ML17309A255

Revised Tech Spec Table 3.6-1 Re Containment Isolation Valve

ML17309A255
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	04/16/1982
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17256A833	List: ML17256A832 ML17256A834 ML17309A255
References
NUDOCS 8204230588
Download: ML17309A255 (11)

Text

CO O'4PENT.NO.QO 100 101 TM3IZ 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT ISOIATION VALVES MAXIMUM ISOIATION ISOIATION TIME*(SEC)BOUNDAar ISOLATION BOUNlRHY IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Fuel transfer tube (1)(2)(5)(5)(2)MV 5129 (3)(2)flange CV 370B charging line to"B" locp SI Pump 1B discharge CV 889B CV 870B CV 383B 102 Alternate charging to"A" cold leg 103 Construction Fire Service Water welded flange CV 862A CV 304A AOV 1728 MOV 313 AOV 1723 (4)60 105 Containment Spray Pump lA 106"A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)seal water 4l inlet 1 07 Sump A dl scharge to Waste Holdup Tank 108 RCP seal water out and excess letdown to VCT MAXIMUM ISOIATION TIME*(SEC)60 109 Containment Spray Pump lB 110"B" RCP seal water inlet 110 SI test.line ill RHR to"B" cold leg 112 letdown to Non-regen.

Heat exchanger 113 SI Bxrp lA discharge 120 Nitrogen to Accumulators 120 Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT)to Gas Analyzer (GA)CV 862B CV 304B MV 879 MOV 720(20)AOV 371 CV 889A CV 870A CV 8623 AOV 539 60 60 (3)(2)(5)(6)MV 204A MV 820 (14)(17)(5)(5)AOV 846 MV 546(7)60 PENT.NO.IDENZIFICATION/DESCRIPTION ISOEATION BOUNDARY t'SXIMUM ISOIATION TIME*(SEC)ISOIATION BOUNDARY MhXIMUM ISOLATION TIME*(SEC)121 121 121 121-123 124 124 125 cn 126 I 127 129 Nitrogen to PRT Reactor Makeup water to PRT Cont.Press.transmitter PT-945 (10)Cont.Press.transmitter PZ-946 (10)Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)to GA Excess letdown supply and return to heat exchanger Post Accident air sample"C" fan Ccmponent Cooling Water (CCW)frcm 1B RCP CCÃfran lA RCP CCN to lA RCP GX to lB RCP RCDZ 6 PRT to Vent Header 130 CCW to reactor support cooling 131 CCN to reactor support cooling 132 Depressurization at~140 RHR pump suction fran"A" Hot leg 141 RHR-51 puqp suction fran Sump B 142 RHR-g2 pump suction frcm Sump B 143 RCDZ purp suction 201 Reactor Ccmpart.cooling Unit A 6 B 202"B" Hydrogen reccmbiner (pilot 6 main)CV 528 CV 529 PZ 945.PT 946 AOV 1789 AOV 745 CV 743 NT 1569 NT 1572 MOV 759B K)V 759A CV 750A CV 750B AOV 1787 CV 1713 MOV 813 K)V 814 AOV 7970 M)V 701(20)MOV 850A(13)M)V 850B(13)AOV 1721 Mv 4757(16)MV 4636(16)MV 1076B MV 1084B 60 60 60 60 60 60 MV 547(8)AOV 508 NT 1819A MV 1819B NT 1655(7)(11)(11)MV 1571 MV 1574 (12)(12)MOV 749A MOV 749B AOV 1786 (19)(19)AOV 7971 (6)MOV 851A(13)MOV 851B(13)AOV 1003A AOV 1003B (11)(11)SOV IV-3B SOV IV-5B 60 NA.60 60 60 60 60 60 NA.Normally Closed NA Normally Closed PENT.NO.IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION ISOIATION BOUNDARY KKZMUM ISOLATION TIME*(SEC)ISOIATION BOUNDARY MAXINM ISOIATION.TIME*(SEC)203 Contain.Press.transmitter PT-947&948 203 Post accident air sample to"B" fan 204 205 206 206 207 207 I 209 Purge Supply Duct Hot leg loop sample Przr.liquid space sample"A" S/G sample Przr.Steam space sample"B" S/G sample Reactor Canpart.cooling Units A&B 210 Oxygen makeup to A&B recanbiners 300 301 303 Purge Exhaust Duct Aux.steam supply to containment Aux.steam condensate return"A" Hydrogen recanbiner (pilot and main)307 Fire Service Water 305 Radiation Monitors R-ll, R-12&R-10A Auto Inlet Isol.305 R-ll, R-12&R-10A Outlet 305 Post Accident air sample (containrrent)

PT 947 PT 948 MV 1563 MV 1566 AOV 5870 AOV 966C AOV 966B AOV 5735 AOV 966A AOV 5736 MV 4758(16)MV 4635(16)MV 1080A AOV 5878 MV 6151 MV 6175 MV 1084A MV 1076A AOV 1597 CV 1599 MV 1554 MV 1557 MV 1560 CV 9229 60 60 60 60 60 MV 1819C MV 1819D MV 1565 MV 1568 AOV 5869 MV 956D(14)MV 956E(14)MV 5733(7)MV 956F MV 5734(7)(11)(11)SOV IV-2A SOV IV-2B AOV 5879 MV 6165(15)MV 6152(15)SOV IV-5A SOV IV-3A MV 1596 AOV 1598 MV 1556 MV 1559 MV 1562 AOV 9227 5K Normally Closed NA Normally Closed 5 NK Normally Closed NK Normally Closed NA 60 (18)

PENT.NO.IDENPIFICATIOH/DESCRIPTION ISOLATION BOUNRQK MAXIMUM ISOIATION ISOZATION TIME*(SEC)BOUNDARY MAXIMM ISOLATION TIME*(SEC)308 Service Water to"A" fan cooler 309 Leakage test depressurization 310 Service Air to Contain.310 Instrument Air to Contain.311 Service Water fran"B" fan cooler 312 Service Water to"D" fan cooler 313 Leakage test depressurization 315 Service Water fran"C" fan cooler 316 317 318 319 Service Water to"B" fan cooler Leakage test supply Dead weight tester (deccmmissioned)

Service Water fran"A" fan cooler 332 Leakage test and hydrogen janitor instrumentation lines 320 Service water to"C" fan cooler 321 A S/G Blowdown 322 B S/G Blowdown 323 Service Water fran"D" fan cooler 324 Demineralized water to Containm nt 332 Cont.Press.Trans.PT-944, 949 6 950 MV 4627(16)flange CV 7226 CV 5393 MV 4630(16)MV 4642(16)flange MV 4643(16)MV 4628(16)flange tubing cap MV 4629(16)MV 4641(16)AOV 5738 AOV 5737 MV 4644(16)CV 8419 PT 944 PT 949 PT 950 MV 7448 MV 7452 MV 7456 SOV 921 SOV 922 SOV 923 SOV 924 60 (>>)M)V 7445 MV7141 AOV 5392 (11)(11)MOV 7444 (11)(11)M)V 7443 cap (11)(11)MV 5701(7)MV 5702(7)(11)AOV 8418 MV 1819G MV 1819F MV 1819E cap cap cap (21)(21)(21)(21)NA Normally Closed NA.60 HK Normally Closed HK NA.Normally Closed NR 60 NK HK NK 5K HA HK PENT.NO.IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPZION ISOIATION BOUNDARY MAXIMUM MAXIMUM ISOZATION ISOZATION ISOIATION TIME.*(SEC)

BOUNDARY TIME*(SEC)40l 402 403 404 l000 Main steam frcm A S/G Main steam fran B S/G Feedwater line to A S/G Feedwater line to B S/G Personnel Hatch 2000 Equipm nt Hatch"The maximum isolation tim does not include diesel start time.*~Zhe MSIVs and feedwater isolation valves are not considered to be containment isolation valves.The containment boundary is the steam generator secondary side and tubes.MV-Manual Valve K)V-Motor Operated Valve AOV-Air Operated Valve CV-Check Valve SOV-Solenoid Operated Valve (10)(11)(12)(13)The pressure transmitter provides a boundary.'

p Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve outside containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg.5.2.2-2).The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor operated.The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the reactor coolant system and, should remain open while the coolant pump is running.A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system.(FSAR 5.2.2 pg.5.2.2-1a)See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2.Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following.

an accident.Containment, leakage testing is not required.The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test.(14)Normally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment.

ln addition to the isolation valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System.(FSAR 5.2.2 pg.5.2.2-1)(15)(16)See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17.The Service Water system operates at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment.

Therefore, these valves are used for flow control only and need not be leak tested.(17)A manual valve outside containment in series with an automatic valve is provided for normally operating outgoing RCS lines (FSAR pg.5.2.2-1).(18)Fire Service Water will be used only to fight fires inside containment.

AOV 9227 is closed during power operation.

A containment isolation signal to automatically close this valve is not required because a spurious signal during a fire may be hazardous to personnel and may impede fire suppression activities.

(19)See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-16.(20)Containment leakage testing is not required per L.D.White, Jr.letter to Dennis L.Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.3.6-10

(21)Acceptable isolation capability is provided for instrument lines by two isolation boundaries outside containment.

One of the boundaries outside containment may be a Seismic Class 1 closed system which is subjected to Type C leak rate testing.I 3.6-11 Attachment B The proposed changes will revise the containment isolation valve table, Technical Specification Table 3.6-1, to incorporate plant system modifications.

Penetration 318, the deadweight.

tester, is no longer used for calibration of pressurizer instrumentation.

'Decommissioning the penetration with caps both inside and outside the containment near the containment wall provides a secure means of preventing containment leakage.Removing the valve outside containment and replacing it with a cap reduces the potential for line leakage and eliminates the need for testing a valve and line which is not used'his modification was performed after Table 3'-1 was submitted for NRC approval but before the table was incorprated in the Technical Specifications.

The means of decommissioning this tubing penetration was discussed with the NRC Staff and verbal approval was given in November 1980.The modified configura-tion is consistent with other penetrations not in.service which have been previously approved by the Staff.Penetration 332, leakage test instrumentation lines, is to be modified for installation of the containment hydrogen monitors required by NUREG-0737.

Leakage from the lines in the penetration in its existing configuration is prevented by a cap inside containment and normally closed manual valves outside containment.

This configuration was acceptable for normal operation because the lines were opened for use only during integrated leak rate tests of the containment.

In.the modified configuration, the caps will be removed inside the containment to allow use of the lines in post accident conditions for monitoring containment hydrogen concentrations.

An acceptable method of isolating this penetration is to provide an isolation valve on each of the three tubing lines both inside and outside containment.

This configuration tends to reduce the reliability of the hydrogen monitors which require both series valves in the suction and return lines to be open to enable sampling of the containment, atmosphere.

Limitations within the containment isolation valve relay racks also prohibited adding six additional isolation valves, at least until two new isolation relay rack cabinets are added to the plant.Another acceptable method of isolating these lines is to provide a design which meets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.11 and Instrument Society of America (ISA)standard S67.02-1980, Nuclear-Safety-Related Instrument Sensing Line Piping and Tubing Standards For Use in Nuclear Power Plants.Compliance with the criteria of these documents assure that the design is acceptable on"some other defined basis" as allowed by General Design Criterion 56, the criterion applicable to lines penetrating the containment which are connected directly to the containment atmos'phere.

The deadline imposed for installation of the hydrogen monitors has not allowed sufficient time to complete the analysis required to demonstrate that the release rate through the as-designed tubing system will be sufficiently limited to meet.l0 CPR Part 100 dose limitations and that the flow rate will still be high enough to allow proper functioning of the monitors.An alternative defined basis for isolation of these tubing lines is to provide redundant, seismically designed barriers outside containment which will be protected from the effects of events inside containment which require containment isolation.

Appropriate isolation barriers to meet this criterion include administratively controlled closed manual valves, closed remote manual isolation valves, tube caps and seismically designed closed system outside containment.

Specifically, the tube branch lines which serve the leak test instrumentation (used only period-ically during outages)will have a closed manual valve in each line near containment and each line will be disconnected and capped near the valve.Branch lines serving the hydrogen monitors will have one normally closed remote manual isolation valve;also close to the containment wall.Each hydrogen monitor has been designed and installed to meet Seismic Class I criteria and will be leak tested to Appendix J Type C standards.

Little additional protection is provided by locating one of the barriers inside containment if both barriers outside containment are protected against the dynamic effects of events which require isolation'lant safety is enhanced by making the hydrogen monitors available for use following LOCAs.Therefore, isolation of this penetration by two barriers in each tubing line outside containment provides acceptable protection against leakage.Penetration 307, fire servicewater, has two isolation valves, check valve 9229 inside containment and AOV 9227 outside containment.

Containment isolation criteria normally require a locked closed valve or an automatic valve outside containment.

AOV 9227 is normally closed during power operation, has position indication and tamper indication in the control room and is remote manually controlled from the control room.AOV 9227 currently gets a containment isolation signal.Ne propose to remove the signal after NRC approval.The only time this valve will be open during power operation is during a fire inside containment.

Under these circumstances, it is possible that the fire could damage transmitters or cables which could generate a containment isolation signal and subsequently cause a loss of fire water to the firefighters inside containment.

The potential hazard to the firefighters is an unacceptable personnel risk and is a greater risk than that posed by a potential leakage path through redundant.

normally closed valves following a LOCA.

3 Both position indication and tamper indication in the control room provide adequate assurance that AOV 9227 will be closed following events which require containment isolation without requiring an automatic closure signal or a lock on the valve.A locked valve may inhibit quick fire brigade action.Therefore, check valve 9229 and normally closed AOV 9227 with'amper indication provide adequate protection of public health and safety through some"other defined basis" as allowed by General Design Criteria 56.Therefore, the proposed technical specification changes will not result in significant increases in potential containment leakage nor increase the allowable containment lea'kage.