ML19325F181

LER 89-022-00:on 891003,unterminated Lead in Circuit to HPCI Trip Solenoid Rendered HPCI Stop Valve Trip Functions Inoperable.Caused by Leads Loosely Hanging Inside Door Panel.Hanging Leads Secured & Panel inspected.W/891102 Ltr

ML19325F181
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/02/1989
From:	Cribbe T, Danni Smith PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-022-01, LER-89-22-1, NUDOCS 8911150141
Download: ML19325F181 (4)

Text

N-89,-14178 -

• ~ ,; .'.. .

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY i i

'd,fla PIACil B(TI'It>M Alt)MIC POWI;R 51ATM)N l

R. D I, ihm 2OH  :

s; J1 Delta, itnny lvania 17314 +

(. .

l etu a surrIUM-tHI Mm sk Of 8 M W4M t (717) 4 % 7014  :

L D. M. Smilli  !

Ykr Proklent  ;

[

t  ;

i t

November 2, 1989 i i

Docket No. 50-277  ;

i Dccument Control Desk I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555 t

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2 ,

This LER concerns an inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)  !

trip solenoid. l

Reference:

- Docket No. 50-277  !

Report Number: 2-89-022 i Revision Number: 00  ;

Event Date: 10/03/89 Report Date: 11/o2/89 ,

Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1. Box 208A, Delta, PA 17314 .

I This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).  !

i Sincerely, cc: T. P. Johnson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector i W. T. Russell,. USNRC, Region 1  !

i l'

1 1

JE2 g8A2*R8$$A $U;$$37

f . eenc . aos o u s. wucttu mieuL;iony comemissio= ,

~

i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ***'*"

i j

, eAciLity *Ami m oocati woneen m i ran a

! Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2 016 l 01010 l 217 l 7 l 1 loFl 0131 i vis t a ..i High Pressure coolant Injection Trip Solenoid Rendered Inoperable DJe To The Power Lead j Bs.comine cano,t In The Panel Door 1.atch And Disconnected From Its.ierminal Strin '

4 WSW1 DAll lli 48 Ot Nuh4DE R lei htPORT DAf t (p. OTH$ h 9 Attklfill INVOL b lD iti MOhfH DAV t ( a ft vtAM bl

',' g' L' 6 "I,'[,'j MON 1H Day v g att , AOL.1 % howt. DOsall NUvDt80SI 016 l 0 l 0 g o ; l _ l l

~ ~

1l0 0l 3 8 9 8l9 0l2l2 0l 0 1l1 012 sl 9 0 1 6 11 0 0f oi l l

,,,,,,,,,, ems ateoat is iv mio PuasuA=, to ,HE aiovinimi=n o, n c.n , ,c . . ., . .. u,. ,, ou mooi

• N . .oem eo .ooi.i no n.iir:9.i vi tiii.i ro sasumui ooamm X p n='mm 's 'u.i n., 1i 00 t n .o.mimm no=mm eo n.imi..i

_ gt, Hgs,.7,,. ,.g,,

n o.. mi .i n.imni n.im . .iai mA, no animo i u naimm w ni.imi. nei

1. 0.oti.li1ini 60.73 simbed .0136.litital LtCENEL6 COW 1 ACT Pom TH18 Lt a 1131 4.W I fl LIPHoht Nu%etilft aus A c.ns t T. E. cribbe, Regulatory Engineer

~ 7l1l7 41516 i 17101114I COMPLtit ONt LING FOR E ACH COMPOhlNT f AlkuSE (>tSchltlO IN THl$ AGPOflI 4%$3 CAu6t Svlif v CouPDAtNT l'p$,' "i $ ' Cav68 Sylf f v CovPC%th, *OHiA E

"' % 'C MahlAC p pn I I l l__ L,1 l l l 1 I i 1 i i i l I i i l I I I I i 1 1  !

$UPPLEptht AL mIPosti t KPECTID ital MON 1H DAv vl AR j t t $ II9..e <0*'94,0 S k*t L'T(D SL*06,r$510N Ce til kO l l l

.av.Ac,n-,....,,,,.,,,..-.,,,,,..,,,,......,o..

On October 3. 1989, at 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> the Unit 2 remote High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) stop valve trip functions were rendered inoperable. Technicians performing maintenance in a HPCI electrical panel discovered an unterminated lead in the circuit to the HPCI trip solenoid. The lead had become entangled with the panel door inner latching mechanit.m. such that when the technicians opened the panel door the lead pulled out of its lug on the terminal strip. The root cause of the event was leads loosely hanging inside the panel. No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. The lead was repaired and the HPCI trip functions tested satisfactorily. The leads in the Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI panels were inspected and

secured as necessary to prevent recurrence. There was one previous similar LER.

m 4e

_ . _ ---__ - --- _ _ _ - _ _ _-- - g ggy

+

UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEJ TEXT CONTINUATON waovio ow wo >=-++

l .-

i mais a w e i PActpTV IeMAS H DOCellt tout $lk 6p g g3 wpgggg; g pg g gg, l Pr.ch Bottom Atomic Power Station "** "MW 'UEN  ;

Unit 2 I o l5 l0 l0 l0 l2 l7 l7 8l9 -

0l2l2 -

0l0 0l2 0F 0l 31 wt , - . w c w = m mi i

Requirements of the Report Thisreportisrequiredper10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)duetothepotentialforthis c;ndition to prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the High Pressure l

Coolant Injection system (E!!StBJ).

l Unit Status at Time of Event  ;

Unit 2 was in the Run Mode at 100% power.

Description of Event On October 3, 1989, at 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br />, technicians entered High Pressure Coolant l Injection (HPCI) electrical panel turbinethermocouple,anddiscovere(EIISPL)J-1056,toperformmaintenanceonaHPCI d an unterminated lead. The lead had pulled out i

cf its lug (EIIS: CON) which was still landed at terminal D-3. This lead provides DC powertotheHPCIturbinesteaminletstopvalve(H0-4513)tripsolenoid(EIIS: SOL). l By 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> the technicians had notified Operations Shift Management and i temporarily corrected the condition by landing the lead to its terminal. HPCI was j declared inoperable pending permanent repair. At 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br /> permanent repair of the l 1eadwascompletedandoperabilityoftheHPCIstopvalve(EIISISHV)tripfunctions I were verified.

1 Cause of the Event The root cause of this event was r. lead in the HPCI trip solenoid circuit becoming i

entangled with the panel door (El d:DR) inner latching mechanism. Apparently when l the technicians opened the panel door the lead pulled cut of its lug on the terminal  !

strip. The wiring layout is such that mrtny leads are loosely hanging inside the i panel. i Anal.ysis of the Event i No actual safety consequences occut red as a result of this event.  ;

The disconnected lead would have prevented energization of the HPCI stop valve ,

electro-hydraulic trip solenoid. This condition rendered the following HPCI stop '

valve trip functions inoperable:

High Reactor Vessel Level Trip Ltw HPCI Pump Suction Pressure Trir High HPCI Turbine Exhaust Pressure Trip C ntrol Room Manual Trip Remote Shutdown Panel Manual Trip The HPCI containment isolation functions: HPCI Steam Line High Flow HPCI Steam Line Area High Temperature, and Low Steam Pressure were operable and HPCI ster.m line isolationvalves(EIIS:ISV),M0-15andM0-16,wouldhaveoperatedasdesigned.

However, the HPCI stop valve would not have closed upon receipt of these signals.

4 UCEZSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CCNTINUATION cc:ovioow =ose-em i 1:Pentt 6'3116 j t acit et y o.atet au txicalisounastm in gga gynnegg o p;p, tai i PJach Bottom Atomic Power Station " " N a" DE Unit 2 0 l6 l0 l0 l0 l 2 l 7l7 81 9 0l2l2 -

010 01 3 0' 0l3 f tKT

• mwe speso e see.wed, was ses senemsf NAC #ene Jeha W tih The HPCI system was fully capable of starting and injecting at rated flow and I pressure. With the High Reactor Vessel Level Trip function inoperable HPCI l injection during a small break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) could have resulted in exceeding the vessel high level trip setpoint and possibly filling the main steam i lines rendering HPCI and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system (Ells:BN)  !

inoperable. However, the HPCI turbine steam admission valve M0-14 as well as the I HPCI steam line isolation valves could have been closed from the control room to preclude vessel (EIIS RPV) overfill. In the event of loss of HPCI during a SBLOCA I the Automatic Depressurization System is designed to depressurize the reactor vessel i to the point where the Core Spray (Ells:BM) and Low Pressure Coolant injection i (EIIS:BO) systems would actuate. RCIC is not required to mitigate the consequences l of a SBLOCA. 1 I

Corrective Acti0g i l

The disconnected lead was repaired and the HPCI stop valve trip function was tested satisfactorily by 1830 on 10/3/89. The hanging leads in the electrical panel were secured in order to prevent recurrence. The corresponding Unit 3 HPCI panel was ,

inspected and was found to be in good order with no similar hanging or unkempt )

electrical leads.  ;

The panel involved in this event is not frequently entered and not used for routine '

testing activities. Safety related electrical panels which are entered frequently for testing are configured such that the terminal strips are set back from the doors.  !

Therefore, this problem would not occur when entering these panels.

Previous Similar Events There was one previous similar LER (3-85-003) in which the Unit 3 HPCI trip solenoid l tras rendered inoperable. However, that was due to binding of the solenoid due to  !

paraffin build-up, therefore the corrective actions for that LER would not have prevented this event.

l I

. _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ . _ _ _ a