ML20128G000: Difference between revisions

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Safeguards Contingency Plan", Revision 0 transmitted by Letter dated July 28, 1983 and " Training and Qualification
Safeguards Contingency Plan", Revision 0 transmitted by Letter dated July 28, 1983 and " Training and Qualification
                                                                                           ~ ''
                                                                                           ~ ''
Plan" Revision 0 transmitted by letter dated July 28, 1983".
Plan" Revision 0 transmitted by {{letter dated|date=July 28, 1983|text=letter dated July 28, 1983}}".
This Safety Evaluation Report (SER) sumnarizes how the e
This Safety Evaluation Report (SER) sumnarizes how the e
Licensee has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part '7 3 . The SER is composed of a basic analysis that is evailable for pubLic review, and a protected Appendix.
Licensee has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part '7 3 . The SER is composed of a basic analysis that is evailable for pubLic review, and a protected Appendix.

Latest revision as of 21:24, 21 August 2022

Safeguards SER Supporting Rev 0 to Physical Security & Safeguards Contingency Plan & Rev 0 to Training & Qualification Plan Dtd 830728.Info Deleted.Salp Input Encl
ML20128G000
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 07/23/1984
From:
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128F979 List:
References
FOIA-84-926 NUDOCS 8505300048
Download: ML20128G000 (13)


Text

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. n/l - 50-412 SA:EG; ADS FORVf~d EliCLOSURE 2

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SAFEGUARDS SAFET,Y EVALUATION REPORT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION

'l 3 sATEGUAF.DS I;:yoguTION 0 Den ecparated from

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' Unm eorhed .4 0 ici al e ations. , EA' IDLE CHIS DOCBET AS Ad=inistre. i e

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8505300048 850304 PD1 FOIA GP.ABER84-926 PDR SA:EGJADS F0nlAToy

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.G i 1.0 Introduction

~The Duquesne Light Company originally . filed with the Nuclear Regulatory C'ommission for the Beaver Valley Power Station the following security program plans which.have since

-been revised and amended:

" Beaver Valley Power Station Physical Security Plan and I

Safeguards Contingency Plan", Revision 0 transmitted by Letter dated July 28, 1983 and " Training and Qualification

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Plan" Revision 0 transmitted by letter dated July 28, 1983".

This Safety Evaluation Report (SER) sumnarizes how the e

Licensee has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part '7 3 . The SER is composed of a basic analysis that is evailable for pubLic review, and a protected Appendix.

2.0 Physical Security Organization To satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b) the Duquesne Light Company has provided a physical security organization that includes a Shift Security Supervisor who is onsite at

,all times with the authority to direct the physical' protection activities. To implement the commitments made in the physical security plan, training and qualification plan, and~the safeguards contingency plan, written security procedures c.necifying the duties of 'he security organization members have been developed and are available for inspection.

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The training program and. critical security tasks and duties for the security organization personnel are defined in the

" Beaver Valley Power Station Training and Qualification Plan" which meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B for the training, equipping and requalification of the security organization members. The physical security plan and I

the train'ing program provide commitments that preclude the assignment of any individual to a security related duty or ,

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task prior to the individual being trained, equipped and qualified.to perform the assigned duty in accordance with the approved guard training and qualification plan. ,

3.0 Physical Barriers In neeting the requireme.nts of 10 CFR 73.55(c) the applicant has provided a protected area barrier which meets the definition in 10 C FR 73.2 (f) (1) . A 20 foot wide isolation zone, to-permit observation of activities at-the perimeter, is provided (except for the locations listed in the Appendix) along_both sides of barrier.

The staff has reviewed those Lo. cations and determined that the security measures in place are satisfactory and continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c).

Illumination of 0.2 foot-candles is maintained for the isolation zones, protected area' barriers, and external portions of the protected area.

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4.0 Identification of Vital Areas

. The Appendix contains a discussion of the applicant's vital area program and identifies those areas and items'of equipment determined to be vital for protection purposes. Vital equipment is located within vital areas which are located within the

, protected area and which require passage through at least two i

barriers, as ' defined in 10 C FR 73.2(f)(1) and (2), to gain access to the vital equipment. Vital area barriers are separated from the protected area barrier.

The control room and central alarn station are provided with bullet-resistant walls, doors', ceilings, floors, and windows.

Based.on these findings and the analysis set forth in

. paragraph C of the Apoendix (except as noted therein), the staff has concluded that the applicant's program for i.dentification and protection of vital equipment satisfies the regulatory intent. However, this program is subject to onsite validation by the staff in the future, and to subsequent changes if found to be necessary.

5.0 Access Requirements In~accor' dance with 10 CFR 73.55(d) all points of personnel and vehicle access to the protected-area are controlled. The individual responsible for controlling the final point of access into the protected area is located in a bullet-resistant structure. As part of the access control program, vehicles (except under emergency conditions), personnel, packages, and materials entering the protected area are searched for

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explosives, firearms and incendiary devices by' electronic search equipment and/or physical search.

' Vehicles admitted to the protected area, except Licensee designated vehicles, are controlled by escorts when in operation.

Licensee designated vehicles are limited to on-site station functions and remain in the protected area except for operational maiptenance, repair, security and emergency purposes.

Positive con *rol over the vehicles is maintained by personnel authorized to use the vehicles or by the escort personnel. A picture badge / key card systen, utin 'ng encoded information, identifies individuals that are authorized unescorted access to protected and vital areas,

. and is.used to control acces: to these areas. Individuals not authorized unescorted acc^ess are i ssued non picture badges that indicate an escort is required. Access authorizations are limited to those individuals who have a need for access to perform their duties.

Unoccupied vital areas are locked and' alarmed. During periods of refueling.or major maintenance, access to the reactor

-containment (s) is positively controlled by a member of the security organization to assure that only authorized .

individuals and materials are' permitted to enter. In addition, all1 doors ~and pers,onnet/ equipment hatches into the reactor containment (s) are locked and alarmed. Keys, Locks, t

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combinations and related equipment are changed on an annual basis. In addition, when an individual,'s access authorization has been terminated due to the lack of reliability or trustworthiness, or for poor work performance, the keys, Locks, combinations and related equipment to which that person had access are changed.

-6.0 Detection Aids In satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) the applicant has installed intrusion detection systems at the - -

protected area barrier, at entrances to vital areas, and at a L L emergency exit's. Alarms from the intrusion detection system annunciate within the continuously manned central alarm' station and a secondary alarm station located within

, 2, the protected area. The central alarm station is located such that the interior of the station is not visible from cutside the perimeter of the protected area. In addition, the central. station is constructed so that walls, floors, ceilings, doors, and windows are bullet-resistant. The alarm stations are located and desig'ned in such a ma'nner so a single act cannot interdict the capability of calling for assistance or responding to alarms. The central alarm station contains no other functions or duties that would interfere with its alarm response function. The intrusion detection system transmission Lines and associated alarm I

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annunciation hardware are self-checking and tamper-indicating.

Alarm annunciators indicate the type of, alarm and its location when activated. An automatic indication of when the alarm system is on standby power is provided in the central alarm s'tation.

7.0 Communications As required in 10 CFR 73.55(f) the applicant has provided for the capability of continuous communications between the central and secondary alarm station operators, guards, watchmen, and -

  • armed response personnel throu'gh the use of a conventional telephone system, and a security radio system. In addition, direct communication with the local Law-enforcement authorities

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is maintained through the use of a conventional telephone

.., system and two-way VHF radio links. AlL non portable communication Links, except the conventional telephone system, are provided with an uninterruptable emergency power source.

8.0 Test and Maintenance Requirements In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(g) the applicant

.has established a program for the testing and maintenance of all intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communication equipment, physical barriers and other security related devices an'd equipment. Equipment or devices that do not meet the design performance criteria or have failed to otherwise operate wiLL i

be compensated for by appropriate compensatory measures as defined in the " Beaver Valley Power Station Physical Security Plan" and in site procedures. The compensatory measures 1

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- defined in these plans wiLL assure that the effectiveness of

. . the security system is not reduced by f ailures or other contingencies affect'ing the operation of th,e security related equipment or structures. Intrusion detection systems are tested for proper performance at the beginning and end of any period that they are used for security. Such testing wiLL be conducted at least once-every seven days.

Communication systems.for onsite communications are tested at the beginning of each security shift. Offsite communications - -

are tested at least once each' day.

Audits of the security program are conducted once every 12 months by personnel independent of site security manag'ement and supervision. The audits, focusing on the e2 - effectiveness of the physical protection provided by the onsite security organization implementing the approved security I program plans, include, but are not limited to: a review of the security procedures and practices; system testing and maintenance programs; and local Law enforcement assistance agreements. . A report is prepared documenting audit findings and recommendations'and is submitted to the plant management.

9.0 Responte' Requirements -

In meeting the requirements of 10 C FR 73.55(h) the applicant has provided for armed responders immediately available for response duties on aLL shifts consistent with the requirements of:the regulations. Considerations used in support of this 4

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. .e . number are attached (see Appendix). In addition, liaison with local Law enforcement authorities to provide additional response support in the event of security events has been established and documented.

The applicant's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with thefts, threats and radiolbgical sabotage events. satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C. The plan identifies appropriate security events which could initiate .. . -

a radiological sabotage event and identifies the app li cant 's preplanning, response resources, safeguards contingency participants and coordination activities for each identified event.' Through this plan, upon the detection of abnormal presence or activities within the protected or vital areas, response activities using the available resources would be initiated. The response activities and objectives include the neut ralization of the existing threat by requiring the response force members to interpose themselves between the adversary and their objective, instructions to use force commensurate with that used by the adversary, and authority to request sufficient assistance from the local Law enforcenant autho.rities to maintain control over the situation. )

l To assist in the assessment / response activities a closed i

circuit television system, providing the capability to  !

l observe the entire protected area perimeter, isolatien

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zones and a majority cf the protected area, is provided to the security organization. .

10.0 Employee Screening Program -

In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect against the design basis threat as stated in 10 CFR 73.1 (a ) (1) (i i), the Duquesne Light Company has provided an emp loye e screening program. Personnel who successfulLy complete- the employee screening program or its equivalent' .

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may be granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas at the Beaver Valley site. All other personnel requiring access to the site are escorted by persons authorized and trained for escort duties and who ha've successfulLy

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completed the employee screening program. The employee

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screening program is based upon accepted industry standards and includes a background investigation, a psychological e va lu a t i on, and a continuing observation program. In addition, the applicant may recognize the screening program of other nuclear util'ities or contractors based upon.a comparability r.eview conducted by the Duquesne Light Company. The plan also provides for a " grandfather clause" exclusion which atLows recognition of a certain period of trustworthy service with the Otility or contractor, as being equivalent to the overalL employee screening program. The staff has reviewed the applicant's screening program against the accepted industry standards (ANSI N18.17 1973) and has determined that the program is acceptable. -

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SITE SPECIFIC APPEllDIX t

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jAE""55 Aaterx;.nu. subj ect to L'nautho '- -.

ha ve and Crimin2 sanctions.

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, 50-412 RESP 0liSE FORCE ArtALYSIS SATEGUARDS INFOR'?.ATION

' ect to Unect*T5FGid disclosttro AC-inistr inal se.uctions.

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,Er.; CLOSURE ;5

....1..60-334/412 . .

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SALP INPUT EVALUATION BEAVERVALLEYNUCLEARPOWERhTATIOS .

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SAFEGUARDS REVIEW -

Q.:

#icategory Criteria

1. Manaaement Involvement and : Control in Assurind Quality 2

. Licensee has provided evidence of prior planni.ng and proper prioritization of safeguards matters, Safeguards issues '

are decided by Duquesne managem,ent.

2. Acorcach to Resolution of Technical Issues frcm a Safety 2

Stancocint

~ Licensee has demonstrated an understanding of safeguards issues. Approaches to safet9/safecuards matters are usually soun.d, thorough and conservative. ..

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.3. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives 1 Licensee provided technically sour.d responses in a timely ,

manner.

4. Enforcement History ,

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Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events N/A

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2

6. Steffino (Includino Manaoement) '

The authority and responsibilities associated with security organization positions are identified for management plant levels. The staff occup ing these positions show professionalism and expertise.

Training and Oualification Effectiveness

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The safeguards training and qualification plan and procedures contribute to a well defined security program.

' *Although the management struct0re for Unit 1 and 2 will be the same, the contents for this SALP reflect interactions mostly involving Unit 1.

Uhen Unit 2 is licensed, a combined SALP will be written for both units.

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ANUS G4CORATON "N d* 3 ?n"il s M 1E?oa<

(81L 7GS 22f54 December 14, 1984 CD-LIS-84-929 Project 1816 Director FREEDOM OF INFORMATKJN Division of Rules and Records ACT. REQUES U.S. N.R.C. cgA =#4 Washington, D.C. 20555 {ga e if Q. f7 -f (,

Dear Sir:

This is a Freedom of Informatm Act ret; est for the following document to be placed in the Public Document Room: 1 All NRC internal memos to Division of Licensing on Beaver Valley Unit 2 from May through November 1984 which provided draft SER, SER sections, and NRC questions / request for additional information for transmittal to Division of Licensing.

If clarification is neec':6 please call me at (813) 796-2264. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely, Lyle Graber Licensing Engineer ,

Licensing Information Service I ks l

l o neisee,1ce cemneev