Information Notice 1989-80, Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 12/01/1989
| issue date = 12/01/1989
| title = Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
| title = Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
| author name = Rossi C E
| author name = Rossi C
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 9
| page count = 9
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
===NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
===WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION
December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL


NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL
===STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING===
IN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION


FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING IN HIGH-PRESSURE
PIPING


COOLANT INJECTION PIPING
==Addressees==
:
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
reactors.


==Addressees==
==Purpose==
:
:
All holders of operating
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro- blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valves


licenses or construction
in a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCI


permits for nuclear power reactors.
system during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients


==Purpose==
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
: This information


notice is being provided to alert addressees
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.


to potential
However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


pro-blems resulting
==Description of Circumstances==
:
On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature was


from failure of high-pressure
greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load


coolant injection((HPCI)
was caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensate
valves in a boiling-water


reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater
storage tank.


into the HPCI system during operation
During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 3500F,
and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con- densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injection


of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients
valve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injection


will review the information
valve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.


for applicability
On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi- ciently to raise the temperature between the injection valve and the HPCI


to their facilities
pump discharge valve to 2750F and at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 2460F.


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature


However, suggestions
gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded that feedwater


con-tained in this information
leaking through the injection valve was flashing and displacing some of the


notice do not constitute
water in the piping with steam. This conclusion was confirmed by closing the


NRC requirements;
pump discharge valve and monitoring the temperature of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature decreased to ambient.
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances:
:891127000
On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating
o j,  
''@


at power, temperature
IN 89-80
December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe


was greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load was caused by feedwater
supports were found near the injection valves.


leaking through uninsulated
===Concrete surfaces near the===
support attachment points were spalled.


===HPCI piping to the condensate===
The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, and
storage tank. During power operation, feedwater


temperature
notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.


is less than 350 0 F, and feedwater
===After performing a review under 10===
CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closed


pressure is approximately
the normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarily


1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con-densate storage tank is prevented
as the injection valve.


by the injection
Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated that


check valve; the injection valve, or the discharge
less significant leakage was occurring.


valve on the auxiliary
Discussion:
The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for water


cooling water pump. The injection valve and the injection
hammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for


check.valve
steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump.


are shown in Attachment
===Further, failure of HPCI===
piping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of two


1.On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased
feedwater pipes.


suffi-ciently to raise the temperature
The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with water


between the injection
hammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concrete


valve and the HPCI pump discharge
surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that


valve to 275 0 F and at the discharge
water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump


of the HPCI pump to 246 0 F.Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature
tests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation on


gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded
the piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak.


that feedwater leaking through the injection
NRC


valve was flashing and displacing
Information Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer


some of the water in the piping with steam. This conclusion
events at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other references


was confirmed
mentioned in this notice.


by closing the pump discharge
Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is related


valve and monitoring
to three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for


the temperature
issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. These


of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature
events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. In


decreased
all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system


to ambient.:891127000
through closed valves in an emergency coolant system.
o j, ''@
IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 Accessible


portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe supports were found near the injection
===Thermal stratification===
of water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations of


valves. Concrete surfaces near the support attachment
the interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal


points were spalled.The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable
fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of welds


on October 23, 1989, and notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing
and in the base metal.


a review under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection
===For these reactors, the configuration of the piping===
between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency cooling


valve, closed the normally open discharge
system is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. The


valve, and will use the discharge
licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at the


valve temporarily
next scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.


as the injection
During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pump


valve.Temperature
existed because the discharge valve was normally open.


measurements
===Events have occurred===
in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.


on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated
Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary ''-$ '


that less significant
'4, IN 89-80
December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the


leakage was occurring.
staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees


Discussion:
develop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to
The event at Dresden is significant


because the potential
ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify


existed for water hammer or thermal stratification
steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.


to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI piping downstream
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


from the injection
completed.


valves would cause loss of one of two feedwater
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.


pipes.The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated
If


with water hammers. Nevertheless, loosening
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


of the pipe supports, damage to concrete surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump tests or valve manipulations.
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project


Temperature-monitoring
manager.


instrumentation
I


on the piping near the injection
* e4


valves was useful in detecting
===Charles E. Rossi, Drec===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


the leak. NRC Information
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD


Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer events at other facilities.
(301) 492-9005


Attachment
===Roger Woodruff, NRR===
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


2 lists these and other references
2. Referenced Generic Communications


mentioned
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


in this notice.Concern for potential
I


thermal stratification
_
,
r


in the HPCI piping is related to three events in pressurized-water
1.


reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements
5/1 1/89
7/18 /89
1 0/23/89 A


to that bulletin.
140 F


These events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors.
175 F


In all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system through closed valves in an emergency
248 F


coolant system. Thermal stratification
B


of water in the piping of the emergency
180 F


coolant system and fluctuations
220 F


of the interface
275 F


between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected
c


zones of welds and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration
INJECTION


of the piping between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency
VALVES


cooling system is approximately
D I SCHARGE


like the configuration
VALVE


of the piping at Dresden. The licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically
B


at the next scheduled
FEEDWATER


outage to determine
A


whether detectable
FPC I


damage has occurred.During the event at Dresden, the potential
PUMP


for steam bindingv the HPCI pump existed because the discharge
TEST RETURN


valve was normally open. Events have occurred in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary
*(
DRESDEN 2 - HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINE


feedwater
ul


pumps.Because the NRC staff was concerned
0
C- +
VD (D oFr


about the availability
a to c-,
CD (D CO O


of the auxiliary
CD CX)
o


''-$ '
-1 CDM
'4, IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater


pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
..


of an accident, the staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop Procedures
0


for monitoring
===Attachment 2===
IN 89-80


the temperature
===December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS===
1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"
September 19, 1985.


of the pump discharge
2.


to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves


temperature
Causes


and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"
January 1, 1986.


of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
3.


information
NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer During


as more inspection
Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.


and analysis is completed.
4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage


This information
Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"
April 18, 1988.


notice requires no specific action or written response.
5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"
October 29, 1985.


If you have any questions
6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor


about the information
Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
===Attachment 3===
IN 89-80


contacts listed below or the appropriate
===December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


NRR project manager. I* e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec Division of Operational
Information


===Events Assessment===
Date of
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Notice No.


Contacts:
Subject
Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
Issuance


Line 2. Referenced
Issued to


===Generic Communications===
89-79
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
89-56, Supp. 1
89-78.


Notices I
89-77


_ , r 1.5/1 1/89 7/18 /89 1 0/23/89 A 140 F 175 F 248 F B 180 F 220 F 275 F c INJECTION VALVES D I SCHARGE VALVE B FEEDWATER A FPC I PUMP TEST RETURN*(DRESDEN 2 -HIGH-PRESSURE
===Degraded Coatings and===
Corrosion of Steel


COOLANT INJECTION
===Containment Vessels===
Questionable Certification


LINE ul 0 C- +VD (D oFr a to c-, CD (D CO O CD CX)o -1 CDM..0
of Material Supplied to
Attachment


2 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 REFERENCED
the Defense Department


===GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS===
by Nuclear Suppliers
1. NRC Information


Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events," September
===Failure of Packing Nuts===
on One-Inch Uranium


19, 1985.2. NRC Information
===Hexafluoride Cylinder===
Valves


Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater
===Debris in Containment===
Emergency Sumps and


Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater
===Incorrect Screen===
Configurations


System Integrity
Biofouling Agent:
Zebra


and Water Hammer Damage," January 1, 1986.3. NRC Information
Mussel


Notice No. 87-10, "Potential
===Falsification of Welder===
Qualifications for


for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.4. NRC Information
===Contractor Employees===
Clarification of Trans- portation Requirements


Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication
===Applicable to Return of===
Spent Radiopharmacy Dosages


of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm
from Users to Suppliers


Globe Valves," April 18, 1988.5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary
===Potential Overpressurization===
of Low Pressure Systems


Feedwater
12/1/89
11/22/89
11/22/89
11/21/89
11/21/89
11/20/89
11/7/89
11/1/89


Pumps," October 29, 1985.6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for LWRs.


to Reactor Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


1, June 24, 1988; Supplement
power reactors.


2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement
===All NRC licensees===
authorized to possess


3, April.11, 1988.
and use source material


Attachment
and/or special nuclear


3 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
material for the heating, emptying, filling, or


NOTICES Information
shipping of uranium


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 89-79 89-56, Supp. 1 89-78.89-77 Degraded Coatings and Corrosion
hexafluoride in 30-
and 48-inch diameter


of Steel Containment
cylinders.


Vessels Questionable
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for PWRs.


===Certification===
===All holders of OLs===
of Material Supplied to the Defense Department
or CPs for nuclear


by Nuclear Suppliers Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride
power reactors.


===Cylinder Valves Debris in Containment===
===All holders of OLs===
Emergency
or CPs for nuclear


Sumps and Incorrect
power reactors.


===Screen Configurations===
===All manufacturers===
Biofouling
and distributors of


Agent: Zebra Mussel Falsification
radiopharmaceuticals


of Welder Qualifications
for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.


for Contractor
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


Employees Clarification
power reactors.


of Trans-portation
89-76
89-75
89-74
89-73 OL = Operating License


===Requirements===
CP = Construction Permit
Applicable


to Return of Spent Radiopharmacy
IN 89-80
December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the


Dosages from Users to Suppliers Potential
staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees


===Overpressurization===
develop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to
of Low Pressure Systems 12/1/89 11/22/89 11/22/89 11/21/89 11/21/89 11/20/89 11/7/89 11/1/89 All holders of OLs or CPs for LWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized


to possess and use source material and/or special nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or shipping of uranium hexafluoride
ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify


in 30-and 48-inch diameter cylinders.
steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.


All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


and distributors
completed.


of radiopharmaceuticals
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-76 89-75 89-74 89-73 OL = Operating
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project


License CP = Construction
manager.


Permit
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts:


pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
===Eric W. Weiss, AEOD===
(301) 492-9005 Roger


of an accident, the staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop procedures
(301)


for monitoring
===Woodruff, NRR===
492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


the temperature
2.


of the pump discharge
===Referenced Generic Communications===
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


temperature
EAB: NRR


and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
*RWoodruff:db


of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII


information
*WShafer


as more inspection
11/13/89 IRB:AEOD


and analysis is completed.
*EWeiss


This information
11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR


notice requires no specific action or written response.
*CHaughney


If you have any questions
11/15/89 TECH EDITOR


about the information
*RSanders


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR


contacts listed below or the appropriate
*CBerlinger


NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
11/22/89 EAB:NRR


===Events Assessment===
*PBaranowsky
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
11/1§/89 D:06A.


Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger (301)Woodruff, NRR 492-1180 Attachments:
CERossi DO
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR


Line 2. Referenced
*BSiegel


===Generic Communications===
11/15/89
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
I


EAB: NRR*RWoodruff:db
NRCIN 88-xx


11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII
November x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at less
 
than saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.


*WShafer 11/13/89 IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR*CHaughney
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


11/15/89 TECH EDITOR*RSanders 11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR
completed.


*CBerlinger
No specific action or written response is required by this information


11/22/89 EAB:NRR*PBaranowsky
notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the


11/1§/89 D:06A.CERossi DO 11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the


*BSiegel 11/15/89 I NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 monitoring
appropriate regional office.


the temperature
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


of the pump discharge
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts:


to ensure that it is at less than saturation
===Eric W. Weiss, AEOD===
(301) 492-9005


temperature
===Roger Woodruff, NRR===
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line


and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices


information
*SEE PREVIOUS


as more inspection
EAB:NRR


and analysis is completed.
*RWoodruff:db


No specific action or written response is required by this information
11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII


notice. If you have questions
*WShafer


about this matter, please call one of the technical
11/ /89 CONCURRENCE


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
IRB:AEOD


of the appropriate
*EWeiss


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
11/
/L6 TECH EDITOR


===Events Assessment===
EAB:NRR
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
PBaranomsky


Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure


Coolant Injection
BSiegelrP


Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
11115189 Ko


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS EAB:NRR*RWoodruff:db
D:DOEA:NRR


11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII
CERossi


*WShafer 11/ /89 CONCURRENCE
11/ /89
1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A


IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/ /L6 TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PBaranomsky
4.1.d


11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR
NRCIN 88-xx


BSiegelrP 11115189 Ko D:DOEA:NRR
November x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less than


CERossi 11/ /89 1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A
saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.


4.1.d NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 temperature
The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is


of the pump discharge
completed.


to assure that it is at less than saturation
No specific action or written response is required by this information


temperature
notice.


and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the


information
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the


as more inspection
appropriate regional office.


and analysis is completed.
===Charles E. Rossi. Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


No specific action or written response is required by this information
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts:


notice. If you have questions
===Eric W. Weiss, AEOD===
(301) 492-9005


about this matter, please call one of the technical
===Roger Woodruff, NRR===
(301) 492-1180
Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 - High Pressure Coolant Injection Line


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices


of the appropriate
EAB:NRR


regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational
RWoodruff:db


===Events Assessment===
11/11189
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
3BM tricpkoa~
C:PB1:RILI~
WShafer-Cd,'
11/13/89 IRB:AEOD


Technical
EWei S


Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR
1. Dresden 2 -High Pressure Coolant Injection


Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
CHaughney


Notices EAB:NRR RWoodruff:db
11/ /89 TECH EDITOR


11/11189 3BM tricpkoa~C:PB1:RILI~
11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR
WShafer-Cd,'
11/13/89 IRB:AEOD EWei S 11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR CHaughney 11/ /89 TECH EDITOR 11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR


CBerlinger
CBerlinger


11/ /89 EAB:NRR PBaranowsky
11/ /89 EAB:NRR
 
PBaranowsky


11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR
11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR


BSiegel 11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR
BSiegel
 
11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR
 
CERossi


CERossi 11/ /89}}
11/ /89}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 10:22, 16 January 2025

Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
ML031190089
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 12/01/1989
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-080, NUDOCS 8911270002
Download: ML031190089 (9)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL

STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING

IN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

PIPING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro- blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valves

in a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCI

system during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature was

greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load

was caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensate

storage tank.

During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 3500F,

and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con- densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injection

valve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injection

valve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.

On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi- ciently to raise the temperature between the injection valve and the HPCI

pump discharge valve to 2750F and at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 2460F.

Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature

gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded that feedwater

leaking through the injection valve was flashing and displacing some of the

water in the piping with steam. This conclusion was confirmed by closing the

pump discharge valve and monitoring the temperature of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature decreased to ambient.

891127000

o j,

@

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe

supports were found near the injection valves.

Concrete surfaces near the

support attachment points were spalled.

The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, and

notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.

After performing a review under 10

CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closed

the normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarily

as the injection valve.

Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated that

less significant leakage was occurring.

Discussion:

The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for water

hammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for

steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump.

Further, failure of HPCI

piping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of two

feedwater pipes.

The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with water

hammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concrete

surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that

water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump

tests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation on

the piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak.

NRC

Information Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer

events at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other references

mentioned in this notice.

Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is related

to three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for

issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. These

events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. In

all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system

through closed valves in an emergency coolant system.

Thermal stratification

of water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations of

the interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal

fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of welds

and in the base metal.

For these reactors, the configuration of the piping

between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency cooling

system is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. The

licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at the

next scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.

During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pump

existed because the discharge valve was normally open.

Events have occurred

in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary -$ '

'4, IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

I

  • e4

Charles E. Rossi, Drec

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I

_

,

r

1.

5/1 1/89

7/18 /89

1 0/23/89 A

140 F

175 F

248 F

B

180 F

220 F

275 F

c

INJECTION

VALVES

D I SCHARGE

VALVE

B

FEEDWATER

A

FPC I

PUMP

TEST RETURN

  • (

DRESDEN 2 - HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINE

ul

0

C- +

VD (D oFr

a to c-,

CD (D CO O

CD CX)

o

-1 CDM

..

0

Attachment 2

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"

September 19, 1985.

2.

NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves

Causes

Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"

January 1, 1986.

3.

NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer During

Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.

4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage

Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"

April 18, 1988.

5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"

October 29, 1985.

6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor

Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.

Attachment 3

IN 89-80

December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

89-79

89-56, Supp. 1

89-78.

89-77

Degraded Coatings and

Corrosion of Steel

Containment Vessels

Questionable Certification

of Material Supplied to

the Defense Department

by Nuclear Suppliers

Failure of Packing Nuts

on One-Inch Uranium

Hexafluoride Cylinder

Valves

Debris in Containment

Emergency Sumps and

Incorrect Screen

Configurations

Biofouling Agent:

Zebra

Mussel

Falsification of Welder

Qualifications for

Contractor Employees

Clarification of Trans- portation Requirements

Applicable to Return of

Spent Radiopharmacy Dosages

from Users to Suppliers

Potential Overpressurization

of Low Pressure Systems

12/1/89

11/22/89

11/22/89

11/21/89

11/21/89

11/20/89

11/7/89

11/1/89

All holders of OLs

or CPs for LWRs.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All NRC licensees

authorized to possess

and use source material

and/or special nuclear

material for the heating, emptying, filling, or

shipping of uranium

hexafluoride in 30-

and 48-inch diameter

cylinders.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for PWRs.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All manufacturers

and distributors of

radiopharmaceuticals

for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

89-76

89-75

89-74

89-73 OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 89-80

December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the

staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees

develop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to

ensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identify

steam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005 Roger

(301)

Woodruff, NRR

492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2.

Referenced Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB: NRR

  • RWoodruff:db

11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII

  • WShafer

11/13/89 IRB:AEOD

  • EWeiss

11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR

  • CHaughney

11/15/89 TECH EDITOR

  • RSanders

11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR

  • CBerlinger

11/22/89 EAB:NRR

  • PBaranowsky

11/1§/89 D:06A.

CERossi DO

11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR

  • BSiegel

11/15/89

I

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at less

than saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS

EAB:NRR

  • RWoodruff:db

11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII

  • WShafer

11/ /89 CONCURRENCE

IRB:AEOD

  • EWeiss

11/

/L6 TECH EDITOR

EAB:NRR

PBaranomsky

11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegelrP

11115189 Ko

D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/ /89

1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A

4.1.d

NRCIN 88-xx

November x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less than

saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.

The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis is

completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.

If you have questions about this matter, please call one of the

technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD

(301) 492-9005

Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 - High Pressure Coolant Injection Line

2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices

EAB:NRR

RWoodruff:db

11/11189

3BM tricpkoa~

C:PB1:RILI~

WShafer-Cd,'

11/13/89 IRB:AEOD

EWei S

11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR

CHaughney

11/ /89 TECH EDITOR

11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR

CBerlinger

11/ /89 EAB:NRR

PBaranowsky

11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegel

11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/ /89


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