ML18136A361

LER 79-038/03L-0:on 791214,two Manual Isolation Valves for Refueling Water Storage Tank Chemical Addition Tank Outlet Valve MOV-CS-102B Found Closed.Caused by Operator Procedural Error.Operators Instructed

ML18136A361
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/04/1980
From:	Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18136A360	List: ML18136A359 ML18136A361
References
LER-79-038-03L-01, LER-79-38-3L-1, NUDOCS 8001070450
Download: ML18136A361 (2)

Text

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REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST

~ I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed.

((:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability

((TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general

((II] I public were not affected. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical I

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[I12] I The discrepancy in valve al igrment was caused by an operator failirg to follow a ITTIJ I procedure that required the reopeni.rg of manual isolation valves for IDV-CS-102B OJI] I followi~ canpletion of a test. Operators have been explicitly reinstructed on um I the importance of perfonni.rg a periodic test in canplete conformance with the

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• ~~~ATTaCHMENT: Page 1

- -,- - ~ ""'J St1rry Power Station

... Docket No.:

Report No.:

Event Date:

Title of Event:

50-280 79-038/03L 12/14/79

• MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43

1. Description of Event:

With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator. The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br />.

The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification

• 6.6.2.b.3.

2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:

With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~

tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were*

not affected. *

3. Cause:

The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated. In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly re-instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.

7. Generic Implications:

Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.