ML13252A111

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1, Rev. 0, Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 - Supplemental Information.

ML13252A111
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	08/31/2013
From:	Djordjevic W, Perez R Arizona Public Service Co, Westinghouse
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1, Rev 0
Download: ML13252A111 (110)

Text

ENCLOSURE 1, APPENDICES A and B CONTAINSecurity-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED ENCLOSURE Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde NuclearGenerating Station Unit 2 -Supplemental Information ENCLOSURE 1, APPENDICES A and B CONTAINSecurity-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390UDon seDaration this pale is decontrolled Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 August 2013Revision 0Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report forPalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 -Supplemental Information Westinghouse' Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1Revision 0Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde NuclearGenerating Station Unit 2 -Supplemental Information Rolando Perez *Risk Applications

& Methods IIWalter Djordjevic Seismic Walkdown Peer Review Team LeaderAugust 2013Reviewer:

Derek Seaman*Risk Applications

& Methods IIReviewer:

Chris WandellSenior Consulting

Engineer, Arizona Public ServiceApproved:

Dan Sadlon*Manager, Risk Applications

& Methods II*Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic document management system.Westinghouse Electric Company LLC1000 Westinghouse DriveCranberry

Township, PA 16066, USA© 2013 Westinghouse Electric Company LLCAll Rights Reserved Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled REVISION LOGRev Date Revision Description Rev. 0 08/2013 Supplement 1 includes the main body of WCAP-17680-NP, Rev. 0(Reference 48, "Executive Summary" through "References")

and new orrevised content in the appendices that address the conduct and results of thefollow-on walkdown activities performed during and following refueling outage 2R17. Revision bars are used in the main body to easily identify theupdates.

With the exception of Appendices A and B, revision bars areutilized in the appendices to identify the updates relative to the corresponding appendices of WCAP-17680-NP, Rev. 0. Note that Appendices A and Bconsist of the completed checklists resulting from the follow-on walkdowns only. Editorial and formatting corrections relative to WCAP- 1 7680-NP, Rev.0 are not identified with individual revision bars in this document.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Executive SummaryFollowing the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response toCommission direction.

The NTTF made several recommendations, some of which are related toimproving the protection of nuclear power plants against natural phenomena.

With recommendation 2.3(Rec 2.3), the NTTF recommended the NRC require licensees to perform Seismic and FloodingWalkdowns to identify and address vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of hazard protection features.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f),

that requests information fromall power reactor licensees related to NTTF recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3. For the seismic aspect ofRec 2.3, licensees are required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis, verify the adequacy of current strategies and maintenance plans,and identify and address degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

This report contains theArizona Public Service Company (APS) response for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 2 to the request for information related to the seismic aspects of NTTF Rec 2.3, as addressed inenclosure 3 of the NRC letter.The original version of this WCAP report summarizes the results from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed from July 23 through July 30, 2012. Supplement I incorporates the resultsfrom the additional walkdowns performed during and after refueling outage 2R17, from October 13through October 15, 2012, and on December 5, 2012.To establish a consistent methodology for performance of the Seismic Walkdowns, the Electric PowerResearch Institute (EPRI), in conjunction with the industry, developed guidance in EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286.

This guidance was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The SeismicWalkdowns conducted at PVNGS Unit 2 conform to the requirements of the EPRI Technical Report.Consistent with the guidance, the following topics are addressed in this PVNGS Unit 2 SeismicWalkdown report:1. Seismic Licensing Basis for Seismic Category I Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)2. Personnel Qualifications

3. Process used for selection of SSCs4. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys5. Licensing Basis Evaluations

6. Peer Review7. IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution ReportThe required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed for accessible equipment inPVNGS Unit 2 during the period from July 23 through July 30, 2012, while the plant was operating inMode 1. Containment Building equipment and energized high-voltage equipment inspections wereconducted October 13 through October 15, 2012, during the 2R17 refueling outage. Palo Verde alsoperformed supplemental inspections of some electrical cabinets in accordance with the NRC response toindustry frequently asked question 4.20. Inspection of remaining electrical

cabinets, as identified in thePVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, were conducted on December 5, 2012. Documentation of Ithese additional inspections and the related evaluations is provided in this supplemental report.The following information identifies the requests in the 50.54(f) letter (in italics) followed by a summaryof the APS response:

a. InJbrination on the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled 11The PVNGS current Seismic Licensing Basis (seismic codes, standards, and methods) isdocumented in report Section 1 and was used to inform the Seismic Walkdown licensing basis evaluations.

b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process.The approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdown process at PVNGS conforms to theguidance of EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286.

Report Sections 3 through 5 providedetailed descriptions of how the walkdown process was implemented at PVNGS.c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies,

outliers, or otherfindings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate orreduce them (including their completion dates).No plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at PVNGS Unit 2 by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program.

The results of the IPEEE programare described in report Section 7.d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified

degraded, nonconforming, orunanalyzed conditions.

Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned toaddress these conditions using the guidance in Regulator, Issues Summar' 2005-20,Revision, 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical

Guidance, "Operabiliti, Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safeo,,"

including entering the condition in the corrective action program.The summary of the key findings of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys is providedin report Section 4. The licensing basis evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions and their resolutions are described in detail in Section 5 and Appendix D of this report. Atotal of 22 licensing basis evaluations have been satisfactorily closed and ten openevaluations have been entered into the PVNGS Corrective Action Program (CAP) forresolution.

Items entered into the CAP are annotated in Appendix D. None of theseidentified conditions prevent the equipment from performing the intended safety functions during or after a design basis seismic event. Results of the Seismic Walkdowns and AreaWalk-Bys are documented on EPRI TR-1025286 checklists in report Appendices A and B,respectively.

e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.

There are no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features that resulted fromthe implementation of the Seismic Walkdown guidance at PVNGS. However, one potentially adverse seismic condition that was identified during the Seismic Walkdowns resulted inaction being taken to restore seismic design margin. Bookcases installed near the controlboards in the Unit 2 Control Room were removed.

The condition related to this changewould not have prevented safety-related equipment from performing its intended safetyfunction during or after a design basis seismic event, the change was implemented to restoreseismic design margin.f Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.The peer review process performed at PVNGS confirmed and informed the selection of SSCsprocess, provided real-time feedback to the Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) duringperformance of the walkdowns, and confirmed that the licensing basis evaluations carefully WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled iiicompared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basisdocumentation.

Details of the peer reviewer activities are described in report Section 6.In summary, PVNGS Unit 2 equipment that was inspected and evaluated for the Seismic Walkdownprocess, including initial and supplemental inspections and related licensing basis evaluations, wasdetermined to be capable of performing intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismicevent. The site monitoring and maintenance procedures were determined to be adequate.

Follow-on activities to complete the remaining aspects of this process were completed as described in thissupplemental report. Therefore, the required NTTF 2.3 walkdown activities have been successfully completed for PVNGS Unit 2 in accordance with the EPRI Guidance document and the intent ofEnclosure 3 to the NRC 50.54(f) letter has been satisfied.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled ivACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to acknowledge the following contributors to the effort.Mike Powell -Arizona Public Service (Director Fukushima Response)

Chris Wandell -Arizona Public ServiceJustin Wood -Arizona Public ServiceWinston Borrero -Arizona Public ServiceRandall "Gene" Eimar -Arizona Public ServiceJonathon Lucero -Arizona Public ServiceNick Reidenbach

-Arizona Public ServiceDerek Morris -Arizona Public ServiceMark Meyer -Arizona Public ServiceNathan Hardwick

-Arizona Public ServiceJose "Angel" Delgadillo

-Arizona Public ServiceMichael Cribbins

-Westinghouse Electric CompanyRolando Perez -Westinghouse Electric CompanyDerek Seaman -Westinghouse Electric CompanyGary Douglas -Westinghouse Electric CompanyJoe Somsel -Westinghouse Electric CompanyPaul Karavoussianis

-Stevenson

& Associates Walter Djordjevic

-Stevenson

& Associates Cory Figliolini

-Stevenson

& Associates Hunter Young -Stevenson

& Associates Andrew Masiunas

-Stevenson

& Associates WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled vLIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AFAS Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation SignalAF Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAHU Air Handling UnitAPS Arizona Public ServiceASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AUX Auxiliary BuildingAWC Area Walk-By Checklist CAP Corrective Action ProgramCE Combustion Engineering CF Containment FunctionCH Chemical and Volume ControlCLB Current Licensing BasisCP Containment PurgeCST Condensate Storage TankCT Condensate Transfer and StorageCTMT Containment CTRL Control BuildingCVCS Chemical and Volume Control SystemDBM Design Basis ManualDCM Design Criteria ManualDF Diesel Fuel Oil and TransferDG Diesel Generator DHR Decay Heat RemovalEAHU Essential Air Handling UnitEC HVAC Essential Chilled WaterEPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQCF Equipment Qualification Control FormEQID Equipment Identification EW Essential Cooling WaterFAQ Frequently Asked Question(s)

FCR Field Change RequestGA Service GasGR Gaseous RadwasteHA HVAC Auxiliary BuildingHC HVAC Containment BuildingHD HVAC Diesel Generator BuildingHJ HVAC Control BuildingHPSI High Pressure Safety Injection HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viAcronym Definition IA Instrument and Service AirIC Reactor Coolant Inventory ControlIPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External EventsIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISRS In-Structure Response SpectraMCC Motor Control CenterMOV Motor-Operated ValveMSSS Main Steam Support Structure NCR Non-Conformance ReportsNQR Non-Quality RelatedNRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply SystemNTTF Near-Term Task ForceOBE Operating Basis Earthquake P&ID Piping and Instrumentation DiagramPB Class IE 4.16 kv PowerPC Reactor Coolant Pressure ControlPE Class IE Standby Generation PG Class IE 480v Power Switchgear PGD Project General Design CriteriaPH Class 1 E 480v Power Motor Control CenterPK Class 1E 125 VDCPN Class 1 E Instrument PowerPRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PVAR Palo Verde Action Request (Corrective Action Program)PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating StationRAS Re-circulation Actuation SignalRAW Risk Achievement WorthRC Reactivity Control or Reactor CoolantRCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure BoundaryRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRD Radioactive Waste DrainRLE Review Level Earthquake RM Main Control BoardROB Rule of the BoxRWT Refueling Water TankS&A Stevenson

& Associates SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation SystemSB Reactor Protection SC-1 Seismic Category ISDC Shutdown CoolingWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viiAcronymSDOCSFPSGSISoVSPSPRASQUGSSCsSSESSELSWCSWESWELSWGSWMSSWTUFSARUHSZAZGzJDefinition Vendor/Supplier DocumentSpent Fuel PoolMain SteamSafety Injection Solenoid-Operated ValveEssential Spray PondsSeismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic Qualification Utility GroupStructures,

Systems, and Components Safe Shutdown Earthquake Safe Shutdown Equipment ListSeismic Walkdown Checklist Seismic Walkdown EngineerSeismic Walkdown Equipment ListSeismic Walkdown Guidance (EPRI TR-1025286)

Site Work Management SystemSeismic Walkdown TeamUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportUltimate Heat SinkAuxiliary BuildingDiesel Generator BuildingControl BuildingWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viiiTABLE OF CONTENTS1. SEISM IC LICENSING BASIS ...........................................................................................................

1-11.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA ...............................................................................

1-11.2 SEISM IC QUALIFICATION OF SC-I EQUIPM ENT .............................................................

1-12. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

................................................................................................

2-I2.1 EQUIPM ENT SELECTION PERSONNEL

.............................................................................

2-12.2 SEISMIC W ALKDOW N ENGINEERS

...................................................................................

2-12.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEW ERS ..........................................................................................

2-32.4 IPEEE REVIEW ERS ................................................................................................................

2-32.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM .............................................................................................................

2-33. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES,

SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS

............................................

3-13.1 SELECTION PROCESS SUMM ARY ......................................................................................

3-13.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS

.........................

3-43.2.1 Base List I ..........................................................................................................

3-103.2.2 SW EL 1 ......................................................................................................................

3-103.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEM S .....................................................................

3-113 .3 .1 B ase L ist 2 ..................................................................................................................

3 -123.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down

.....................................................................................................

3-133.3.3 SW EL 2 ... ..... .................................................

.............................................

3-133.4 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ........................................................................................................

3-144. SEISM IC W ALKDOW NS AND AREA W ALK-BYS ........................................................................

4-14.1 BACKGROUND

.......................................................................................................................

4-14.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISM IC W ALKDOW NS ....................................................................

4-24.3 W ALKDOW N RESULTS .........................................................................................................

4-35. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

...............................................................................................

5-16. PEER RE VIEW ...................................................................................................................................

6-

16.1 INTRODUCTION

.....................................................................................................................

6-16.2 PEER REVIEW -SELECTION OF SSCs ................................................................................

6-26 .2 .1 P u rp o se .........................................................................................................................

6 -26.2.2 Peer Review Activity

-Selection of SSCs ...................................................................

6-26.2.3 Peer Review Findings

-Selection of SSCs ..................................................................

6-36.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comm ents -Selection of SSCs ........................................

6-56.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review -Selection of SSCs ..........................................................

6-56.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BYCHECKLISTS

...........................................................................................................................

6-56.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

..........................................................

6-86.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORT ............................................................................................

6-97. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES

..............................................................................................................

7-18. RE FERE NCES ....................................................................................................................................

8-1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled ixAPPENDIX AAPPENDIX BAPPENDIX CAPPENDIX DAPPENDIX EAPPENDIX FAPPENDIX G-SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs) ................................................

A-1-AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCs) ............................................................

B-1-PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS

..............................................................................

C-1-LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS SUMMARY ..............................................

D-1-Q U A LIFIC ATIO N S ................................................................................................

E-1-PVNGS UNIT 2 SWEL REPORT ............................................................................

F-1-SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES .......................................................................

G- 1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled xLIST OF TABLESTable 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type' .....................

3-7Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute

....... 3-8Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" ............

3-9Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)".

...... 3-10Table 3-5: PVNGS-2 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns

...............................

3-14Table 3-6: PVNGS-2 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections

......................................................................

3-15Table 3-7: PVNGS-2 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 2R17 .........................................................

3-16Table 3-8: PVNGS-2 Items Completed During the December 5, 2012 Inspection

................................................

3-17Table 6-I: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 2 ..........................

6-6Table 6-2 Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection

.......................................................................

6-9T able G -l: PV N G S-2 B ase L ist 1 ............................................................................................................................

G -ITable G -2: PV N G S-2 SW EL 1 ................................................................................................................................

G -2Table G-3: PVNGS-2 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2) ..............................................................

G-15WCAP- 1 7680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement APVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 1-11. SEISMIC LICENSING BASISThis report is applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2.The licensing basis for Seismic Category I (SC-1) equipment at PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is defined in theUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Reference

32) Section 3.7 and is supported by summaryseismic design criteria defined in Design Criteria Manual -Project General Design Criteria (DCM-PGD, Reference

42) Section 1.3.2. Site design ground motion response spectra for the Safe ShutdownEarthquake (SSE) are provided in UFSAR Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2, as well as UFSAR Sections 3.9.2.2,3.9.3 and 3.10, and adhere to Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants (Reference 43). Damping values for SC-1 equipment are listed in UFSAR Table3.7-1 and conform to Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear PowerPlants (Reference 44).As defined in UFSAR Section 2.5, the SSE is based on the postulated occurrence of a magnitude 8.0earthquake located 72 miles from the site. Through use of attenuation curves, extrapolation of responsespectra, and analysis of intensity data, 0.2g is considered a conservative representation of the severity ofhorizontal and vertical vibratory ground motion for the SSE. For additional conservatism, the seismicanalysis of all Category I structures was performed utilizing a 0.25g SSE. Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4 ofthe UFSAR show the horizontal and vertical design response spectra corresponding to the SSE andOperating Basis Earthquake (OBE), respectively.

1.1 In-Structure Response SpectraA time-history analysis was used to develop in-structure response spectra (ISRS) for buildings housingSC-1 equipment.

Modeling techniques such as the selection of the minimum number of mass points,number of dynamic degrees of freedom per mass point, and torsional

effects, are described in BechtelTopical Report BC-TOP-4-A (Reference 51). The seismic input was defined in terms of the free-field acceleration time history and the soil-structure interaction parameters.

The structural damping values usedwere per Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 44). Soil damping characteristics were modified to accountfor strain levels. Design basis ISRS are plotted in DBM-C5 (Reference

53) Appendix A.1.2 Seismic Qualification of SC-I Equipment SC-1 equipment is classified according to Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification (Reference 45), and is discussed in UFSAR, Section 3.2 (Reference

32) and in DCM-PGD Section 1.4.3(Reference 42), which states:Category, I structures, systems.

and components are those that are important to safet, anddesigned to remain functional in the event of a sqfe shutdown earthquake (SSE). These structures,

systems, and components are those necessary to assure:* The integrii, of the reactor coolantpressuare bondalry (RCPB).* The capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a sqfe condition.

• The capabilit, to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could resultin potential offsite exposures.

Per UFSAR Section 3.10.2, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Bechtel scope of supply was qualified per Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 344-75 (Reference 46). This standard iscomprehensive and similar to current requirements for nuclear safety-related components.

Per UFSARWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 1-2Section 3.10.5, SC-I electrical equipment within the Combustion Engineering scope of supply wasqualified per IEEE Std 344-71 (Reference

41) plus the additional requirements listed. With the additional requirements, the qualification criteria and methods are similar to those of IEEE Std 344-75 (Reference 46). For qualification by testing, per application of the preceding

criteria, much of the electrical equipment was subject to shake table testing.

The required test levels were typically based on the in-structure response spectra discussed above.Per Section 3.9.2.2 of the UFSAR, analytical methods without testing were employed to qualify SeismicCategory I mechanical equipment such as piping, ductwork, tanks and vessels, heat exchangers, filters,and pumps. Qualification for mechanical components with mechanisms that must change position inorder to perform the safety-related function was performed by test or a combination of test and analysis asper the IEEE Std 344-1975 requirements and UFSAR Sections 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10. These components include American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non ASME items such as valves withactuators and their appurtenances as well as check valves, relief valves, fans, chillers, air handling units,and various skid-supplied devices.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-12. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 Equipment Selection Personnel The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) development was performed by Westinghouse personnel, Messrs. Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. PVNGSOperations (Gene Eimar, Shift Manager and Angel Delgadillo, Senior Auxiliary Operator) providedverification of safety function selections.

PVNGS Engineering (Chris Wandell, Winston Borrero)provided technical input to screening and selection of equipment.

PVNGS System Engineering input wasprovided by performing a review of System Health Reports.Rolando Perez -Mr. Perez is the Technical Leader for the Palo Verde Unit 2 SWEL development activityin the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and MajorProjects Division.

Rolando has over 15 years of experience in Westinghouse and over 35 years ofexperience in the nuclear safety area. Rolando has worked for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (CE) as a Training

Engineer, Transient

Analyst, and Setpoint Analyst.

Rolando has conducted lectures onreactor core physics, health physics, fluid systems, protection

systems, and plant operational concepts.

In2009 Rolando expanded his expertise to include CE-designed plants that employ digital-based reactor tripand monitoring systems ("CE digital plants").

Derek Seaman -Mr. Seaman is a member of the Palo Verde Unit 2 SWEL development team in the RiskApplications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major ProjectsDivision.

Derek has over 6 years of experience in Westinghouse in the nuclear engineering area. Derekhas rotated through various plant outage positions including reload engineering analyses and projectmanagement of fuel reload campaigns.

Derek has evaluated power increase proposals from a safetyanalysis perspective and has designed and implemented quality assurance systems in the nuclearengineering area.Chris J. Wandell, P.E. -Mr. Wandell is a Senior Consulting Civil Engineer in the Palo Verde NuclearDesign Engineering Department.

Chris is a Professional Civil Engineer with over 30 years of experience in the design, analysis, and modification of Seismic Category I pipe supports, electrical raceway supports,

heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) supports, instrument

supports, and steel and concretestructures.

His experience also includes Class 1E Seismic Equipment Qualification.

Mr. Wandell is PaloVerde's structural and seismic subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

Winston G. Borrero -Mr. Borrero is a Senior Consulting Mechanical Engineer in the Palo Verde NuclearDesign Engineering Department.

Winston has over 30 years of experience in the design and construction of Nuclear Plants having worked for Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Sargent & Lundy Engineers at variousnuclear sites. Areas of expertise include stress analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue analysis, seismicand environmental qualification of equipment, and bolted joint analysis.

Mr. Borrero is Palo Verde'sbolted joint and fatigue stress analysis subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

2.2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers The Seismic Walkdown team (SWT) consisted of Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as aWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-2regular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded researchprojects.

The professional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural

dynamics, and structural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants,using either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) or Seismic Margin Assessments, to addressUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) forover 35 US and European plants. S&A conducted seismic PRA analyses for all of the US Army depotsthat are demilitarizing their stores of nerve gas ordnance.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit 2, consisting of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini of S&A, conducted initialwalkdowns from July 23, 2012, through July 27, 2012, and supplemental walkdowns on December 5,2012. For supplemental watkdowns occurring October 13, 2012, and October 14, 2012, during refueling outage 2R17, the SWT consisted of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A (Resumes are provided inAppendix E). Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well asthe interface with plant operators.

Other PVNGS professional staff provided support and guidance andthese persons are acknowledged within this report. The Stevenson

& Associates Seismic WalkdownEngineers were accompanied by at least one of the following PVNGS qualified Seismic WalkdownEngineers:

Chris Wandell, Nicholas Reidenbach, Winston Borrero, Justin Wood, Derek Morris, and MarkMeyer. The PVNGS engineers (along with the Auxiliary Operator team member) provided walkdownoversight relative to expected conduct in the plant (Nuclear, Radiological and Industrial Safety),compliance with NRC-Approved EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (TR-1025286),

PVNGS procedural compliance (inclusive of CAP), and insight into Licensing Basis issues.Hunter Young, P.E. -Mr. Young is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in thedynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He hasmanaged and led Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Young has performed the seismic analyses of braced steel frames,concrete foundations, masonry walls, large storage tanks, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorages.

In addition, Mr. Young has executed the walkdown and analysis of tank structures and theirassociated leak path piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic eventsusing manual and finite element methods.

Mr. Young has a Master of Engineering in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Bachelors of Science in CivilEngineering from the University of Notre Dame. He is a licensed P.E. (civil) in California and hascompleted the 5-day Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown training course.Cory Figliolini

-Mr. Figliolini is a Staff Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office. He has planned andperformed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment.

Mr. Figliolini has a JointMaster of Science, Structural Engineering

& Mechanics from the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh and a Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute.

He is registered asan E.I.T. in Massachusetts.

Mr. Figliolini has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.Timothy Nealon -Mr. Nealon is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in thedynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He hasparticipated in Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

In addition, Mr. Nealon has conducted walkdowns and analysis of tankstructures and their associated leakpath piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using various methods.

Furthermore, he has been trained and has conducted NTTF2.3 Fukushima response Seismic Walkdowns at multiple nuclear stations.

Mr. Nealon has a Master ofWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-3Science in Structural Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University at Buffalo.

Mr. Nealon has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.2.3 Licensing Basis Reviewers The Licensing Basis Reviewers for PVNGS Unit 2 consisted of Mr. Hunter Young, Mr. Cory Figliolini, and Mr. Timothy Nealon from the SWT. Their qualifications are provided under Section 2.2. ChrisWandell and Winston Borrero participated in the development of the licensing basis evaluations andprovided technical bases for Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments for potentially adverseseismic conditions which were entered into the Corrective Action Program.2.4 IPEEE Reviewers The IPEEE Reviewers consisted of a combination of the Equipment Selection Personnel and the SWT.Mr. Rolando Perez and Mr. Derek Seaman of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (qualifications listedin Appendix E) identified equipment subject to IPEEE enhancements for incorporation in SWEL 1. Mr.Hunter Young and Mr. Cory Figliolini of S&A (qualifications listed in Section 2.2) performed theidentification of actions taken to eliminate or reduce the IPEEE vulnerabilities previously identified.

Jonathan Lucero, Engineer Sr. PRA from PVNGS, contributed to the IPEEE review.Jonathan L. Lucero -Mr. Lucero is a Senior Engineer in the Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment Department.

Jonathan has over 10 years of engineering experience in foundation design, structural

dynamics, and uncertainty analysis.

His experience also includes multidisciplinary applications, generalized information theory, and fuzzy logic. Mr. Lucero is Palo Verde's seismic PRA subject matterexpert. He has attended EPRI's Education of Risk Professionals Program and Seismic PRA trainingcourse.2.5 Peer Review TeamThe peer reviewers for PVNGS Unit 2 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas ofWestinghouse.

Mr. Djordjevic is also designated the peer review Team Leader. Neither was involved inthe Seismic Walkdown inspection process as to maintain their independence from the project.

Mr.Djordjevic is an advanced-degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience and has been trained as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training),

EPRI IPEEE Add-on, andSeismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE). Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resumes areprovided in Appendix E. Mr. Djordjevic led the seismic peer review activities and Mr. Douglas led theSWEL selection peer review. All peer review activities were performed by both engineers.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-13. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES,

SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 Selection Process SummaryThis section describes the process used by Westinghouse to select the structures,

systems, andcomponents (SSCs) that were included in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (PVNGS-2)

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The process described in Section 3 (Selection of SSCs) ofEPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was used as guidance todevelop the PVNGS-2 SWEL. The following steps from the integrated project schedule outline thisprocess of SWEL selection:

Project Kickoff MeetingObtain customer inputsRetrieve original Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE -full-scope Seismic Margin Assessment) documentation

-basis for Safe Shutdown Equipment List(SSEL) Base List 1Review current Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) databaseRetrieve containment function equipment Retrieve modifications since the IPEEERetrieve recently modified!upgraded equipment information Retrieve seismic vulnerabilities from Corrective Action Program (CAP)Retrieve System Health ReportsRetrieve spent fuel pool (SFP) SC-I equipment (piping and instrumentation

drawings, Design Basis Manuals, and Training Manual) -basis for SSEL Baselist 2Assemble preliminary Safe Shutdown Equipment List (i.e., Base List 1)Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)Perform Screen #3, Safety Function SupportAssemble preliminary SSEL (Base List 2)Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)Site visit to confirm preliminary SSELFinalize SSELSelect SWEL 1Perform Screen #4System varietyEquipment type varietyEnviromnent varietyRisk importance considerations Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)IPEEE Seismic Vulnerability findingsSample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Select SWEL 2 (spent fuel pool Related Items)Perform Screen #3System varietyEquipment type varietyWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-2Environment varietyEquipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Perform Screen #4 rapid drain-down assessment Confirm SWEL with Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)Obtain PVNGS-2 Operations approval of SWELSWEL Peer ReviewPer the guidance provided in Section 2 of Reference 1, PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staffmembers participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided input andassistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel collecting the data associated with the equipment considered.

The exchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the PVNGSstaff members included:

• Review of the IPEEE and PRA list of components was performed by the Westinghouse andPVNGS team to correct discrepancies in classification, errors in equipment identification (EQID),omissions, risk categorization, etc." Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

" A presentation held on July 17, 2012, to discuss Westinghouse's methodology for SWELselection.

• Verification of equipment information through PVNGS's Site Work Management System(SWMS) (Reference 2).* Provide risk importance data derived from the PVNGS Internal Events Probabilistic RiskAssessment (PRA) model (Reference 33).* Assist in identifying and categorizing the different operating environment types existing at theplant.* Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that have thepotential to be relevant to the SWEL." Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

• Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) Database for review of CAP and modifications against seismic equipment.

" Provide System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals (DBMs) for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

• SWEL Peer Review and approval of the SSCs selected for the Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys(see Appendix F).WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-3Meetings were conducted from June 26, 2012, through June 29, 2012, to perform a Pre-Job Brief of theproject and to conduct working sessions with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff memberswith the goal of achieving confirmation of at least 80% of the SWEL and to identify items for follow-up.

The agenda followed during the meetings included:

• Pre-Job Brief of the SWEL selection project" Discuss high-level approach to SWEL Development

• Review of preliminary Base List 1 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #4 Sample Selection attributes o Select the SWEL 1 itemso Identify items for follow-up

" Review of preliminary Base List 2 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #3 Sample selection attributes o Select the SWEL 2 itemso Identify items for follow-up

• Identify any unit-to-unit considerations

" Summarize results* Summary post-job briefingA second meeting was held on July 17, 2012, to provide a presentation summarizing theWestinghouse/PVNGS team's selection methodology and conduct a second working session withPVNGS staff members to further refine the SWEL.The following personnel participated in these working sessions:

AttendeeChris WandellWinston BorreroJustin WoodJose (Angel) Delgadillo Randall (Gene) EimarRolando PerezDerek SeamanCompanyAPSAPSAPSAPSAPSWestinghouse Westinghouse PositionSenior Consulting Engineer (Civil)Senior Consulting Engineer (Mechanical)

Engineer (Modifications)

Auxiliary OperatorOperations Shift ManagerSWEL Development Lead (participated remotely via WebEx')SWEL Developer Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, SSCs were selected in the following two groups:" SWEL 1 -A sample of items that safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity.

• SWEL 2 -A sample of spent fuel pool (SFP) related items, including items that could result in arapid drain-down of the SFP.The SWELs from these two groups were combined into a single SWEL for use during the SeismicWalkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

WebEx is a trademark or registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-4The following sections discuss how the PVNGS-2 SWEL selection process has met the objectives of theguidance of Reference 1, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety of classes ofequipment, environments, primary and secondary

systems, new and replacement equipment, and otherelements discussed in Section 3 of Reference 1.3.2 Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions The five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity

control, reactorcoolant pressure

control, reactor coolant inventory

control, and decay heat removal, which includes theultimate heat sink), plus the containment functions.

The IPEEE (Reference

3) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was used as the starting point forcompiling a list (Base List 1) of the SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 1 selection process.

A listconsisting of 979 SSCs was assembled based on the following tables documented in Appendix 3.A ofReference 3:* Table 3A-I -Reactor Protection System SSEL (36 items)* Table 3A-2 -Support Systems SSEL (403 items)" Table 3A-3 -Required Instrumentation SSEL (72 items)* Table 3A-4 -Primary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (70 items)* Table 3A-5 -Secondary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (59 items)* Table 3A-6 -Atmospheric Dump Valves SSEL (72 items)* Table 3A-7 -Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray SSEL (42 items)* Table 3A-8 -Shutdown Cooling System SSEL (84 items)" Table 3A-9 -High Pressure Safety Injection SSEL (89 items)* Table 3A-10 -High Pressure Recirculation SSEL (52 items)A review of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database (Reference

34) was thenperformed to expand the equipment list. Seismic Category I (SC-I) equipment that was considered in theSPRA, but not included in the IPEEE tables, was identified and added to the equipment list, resulting in atotal Base List 1 count of 1237 items.Since the IPEEE applies to the three PVNGS Units, general equipment identification numbers (IDs) wereused in the SSEL tables (i.e., the IDs presented therein do not show the Unit number, which is normallyindicated by the first character of the equipment ID). In contrast, in the SPRA database, much of theequipment was identified by using the Unit 1 designation.

Therefore, all equipment IDs in the list wereconverted to the Unit 2 designation.

Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCsassociated with the safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity must include thefollowing four screens:* Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as SC-I. This is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(f)

Letter (Reference 50),under the "Requested Actions"

section, to "verify current plant configuration with the currentlicense basis."WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-5Out of 1237 SSCs initially considered, 1122 were retained by Screen #1 and subsequently passedto Screen #2.* Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirmthat their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. Thetypes of SSCs that are excluded consist of SC-1 Structures, Containment Penetrations, and SC-1Piping Systems.Manual valves, check valves, flow orifices, fire dampers, and relief valves were also excluded inaccordance with the guidance, since they are either considered in-line components or equipment that is regularly inspected.

Out of 1122 items coming in from Screen #1, 778 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed to Screen #3." Screen #3 -Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to filter out the SSCs that do not support at least one of the following safety functions:

o Reactor reactivity controlo Reactor coolant pressure controlo Reactor coolant inventory controlo Decay heat removal, including the ultimate heat sinko Containment functionThe safety functions supported by each SSC exiting Screen #2 were determined in consultation with PVNGS staff members (Shift Manager/Auxiliary Operator) during the first set of meetings.

Out of 778 items coming in from Screen #2, 415 were retained by Screen #3 and subsequently passed to Screen #4. The list of equipment from Screen #3, entering Screen #4, is defined as BaseList 1." Screen #4 -Sample Considerations:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to narrow the Base List 1 candidate items to those of mostsignificance.

The PVNGS-2 SWEL I contains 1242 representative items from each of thefollowing sample selection attributes:

2 The original SWEL 1 consisted of 126 items. Two items were removed (2JCHAUVO516 and 2MCHEE01) because they were inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. See discussion in Section 3.4.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-6o A variety of types of systems:The PVNGS-2 Base List 1 equipment was categorized based on the third and fourthcharacters of their tag identification numbers (IDs), which identifies the plant system.There were 31 system categories contained in Base List 1. Table 3-1 shows how thesesystem categories were represented in SWEL 1.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-7Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type"Number of Items Number of Itemsin Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1AF Auxiliary Feedwater 14 6CH Chemical and Volume Control 29 9 *CP Containment Purge 4 1CT Condensate Transfer and Storage 3 3DF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer 1 1DG Diesel Generator 14 3EC HVAC Essential Chilled Water 8 4EW Essential Cooling Water 8 5GA Service Gas 1 1GR Gaseous Radwaste 2 0HA HVAC Auxiliary Building 4 4HC HVAC Containment Building 12 6HD HVAC Diesel Generator Building 4 2HJ HVAC Control Building 21 9JA Instrument and Service Air 1 IPB Class 1E 4.16 kv Power 3 2PE Class lE Standby Generation 2 1PG Class IE 480v Power Switchgear 6 3PH Class 1E 480v Power Motor Control Center 8 4PK Class 1E 125 VDC 20 11PN Class lE Instrument Power 12 7RC Reactor Coolant 16 5RD Radioactive Waste Drain 2 1RM Main Control Board 31 7SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System 1 1 0SB Reactor Protection 14 1SG Main Steam 42 9SI Safety Injection 101 16SP Essential Spray Ponds 4 2ZA Auxiliary Building 6 0ZJ Control Building 11 0* Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL 1 System Type.Note that the Gaseous Radwaste (GR) system is not a safety-related system but does havecontainment isolation valves, which are safety-related.

These GR valves are not includedin the SWEL since motor-operated valves and solenoid-operated valves (equipment type8 in Table 3-3; discussed later) are already being well represented (34 valves selected outof 117 total valves).

With only 2 valves from the GR system on Base List 1, the exclusion of these valves from the SWEL does not skew the system sampling

-the MOV/SOVequipment type (i.e., containment isolation valves) is well represented in SWEL 1.Note that the SA (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System),

ZA (Auxiliary Building),

and ZJ (Control Building) systems are not represented because the equipment types covered by each system are already well represented.

WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-8o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications):

Major new and replacement equipment were identified through a review of either:1) Section 8 (System Design History),

or 2) Section 11 (Change History),

of a selection of the major system DBMs (References 4 through 30). Recent modifications wereassessed through consultation with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staffmembers.

Additionally, System Health Reports were reviewed to ensure that recentmodifications were captured and examined for potential impact. The participating PVNGS Operations staff members were asked to provide any information they felt theSystem Health Reports may not have touched upon. This was to address any recentmodifications where 1) weight and/or the location of the center of gravity of thereplacement are significantly different, or 2) design of the mounting and anchorage of thereplacement is significantly different than the original, or 3) items within the zone ofinfluence had to be reinstalled.

Based on this sampling consideration, 38 Base List I items were identified as havingmajor new or replacement modifications.

Of these, the 10 items shown in Table 3-2 wererepresented in SWEL 1.Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute Item Walkdown Description Major New or Replacement Equipment Equipment Modifications Replacement of POSI-seal hard seats on valves. See279 2JSIAUVO673 Sump isolation valve Reference 30, p. 249.280 23SIAUV0674 Sump isolation valve Replacement of POSI-seal hard seats on valves. SeeReference 30, p. 249.Inserted 90/10 Cu/Ni 8-inch sleeves into the inlet andoutlet ends of Unit 2 essential cooling water heat61 2MEWAE01 EW "A" heat exchanger exchangers 2MEWAEOI and 2MEWBEOI to preventfurther degradation of the tubes due to primary waterstress corrosion cracking.

See Reference 8, p. 74 (Unit 2only).5 2JAFAUVO037 SG-EOIB isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. SeeReference 4, p. 104.1HPSI pump "A" recire iso (closes on Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 278 2JSIAUV0666 PS) valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed theRAS) motor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.Relocated the motor-operated valve from outside the274 2JSIAUV0651 RC loop I long-term recirc/SDC bioshield wall to the inside near the hot-leg nozzle tovalve eliminate flow-induced vibration in the line. SeeReference 30, p. 248.47 2MDGAF03 DG "A" air intake filter Modified hangers.

See Reference 6, p. 104.208 2JSGAUV0 134A AF turbine steam supply heatup Changed from SOV to MOV. See Reference 4, p. 105and Reference 21, p. 49.2AUV38A AF turbine steam supply heatup Changed from SOV to MOV. See Reference 4, p. 105(Train A) and Reference 21, p. 49.115 2EPBBS04

• 4.16 kV bus S04 Addition of relays. See Reference 6, p. 101* Replacement for 2EPBAS03 (protected component).

2EPBAS03 was not a Major New or Replacement Equipment item; 2EPBBS04 is a Major New or Replacement Equipment itemWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-9o A variety of types of equipment:

The Base List 1 items were each assigned to one of the 22 classes of equipment listed inAppendix B of Reference

1. Table 3-3 shows how these classes were represented inSWEL 1. Two classes, compressors and motor generators, were not represented becausethere is no SC-1 equipment in these categories.

Additionally, the transformers that areSC-1 were considered part of the larger equipment typically represented as switchgear ormotor control centers (MCCs). Thus, this classification is not individually represented inSWEL 1.Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number"Equipment Type Number of Items Number of ItemsNumber Description in Base List forSWEL I0 Miscellaneous 13 51 Motor Control Centers 13 72 Low-Voltage Switchgear 12 43 Medium-Voltage Switchgear 2 14 Transformers 0 05 Horizontal Pumps 11 .66 Vertical Pumps 8 37 Fluid-Operated Valves 23 8*8 Motor-Operated Valves, Solenoid-Operated Valves 117 349 Fans 8 310 Air Handlers 10 711 Chillers 2 112 Air Compressors 0 013 Motor Generators 0 014 Distribution Panels 41 415 Batteries on Racks 4 316 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 617 Engine Generators 2 118 Instruments on Racks 74 1419 Temperature Sensors 3 220 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 40 721 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 20 8 ** Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Equipment Type Number.o A variety of environments:

Since the site is located in a dry environment, typical of a desert climate, it was decidedto identify the equipment operating environments based on its location either "inside"(i.e., inside an equipment room) or "outside" (i.e., outdoors) and based on the normalmaximum design temperature of the corresponding equipment environment.

These designtemperatures were determined from a review of Appendix A of the Equipment Qualification Program Manual (Reference

31) and Section 9.4 of the Updated FinalSafety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 32). Based on this review, seven categories of equipment operating environments were identified.

Table 3-4 shows how theseequipment operating environments were represented in SWEL 1.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-10Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)"

Temperature Number of Items Number of Items(OF) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 180 143 (All inside) 45 (All inside)104 150 (All inside) 43 (All inside)113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 4 (2 inside and 2 outside)120 62 (All inside) 13 * (All inside)122 6 (2 inside and 4 outside) 2 (All outside)124 18 (All inside) 7 (All inside)140 28 (All inside) 10 (All inside)* Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL 1 Environment list.o Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program:Based on a review of the IPEEE report (Reference 3), there were no Unit 2 seismicvulnerabilities identified.

However, the IPEEE report states that a limited number ofactions were taken to improve plant seismic capacity; no specific actions other than aUnit 3 example were provided, e.g., the anchorage on the bookcases located behind thecontrol cabinets in Unit 3 was improved to reduce the possibility that the cabinets wouldbe impacted during a seismic event.The following additional considerations were factored into the SWEL I selection process:o Numerical measures of risk importance:

The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) derived from the Internal Events PRA model(Reference

33) was compiled for the Base List 1 items to determine potentially risk-significant SSCs. Items with a RAW value greater than 2 were considered of "high" riskimportance.

There were 70 items of high risk importance in Base List 1; 35 were selectedfor SWEL 1.o Protected train restrictions during the walkdown week:The protected train schedules

[PVNGS "Work Week Schedule"]

during the PVNGS-2walkdown dates (from July 23, 2012, through July 27, 2012) were reviewed so thatinaccessible items could be identified and deferred from SWEL 1. Of the 124 itemsselected for SWEL 1, 1 item (SWEL Item #92) was initially expected to be inaccessible due to protected train restrictions.

However, it was later determined that its walkdowncould be performed.

Therefore, there was no need to defer its walkdown to PVNGSrefueling outage 2R17 in fall 2012.3.2.1 Base List 1The list of equipment retained by Screen #3 (and subsequently entering Screen #4) is defined as Base List1 and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-1.3.2.2 SWEL 1The list of equipment retained by Screen #4 is defined as SWEL 1 and is summarized in Appendix G,Table G-2.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-113.3 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Related ItemsThe starting point for compiling a list of the SFP-related SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 2 selection process was a review of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System DBM (Reference

35) and itsassociated drawings (References 36 through 40). This review identified fifteen SC-1 components.

Elevenadditional components were later identified (during the first set of meetings) based on a system review.Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCsassociated with the SFP includes the following four screens:* Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #1 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #1 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #1 is to limit the items to those that havea seismic licensing basis.All SSCs initially considered for SWEL 2 (26 items) were passed from Screen #1 to Screen #2." Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #2 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #2 of SWEL 1. Screen #2 considers only those items associated with the SFPthat are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process.

The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter outthe SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to beconsistent with the established plant licensing basis.Of the 26 items retained by Screen #1, 6 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed onto Screen #3.* Screen #3 -Sample Considerations:

The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List2.The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #3 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #4 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the Base List 2 candidate items to those of most significance, considering the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systemso Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications) o A variety of types of equipment o A variety of environments Since there were only six items associated with the SFP, all items contained in Base List 2 wereselected for input to SWEL 2." Screen #4 -Rapid Drain-Down:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to identify items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly.

Per theguidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the SSCs considered are not limited to SC-1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-12items. Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the SFP should beconsidered.

The Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference

1) specifies the following on page 3-8:"Determine whether there are SFP penetrations below about 1 0feet above the top of the fuelassemblies.

If there are no such penetrations, then no rapid drain-down items would beadded to SWEL 2."UFSAR (Reference

32) Section 9.1.3.3.1.1.1, pages 9.1-35 and 9.1-36, states the following:

"If a pipe break were to occur in the Seismic Categorv I/quality portion of the system, poolcooling could be lost. However, the event would be self-limiting as all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water levels .for spent fuelshielding of lOft as required by Regulatory Guide 1.13. All pipes extending down into thepool have siphon breaker holes at or above the minimum required water level. Under theseconditions, sufficient time (longer than 30 minutes) is available to isolate the break andrecover the minimum level required for start of the pool cooling system. If the spent fuel poolclean up system is aligned with the refueling pool (drain valves),

administrative procedures are in place to identify, locate and isolate a pipe break within the containment in a timelymanner.The first two sentences of this UFSAR excerpt deal with the possibility of losing SFP waterinventory following a pipe break. The next two sentences deal with how quickly the Fuel PoolCooling and Cleanup System can be restored following a pipe break and are not pertinent to rapiddrain-down.

Based on this documentation, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to SWEL 2.A review of the SFP and its relationship to the adjacent fuel transfer canal and cask load pit wasconducted to ensure that a rapid drain-down could not occur via a loss of gate seal integrity.

Asystem review showed that the bottom of the fuel transfer canal gate and cask load pit gate invertare 3-1/2 inches below the top of the spent fuel racks. Although a loss of these gate seals wouldresult in flooding of the cask load pit and the fuel transfer canal, it would not result in a waterlevel less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

This is due to the relatively smallvolume of the fuel transfer canal and cask load pit. The fuel transfer tube within the fuel transfercanal was also considered since it provides an isolation path to the reactor cavity. The fueltransfer tube seal, canal isolation valve PPCNV 118, and quick-operating closure deviceMPCEM01A are SC-1 items considered part of the SFP structure assessed by analysis andperiodic inspections and were therefore excluded from SWEL 2. Drainage from the cask load pitto the decontamination pit would be limited because the bottom of the decontamination gateinvert is 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

Although a rapid drain-down threatassociated with the gate seal system was not found, the instrument air supply system to the SFPgate was included in the Area Walk-By.3.3.1 Base List 2The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2 and issummarized in Appendix G, Table G-3.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-133.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down SWEL 2 is augmented by the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly (theequipment retained by Screen #4). As discussed

earlier, there are no rapid drain-down items for input tothe PVNGS-2 SWEL 2.3.3.3 SWEL 2SWEL 2 is defined as the list of equipment retained by Screen #3 plus the equipment retained by Screen#4. As discussed

earlier, Screen #3 was not utilized because all 6 items contained in Base List 2 wereselected for input into SWEL 2. In addition, there was no equipment associated with rapid drain-down.

Therefore, SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2 (summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3).WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-143.4 Inaccessible ItemsThe equipment items that were inaccessible during the scheduled PVNGS-2 at-power walkdown dates(from July 23, 2012, through July 27, 2012) are identified in Table 3-5. The guidance allows for items tobe deferred to a later date if inspection poses a safety concern.

Items with electrical safety challenges oritems within containment were deferred to ensure safety when inspecting.

The items in Table 3-5 weresubsequently walked down during and following PVNGS refueling outage 2R1 7.Table 3-5: PVNGS-2 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns SWELI Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment LocationNumber7 2JCHAHV0205 Auxiliary pressurizer spray valve CTMT11 2JCHAUV0516 Reactor coolant letdown line to regenerative heat exchanger CTMTisolation globe valve12 2MCHEE01 Regenerative heat exchanger CTMT13 2JCHEPDV0240

• Charging header to RCS backpressure control valve CTMT18 2JCPAUVO004B Containment power access purge exhaust isolation butterfly CTMTdamper58 2EPBAS03 4.16 kV bus S03 CTRL61 2EPGAL31 480 V LC31 bus CTRL62 2EPGAL33 480 V LC33 bus CTRL86 2JRCAPT0102A Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

CTMT87 2JRCAPT 103 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT90 2JRCNTE 101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT101 2JSGALTI 1 13A SG-EO1A WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT114 2JSIAUVO634 Safety injection tank 1A discharge isolation globe valve CTMT115 2JSIAUV0644 Safety injection tank IB discharge isolation globe valve CTMT116 2JSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT120 2JSIAUVO673 Sump isolation valve CTMT123 2JSINPT39l HPSI long-term recirc loop I pressure xmtr CTMT* This equipment was incorrectly identified in Reference 48 as 2JCHEHV0240.

The correct equipment ID is2JCHEPDVO240; the Operations equipment description is provided.

This has been corrected in the tables ofAppendix G.Items 2JCHAUVO516 and 2MCHEE01 were inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. Forradiological safety considerations, it was decided to remove these components from SWEL 1. New itemswere not selected to replace these items for the following reasons:" These two items belong to system type CH. The removal of these items reduced the number ofCH items in SWEL 1 from 11 to 9 (see Table 3-1), which is still a good representation of thissystem type." These two items were not identified as having major new or replacement modifications (see Table3-2). Therefore, the removal of these items from SWEL 1 had no effect on the representation ofequipment having major new or replacement modifications.

• JCHAUV0516 belongs to equipment type 7 and 2MCHEEO 1 to equipment type 21. The removalof these items from SWEL 1 reduced the number of type 7 items from 9 to 8 and the number ofWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-15type 21 items from 9 to 8 (see Table 3-3), which are still good representations of the equipment type.* These two items are assigned a maximum environment temperature of 1201F. The removal ofthese items reduced the number of "120'F items" in SWEL 1 from 15 to 13 (see Table 3-4),which is still a good representation of the environment temperature type.* These two items were not risk-significant SSCs. Therefore, the removal of these items fromSWEL I had no effect on the representation of high-risk-importance items in SWEL 1.Following the completion of the Unit 2 at-power Seismic Walkdowns, the industry was made aware thatthe NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismicconditions.

Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets per FAQ 4.20 were conducted during thefollow-on walkdowns.

The list of electrical cabinets that required supplemental inspection is included inTable 3-6.Table 3-6: PVNGS-2 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections Item WalkdownDescription Equipment Num Equipment Location63 2EPGAL35 480 V LC35 bus CTRL64 2EPHAM31 480 V MCC M31 CTRL65 2EPHAM33 480 V MCC M33 AUX66 2EPHAM35 480 V MCC M35 AUX67 2EPHAM37 480 V MCC M37 AUX68 2EPKAD21 LC 33 control power CTRL70 2EPKAH 11 Battery charger "A" CTRL71 2EPKAH15 125 VDC Class 1E battery charger AC CTRL72 2EPKAM41 DC power to TCB1 control circuit CTRL74 2EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation valve 2JSICUV653 CTRL75 2EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 CTRL77 2EPKDM44 DC power to TCB 1 control circuit CTRL78 2EPKDN44 Inverter for 2JSIDUV654 shutdown cooling B return inside containment CTRLisolation valve80 2EPNAN 11 DC/AC inverter "A" CTRL84 2EPNDN 14 DC/AC inverter "D" CTRL94 2JRMAB05 Containment pressure CTRL96 2JRMDB05 Containment pressure CTRL98 2JSBAC03 Reactor trip breaker "A" AUXThe inaccessible equipment walkdowns performed during refueling outage 2R 17 are summarized in Table3-7. Since Train A was protected during refueling outage 2R17, Train A electrical components weresubstituted with their counterpart from Train B. Table 3-7 indicates the equipment that were used assubstitutes.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-16Table 3-7: PVNGS-2 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 2R17SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description LocationNumber7 2JCHAHV0205 Auxiliary pressurizer spray valve CTMT13 JCEPVO40Charging header to RCS backpressure CTMT13 2JCHEPDV0240 control valve18 2JCPAUVO004B Containment power access purge CTMT18____ 2 Vexhaust isolation butterfly damper58 2EPBBS04 (substitute for 2EPBAS03) 4.16 kV bus S03 CTRL61 2EPGBL32 (substitute for 2EPGAL3 1) 480 V LC31 bus CTRL62 2EPGBL34 (substitute for 2EPGAL33) 480 V LC33 bus CTRL63 2EPGBL36 (substitute for 2EPGAL35; inspected 480 V LC35 bus CTRLto satisfy FAQ 4.20)64 2EPHBM32 (substitute for 2EPHAM3 1; inspected 480 V MCC M31 CTRLto satisfy FAQ 4.20)65 2EPHBM34 (substitute for 2EPHAM33; inspected 480 V MCC M33 AUXto satisfy FAQ 4.20)66 2EPHBM36 (substitute for 2EPHAM35; inspected 480 V MCC M35 AUXto satisfy FAQ 4.20)67 2EPHBM38 (substitute for 2EPHAM37; inspected 480 V MCC M37 AUXto satisfy FAQ 4.20)2EPKBD22 (substitute for 2EPKAD2 1; inspected LC 33 control power CTRLto satisfy FAQ 4.20)72 2EPKBM42 (substitute for 2EPKAM41; inspected DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRLto satisfy FAQ 4.20)75 2EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 CTRL77 2EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 control circuit CTRLInverter for 2JSIDUV654 shutdown78 2EPKDN44 cooling B return inside containment CTRLisolation valve86 2JRCAPT0102A Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

CTMT87 2JRCAPT 103 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT90 2JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT94 2JRMAB05 Containment pressure CTRL96 2JRMIDBO5 Containment pressure CTRL98 2JSBAC03 Reactor trip breaker "A" AUX101 2JSGALTI 113A SG-EO1A WR level (required for CTMTAFAS)114 2JSIAUVO634 Safety injection tank 1A discharge CTMTisolation globe valve115 2JSIAUV0644 Safety injection tank 1B discharge CTMTisolation globe valve116 2JSIAUVO651 RC loop I long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT120 2JSIAUV0673 Sump isolation valve CTMT123 2JSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop I pressure CTMTxrntrWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 2PVNGS-2Revision 0Auguist 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-17The equipment that could not be inspected during refueling outage 2R17 is identified in Table 3-8. Thewalkdown of this equipment was completed on December 5, 2012.Table 3-8: PVNGS-2 Items Completed During the December 5, 2012 Inspection SWEL 1 Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description LocationNumber70 2EPKAHI1 Battery charger "A" CTRL71 2EPKAH15 125 VDC Class I E battery charger AC CTRL74 2EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation CTRLvalve 2JSICUV653 80 2EPNAN 11 DC/AC inverter "A" CTRL84 2EPNDN 14 DC/AC inverter "D" CTRLAll required and supplemental inspections are complete.

Inspection results are documented on thecorresponding Seismic Walkdown checklist in Appendix AWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-14. SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS4.1 BACKGROUND Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in accordance with the requirements of Section4 of EPRI TR-1025286 (Reference 1). The walkdowns were conducted by the SWT, consisting of the twoSWEs mentioned in Section 2.2. Members of PVNGS Operations and Engineering provided supportduring all walkdowns.

The SWEs utilized engineering judgment based upon experience and trainingindicated in Section 2.2, supplemented by existing current licensing basis (CLB) plant documentation andanalyses, where applicable, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions.

For items on the SWEL,these potential seismic conditions included any adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic spatialinteractions, or other adverse seismic conditions.

The results of the walkdown and any pertinent observations were documented for each item on the SWEL using the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) included in Appendix A. In addition to potentially adverse seismic conditions, observations described in the SWCs include those that, after discussion between the SWEs, were determined to beadequate.

Area Walk-Bys were conducted by the SWT in each area of the plant that contained an item on theSWEL. The Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCslocated in the vicinity of the SWEL item (up to a maximum radius of 35 ft from the component).

Thearea examinations identified:

1) adverse anchorage conditions,

2) degraded equipment in the area,3) potential seismic spatial interactions,

4) adverse cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting,5) potential flooding/spray or fire hazards, and 6) other adverse housekeeping conditions.

The results ofthe walk-bys and any pertinent observations were documented for each inspected area using Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs), which are included in Appendix B. Observations described on the AWCs includepotentially adverse seismic conditions as well as conditions that were discussed and determined to beadequate at that time.The SWT was assisted by other individuals present on the walkdown, including PVNGS Operations andEngineering personnel.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit 2 consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini ofS&A. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as theinterface with plant operators.

Additional PVNGS staff facilitated access to equipment and providedadditional information regarding plant procedures and functions of SWEL items. In addition, theseindividuals assisted in identifying nearby equipment and systems that could cause adverse seismicinteraction.

Any issue that could not be resolved by consensus of the SWEs during the walkdowns wasidentified as a potentially adverse seismic condition on the SWC or AWC (as applicable).

The conditions identified were evaluated with respect to the CLB. These Licensing Basis Evaluations are listed anddescribed in Appendix D.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-24.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS In preparation for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, the SWT obtained the SWEL and selected50% of the items (excluding line-mounted equipment) for anchorage configuration verification.

A total of89 components were identified as potential anchorage verification candidates and 49 were randomlychosen to fulfill the 50% anchorage configuration verification requirement.

The selection was adjusted toconsider equipment of interest identified by PVNGS, including items that had recent modifications oranchorage changes.

PVNGS design drawings, seismic qualification calculations, and vendor/supplier documents (SDOCs) were reviewed and later taken to the field to verify as-installed configurations wereconsistent with the CLB established by these documents.

The SWT also obtained PVNGS equipment layout drawings to establish a detailed walkdown schedule.

To prepare for observations involving potential interaction with masonry block walls, the SWT reviewedthe equipment layout drawings associated with the SWEL and located masonry walls in proximity.

TheControl Building 74 ft, 100 ft, and 140 ft elevations, in addition to the Auxiliary Building sub-100 ftelevations, were found to have block walls adjacent to SWEL items and Area Walk-By items. The SWTobtained and reviewed calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120 (Reference

60) for Control Building masonry wallsand 13-CC-ZA-0 140 (Reference 6 1) for Auxiliary Building masonry walls. The calculations indicate thatall in-scope walls were designed and analyzed to not collapse under SSE accelerations, which enabled theSWT to conclude that the SWEL items were free of seismic spatial interaction due to a postulated masonry block wall collapse.

The SWT assessed SWEL and Area Walk-By equipment for seismic spatialinteraction due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls.In anticipation of potential flooding/spray interaction hazards due to threaded fire piping, the SWTobtained fire suppression diagrams provided within the IPEEE Report (Reference 3). These diagramswere later used in the field for Area Walk-Bys to determine whether threaded fire piping, where present,was normally wet or pre-actuated and dry. Preliminary review of the fire suppression diagrams indicated that areas with threaded fire piping are generally pre-activated sprinkler systems and therefore arenormally dry, thus precluding potential flooding/spray interaction hazards.

However, the SWT wascognizant of exceptions where threaded piping could be normally wet. For these cases, the SWT wouldlook for long spans with flexible

supports, which may lead to excessive threaded joint rotation andpotential spray.Additional current licensing basis documentation obtained and reviewed to support the walkdowns included:

the in-structure floor response spectra for the SSE (DBM-C5, Reference 53), structural dampingcriteria per UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference 32), the PVNGS scaffolding procedure and installation specifications (30DP-9WPll and 13-CN-0380, References 54 and 55), the PVNGS housekeeping procedure (30DP-OWM12, Reference 56), the PVNGS transient material details and analyses (13-A-ZYD-0034 and 13-CC-ZZ-0309, References 57 and 58), the PVNGS lighting details (13-E-ZAL-0011, Reference 59), and the control room ceiling qualification (Log No. 13-10407-A216-12, Reference 65).The PVNGS IPEEE Report (Reference

3) was also obtained and reviewed.

This document is discussed infurther detail in Section 7.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-34.3 WALKDOWN RESULTSThe SWT conducted the initial Seismic Walkdowns for Unit 2 at PVNGS July 23, 2012, through July 27,2012. For components not originally inspected due to having either inaccessible internal anchorages, being located inside containment, or requiring additional interior inspection related to FAQ 4.20,additional walkdowns were conducted during refueling outage 2R17 on October 13, 2012, throughOctober 14, 2012, and during follow-on inspections performed on December 5, 2012. Detailed walkdownresults are provided on the SWCs and AWCs in Appendices A and B, respectively.

When walkdownactivities identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, licensing basis evaluations were performed and are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D. Appendix D provides additional information on theresolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of each of these conditions.

Asummary of initial walkdown statistics follows:* A total of 137 components were walked down and 63 Area Walk-Bys were performed.

Five itemslisted on the SWEL (2EPKAD21,

2EPKBD22, 2EPKDD24,

2JRMNB04, and 2JRMAB05) werechild components contained within parent SWEL components.

These child components arereferred to as "Rule of the Box" (ROB) items, for which the walkdown observations are identical to those of the parent item.* Eighteen (18) SWEL components were electrical cabinets whose interiors were not completely examined during the initial walkdowns.

Following the completion of the at-power SeismicWalkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified under FAQ 4.20 aposition on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets occurred on October 13, October 14, andDecember 5, 2012. The list of electrical cabinets requiring supplemental inspection per FAQ4.20 is included in Section 3.4. Seven (7) SWEL electrical cabinets originally inspected duringthe at-power walkdowns were inaccessible during the supplemental inspections due to the plantprotected train. To fulfill the recommendations of FAQ 4.20, sister components for thesecabinets on the opposite train were fully inspected-including the cabinet interiors-and documented on SWCs. One hundred twelve (112) components and fifty-six (56) Area Walk-Byswere resolved in the field as having no potentially adverse seismic concerns.

" Thirty-two (32) observations for Twenty-five (25) SWEL components and seven (7) Area Walk-By observations could not be readily resolved by the consensus of the SWEs and were considered potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation.

It is important to note thatsome SWEL components or Area Waik-Bys may have multiple potentially adverse conditions that involve anchorage, spatial interaction, or other adverse concerns.

Twenty-two (22) of the 32observations requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; six involvedpotential seismic spatial interaction concerns; two involved other potential adverse concerns; andtwo involved spray/flooding hazards.

Twenty-two

(.22) of the 32 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet the current seismic licensing basis. Ten (10) items could not be readilyresolved per the Licensing Basis Evaluation process and were entered into the CAP. All 32Licensing Basis Evaluation items are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D, which includesadditional information on the current status of potentially non-conforming conditions.

Summaries of Seismic Walkdown observations follow:Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions While inspecting anchorages for SWEL equipment and in-scope Area Walk-By equipment, the SWTnoted 22 cases where as-installed configurations could not be verified by the PVNGS documentation WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-4brought in the field (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations).

Discrepancies included:

exceeded boltprojection

lengths, varying equipment pad thicknesses for mechanical components, varying weld patternsfor electrical equipment, and varying anchorage spacing.

Detailed descriptions of these discrepancies arealso indicated in Appendix D. To a limited extent, Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) associated with the anchorage documentation that could verify the as-installed configurations were reviewed as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

One potentially degraded anchorage condition was noted for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "A"(2MAFP01) for which the SWT observed a sheared-off anchor bolt. PVNGS Engineering informed theSWT that this condition was previously analyzed.

The SWT noted the observation as potentially adverseand was provided with documentation indicating the sheared-off bolt was acceptable as shown in theLicensing Basis Evaluation.

The SWT observed no indications of reinforcement yielding and no signs of excessive corrosion for in-scope safety-related equipment.

All cracks observed were noted to be hairline or small cracks (less than0.03 inch) as defined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 47).Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions In general, the SWT noted adequate clearances around safety-related equipment and sufficient anchorages of potential safety-related equipment impact hazards including transient materials.

Potential exceptions included the auxiliary relay cabinets in Room A-202 of the Auxiliary Building and the bookcase south ofthe main control boards outside the Control Room horseshoe on the 140 ft elevation of the ControlBuilding.

The auxiliary relay cabinets were noted to be close to concrete walls and the bookcase wasnoted to have potentially weak anchorage that could allow overturning and impact with a main controlboard cabinet.

Both concerns were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT inspected overhead piping and distribution systems including cable trays and found them well-anchored and ruggedly supported throughout the unit. Large fire extinguishers on small hooks that couldpossibly uplift and fall were found throughout the unit, but no safety-related equipment items were withinfire extinguisher zone of influence.

Overhead lighting was also noted to be rugged in all areas withsensitive equipment, particularly the Control Building.

Where equipment is less sensitive to impact,several instances of lighting fixtures supported by S-hooks with disengaged or missing setscrews wereobserved.

The SWT judged all cases not to be hazardous to safety-related equipment, but the conditions were noted and documented in the CAP.Attached lines and piping to SWEL equipment were inspected and concluded to have adequate flexibility.

As noted in Section 4.2, all SWEL components and Area Walk-By equipment within the zone ofinfluence of masonry block walls were evaluated prior to walkdowns not to be impact hazards due tocollapse per existing calculations.

No seismic spatial interaction hazards due to differential movementbetween the equipment and the masonry block walls were observed during the walkdowns.

All scaffolding encountered by the SWT was found to be adequately braced and anchored in addition tohaving sufficient clearances to safety-related equipment in accordance with station procedures.

No adverse seismic conditions pertaining to housekeeping were identified.

Non-seismic housekeeping issues found in violation of housekeeping procedure (Reference

56) were entered into the CAP.Detailed descriptions of all potentially adverse seismic spatial interaction concerns are provided inAppendix D.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-5Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed a loose cabinet door on Reactor Trip Breaker "A" (2JSBAC03).

Operations openedthe door and confirmed that the door was on a separate enclosure from the breaker and, therefore, therewas no interaction hazard. The condition was noted and entered into the CAP.For load center 2EPGBL32, inspected during refueling outage 2R17, the SWT noted 50G Ground FaultRelay L32D4 with 1 out of 4 door-mounting bolts not installed.

Ongoing maintenance was beingperformed on the equipment as part of the electrical bus outage. Given that the Unit was in outage andthe equipment was serving no Tech-Spec related function at the time, no adverse seismic condition wasrecorded.

PVNGS generated Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4267409, which documents thatfasteners had been restored and there is no current non-conforming condition.

During the Area Walk-By for Room J- 114 in the Control Building, the SWT observed an apparentmodification to the DC Equipment Room "B" emergency air handling unit (AHU, 2MHJBZ04) where aP1000 Unistrut member was welded to the AHU to support a non-quality related (NQR) component.

Verification is required to determine whether the modification reconciled the configuration in a mannerthat preserves the individual AHU seismic qualification.

This observation was reviewed during the relatedLicensing Basis Evaluations, see Section 5 and Appendix D. The SWT did not note any other degradedconditions, missing equipment fasteners, or irregular mountings on equipment.

Potential Flooding/Spray HazardsThe SWT was cognizant of potential spray and flooding

hazards, particularly from threaded fire piping.Overhead fire piping was generally found to be welded and ruggedly supported (no rod hung piping) atshort and regular intervals.

Areas that had threaded piping were generally confirmed to be pre-activated and therefore normally dry. During the Area Walk-By for Room J-A02 on the 74 ft elevation of theControl Building, the SWT noted threaded piping passing through an area without fire suppression.

Inaddition, Room C-A09 was observed to also have threaded fire piping that could not be verified as pre-activated.

Since the SWT could not verify the threaded piping sections as dry, the team marked theconditions to be further reviewed under Licensing Basis Evaluations, see Section 5 and Appendix D.Potential Seismically Induced Fire interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit 2 by the SWT. This included noobservations of hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored

shelves, or unlocked cabinets; and no adverse natural gas or hydrogen lines. Hydrogen andoxygen tanks were noted during the Area Walk-By for the 120 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building inRoom A-204. The bottles were adequately secured with no potential impact hazards from adjacent oroverhead equipment.

Accordingly, no seismically induced fire hazards were noted.Non-NTTF 2.3 Related Observations The SWT (including PVNGS Operator and Engineering SWEs) were also cognizant of issues notnecessarily pertaining to the seismic qualification of safety-related equipment.

The SWT noted conditions such as:* Broken/missing fasteners

• Missing or partially-engaged set-screws on pendant lighting S-hooks* Broken plastic alarm window* Battery sample caps not installed WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-6* Door hinge pins not fully-engaged

• General housekeeping issues such as:o Loose ladder restraint o Unsecured carto Loose insulation band-ito Hose-reel station missing exclusion area markingNon-NTTF 2.3 observations were recorded on the SWCs/AWCs and entered into the PVNGS CAP.Many of these conditions were also corrected on-the-spot by the operations member of the SWT. None ofthese observations (by definition) represented potentially adverse seismic conditions

-fasteners werelocated on non-seismic components; lighting and loose or unsecured items were not within the zone ofinfluence of any soft targets.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-15. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS The 32 potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns orthe Area Walk-Bys as discussed in Section 4 were evaluated with respect to their seismic licensing basis.As indicated in Section 4.3, 22 of the 32 items requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; six involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; two involved other potential adverseconcerns; and two involved spray/flooding hazards.

These potentially adverse conditions are included inAppendix D, along with their dispositions.

Twenty-two (22) of the 32 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. The ten potentially adverse seismic conditions thatcould not readily be shown to meet the current seismic licensing basis were entered into the site's CAP.For each of the items that fell into this category, the PVAR number is included in the disposition text,which is shown in Appendix D. Additional information pertaining to the current resolution andOperability Determinations/Functional Assessments of these items is included in Appendix D.General methodologies adopted by the Licensing Basis Reviewers listed in Section 2.3 for addressing theobservations noted in Section 4 are summarized in the following subsections.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions For the anchorage observations noted in Section 4 that involved discrepancies between the as-installed configurations and the anchorage documentation (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations) taken into thefield, the Licensing Basis Reviewers collected and reviewed FCRs and NCRs for updates to the fielddocuments that represent the Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Thirteen (13) as-installed anchorage configurations were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Nine (9) as-installed anchorage configurations for SWEL components

2EPHAM31, 2EPKDM44,

2EPNAV25, 2JHCAPT0351A, 2JHCAPT0352A, 2JHCCPT0351C, 2JHCCPT0352C,

2MECAT01, and 2MEWAP01 could not bereadily shown to reflect CLB documentation, and therefore were entered into the CAP and indicated aspotentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 5 of the SWCs.Information was provided by PVNGS Engineering that showed the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "A"anchorage noted to have an anchor bolt sheared-off was analyzed and determined to be acceptable as-installed per Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-MOI (Reference

52) and entered into the Non-Conformance processNCR CC-4087 during construction of Unit 2.Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions Observations involving the possibility of insufficient clearances between safety-related components weregenerally resolved by estimating relative displacement from the in-structure response spectra of Reference

53. Given equipment anchorage and spatial configuration, the Licensing Basis Reviewers determined lower-bound estimates of component frequencies.

These frequency estimates along with the appropriate damping values from UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference

32) were used to obtain spectral accelerations.

Component displacement was then estimated by the following formula (Reference 63):S0

• 386.4 id=SF* S(co

• 21r)2Where SF = modal shape factor (1.6 for cantilever)

S,, = spectral acceleration (g) from response spectra0) = fundamental frequency (Hz)WCAP-17680-NP.

Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-2If the combinations of component displacements under SSE loadings did not exceed the gap noted in thewalkdown, the gap was noted as sufficient to preclude impact.In some instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by inspection of installation details and existing analyses.

This disposition method was applied for the Auxiliary RelayCabinets located 3/8-inch from concrete walls. The Licensing Basis Reviewers located EQCF D95-0038(Reference 65), which indicates that the auxiliary relay cabinets were analyzed by finite elementmethodology and determined to be rigid. Therefore, the 3/8-inch as-built gap was noted as sufficient.

In other instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by generating new analyses that confirmed anchorage strength was adequate to prevent overturning.

For example, theUnit 2 bookcase south of the Control Room was evaluated by estimating the tensile demand on existingscrews fastened to the metal stud wall. These forces were evaluated by the Licensing Basis Reviewers anddetermined to be adequately low to preclude failure and overturning.

All of the potential spatial interaction concerns were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis.Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed a loose cabinet door on Reactor Trip Breaker "A" (2JSBAC03).

Operations openedthe door and confirmed that the door was on a separate enclosure from the breaker and, therefore, therewas no interaction hazard. The condition was noted and entered into the CAP.The apparent modification to the DC Equipment Room "B" Emergency AHU (2MHJBZ04; refer to theArea Walk-By for Room J-1 14 in the Control Building) could not be readily shown throughdocumentation to reconcile the individual equipment seismic qualification, and therefore was entered intothe CAP and indicated as a potentially non-conforming condition by the listing as a "No" under Question8 of the AWC.Evaluations of Potential Flooding/Spray HazardsPotential flooding/spray hazards noted during the walkdown were evaluated by further documentation review. For potentially wet threaded fire piping, the Licensing Basis Reviewers reviewed documentation from piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) to verify the presence of pre-activation valvesupstream of the piping that could potentially rupture and pose a hazard to equipment.

The subject firepiping was verified to be pre-activated, and therefore dry. Hence, there are no potential flooding and orspray hazards.Evaluations of Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit 2 by the SWT; therefore, there areno Licensing Basis Evaluations.

WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-16. PEER REVIEW6.1 Introduction This section documents the independent peer review for the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns that were performed for Unit 2 of Palo Verde NuclearGenerating Station (PVNGS).

The peer review addresses the following activities:

• Review of the selection of the structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) that are included inthe Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)* Observation of actual SWE Seismic Walkdowns on July 25, 2012, by the peer reviewers

• Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Review of the licensing basis evaluations

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP)* Review of the final and supplement submittal reportsThe peer reviewers for Unit 2 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas ofWestinghouse.

In addition, Messrs. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero also participated and contributed to the peer review. Mr. Djordjevic is designated the peer review Team Leader and participated in all peerreview activities as the seismic subject matter expert. Mr. Douglas participated in all peer reviewactivities and led the SWEL selection peer review as the SWEL selection subject matter expert. Neitherpeer reviewer was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process.

Mr. Djordjevic is an advanceddegree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience.

He has received SeismicCapability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training),

EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility, and SeismicWalkdown Engineer (SWE) training.

Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclearengineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resumes are provided inAppendix E.The peer review of the SWEL development began on July 14, 2012, and was completed on August 8,2012. All findings noted on the SWEL Peer Review Checklist were resolved.

The completed SWEL PeerReview Checklist is found in Appendix C. The results of the SWEL development peer review arediscussed in Section 6.2.The peer review of the Seismic Walkdown activities started on July 25, 2012, with a peer check of theactual walkdowns.

Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas joined the walkdown team for a portion of the day'splanned walkdowns to observe the conduct of walkdowns and adherence to the Seismic WalkdownGuidance (SWG) (Reference 1). Messrs. C. Wandell and W. Borrero also participated in the actualwalkdowns to monitor compliance with the SWG (Reference 1). In addition, an interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team on August 17, 2012, after review of asample of the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) and Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs) to ascertain the quality and compliance with the SWG. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young on May 29, 2013, to review the SWCs and AWCs completed during the follow-on walkdowns.

The discussion of the results of these sample SWC and AWC reviewsare provided in Section 6.3.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-2The results of the peer review of licensing basis evaluations are provided in Section 6.4. These resultswere also discussed with the SWE inspection team on August 17, 2012, and May 29, 2013. The peerreviewers reviewed the 32 licensing basis evaluations and found the final determinations made by theSWEs to be correctly performed, and also concurred with the conclusions for the 10 items that were notreadily determined to meet current licensing basis, which were placed in the corrective action program.6.2 PEER REVIEW -SELECTION OF SSCs6.2.1 PurposeThe purpose of this section is to describe the process used to perform the peer review of the selected SSCsthat were included in the SWEL.6.2.2 Peer Review Activity

-Selection of SSCsThe guidance in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resohltion ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic (Reference 1 ), Section 3: Selection ofSSCs was used as the basis for this review.This peer review was also based on reviews of the spreadsheets utilized by the SWEL developers togenerate the Base Lists and Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists.Peer review was also based on interviews with the following individuals who were directly responsible for development of the SWEL:o Rolando Perez (Westinghouse) o Derek Seaman (Westinghouse) o Chris Wandell (Palo Verde Engineering) o Winston Borrero (Palo Verde Engineering)

This peer review utilized the Seismic Walkdown Guidance checklist shown in Reference I Appendix F:Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection.

For SWEL I development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:Verification that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required toperform the following five safety functions:

o Reactivity Control (RC)o Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (PC)o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (IC)o Decay Heat Removal (DHR); Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)o Containment Function (CF)WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-3Verification that the SSCs selected include an appropriate representation of items having thefollowing sample selection attributes:

o Various types of systemso Major new and replacement equipment o Various types of equipment o Various environments o Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE programo Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:Verification that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL2.Verification that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items thatwere not included in SWEL 2.6.2.3 Peer Review Findings

-Selection of SSCsThis peer review found that the process for selecting SSCs that were added to the SWEL complied withthe process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. SWEL 1 selections totaled 124 itemsand SWEL 2 selections totaled six items.The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment requiredto perform the five safety functions.

The bases for items selected to SWEL I were the IPEEE Report,Appendix 3.2 (Reference 3), which listed safe shutdown equipment from each redundant train of thesystems supporting the five safety functions, and Seismic Category I items from the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database.

A breakdown of the safety functions represented by the SWEL 1selections follows:Reactivity control -39 SWEL selections support this functionPressure control -84 SWEL selections support this functionInventory control -56 SWEL selections support this functionDecay heat removal/ultimate heat sink -92 SWEL selections support this functionContainment function

-22 SWEL selections support this functionThe peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected to SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation ofitems having the required sample selection attributes.

A breakdown of the sample selection attributes represented by the SWEL I selections follows:Twenty-seven (27) of 31 Base List systems were represented in the SWEL 1 list. Components from the unrepresented systems were component types that were adequately represented by othersystem selections.

Since all five safety functions are also adequately represented by the SWEL,the peer review team concluded that the "various types of systems" sample selection attribute wassatisfactorily represented.

Nine (9) of 38 major new or replacement items were represented in the SWEL 1 list. The sourcesfor these items were Design Basis Manuals for the systems supporting the five safety functions.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-4Several of the new or replacement items involved a change to a group of similar items, and atleast one item was selected from each group to represent the change. The peer review team.concluded that the "'major new and replacement equipment" sample selection attribute wassatisfactorily represented.

During review of the submittal report, a revision to the SWEL wasneeded to correct an error to this sample consideration attribute in the spreadsheet that was usedto track and implement the SWEL selection process.

This error did not result in a change to theBase List or SWEL selections; it decreased the number of major new or replacement itemsrepresented in the SWEL 1 list. The peer reviewers verified that the Seismic WalkdownGuidance requirements for this sample consideration attribute were maintained.

Twenty (20) of 22 types of equipment were represented in the SWEL I list. The equipment typesnot represented were "compressors" and "motor-generator sets." The site does not have safety-related equipment in these equipment types. Equipment type "transformer" is a subcomponent toequipment type "switchgear."

The peer review team concluded that the "various types ofequipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

All environments were represented in the SWEL 1 list. The PVNGS Units are located in a dryenvironment; therefore, environment classification was based on the maximum designtemperature of the equipment rooms. Since at least one item was selected from each environment classification, the peer review team concluded that the "various environments" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

No items were added to the SWEL 1 list based on findings of the IPEEE program because noequipment enhancements were required in Unit 2.Thirty-five (35) of seventy (70) risk-significant items were represented in the SWEL list. Riskinsights were applied from the Seismic PRA and Internal Events models to the selection of itemsto the SWEL. The peer review team concluded that the "risk insights" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

The peer reviewers verified that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added toSWEL 2.Spent fuel pool related items considered were based on a review of design basis manualdescriptions, piping and instrumentation

drawings, isometric

drawings, and a system review usingthe Site Work Management System (SWMS). All items that screened into Base List 2 wereselected to SWEL 2.The peer reviewers verified that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related itemsthat were not included in SWEL 2.The justification for screening out spent fuel pool related items was reviewed and found to besupported by the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Components in-line with SeismicCategory I piping were screened out. No rapid drain-down items were included in SWEL 2. Thisconclusion was supported by a review of the UFSAR (Reference 32), which determined that allpipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ftabove top of fuel assemblies.

All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holesthat are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies.

Allitems that screened in to Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2; therefore, the peer review teamconcluded that appropriate justification was documented.

The completed peer review checklist in Appendix C documents the peer review results.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-5The SWEL was revised during the follow-on walkdowns to remove components JCHAUV0516 and2MCHEE0I, and to replace ten (10) protected Train A components with corresponding Train Bcomponents which were readily accessible.

This change reduced the number of SWEL 1 items from 126to 124. The components were removed because they were located in a locked high-radiation area. It wasnot necessary to replace JCHAUV0516 and 2MCHEE01with similar equipment types since the samplingselection attributes remained adequately represented by multiple items on the SWEL. The replacement ofTrain A components with corresponding Train B components is acceptable per the guidancerequirements.

The Peer Review Team reviewed these SWEL changes and verified that all samplingselection attributes remained adequately represented on the SWEL.6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments

-Selection of SSCsThe peer review comments documented in the peer review checklist in Appendix C were resolved in atimely manner and improved the Seismic Walkdown process as summarized in the following:

• Editorial corrections were made to the SWEL report to correct minor errors; this provided for acomplete and accurate report.* Notations were added to the SWEL report to explain the sources of information that supported theSWEL selections based on modifications, IPEEE enhancements, and recent upgrades/changes; this provided for a complete and accurate report." Notation was added to the SWEL report to explain why equipment type "transformer" was notdirectly represented on the SWEL; this provided for sample selection clarity in the report.* A column was added to the SWEL report to indicate inside/outside environments; this providedfor sample selection clarity in the report.* Notation was added to the SWEL report to explain the sources of information that supported theSWEL 2 selections; this provided for clarity in the report." Notation was added to the SWEL report to explain how component identifications for Unit 1, 2,and 3 were reconciled and action was taken to perform a review to identify unit-to-unit differences; this provided for a complete and accurate report carried forward to the other units.6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review -Selection of SSCsThis peer review concluded that the process for selecting SSCs to be included in the Seismic Walkdownequipment list complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. It isfurther concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a variety of the required sampling of plantSeismic Category I safe shutdown equipment to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(0 Letter(Reference 50).6.3 Peer Review of Sample Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by Checklists A site visit was made on July 25, 2012, by Messrs. Walter Djordjevic and Mr. Gary L. Douglas toperform the peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns.

The SWC and AWC reviews (July 25 and 26, 2012)were performed on a sampling of the checklists that were available at that time. In accordance with theSWG requirements, the peer reviewers performed a final review of the SWC and AWC samples onAugust 17, 2012, after which the SWEs (Messrs.

Hunter A. Young and Cory T. Figliolini) wereinterviewed regarding their entries on the checklists to ensure they met the SWG requirements.

AnWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-6additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young inaccordance with the SWG requirements on May 29, 2013.The peer reviewers noted four observations of industry good practice during the Seismic Walkdown peerreview:1. Visible exclusion areas employed around selected equipment

2. Engineered scaffolding

3. Comprehensive pre-job briefs by the SWT prior to entering each room4. Comprehensive daily pre-job and post-job briefs by the walkdown management teamTable 6-1 lists the SWC and AWC samples, which represent 20% of the SWC and 20% of the AWCpopulations, respectively.

The sample includes the equipment inspected by the peer reviewers on July 25,2012, while observing the Seismic Walkdowns and equipment items from other classes to introduce diversity into the sampling.

Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 2Equipment Equipment Walkdown Item Observations Identification (GIP) Class2MHFAJ01 10 Air Handlers Bolt schedule was used to verify anchorage type.2MHFBJ01 10 Air Handlers Bolt schedule was used to verify anchorage type.2MPCAE01 21 Tanks and HX No comment2MPCBE01 21 Tanks and HX No comment2MPCAPO1 5 HOR. Pump No comment2MPCBP01 5 HOR. Pump No comment2MCHET01 21 Tanks and HX/RWT No comment2JSAAUVO664 8 MOV No comment2JSIAHV0684 8 MOV No comment2MSIAP03 6 Vert. Pump No comment2MSIAP02 5 HOR. Pump No comment2JSIAHV0604 8 MOV No comment2JSIAUV0666 8 MOV No comment2MHAAZO1 10 Air Handlers No comment2MHAAZO2 10 Air Handlers No comment2MECAE01 11 Chiller No comment2EPHAM31 1 MCC No comment2EPGAL35 2 LV SWGR Question with clearance between theWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-7switchgear housing and an adjacent cabletray is correctly dispositioned.

2MJAJ01A 9 Fans No comment2EPKAF11 15 Battery Racks No comment2EPKAH11 16 Battery Charger A Used SDOC E051-00047 to verify anchorage 2EPNAN11 16 DCA Inverter A Used SDOC E054-00070 to verify anchorage 2EPGBL32 2 LV SWGR Question with clearance between theswitchgear housing and an adjacent cabletray is correctly dispositioned.

Assessment of 50G Ground Fault Relay basedon discussion with APS staff is correctly dispositioned.

2JSINPT391 18 Instruments on Racks Anchorage configuration verified.

2EPHBM32 1 Motor Control Centers Assessment of loose bolts based ondiscussion with APS staff is correctly dispositioned.

2EPBBS04 3 MVSWGR No comment2EPKDD24 14 Distribution Panel No comment2JCHAHV0205 7 Fluid-Operated Valves No commentArea Walkdown Description Observations Area: Yard No commentArea: Aux, 40, A-D05 No commentArea: AUX, 52, A-C05 No commentArea: Aux, 40, A-D07 No commentAWC: Fuel Bldg, F-103 No commentAWC: Fuel Bldg, F-101 No commentArea: AUX, 52, A-C04 No commentArea: AUX, 100, A-127 Questions with clearance between the relay cabinets and concrete walls,flexibly supported

lighting, and S-hook fixtures are correctly dispositioned.

Area: CTRL, 100, J-114 Question on seismic qualification of 2MHJBZ04 is correctly dispositioned.

Area: CTMT, 100, Area N of No commentTransfer CanalArea: CTMT, 100, SIT 1A Proximity No commentWCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-8Area: CTMT, 100, W Regen HX No commentCTRL Valve AccessArea: CTMT, 150, Pressurizer Cube No commentThe peer reviewers provided an observation to the SWEs based on the Seismic Walkdowns and review ofthe checklists.

Some immediate remedies such as relocating temporary equipment in close proximity toSWEL equipment (or other equipment in the area) to a benign location were performed during thewalkdowns when they were discovered.

The peer reviewers made it clear that the "as-found" statedetermines the final status (Yes or No) of the SWC or AWC assessment in the submittal report. Evenwhen the corrective action has already been accomplished, it should be documented via the PVARprocess at PVNGS for both reporting and trending purposes.

6.4 Review of Licensing Basis Evaluations Appendix D provides a list of the potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Unit 2Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys and how they were addressed.

If a PVAR was generated, it isreferenced in Appendix D. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas conducted an interview with the SWEinspection team on August 17, 2012, to discuss the issues identified to determine if, in the opinion of thepeer reviewers, any of them potentially challenged the current licensing basis of the plant.As noted in Section 5, there were 32 potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in either theequipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys requiring evaluation with respect to their seismiclicensing basis. Not all potentially adverse conditions were resolved.

The peer reviewers performed areview of all licensing basis evaluations and the walkdown team's decisions for entering these potentially adverse seismic conditions into the plant's CAP. Twenty-two (22) of the licensing basis evaluations Idetermined that the potentially adverse conditions were ultimately found to be in compliance with thecurrent licensing basis. Of the remaining 10 potentially adverse seismic conditions that were entered into Ithe plant's CAP, 9 involved follow-up verification of the as-built anchorage configuration with plantdocumentation and 1 involved a follow-up verification of individual equipment seismic qualification.

Thepeer reviews of Sections 4.3 and 5, and Appendix D led the peer reviewers to conclude that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation in order to assess configuration compliance with the Palo Verde design basis, and thedecisions for entering conditions into the plant's CAP complied with the expectations of the SWG.The peer reviewers performed a review of the status of items that were entered into the plant's CAP as aresult of the Seismic Walkdowns (see Table 6-2). The submittal report was found to appropriately reflectthese updates.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-9Table 6-2 Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection CAP Item CAP StatusPVAR 4214832 Bookcases in the zone of influence of the main Action completed.

Bookcases control boards removed in all three units.PVAR 4220252 2EPHAM31 anchorage configuration could not be As-found configuration will bereadily verified against CLB documentation documented on EDC 2013-00455.

PVAR 4220252 2EPKDM44 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated in NCR EJ-02396.

PVAR 4267409 2EPGBL32 Ground Fault Relay missing fastener Action completed.

Fastenerreplaced.

PVAR 4275113 2EPNAV25 anchorage configuration could not be As-found configuration will bereadily verified against CLB documentation documented on EDC 2013-00455.

PVAR 4275113 2JHCAPT0351A

/ 2JHCAPT0352A

/ 2JHCCPT0351C As-found configuration will be/2JHCCPT0352C anchorage configuration could not documented on EDC 2013-00455.

be readily verified against CLB documentation PVAR 4215794 2JSBAC03 Noted loose cabinet door Action completed.

Door adjusted.

PVAR 4275113 2MECATO1 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated in NCR M J-00520.PVAR 4275113 2MEWAPO1 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated per drawing 13-C-ZAS-0241.PVAR 4275113 Verify whether unistrut welded to 2MHJBZ04 As-found configuration will bereconciles with original seismic qualification documented on EDC 2013-00455.

6.5 Review Submittal ReportThe entire final submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. Douglas and foundto meet the requirements of TR-1025286

-Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). The supplement submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. L. Douglas and found to meet therequirements of TR-1025286

-Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1).WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 7-17. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES A summary of IPEEE vulnerabilities is available in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events report (Reference 3). Per Reference 3, no seismic vulnerabilities were determined to exist at PVNGS-2 and no significant changes to plant design were required in order todemonstrate the ability to mitigate the Review Level Earthquake (RLE). All observations identified fromthe IPEEE walkdowns were resolved prior to issuing of the IPEEE report on June 1, 1995.Table 4-1 of PVNGS CORR 94-001-506 (Reference

62) had documented items to review for the SeismicIPEEE prescreening and walkdown of all three units; and Table 3-4 of Reference 3 summarized theresolution of these original walkdown concerns.

The IPEEE report (Reference

3) concluded that allcomponents have capacities exceeding the 0.3g peak ground acceleration of the RLE. However, actionwas taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in the Unit3 Control Room. The existing anchorage was determined to be marginal, and additional anchorage wasprovided prior to issuing of the IPEEE report to resolve the concern.

While the condition was also notedfor the same bookcases in Unit 2 per Reference 62, the IPEEE report did not specify action to provideadditional anchorage for these bookcases.

As noted in Section 4.2, the SWT reviewed the IPEEE report prior to conducting walkdowns.

Similarobservations noted in the IPEEE report regarding the Control Room bookcases were also noted for reviewduring these walkdowns.

The SWT reviewed Detail 35 of 13-A-ZYD-0034 (Reference 57), whichspecifies 23 metal screws fastening the bookcases in all three units to the metal stud wall. The SWT andlicensing basis reviewers determined that, although the as-installed anchorage for the Unit 2 bookcase didnot comply with this detail, the demand forces were adequately low to preclude failure; therefore, noadverse spatial interaction was identified.

As a result of this observation, PVAR 4214832 was generated and PVNGS removed these bookcases from the zone of influence of the main control boards in all threeunits.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-18. REFERENCES

1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.2. Drawing 13-I-ZZI-0001.R01 1, "Site Work Management System (SWMS) Equipment Database."

3. CORR 102-03407, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station -IPEEE."4. Design Basis Manual DBM AF, "Auxiliary Feedwater System,"

Revision 22.5. Design Basis Manual DBM CH, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"

Revision 21.6. Design Basis Manual DBM DF/DG/PE, "Diesel Generator, Class IE Standby Generation, FuelOil Storage and Transfer System,"

Revision 23.7. Design Basis Manual DBM EC, "Essential Chilled Water System,"

Revision 13.8. Design Basis Manual DBM EW, "Essential Cooling Water System,"

Revision 23.9. Design Basis Manual DBM FW, "Feedwater System,"

Revision 13.10. Design Basis Manual DBM HA, "Auxiliary Building HVAC System,"

Revision 17.11. Design Basis Manual DBM HC, "Containment Building HVAC System,"

Revision 9.12. Design Basis Manual DBM HD, "HVAC -Diesel Generator Building,"

Revision 12.13. Design Basis Manual DBM HP, "Containment Hydrogen Control System,"

Revision 13.14. Design Basis Manual DBM MA, "Main Generation System,"

Revision 8.15. Design Basis Manual DBM NA, "13.8 kV AC Non-Class IE Power System,"

Revision 10.16. Design Basis Manual DBM NC, "Nuclear Cooling Water System,"

Revision 19.17. Design Basis Manual DBM NE, "Station Blackout Topical,"

Revision 18.18. Design Basis Manual DBM PB, "Class IE 4.16 kV Power System,"

Revision 13.19. Design Basis Manual DBM PG, "Class IE 480 VAC Power Switchgear System,"

Revision 11.20. Design Basis Manual DBM PH, "Class 1E 480V Power -MCC," Revision 11.21. Design Basis Manual DBM PK, "Class 1E 125 VDC Power System,"

Revision 17.22. Design Basis Manual DBM PN, "Class 1E Instrument AC Power System,"

Revision 10.23. Design Basis Manual DBM QD, "Emergency Lighting System,"

Revision 10.24. Design Basis Manual DBM RC, "Reactor Coolant System,"

Revision 29.25. Design Basis Manual DBM SA, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System,"

Revision 16.26. Design Basis Manual DBM SB, "Reactor Protection System,"

Revision 18.27. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-FWCS, "Feedwater Control System,"

Revision 6.28. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-SBCS, "Steam Bypass Control System,"

Revision 6.29. Design Basis Manual DBM SG, "Main Steam," Revision 31.30. Design Basis Manual DBM SI, "Safety Injection System,"

Revision 33.31. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Files EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual,Revision 21.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-232. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,Revision 16B, August 2012.33. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-1 1-019, "Validation of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Conversion for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,"

September 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).34. Interim Version of the Westinghouse Seismic PRA Database (Microsoft Access database file"APS-SPRA.mdb,"

dated August 22, 2012).35. Design Basis Manual DBM PC, "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"

Revision 18.36. Drawing Number 01-M-PCP-0001, "P & I Diagram.,

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"Revision 27.37. Drawing Number 0 1-P-PCF-0501, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 4.38. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0502, "Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling andCleanup System,"

Revision 2.39. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0503, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 0.40. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0504, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 0.41. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-71, "Recommended Practicefor Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

42. Design Criteria Manual DCM-PGD, "Project General Design Criteria,"

Revision 24.43. Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"Revision 1, December 1973.44. Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"Revision 0, October 1973.45. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification,"

Revision 1, August 1973.46. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-75, "Recommended Practicefor Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

47. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant SeismicMargin (Revision 1)," Revision 1.48. WCAP- 17680-NP, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2," Revision 0, November 2012.49. Not used.50. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident,"

Enclosure 3,"Recommendation 2.3: Seismic."

51. Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A, Rev. 3, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,"

November 1974.52. Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-MO 1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Mechanical Equipment,"

Revision 8.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-353. Design Basis Manual DBM-C5, "Seismic Topical,"

Revision 4.54. Procedure 30DP-9WP 11, "Scaffolding Instructions,"

Revision 24.55. Specification 13-CN-0380, "Installation Specification for Seismic Cat IX and Non-Seismic Scaffolding,"

Revision 20.56. Procedure 30DP-OWM 12, "Housekeeping,"

Revision 20.57. Drawing 13-A-ZYD-0034, "Transient Material Restraint Details,"

Revision 20.58. Calculation 13-CC-ZZ-0309, "Transient Material Analysis,"

Revision 5.59. Drawing 13-E-ZAL-00 11, "Lighting Fixture Mounting,"

Revision 31.60. Calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120, "Concrete Block Walls," Revision 5.61. Calculation 13-CC-ZA-0 140, "Hatches and Penetrations,"

Revision 7.62. Correspondence 94-001-506, "Transmittal of Report Prescreening and Walkdown of PVNGS forSeismic IPEEE."63. "Dynamics of Structures, Theory and Application to Earthquake Engineering,"

Anil K. Chopra,University of California at Berkeley.

64. Not used.65. PVNGS Documents used for Anchorage Configuration Verification and Licensing BasisEvaluations

a. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZG-0070, "Diesel Generator Building Equipment Supports,"

Revision 6.b. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-EOO, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Electrical Equipment,"

Revision 5.c. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-JOO, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-ControlEquipment,"

Revision 6.d. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-M00 1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Mechanical Equipment,"

Revision 8.e. Drawing Number 02-E-ZGL-000 1, "Diesel Generator Building Lighting andCommunication Plans at El. 100'-0" and 115'-0","

Revision 6.f. Drawing Number 02-M-FPP-0003, "P&I Diagram Fire Protection System,"

Revision17.g. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0001, "Civil-Structural Generator Notes," Revision 24.h. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-00 11, "Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details,"

Revision 9.i. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0376, "Nuclear Service Spray Ponds Sections and DetailsSht 1," Revision 11.j. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0240, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 1," Revision 10.k. Not used.1. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0241, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 2," Revision 9.m. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0242, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 3," Revision 11.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-4n. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0243, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 4," Revision 13.o. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0245, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 5," Revision 8.p. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0703, "MSSS Concrete Sections and Details,"

Revision 8.q. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0705, "MSSS Floor Inserts and Penetrations,"

Revision20.r. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0187, "Fuel Building Concrete Sections

& Details,"

Revision 11.s. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 10, "Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator Foundation Plan Sections and Details,"

Revision 5.t. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 16, "Diesel Generator Building Concrete Section andDetails Sht 2," Revision 7.u. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0102, "Control Building Area J1D Concrete and SteelPlans for El. 74' and 100'," Revision 10.v. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0580, "Control Building Misc Steel Platforms and DetailsSht 1," Revision 6.w. Drawing Number 13-E-ZAL-00 11, "Lighting Fixture Mounting Detail Sheet 1,"Revision 32.x. Drawing Number 13-J-O0D-0103, "Auxiliary Building Isometric HCA-PT-351A andHCA-PT-352A Sensing Lines," Revision 4.y. Drawing Number 13-J-01D-0 104, "Sensing Lines for HCC-PT-351C and 352-CAuxiliary Building,"

Revision 3.z. Drawing Number 13-J-01D-0 173, "MSSS Building Iso Sensing Line SGA-PT308, 315;SBG-PT301, 321," Revision 6.aa. Drawing Number 13-J-04D-01 18, "MSSS ISO AFA-FT-40A and AFB-FT-41A Sensing Lines," Revision 2.bb. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0157, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for12"W x 24"H Plate with Unistrut,"

Revision 6.cc. EQCF Number D95-0038, "Restraints for Aux. Relay Cabinets."

dd. Field Change Request Number 7030C, "Essential Chiller Outline Drawings."

ee. Field Change Request Number 854 1C, "Control Building Area JIA & B."ff. Log Number 13-10407-A216-12, "Wyle Job No. 44815 -Seismic Test of CompactCeiling Light Module and an Incandescent Light Module,"

Revision A.gg. SDOC Number E051-00047, "Qualification Report for Class 1 E Battery Charger,"

Revision 10.hh. SDOC Number E054-0070, "Class I E Inverter IEEE 323 and 324 Qualification Report,"

Revision 7.ii. SDOC Number E 105-00011, "Outline Line Voltage Regulator 25KVA," Revision 17.jj. SDOC Number EN050B-A00015, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Rack Sht. 3,"Revision 5.kk. SDOC Number J601A-00274, "Nuclear Qualification Test Report for Modulating Atmospheric Dump Valve," Revision 0.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-511. SDOC Number M598-01433, "Mounting and Wiring Detail for Q Class HVACInstruments,"

Revision 21.mm. SDOC Number N001-0502-00322, "Bridge Assembly SFHM V-CE-14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 4.nn. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-015, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic RiskAssessment

-Model Development,"

November 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class2).oo. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM- 12-022, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic RiskAssessment

-Quantification,"

December 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page C- IAPPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS There was no change to this appendix.

The SWEL Peer Review Checklist canbe found in Appendix C of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo VerdeNuclear Generating Station Unit 2").WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D- 1APPENDIX D -LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS SUMMARYItem Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42EPEAG01 EmewgenGy diesel 1.) Noted sole plate n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

1.) A closer review of 13-C-ZGS-generator "A" dimension deviations from 0110 (Ref. 65) shows that the sole plate dimensions read indocumentation in field. the field by the SWT were for the pockets to be chippedVerify as-built meets CLB. out of the foundation and not the plates themselves.

2.) Noted light fixture and Furthermore, sole plates were provided by vendor and areheater suspended over therefore not to be evaluated per EPRI TR-1025286 Domestic Service water guidance.

SSC meets CLB.line; possible spray hazard if 2.) Diesel Gen lighting plan 02-E-ZGL-0001 (Ref. 65) showsoverhead equipment not that light fixture is mounted per Detail 1 of 13-E-ZAL-0011 adequately mounted.

(Ref. 65): 1/4" Kwik bolt mounted j-box supporting 3/4"conduit stem. This is a rugged and ductile connection andJudged to be acceptable.

The overhead heater Is verified asSeismic Category IX CALC 13-CC-ZG-0070 (Ref. 65). SSCmeets CLB.3 PVAR denotes Palo Verde Action Request which is the entry document for the PVNGS corrective action program.4 NTTF Status denotes conclusions of LBE for the condition.

Y- Condition was found to conform to the current licensing basis. N- Condition is either a Non-Conforming Condition or a Potential Non-Conforming Condition (if PVAR resolution is on-going)

WCAP-17680-NP,.

Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-2Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42EPHAM31 480 V MCC M31 Documentation gap on as- 4220252 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed exceeds vendorinstalled pattern measuredin field and that shown asas-installed in 13-CC-ZQ-EO1 (Ref. 65).2EPHBM322EPKAH112EPKAH152EPKCF13480 V MCC M32Battery charger"A"125 VDC Class 1Ebattery ChargerACDC battery "C"Verify as-Installed configuration recorded onchecklist per CLBdocumentation.

Could not verify Y4" weldmeets CLB configuration with anchorage documentation taken infield.Could not verify 14" weldmeets CLB configuration with anchorage documentation taken infield.Verify that CLB anchorage configuration consists of1/4" welds to embeds atminimum 5" length.n/an/an/an/arequirements and is therefore acceptable for seismicadequacy;

however, as-installed configuration could not bereadily shown to match the CLB documentation.

PVAR4220252 generated to update the calculation to reflect theas-installed configuration found in the field.SWC indicates

-As-installed weld exceeds vendorrequirements; no adverse seismic condition exists.APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

An Operability Determination concluded that the SSCremained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports thatconfiguration documentation determined to be non-conforming.

As-found configuration will be documented on EDC 2013-00455.

V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration exceeds the requirements per SDOC E018-00564.

Nohazard. SSC meets CLB.Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

1/4" required weld thickness verified from SDOC E051-00047 (Ref. 65); SSC meets CLB.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

1/4" required weld thickness verified from SDOC E051-00047; SSC meets CLB.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per SDOC EN05OB-AO0015 (Ref.65), the length of welds is a minimum of 4" at the ends ofbase beams at a thickness of 1/4". Configuration istherefore acceptable; SSC meets CLB.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-3Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42EPKCN43 Inverter.fpr Anchorage documentation n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Review of FCR 8541C (Ref. 65)shutdown cooling in field did not meet as-built confirms that 1/4" fillet welds connecting the channels toisolAlion laive configuration.

13-CC-ZQ-the embeds are required, which are provided in the field;2JSIKUV65'3 E01 confirms the as- SSC meets CLB.installed welds between theinverter tube steel and thebase channels, butverification of the channel-to-embed weld is required.

Verify as-built meets CLB.2EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 Anchorage documentation 4220252 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration couldcontrol circuit in field did not meet as-built not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR(and DC configuration.

Verify as- 4220252 generated to reconcile the configuration Distribution Panel built meets CLB. 4"x3"xl" discrepancy.

D24) thick plates were providedat two locations that differ Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that as-foundfrom that shown on Sheets condition is evaluated in NCR EJ-02396 and meets Current97 and 98 of Calc 13-CC-ZQ-Licensing Basis. EDC 2013-00455 is in-progress to updateE01 (Ref. 65). Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EO01 (Ref. 65) to reflect NCR-approved configuration.

2EPNAN11 DC/AC inverter Could not verify anchorage n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Anchorage verified from E054-"A" meets CLB in field. 00070 (Ref. 65); SSC meets CLB.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-4Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42EPNAV25 120 V vital ac Could not verify as-installed 4275113 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration couldvoltage regulator welding/bolting of channel not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR"A" to embeds meets CLB in 4275113 generated to reconcile the configuration field. discrepancy.

APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates the as-found anchorage capacity is equivalent to vendor requiredcapacity; therefore no adverse seismic condition exists.APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

An Operability Determination concluded that the SSCremained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports configuration documentation determined to be non-conforming.

As-found configuration will be documented on EDC 2013-00455.2EPNDD28 Power to .PPS "D" Noted 3/4" gap between n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Gap is in the longitudinal lnstriumefatation component and rigid direction of the large panel enclosure, so a frequency of 8conduit support.

Action Hz Is applied.

Using 2% damping (conservative),

SSEneeded to verify gap as acceleration at 100' CTRL building is 0.95g (Ref. 53).sufficient.

Estimated displacement is then (0.95g

• 386.4in/sA2/g)/(2*3.14*8 Hz)A2 = 0.15 inches. Therefore, 3/4"gap is judged to be sufficient; SSC meets CLB.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-5Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42JHCAPT0351A

/ Containment 13-J-01D-0103 (Ref. 65) 4275113 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

No documentation found to2JHCAPT0352A/

2JHCCPT0351C

/2JHCCPTO352C pressureshows 1' gap betweenmounting plates. No gapprovided in field.show that less than 1" gap is permissible; therefore theanchorage configuration is not consistent with plantdocumentation.

However, no adverse seismic concern ispresent since the gap criteria have no influence on thecomponent's safety-related function during and after SSEevents. PVAR 4275113 generated to reconcile anchorage configuration.

SWC indicates

-absence of gap has no impact on ability tofunction during/after SSE; no adverse seismic condition exists.APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

An Operability Determination concluded that the SSCremained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports configuration documentation determined to be non-conforming.

As-found configuration will be documented on EDC 2013-00455.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Ops opened the door and notedseparate enclosure for breaker.

Therefore no chatter issueand no adverse seismic concern.

SSC meets CLLB. Note thatPVAR 4215794 was generated by PVNGS to document thecondition and adjust the door.APS reports this is not a non-conforming condition.

AnOperability Determination concluded that the SSCremained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that PVAR4215794 is closed.2JSBAC03b3ýea'ker'V Noted loose cabinet door.4213794WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-6Item Tag/ ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3Status42JSGAHV0179 Atmospheric Dump Valve2JSINPT391 2MAFAP012MDGAX012M ECAE01HPSIlong.term recirc loop 1pressure xmtrAF Pump AAREA WALK-BYEssential chiller"A"SWT noted Y2" clearance between mounting plate forsolenoid valves andindependently mountedconduit.

Given pipesupports immediately

adjacent, independent valve motion is judged asprimary contributor towhether the gap can beclosed. Verify whether valveis stiff enough to precludeexcessive displacement.

Verify whether CLBdocumentation matches as-built configuration oftransmitter mounting platefastenred by four 1/2" boltsto2 horizontal P1000Un istrut members, whichare 1/4" vertical filletwelded to outsides ofcolumn flanges._

Noted sheared-off bolt.Could not verify this meetsCLB.Could not verify as-installed kicker angle anchorage infield. Verification againstCLB documentation isrequired.

Could not verify as-installed 5" pad configuration meetsCLB.n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per SDOC J601A-00274 (SSC 65),all valve frequencies are above 33 Hz; therefore"1/2" gapis sufficient.

SSC meets CLB.n/an/an/an/aY Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per Dwg 13-J-01D-0119, as-installed configuration meets CLB configuration documentation.

No concern.

SSC meets CLB.Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

During original construction, the as-built configuration was analyzed with the missingbolt and determined to be acceptable.

Documentation wasprovided in 13-CC-ZQ-MO1 (Ref. 65). SSC meets CLB.Y Licensing BasisEvaluatlon:

The anchorage for the kickerangle was verified per 13-CC&ZG-0070 (Ref. 65). SSC meetsCLB.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

The only issue was the 5" padconfiguration and this has been verified as acceptable perFCR 7030C (Ref. 65) which approved the field request tochip the "A" chiller down 1". SSC meets CLB.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-7Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status42MECAT01 EC expansion tank Noted tank leg flange 4275113 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration could"A" overhangs supporting W8 not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVARbeam so all-around fillet 4275113 generated to reconcile the configuration weld was not possible.

discrepancy.

Could not verify as-installed weld pattern meets CLB. Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that as-foundcondition is evaluated in NCR MJ-00520 and meets CurrentLicensing Basis. This condition identified on PVAR 4275113is closed.2MEWAP01 EW pump "A" Noted welded plates 4275113 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration couldaround anchor bolts that not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVARwere not noted on field 4275113 generated to reconcile the configuration anchor documentation.

discrepancy.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that solid platedesign matches design detail on drawing 13-C-ZAS-0241 (Ref. 65) and meets Current Licensing Basis. This condition identified on PVAR 4275113 is closed.2MHFAJ01 FuelBuilding AHY Could not verify 5/8" bolt n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

5/8" bolts verified per 13-C-meets CLB from field OOA-001 (Ref, 65). SSC meets CLB.documentation.

2MHFBJO1 Fuel Building AHU Could not verify 5/8" bolt n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

5/B" bolts verified per 13-C-meets CLB from field OOA-0011 (Ref. 65). SSC meets CLB.documentation.

WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-8Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status4Control Room, AREA WALK-BY Noted book case as 4214832 Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Given that the books will fallOutsideHorseshoe potential Interaction hazardwith cabinet RMA-B01.Fuel Bldg 140'ROOM A-202ROOM C-A09ROOM G-102AREA WALK-BYAREA WALK-BYAREA WALK-BYAREA WALK-BYAction needed to verifyrefueling rig cannot upliftfrom track.Noted small gaps betweenZAA-C04/C05/C06 andconcrete walls. 3/8" gap Isminimum.

Action needed toassess displacement andwhether essential relays areIn the cabinets.

Noted threaded piping aspotential spray hazard.Noted light fixture andheater suspended overDomestic Service waterline; possible spray hazard ifoverhead equipment notadequately mounted.n/an/an/an/aout of the case at elevated SSE acceleration levels, theinertial demand generated by the mass of the book casewill not exceed the capacity of screws. Therefore, there Isno adverse seismic condition.

This configuration meetsCLB.APS reports that PVAR 4214832 was issued and this non-conforming condition was corrected in all 3 units byremoval of the book cases. An Operability Determination concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that PVAR4214832 is closed.Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

SDOC NOO1-0502-00322 (Ref.65) confirms that members which fit into grooves on theinside of the rails resist uplift for the spent fuel handlingmachine (2MZFNM03).

SSC meets CLB.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per EQCF D95-0038 (Ref. 65),all ZAA and ZAB cabinets were analyzed and determined tobe rigid. Therefore, the as-built gap Is sufficient.

SSCs meetCLB.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Fire piping was verified to bepre-activated per fire suppression maps and therefore normally dry. Therefore no spray hazard. Thisconfiguration meets CLB.Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Diesel Gen lighting plan 02-E-ZGL-0001 shows that light fixture Is mounted per Detail 1of 13-E-ZAL-0011:

1/4" Kwlk bolt mounted ]-boxsupporting 3/4" conduit stem. This is a rugged and ductileconnection and judged to be acceptable.

The overheadheater Is verified as Seismic Category IX CALC 13-CC-ZG-0070. This configuration meets CLB.WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Retated Wnaormatikon

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-9Item Tag/ID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)3 Status4ROOM J-A02 AREA WALK-BY Could not verify in field n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

02-M-FPP-003 (Ref. 65)whether threaded piping confirmed FP-686 is pre-activation valve and therefore over 2MECAE01 is normally piping is dry. This configuration meets CLB.dry.ROOM J-114 AREA WALK-BY SWT noted apparent 4275113 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

CLB documentation reconciling modification with P1000 original seismic qualification could not be readily obtained; Unistrut support from HJN- therefore PVAR 4275113 will be amended to research CLB.PDSL-138 welded to2MHJBZ04.

Verify APS reports that configuration documentation determined modification reconciled to be non-conforming.

An Operability Determination 2MHJBZ04 original seismic concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

As-foundqualification.

configuration will be documented on EDC 2013-00455 (in-progress).

WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E- 1APPENDIX E -QUALIFICATIONS This appendix contains only the qualifications of new personnel involved with the2R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from October 13 throughOctober 15, 2012, and the subsequent walkdowns performed on December 5,2012. The qualifications of personnel involved with the at-power SeismicWalkdowns performed from July 23 through July 30, 2012, can be found inAppendix E of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating StationUnit 2").WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E-2TIMOTHY S. NEALONEDUCATION 2010 -2012 University at Buffalo,

Buffalo, New YorkMaster of Science, Civil Engineering (MSc)2006-2010 University at Buffalo,

Buffalo, New YorkBachelor of Science, Civil and Environmental Engineering (BSCE)PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES Structural analysis and design of steel, concrete, and masonry structures using IBC and UBCDynamic analysis of structures for seismic, vibration, blast, fluid, and wind loadsCompeted the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Plant Seismic Walkdown training courseFinite element modeling and analysis including use of ABAQUS, and SAP2000PROFESSIONAL HISTORY2012 -Present Stevenson and Associates,

Goodyear, ArizonaEngineerPROJECT EXPERIENCE SUMMARYSeismic Fragilit, ProjectsMr. Nealon has performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components foruse in probabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Nealon has executed the seismic analyses of concretefoundations, masonry walls, large storage tanks, piping, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorages.

In addition, Mr. Nealon has performed Seismic Walkdowns of tanks and their associated leakpath piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events. He hasassessed piping systems for excessive stresses due to differential support movement and performed subsequent analyses using manual and finite element methods.WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 C' ~)00CDCDCertificate of Completion

! ýITim NealonSuccessfulhj Completed Training on Near Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns m0Ci,CL*00~CD :Ci)CnOCDCD00.0(DBruce M. Lory"- Instructor NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown CourseDate: 06/26/12-Ci,k)UJO Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F- IAPPENDIX F -PVNGS UNIT 2 SWEL REPORTThis appendix contains only the revised SWEL transmittal for the 2R17refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from October 13 throughOctober 15, 2012, and afterward on December 5, 2012. The SWEL transmittal for the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 23 through July 30,2012, can be found in Appendix F of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo VerdeNuclear Generating Station Unit 2").WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-2*Westinghouse Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Revision 3In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: SeismicPalo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 2(As-Walked Down)/17.12 /,-,7/ '. /' -Rolando Perez K CLO -i _ ,-Equipment Selection Peitsqnnel Lead 'bateDerek Seaman /d- -6/Y A3Equipment Selection Personnel E i mar, Randall Digitally signed by Eimar, Randall DateG(Z34606)

DN: cn=Eimar, Randall G(Z34606)

Randall Eimar G(Z34606)

Date: 2013.08.28 15:15:12

-07'00'Station Operations DatePVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListMay21,2013I WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-3Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Revision HistoryRevision 0 of this document provides the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)developed prior to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) At-PowerSeismic Walkdowns performed between Monday, July 23rd, 2012 and Friday, July 27th,2012. The SWEL contained a total of 132 components (126 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2).Revision 1 of this document updates the PVNGS SWEL based on modifications required during the At-Power Seismic Walkdowns performed between Monday, July23rd, 2012 and Friday, July 27th, 2012. As a result of these modifications, the SWEL stillcontains a total of 132 components (126 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2).A review of the modifications verified that the requirements of Screen #4 -SampleConsiderations of the EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidancefor Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic,dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, are maintained.

These modifications include thefollowing:

Component Resolution Justification ID Affected2JCHALT0203A Replaced with Component ID 2JSBAC02A Item was inaccessible due tosecurity missile barrier.2JCHDLT0203D Replaced with Component ID 2JSBDC02A Item was inaccessible due tosecurity missile barrier.2JSIAHV0691 Replaced with Component ID 2JRDBUVO024 Was removed from SWEL toaccommodate 2JRDBUVO024 addition.

2JCHAUVO580 Replaced with Component ID 2JCTAL035 Was removed from SWEL toaccommodate 2JCTAL035 I addition.

Revision 2 of this document updates the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" column of the SWEL 1 table included in Attachment 1 and Table 3-2 of Attachment 3.The information related to "Major New or Replacement Equipment" was revised as aresult of an error found in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that was used track andimplement the SWEL selection process.

This error did not result in a change to theBase List or SWEL selections.

Although the number of "Major New or Replacement Equipment" decreased from 13 to 9, this equipment selection attribute remainedadequately represented on the SWEL.Revision 3 of this document revises the SWEL 1 table provided in Attachment 1 todocument the following changes required for the additional walkdowns performed duringand after refueling outage 2R17, from October 13 through October 15, 2012 and onDecember 5, 2012:1. Items 2JCHAUVO516 and 2MCHEE01 were inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. Therefore, for radiological safety considerations, it was decidedPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 2 IWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 Auaust 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-4Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2to remove these components from SWEL 1. New items were not selected toreplace these items since the resulting equipment list still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance.

That is, all attributes remain adequately represented on the SWEL.2. Since Train A was protected during refueling outage 2R1 7, the following Train Aelectrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train B, whichwere selected from Base List 1:a. 2EPBAS03 was substituted with sister component 2EPBBS04.

b. 2EPGAL31 was substituted with sister component 2EPGBL32.

c. 2EPGAL33 was substituted with sister component 2EPGBL34.

d. 2EPGAL35 was substituted with sister component 2EPGBL36.

e. 2EPHAM31 was substituted with sister component 2EPHBM32.

f. 2EPHAM33 was substituted with sister component 2EPHBM34.

g. 2EPHAM35 was substituted with sister component 2EPHBM36.

h. 2EPHAM37 was substituted with sister component 2EPHBM38.

i. 2EPKAD21 was substituted with sister component 2EPKBD22.

j. 2EPKAM41 was substituted with sister component 2EPKBM42.

The components in Items d through j were inspected to fulfill Frequently AskedQuestion (FAQ) 4.20 regarding the supplemental inspection of electrical cabinets.

These substitutions did not affect the number of SWEL items and since thereplacements were performed with equipment of the same type, the revisedSWEL 1 still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance.

That is, component type, alongwith other attributes, remain adequately represented on the SWEL.Revision 3 of this document also revises a typographical error found in the tag ID ofSWEL 1 item number 13, which corresponds to Base List 1 item number 36. Thisequipment was incorrectly identified as 2JCHEHV0240 instead of 2JCHEPDVO240.

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)A listing of structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) that will be inspected duringthe walkdown, the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), has been prepared inadvance of the walkdown effort.The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, SeismicWalkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, was utilized to developthe SWEL for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2.The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:PVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 3 IWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 Au Ist' I2t0131ty Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-5Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2o. SWEL 1 (Attachment

1) is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor andmaintain containment integrity

• . SWEL 2 (Attachment

2) is a list of spent fuel pool related itemsAPS Operations and Design Engineering Staff Members participated in the selection ofthe SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided inputs and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel to find the data associated with the equipment considered.

Theinterchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the APSStaff Members included:

" Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

" Verification of equipment information through APS's SWMS Database system." Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plantthat might be relevant to the SWELs.* Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment withoperational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

• Provided System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals for review by theEquipment Selection Personnel.

Details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL have beenprovided to APS in the form of a formal presentation, given on July 18, 2012.Additionally, details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWELare provided in the "Selection of SSCs" section of the Submittal Report.References

1) EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.PVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 4WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-6Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Attachments

1) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 12) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 23) SWEL Sort TablesIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 5 IRevision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-7Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownSWEL Walkdown Du 1 Screen gu2 (Safety Major new or (Temp, °F) IPEEE Deferred CommentsItemDerp (SC- 1 (Regular Equipment System replacement (I for "Inside"or vulnerability Number Equipment Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type e n 0f en cm tBasis?) Support)equipment?

for enhancement?

"Outside")

Operations noted engineered 2JAFAFTOO4A uxiliary feedwater MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the(flow 18) AF No 140(I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered Auxiliary feedwater Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the2 2JAFAFTOO4OB flow IMSSS Yes Yes PC DHR 1) AF No 140(lI) No No MS.Ti hudb xmndbflw(18) MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the3 2JAFAHVO32 SG-E01A reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (B) AF No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered 4 AFA-K02 turbine oil MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Horz. Pump AF No 10l No scaffolding was recently added to thecooler (5) MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered SG-E01B isolation scaffolding was recently added to theS 2JAFAUVO037 valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (g) AF Yes 104 (I) No No MS.Ti hudb xmndbvalveMSSS.

This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered 6 2JAFCHV0033 SG-E01B reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to theMSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.7 2JCHAHV0205 Auxiliary pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (7) CH No 120 (I) No Yesspray valve8 2JCHAHVO524 Charging pumps to AUX Yes Yes PC MOV (8) CH No 104 (I) No Noregen HX isolation 9 2JCHAHV0531 RWT outlet to SI train AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) CH No 104 (I) No No"A"10 2MCHAP01 Charging pump 1 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz. Pump CH No 104 (I) No No(5)Actn=.::.-.

I dn TR This item was removed from44 2,-G , AUV0,,6 Regeni Ye ..ea. L444 .e& *es RC4G PQVI4 -4;k 4 120() 4 *esE*Ganger isolatio.n.

SWEL 1..........

Ve heale, item was removed fromeeel;_egev 4a44 __10_* SWEL 1.Charging Line To13 2JCHEPDVO240 Reactor Coolant Loop CTMT Yes Yes BCIC POV (7) CH No 120(I) No Yes2A Isolation GlobeValve14 2JCHEHV0532 RUT suction iso (fails X Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (I) No Noopen on loss of air)15 2JCHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8)1 CH No 104 (I) No NoIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListMay 21, 2013Page 6 1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-8Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownSWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new or (Temp, °F) IPEEEIter Eq Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular Fuct Equipment System replacement (I for "Insideor vulnerability Deferred CommentsNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Support)

Class Type equipment?

0 for enhancement?

to Outage?Basis?) "Outside")

Horz. Pump16 2MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC (5) CH No 104 (I) No No17 2MCHETO1 RWT (refueling water Yard Yes Yes RC PC IC Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No Notank) DHRContainment Power18 2JCPAUVOOD4B Access Purge Exhaust CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (B) CP No 120(l) No YesIsolation Butterfly Damper19 2JCTAHV0001 CST isolation valve CST Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) CT No 113 (I) No No20 2JCTAHVO004 CST isolation valve CST Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) CT No 113 (I) No No21 2MCTET01 CST (condensate Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No No______ ___________storage tank) ____ _____22 2MDFAT02 DG "A" fuel oil day DG Yes Yes RC PC IC Tank (21) DF No 140(l) No No2 tank D DHRDG "" ar inakeRC PC IC23 2MDGAF03 DG "A" air intake DG Yes Yes DHR Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No NoStarting air RC PC IC24 2MDGAX01A accumulator DG Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) DG No 140(l) No No25 2MDGAXO1B Starting air DG YesRC PC IC Tank (21) DG No 140 (I) No No25 2MGX0B accumulator DG Ys Ys DHR26 2MECAE01 Essential chiller "A" CTRL Yes Yes R Chiller (11) EC No 80(I) No No27 2MECAP01 Circulating water CTRL Yes Yes Hr Pump EC No 80(l) No Nopump "A" DHR (5)28 2MECAT01 EC expansion tank "A" CTRL Yes Yes R Tank (21) EC No 80(l) No No29 2ECATOO29 Control room "A"29EAHU flow reg valve CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) EC No 80 (I) No NoEW "A" heat Heat30 2MEWAE01 exchanger AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Exchanger EW Yes 104 (I) No No(21)31 2MEWAP01 EW pump "A" AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Horz Pump EW No 104(I) No No This pump was replaced in U2R16(5) EW N0Io T p rl iU32 2MEWAT01 EW "A" surge tank AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (I) No No33 2JEWAUVO065 EC/NCWS cross tie AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) EW No 104 (I) No Novalve______

34 2EWAU0145EC/NCWS cross tie34 2JEWAUVO145 e AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) EW No 104 (I) No NovalveHigh Pressure35 2JGAAUVO002 Nitrogen Supply AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GA No 104(I) No NoIsolation Gate Valve36 2MHAAZO1 HPSI pump room "A" AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No NoEAHU3 MAZ2 LSpuprom""

AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (l) No NoIEAHUIIIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 7 IRevision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-9Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownSWE Walkdown D i Scre (Safety Major new or (Temp, °F) IPEEE Deferred CommentsItem Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 Regular Function Equipment System replacement (I for "lnside"or vulnerability Number Equipment Licensing Inspections?)

Support)

Class Type equipment?

0for enhancement?

Basis?) S"Outside")

38 2MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" MSSS Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No NoEAHU39 2MHAAZ05 ECW pump room "A" AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (l) No NoEAHUIInst. Rack40 2JHCAPT0351A Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104(I) No No(18)Inst. Rack41 2JHCAPTO352A Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104(I) No No(18)Discharge Sampling42 2HCAUOD4S From RU-i42 2JHCAUVO04 containment Isolation AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 104 (I) No NoValveInlet Sampling To RU-43 2JHCAUVO046 1 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 104 (I) No NoIsolation Valve44 2JHCCPT0351C Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104(I) No No(18)45 2JHCCPT0352C Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No(18)46DG "A" room EAHU DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No NoDG "A" room essential 47 2MHDAJ01 DG"A"room exhaust fa DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No48 2MHJAF04 Control room EAnHU CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(l) No NoBattery roo "A"49 2MBJAJ1A toom "At CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(l) No No49 2 HI J I essential exhaust fan50 2MHJAMO2 motor-operated CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) HI No 80(I) No No50_ 2M__AM2 damper 151 2MNJAM03 motor-operated CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) HJ No go (I) No Nodamper52 2JHJAM34 Pneumatic Damper CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(l) No NoHJAM34 Solenoid I_______I______I__

53 2MHJAM62 Air-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No54 Control room temp CTRL Y ee Temp NJ54 2J'A"12 indicating controller Yes IC DHR Sensor (19) No B0(I) No No55ESF switchgear room CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(l) No No5 2MJAZ4 Dr"A" EAEU56 2MJAZO4 DCnroomu"A" EAHn U CTRL Yes Yes PCSICDR AU(10) J No 80(l) No NoInstrument Air Supply57 2JIAAUVOO02 Containment Isolation AUX Yes Yes CIF SO(8) IA No 104(l) No NoI S Gate valve __P__CMed Vot2EPBBS04 RC PC IC bus Volt58 (substitute for 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL Yes Yes Med. VoltR 3) P Yes 80(l) No No2EPAS3(DNR CF SWGR (3)ý2EPBAS03)

PVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 8WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3Page F-10NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownSWE Walkdown D i Scr (Safety Major new or (Temp, °F) IPEEE Deferred CommentsItem Equipment Description Building SC- 1 Regular ion Equipment System replacement (I for "lnside"or vulnerability Number Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type e 0 fr ehcmnBasis?))

equipment?

for enhancement?Support)

"Outside")

Selector Switch For125 VDC To2EPBASO3S From Wall Mount59 2EPBAUO1 Either3Panel m CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR PB No 80 (I) No NoEither Panel Cont. (1)Distribution OrBattery Charger A60 2EPEAG01 Emergency diesel DG Yes Yes RC PC IC Eng. Gen. PE No 140( I) No Nogenerator "A" DHR (17)2EPGBL3261 (substitute for 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PG No 80 (I) No No2EPGAL31)

SWGR (2)2EPGBL3462 2EGBL34Low Volt.62 (substitute for 480 V LC34 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PG No 80(1) No No2EPGAL33)

SWGR (2)2EPGBL3663 (substitute for 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Low Volt PG No 80(I) No No2EPGAL35)

SWGR (2)2EPHBM3264 (substitute for 480 V MCC M32 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 80(l) No No2EPHAM31) 2EPHBM3465 (substitute for 480 V MCC M34 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104 (I) No No2EPHAM33) 2EPHBM3666 (substitute for 480 V MCC M36 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104 (I) No No2EPHAM35) 2EPHBM3867 (substitute for 480 V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(l) No No2EPHAM37) 2EPKBD222EPKBD22Dist Panel68 (substitute for LC 34 control power CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80() No No2EPKAD21)

(14)69 2EPKAF11 DC battery "A" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Rack PK No 80(I) No No1_ _ _(15) 170 2EPKAH11 Battery charger "A" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Chg PK No 80(I) No No(16)71 2EPKAH15 125 VDC Class 1E CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Battery Chg PK No 80(I) No NoBattery Charger AC DHR (16)2EPKBM42 DC power to TCB172 (substitute for control circuit CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No go (1) No No_ 2EPKAM41) 73 2EPKCF13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Rack PK No Boll) No No(15)Inverter For Shutdown74 2EPKCN43 Cooling Isolation Valve CTRL Yes Yes DHR Inverter (16) PK No 80(l) No No2JSICUV653 IPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 9 1Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-1 1Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTI-F Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #14 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment Walkdowntem qWalkdown DB ScRenul2r (Safety Major new or (Temp, "F) IPEEE Deferred CommentsItem Equipmt Description Building (SC -1r Function Equipment System replacement (I for "Inside"or vulnerability to Outage?Number Licensing Inspections?)

Support)

Class Type equipment?

0 for enhancement?

toOutage?

Basis?) "Outside")

7 2PKD4 DC distribution panel Ds ae75 2EPKDD24 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Dist PanelNo () No No024 (14)_PKNo8(14INoNo 76 2EPKDF14 DC battery "D" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Rack No ( No No(15) PKNo_80_(I__No__o 77 2EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(l) No No2EPKDM44 control circuitInverter For2JSIDUV654 78 2EPKDN44 Shutdown Cooling B CTRL Yes Yes CF Inverter (16) PK No so(l) No NoReturn Inside Jivre 1) P o8 t oNContainment Isolation ValvePower to PPS "A" RC PC IC Dist Panel79 2EPNAD25 instrumentation" CTRL Yes Yes R (4 PN No 80(I) No Noinstrumentation DHR (14)PC IC DHR80 2EPNAN11 DC/AC inverter "A" CTRL Yes Yes CF Inverter (16) PN No 80ll) No No81 2EPNAV25 120 V vital ac voltage CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80 (I) No Noregulator "A" CF120 V vital ac voltage PC IC DHR82 2EPNCV27 regulator "C" CTRL Yes Yes CF Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No83 Power to PPS "D" CTRL Y RC PC IC Dist Panel PN No 80(l) No Noinstrumentation DHR (14)PC IC DHR84 2EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" CTRL Yes Yes CF Inverter (16) PN No 80(l) No No120 V vital ac voltage PC IC DHR85 2EPNDV28 regulat '.lDge CTRL Yes Yes C Other (0) PN No 80 (l) No No___ _____regulator "D" CFPrzr pressure Inst. Rack86 2JRCAPTO012A (required for CTMT Yes Yes PC 1 RC No 120 (l) No YesRPS/SIAS)

(18)87 2JRCAPT13 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst Rackinterlock (18)TRC No 120 (I) No YesInst. Rack88 2JSBAC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR In8) RC No 80(I) No No_______ ~~~~~~~(18)

___ _____ ______Inst. Rack89 2JSBDC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 120 (I) No No90 2JRCNTE101 Pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp RC No 120 (l) No YesI temperature I Sensor (19)Isolation Containment When choosing containment isolation 91 2JRDBUVO024 Radwaste Sump AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104(l) No No valves that exist for both inside andOutlet Isolation Gate outside containment, outside wasValve chosen,Control92 2JRMAB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes RC IC DHR RM No 80 (l) No No________

____________

~~Panel (201)______________________

Control93 2JRMAB04 RCS temperature CTRI Yes Yes RC RM No 80(l) No NoPanel (20)Control94 2JRMAB05 Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel RM No 80(I) No NoPanel (20)IPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListMay 21, 2013Page 10 1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownUpon separation this page is decontrolled Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Page F-12Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2IScreen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownIte Walkdown Description Building (SC- I (Regular 2 Safety Equipment System Major new or Temp, F) IPEEE Deferred Commentsm Licensing Function replacement (I for "Inside"or vulnerability to Outage?Number EupetLicensing Inspections?)

Support)

Class Type eqimn? 0fr nhcmnt oOua?Eqipens ni ecsos? lasequipment?

0 for enhancement?

Basis?) r"Outside")

Ausiliary feedwater Control95 2JRMAB06 flow CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Conel RM No 80(1) No No________

flow___________

Panel 1201Control96 2JRMDBO5 Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel 1201 RM No 80(l) No NoPressurizer Control97 2JRMNBO4 temperature CTRL Yes Yes PC Panel (20) RM No 80 (I) No NoReactor trip breaker Breaker98 2JSBAC03 AUX Yes Yes RC PC SB No 104 (I) No No"A" Panel (2)Operations noted engineered 99 Atmospheric dump MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to the99 2SAHV0179 valve HV-179 MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered 100 2JSGAHV0184 Atmospheric dump MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124(1) No No scaffolding was recently added to thevalve HV-184 MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.SG-E01A WR level Inst. Rack101 2JSGALT1113A (required for AFASI CTMT Yes Yes DHR SG No 120 (I) No YesOperations noted engineered Instrument air line Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to thepressure transmitter MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR (18) S No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered AF turbine steam scaffolding was recently added to the103 2SGAUV0134 supplyMSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MV () S No 124 I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered AF turbine steam scaffolding was recently added to the104 2JSGAUV34A supplyMSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MV () S Yes 24 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.Operations noted engineered 1 AF turbine steam scaffolding was recently added to the105 SGAUV13 supply MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MV () a No 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.AF turbine steam Operations noted engineered 106 2JSGAUV138A supply heat up (Train MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) SG Yes 124 (1) No No scaffolding was recently added to theA) MSSS. This should be examined byarea walkby.SG-2 Line 1 Inst. Rack107 2JSGDHY0185S Atmospheric Dump MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR (18) SG No 124(I) No NoSolenoid108 2JSIAHV0604 RC loop 1 long term AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (I) No Norecircv valve I IIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2May 21, 2013Page 11Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3Page F-13NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Screen Screen #4 Sample Considerations Scee Screen #3 Environment WalkdownSWEl- Walkdown

1. f1 Screen #2 (SfeyMao nwor (TmownIPF Item Description Building (SC -1 (Regular (Safety Equipment SysteM Deferred CommentsNmbEr upp Function m replacement (I for "Inside"or vulnerability toOutage?

Nm e qupmn Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type etioes Ofouehanemnt Basis?)equipment?

for enhancement?

Basis?)_

"Outside")

Containment SprayPump A Discharge To109 251AHV0684 Shutdown Cooling AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) SI No 104 (l) No NoHeat Exchanger AValve110 2JSIAHV0685 SDHX "A" isolation AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (I) No Novalve111 2MSIAP02 HPSI pump "A" AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Horz. Pump SI No 104 (I) No No____________I

-___ (5) ______The CS pump was selected for112 2MSIAP03 Pump A AUX Yes Yes CF (6) SI No 104 (I) No No walkdown per ops/engineering Pump A (6) euetHPSI train "A"request.

113 2JSIAPSVO417 injectin to AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 104 (I) No Noinjection to EDT reliefSafety Injection Tank114 2JSIAUV0634 IA Discharge Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No YesGlobe ValveSafety Injection Tank115 2JSIAUV0644 1B Discharge Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No YesGlobe ValveThis item is being specifically walked116 2JSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120 (I) No Yes down due to its significance in plantrecirc/SDC valve history (pipe vibration),

117 2JSIAUV0660 SIltrain "AS AUX Yes Yes IC DHR SOV (8) Si No 104 (I) No No___________(closes on RAS)_____

_________________

Containment Spray118 2JSIAUV0664 Pump Recirculation To AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) No NoRefueling Water TankTrain A Globe Valve119 2JSIAUV0666 HPSI pump "A" recirc AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (B) Sl Yes 104 (I) No Noiso (closes on RAS)120 2JSIAUV0673 SUMP isolation valve CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 120 (I) No Yes121 2JSIAUVO674 SUMP isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S Yes 104 (I) No No122 2JSIDHV331 RC loop 2 long term AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (I) No NorecircNon Class Power however kept in list123 2JSINPT391 HpSI pressurecir CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR (18) SI No 120 (I) No Yes because of pressure boundaryloop 1 pressure xmtr (18) considerations.

124 2MSPAP01 Spray pond pump "A" SP Yes Yes PC DHR Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No NoUHS (6)Spray pond pump PC DHR Selected per ops/engineering request125 2MHSAJ01 hueehstfnA' SP Yes Yes AHU (6) SP No 1.22(0O)

No No dutohenvrmnalcdios house exhaust fan "A" UHS_ due to the environmental conditions Inst. Rack126

• 2JCTALT03S CST Level indicator CST Yes Yes RC IC DHR RM No 80({I)No No(20) _ __ II* The total number of SWEL 1 items is 124 instead of 126 because items 11 (2JCHAUVO516) and 12 (2MCHEE01) were removed.

The item numbers in the first column of this table were notadjusted to make it easier to compare the items listed herein to those in previous revisions of this document.

IPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013Page 12Revision 0August 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-14Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 2 -SWEL 2 (As-Walked Down)Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2SWEL Screen #2 Screen #2 Associated I Walkdown Equipment System Building (SeismicItem EupetDescription Licensinguiling(Screens with Rapid CommentNumber Equipment Class Type censing In?) Draindown?

Basis?)1 2MPCAPO1 Fuel pool cooling pump I PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes No2 .2MPCAE01 Fuel pool cooling heat exchanger I HX PC Fuel Building Yes Yes No3 2MPCBPO1 Fuel pool cooling pump 2 PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes No4 2MPCBE01 Fuel pool cooling heat exchanger 2 HX PC Fuel Building Yes Yes No5 2MHFAJO1 Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes No6 2MHFBJ01 Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes NoPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 13WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-15Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "System Type"(Note: The GR system is not represented due to the containment isolation valvesbeing well represented.)

Number of Items Number of ItemsSystem Type in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1AF 14 6CH 29 9CP 4 1CT 3 3DF 1 1DG 14 3EC 8 4EW 8 5GA 1 1GR 2 0HA 4 4HC 12 6HD 4 2HJ 21 9IA 1 1System Type Number of Items Number of Itemsin Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1PB 3 2PE 2 1PG 6 3PH84PK 20 11PN 12 7RC 16 5RD 2 1RM 31 7SB 14 1SG 42 9SI 101 16SP 4 2PVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 14WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-16Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Table 3-2: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Major new or replacement equipment" (Of the 414 items comprising Base List 1, 38 items were identified as "Major new or replacement equipment."

The following 10 items were selected for SWEL 1.)Item Walkdown Equipment Description 279 2JSIAUV0673 SUMP isolation valve278 2JSIAUV0666 HPSI pump "A" recirc iso (closes on RAS)61 2MEWAE01 EW "A" heat exchanger 5 2JAFAUVO037 SG-E01B isolation valve274 2JSIAUV0651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve47 2MDGAF03 DG "A" air intake structure 208 2JSGAUVO134A AF turbine steam supply heat up225 2JSGAUV138A AF turbine steam supply heat up (Train A)280 2JSIAUV0674 SUMP isolation valve115 2EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04PVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 15 [WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-17Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Equipment Type"(Note: Equipment type 4 (transformers) are not mentioned as they are part of larger parent equipment (i.e.,switchgear, load centers).

Additionally, EQ type 12 (Air Compressors) and 13 (Motor Generators) are not includedas Palo Verde does not have any safety related equipment in this category.)

Equipment Type Description Number of Items Number of ItemsNumber in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 10 Miscellaneous 13 51 Motor Control Centers 13 72 Low Voltage Switchgear 12 43 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 14 Transformers 0 05 Horizontal Pumps 11 66 Vertical Pumps 8 37 Fluid Operated Valves 23 88 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 117 349 Fans 8 310 Air Handlers 10 711 Chillers 2 112 Air Compressors 0 013 Motor Generators 0 014 Distribution Panels 41 415 Batteries on Racks 4 316 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 617 Engine Generators 2 118 Instruments on Racks 74 1419 Temperature Sensors 3 220 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 40 721 Tanks and Heat Exchangers (GIP Section 7) 20 8IPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 16Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-18Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Environment (Temperature)"

(Since the PVNGS Units are located in a dry environment, it was decided to classify theenvironments based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Temperature values were determined from a review of the EQ DBM and the UFSAR.)Temperature Number of Items Number of Items(7F) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 180 143 (All inside) 45 (All inside)104 150 (All inside) 43 (All inside)113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 4 (2 inside and 2 outside)120 62 (All inside) 13 (All inside)122 6 (2 inside and 4 outside) 2 (All outside)124 18 (All inside) 7 (All inside)140 28 (All inside) 10 (All inside)IIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 17 1Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-19Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Table 3-5: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Availability of the Associated TrainBase Walkdown Is the TrainList 1 Equipment Description RAW IsathelTrain Item Unavailable?

45 2MCTET01 CST (condensate storage tank) 30500 No40 2MCHET01 RWT (refueling water tank) 56.89 No113 2EPBAS03 4.16 kV bus SO3 15.27 No133 2EPKAF11 DC battery "A" 12.62 No120 2EPGAL35 480 V LC35 bus 3.06 No126 2EPHAM35 480 V MCC M35 3.06 No119 2EPGAL33 480 V LC33 bus 3.03 No125 2EPHAM33 480 V MCC M33 2.87 No43 2JCTAHV0001 CST isolation valve 2.62 No44 2JCTAHV0004 CST isolation valve 2.62 No337 2MSPAP01 Spray pond pump "A" Low Risk No279 2JSIAUV0673 SUMP isolation valve Low Risk No280 2JSIAUVO674 SUMP isolation valve Low Risk No87 2MHDAA01 DG "A" room EAHU fan Low Risk No88 2MHDAJO1 DG "A" room essential exhaust fan Low Risk No118 2EPGAL31 480 V LC31 bus Low Risk No124 2EPHAM31 480 V MCC M31 Low Risk No37 2JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails open on loss of air) Low Risk No262 2MSIAP02 HPSI pump "A" Low Risk No265 2JSlAPSV0417 HPSI train "A" injection to EDT relief Low Risk No62 2MEWAP01 EW pump "A" Low Risk No63 2MEWAT01 EW "A" surge tank Low Risk No17 2JCHAHV0531 RWT outlet to Sl train "A" Low Risk No253 2JSIAHV0684 Containment Spray Pump A Discharge To Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger A Valve Low Risk NoIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 18 IRevision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-20Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Base Walkdown Is the TrainList 1 Equipment Description RAW Unavailable?

Item278 2JSIAUV0666 HPSI pump "A" recirc iso (closes on RAS) Low Risk No61 2MEWAE01 EW "A" heat exchanger Low Risk No116 2EPEAG01 Emergency diesel generator "A" Low Risk No249 2JSIAHV0604 RC loop 1 long term recirc valve Low Risk No329 2JSIDHV331 RC loop 2 long term recirc Low Risk No56 2JECATV0029 Control room "A" EAHU flow reg valve Low Risk No91 2MHJAF04 Control room EAHU (fan, filters and HX) Low Risk No53 2MECAE01 Essential chiller "A" Low Risk No54 2MECAP01 Circulating water pump "A" Low Risk No127 2EPHAM37 480 V MCC M37 Low Risk No270 2JSIAUV0634 Safety Injection Tank 1A Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No272 2JSIAUV0644 Safety Injection Tank 1B Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No3 2JAFAHV0032 SG-E01A reg valve Low Risk No5 2JAFAUVO037 SG-E01B isolation valve Low Risk No13 2JAFCHV0033 SG-E01B reg valve Low Risk No38 2JCHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation Low Risk No277 2JSIAUV0664 Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling Water Tank Train A Globe Valve Low Risk No143 2EPKCF13 DC battery "C" Low Risk No148 2EPKDF14 DC battery "D" Low Risk No19 2MCHAP01 Charging pump 1 Low Risk No114 2EPBAU01 Selector Switch For 125 VDC To 2EPBAS03S From Either Panel Distribution Or Battery Charger A Low Risk No146 2EPKCN43 Inverter For Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve 2JSICUV653 Low Risk No151 2EPKDN44 Inverter For 2JSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Return Inside Containment Isolation Valve Low Risk No198 2JSGAHV0179 Atmospheric dump valve HV-179 Low Risk No199 2JSGAHV0184 Atmospheric dump valve HV-184 Low Risk No233 2JSGDHY0185S SG-2 Line 1 Atmospheric Dump Solenoid Low Risk No254 2JSIAHV0685 SDHX "A" isolation valve Low Risk NoIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 19 IRevision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-21Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Base Walkdown RAW Is the TrainList 1 Equipment Description Unavailable?

Item263 2MSIAP03 Containment Spray Pump A Low Risk No274 2JSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve Low Risk No1 2JAFAFT0040A Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No2 2JAFAFT0040B Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No4 2MAFAP01 AFA-KO1 turbine oil cooler Not Modeled in the PRA No15 2JCHAHV0205 Auxiliary pressurizer spray valve Not Modeled in the PRA No16 2JCHAHV0524 Charging pumps to regen HX isolation Not Modeled in the PRA No21 2JCHAUVO516 Reactor Coolant Letdown Line To Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No34 2MCHEEO1 Regenerative heat exchanger Not Modeled in the PRA No36 2JCHEPDVO240 Charging Line To Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No39 2MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 Not Modeled in the PRA No41 2JCPAUVO004B Containment Power Access Purge Exhaust Isolation Butterfly Damper Not Modeled in the PRA No46 2MDFAT02 DG "A" fuel oil day tank Not Modeled in the PRA No47 2MDGAF03 DG "A" air intake structure Not Modeled in the PRA No48 2MDGAX01A Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No49 2MDGAXO1B Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No55 2MECAT01 EC expansion tank "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No64 2JEWAUVO065 EC/NCWS cross tie valve Not Modeled in the PRA No65 2JEWAUVO145 EC/NCWS cross tie valve Not Modeled in the PRA No69 2JGAAUVO002 High Pressure Nitrogen Supply Header Containment Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No71 2MHAAZO1 HPSI pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No72 2MHAAZO2 LPSI pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No73 2MHAAZO4 AFW pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No74 2MHAAZO5 ECW pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No75 2JHCAPT0351A Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No76 2JHCAPT0352A Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No77 2JHCAUVO045 Discharge Sampling From RU-i Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA NoPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013 Page 20WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-22Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Base WalkdownList I Equipment Description RAW Is the TrainItem Unavailable?

78 2JHCAUVO046 Inlet Sampling To RU-1 Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No83 2JHCCPT0351C Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No84 2JHCCPT0352C Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No92 2MHJAJO1A Battery room "A" essential exhaust fan Not Modeled in the PRA No94 2MHJAM02 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No95 2MHJAM03 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No96 2JHJAM34 Pneumatic Damper HJAM34 Solenoid Not Modeled in the PRA No97 2MHJAM62 Air-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No98 2JHJATIC0123 Control room temp indicating controller Not Modeled in the PRA No99 2MHJAZO3 ESF switchgear room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No100 2MHJAZO4 DC room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No112 2JIAAUVO002 Instrument Air Supply Containment Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No132 2EPKAD21 LC 33 control power Not Modeled in the PRA No134 2EPKAH11 Battery charger "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No135 2EPKAH15 125 VDC Class 1E Battery Charger AC Not Modeled in the PRA No136 2EPKAM41 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No147 2EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 Not Modeled in the PRA No150 2EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No152 2EPNAD25 Power to PPS "A" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No153 2EPNAN11 DC/AC inverter "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No154 2EPNAV25 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No160 2EPNCV27 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "C" Not Modeled in the PRA No161 2EPNDD28 Power to PPS "D" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No162 2EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No163 2EPNDV28 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No164 RCAPT0102A Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

Not Modeled in the PRA No165 RCAPT103 SDC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA NoIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 21Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-23Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 2Base Walkdown Is the TrainList 1 Equipment Description RAW IsathelTrain Item Unavailable?

166 2JSBAC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No178 2JSBDC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No179 2JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No181 2JRDBUVO024 Isolation Containment Radwaste Sump Outlet Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No182 2JRMAB02 RWT level Not Modeled in the PRA No183 2J2JRMAB04 RCS temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No184 2JRMAB05 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No185 2JRMAB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No191 2JRMDBO5 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No193 2JRMNBO4 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No194 2JSBAC03 Reactor trip breaker "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No200 2JSGALT1113A SG-EO1A WR level (required for AFAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No204 2JSGAPT0313 Instrument air line pressure transmitter Not Modeled in the PRA No207 2JSGAUVO134 AF turbine steam supply Not Modeled in the PRA No208 2JSGAUVO134A AF turbine steam supply heat up Not Modeled in the PRA No224 2JSGAUV138 AF turbine steam supply (Train A) Not Modeled in the PRA No225 2JSGAUV138A AF turbine steam supply heat up (Train A) Not Modeled in the PRA No276 2JSIAUVO660 SI train "A" recirc (closes on RAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No336 2JSINPT391 HPSI long term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr Not Modeled in the PRA No339 2MHSAJO1 Spray pond pump house exhaust fan "A" Not Modeled in the PRA No415 2JCTALT035 CST Level indicator Not Modeled in the PRA NoIPVNGS Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 21, 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Page 22 1Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-1APPENDIX G -SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLESThere were no changes to the equipment selected for Base List 1, but two items were removed from SWEL 1 becausethey were inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area (discussed in Section 3.4).There were no changes to Base List 2 and SWEL 2.Table G-i: PVNGS-2 Base List 1(Refer to Table G-1 of Reference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2")WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-2Table G-2: PVNGS-2 SWEL IScreen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Environment WalkdownSWEL #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp., *F DeferredItem Walkdown Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (I for IPEEE D rNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

I 2JAFAFT0040A Auxiliary MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack AF No 140(l) No Nofeedwater flow (18)AuxiiaryInst.

Rack2 2JAFAFT0040B Auxiliary w MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Is) AF No 104 (1) No No2JAAF000Bfeedwater flow (18)SG-EOIA3 2JAFAHV0032 regulating MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 140 (l) No NovalveAFA-KOl Horz.4 2MAFAP01 turbine oil MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Pump (5) AF No 104 (l) No NocoolerSG-E01B5 2JAFAUVO037 isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 1040() No NoSG-E0IB6 2JAFCHV0033 regulating MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 120 (I) No NovalveAuxiliary 7 2JCHAHV0205 pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (7) CH No 104 (1) No Yesspray valveCharging8 2JCHAHV0524 pumps to regen AUX Yes Yes PC MOV (8) CH No 104 (l) No NoHX isolation RWT outlet to AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) CH No 104(l) No No2JCHAHV0531 SI train "A" AUX YeIeC___O I8) _CH No 104 _,_)_NoNo 10 2MCHAPOI Charging pump AUX Yes Yes RC PC Horz. CH No 120(1) No NoSYIC Pump (5)WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separatio this page is decontrolled Page G-3Table G-2: PVNGS-2 SWEL 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Environment WalkdownSWEL #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp., IF DeferredItem Walkdown Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (I for IPEEE toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

Reaetef2JIG AUV (This item was 6 t -vlin tremoved from SWEL 1 in eTA4 4es R CI C. 110,() C44 Ne 120(i) NOSupplement I of this report.See Section 3.4.) heat ...e4 ie gi. .2N4C'rHEEP1 (This item was l4eat4 removed from SWEL I in YA4 ..... .,0 R) NOSupplement 1 of this report. heat ..eha.ge (2-.-)See Section 3.4.) (-_-4-)Charging13 2JCHEPDVO240 header to RCS CTMT Yes Yes RC IC POV (7) CH No 104 (1) No Yesbackpressure control valveRWT suction14 2JCHEHV0532 iso (fails open AUX Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (1) No Noon loss of air)15 2JCHEHV0536 RWTsuction AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8) CH No 104(l) No Noisolation

_____16 2MCHEP0i Charging pump AUX Yes Yes RC PC Horz. CH No 113(0) No No3 IC Pump (5)RWT RC PC17 2MCHET01 (refueling Yard Yes Yes IC DHR Tank (21) CH No 120(1) No Nowater tank)Containment power access18 2JCPAUVO004B purge exhaust CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 113 (1) No Yesisolation butterfly damper19 2JCTAHV0001 CST isolation CST Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) CT No 113(l) No Novalve20 2JCTAHV0004 CST isolation CST Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) CT No 113 (0) No NoI____ _____________

valve I____ I____ _______________________

_____WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement APVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolaNd Page G-4Table G-2: PVNGS-2 SWEL 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Environment WalkdownSWEL #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp., 'F DeferredItem Walkdown Equipment Description Building (SC -1 (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (I for uPEEE toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

CST21 2MCTET0I (condensate Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21 ) CT No 1400() No Nostorage tank)________

22 2MDFAT02 DO "A" ftael DG Yes Yes RC PC Tank (21) DF No 140(f) No Nooil day tank ____IC DHRDO "A" sir RC PC23 2MDGAF03 intake tilter DG Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) DO Yes 140 () No NoStarting air DG YsYs RC PC24 2MDGAX0IA accumulator D Yes Yes IC DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (l) No NoStarting air RC PC25 2MDGAXOIB accumulator DG Yes Yes IC DHR Tank (21) DG No 800() No NoEssential RC PC26 2MECAE01 chillerA" CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR Chiller (11) EC No 80 (1) No NoCirculating RC PC Horz Pump27 2MECAPOI water pump CTRL Yes Yes RC H o Pum EC No 80(1) No No"A" IC D-R (5)28 2MECAT01 EC expansion CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Tank (21) EC No 80(1) No Notank "A" IC DHRControl room29 2JECATV0029 "A" EAHU CTR Yes Yes PC IC POV (7) EC No 104(1) No Noflow regulating DHRvalveEW "A" heat APC IC HeatEW""Het CI Exchanger EW Yes 104 (1) No No30 2MEWAE01 exchanger AUX Yes Yes DHR Eca231 2MEWAP01 EW pump "A" AUX Yes Yes PC IC Horz Pump EW No 104 (1) No NoDHR (5)WCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-5Table G-2: PVNGS-2 SWEL IScreen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Environment WalkdownSWEL #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp., *F DeferredItem Walkdown Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (n for IPEEE toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability taClas Tpe eplcemnt Insde"or enhancement?

Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

32 2MEWATOI EW "A" surge AUX Yes Yes P Tank (21) EW No 104 (1) No Notank DHR33 2JEWAUVO065 EC/NCWS AUX Yes Yes PC IC MOV (8) EW No 104 (l) No Nocross tie valve AX Yses DHR34 2JEWAUVOI45 ECINCWS AUX Yes Yes PC IC MOV (8) EW No 104 (0) No Nocross tie valve AX Yses DHRHigh PressureNitrogen35 2JGAAUV0002 Supply Header AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GA No 104 (l) No NoContainment Isolation GateValveHPSI pump PC IC36 2MHAAZ01 room "A" AUX Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (1) No NoEAHULPSI pump PC IC37 2MHAAZO2 room "A" AUX Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No NoEAHUAFW pump PC IC38 2MHAAZO4 room "A" MSSS Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (l) No NoEAHUECW pump PC IC39 2MHAAZO5 room "A" AUX Yes Yes PC AHU (10) HA No 104 (1) No NoEAHU DHR40 2JHCAPT035IA Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Inst. Rack HC No 104 (I) No Nopressure (18)41 2JHCAPT0352A Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Inst. Rack HC No 1041) No Nopressure (18)WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability taClas Tpe eplcemnt Insde"or enhancement?

Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

Discharge Sampling From42 2JHCAUV0045 RU-I AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 104(1) No NoContainment Isolation ValveInlet SamplingTo RU-I43 2JHCAUVO046 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 104 (l) No NoIsolation Valve44 2JHCCPT0351C Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Inst. Rack HC No 104 (l) No No45 2JHCCPT0352C Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Inst. Rack HC No 140 (l) No Nopressure (18)46 2MHDAA0I DG "A" room DG Yes Yes PC IC Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No NoEAHU fan DHRDG "A" room PC IC47 2MHDAJ01 essential DG Yes Yes PC Fan (9) HD No 80 (1) No Noexhaust fan DHRControl room PC IC48 2MHJAF04 EAHU (fan, CTRL Yes Yes DHR Al-U (10) Hi No 80(1) No Nofilters and IX) DBattery room PC IC49 2MHJAJ0IA "A" essential CTRL Yes Yes PC Fan (9) HJ No 80 (l) No Noexhaust fan DHR50 2MHJAM02 motor-operated PC IC MOV (8) HJ No 80 (1) No Nodamper CTRL Yes Yes DHR51 2MHJAM03 motor-operated CTRL Yes Yes MOV (8) HJ No 80(1) No Nodamper DHRPneumatic 52 2JJAM34Damper 52 2JHJAM34 DJAM34 CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No NoSolenoidWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement Outage?"Outside")

53 2MHJAM62 Pneumatie CTRL Yes Yes PC POV (7) HJ No 80 (1) No Nodamper DHRControl room PC IC Temp54 2JHJATICO123 temp indicating CTRL Yes Yes DHR Sensor (19) Hi No 80(1) No Nocontroller ESF55 2MHJAZO3 switchgear CTRL Yes Yes PC IC AHU (10) HJ No 80(H) No Noroom "A" DHR IEAHU56 2MHJAZO4 DC room "A" CTRL Yes Yes PC IC AHU (10) HJ No 104 (I) No NoEAHFU DHRInstrument AirSupply57 2JIAAUVO002 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) IA No 80(I) No NoIsolation GateValve2EPBBS04 RC PC2EBS44.16 kV bus RPC Med. Volt58 (substitute for 4 CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR Med. Vol PB Yes 80(l) No Yes2EPBAS03)

S04CF SWGR (3)SelectorSwitch For 125VDC To2EPBAS03S Wall59 2EPBAU01 From Either CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Mount PB No 140 (1) No NoPanel Cont. (I)Distribution OrBatteryCharger AEmergency RC PC Eng. Gen.60 2EPEAGOI diesel DG Yes Yes IC PC Eng. PE No 80(I) No Nogenerator "A" IC DHR (17)480 V LC32 RC PC Low Volt.61 (substitute for bus CTRL Yes Yes DHR SWGR (2)80() No No2EPGAL3 1) 1 1_1_1_1_1_1_1_1_1

_ 1WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability taClas Tpe eplcemnt Insde"or enhancement?

Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

480 V LC34 RC PC Low Volt.62 (substitute for bus CTRL Yes Yes DHR SWGR 12) PG No 80 (t) No No2EPGAL33) 2EPGAL36) 2EPHBM32 480 V TCYe RC PC MCw PN4tN64 (substitute for M32CTRL Yes Yes DHRP No 0() No No2EPHAM35I) bus__D__RSWGR__(2) 2EPHBM342E H M 4480 V MCC s RC PC MC (165 (substitute for M3 CC AUX Yes Yes R MCC (1) PH No 104 (1) No No2EPHAM33) 2EPHBM36 48O V MCC RC PC6 (substitute for M36 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 1040() No No2EPHAM35) 2EPHBM38 480 V MCC RC PC67 (substitute for M38 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (I) PH No 80(1) No No2EPHAM37) 2EPKBD2268 (substitute for Lw34r CTRL Yes Yes DHR PC (Pn) PK No 80 (l) No No2EPKAD21)

LC 4 ontolRC PC BattPaery 69 2EPKAFII DC battery "A" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery PK No 80(1) No NoYs DHR Rack 015)70 2EPKAHI Battery charger RC PC Battery PK No 80(1) No No"A" CTRL Yes Yes DHR Chg (16)125 VDC Class RC PC Battery71 2EPKAH15 I E battery CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR Chg (16) PK No 80(1) No Nocharger AC2EPKBM42 DC power to72 (substitute for TCB I control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80 (1) No No2EPKAM41) circuit73 2EPKCF 13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC P attery) PK No 80(1) No NoI .IIDHR Rack (15) PK o8 1) o NoWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability toBasis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

Inverter forshutdownInverter PKo8(1Noo 74 2EPKCN43 cooling CTRL Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 80(1) No Noisolation valve_2JSICUV653 75 2EPKDD24 DC distribution CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Dist Panel PK No 80(1) No Nopanel D24 DHR (14)76 2EPKDF14 DCbattery"D" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery PK No 800() No NoDHR Rack (15)DC power to77 2EPKDM44 TCB I control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(l) No NocircuitInverter for2JSIDUV654 shutdown Inverter78 2EPKDN44 cooling B CTRL Yes Yes CF (16) PK No 80(1) No Noreturn insidecontainment isolation valvePower to PPS RC PC Dist Panel79 2EPNAD25 "A" CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR (1D4) PN No 80 (I) No Noinstrumentation DC/AC P C Ivre80 2EPNAN II i1ere CTRL Yes Yes PC IC Inverter PN No 80(1) No Noinverter "A" DHR CF (16)120 V vital ac PC IC81 2EPNAV25 voltage CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80(1) No Noregulator "A"120 V vital ac PC IC82 2EPNCV27 voltage CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80 (1) No Noregulator "C"Power to PPS RC PC Dist Panel83 2EPNDD28 "D" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC D14) PN No 80(1) No Noinstrumentation WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

DC/AC PC IC Inverter84 2EPNDN 14 D CTRL Yes Yes DC (6 PN No 80(l) No Noinverter "13" DHR CF (16)120 V vital ac PC IC85 2EPNDV28 voltage CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 120(1) No Noregulator "D"Przr pressure Inst. Rack86 2JRCAPT0102A (required tbr CTMT Yes Yes PC (18) RC No 120 (1) No YesRPS/SIAS)

SDC RCS Inst. Rack87 2JRCAPT103 pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 80 (l) No Yesinterlock 88 2JSBAC02A ILV converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120(1) No No(18)89 2JSBDC02A IVV converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 (1) No No(18)90 2JRCNTE101 Pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp RC No 1046() No Yestemperature Sensor (19)Isolation Containment 91 2JRDBUVO024 Radwaste AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 80(1) No NoSump OutletIsolation GateValve 1RC IC Control92 2JRMAB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes DHR Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No No93 2JRMAB04 RCS CTRL Yes Yes RC Control RM No 80(1) No Notemperature Panel (20)94tanmntControl RMN801Noo 94 2JRMAB05 Containment CTRL Yes Yes CF nl RM No 80() No Nopressure Panel (20)WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability toBasis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

95 2JRMAB06 Auxiliary CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Control RM No 80 (1) No Nofeedwater flow Panel (20)96 2JRMDB05 Containment CTRL Yes Yes CF Control RM No 80 (0) No Nopressure Panel (20)97 2 Pressurizer CTRL Yes Yes PC Control RM No 1040) No No9 JRM.ALNB04 temperature Panel (20)Reactor trip AUX Yes Yes RC PC Breaker98 2JSBAC03 breaker "A" Panel (2) SB No 124 (1) No NoAtmospheric 99 2JSGAHV0179 dump valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 () No NoHV-179Atmospheric 100 2JSGAHV0184 dump valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 120 (1) No NoHV-184SG-EOIA WR101 2JSGALTI I 13A level (required CTMT Yes Yes DHR ns SG No 104 (1) No Yesfor AFAS) (18)Instrument air Inst. Rack102 2JSGAPT0313 line pressure MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR SG No 124 (I) No Notransmitter (18)AF turbine103 2JSGAUVOI34 steam supply MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) SG No 124 (I) No NoAF turbine104 2JSGAUVOI34A steam supply MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) SG Yes 124 (1) No Noheat upAF turbine105 2JSGAUVI38 steam supply MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) SG No 124 (1) No No(Train A) IWCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability toClas Tpe eplcemnt Insde"or enhancement?

Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

AF turbine106 2SGAUI38Asteam supply106 2JSGAUVI38A heat up (Train MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) SG Yes 124 (l) No NoA)SG-2 Line I107 2JSGDHY0185S Atmospheric MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack SG No 104 (1) No NoDump (18)SolenoidRC loop 1108 2JSIAHV0604 long-term AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (1) No Norecire valveContainment Spray Pump ADischarge To109 2JSIAHV0684 Shutdown AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) SI No 104 (l) No NoCooling HeatExchanger AValve110 2JSAHV65S D I-X"A"110 2JSIAHV0685 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (l) No NoIlI 2MSIAP02 HPSI pump AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Horz. SI No 104 (I) No No"A" Pump (5)112 2MSIAP03 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. Pump SI No 104 (1) No NoSpray Pump A (6)HPSI train "A"113 2JSIAPSVO417 injection to AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 120(1) No NoEDT reliefSafetyinjection tank114 2JSIAUV0634 IA discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No Yesisolation globevalveWCAP- 17680-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-2 August 2013WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

Safetyinjection tank115 2JSIAUV0644 I B discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (l) No Yesisolation globevalveRC loop 1116 2JSIAUV0651 long-term CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) Si Yes 104 (I) No Yesrecirc/SDC valveSI train "A"117 2JSIAUV0660 recirc (closes AUX Yes Yes IC DHR SOV (8) SI No 104 (l) No Noon RAS)Containment Spray PumpRecirculation 118 2JSIAUV0664 To Refueling AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) SI No 104 (1) No NoWater TankTrain A GlobeValveHPSI pump119 2JSIAUV0666 "A" recirc iso AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120(l) No No(closes onRAS)120 2JSIAUV0673 Sump isolation CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (l) No Yesvalve121 2JSIAUV0674 Sump isolation AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) St Yes 104(f) No NovalveRC loop 2122 2JSIDHV331 long-term AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No NorecircHPSI long-tem recirc Inst. Rack SI No 122(0) No Yes12teSIP39 lo 1ressire CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR (18) S o12()N el2 251PT9Iloop I pressure (8xmtr 1124 2MSPAPOI Spray pond SP Yes Yes PC DHR Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No Nopump "A" UHS (6)WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement "Inside" or vulnerability Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

Spray pond125 2MHSAJOI pump house Y Yes PC DHR AHU (6) SP No 80(1) No Noexhaust fan UHS"A"126 2JCTALT035 2 CST Level CST Yes Yes RC IC Inst. Rack CT No 800() No NoIndicator DHR (18) 1 1 1The total number of SWEL 1 items is 124 instead of 126 because items 11 (2JCHAUVO516) and 12 (2MCHEEO1) were removed (see discussion in Section 3.4). Theitem numbers in the first column of this table were not adjusted to make it easier to compare the items to those in Table G-2 of Reference 48.2 2JCTALT035 was added during the walkdown as a replacement for another piece of equipment that was inaccessible.

WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-15Table G-3: PVNGS-2 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2)(Refer to Table G-3 of Reference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2")WCAP-17680-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-2Revision 0August 2013