | NRC INFO NOTICE 88-XX. DIESEL GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS FAIL |
| | |
| | CLOSE |
| | |
| | :SL:OEAB :C:OEAb :L:SELB :C:OGCB :D:DUEA |
| | |
| | OFC :OEAB :Te h Ed |
| | |
| | lure :PBaranowsky :WLanning :FRosa :CBerlinger :ERossl |
| | |
| | NAME :CSchulten |
|
| |
|
| }} | | /88 : I /88 / /88 : / /88 : / /88 DATE : / 88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Disabling of Diesel Generator Output Circuit Breakers by Anti-Pump CircuitryML031150110 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, 05000370 |
---|
Issue date: |
09/16/1988 |
---|
From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-88-075, NUDOCS 8809120197 |
Download: ML031150110 (8) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, 05000370 |
---|
Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:05000370]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:05000370]] </code>. |
I
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 16, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-75: DISABLING OF DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT
CIRCUIT BREAKERS BY ANTI-PUMP CIRCUITRY
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential
problems where the capability to either automatically or manually close
diesel generator circuit breakers from the control room may be lost. It
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances
On June 5, 1988, operators at Browns Ferry Unit 3 were unable to reclose the
diesel generator output breakers to the 4-kV shutdown boards from the control
room during a loss-of-power/loss-of-coolant-accident (LOP/LOCA) test. During
the test, the output breakers connected the diesel generators to their respec- tive 4-kV shutdown boards after the LOP signal was generated; however, the
breakers tripped and remained open after receiving the LOCA signal. Operators
diagnosed the output breaker lockout problem using system electrical configu- ration drawings. An operator was sent to the 4-kY shutdown board to manually
transfer output breaker control power to its alternate source. This momentarily
removed power, enabling the breaker to close when the power was restored.
On October 14, 1987, an operator at Wolf Creek Generating Station manually
tripped the output circuit breaker of the emergency diesel generator (EDG)
from the control room. At the time, the EDG was supplying a vital bus. When
the operators tried to reenergize the vital bus from the still-operating EDG,
they found that they could not close the EDG output breaker from the control
room. The vital bus was finally reenergized from the offsite power supply.
Through examination of the breaker control schematics the licensee later
found that the EDG circuit breaker could be closed by cycling the EDG mode
switch at the EDG local control station.
880920197
IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 Discussion:
The anti-pump circuit configuration will protect large breakers from rapid
cycling and, under certain circumstances, will prevent breaker closure. At
Browns Ferry Unit 3, a unique sequence of events, a LOP signal followed within
6 seconds by a LOCA signal, led to the discovery of a design deficiency of this
circuit configuration. Contacts from the undervoltage relay will seal in the
breaker anti-pump relay until the undervoltage condition on the 4-kV boards
clears.
The circuit is designed such that following a LOP, the undervoltage condition
must exist for at least 5 seconds and the diesel. must reach rated speed before
the diesel generator output breaker will close on the bus. Once the breaker
has closed, the closure spring recharge motor and the breaker anti-pump relay
will be energized. A fully discharged closure spring requires 2 seconds for
the spring to be fully recharged. During this 2 second window the anti-pump
coil will remain energized via contacts sensing spring position, and if an
undervoltage condition exists on the 4-kY bus it will seal in and lock open
the breaker.
During the Browns Ferry event, the EDG output breaker closed 5 seconds after
the LOP signal, the undervoltage condition was eliminated, and the undervoltage
relay began its 5 second cycle to reset from the undervoltage condition. About
1.5 seconds 1ater. the.LOCA-signaL-retr-ipped-the-breaker-and-created-another--
undervoltage condition on the 4-kV bus. At this point, because the undervoltage
relay had not completed its reset cycle, the undervoltage relay remained in its
undervoltage state. Therefore, the undervoltage relay sealed in the still- energized anti-pump relay because the undervoltage condition occurred before
the breaker charging spring was fully charged. Thus, the breaker could not
be closed from the control room either manually or automatically until control
power was removed, which deenergized the anti-pump relay.
The Browns Ferry licensee modified the breaker control logic to prevent the anti- pump relay from sealing in during a LOCA condition by adding a time-delay relay
in the breaker trip coil circuitry. This relay will be energized by a LOCA
signal and its contact in the anti-pump coil seal-in path will open after a
2-to 5-second delay to prevent anti-pump coil seal-in and breaker lockout.
The Wolf Creek EDG output circuit breaker has automatic closing logic to close
the circuit breaker when the following five permissives are satisfied:
(1) Both offsite circuit breakers are open'
(2 The EDG mode switch is in the automatic mode.
(3 Lockout relays are deenergized.
(4 A 3-second time delay has elapsed.
(5) The EDG has reached operating speed and voltage.
This logic sends a constant close signal to the circuit breaker that keeps the
breaker's internal anti-pump relay energized as long as the logic permissives
are satisfied. The anti-pump relay prevents the circuit breaker from cycling
if attempts are made to hold the breaker closed against a valid trip signal.
I',
IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto- matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pump
relay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cycling
the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit
breaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there- by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by
returning the switch to the "auto' position, the circuit breaker's automatic
closing logic closed the breaker.
The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the
control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the
control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch
can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re- close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal"
position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch.
When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker
anti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put
the switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal"
position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.
It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDG
output- circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to other
breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers
and offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.
The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentially
significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRC
evaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Di rector
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR
(301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR
(301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR
(301) 492-0783 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Att"aant
IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 Page I of I
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRCINFORMATION NOTICES
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
88-74 Potentially Inadequate 9/14/88 All holders of OLs
Perfornance of ECCSin or CPs for Wand
PWRs During Recirculation 8&W-designei nuclear
Operation Following a LOCA power reactors.
88-73 Direction-Dependent Leak 9/8/88 All holders of 0Ls
Characteristics of or CPs for nuclear
Containment Purge Valves power reactors.
88-72 Inadequacies in the Design 9/2/88 All holders of OLs
of dc Motor-Operated Valves or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-71 Possible Environmental 9/1/88 All holders of OLs
Effect of the Reentry or CPs for nuclear
of COSMOS 1900 and power reactors, fuel
Request for Collection cycle licensees, of Licensee Radioactivity and Priority I
Measurements Attributed material licensees.
to That Event
88-70 Check Valve Inservice 8/29/88 All holders of OLs
Testing Program or CPs for nuclear
Deficiencies power reactors.
88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88 All holders of OLs
Binding in HFA Relays or CPs for nuclear
Manufactured by General power reactors.
Electric (GE)
88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/24/88 All holders of OLs
Supplement I Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88 All holders of OLs
surizer Safety Valves with or CPs for nuclear
Filled Loop Seals Using power reactors.
Hydraulic Assist Devices
_
88P67- -P-F Zfiiairy Fiedeaer Pump 8/Z2j88 All holders of OLs
Turbine Overspeed Trip or CPs for nuclear
Failure power reactors.
OL
CP* Construction Permit
UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POSTAGE & FEES PAID
USNRC
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 PERMIT No. 0-57 OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
IN 88-75 September 16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto- matic closing logic permissives remained satisfied. Therefore, the anti-pump
relay remained energized, preventing reclosure of the circuit breaker. Cycling
the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit
breaker to reclose by momentarily interrupting the automatic close signal, there- by resetting the anti-pump logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by
returning the switch to the "auto" position, the circuit breaker's automatic
closing logic closed the breaker.
The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the
control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the
control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch
can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and allow the automatic circuit to re- close the breaker. The modification added a contact that is closed in the "normal"
position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions of the control switch.
When operators manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker
anti-pump relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put
the switch in the "pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal"
position completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.
It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with EDG
output circuit breakers, anti-pump circuit problems could also apply to other
breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers
and offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.
The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a potentially
significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC staff. If NRC
evaluation so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR
(301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR
(301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR
(301) 492-0783 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
OFC *OEAB Ed *SL:OEAB
- Tech *C:OEAB *D:DEST *C:OGCB
NAME CSchulten BCalure PBaranowsky WLanning LShao CBerlinger e l
9/(,f 88 DATE 9/7/88 7/28/88 9/7/88 9/7/88 8/24/88 9/8/88
IN 88- September , 1988 the
contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position.
circuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker.
in the
The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located from
control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker
of
the control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means
paralleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current
allow
modification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump logic and
breaker. The modification added a
the automatic circuit to reclose the and
contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip"
switch. When operators manually trip
"pull to lock" positions of the control to
the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch. the contacts open
interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump relay.
the breaker open. he must put the switch in the
If the operator wishes to keep
"pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" position
completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.
EDG
It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only withto other
circuit problem could also apply
output circuit breakers. the anti-pump breakers and
breakers that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing
offsite supply breakers to the emergency buses.
a
The information herein is being provided as an early notification byof the NRC
potentially significant matter that is still under consideration
be
staff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may
requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this informationany of the
notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact appropriate
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: James Lazevnick. NRR
(301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten. NRR
(301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR
(301) 492-0783
-e - ---
- :D: -
NAME :CSchu Mn are :P aranowsky :WLan n :LShao :CBeri nger :ERossi
DATE q 88 /8 :1/88 /88 :18188 /88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 88- August . 1988 contact was reclosed by returning the switch to the "auto" position. the
circuit breaker's automatic closing logic closed the breaker.
the
The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in
breaker from
control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit
the control room. This switch was originally intended only as a means of
paralleling the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current
modification. the switch can be used to reset the anti-pumping logic and allow
the automatic circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification added aand
contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" trip
"pull to lock" positions of the control switch. When operators manually
the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to
interrupt the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pumping relay.
If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the
"pull to lock" position. Returning the switch to the "normal" position
completes the automatic close circuit and the breaker recloses.
EDG
It should be noted that although the above discussion has dealt only with
output circuit breakers, the same problem could also apply to other breakers
that use automatic closing logic, such as load-sequencing breakers and offsite
supply breakers to the emergency buses.
The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a
potentially significant matter that is still under consideration by the NRC
staff. If NRC evaluation so indicates. specific licensee actions may be
requested.
No specific action or written responses is required by this information the
notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact either
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi. Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
James Lazevnick. NRR
(301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten. NRR
(301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR
(301) 492-0783 T EOGCB :D:DOEA
OFC _:
t -:-8{tjA---:-4og-yF---:---4-----------------:-----------
"4i>
- ERossi
NAME :CSchulten :B& lure :PB pnowsky :WLanni:LS :CBerlinger
- //88 F./ A1/88 .1.V8 8 4f8 8/88COPY 8 DATE1&/O F:I 1 g/ECORD : /
DAT
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
TO AUTOMATICALLY
NRC INFO NOTICE 88-XX. DIESEL GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS FAIL
CLOSE
- SL:OEAB :C:OEAb :L:SELB :C:OGCB :D:DUEA
OFC :OEAB :Te h Ed
lure :PBaranowsky :WLanning :FRosa :CBerlinger :ERossl
NAME :CSchulten
/88 : I /88 / /88 : / /88 : / /88 DATE : / 88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1988-01, Safety Injection Pipe Failure (27 January 1988, Topic: Unidentified leakage, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-03, Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds (2 February 1988, Topic: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (5 February 1988, Topic: Fire Barrier, Fire Watch, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets (12 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-06, Foreign Objects in Steam Generators (29 February 1988, Topic: Eddy Current Testing, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-07, Inadvertent Transfer of Licensed Material to Uncontrolled Locations (7 March 1988, Topic: Stolen, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-08, Chemical Reactions with Radioactive Waste Solification Agents (14 March 1988, Topic: Process Control Program, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-09, Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused by Instability of Woodward PG-PL Type Governors (18 March 1988, Topic: Overspeed trip, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 FR 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988, Topic: Fatality, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Osha Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988. (23 December 1988, Topic: Fatality, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center And/Or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts (7 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-12, Overgreasing of Electric Motor Bearings (12 April 1988, Topic: Hardened grease)
- Information Notice 1988-13, Water Hammer & Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves (18 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-14, Potential Problems with Electrical Relays (18 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer, Potassium iodide)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (Fda) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer, Potassium iodide)
- Information Notice 1988-16, Identify Waste Generators in Shipments of Low-Level Waste to Land Disposal Facilities (22 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-17, Summary of Responses to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants. (22 April 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Weld Overlay, Feedwater Heater, Through-Wall Leak, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-18, Malfunction of Lockbox on Radiography Device (25 April 1988, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class Ie Components (26 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class IE Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-20, Unauthorized Individuals Manipulating Controls and Performing Control Room Activities (5 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-21, Inadvertent Criticality Events at Oskarshamn and at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (9 May 1988, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1988-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage Treatment Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-23, Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps During a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-24, Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems (13 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-25, Minimum Edge Distance for Expansion Anchor Bolts (16 May 1988, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1988-26, Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records (16 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-27, Deficient Electrical Terminations Identified in Safety-Related Components (18 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-28, Potential for Loss of Post-Loca Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage (19 May 1988, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1988-29, Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies (24 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-31, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material (25 May 1988, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-33, Recent Problems Involving the Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (27 May 1988, Topic: Depleted uranium)
- Information Notice 1988-34, Nuclear Material Control & Accountability of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material at Power Reactors (31 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-36, Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation (8 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-37, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components (14 June 1988, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1988-38, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment of General Electric Circuit Breakers (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-39, Loss of Recirculation Pumps with Power Oscillation Event (15 June 1988, Topic: Feedwater Heater)
- Information Notice 1988-40, Examiners' Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-42, Circuit Breaker Failures Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts (23 June 1988, Topic: Locktite)
- Information Notice 1988-43, Solenoid Valve Problems (23 June 1988, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1988-44, Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device in Westinghouse Type DS-416 Circuit Breakers (24 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-45, Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination (7 July 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1988-46, Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers (8 July 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-47, Slower-than-Expected Rod-drop Times (14 July 1988)
... further results |
---|