ML20012A084

LER 90-001-00:on 900108,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing When Start Time Exceeded 25 S.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Procedure Which Allowed Setting of 18 S. Ramp Generator & Signal Converter replaced.W/900207 Ltr

ML20012A084
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	02/07/1990
From:	Cribbe T, Danni Smith PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001-03, LER-90-1-3, NUDOCS 9003080261
Download: ML20012A084 (4)

Text

mg e -

5 2*khN-90.-14028 a .- . t Qe7 .-

l

?. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY '

PEACilliOT1DM A1DMIC POWER STATION-R. D. I, Ilox 208 Delta, Pennsyhinia 17314  ;

nacu morrou-vue rou rs on actitracs (717) 456-7014 s D. M. Smith ;i

' Vice President xg February 7, 1990-Docket No. 50-278 $

Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3 7 t

This LER concerns the operability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System due to excessive start time.

Reference:

Docket No. 50-278 Report Number: 3-90-001 Revision Number: 00 '

Event Date:' 01/08/90 Report Date: 02/07/90 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314 This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

Sincerely 7

cc: J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector >

W._T. Russell, USNRC, Region I e, m m % K.

. ~.

w fe's att U $_ NLCLERH EtSULATOAV COMMISSION APPROVE D OMB 900 3140 0104 LICENSEE RENT REPORT (LER) ' " *'a' * ' ' 8 l-DOCEtt huMet R (21 PAGEi31 9ACILITV NAMt til Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3 0 l 5 l 0 l 0,10 l 2 l 7 l8 1loFlol3 TITLE tel Excessive liigh Pressure Coolant Injection System Start Time Due To Procedure Deficiency 4 VENT DATE ISI Lim NUMelR tel REPORT DAf t 17) OTHER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED lel MONTH DAY YlAR YtAR D eat e MONTH DAV vgAR P ACILIT V h AMES DOCKET NUM6kMtlk n

0 151010!0 I I I

~ ~

o l1 ol 0 9o 9lo ol ol1 ol0 ol2 ol 7 9l0 0 ;S to l0 iog l [

THIS REPORT 15 $USMITilD PUR$UANT TO THE REQUlfilMENY$ Of 10 Cf R g icnece one es more re ,as roero..ays till OPE R ATING uoot ian N o .o:i.i 3 .o.i., ,c ,3i,iiru,, 73,,i.) .

P 20 408teH1110 60 3eleHil X to 734elGHet 73 ?!let 11ol o1 919 ** ao*6'H1 Ha' 50 **taital 50 73'*H2H'a'

_ 47,M'gg'ga g,*L 20 406teH1Hieil 60.731slGHal 50.73te H2HomH Al J6648 20 406telt1Hevi 50.13tsH2 Hal 50 73teH2HvmHal 70 40steH1Hol 60.73teH2 Hull 60.73telGHet 8.lCENSE E CONT ACT POR THIS LtR liti NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER

• ARL A CCQi T. E. Cribbe, Regulatory Engineer 711 1 7 4l5l6 1-1 7 t o 11l4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR L ACH COMPONINT f AILunt DESCRittD IN THIS REPORT 1131

"" "C HE OR,fA f " AC stp CAu$t S Y ST E M COMPONINT , C AU$5 $V $TE M COMPONENT g y0 PR

-I I I I I I I I i i i l i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT E MPICTED (14# MONTH DAY YEAA Y 8 5 lievee comotore Ek9ECTED SUOw33 ION 0A Til NO l l l s..., A Ae, it - ,, , a - . . . .~.., s ,,.,,..~,,..u.,o.,

On January 8, 1990, at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable during surveillance testing when-its start time exceeded 25 seconds. The surveillance test acceptance criteria and Final Safety Analysis Report section 6.4.1 specify a 25 second start time for HPCI. During this test, HPCI achieved rated flow and discharge pressure in 25.1 seconds. The cause of this event was an inadequate calibration procedure which allowed a HPCI Ramp Generator and Signal Converter (RGSC) setting of 18 seconds; the time in which thr:

RGSC allows the HPCI- control valve to fully open. This setting combined with the designed six to eight second delay between receipt of a HPCI initiation signal anc initiation of the RGSC resulted in the excessive start time. No actual safety consequences occuired as a result of this event. The RGSC was recalibrated and HPCI was tested satisfactorily with a start time of 21.5 seconds. The Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI RGSC calibration procedures were revised to specify an acceptable range of 10 to 15 seconds. No previous similar Licensee Event Reports were identified, i

i gR,C,,

i gE r senc poem 3acA .. U1 NUCI EAR KEIULATORY C0aAMs0060N

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

. :, smoveo ove woain-cios -

EXPtRES: 8/31/50 .

SACsttiv psAast (18, Docetti tavaADER (2) gyn gunsegR (4) PAGE (3)

,Psach. Bottom Atomic Powbf Station' "*" " E ia" E*mN 0 j5 l0 l0 l0 l 2l7 l 8 9l0 -

o l 0l 1 -

olo ol2 oF -Ol 3 f tXT ## mese apose de regnske( uns asheweenef Ar4C Form Ws1(17)

-Requirements for the Report

-This n oort is required per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) due to a condition which could have

' prevn ed the fulfillment of the safety function of the High Pressure Coolant '

Injection System.

Unit Status of Time of Event Unit 3 was in the RUN' mode at 99 percent power.

Description of Event 10n January 8, 1990, at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />, the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)-(EIIS:BJ) was declared inoperable during surveillance testing when its start

' time exceeded 25 seconds. The purpose of the surveillance-test was to confirm operability of HPCI, as required by Technical Specification 4.5.D.2 due to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) (EIIS:Ini) having previously been declared-inoperable. 'The surveillance test acceptance criteria and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 6.4.1 specify a 25 second start time for HPCI. During

.this test HPCI reached rated flow and discharge pressure in 25.1 seconds. At 0530 .

hours, a plant shutdown was initiated in accordance with Technical Specification

'3.5.C.3. At 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> it was determined that RCIC had not actually been inoperable during this time period. By 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> the HPCI control valve Ramp Generator and 3

Signal: Converter (RGSC) was being recalibrated to provide a quicker start time. '

However, during recalibration the RGSC failed and was replaced. At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on January 9. HPCI was tested satisfactorily with a-start time of 21.5 seconds and

-declared operable.

Cause of the Event

'The cause of this event was a calibration procedure inadequacy which allowed a HPCI-RGSC setting of 18 seconds; the time in which the RGSC allows the HPCI control valve

_to fully open. The RGSC begins to open the HPCI control valve between six and eight seconds after a HPCI initiation signal. Therefore, slightly more than 25 seconds elapsed between a-HPCI initiation signal and the time rated flow and discharge pressure were achieved. The HPCI start time was previously measured at less than 25

-seconds.during_ Unit.3 startup testing in November, 1989.

The 18 second setting was_ consistent with the RGSC calibration procedure which specifies an acceptable range of 15 to 20 seconds. The calibration procedure

-previously specified a range of 10 to 15 seconds but was revised to specify 15 to 20

- secor.ds in February,1988 during the instrument and control surveillance instruction upgrade program. The.HPCI RGSC acceptable range was inappropriately revised at that time to.be consistent with that of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) RGSC.

.The RCIC RGSC begins opening tne RCIC control valve immediately upon receipt of the initiation signal, without the six to eight second additional delay associated with HPCI. It is believed that, at the time the HPCI RGSC calibration procedure was revised, the six to eight second pre-delay was overlooked.

I 80.8. GPOs 1988 4 20-389 00070 L9 83) -

RCterS stSA U S NUCLt12 9.tGutafoRY COMMeetiON

" e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ueRovep oMe Wo siso-om s

, EXPIRES. S/31?W l

1. ACILif f NAME 11) DOCKET NVMSth (2) Lf R WUMSER (6l PA06 (31 IPsach Bottom AtomiciPower Station " ' " ~

• Ia" UaN

' Unit 3 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l 2l7 l 8 9l0 -

ol ol1 -

0l0 ol 3 oF oj 3 Ytn w ma. au s ,,ea.o. en ennenonc rem seuw <m Analysis of~the Event No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event.

The FSAR specifies that HPCI will achieve design flow rate within 25 seconds from receipt of a reactor vessel (EIIS:RPV) low water level signal or a primary containment high pressure signal. During this test the HPCI system achieved rated flow and discharge pressure in 25.1 seconds from a simulated initiation signal.

The HPCI system is provided to assure the retetor is adequately cooled in the event of'a small break in the nuclear system and subsequent loss of coolant (LOCA) which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. A HPCI initiation signal occurs if reactor vessel water level reaches 124 inches above the top of active fuel. It is not likely that, in the event of an actual small break LOCA, the core would have become uncovered due to an additional 0.1 second delay in HPCI start time. In the event-HPCI is unavailable, the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) is designed to depressurize the reactor to the point where the Core Spray (EIIS:BM) and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems (LPCI) would actuate. During the time HPCI was declared inoperable the ADS and LPCI systems were verified operable.

Additionally, it was subsequently determined that RCIC was not actually inopesable at the' time of this event.

-Corrective Actions The Unit 3 HPCI RGSC was replaced, calibrated within the 10 to 15 second range and tested satisfactorily resulting in a HPCI start time of 21.5 seconds. The HPCI RGSC

. calibration procedures for both unit 2 and Unit 3 were revised to specify an

. acceptable range of 10 to 15 seconds.

Previous Similar Events No previous similar Licensee Event Reports were identified.

80,$, GF0e 1980-520-549,00010

.