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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT TOAEP:NRC:1303RESTARTPLAN-REVISION29806f00446 980506PDRADOCK05000315PPDR
{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT TO AEP:NRC: 1303 RESTART PLAN-REVISION 2 9806f00446 980506 PDR ADOCK 05000315 P PDR
'I CookNuclearPlantRestartPlanJ.RSampsonSiteVicePresident Revision2
'I Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan J.R Sampson Site Vice President Revision 2


Introduction andOverview1.1Purpose1.2Background 1.3RolesandResponsibilities 1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverview2.RestartWorkScopeDetermination 2.1RestartWorkScopeDetermination Process2.2PlantSystemReviews2.3Redefined RestartWorkScope3..RestartWorkScopePerformance 3.1WorkScopePerformance 4.RestartReadiness Assessment 4.14.24.34.4SystemReadiness Functional AreaReadiness Prograinmatic Readiness Containment Readiness 5.RestartAuthorization 5.1RestartOversight Committee (ROC)ReviewandApproval5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApproval5.3Executive VicePresident RestartAuthorization 6.StartupandPowerAscension 6.1Management Oversight andOrganizational Support6.2Operating Proficiency andExperience ReviewAttachments:
Introduction and Overview 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Background 1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 1.4 Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Process Overview 2.Restart Work Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process 2.2 Plant System Reviews 2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope 3..Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance 4.Restart Readiness Assessment 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 System Readiness Functional Area Readiness Prograinmatic Readiness Containment Readiness 5.Restart Authorization 5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Review and Approval 5.2 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT)Review and Approval 5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization 6.Startup and Power Ascension 6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support 6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review Attachments:
Asystemengineerreviewboard(SERB)charterBrestartoversight committee (ROC)charterCcriteriaforworkincludedinrestartscopeDplantsystemstobereviewedbyROCErestartprocessmapFplantperformance assurance oversight ofrestartRevisionBlock
A system engineer review board (SERB)charter B restart oversight committee (ROC)charter C criteria for work included in restart scope D plant systems to be reviewed by ROC E restart process map F plant performance assurance oversight of restart Revision Block


==1.0 Introduction==
==1.0 Introduction==
andOverview1.1PurposeTheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlandescribes theactivities andcontrolsthatwillbeimplemented toensurethefacilityisreadytosafelystartupandoperateinanevent&eemanner.Toprovideuswiththeassurance thatthiscanbeaccomplished wemustdetermine thatourpeople,plantandprogramsarereadytomeetthischallenge.
and Overview 1.1 Purpose The Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan describes the activities and controls that will be implemented to ensure the facility is ready to safely start up and operate in an event&ee manner.To provide us with the assurance that this can be accomplished we must determine that our people, plant and programs are ready to meet this challenge.
Theplanwillassesstheseareasandidentifyanyneededactiontoensurewecansafelystartupandoperatereliablyinanevent&eemanner.Theplanwillassessthefollowing:
The plan will assess these areas and identify any needed action to ensure we can safely startup and operate reliably in an event&ee manner.The plan will assess the following:
~PeopleHaveweadequately preparedourpeoplesuchthattheyaretrainedonthechangesinourprogramsandprocedures andunderstand theissuesinvolvedinrestarting andoperating theplant?Arethefunctional areasstaffed,organized andfunctioning ataleveltosupportsafestartupandreliableoperation inanevent&eemanner?~'rogramsHaveourprogramsandprocedures beenadjustedtoincludethelessonslearned?Aretheyadequatetoallowustoreturntooperation andpreventfuturenonconforming conditions?
~People Have we adequately prepared our people such that they are trained on the changes in our programs and procedures and understand the issues involved in restarting and operating the plant?Are the functional areas staffed, organized and functioning at a level to support safe startup and reliable operation in an event&ee manner?~'rograms Have our programs and procedures been adjusted to include the lessons learned?Are they adequate to allow us to return to operation and prevent future nonconforming conditions?
oPlantAreourmaterielcondition, configurations, restart.readiness ofsystemsandabilitytomeetdesignfunctionwhilecomplying withapplicable regulations adequatetoallowustoreturntoservice?Thisplanprovidesamaptoconducttheassessments neededtoassureourselves thatwearereadytorestart.Theactionsandactivities neededtodothisandanycorrective actionswillbeperformed inaccordance withapprovedprocedures.
o Plant Are our materiel condition, configurations, restart.readiness of systems and ability to meet design function while complying with applicable regulations adequate to allow us to return to service?This plan provides a map to conduct the assessments needed to assure ourselves that we are ready to restart.The actions and activities needed to do this and any corrective actions will be performed in accordance with approved procedures.


===1.2Background===
===1.2 Background===
DuringtheJuly-September, 1997,time&arne, theNRCconducted anarchitect engineering inspection atCookNuclearPlant.TheAEinspection focusedprimarily ontwosafetysystems,ECCSandCCW.SixweeksintotheAEinspection, aquestionsurfacedregarding ourabilitytosustainlong-term coolingofthecoreduringadesignbasisaccident.
During the July-September, 1997, time&arne, the NRC conducted an architect engineering inspection at Cook Nuclear Plant.The AE inspection focused primarily on two safety systems, ECCS and CCW.Six weeks into the AE inspection, a question surfaced regarding our ability to sustain long-term cooling of the core during a design basis accident.As a conservative measure, both units were shut down on September 9 and cooled to cold shut down until this question could be properly answered.
Asaconservative measure,bothunitswereshutdownonSeptember 9andcooledtocoldshutdownuntilthisquestioncouldbeproperlyanswered.
On September 12, the NRC concluded the AE inspection with a public exit.meeting.Following this meeting, Cook Nuclear Plant committed to addressing and resolving seven (7)specific issues identified during the inspection prior to restart of the units.It was believed that these seven issues could be resolved within a few weeks.Subsequent to our letter to the NRC committing to these actions, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL)identifying their approval would be required prior to restarting the units.The NRC CAL also identified two additional actions to be taken as a condition for restarting the units.The unit 2 reactor was scheduled for a refueling to begin in late September, 1997.The unit 2 core was within two weeks of normal burn up window at the time of the unscheduled shut down.Our objective was to resolve the CAL items, and restart unit 2 for the remaining two weeks of fuel burn up, then commence the refueling outage.Over the next several weeks, it became apparent that a restart would not be achievable in the near term, and a decision was made to begin the unit 2 refueling outage and its scheduled work on October 20, 1997.In parallel with the outage work, our organization worked through the many AE inspection/CAL issues.It appeared that a January 1998 restart of both units would be feasible.During the time period of January-February 1998, the Cook Nuclear Plant senior management team had several meetings with the NRC, and the CAL issues were nearing resolution.
OnSeptember 12,theNRCconcluded theAEinspection withapublicexit.meeting.Following thismeeting,CookNuclearPlantcommitted toaddressing andresolving seven(7)specificissuesidentified duringtheinspection priortorestartoftheunits.Itwasbelievedthatthesesevenissuescouldberesolvedwithinafewweeks.Subsequent toourlettertotheNRCcommitting totheseactions,theNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionletter(CAL)identifying theirapprovalwouldberequiredpriortorestarting theunits.TheNRCCALalsoidentified twoadditional actionstobetakenasacondition forrestarting theunits.Theunit2reactorwasscheduled forarefueling tobegininlateSeptember, 1997.Theunit2corewaswithintwoweeksofnormalburnupwindowatthetimeoftheunscheduled shutdown.Ourobjective wastoresolvetheCALitems,andrestartunit2fortheremaining twoweeksoffuelburnup,thencommencetherefueling outage.Overthenextseveralweeks,itbecameapparentthatarestartwouldnotbeachievable inthenearterm,andadecisionwasmadetobegintheunit2refueling outageanditsscheduled workonOctober20,1997.Inparallelwiththeoutagework,ourorganization workedthroughthemanyAEinspection/CAL issues.ItappearedthataJanuary1998restartofbothunitswouldbefeasible.
It was during this time period that several new issues arose, concerning or relating to our containment systems that would require significant resources and focus to reconcile.
DuringthetimeperiodofJanuary-February1998,theCookNuclearPlantseniormanagement teamhadseveralmeetingswiththeNRC,andtheCALissueswerenearingresolution.
Given the significant period that both units had been shut down up to this point, and the uncertainty for a near-term start up date, it was decided that the scope of both units'utages needed to be re-evaluated, and a more rigorous assessment of plant readiness was required prior to any restart.These steps are necessary in order to achieve the objectives described in Section 1.1.The key factors that led to this decision are: Design basis concerns and equipment performance and testing issues which have come to light in recent months raised the concern that additional hardware and non-hardware activities may need to be completed during this extended shut down.Confirmation is required that procedure inadequacies or equipment deficiencies that may challenge plant operators during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions have been adequately identified and addressed.
Itwasduringthistimeperiodthatseveralnewissuesarose,concerning orrelatingtoourcontainment systemsthatwouldrequiresignificant resources andfocustoreconcile.
Lessons learned&om other nuclear utilities in the implementation of an integrated assessment of readiness to restart following an extended shutdown period are being adopted and applied to Cook Nuclear Plant on a pilot basis during this outage.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities Roles and responsibilities for the execution of this plan are as follows: 1.3.1 All Nuclear Generation Employees Responsible for supporting the restart activities by focusing on safe operations and continuous improvement.
Giventhesignificant periodthatbothunitshadbeenshutdownuptothispoint,andtheuncertainty foranear-term startupdate,itwasdecidedthatthescopeofbothunits'utages neededtobere-evaluated, andamorerigorousassessment ofplantreadiness wasrequiredpriortoanyrestart.Thesestepsarenecessary inordertoachievetheobjectives described inSection1.1.Thekeyfactorsthatledtothisdecisionare:Designbasisconcernsandequipment performance andtestingissueswhichhavecometolightinrecentmonthsraisedtheconcernthatadditional hardwareandnon-hardware activities mayneedtobecompleted duringthisextendedshutdown.Confirmation isrequiredthatprocedure inadequacies orequipment deficiencies thatmaychallenge plantoperators duringnormal,abnormal, oremergency conditions havebeenadequately identified andaddressed.
All employees are obligated to raise any and all quality concerns to management's action through the corrective action program.1.3.2 System Engineers Responsible for successful completion of restart work on selected systems, performing an assessment of system readiness to support unity restart and , safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing affirmation of readiness.
Lessonslearned&omothernuclearutilities intheimplementation ofanintegrated assessment ofreadiness torestartfollowing anextendedshutdown periodarebeingadoptedandappliedtoCookNuclearPlantonapilotbasisduringthisoutage.1.3RolesandResponsibilities Rolesandresponsibilities fortheexecution ofthisplanareasfollows:1.3.1AllNuclearGeneration Employees Responsible forsupporting therestartactivities byfocusingonsafeoperations andcontinuous improvement.
1.3.3 System Engineering Review Board (SERB)Board internal to the engineering organization responsible for assessing the readiness of plant systems and providing recommendations for additional restart scope to the ROC.The SERB charter is provided in attachment A.1.3.4 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Responsible for determining the restart scope of work using consistent standards and criteria approved by the senior management review team (SMRT)and assessing the readiness of Cook Nuclear Plant to restart and resume power operations, using the process approved by the SMRT in this procedure.
Allemployees areobligated toraiseanyandallqualityconcernstomanagement's actionthroughthecorrective actionprogram.1.3.2SystemEngineers Responsible forsuccessful completion ofrestartworkonselectedsystems,performing anassessment ofsystemreadiness tosupportunityrestartand,safe,reliablepoweroperations, implementing necessary corrective actionsandproviding affirmation ofreadiness.
The ROC charter is provided in attachment B.1.3.5 Senior Management Review Team (SMRT)Members: Site Vice President (Chairman)
1.3.3SystemEngineering ReviewBoard(SERB)Boardinternaltotheengineering organization responsible forassessing thereadiness ofplantsystemsandproviding recommendations foradditional restartscopetotheROC.TheSERBcharterisprovidedinattachment A.1.3.4RestartOversight Committee (ROC)Responsible fordetermining therestartscopeofworkusingconsistent standards andcriteriaapprovedbytheseniormanagement reviewteam(SMRT)andassessing thereadiness ofCookNuclearPlanttorestartandresumepoweroperations, usingtheprocessapprovedbytheSMRTinthisprocedure.
Vice President Nuclear Engineering Director Performance Assurance Director Regulatory Affairs*Independent Safety Review Committee Member-*This member will actively participate as available, and will perform a continuous oversight role.Routine communication with this member may be accomplished through review of meeting minutes, phone conferencing and follow up interviews with the SMRT members.The SMRT is responsible for generation and approvals of: (a)criteria for screening work items required for completion of restart;and, monitoring and oversight of the process for affirmation and approval of plant and staff readiness for restart.1.3.6 Plant Manager, Engineering Managers and Department Superintendents Responsibility for successful completion of the restart work, performing an assessment of functional area readiness to support unit restart and safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing affirmation of readiness to the ROC.1.3.7 Restart Manager Responsibility for the management and control of restart work activities including the scheduling of activities and coordination of resources.
TheROCcharterisprovidedinattachment B.1.3.5SeniorManagement ReviewTeam(SMRT)Members:SiteVicePresident (Chairman)
1.3.8 Site Vice President Overall responsibility for the management and implementation of the restart plan to achieve the purpose described in section 1.1.Serves as chairman of the (SMRT).1.3.9 Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Responsible for authorizing startup and power ascension, and providing senior management oversight of the restart process.1.3.10 Plant Performance Assurance Responsible to discharge performance assurance responsibilities under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to provide assurance that activities affecting quality are satisfactorily accomplished.
VicePresident NuclearEngineering DirectorPerformance Assurance DirectorRegulatory Affairs*Independent SafetyReviewCommittee Member-*Thismemberwillactivelyparticipate asavailable, andwillperformacontinuous oversight role.Routinecommunication withthismembermay beaccomplished throughreviewofmeetingminutes,phoneconferencing andfollowupinterviews withtheSMRTmembers.TheSMRTisresponsible forgeneration andapprovals of:(a)criteriaforscreening workitemsrequiredforcompletion ofrestart;and,monitoring andoversight oftheprocessforaffirmation andapprovalofplantandstaffreadiness forrestart.1.3.6PlantManager,Engineering ManagersandDepartment Superintendents Responsibility forsuccessful completion oftherestartwork,performing anassessment offunctional areareadiness tosupportunitrestartandsafe,reliablepoweroperations, implementing necessary corrective actionsandproviding affirmation ofreadiness totheROC.1.3.7RestartManagerResponsibility forthemanagement andcontrolofrestartworkactivities including thescheduling ofactivities andcoordination ofresources.
See Attachment F for further details.1.4 Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Process Overview The restart plan consists of the following major activities:
1.3.8SiteVicePresident Overallresponsibility forthemanagement andimplementation oftherestartplantoachievethepurposedescribed insection1.1.Servesaschairmanofthe(SMRT).1.3.9Executive VicePresident NuclearGeneration Responsible forauthorizing startupandpowerascension, andproviding seniormanagement oversight oftherestartprocess.1.3.10PlantPerformance Assurance Responsible todischarge performance assurance responsibilities under10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurance thatactivities affecting qualityaresatisfactorily accomplished.
(1)scope determination (2)work performance (3)readiness assessment  
SeeAttachment Fforfurtherdetails.1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverviewTherestartplanconsistsofthefollowing majoractivities:
(1)scopedetermination (2)workperformance (3)readiness assessment  


(4)startupauthorization (5)startupandpowerascension Following isaprocessmapandsummaryoftheactivities withmoredetailedinformation presented inlatersectionsofthisdocument.
(4)startup authorization (5)startup and power ascension Following is a process map and summary of the activities with more detailed information presented in later sections of this document.
f CookPlantRestartPlanOverviewL1srvBgheenPerformSystemReadiness Reviews15sERSRexxnmedRestartWorkScopesaRocAppmveRestartWorkScope2.1ReawQeneoerPerformRestartWorkMPerformRnatReviewRacerrvnendStartup41srNTReconvnend Restart$.1opearoeRestartAndPowerOperation 12IleagerPerformFnctionalAreaReadeessReviewsFinalReview12nanoyooPerformProgranmatic Rearfeess Reviews1AovRers~PerformContainment Readiness Review 1.1SysEngineers PerformSystem'eadiness ReviewsThe'objective oftherestartreadiness assessment istoensurethattheintegrated setofplantequipment, humanresources andworkprogramsarecapableofsupporting safeandreliablepoweroperations.
f Cook Plant Restart Plan Overview L1 srv Bgheen Perform System Readiness Reviews 15 sERS Rexxnmed Restart Work Scope sa Roc Appmve Restart Work Scope 2.1 Reaw Qeneoer Perform Restart Work M Perform Rnat Review Racer rvnend Startup 41 srNT Reconvnend Restart$.1 opearoe Restart And Power Operation 12 Il eager Perform F nctional Area Readeess Reviews Final Review 12 nanoyoo Perform Progranmatic Rearfeess Reviews 1A ovRers~Perform Containment Readiness Review 1.1 Sys Engineers Perform System'eadiness Reviews The'objective of the restart readiness assessment is to ensure that the integrated set of plant equipment, human resources and work programs are capable of supporting safe and reliable power operations.
Therestartreadiness assessment willbeinitiated inparallelwiththeexecution andcompletion ofrestartwork.Therestartreadiness assessment willfocusonthefollowing 1.2~ManagersPerformFunctional AreaReadiness Reviews~plantsystemreadiness
The restart readiness assessment will be initiated in parallel with the execution and completion of restart work.The restart readiness assessment will focus on the following 1.2~Managers Perform Functional Area Readiness Reviews~plant system readiness~functional area readiness~programmatic readiness~containment readiness 1.3.Managers Perform Programmatic Readiness Reviews 1.4 Dir Plant Engineering Perform Containment Readiness Reviews 1.5 SERB Recommend Restart Work Scope The restart work scope may be increased as a result of the plant system assessments or other ongoing work.The system engineers will recommend the restart work scope to the System Engineer Review Board (SERB).
~functional areareadiness
1.6'OC'pprove Restart Work Scope All restart scope additions will be approved by the Restart Oversight Committee (ROC).2.1 Restart Manager Perform Restart Work Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, scheduling and completion of the work.3.1 ROC,PNSRC Perform Final Review Recommend Startup Results of the restart assessment will be presented to the Restart Oversight.
~programmatic readiness
Committee (ROC)with an af5rmation by the responsible system engineer or engineering manager, and the functional area superintendent of the readiness of the system'r organization to support plant startup and safe, reliable power operations.
~containment readiness 1.3.ManagersPerformProgrammatic Readiness Reviews1.4DirPlantEngineering PerformContainment Readiness Reviews1.5SERBRecommend RestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemaybeincreased asaresultoftheplantsystemassessments orotherongoingwork.Thesystemengineers willrecommend therestartworkscopetotheSystemEngineerReviewBoard(SERB).
4.1 SMRT Recommend Restart Following presentation and acceptance of the assessment results by the ROC, the Site Vice President will convene the SMRT to perform an integrated review of the affirmations, verify compliance with regulatory commitments and any other special criteria that may impact the initiation of startup activities.
1.6'OC'pprove RestartWorkScopeAllrestartscopeadditions willbeapprovedbytheRestartOversight Committee (ROC).2.1RestartManagerPerformRestartWorkFollowing determination oftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsible forcoordinating theplanning, scheduling andcompletion ofthework.3.1ROC,PNSRC PerformFinalReviewRecommend StartupResultsoftherestartassessment willbepresented totheRestartOversight.
4.2 Exec Vice Pres Authorize Restart Based on the results of this review, the Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation will authorize startup and power ascension.
Committee (ROC)withanaf5rmation bytheresponsible systemengineerorengineering manager,andthefunctional areasuperintendent ofthereadiness ofthesystem'rorganization tosupportplantstartupandsafe,reliablepoweroperations.
5.1 OPS Startup and Power Ascension Startup and power ascension following the completion of startup work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures operational and personnel safety.The normal startup process defined in Cook Nuclear Plant procedures will be supplemented with appropriate management oversight and support&om engineering and maintenance organization such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the startup can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner.
4.1SMRTRecommend RestartFollowing presentation andacceptance oftheassessment resultsbytheROC,theSiteVicePresident willconvenetheSMRTtoperformanintegrated reviewoftheaffirmations, verifycompliance withregulatory commitments andanyotherspecialcriteriathatmayimpacttheinitiation ofstartupactivities.
0 2.0 Restart Work Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process The restart work scope is being defined through a determination process driven by the ROC consistent with their charter.Outstanding work items and selected progranunatic issues are reviewed against defined criteria to determine which items should be included in the restart scope.System engineers have the largest role in this process, but there is also considerable involvement from other organizations including operations, design engineering, and maintenance.
4.2ExecVicePresAuthorize RestartBasedontheresultsofthisreview,theExecutive VicePresident NuclearGeneration willauthorize startupandpowerascension.
The restart work scope determination process is outlined in attachment E..2.2 Plant System Review Plant systems are reviewed by the system engineer using the plant system review instructions with results and recommendations presented to the ROC.The plant system review process consists of four primly elements as described below.2.2,1 Selection of Plant Systems Plant systems have been selected for a detailed review and affirmation based on the historical performance and risk significance of the system.This review will be performed in accordance with the plant system readiness review instructions.
5.1OPSStartupandPowerAscension Startupandpowerascension following thecompletion ofstartupworkwillfollowadeliberate andcontrolled approachthatensuresoperational andpersonnel safety.ThenormalstartupprocessdefinedinCookNuclearPlantprocedures willbesupplemented withappropriate management oversight andsupport&omengineering andmaintenance organization suchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressed andthestartupcanbeaccomplished inasafe,controlled manner.
Results of the assessment of selected systems will be presented first to the SERB and, upon approval, to the ROC with appropriate recommendations for additional actions'o be performed after restart.The systems are listed in attachment D.The remaining systems will be assessed and evaluated as part of the line responsibility of the engineering organization through the use of the SERB.Issues that affect restart scope on these systems will be presented to the ROC on a case basis.2.2.2 Restart Work Scope Additions The restart work scope addition for plant systems is focused on those items not already included in the restart work scope.Items already scheduled for completion prior to restart are not evaluated against the criteria provided in attachment C unless there is a proposal to delete them.The goal of the system review and work scope addition process is to define'the work necessary for completion prior to restart such that the system is capable of supporting safe and reliable power operation.
0  
This review will include the following:
10 (a)(c)the magnitude, significance and risk of items which will be resolved aAer restart should be defined and evaluated; assurance that recurring problems on the system that could affect safe and reliable operations are being fixed;assurance that any design basis and licensing issues on the system are being addressed within a time frame that is appropriate for the issue;and assurance that operators will not be unnecessarily challenged in the operation of the system during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions.
Based on the review of open work items against the criteria presented in attachment C, the system engineer is to provide recommendations for the restart scope changes for the selected systems in attachment D to the SERB and upon approval to the ROC.Items recommended for addition to the restart scope for remaining plant systems will be handled on an item specific basis by the ROC following an initial review by line management.
It should be noted that.it was not the intent of this program to resolve all design basis issues.We are committed to a long range program to accomplish this resolution.


==2.0 RestartWorkScopeDetermination==
====2.2.3 Monitoring====
2.1RestartWorkScopeDetermination ProcessTherestartworkscopeisbeingdefinedthroughadetermination processdrivenbytheROCconsistent withtheircharter.Outstanding workitemsandselectedprogranunatic issuesarereviewedagainstdefinedcriteriatodetermine whichitemsshouldbeincludedintherestartscope.Systemengineers havethelargestroleinthisprocess,butthereisalsoconsiderable involvement fromotherorganizations including operations, designengineering, andmaintenance.
Restart Work, Addressing Emergent Issues and Performing a More Detailed Assessment of System Readiness System engineering is to monitor the progress of work on assigned system and address emergent issues as required.Any major restart scope impacts defined by emergent issues should be brought to the ROC following line management review.All other emergent issues are assessed daily by the engineering managers.Also, the system engineer is to use this period to complete the assessment and evaluation of system readiness in preparation for the final system readiness review and affirmation of readiness for restart.2.2.4 Final System Readiness Review and Affirmation This aspect of the system readiness review process is summarized in section 4.1.Although it is not expected that any significant restart work scope issues will be identified during this final review, if any are identified, they are to be brought to the immediate attention of the ROC (following line management review).11  
Therestartworkscopedetermination processisoutlinedinattachment E..2.2PlantSystemReviewPlantsystemsarereviewedbythesystemengineerusingtheplantsystemreviewinstructions withresultsandrecommendations presented totheROC.Theplantsystemreviewprocessconsistsoffourprimlyelementsasdescribed below.2.2,1Selection ofPlantSystemsPlantsystemshavebeenselectedforadetailedreviewandaffirmation basedonthehistorical performance andrisksignificance ofthesystem.Thisreviewwillbeperformed inaccordance withtheplantsystemreadiness reviewinstructions.
Resultsoftheassessment ofselectedsystemswillbepresented firsttotheSERBand,uponapproval, totheROCwithappropriate recommendations foradditional actions'o beperformed afterrestart.Thesystemsarelistedinattachment D.Theremaining systemswillbeassessedandevaluated aspartofthelineresponsibility oftheengineering organization throughtheuseoftheSERB.Issuesthataffectrestartscopeonthesesystemswillbepresented totheROConacasebasis.2.2.2RestartWorkScopeAdditions Therestartworkscopeadditionforplantsystemsisfocusedonthoseitemsnotalreadyincludedintherestartworkscope.Itemsalreadyscheduled forcompletion priortorestartarenotevaluated againstthecriteriaprovidedinattachment Cunlessthereisaproposaltodeletethem.Thegoalofthesystemreviewandworkscopeadditionprocessistodefine'the worknecessary forcompletion priortorestartsuchthatthesystemiscapableofsupporting safeandreliablepoweroperation.
Thisreviewwillincludethefollowing:
10 (a)(c)themagnitude, significance andriskofitemswhichwillberesolvedaAerrestartshouldbedefinedandevaluated; assurance thatrecurring problemsonthesystemthatcouldaffectsafeandreliableoperations arebeingfixed;assurance thatanydesignbasisandlicensing issuesonthesystemarebeingaddressed withinatimeframethatisappropriate fortheissue;andassurance thatoperators willnotbeunnecessarily challenged intheoperation ofthesystemduringnormal,abnormal, oremergency conditions.
Basedonthereviewofopenworkitemsagainstthecriteriapresented inattachment C,thesystemengineeristoproviderecommendations fortherestartscopechangesfortheselectedsystemsinattachment DtotheSERBanduponapprovaltotheROC.Itemsrecommended foradditiontotherestartscopeforremaining plantsystemswillbehandledonanitemspecificbasisbytheROCfollowing aninitialreviewbylinemanagement.
Itshouldbenotedthat.itwasnottheintentofthisprogramtoresolvealldesignbasisissues.Wearecommitted toalongrangeprogramtoaccomplish thisresolution.
2.2.3Monitoring RestartWork,Addressing EmergentIssuesandPerforming aMoreDetailedAssessment ofSystemReadiness Systemengineering istomonitortheprogressofworkonassignedsystemandaddressemergentissuesasrequired.
AnymajorrestartscopeimpactsdefinedbyemergentissuesshouldbebroughttotheROCfollowing linemanagement review.Allotheremergentissuesareassesseddailybytheengineering managers.
Also,thesystemengineeristousethisperiodtocompletetheassessment andevaluation ofsystemreadiness inpreparation forthefinalsystemreadiness reviewandaffirmation ofreadiness forrestart.2.2.4FinalSystemReadiness ReviewandAffirmation Thisaspectofthesystemreadiness reviewprocessissummarized insection4.1.Althoughitisnotexpectedthatanysignificant restartworkscopeissueswillbeidentified duringthisfinalreview,ifanyareidentified, theyaretobebroughttotheimmediate attention oftheROC(following linemanagement review).11  


2.3Redefined RestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemayberedefined basedontheevaluation processdescribed above.Decisions madeby,theROCregarding therestartworkscopearedocumented inmeetingminutesandworkitemstatusistracked.3.0RestartWorkScopePerformance 3.1WorkScopePerformance Following determination oftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsible forcoordinating theplanning, scheduling andcompletion ofthework,including theimplementation ofprograinmatic changes.Therestartworkscopeperformance processisoutlinedinattachment E.4.0RestartReadiness Assessment
2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope The restart work scope may be redefined based on the evaluation process described above.Decisions made by, the ROC regarding the restart work scope are documented in meeting minutes and work item status is tracked.3.0 Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, scheduling and completion of the work, including the implementation of prograinmatic changes.The restart work scope performance process is outlined in attachment E.4.0 Restart Readiness Assessment
'herestartieadiness assessment isanintegrated linemanagement assessment thatassistsstationmanagement indetermining thereadiness toinitiatestartupandachievesafe,reliablepoweroperation throughthenextoperating cycle.Therestartreadiness assessment processisoutlinedinattachment E,Thisformofassessment isoneelementofacomprehensive plantassessment programthatisthefoundation ofourcontinuous improvement philosophy.
'he restart ieadiness assessment is an integrated line management assessment that assists station management in determining the readiness to initiate startup and achieve safe, reliable power operation through the next operating cycle.The restart readiness assessment process is outlined in attachment E, This form of assessment is one element of a comprehensive plant assessment program that is the foundation of our continuous improvement philosophy.
Implementation ofthisactionisconsistent withtheexperience andlessonslearnedofothernuclearutilities.
Implementation of this action is consistent with the experience and lessons learned of other nuclear utilities.
Therestartreadiness assessment isbeingimplemented atCookNuclearPlantbasedonlessonslearnedandwillbecapturedsuchthatthisprocesscanbeimplemented onaroutinebasisinthefuture.Therestartreadiness assessment forrestartwillverifythecompletion ofalldefinedrestartworkandtheaffirmation ofsystem,department andrestartreadiness forstartupandpoweroperations.
The restart readiness assessment is being implemented at Cook Nuclear Plant based on lessons learned and will be captured such that this process can be implemented on a routine basis in the future.The restart readiness assessment for restart will verify the completion of all defined restart work and the affirmation of system, department and restart readiness for startup and power operations.
Resultsoftheassessment andafBrmation ofreadiness willbepresented totheROCbytheresponsible systemengineer, functional areamanagerandoperations shiftsupervisor.
Results of the assessment and afBrmation of readiness will be presented to the ROC by the responsible system engineer, functional area manager and operations shift supervisor.
-Following acceptance bytheROC,thesitevicepresident willconveneanSMRTmeetingtoreviewtheseaffirmations andverifycompliance withregulatory commitments andanyotherapplicable criteria.
-Following acceptance by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to review these affirmations and verify compliance with regulatory commitments and any other applicable criteria.The site vice president will recommend start up of the units based on this review, and assurance regarding the readiness of the station to initiate startup and safely, reliably operate through the next operating cycle.Following is a summary of the key elements of the program.4.1 System Readiness System readiness affirmations by the system engineer are to confirm that plant systems meet functional design requirements, have been suitably tested and are ready to support safe and reliable startup and operation through the next cycle.This afIirmation is based on the work completed as described in section 2.2, and is to 12
Thesitevicepresident willrecommend startupoftheunitsbasedonthisreview,andassurance regarding thereadiness ofthestationtoinitiatestartupandsafely,reliablyoperatethroughthenextoperating cycle.Following isasummaryofthekeyelementsoftheprogram.4.1SystemReadiness Systemreadiness affirmations bythesystemengineeraretoconfirmthatplantsystemsmeetfunctional designrequirements, havebeensuitablytestedandarereadytosupportsafeandreliablestartupandoperation throughthenextcycle.ThisafIirmation isbasedontheworkcompleted asdescribed insection2.2,andisto12


includeacoordinated systemwalkdownofthesystemwithoperations andmaintenance personnel onsystemsdefinedbytheplantengineering manager.Wherenecessary, compensatory actionsforrescheduled workorotherareasofperformance riskaretobedefinedandaddressed.
include a coordinated system walkdown of the system with operations and maintenance personnel on systems defined by the plant engineering manager.Where necessary, compensatory actions for rescheduled work or other areas of performance risk are to be defined and addressed.
Systemreadiness affirmations aretobepresented bythesystemengineertotheSERBanduponitsapprovaltotheROCforthesystemsidentified inattachment D.Affirmation ofsystemreadiness isdocumented withthesignature ofthesystemengineerandmanager.Affirmation ofindividual systemreadiness fortheremaining plantsystemswillbeaddressed aspartofthesystemengineering linemanagement responsibility andwillbeoneelementofthefunctional areareadiness evaluation.
System readiness affirmations are to be presented by the system engineer to the SERB and upon its approval to the ROC for the systems identified in attachment D.Affirmation of system readiness is documented with the signature of the system engineer and manager.Affirmation of individual system readiness for the remaining plant systems will be addressed as part of the system engineering line management responsibility and will be one element of the functional area readiness evaluation.
4.2Functional AreaReadiness rFunctional areareadiness byselectedfunctional areasisanaffirmation thatthedepartment isinanappropriate stateofreadiness tosupportstartupandsafeandreliablepoweroperation throughthenextcycle.Functional areareadiness willincludeitemssuchas:(a)(c)(d)adequacyofstaffinglevels,personnel experience andqualifications todemonstrate compliance withregulatory requirements andcommitments; completion ofpersonnel trainingonnormalstartupevaluations, powerascension requirements, industryoperating experience including extendedshutdownandunusualeventsatsimilarplants,emergency preparedness, changesinplantconfiguration, changesinplantoperating andemergency procedures, andchangesinkeyadininistrative procedures andprocesses; resolution ofsignificant performance deficiencies andreduction ofbacklogs(corrective action,corrective maintenance etc.)tomanageable levels;andestablishment ofgoalsandpriorities forthecontinued improvement ofthedepartment including useofcriticalassessment methods.Functional Areareadiness willbeaffirmedtotheROCbythefollowing functional
~operations outagemanagement
~maintenance licensing plantengineering fuelsdesignengineering
~plantprotection
~production engineering information management chemistry plantperformance assurance radiation protection Affirmation offunctional areareadiness isdocumented withthesignature ofthefunctional areamanager.13


4.3Programmatic Readiness Programmatic readiness reviewwillconfirmthatprogramsareinplacetosupportidentification andcorrection ofproblems.
===4.2 Functional===
Programmatic issuesidentified duringtheunitshutdownhavebeenevaluated andnecessary corrective orpreventive actionshavebeencompleted.
Area Readiness r Functional area readiness by selected functional areas is an affirmation that the department is in an appropriate state of readiness to support startup and safe and reliable power operation through the next cycle.Functional area readiness will include items such as: (a)(c)(d)adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualifications to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments; completion of personnel training on normal startup evaluations, power ascension requirements, industry operating experience including extended shutdown and unusual events at similar plants, emergency preparedness, changes in plant configuration, changes in plant operating and emergency procedures, and changes in key adininistrative procedures and processes; resolution of significant performance deficiencies and reduction of backlogs (corrective action, corrective maintenance etc.)to manageable levels;and establishment of goals and priorities for the continued improvement of the department including use of critical assessment methods.Functional Area readiness will be affirmed to the ROC by the following functional
Programsinplaceatthetimeofunitstart-upwillensurethattheplantwillbeoperatedinconformance withitsdesignbasesandinaccordance withtheAEPqualityassurance program.A/Eprogrammatic issuespotential bypassof50.59safetyevaluations 50.59safetyevaluation qualitycorrective actionprogramimprovements surveillance programassessment 4.4Containment Readiness Thecontainment readiness reviewwillfocusontheabilityofthecontainment systemtomeettheintendedfunctional designrequirements.
~operations outage management
Thecriticalpointsofthereviewwillfocusonthesystemmaterielcondition, adequatesurveillance testing,andthesystemconfiguration control,5.0RestartAuthorization Therestartauthorization processisoutlinedinattachment E.5.1RestartOversight Committee (ROC)ReviewandApprovalTheROCwillreviewandaccepttheassessment affirmations in4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4.Arestartrecommendation willbemadetotheSMRTbasedontheresultsofthefunctional areaassessments.
~maintenance licensing plant engineering fuels design engineering
5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApprovalUponreviewandacceptance oftheassessment affirmations in4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4bytheROC,thesitevicepresident willconveneanSMRTmeetingtoperformanintegrated reviewandapproval.
~plant protection
5.3Executive VicePresident RestartAuthorization Basedonthisreviewtheexecutive vicepresident nucleargeneration willprovide-theauthorization forrestartandpowerascension.
~production engineering information management chemistry plant performance assurance radiation protection Affirmation of functional area readiness is documented with the signature of the functional area manager.13
 
===4.3 Programmatic===
Readiness Programmatic readiness review will confirm that programs are in place to support identification and correction of problems.Programmatic issues identified during the unit shutdown have been evaluated and necessary corrective or preventive actions have been completed.
Programs in place at the time of unit start-up will ensure that the plant will be operated in conformance with its design bases and in accordance with the AEP quality assurance program.A/E programmatic issues potential bypass of 50.59 safety evaluations 50.59 safety evaluation quality corrective action program improvements surveillance program assessment
 
===4.4 Containment===
Readiness The containment readiness review will focus on the ability of the containment system to meet the intended functional design requirements.
The critical points of the review will focus on the system materiel condition, adequate surveillance testing, and the system configuration control, 5.0 Restart Authorization The restart authorization process is outlined in attachment E.5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Review and Approval The ROC will review and accept the assessment affirmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.A restart recommendation will be made to the SMRT based on the results of the functional area assessments.
5.2 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT)Review and Approval Upon review and acceptance of the assessment affirmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to perform an integrated review and approval.5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization Based on this review the executive vice president nuclear generation will provide-the authorization for restart and power ascension.
14  
14  


==6.0 StartupandPowerAscension==
6.0 Startup and Power Ascension Startup and power ascension, following the completion of the restart work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures operational and personnel safety.The normal startup management team will be augmented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the status can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner.The startup and power ascension actions summarized in this section do not change or alter any requirements of the startup procedures defined above.6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support The Cook Nuclear Plant management structure will be supplemented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager to compliment the shift maintenance manager during the startup and power ascension phase.The responsibilities of these positions are as follows: 6.1.1 Shift Plant Manager The shift plant manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the plant manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of the startup process.If necessary, the shift plant manager is authorized to request operations to delay the startup, reduce power, or shutdown to make necessary repairs.6.1.2 Shift Engineering Manager The shift engineering manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the plant engineering manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of engineering support of the startup process.The shift engineering manager will control on-shift engineering resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent operability issues, support maintenance and manage necessary reactor engineering test activities.
Startupandpowerascension, following thecompletion oftherestartworkwillfollowadeliberate andcontrolled approachthatensuresoperational andpersonnel safety.Thenormalstartupmanagement teamwillbeaugmented withashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineering managersuchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressed andthestatuscanbeaccomplished inasafe,controlled manner.Thestartupandpowerascension actionssummarized inthissectiondonotchangeoralteranyrequirements ofthestartupprocedures definedabove.6.1Management Oversight andOrganizational SupportTheCookNuclearPlantmanagement structure willbesupplemented withashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineering managertocompliment theshiftmaintenance managerduringthestartupandpowerascension phase.Theresponsibilities ofthesepositions areasfollows:6.1.1ShiftPlantManagerTheshiftplantmanagerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative oftheplantmanagerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofthestartupprocess.Ifnecessary, theshiftplantmanagerisauthorized torequestoperations todelaythestartup,reducepower,orshutdowntomakenecessary repairs.6.1.2ShiftEngineering ManagerTheshiftengineering managerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative oftheplantengineering managerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofengineering supportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftengineering managerwillcontrolon-shiftengineering resources asnecessary tosupportscheduled startuptestingactivities, resolveemergentoperability issues,supportmaintenance andmanagenecessary reactorengineering testactivities.
6.1.3 Shift Maintenance Manager The shift maintenance manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the maintenance manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of maintenance support of the startup process.The shift maintenance manager will control on-shift maintenance resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent equipment issues, and support operations.
6.1.3ShiftMaintenance ManagerTheshiftmaintenance managerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative ofthemaintenance managerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofmaintenance supportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftmaintenance managerwillcontrolon-shiftmaintenance resources asnecessary tosupportscheduled startuptestingactivities, resolveemergentequipment issues,andsupportoperations.
15 0
15 0
Thisorganization willbeimplemented asdirectedbytheplantmanageratcriticalevolutions duringstartupsuchaschangetomode4,initialcriticality, turbineroll,andparalleltogrid.Theorganization willbedisbanded asdirectedbytheplantmanagerbutnotbeforemode4to30%power.6.2Operating Proficiency andExperience ReviewTominimizethepotential forperformance errorsduringtheplantstartup,thefollowing actionswillbetaken:~operations personnel willutilizethesimulator topracticethestartupevolution andensureunderstanding andproficiency withapplicable startupprocedures andspecialrequirements; areviewofpastCookNuclearPlantstartupissuesrelevantindustryoperating experience willbeperformed duringthefunctional areareviewstoensureunderstanding ofpastexperience andlessonslearned;department communication meetingswillbeconducted witheachplantdepartment todiscussmanagement expectations regarding thestartupandpowerascension processes,
This organization will be implemented as directed by the plant manager at critical evolutions during startup such as change to mode 4, initial criticality, turbine roll, and parallel to grid.The organization will be disbanded as directed by the plant manager but not before mode 4 to 30%power.6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review To minimize the potential for performance errors during the plant startup, the following actions will be taken:~operations personnel will utilize the simulator to practice the startup evolution and ensure understanding and proficiency with applicable startup procedures and special requirements; a review of past Cook Nuclear Plant startup issues relevant industry operating experience will be performed during the functional area reviews to ensure understanding of past experience and lessons learned;department communication meetings will be conducted with each plant department to discuss management expectations regarding the startup and power ascension processes, schedule, and responsibilities.
: schedule, andresponsibilities.
These~meetings will be completed prior to initiating the startup evolution.
These~meetingswillbecompleted priortoinitiating thestartupevolution.
16 ATTACHMENT A PURPOSE: Perform a system-based, multi-disciplinary technical review of potential restart issues associated with risk significant plant equipment.
16 ATTACHMENT APURPOSE:Performasystem-based, multi-disciplinary technical reviewofpotential restartissuesassociated withrisksignificant plantequipment.
This board will ensure consistent application of the restart criteria contained in Attachment C of the Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan among system engineers, and ensure that restart decisions reflect the shared concerns of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering.
Thisboardwillensureconsistent application oftherestartcriteriacontained inAttachment CoftheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlanamongsystemengineers, andensurethatrestartdecisions reflectthesharedconcernsofOperations, Maintenance andEngineering.
The result of this review will be to define the equipment related work which is needed to ensure a safe and event free startup and achieve a reliable post startup operating cycle.MEMBERS: Director Plant Engineering (Chair)Mechanical Component Manager Electrical System Manager.Safety and Analysis Manager I&C Manager Performance Testing Manager Preventive Maintenance Manager Board Secretary Non-Member:
Theresultofthisreviewwillbetodefinetheequipment relatedworkwhichisneededtoensureasafeandeventfreestartupandachieveareliablepoststartupoperating cycle.MEMBERS:DirectorPlantEngineering (Chair)Mechanical Component ManagerElectrical SystemManager.SafetyandAnalysisManagerI&CManagerPerformance TestingManagerPreventive Maintenance ManagerBoardSecretary Non-Member:
Additional attendance by members of Restart Oversight Committee is expected to reinforce expectations and provide oversight for the restart Issue review process.Alternate chair: Site Engineering Managers Alternate safety and analysis manager: Engineers in the Safety and Analysis Section, subject to acceptance of the SERB chair or alternate chair.QUORUM: Chair (or alternate), two Onsite Managers, Safety and Analysis Manager (or alternate), and Secretary.
Additional attendance bymembersofRestartOversight Committee isexpectedtoreinforce expectations andprovideoversight fortherestartIssuereviewprocess.Alternate chair:SiteEngineering ManagersAlternate safetyandanalysismanager:Engineers intheSafetyandAnalysisSection,subjecttoacceptance oftheSERBchairoralternate chair.QUORUM:Chair(oralternate),
twoOnsiteManagers, SafetyandAnalysisManager(oralternate),
andSecretary.
17 0
17 0
ACTIONS:3.5.6.Reviewallpotential restartitemsidentified bySystemEngineers basedoncriteriadefinedintherestartplan;theSystemEngineerwillpresenttheproposedrestartitemsfordiscussion.
ACTIONS: 3.5.6.Review all potential restart items identified by System Engineers based on criteria defined in the restart plan;the System Engineer will present the proposed restart items for discussion.
Arepresentative ofOperations andMaintenance knowledgeable ofthesystem'srestartissueswillsupportthesystemengineerandensuretheperspective oftheotherproduction groupsisconsidered.
A representative of Operations and Maintenance knowledgeable of the system's restart issues will support the system engineer and ensure the perspective of the other production groups is considered.
TheOperations representative willnormallybeanSSoraUSoftheOperations crewresponsible forthesystem,butcanbeanSSassignedtothe%orkControlCenter.Designate systemsthatarerequiredtobepresented totheSERBbysystemengineer, Maintenance andOperations.
The Operations representative will normally be an SS or a US of the Operations crew responsible for the system, but can be an SS assigned to the%ork Control Center.Designate systems that are required to be presented to the SERB by system engineer, Maintenance and Operations.
TheSERBwillreviewallitemsidentified aspotential restartissuesbythesystemengineersystemreadiness review.Thesystemengineer, Operations orMaintenance representatives willalsoidentifyotherissueswhicharenotidentified aspotential restMtissuesbutmaybequestioned.
The SERB will review all items identified as potential restart issues by the system engineer system readiness review.The system engineer, Operations or Maintenance representatives will also identify other issues which are not identified as potential restMt issues but may be questioned.
Acompletelistofopenissuesoneachsystemwillbeavailable duringSERBmeetings.
A complete list of open issues on each system will be available during SERB meetings.The SERB will review and question additional items as desired to determine if they should be restart issues.Ensure a record of all decisions and concerns raised by the SERB review is documented for futtue review.As a iesult of the review, recommend specific potential restart items for approval by the ROC.Review and approve the charter and any revisions needed to support the restart plan.Disband this board after startup when directed by the Site Vice President.
TheSERBwillreviewandquestionadditional itemsasdesiredtodetermine iftheyshouldberestartissues.Ensurearecordofalldecisions andconcernsraisedbytheSERBreviewisdocumented forfuttuereview.Asaiesultofthereview,recommend specificpotential restartitemsforapprovalbytheROC.Reviewandapprovethecharterandanyrevisions neededtosupporttherestartplan.DisbandthisboardafterstartupwhendirectedbytheSiteVicePresident.
D.R.Hafer Director of Plant Hnginccting 18  
D.R.HaferDirectorofPlantHnginccting 18  


ATTACHMENT BPURPOSE:Exercisemanagement oversight andapprovalofphysicalandprogrammatic workscopenecessary toensureasafeanduneventful unitstartup,andachieveareliableoperating cycle.PositionPlantManager,ChairOperations Superintendent ViceChairProduction Engineering DirectorPlantEngineering DirectorMaintenance Superintendent Licensing ManagerChemistry Superintendent Radiation Protection Superintendent TrainingSuperintendent RestartManagerRestartPlanProjectManager*Secretary*
ATTACHMENT B PURPOSE: Exercise management oversight and approval of physical and programmatic work scope necessary to ensure a safe and uneventful unit startup, and achieve a reliable operating cycle.Position Plant Manager, Chair Operations Superintendent Vice Chair Production Engineering Director Plant Engineering Director Maintenance Superintendent Licensing Manager Chemistry Superintendent Radiation Protection Superintendent Training Superintendent Restart Manager Restart Plan Project Manager*Secretary*
DougCooperBobGillespie KenBakerDonHaferJohnBoeschMarkAckermanDaveMoreyDougNobleDennisLoopeJohnStubblefield PhilGoraBettyClarkAlternate BobGillespie GuyTollasAlbertoVerteramo MikeFinissiMarkStarkGordonArentBobClaesPaulHollandDennisWilleminDickStrasserSandyMcClintock
Doug Cooper Bob Gillespie Ken Baker Don Hafer John Boesch Mark Ackerman Dave Morey Doug Noble Dennis Loope John Stubblefield Phil Gora Betty Clark Alternate Bob Gillespie Guy Tollas Alberto Verteramo Mike Finissi Mark Stark Gordon Arent Bob Claes Paul Holland Dennis Willemin Dick Strasser Sandy McClintock
*Indicates non-voting membersQUORUM:Chairperson orvicechairperson, andthree(3)additional votingmembers,twoofwhichmustbeprimarymembers.Attendance
*Indicates non-voting members QUORUM: Chairperson or vice chairperson, and three (3)additional voting members, two of which must be primary members.Attendance
&omPerformance Assurance andBusinessPerformance isstronglyencouraged toperformanactiveoversight role.ACTIONS:2.Setandcommunicate expectations fortheorganization toevaluateworkitemsagainsttherestartscopecriteria.
&om Performance Assurance and Business Performance is strongly encouraged to perform an active oversight role.ACTIONS: 2.Set and communicate expectations for the organization to evaluate work items against the restart scope criteria.Ensure screening criteria are consistently applied via the restart oversight committee review, meeting and approval process.19 4 I Some items that meet one or more of the criteria maybe deferred until after restart if there is special consideration that provides the basis for this decision.Examples may include items that are only a concern during certain seasons, reduced risk of performing the work during a system outage, or implementation ofadequate compensatory actions until a long-term solution is defined.A clear basis for deferral of these items is to be provided.3.Review and approve: A.Restart action items to be completed prior to star{up.B.Station readiness to initiate until startup and power ascension as determined by the results of the assessment of readiness to startup, 4.Maintain arecotd ofpresentations, discussions, deliberations and basis for decisions and recommendations.
Ensurescreening criteriaareconsistently appliedviatherestartoversight committee review,meetingandapprovalprocess.19 4I Someitemsthatmeetoneormoreofthecriteriamaybedeferreduntilafterrestartifthereisspecialconsideration thatprovidesthebasisforthisdecision.
5, Review charter as necessary to accommodate changing conditions.
Examplesmayincludeitemsthatareonlyaconcernduringcertainseasons,reducedriskofperforming theworkduringasystemoutage,orimplementation ofadequate compensatory actionsuntilalong-termsolutionisdefined.Aclearbasisfordeferraloftheseitemsistobeprovided.
Convene as necessary to accomplish this charter prior to and during starship.Disband after unit startup when directed by the site vice president..
3.Reviewandapprove:A.Restartactionitemstobecompleted priortostar{up.B.Stationreadiness toinitiateuntilstartupandpowerascension asdetermined bytheresultsoftheassessment ofreadiness tostartup,4.Maintainarecotdofpresentations, discussions, deliberations andbasisfordecisions andrecommendations.
Site Vice dent Date 20 ATTACHMENT C.To be included in the plant restart work scope, items must meet the following criteria: 1.Level 1 Screening Resolves an immediate industrial or nuclear safety, operability or regulatory issue.These issues will be mandatory restart items.1.Necessaiy to address the voluntary shutdown for the A/E inspection and related programmatic issues.I 2.Necessary to address the confirmatory action letter.3.Required to return an INOPERABLE system, subsystem or component to OPERABLE status.4.Required to resolve an immediate industrial or nuclear safety concern.5.Necessary to address regulatory commitments.
5,Reviewcharterasnecessary toaccommodate changingconditions.
2.Level 2 Screening Not an immediate industrial or nuclear safety, operability or regulatory issue.These issues will be considered for addition to the restart item list based on the review and recommendations of plant engineering, operations, and maintenance if the action: 1~Eliminates an existing component failure, deficiency, or condition that could result in operation in, or entry to, an LCO action statement.
Conveneasnecessary toaccomplish thischarterpriortoandduringstarship.
'2.Resolves existing deficiencies or conditions that: a.would result in failure or inability to perform a required surveillance test during the current outage or the following operating cycle in accordance with the plant technical specifications; b.would increase the risk to operation for safety associated with performing a surveillance; or c.would result in the failure to meet a license requirement or a restart commitment to an outside agency.21  
Disbandafterunitstartupwhendirectedbythesitevicepresident..
SiteVicedentDate20 ATTACHMENT C.Tobeincludedintheplantrestartworkscope,itemsmustmeetthefollowing criteria:
1.Level1Screening Resolvesanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafety,operability orregulatory issue.Theseissueswillbemandatory restartitems.1.Necessaiy toaddressthevoluntary shutdownfortheA/Einspection andrelatedprogrammatic issues.I2.Necessary toaddresstheconfirmatory actionletter.3.RequiredtoreturnanINOPERABLE system,subsystem orcomponent toOPERABLEstatus.4.Requiredtoresolveanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafetyconcern.5.Necessary toaddressregulatory commitments.
2.Level2Screening Notanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafety,operability orregulatory issue.Theseissueswillbeconsidered foradditiontotherestartitemlistbasedonthereviewandrecommendations ofplantengineering, operations, andmaintenance iftheaction:1~Eliminates anexistingcomponent failure,deficiency, orcondition thatcouldresultinoperation in,orentryto,anLCOactionstatement.
'2.Resolvesexistingdeficiencies orconditions that:a.wouldresultinfailureorinability toperformarequiredsurveillance testduringthecurrentoutageorthefollowing operating cycleinaccordance withtheplanttechnical specifications; b.wouldincreasetherisktooperation forsafetyassociated withperforming asurveillance; orc.wouldresultinthefailuretomeetalicenserequirement orarestartcommitment toanoutsideagency.21  


3.Restoresdegradedcriticalcomponents orconditions thatcouldresultinaplanttransient, powerreduction orshutdown.
3.Restores degraded critical components or conditions that could result in a plant transient, power reduction or shutdown.4.Resolves conditions that have resulted in repetitive safety system or equipment failures.5.Restores hcensing basis deficiencies to conforming conditions (extended programmatic reviews and scheduled coirective actions maybe completed post-restart with the proper justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITY determination, and appropriate regulatory communication).
4.Resolvesconditions thathaveresultedinrepetitive safetysystemorequipment failures.
6.Corrects equipment with design basis deficiencies; i.L, deficiencies in safety-related or technical specification equipment not in conformance with design basis documents such as the FSAR(extended programmatic reviews and scheduled comctive actions may be completed post-restart with justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITY determination and appropriate regulatory communication).
5.Restoreshcensingbasisdeficiencies toconforming conditions (extended programmatic reviewsandscheduled coirective actionsmaybecompleted post-restart withtheproperjustification ofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactory OPERABILITY determination, andappropriate regulatory communication).
7.Corrects deficiencies in configuration management programs, processes, engineering analysis codes, or operating, maintenance, or test procedures that have a reasonable probability of affecting equipment OPERABILITY (documentation deficiencies, which have no safety impact, may be completed post-restart).
6.Correctsequipment withdesignbasisdeficiencies; i.L,deficiencies insafety-related ortechnical specification equipment notinconformance withdesignbasisdocuments suchastheFSAR(extended programmatic reviewsandscheduled comctiveactionsmaybecompleted post-restart withjustification ofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactory OPERABILITY determination andappropriate regulatory communication).
8, Eliminates conditions that create a potential for peieonnel radiation exposure, radioactivity release, or efHuent discharge in excess of limits.9.Reduces aunulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggri~te, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on safety, operability or reliable plant operation.(Not applicable to individual work items).Ap paved: Site ident 22 23 ATTACHhgNT D.120 Vac/CRID Inverters Air Recirculation/Hydrogen Skimmer Auxiliary Feedwater 250 Vdc Station Batteries Component Cooling Water Containment Containment Spray Control Air ECCS Accumulators ECCS Charging Modes 1, 2, 3/CVCS High-head Injection ECCS RHR ECCS SI Electrical Safety Busses (4000 V/600 V)Emergency Diesel Generators Essential Service Water Ice Condenser Main Steam Non-essential Service Water Plant Air Compressors Reactor Coolant System/RCS Pressure Relief Reactor Protection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS 24  
7.Correctsdeficiencies inconfiguration management
: programs, processes, engineering analysiscodes,oroperating, maintenance, ortestprocedures thathaveareasonable probability ofaffecting equipment OPERABILITY (documentation deficiencies, whichhavenosafetyimpact,maybecompleted post-restart).
8,Eliminates conditions thatcreateapotential forpeieonnel radiation
: exposure, radioactivity release,orefHuentdischarge inexcessoflimits.9.Reducesaunulative deficiencies, backlogsorconditions that,intheaggri~te, areevaluated tohavesignificant negativeimpactonsafety,operability orreliableplantoperation.
(Notapplicable toindividual workitems).Appaved:Siteident22 23 ATTACHhgNT D.120Vac/CRIDInverters AirRecirculation/Hydrogen SkimmerAuxiliary Feedwater 250VdcStationBatteries Component CoolingWaterContainment Containment SprayControlAirECCSAccumulators ECCSChargingModes1,2,3/CVCSHigh-head Injection ECCSRHRECCSSIElectrical SafetyBusses(4000V/600V)Emergency DieselGenerators Essential ServiceWaterIceCondenser MainSteamNon-essential ServiceWaterPlantAirCompressors ReactorCoolantSystem/RCS PressureReliefReactorProtection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS 24  


ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap(1)RestartWorkScopeDetermination 1.1BeniEngheenrc SelectPlantSystemsForReviewApprovePlantSystemForReview1.3SYSENO~OPS,MrPerformSystemReviewsAddithnal WorkScoRequired?
ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map (1)Restart Work Scope Determination 1.1 Beni Engheenrc Select Plant Systems For Review Approve Plant System For Review 1.3 SYS ENO~OPS, Mr Perform System Reviews Addithnal Work Sco Required?Perform Readiness Assessment
PerformReadiness Assessment
)sadness Assessmara 1 1.2 ROC Validate Existing Resta Work Scope YES 1.5 SERB SERB Review And Approval Approve Restart Work Scope Additions Approved Restart Scope Additions 1.7 SYS ENGR Monitor Work, Address Emergent Issues Perform Work Scop Approved Restart Work Scope (2)Restart Work Scope Performance 2.1 Mr, IS Plan Restart Work Schedule Restart Wo 2.3 Al Oqy Conduct Restart Work Perform Readiness Assessment I3I eenness Assessnenl 3.1 25
)sadnessAssessmara 11.2ROCValidateExistingRestaWorkScopeYES1.5SERBSERBReviewAndApprovalApproveRestartWorkScopeAdditions ApprovedRestartScopeAdditions 1.7SYSENGRMonitorWork,AddressEmergentIssuesPerformWorkScopApprovedRestartWorkScope(2)RestartWorkScopePerformance 2.1Mr,ISPlanRestartWorkScheduleRestartWo2.3AlOqyConductRestartWorkPerformReadiness Assessment I3IeennessAssessnenl 3.125


ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap(3)Readiness Assessment 3.1SyeEny'neerAffirmPlantSystemReadiness saSERBSERBConfirmsReadiness PlantSystemReady?SERBnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination 3AMenegeaAffirmFunctional AreaReadiness Functional AreasReady1oeienlIoeen 1AYesYesS.euORBSAffirmProgrammatic Readiness ProgramsReady?noRestartWorkScopeDetermination 1oeienneieeen 1AYesS.laMenderCompliieAndPresentResultsRestartAuthorization 4eeienALerertzeiion AAnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination 1oeienTwLteen 1AYesAffirmContainment Readiness Containment Ready?26noRestartWorkScopeDetermination Oe~1A  
ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map (3)Readiness Assessment 3.1 Sye Eny'neer Affirm Plant System Readiness sa SERB SERB Confirms Readiness Plant System Ready?SERB no Restart Work Scope Determination 3A Menegea Affirm Functional Area Readiness Functional Areas Ready 1 oeienlIoeen 1A Yes Yes S.e u ORBS Affirm Programmatic Readiness Programs Ready?no Restart Work Scope Determination 1 oeienneieeen 1A Yes S.la Mender Compliie And Present Results Restart Authorization 4 eeien ALerertzeiion AA no Restart Work Scope Determination 1 oeienTwLteen 1A Yes Affirm Containment Readiness Containment Ready?26 no Restart Work Scope Determination Oe~1A  


ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMapATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap{4)RestartAuthorization
ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map{4)Restart Authorization
{5)PowerOperation 4.1ROCPerformFinalReadinesReview42ROC,PNSRCPerformFinalReviewRecommend StartupRecommend Restart4AExecVlccPresa%Authorize Restart5.1OexeSNNStartupandPowerAscension 27 V.~
{5)Power Operation 4.1 ROC Perform Final Readines Review 42 ROC, PNSRC Perform Final Review Recommend Startup Recommend Restart 4A Exec Vlcc Presa%Authorize Restart 5.1 OexeSNN Start up and Power Ascension 27 V.~
ATTACHMENT FPerfoanceAssurance Oversight ofRestartPerformance Assurance Oversight ofRestartThepurposeofthisoversight effortistodischarge Performance Assurance responsibilities, under10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurance thatactivities afffecting qualityaresatisfactorily accomplished.
ATTACHMENT F Perfo ance Assurance Oversight of Restart Performance Assurance Oversight of Restart The purpose of this oversight effort is to discharge Performance Assurance responsibilities, under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to provide assurance that activities afffecting quality are satisfactorily accomplished.
Thisoversight willincludeproviding independent feedbacktolinemanagement concerning theadequacyoftherestartplanandhoweffective theplanisbeingimplemented.
This oversight will include providing independent feedback to line management concerning the adequacy of the restart plan and how effective the plan is being implemented.
Toenhanceindependence, personnel conducting thisoversight willincludethosewhohavenotbeeninvolvedwiththeevolution ofpractices andlessonslearnedastheRestartPlanhasbeenimplemented.
To enhance independence, personnel conducting this oversight will include those who have not been involved with the evolution of practices and lessons learned as the Restart Plan has been implemented.
Criticalactivities wereidentified
Critical activities were identified
&omtherestartplan.Criticalattributes oftheseactivities wereidentified andscheduled foroversight asfollows:ListofCriticalActivities SystemReadiness ReviewsFunctional AreaReviewsProgrammatic ReviewsContainment Readiness ReviewsDetermination ofRestartWorkScopeRestartWorkSERBROCIntegration ofReviewsStartupandPowerAscension CriticalAttributes ofCriticalActivities SystemReadiness ReviewsAretherightsystemsbeingreviewed?
&om the restart plan.Critical attributes of these activities were identified and scheduled for oversight as follows: List of Critical Activities System Readiness Reviews Functional Area Reviews Programmatic Reviews Containment Readiness Reviews Determination of Restart Work Scope Restart Work SERB ROC Integration of Reviews Startup and Power Ascension Critical Attributes of Critical Activities System Readiness Reviews Are the right systems being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective?
Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective?
Functional Area Reviews Are the right areas being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effectlve2 Programmatic Reviews Are the right programs being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective2 Containment Readiness Reviews Is the right scope being reviewed2 Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective2 Determination of Restart Work Scope Is the right criteria being used to determine restart work scope?Are there any hidden inventories of items that are not being considered?
Functional AreaReviewsAretherightareasbeingreviewed?
Review work not included in restart?Adherence to Criteria Expert Judgement 28  
Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffectlve2 Programmatic ReviewsAretherightprogramsbeingreviewed?
Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2 Containment Readiness ReviewsIstherightscopebeingreviewed2 Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2 Determination ofRestartWorkScopeIstherightcriteriabeingusedtodetermine restartworkscope?Arethereanyhiddeninventories ofitemsthatarenotbeingconsidered?
Reviewworknotincludedinrestart?Adherence toCriteriaExpertJudgement 28  


ATTACHMZYI' PerfceAssurance Oversight ofRestartRestartWorkIsrestartworkbeingperformed toproperstandards?
ATTACHMZYI' Perf ce Assurance Oversight of Restart Restart Work Is restart work being performed to proper standards?
Engineering Maintenance Operations OtherSERBIsthecharteradequate?
Engineering Maintenance Operations Other SERB Is the charter adequate?Is the SERB effectively carrying out the charter2 ROC Is the charter adequate?Is the ROC effectively carrying out the charter2 Integration of Reviews Is the method of integrating reviews adequate?Plant Equipment Human Resources Work Programs Startup and Power Ascension Is it adequately Planned2 Is it adequately Scheduled?
IstheSERBeffectively carryingoutthecharter2ROCIsthecharteradequate?
Is is adequately Performed (Onshift Observations)?
IstheROCeffectively carryingoutthecharter2Integration ofReviewsIsthemethodofintegrating reviewsadequate?
29 Revision Block Restart Plan Revisions Revision Number Description Page 26: New page.Added Revision Block Page 8"Authorize Restart": Deleted Executive Vice President Nuclear Engineering.
PlantEquipment HumanResources WorkProgramsStartupandPowerAscension Isitadequately Planned2Isitadequately Scheduled?
Added Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation.
Isisadequately Performed (OnshiftObservations)?
Pages 20 and 21: Added reference numbers to restart criteria.Sect 1.3.5: Added Director Regulatory Affairs to SMRT Attachment A: Added Preventive Maintenance Manager to SERB charter Sect 1.3.10: Added Plant Performance Assurance responsibilities Added Attachment F, Performance Assurance Oversight Of Restart Index: Added Attachment F Attachment C: Added"operability or regulatory" to level 1 screening.
29 RevisionBlockRestartPlanRevisions RevisionNumberDescription Page26:Newpage.AddedRevisionBlockPage8"Authorize Restart":
Added 5.Necessary to address regulatory commitments.
DeletedExecutive VicePresident NuclearEngineering.
Added"regulatory" to level 2 screening.
AddedExecutive VicePresident NuclearGeneration.
Date 4/7/98 30 e.}}
Pages20and21:Addedreference numberstorestartcriteria.
Sect1.3.5:AddedDirectorRegulatory AffairstoSMRTAttachment A:AddedPreventive Maintenance ManagertoSERBcharterSect1.3.10:AddedPlantPerformance Assurance responsibilities AddedAttachment F,Performance Assurance Oversight OfRestartIndex:AddedAttachment FAttachment C:Added"operability orregulatory" tolevel1screening.
Added5.Necessary toaddressregulatory commitments.
Added"regulatory" tolevel2screening.
Date4/7/9830 e.}}

Revision as of 06:38, 6 July 2018

Rev 2 of Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan.
ML17334A730
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1998
From: SAMPSON J R
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17334A731 List:
References
PROC-980506, NUDOCS 9806100446
Download: ML17334A730 (52)


Text

ATTACHMENT TO AEP:NRC: 1303 RESTART PLAN-REVISION 2 9806f00446 980506 PDR ADOCK 05000315 P PDR

'I Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan J.R Sampson Site Vice President Revision 2

Introduction and Overview 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Background 1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 1.4 Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Process Overview 2.Restart Work Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process 2.2 Plant System Reviews 2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope 3..Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance 4.Restart Readiness Assessment 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 System Readiness Functional Area Readiness Prograinmatic Readiness Containment Readiness 5.Restart Authorization 5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Review and Approval 5.2 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT)Review and Approval 5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization 6.Startup and Power Ascension 6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support 6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review Attachments:

A system engineer review board (SERB)charter B restart oversight committee (ROC)charter C criteria for work included in restart scope D plant systems to be reviewed by ROC E restart process map F plant performance assurance oversight of restart Revision Block

1.0 Introduction

and Overview 1.1 Purpose The Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan describes the activities and controls that will be implemented to ensure the facility is ready to safely start up and operate in an event&ee manner.To provide us with the assurance that this can be accomplished we must determine that our people, plant and programs are ready to meet this challenge.

The plan will assess these areas and identify any needed action to ensure we can safely startup and operate reliably in an event&ee manner.The plan will assess the following:

~People Have we adequately prepared our people such that they are trained on the changes in our programs and procedures and understand the issues involved in restarting and operating the plant?Are the functional areas staffed, organized and functioning at a level to support safe startup and reliable operation in an event&ee manner?~'rograms Have our programs and procedures been adjusted to include the lessons learned?Are they adequate to allow us to return to operation and prevent future nonconforming conditions?

o Plant Are our materiel condition, configurations, restart.readiness of systems and ability to meet design function while complying with applicable regulations adequate to allow us to return to service?This plan provides a map to conduct the assessments needed to assure ourselves that we are ready to restart.The actions and activities needed to do this and any corrective actions will be performed in accordance with approved procedures.

1.2 Background

During the July-September, 1997, time&arne, the NRC conducted an architect engineering inspection at Cook Nuclear Plant.The AE inspection focused primarily on two safety systems, ECCS and CCW.Six weeks into the AE inspection, a question surfaced regarding our ability to sustain long-term cooling of the core during a design basis accident.As a conservative measure, both units were shut down on September 9 and cooled to cold shut down until this question could be properly answered.

On September 12, the NRC concluded the AE inspection with a public exit.meeting.Following this meeting, Cook Nuclear Plant committed to addressing and resolving seven (7)specific issues identified during the inspection prior to restart of the units.It was believed that these seven issues could be resolved within a few weeks.Subsequent to our letter to the NRC committing to these actions, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL)identifying their approval would be required prior to restarting the units.The NRC CAL also identified two additional actions to be taken as a condition for restarting the units.The unit 2 reactor was scheduled for a refueling to begin in late September, 1997.The unit 2 core was within two weeks of normal burn up window at the time of the unscheduled shut down.Our objective was to resolve the CAL items, and restart unit 2 for the remaining two weeks of fuel burn up, then commence the refueling outage.Over the next several weeks, it became apparent that a restart would not be achievable in the near term, and a decision was made to begin the unit 2 refueling outage and its scheduled work on October 20, 1997.In parallel with the outage work, our organization worked through the many AE inspection/CAL issues.It appeared that a January 1998 restart of both units would be feasible.During the time period of January-February 1998, the Cook Nuclear Plant senior management team had several meetings with the NRC, and the CAL issues were nearing resolution.

It was during this time period that several new issues arose, concerning or relating to our containment systems that would require significant resources and focus to reconcile.

Given the significant period that both units had been shut down up to this point, and the uncertainty for a near-term start up date, it was decided that the scope of both units'utages needed to be re-evaluated, and a more rigorous assessment of plant readiness was required prior to any restart.These steps are necessary in order to achieve the objectives described in Section 1.1.The key factors that led to this decision are: Design basis concerns and equipment performance and testing issues which have come to light in recent months raised the concern that additional hardware and non-hardware activities may need to be completed during this extended shut down.Confirmation is required that procedure inadequacies or equipment deficiencies that may challenge plant operators during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions have been adequately identified and addressed.

Lessons learned&om other nuclear utilities in the implementation of an integrated assessment of readiness to restart following an extended shutdown period are being adopted and applied to Cook Nuclear Plant on a pilot basis during this outage.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities Roles and responsibilities for the execution of this plan are as follows: 1.3.1 All Nuclear Generation Employees Responsible for supporting the restart activities by focusing on safe operations and continuous improvement.

All employees are obligated to raise any and all quality concerns to management's action through the corrective action program.1.3.2 System Engineers Responsible for successful completion of restart work on selected systems, performing an assessment of system readiness to support unity restart and , safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing affirmation of readiness.

1.3.3 System Engineering Review Board (SERB)Board internal to the engineering organization responsible for assessing the readiness of plant systems and providing recommendations for additional restart scope to the ROC.The SERB charter is provided in attachment A.1.3.4 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Responsible for determining the restart scope of work using consistent standards and criteria approved by the senior management review team (SMRT)and assessing the readiness of Cook Nuclear Plant to restart and resume power operations, using the process approved by the SMRT in this procedure.

The ROC charter is provided in attachment B.1.3.5 Senior Management Review Team (SMRT)Members: Site Vice President (Chairman)

Vice President Nuclear Engineering Director Performance Assurance Director Regulatory Affairs*Independent Safety Review Committee Member-*This member will actively participate as available, and will perform a continuous oversight role.Routine communication with this member may be accomplished through review of meeting minutes, phone conferencing and follow up interviews with the SMRT members.The SMRT is responsible for generation and approvals of: (a)criteria for screening work items required for completion of restart;and, monitoring and oversight of the process for affirmation and approval of plant and staff readiness for restart.1.3.6 Plant Manager, Engineering Managers and Department Superintendents Responsibility for successful completion of the restart work, performing an assessment of functional area readiness to support unit restart and safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing affirmation of readiness to the ROC.1.3.7 Restart Manager Responsibility for the management and control of restart work activities including the scheduling of activities and coordination of resources.

1.3.8 Site Vice President Overall responsibility for the management and implementation of the restart plan to achieve the purpose described in section 1.1.Serves as chairman of the (SMRT).1.3.9 Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Responsible for authorizing startup and power ascension, and providing senior management oversight of the restart process.1.3.10 Plant Performance Assurance Responsible to discharge performance assurance responsibilities under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to provide assurance that activities affecting quality are satisfactorily accomplished.

See Attachment F for further details.1.4 Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Process Overview The restart plan consists of the following major activities:

(1)scope determination (2)work performance (3)readiness assessment

(4)startup authorization (5)startup and power ascension Following is a process map and summary of the activities with more detailed information presented in later sections of this document.

f Cook Plant Restart Plan Overview L1 srv Bgheen Perform System Readiness Reviews 15 sERS Rexxnmed Restart Work Scope sa Roc Appmve Restart Work Scope 2.1 Reaw Qeneoer Perform Restart Work M Perform Rnat Review Racer rvnend Startup 41 srNT Reconvnend Restart$.1 opearoe Restart And Power Operation 12 Il eager Perform F nctional Area Readeess Reviews Final Review 12 nanoyoo Perform Progranmatic Rearfeess Reviews 1A ovRers~Perform Containment Readiness Review 1.1 Sys Engineers Perform System'eadiness Reviews The'objective of the restart readiness assessment is to ensure that the integrated set of plant equipment, human resources and work programs are capable of supporting safe and reliable power operations.

The restart readiness assessment will be initiated in parallel with the execution and completion of restart work.The restart readiness assessment will focus on the following 1.2~Managers Perform Functional Area Readiness Reviews~plant system readiness~functional area readiness~programmatic readiness~containment readiness 1.3.Managers Perform Programmatic Readiness Reviews 1.4 Dir Plant Engineering Perform Containment Readiness Reviews 1.5 SERB Recommend Restart Work Scope The restart work scope may be increased as a result of the plant system assessments or other ongoing work.The system engineers will recommend the restart work scope to the System Engineer Review Board (SERB).

1.6'OC'pprove Restart Work Scope All restart scope additions will be approved by the Restart Oversight Committee (ROC).2.1 Restart Manager Perform Restart Work Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, scheduling and completion of the work.3.1 ROC,PNSRC Perform Final Review Recommend Startup Results of the restart assessment will be presented to the Restart Oversight.

Committee (ROC)with an af5rmation by the responsible system engineer or engineering manager, and the functional area superintendent of the readiness of the system'r organization to support plant startup and safe, reliable power operations.

4.1 SMRT Recommend Restart Following presentation and acceptance of the assessment results by the ROC, the Site Vice President will convene the SMRT to perform an integrated review of the affirmations, verify compliance with regulatory commitments and any other special criteria that may impact the initiation of startup activities.

4.2 Exec Vice Pres Authorize Restart Based on the results of this review, the Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation will authorize startup and power ascension.

5.1 OPS Startup and Power Ascension Startup and power ascension following the completion of startup work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures operational and personnel safety.The normal startup process defined in Cook Nuclear Plant procedures will be supplemented with appropriate management oversight and support&om engineering and maintenance organization such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the startup can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner.

0 2.0 Restart Work Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process The restart work scope is being defined through a determination process driven by the ROC consistent with their charter.Outstanding work items and selected progranunatic issues are reviewed against defined criteria to determine which items should be included in the restart scope.System engineers have the largest role in this process, but there is also considerable involvement from other organizations including operations, design engineering, and maintenance.

The restart work scope determination process is outlined in attachment E..2.2 Plant System Review Plant systems are reviewed by the system engineer using the plant system review instructions with results and recommendations presented to the ROC.The plant system review process consists of four primly elements as described below.2.2,1 Selection of Plant Systems Plant systems have been selected for a detailed review and affirmation based on the historical performance and risk significance of the system.This review will be performed in accordance with the plant system readiness review instructions.

Results of the assessment of selected systems will be presented first to the SERB and, upon approval, to the ROC with appropriate recommendations for additional actions'o be performed after restart.The systems are listed in attachment D.The remaining systems will be assessed and evaluated as part of the line responsibility of the engineering organization through the use of the SERB.Issues that affect restart scope on these systems will be presented to the ROC on a case basis.2.2.2 Restart Work Scope Additions The restart work scope addition for plant systems is focused on those items not already included in the restart work scope.Items already scheduled for completion prior to restart are not evaluated against the criteria provided in attachment C unless there is a proposal to delete them.The goal of the system review and work scope addition process is to define'the work necessary for completion prior to restart such that the system is capable of supporting safe and reliable power operation.

This review will include the following:

10 (a)(c)the magnitude, significance and risk of items which will be resolved aAer restart should be defined and evaluated; assurance that recurring problems on the system that could affect safe and reliable operations are being fixed;assurance that any design basis and licensing issues on the system are being addressed within a time frame that is appropriate for the issue;and assurance that operators will not be unnecessarily challenged in the operation of the system during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions.

Based on the review of open work items against the criteria presented in attachment C, the system engineer is to provide recommendations for the restart scope changes for the selected systems in attachment D to the SERB and upon approval to the ROC.Items recommended for addition to the restart scope for remaining plant systems will be handled on an item specific basis by the ROC following an initial review by line management.

It should be noted that.it was not the intent of this program to resolve all design basis issues.We are committed to a long range program to accomplish this resolution.

2.2.3 Monitoring

Restart Work, Addressing Emergent Issues and Performing a More Detailed Assessment of System Readiness System engineering is to monitor the progress of work on assigned system and address emergent issues as required.Any major restart scope impacts defined by emergent issues should be brought to the ROC following line management review.All other emergent issues are assessed daily by the engineering managers.Also, the system engineer is to use this period to complete the assessment and evaluation of system readiness in preparation for the final system readiness review and affirmation of readiness for restart.2.2.4 Final System Readiness Review and Affirmation This aspect of the system readiness review process is summarized in section 4.1.Although it is not expected that any significant restart work scope issues will be identified during this final review, if any are identified, they are to be brought to the immediate attention of the ROC (following line management review).11

2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope The restart work scope may be redefined based on the evaluation process described above.Decisions made by, the ROC regarding the restart work scope are documented in meeting minutes and work item status is tracked.3.0 Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, scheduling and completion of the work, including the implementation of prograinmatic changes.The restart work scope performance process is outlined in attachment E.4.0 Restart Readiness Assessment

'he restart ieadiness assessment is an integrated line management assessment that assists station management in determining the readiness to initiate startup and achieve safe, reliable power operation through the next operating cycle.The restart readiness assessment process is outlined in attachment E, This form of assessment is one element of a comprehensive plant assessment program that is the foundation of our continuous improvement philosophy.

Implementation of this action is consistent with the experience and lessons learned of other nuclear utilities.

The restart readiness assessment is being implemented at Cook Nuclear Plant based on lessons learned and will be captured such that this process can be implemented on a routine basis in the future.The restart readiness assessment for restart will verify the completion of all defined restart work and the affirmation of system, department and restart readiness for startup and power operations.

Results of the assessment and afBrmation of readiness will be presented to the ROC by the responsible system engineer, functional area manager and operations shift supervisor.

-Following acceptance by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to review these affirmations and verify compliance with regulatory commitments and any other applicable criteria.The site vice president will recommend start up of the units based on this review, and assurance regarding the readiness of the station to initiate startup and safely, reliably operate through the next operating cycle.Following is a summary of the key elements of the program.4.1 System Readiness System readiness affirmations by the system engineer are to confirm that plant systems meet functional design requirements, have been suitably tested and are ready to support safe and reliable startup and operation through the next cycle.This afIirmation is based on the work completed as described in section 2.2, and is to 12

include a coordinated system walkdown of the system with operations and maintenance personnel on systems defined by the plant engineering manager.Where necessary, compensatory actions for rescheduled work or other areas of performance risk are to be defined and addressed.

System readiness affirmations are to be presented by the system engineer to the SERB and upon its approval to the ROC for the systems identified in attachment D.Affirmation of system readiness is documented with the signature of the system engineer and manager.Affirmation of individual system readiness for the remaining plant systems will be addressed as part of the system engineering line management responsibility and will be one element of the functional area readiness evaluation.

4.2 Functional

Area Readiness r Functional area readiness by selected functional areas is an affirmation that the department is in an appropriate state of readiness to support startup and safe and reliable power operation through the next cycle.Functional area readiness will include items such as: (a)(c)(d)adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualifications to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments; completion of personnel training on normal startup evaluations, power ascension requirements, industry operating experience including extended shutdown and unusual events at similar plants, emergency preparedness, changes in plant configuration, changes in plant operating and emergency procedures, and changes in key adininistrative procedures and processes; resolution of significant performance deficiencies and reduction of backlogs (corrective action, corrective maintenance etc.)to manageable levels;and establishment of goals and priorities for the continued improvement of the department including use of critical assessment methods.Functional Area readiness will be affirmed to the ROC by the following functional

~operations outage management

~maintenance licensing plant engineering fuels design engineering

~plant protection

~production engineering information management chemistry plant performance assurance radiation protection Affirmation of functional area readiness is documented with the signature of the functional area manager.13

4.3 Programmatic

Readiness Programmatic readiness review will confirm that programs are in place to support identification and correction of problems.Programmatic issues identified during the unit shutdown have been evaluated and necessary corrective or preventive actions have been completed.

Programs in place at the time of unit start-up will ensure that the plant will be operated in conformance with its design bases and in accordance with the AEP quality assurance program.A/E programmatic issues potential bypass of 50.59 safety evaluations 50.59 safety evaluation quality corrective action program improvements surveillance program assessment

4.4 Containment

Readiness The containment readiness review will focus on the ability of the containment system to meet the intended functional design requirements.

The critical points of the review will focus on the system materiel condition, adequate surveillance testing, and the system configuration control, 5.0 Restart Authorization The restart authorization process is outlined in attachment E.5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)Review and Approval The ROC will review and accept the assessment affirmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.A restart recommendation will be made to the SMRT based on the results of the functional area assessments.

5.2 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT)Review and Approval Upon review and acceptance of the assessment affirmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to perform an integrated review and approval.5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization Based on this review the executive vice president nuclear generation will provide-the authorization for restart and power ascension.

14

6.0 Startup and Power Ascension Startup and power ascension, following the completion of the restart work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures operational and personnel safety.The normal startup management team will be augmented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the status can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner.The startup and power ascension actions summarized in this section do not change or alter any requirements of the startup procedures defined above.6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support The Cook Nuclear Plant management structure will be supplemented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager to compliment the shift maintenance manager during the startup and power ascension phase.The responsibilities of these positions are as follows: 6.1.1 Shift Plant Manager The shift plant manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the plant manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of the startup process.If necessary, the shift plant manager is authorized to request operations to delay the startup, reduce power, or shutdown to make necessary repairs.6.1.2 Shift Engineering Manager The shift engineering manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the plant engineering manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of engineering support of the startup process.The shift engineering manager will control on-shift engineering resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent operability issues, support maintenance and manage necessary reactor engineering test activities.

6.1.3 Shift Maintenance Manager The shift maintenance manager provides on-shift (24-hour)presence as a direct representative of the maintenance manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of maintenance support of the startup process.The shift maintenance manager will control on-shift maintenance resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent equipment issues, and support operations.

15 0

This organization will be implemented as directed by the plant manager at critical evolutions during startup such as change to mode 4, initial criticality, turbine roll, and parallel to grid.The organization will be disbanded as directed by the plant manager but not before mode 4 to 30%power.6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review To minimize the potential for performance errors during the plant startup, the following actions will be taken:~operations personnel will utilize the simulator to practice the startup evolution and ensure understanding and proficiency with applicable startup procedures and special requirements; a review of past Cook Nuclear Plant startup issues relevant industry operating experience will be performed during the functional area reviews to ensure understanding of past experience and lessons learned;department communication meetings will be conducted with each plant department to discuss management expectations regarding the startup and power ascension processes, schedule, and responsibilities.

These~meetings will be completed prior to initiating the startup evolution.

16 ATTACHMENT A PURPOSE: Perform a system-based, multi-disciplinary technical review of potential restart issues associated with risk significant plant equipment.

This board will ensure consistent application of the restart criteria contained in Attachment C of the Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan among system engineers, and ensure that restart decisions reflect the shared concerns of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering.

The result of this review will be to define the equipment related work which is needed to ensure a safe and event free startup and achieve a reliable post startup operating cycle.MEMBERS: Director Plant Engineering (Chair)Mechanical Component Manager Electrical System Manager.Safety and Analysis Manager I&C Manager Performance Testing Manager Preventive Maintenance Manager Board Secretary Non-Member:

Additional attendance by members of Restart Oversight Committee is expected to reinforce expectations and provide oversight for the restart Issue review process.Alternate chair: Site Engineering Managers Alternate safety and analysis manager: Engineers in the Safety and Analysis Section, subject to acceptance of the SERB chair or alternate chair.QUORUM: Chair (or alternate), two Onsite Managers, Safety and Analysis Manager (or alternate), and Secretary.

17 0

ACTIONS: 3.5.6.Review all potential restart items identified by System Engineers based on criteria defined in the restart plan;the System Engineer will present the proposed restart items for discussion.

A representative of Operations and Maintenance knowledgeable of the system's restart issues will support the system engineer and ensure the perspective of the other production groups is considered.

The Operations representative will normally be an SS or a US of the Operations crew responsible for the system, but can be an SS assigned to the%ork Control Center.Designate systems that are required to be presented to the SERB by system engineer, Maintenance and Operations.

The SERB will review all items identified as potential restart issues by the system engineer system readiness review.The system engineer, Operations or Maintenance representatives will also identify other issues which are not identified as potential restMt issues but may be questioned.

A complete list of open issues on each system will be available during SERB meetings.The SERB will review and question additional items as desired to determine if they should be restart issues.Ensure a record of all decisions and concerns raised by the SERB review is documented for futtue review.As a iesult of the review, recommend specific potential restart items for approval by the ROC.Review and approve the charter and any revisions needed to support the restart plan.Disband this board after startup when directed by the Site Vice President.

D.R.Hafer Director of Plant Hnginccting 18

ATTACHMENT B PURPOSE: Exercise management oversight and approval of physical and programmatic work scope necessary to ensure a safe and uneventful unit startup, and achieve a reliable operating cycle.Position Plant Manager, Chair Operations Superintendent Vice Chair Production Engineering Director Plant Engineering Director Maintenance Superintendent Licensing Manager Chemistry Superintendent Radiation Protection Superintendent Training Superintendent Restart Manager Restart Plan Project Manager*Secretary*

Doug Cooper Bob Gillespie Ken Baker Don Hafer John Boesch Mark Ackerman Dave Morey Doug Noble Dennis Loope John Stubblefield Phil Gora Betty Clark Alternate Bob Gillespie Guy Tollas Alberto Verteramo Mike Finissi Mark Stark Gordon Arent Bob Claes Paul Holland Dennis Willemin Dick Strasser Sandy McClintock

  • Indicates non-voting members QUORUM: Chairperson or vice chairperson, and three (3)additional voting members, two of which must be primary members.Attendance

&om Performance Assurance and Business Performance is strongly encouraged to perform an active oversight role.ACTIONS: 2.Set and communicate expectations for the organization to evaluate work items against the restart scope criteria.Ensure screening criteria are consistently applied via the restart oversight committee review, meeting and approval process.19 4 I Some items that meet one or more of the criteria maybe deferred until after restart if there is special consideration that provides the basis for this decision.Examples may include items that are only a concern during certain seasons, reduced risk of performing the work during a system outage, or implementation ofadequate compensatory actions until a long-term solution is defined.A clear basis for deferral of these items is to be provided.3.Review and approve: A.Restart action items to be completed prior to star{up.B.Station readiness to initiate until startup and power ascension as determined by the results of the assessment of readiness to startup, 4.Maintain arecotd ofpresentations, discussions, deliberations and basis for decisions and recommendations.

5, Review charter as necessary to accommodate changing conditions.

Convene as necessary to accomplish this charter prior to and during starship.Disband after unit startup when directed by the site vice president..

Site Vice dent Date 20 ATTACHMENT C.To be included in the plant restart work scope, items must meet the following criteria: 1.Level 1 Screening Resolves an immediate industrial or nuclear safety, operability or regulatory issue.These issues will be mandatory restart items.1.Necessaiy to address the voluntary shutdown for the A/E inspection and related programmatic issues.I 2.Necessary to address the confirmatory action letter.3.Required to return an INOPERABLE system, subsystem or component to OPERABLE status.4.Required to resolve an immediate industrial or nuclear safety concern.5.Necessary to address regulatory commitments.

2.Level 2 Screening Not an immediate industrial or nuclear safety, operability or regulatory issue.These issues will be considered for addition to the restart item list based on the review and recommendations of plant engineering, operations, and maintenance if the action: 1~Eliminates an existing component failure, deficiency, or condition that could result in operation in, or entry to, an LCO action statement.

'2.Resolves existing deficiencies or conditions that: a.would result in failure or inability to perform a required surveillance test during the current outage or the following operating cycle in accordance with the plant technical specifications; b.would increase the risk to operation for safety associated with performing a surveillance; or c.would result in the failure to meet a license requirement or a restart commitment to an outside agency.21

3.Restores degraded critical components or conditions that could result in a plant transient, power reduction or shutdown.4.Resolves conditions that have resulted in repetitive safety system or equipment failures.5.Restores hcensing basis deficiencies to conforming conditions (extended programmatic reviews and scheduled coirective actions maybe completed post-restart with the proper justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITY determination, and appropriate regulatory communication).

6.Corrects equipment with design basis deficiencies; i.L, deficiencies in safety-related or technical specification equipment not in conformance with design basis documents such as the FSAR(extended programmatic reviews and scheduled comctive actions may be completed post-restart with justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITY determination and appropriate regulatory communication).

7.Corrects deficiencies in configuration management programs, processes, engineering analysis codes, or operating, maintenance, or test procedures that have a reasonable probability of affecting equipment OPERABILITY (documentation deficiencies, which have no safety impact, may be completed post-restart).

8, Eliminates conditions that create a potential for peieonnel radiation exposure, radioactivity release, or efHuent discharge in excess of limits.9.Reduces aunulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggri~te, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on safety, operability or reliable plant operation.(Not applicable to individual work items).Ap paved: Site ident 22 23 ATTACHhgNT D.120 Vac/CRID Inverters Air Recirculation/Hydrogen Skimmer Auxiliary Feedwater 250 Vdc Station Batteries Component Cooling Water Containment Containment Spray Control Air ECCS Accumulators ECCS Charging Modes 1, 2, 3/CVCS High-head Injection ECCS RHR ECCS SI Electrical Safety Busses (4000 V/600 V)Emergency Diesel Generators Essential Service Water Ice Condenser Main Steam Non-essential Service Water Plant Air Compressors Reactor Coolant System/RCS Pressure Relief Reactor Protection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS 24

ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map (1)Restart Work Scope Determination 1.1 Beni Engheenrc Select Plant Systems For Review Approve Plant System For Review 1.3 SYS ENO~OPS, Mr Perform System Reviews Addithnal Work Sco Required?Perform Readiness Assessment

)sadness Assessmara 1 1.2 ROC Validate Existing Resta Work Scope YES 1.5 SERB SERB Review And Approval Approve Restart Work Scope Additions Approved Restart Scope Additions 1.7 SYS ENGR Monitor Work, Address Emergent Issues Perform Work Scop Approved Restart Work Scope (2)Restart Work Scope Performance 2.1 Mr, IS Plan Restart Work Schedule Restart Wo 2.3 Al Oqy Conduct Restart Work Perform Readiness Assessment I3I eenness Assessnenl 3.1 25

ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map (3)Readiness Assessment 3.1 Sye Eny'neer Affirm Plant System Readiness sa SERB SERB Confirms Readiness Plant System Ready?SERB no Restart Work Scope Determination 3A Menegea Affirm Functional Area Readiness Functional Areas Ready 1 oeienlIoeen 1A Yes Yes S.e u ORBS Affirm Programmatic Readiness Programs Ready?no Restart Work Scope Determination 1 oeienneieeen 1A Yes S.la Mender Compliie And Present Results Restart Authorization 4 eeien ALerertzeiion AA no Restart Work Scope Determination 1 oeienTwLteen 1A Yes Affirm Containment Readiness Containment Ready?26 no Restart Work Scope Determination Oe~1A

ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map ATTACHMENT E Restart Process Map{4)Restart Authorization

{5)Power Operation 4.1 ROC Perform Final Readines Review 42 ROC, PNSRC Perform Final Review Recommend Startup Recommend Restart 4A Exec Vlcc Presa%Authorize Restart 5.1 OexeSNN Start up and Power Ascension 27 V.~

ATTACHMENT F Perfo ance Assurance Oversight of Restart Performance Assurance Oversight of Restart The purpose of this oversight effort is to discharge Performance Assurance responsibilities, under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to provide assurance that activities afffecting quality are satisfactorily accomplished.

This oversight will include providing independent feedback to line management concerning the adequacy of the restart plan and how effective the plan is being implemented.

To enhance independence, personnel conducting this oversight will include those who have not been involved with the evolution of practices and lessons learned as the Restart Plan has been implemented.

Critical activities were identified

&om the restart plan.Critical attributes of these activities were identified and scheduled for oversight as follows: List of Critical Activities System Readiness Reviews Functional Area Reviews Programmatic Reviews Containment Readiness Reviews Determination of Restart Work Scope Restart Work SERB ROC Integration of Reviews Startup and Power Ascension Critical Attributes of Critical Activities System Readiness Reviews Are the right systems being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective?

Functional Area Reviews Are the right areas being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effectlve2 Programmatic Reviews Are the right programs being reviewed?Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective2 Containment Readiness Reviews Is the right scope being reviewed2 Are the right methods being used to conduct the reviews?Are the reviews effective2 Determination of Restart Work Scope Is the right criteria being used to determine restart work scope?Are there any hidden inventories of items that are not being considered?

Review work not included in restart?Adherence to Criteria Expert Judgement 28

ATTACHMZYI' Perf ce Assurance Oversight of Restart Restart Work Is restart work being performed to proper standards?

Engineering Maintenance Operations Other SERB Is the charter adequate?Is the SERB effectively carrying out the charter2 ROC Is the charter adequate?Is the ROC effectively carrying out the charter2 Integration of Reviews Is the method of integrating reviews adequate?Plant Equipment Human Resources Work Programs Startup and Power Ascension Is it adequately Planned2 Is it adequately Scheduled?

Is is adequately Performed (Onshift Observations)?

29 Revision Block Restart Plan Revisions Revision Number Description Page 26: New page.Added Revision Block Page 8"Authorize Restart": Deleted Executive Vice President Nuclear Engineering.

Added Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation.

Pages 20 and 21: Added reference numbers to restart criteria.Sect 1.3.5: Added Director Regulatory Affairs to SMRT Attachment A: Added Preventive Maintenance Manager to SERB charter Sect 1.3.10: Added Plant Performance Assurance responsibilities Added Attachment F, Performance Assurance Oversight Of Restart Index: Added Attachment F Attachment C: Added"operability or regulatory" to level 1 screening.

Added 5.Necessary to address regulatory commitments.

Added"regulatory" to level 2 screening.

Date 4/7/98 30 e.