IR 05000324/2014011

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000325/2014011 and 05000324/2014011; Final Significance Determination and Notice of Violation

ML14149A149
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	05/29/2014
From:	Croteau R P Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Hamrick G T Duke Energy Progress
References
EA-14-048 IR-14-011
Download: ML14149A149 (8)

Text

May 29, 2014

EA-14-048 Mr. George Hamrick Vice President Duke Energy Progress, Inc. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461

SUBJECT: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000325/2014011 AND 05000324/2014011; FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear Mr. Hamrick:

This letter provides the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding and apparent violations (AVs) discussed in our previous communications dated March 21, 2014, and April 18, 2014, which were included in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report (IR) Nos. 05000325,324/2013010 and 05000325,324/2014010. The findings were previously characterized as follows: The first finding (AV 05000325,324/2013010-01) was identified as an AV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, with two examples. The first example involved the failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality associated with flood protection of multiple safety-related buildings. Specifically, certain safety-related buildings contained inappropriate openings that were not identified and corrected by the licensee and could have adversely impacted the ability to mitigate external flooding of the buildings in the event of a design basis probable maximum hurricane (PMH). This could have resulted in the potential loss of many safety-related service water pumps (SWPs) during a PMH flooding event. The second example involved the failure to correct a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ). Specifically, corrective actions were not implemented to preclude repetition of a previously identified SCAQ, when an engineering program was not adequately developed or implemented to mitigate the consequences of potential external events (flooding, high winds, and seismic). As documented in previous NRC IR Nos. 05000325,324/2014010 on April 18, 2014, the Unit 1 AV was preliminarily determined to be Green, a finding with very low safety significance. Additionally, the Unit 2 AV was preliminarily determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance. These findings were assessed based on the best available information, using the applicable Significance Determination Process in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M. Following the initial review of this matter using preliminary quantitative analysis, Appendix M was used considering the potential impact of uncertainties on the timeliness of the decision-making, which allows for the use of a bounding analysis and qualitative insights. Currently, the NRC does not have a tool to quantify the estimated likelihood of a severe coastal surge event from a PMH to accurately quantify the risk significance of the performance deficiency.

The second AV (05000325,324/2013010-04) was associated with the first finding and was the failure to report a condition prohibited by plant Technical Specification 3.7.2, Service Water (SW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink, and an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of the residual heat removal system as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This AV was evaluated using the NRC's traditional enforcement process because it impacted NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function.

At your request, a Regulatory Conference and Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference was held on May 12, 2014, to discuss your views on these issues. A copy of the presentation made by Duke Energy was included in the meeting summary issued May 20, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession number ML14140A291). During the meeting, Duke Energy representatives provided an assessment of the significance of the findings, the root cause evaluation, corrective actions taken and planned, and the methodology used to evaluate storm surge and flooding. The discussion included information which addressed the sources of uncertainty identified in the preliminary significance calculation performed by the NRC. Descriptions of the testing performed to determine the flow characteristics of the penetrations used in the licensee's calculations of the inleakage rates were also presented. The results of flooding calculations for both the service water building, and the high pressure coolant injection room in the reactor building, which demonstrated increased margin to immersion of critical equipment were also discussed. In addition, the duration of an assumed maximum storm surge flood was presented using the results of state of the art methodologies. Your calculations indicated the maximum storm surge flood to be less than that stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, the new calculations of the most likely water level that could have been reached in the service water building indicated a lower level, which reduced the probability that critical components would fail. Following the conference, the NRC evaluated the remaining uncertainties and assumptions used in the calculations along with the margin to failure for the inputs presented. The NRC determined that the sequence of events that must occur to result in a failure of all AC powered mitigation equipment during the hurricane surge reduced the probability of the loss of function of the service water system, even with the consideration of the potential uncertainty involved in estimating the frequency of such an extreme coastal surge scenario. The NRC concluded that the Unit 1 preliminary Green finding was appropriately characterized, and the Unit 2 preliminary White finding should be re-characterized as a Green finding, an issue of very low safety significance. The NRC also has determined that because this finding was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and there was a failure to restore compliance from the previous White violation documented in NRC IR Nos. 05000325,324/2011014, this violation is being cited in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The Notice of Violation (Notice) is attached as Enclosure 1. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in NRC IR Nos. 05000325,324/2013010. For this violation, the NRC reviewed whether the NCV criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. In this case, the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation was directly attributable to a failure on the part of Brunswick staff to identify and correct existing non-conformances in response to a previously identified White finding (issued on December 27, 2011, EA-11-251). As such, the NRC concluded that Brunswick failed to restore compliance within a reasonable period of time, and that a cited violation is warranted.

Based on the information developed during the inspection associated with the first issue previously described (AV 05000325,324/2013010-01) and the information provided at the Regulatory Conference and Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference, the NRC has concluded that an additional violation of NRC requirements occurred (AV 05000325,324/2013010-04). Specifically, the NRC determined that you failed to submit a licensee event report to the NRC within 60 days of identifying a condition or event that satisfied the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B). The circumstances surrounding this violation were described in detail in NRC IR Nos. 05000325,324/2013010.

As discussed in the Enforcement Policy, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported. In this case, and as discussed above, the NRC concluded that the failure to provide a required report is associated with a Green finding, a failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality associated with flood protection of multiple safety-related buildings, and the failure to correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Based on the above, the NRC concluded that the violation of 10 CFR 50.73 is appropriately characterized as a Severity Level IV, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is being dispositioned as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, please provide a timeline for completion of specific corrective actions. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

We intend to conduct corrective action follow-up baseline inspection of the related corrective actions (Inspection Procedure 71152) based on the timeline provided in the response to the notice of violation. This inspection will include a review of the inspection findings issued in this final significance determination letter.

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC IR Nos. 05000325,324/2014011. Accordingly, consistent with the regulatory positions described in this letter, AV 05000325,324/ 2013010-01 is updated as VIO 05000325,324/2013010-01 with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, because you did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors. Specifically, licensee management failed to ensure degradation associated with flood protection of the safety-related buildings was identified and corrected [H.2]. AV 05000325,324/2013010-04 is updated as NCV SL IV 05000325,324/ 2013010-04 with no cross-cutting aspect. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Sincerely,/RA/

Richard P. Croteau, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation EA-14-048 cc distribution via listserv