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| issue date = 01/04/1980
| issue date = 01/04/1980
| title = LER 79-038/03L-0:on 791214,two Manual Isolation Valves for Refueling Water Storage Tank Chemical Addition Tank Outlet Valve MOV-CS-102B Found Closed.Caused by Operator Procedural Error.Operators Instructed
| title = LER 79-038/03L-0:on 791214,two Manual Isolation Valves for Refueling Water Storage Tank Chemical Addition Tank Outlet Valve MOV-CS-102B Found Closed.Caused by Operator Procedural Error.Operators Instructed
| author name = STEWART W L
| author name = Stewart W
| author affiliation = VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
| author affiliation = VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 17: Line 17:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-------~ . NRC FORM-366 ----------U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,. .CENSEE EVENT REPORT * .. CONTROL BLOCK: I 1 I IG) 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1 101 ° I O I -I o I o I o I o I o I -Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T [ITIJ 7 8  
{{#Wiki_filter:. NRC FORM-366 - - - - - - - -                       ~  --                                                                                               U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,.
~©I 0 1 5 1 °I O I O 1 2 1 8 I 0 101 11 21 t*1 41 71 9IG)I 01 11 01 41 sl olG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
                    .                                                                    .CENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:             I                                           I IG)                             (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1                                                  6
I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed. [[:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability  
  ~
[[TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general [[II] I public were not affected.
7        8 I9 v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1101 °I O I - I o I oI oI o I o I - Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 14       15                                             LICENSE NUMBER                     25     26       LICENSE TYPE     30   57 CAT 58 LICENSEE CODE CON'T
The event is reportable in accordance with Technical  
[ITIJ 7         8
[[[TI I Specification  
:~~~~~      ~©I 01 5 1°I O I O 12 1 8 I 0101 11 21 t*1 60          61                DOCKET NUMBER                                      68    69      EVENT DATE 41     71 9IG)I 74      75 01 11 01 41 sl olG)
: 6. 6.~-~ b. 3. I I~ [§]]] 7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE [ill] I sl 8 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT @ LER/RO CVENT YEAR REPORT NO: CODE TYPE REPORT I 7 J 9 J l.=.l l O I 3 1
REPORT DATE       80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
* 8 1 J/1 I O I 3 I l£J. l=J NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r'22) ATTACHMENT NPAD-4 FOAM SUB. PRIME C.OMP. SUPPLI EA 80 REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TAK.ff: ACTl2N ON PLANT METHOD . HOURS SUBMITTED  
I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST
~@L_j@ L.:J@ L:J I O I O I O I I ~@ 33 34 35 36 3 7 40 41 ~@ LI@ I z 19 19 19 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 42 43 44 47 [I12] I The discrepancy in valve al igrment was caused by an operator failirg to follow a ITTIJ I procedure that required the reopeni.rg of manual isolation valves for IDV-CS-102B OJI] I followi~ canpletion of a test. Operators have been explicitly reinstructed on um I the importance of perfonni.rg a periodic test in canplete conformance with the [I]3J I test document.
  ~            I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to                                                                                       be closed.
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHERSTATUS
((:ill           Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability
@ METHOD OF A 80 ITE] LI@ I 11 o, 01@11-N-JA
((TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general
____ ___. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~@L..I _s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n
((II] I public were not affected.                                                     The event is reportable in accordance with Technical                                                                 I
_ _. 8 9 10 12 11 ACTIVITY CONTENT REL~SED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~  
(([TI I Specification 6. 6.~-~ b. 3.                                                                                                                                                                       I~
[QI] L:J@) ~@ .... I _NA ______ * ........ 7 8 9 10 11 44 7 45 46 80 44 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,. NUl;l.BEA. TYPE DESCRIPTION~  
[§))]
@TI I o I u I o Jl:J@L----~---------------------,-----'
7         8   9                                                                                                                                                                                           80 SYSTEM               CAUSE                       CAUSE                                                               COMP.         VALVE CODE                 CODE                     SUBCODE                           COMPONENT CODE                   SUBCODE         SUBCODE
7 8 9 11 12 13 BO PERSONNEL INJURIES ONU~BEA . DESCRIPTION 41 Ci:fil I I I O 1@1,._._ ________________________ 7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4J'I TZE DESCAIP~ON 7 8 9 10 80 PUBLICITY Q <Jr-, NRC USE ONLY IS~EDQ DESC:&\_TION 8 0 Q l O 7 0 7 ..J O "' [ill] ~ei ..... l ---------------------:'
[ill]                             I sl 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@
II I I I II I II II I 7 8 9 10 68 69 80*0: NAME OF PREPARER __..w._. * ..__.T .... , .__.S.LJt_,,ew"""-"i:i'-'r
8 7         8                       9         10             11                           12                       13                             18         19           20 SEQUENTIAL                                 OCCURRENCE           REPORT                   REVISION
.... t.__ ________ ___ PHONE =---+(~s~o"*-4)"3"'3~7==
                @       LER/RO CVENT YEAR                                                     REPORT NO:                                     CODE               TYPE                     NO.
3~1i,,:gj,,l,l4,--
REPORT NUMBER I   7 J 9 J l.=.l                       l O I 3 1* 8 1                   J/1           I28O I 3 29I          l&#xa3;J.         l=J         ~
__ 0 Q. " 
21         22           23                         24                       26       27                                 30           31         32 ACTION     FUTURE             EFFECT             SHUTDOWN                                                 r'22)   ATTACHMENT         NPAD-4       PRIME C.OMP.         COMPONENT TAK.ff:     ACTl2N             ON PLANT               METHOD                                   . HOURS ~          SUBMITTED       FOAM SUB.        SUPPLI EA        MANUFACTURER
*~~~ATTaCHMENT:
                ~@L_j@
--,--""'J St1rry Power ... Docket No.: Report No.: Event Date: Page 1 Station
33          34 L.:J@ L:J I O I OI O I I 35                      36                              37                      40
* 50-280 79-038/03L-0
                                                                                                                                      ~@
-12/14/79
41
* Title of Event: MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43 1. Description of Event: With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator.
                                                                                                                                                        ~@
The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification
42 LI@
* 6.6.2.b.3.
43 I z 19 19 19 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS                                                                                                                             44                 47
: 2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems: With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~ tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were* not affected.
[I12] I The discrepancy in valve al igrment was caused by an operator failirg to follow a ITTIJ I procedure                   that required the reopeni.rg of manual isolation valves for IDV-CS-102B OJI] I followi~ canpletion of a test.                                                                       Operators have been explicitly reinstructed on um             I the     importance of perfonni.rg a periodic test in canplete conformance with the
* 3. Cause: The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test. 4. Immediate Corrective Action: Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated.
[I]3J I test document.
In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.
7         8   9                                                                                                                                                                                         80 A
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.  
OTHERSTATUS @
FACILITY                                                                                                 METHOD OF STATUS             % POWER                                                                             DISCOVERY                            DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~
ITE]         LI@ I 11 o,                     01@11-N-JA_______.                                                       ~@L..I_s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n_            _.
7        8   9               10               12       11                                                       44    45        46                                                                    80 ACTIVITY        CONTENT                                                                   ~
REL~SED OF RELEASE                           AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~                                                                             LOCATION OF RELEASE@
[QI] L:J@) ~@ I...._NA                               _ _ _ _ _ _*........                                                               NA 7       8   9               10           11                                                                   44           45                                                                         80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES                                          r:;;:;,.
NUl;l.BEA.     ~ TYPE             DESCRIPTION~
@TI 7        8 I o I u I oJl:J@L----~---------------------,-----'
9               11       12           13                                                                                                                                                 BO PERSONNEL INJURIES                   ~
ONU~BEA .             DESCRIPTION 41 Ci:fil I I I O 1@1,._._________________________~
7         8   9               11       12                                                                                                                                                               80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY               '4J'I TZE         DESCAIP~ON                     ~
~
7         8 9
              ~(s)L--_N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10                                                                                                                                                                            80 PUBLICITY                Q                                                                                                    <Jr-,                            NRC USE ONLY IS~EDQ DESC:&\_TION            ~                                                                              8 0 Q l O7 0 7 ..J            O                                                  "'
[ill]
7         8 9
              ~ei10l.....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : '68 69II I I I II I II II 80*0:                                                                                                      I~
0 NAME OF PREPARER              __..w._.*..__.T...., .__.S.LJt_,,ew"""-"i:i'-'r....t.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____                    PHONE =---+(~s~o"*-4)"3"'3~7==3~1i,,:gj,,l,l4,--__
Q.
 
    *~~~ATTaCHMENT:          Page 1
- -,- - ~ ""'J St1rry Power Station
          ... Docket No.:
Report No.:
Event Date:
Title of Event:
50-280 79-038/03L                              12/14/79
* MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43
: 1. Description of Event:
With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator. The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours.
The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification
* 6.6.2.b.3.
: 2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:
With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~
tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were*
not affected.            *
: 3. Cause:
The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test.
: 4. Immediate Corrective Action:
Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated. In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action:
Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.  
To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly re-instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.
: 7. Generic Implications:
: 7. Generic Implications:
Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.}}
Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.}}

Latest revision as of 13:03, 17 March 2020

LER 79-038/03L-0:on 791214,two Manual Isolation Valves for Refueling Water Storage Tank Chemical Addition Tank Outlet Valve MOV-CS-102B Found Closed.Caused by Operator Procedural Error.Operators Instructed
ML18136A361
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/04/1980
From: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18136A360 List:
References
LER-79-038-03L-01, LER-79-38-3L-1, NUDOCS 8001070450
Download: ML18136A361 (2)


Text

. NRC FORM-366 - - - - - - - - ~ -- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,.

. .CENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: I I IG) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

~

7 8 I9 v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1101 °I O I - I o I oI oI o I o I - Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 LICENSEE CODE CON'T

[ITIJ 7 8

~~~~~ ~©I 01 5 1°I O I O 12 1 8 I 0101 11 21 t*1 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 41 71 9IG)I 74 75 01 11 01 41 sl olG)

REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST

~ I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed.

((:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability

((TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general

((II] I public were not affected. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical I

(([TI I Specification 6. 6.~-~ b. 3. I~

[§))]

7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

[ill] I sl 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@

8 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION

@ LER/RO CVENT YEAR REPORT NO: CODE TYPE NO.

REPORT NUMBER I 7 J 9 J l.=.l l O I 3 1* 8 1 J/1 I28O I 3 29I l£J. l=J ~

21 22 23 24 26 27 30 31 32 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r'22) ATTACHMENT NPAD-4 PRIME C.OMP. COMPONENT TAK.ff: ACTl2N ON PLANT METHOD . HOURS ~ SUBMITTED FOAM SUB. SUPPLI EA MANUFACTURER

~@L_j@

33 34 L.:J@ L:J I O I OI O I I 35 36 37 40

~@

41

~@

42 LI@

43 I z 19 19 19 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 44 47

[I12] I The discrepancy in valve al igrment was caused by an operator failirg to follow a ITTIJ I procedure that required the reopeni.rg of manual isolation valves for IDV-CS-102B OJI] I followi~ canpletion of a test. Operators have been explicitly reinstructed on um I the importance of perfonni.rg a periodic test in canplete conformance with the

[I]3J I test document.

7 8 9 80 A

OTHERSTATUS @

FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS  % POWER DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~

ITE] LI@ I 11 o, 01@11-N-JA_______. ~@L..I_s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n_ _.

7 8 9 10 12 11 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT ~

REL~SED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~ LOCATION OF RELEASE@

[QI] L:J@) ~@ I...._NA _ _ _ _ _ _*........ NA 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,.

NUl;l.BEA. ~ TYPE DESCRIPTION~

@TI 7 8 I o I u I oJl:J@L----~---------------------,-----'

9 11 12 13 BO PERSONNEL INJURIES ~

ONU~BEA . DESCRIPTION 41 Ci:fil I I I O 1@1,._._________________________~

7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4J'I TZE DESCAIP~ON ~

~

7 8 9

~(s)L--_N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

10 80 PUBLICITY Q <Jr-, NRC USE ONLY IS~EDQ DESC:&\_TION ~ 8 0 Q l O7 0 7 ..J O "'

[ill]

7 8 9

~ei10l.....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : '68 69II I I I II I II II 80*0: I~

0 NAME OF PREPARER __..w._.*..__.T...., .__.S.LJt_,,ew"""-"i:i'-'r....t.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ PHONE =---+(~s~o"*-4)"3"'3~7==3~1i,,:gj,,l,l4,--__

Q.

  • ~~~ATTaCHMENT: Page 1

- -,- - ~ ""'J St1rry Power Station

... Docket No.:

Report No.:

Event Date:

Title of Event:

50-280 79-038/03L 12/14/79

  • MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43
1. Description of Event:

With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator. The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br />.

The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification

  • 6.6.2.b.3.
2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:

With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~

tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were*

not affected. *

3. Cause:

The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated. In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly re-instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.

7. Generic Implications:

Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.