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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20205L0401999-04-0909 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Relief Requests for Inservice Insp Second 10-year Interval for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 ML20203E1181999-02-10010 February 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Plant,Units 1 & 2 Quality Assurance Program Description ML20199F5341998-12-29029 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Requests 1-TYP-3-B3.140-1, 1-TYP-3-B5.70-1,1-TYP-3-RH-E-1-1,1-TYP-3-B-G-1, 1-TYP-3-APP-I-1,1-TYP-3-UT-1,1-TYP-3-N-509,1-TYP-3-N-521, 1-TYP-3-N-524,1-TYP-3-B3.120-1 & 1-TYP-3-C6.10-1 ML20198K8551998-12-21021 December 1998 SER Granting Relief Request PRR-5 for Third 10-year Inservice Testing for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198A1631998-12-0909 December 1998 SER Approving Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Facility That Has Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request ML20195J3131998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting First & Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief ML20154R9121998-10-20020 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes to QA Program Description in Chapter 17.2 of BVPS-2 Ufsar.Proposed Changes Would Modify QA Organization to Allow Warehouse QC Inspectors to Report to Manager of Nuclear Procurement Dept ML20154P7491998-10-19019 October 1998 SE Accepting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief RR-1-TYP-2-B5.40-1,Rev 0,for Plant, Unit 1 ML20154C6711998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Model Identified in Dl Submittal Was Appropriate for Analysis of Installed Conduit Ampacity Limits.Determined That There Are No Outstanding Safety Concerns with Respect to Ampacity ML20202B8571997-11-18018 November 1997 SE Approving Relief Requests for Second 10-Yr Interval for Pumps & Valves Inservice Testing Program for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 2 ML20199F4641997-11-13013 November 1997 SER Related to Reactor Pressure Vessel,Pressurized Thermal Shock Assessment for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 2 ML20212G4961997-10-28028 October 1997 SER Accepting Pressurized Thermal Shock Assessment for Beaver Valley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel ML20217J5311997-10-0808 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Re First,Second & Third 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217J5891997-10-0707 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Related to Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 ML20211D8441997-09-17017 September 1997 SER Approving SG 90-day Rept Submitted by Duquesne Light Co for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1,per GL 95-05 ML20216J5861997-09-0404 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Third 10-year IST Program.Approves Valve Relief Requests 1,3 & 4.Valve Relief Request 2 Not Required.Authorizes Pump Relief Requests 1,2,3 & 4 ML20148E1051997-05-28028 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License DPR-66 ML20137X1441997-04-0909 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to RPV Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule ML20057B0641993-09-13013 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief for IST of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pumps of Plant ML20056F3561993-08-12012 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee 930607 Request for Relief from Certain ASME Code Requirements for Temporary Repairs to Svc Water Sys ML20126H7601992-12-30030 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Valve Relief Requests VRR-27, VRR-43 & VRR-44 & Will Provide Reasonable Assurance of Operational Readiness of Valves to Perform Intended Functions.Relief Request PRR-11 Cannot Be Approved ML20127P2081992-11-20020 November 1992 SER Accepting Util Commitment to Entire GIP-2,including Both SQUG Commitments & Implementation Guidance ML20248D7681989-09-29029 September 1989 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Actions in Response to Open Items in 890510 Safety Evaluation Re Plant Safety Monitoring Sys ML20247N3561989-05-30030 May 1989 SER Supporting Util Actions to Comply W/Item 4.5.3 of Generic Ltr 83-28, Reactor Trip Sys Functional Testing ML20246M1791989-05-10010 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Verification & Validation Plan for Plant Safety Monitoring Sys.Hardware Design of Sys Found Acceptable.Verification & Validation Plan Found Incomplete & Unacceptable.Software Design Process Inadequate ML20246D5501989-04-26026 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Submittals on Natural Circulation Cooldown for Unit ML20206G0431988-11-17017 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That All Issues Raised Under Item Resolved & Item 4.3 Closed ML20153C0911988-08-17017 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 870731 Comments on Sser 5, Section 9.5.1.Fire Protection in Cable Rooms & Containment Constitutes Acceptable Deviations from Branch Technical Position Cmeb 9.5-1 ML20205T0021988-08-10010 August 1988 SER Accepting Util 831104,840330 & 870504 Responses to Item 2.2.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20154R4451988-05-31031 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Compliance W/Atws Rule 10CFR50.62.Util Proposed Design Acceptable Subj to Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20154P4341988-05-24024 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Tech Spec Change Acceptable.No Amend Issued Since Conditions Resulting in Need for Amend to License NPF-73 No Longer Exist ML20154F9841988-05-12012 May 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee 851114 Response to Open Issues Noted in 851017 Draft Technical Evaluation Rept of 831104 Submittal Re Salem ATWS Event Action Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review Satisfactory ML20154F9901988-05-12012 May 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee 880322 Response to Open Issues Identified in 860722 Draft Technical Evaluation Rept of 840330 Submittal Re Salem ATWS Event Action Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review Satisfactory ML20153B6291988-04-25025 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 870616 & 871110 Requests for Inservice Insp Relief for Welds on Nonregenerative Hxs,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20148K5231988-03-18018 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Inservice Testing Program & Requests for Relief ML20234E0531987-12-0808 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Design Changes to Be Implemented During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Fuel Reload.Tech Spec Change Unnecessary ML20236X4941987-11-0909 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 860617 Relief Request from Performing Volumetric & Visual Exam Requirements of ASME Section XI for Reactor Coolant Pumps Casing Welds & Internal Surfaces ML20237B1651987-10-21021 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Elimination of Primary Component Support Snubbers from Primary Coolant Loops ML20204H7181987-03-18018 March 1987 Interim Safety Evaluation Re Pump & Valve Operability Assurance (SER Confirmatory Issue 13).Pages from Pvort Audit Encl ML20206G2231987-03-12012 March 1987 SER Accepting Licensee Request to Use Damping Values from ASME Code Case N-411 Per Conditions Outlined in Util ML20207P6551987-01-0202 January 1987 SER Accepting Licensee Compliance W/Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1,Part 2 Re Vendor Interface Program for Reactor Trip Sys (RTS) Components & Item 4.5.2 Concerning RTS Online Reliability Testing ML20212B0111986-11-30030 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Exemptions from App R Requirements Re Separation of Cables & Equipment & Associated Circuits ML20205G4491986-08-31031 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20204G9281986-07-31031 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 860502 Submittal of Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation,Beaver Valley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1 Cycle 6 ML20203G2371986-07-28028 July 1986 Interim SER Re Dcrdr Summary Rept & Preimplementation Audit on 860211 & 12.Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 Generally Satisfied.Several Items Remain to Be Completed ML20206H4931986-06-19019 June 1986 Safety Evaluation on Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.2.3 & 4.2.4, Preventive Maint Program for Reactor Trip Breakers/Life Testing. Licensee Position Unacceptable ML20205N1151986-04-22022 April 1986 Interim Rept Re Review of Util Response to Generic Ltr 85-12 on Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Criteria.Addl Info Required ML20202C5721986-04-0303 April 1986 Sser Accepting Util 860304 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 4.3, Seismic Qualification of Shunt Trip Components ML20214E3631986-03-17017 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 2 to CPPR-105 ML20154N7451986-03-10010 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850819 Request to Withdraw Original Commitment to Provide Steam Leakage Collection Sys Around Certain Steam Valves 1999-04-09
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARL-99-154, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 199 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 199 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with L-99-139, LER 99-S01-00:on 990813,uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect within Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone Occurred.Caused by Procedure non-compliance.Involved Personnel Received Counseling Re Event.With1999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990813,uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect within Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone Occurred.Caused by Procedure non-compliance.Involved Personnel Received Counseling Re Event.With L-99-140, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with L-99-126, Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With L-99-107, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20209D9531999-06-27027 June 1999 Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999 L-99-096, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for BVPS Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for BVPS Units 1 & 2. with L-99-078, Special Rept:On 990326,seismic Monitoring Instruments Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Resolution of Potential TS Compliance Issue & Work Scheduling Issue.Instrumentation Was Returned to Svc Following Calibr & Declared Operable1999-05-0303 May 1999 Special Rept:On 990326,seismic Monitoring Instruments Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Resolution of Potential TS Compliance Issue & Work Scheduling Issue.Instrumentation Was Returned to Svc Following Calibr & Declared Operable L-99-079, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205L0401999-04-0909 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Relief Requests for Inservice Insp Second 10-year Interval for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 L-99-054, Special Rept:On 990320,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Calibration Completed by Vendor Did Not Adequately Cover Full Operating Range of Sensors.Removed Sensors & Sent Offsite1999-04-0505 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990320,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Calibration Completed by Vendor Did Not Adequately Cover Full Operating Range of Sensors.Removed Sensors & Sent Offsite L-99-058, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20196K7981999-03-25025 March 1999 Rev 4 to COLR, for Cycle 8 L-99-038, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20203E1181999-02-10010 February 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Plant,Units 1 & 2 Quality Assurance Program Description L-99-019, Special Rept:On 990120,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Processor Card for Sensor Locked Up & Needed to Be Reset.Heater That Fit Around Shaft of Sensor Replaced1999-02-0505 February 1999 Special Rept:On 990120,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Processor Card for Sensor Locked Up & Needed to Be Reset.Heater That Fit Around Shaft of Sensor Replaced ML20196F7011999-01-31031 January 1999 BVPS Unit 2 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves During Normal Operation at 15 EFPY Using Code Case N-626 ML20203D4811999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2, in Accordance with NRC GL 97-02.With ML20207E6631999-01-28028 January 1999 Rev 0 to EMECH-0713-1, Operational Assessment of SG Tubing at Beaver Valley Unit 1,Cycle 13 ML20210G7041999-01-22022 January 1999 BVPS Unit 1 Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for 980123-990122 ML20207E5861998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Toledo Edison ML20207E5601998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Pennpower ML20198B9021998-12-31031 December 1998 BVPS Unit 1 Simulator Four Yr Certification Rept for 1995-1998 ML20207E5901998-12-31031 December 1998 Dqe 1998 Annual Rept to Shareholders ML20199C9971998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20207E5521998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Ohio Edison ML20207E5761998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Illuminating Co ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20199F5341998-12-29029 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Requests 1-TYP-3-B3.140-1, 1-TYP-3-B5.70-1,1-TYP-3-RH-E-1-1,1-TYP-3-B-G-1, 1-TYP-3-APP-I-1,1-TYP-3-UT-1,1-TYP-3-N-509,1-TYP-3-N-521, 1-TYP-3-N-524,1-TYP-3-B3.120-1 & 1-TYP-3-C6.10-1 ML20198K8551998-12-21021 December 1998 SER Granting Relief Request PRR-5 for Third 10-year Inservice Testing for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198A1631998-12-0909 December 1998 SER Approving Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Facility That Has Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request L-98-229, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20195J3131998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting First & Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief L-98-210, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20206G0291998-10-31031 October 1998 BVPS Unit 2 Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period 971101-981031 ML20154R9121998-10-20020 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes to QA Program Description in Chapter 17.2 of BVPS-2 Ufsar.Proposed Changes Would Modify QA Organization to Allow Warehouse QC Inspectors to Report to Manager of Nuclear Procurement Dept ML20154P7491998-10-19019 October 1998 SE Accepting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief RR-1-TYP-2-B5.40-1,Rev 0,for Plant, Unit 1 ML20198F7611998-10-0606 October 1998 Duquesne Light Co,Beaver Valley Power Station 1998 Emergency Preparedness Ingestion Zone Exercise, Conducted on 981006 ML20154C6711998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Model Identified in Dl Submittal Was Appropriate for Analysis of Installed Conduit Ampacity Limits.Determined That There Are No Outstanding Safety Concerns with Respect to Ampacity ML20154D5001998-09-30030 September 1998 Special Rept on Overview of BVPS-1 & BVPS-2 TS Compliance Issues & Corrective Action Taken L-98-197, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154E2171998-09-28028 September 1998 Follow-up Part 21 Rept Re Defect with 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50 App B Program. Westronics Has Notified Bvps,Ano & RBS & Is Currently Making Arrangements to Implement Design Mods L-98-188, Special Rept:During 1998,Unit 2 SG Eddy Current exam,26 Tubes Were Improperly Encoded in SG 2RCS-SG21C During Previous Outage.Use of Independent Databases to Track New Indications Being Implemented as Preventive Measure1998-09-21021 September 1998 Special Rept:During 1998,Unit 2 SG Eddy Current exam,26 Tubes Were Improperly Encoded in SG 2RCS-SG21C During Previous Outage.Use of Independent Databases to Track New Indications Being Implemented as Preventive Measure L-98-178, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20155B5871998-08-28028 August 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to 51-5001925-01, Risk Assessment for Installation of Electrosleeves at BVPS & Callaway Plant ML20236X2351998-08-0505 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Associated W/Westronics 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50,App B Program.Beaver Valley,Arkansas Nuclear One & River Bend Station Notified.Design Mod Is Being Developed L-98-168, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 L-98-157, Special Rept:On 980423,inoperability of Seismic Monitoring Instrument Noted.Caused by Obsolescence of Instrument & Inability to Obtain Necessary Spare Parts.Design Change Is Being Pursued to Obtain Replacement Product1998-07-29029 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980423,inoperability of Seismic Monitoring Instrument Noted.Caused by Obsolescence of Instrument & Inability to Obtain Necessary Spare Parts.Design Change Is Being Pursued to Obtain Replacement Product L-98-139, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 L-98-119, Monthly Operating Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
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. n/l - 50-412 SA:EG; ADS FORVf~d EliCLOSURE 2
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SAFEGUARDS SAFET,Y EVALUATION REPORT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION
'l 3 sATEGUAF.DS I;:yoguTION 0 Den ecparated from
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' Unm eorhed .4 0 ici al e ations. , EA' IDLE CHIS DOCBET AS Ad=inistre. i e
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(insertiroper classification) -
8505300048 850304 PD1 FOIA GP.ABER84-926 PDR SA:EGJADS F0nlAToy
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- .G i 1.0 Introduction
~The Duquesne Light Company originally . filed with the Nuclear Regulatory C'ommission for the Beaver Valley Power Station the following security program plans which.have since
-been revised and amended:
" Beaver Valley Power Station Physical Security Plan and I
Safeguards Contingency Plan", Revision 0 transmitted by Letter dated July 28, 1983 and " Training and Qualification
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Plan" Revision 0 transmitted by letter dated July 28, 1983".
This Safety Evaluation Report (SER) sumnarizes how the e
Licensee has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part '7 3 . The SER is composed of a basic analysis that is evailable for pubLic review, and a protected Appendix.
2.0 Physical Security Organization To satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b) the Duquesne Light Company has provided a physical security organization that includes a Shift Security Supervisor who is onsite at
,all times with the authority to direct the physical' protection activities. To implement the commitments made in the physical security plan, training and qualification plan, and~the safeguards contingency plan, written security procedures c.necifying the duties of 'he security organization members have been developed and are available for inspection.
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The training program and. critical security tasks and duties for the security organization personnel are defined in the
" Beaver Valley Power Station Training and Qualification Plan" which meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B for the training, equipping and requalification of the security organization members. The physical security plan and I
the train'ing program provide commitments that preclude the assignment of any individual to a security related duty or ,
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task prior to the individual being trained, equipped and qualified.to perform the assigned duty in accordance with the approved guard training and qualification plan. ,
3.0 Physical Barriers In neeting the requireme.nts of 10 CFR 73.55(c) the applicant has provided a protected area barrier which meets the definition in 10 C FR 73.2 (f) (1) . A 20 foot wide isolation zone, to-permit observation of activities at-the perimeter, is provided (except for the locations listed in the Appendix) along_both sides of barrier.
The staff has reviewed those Lo. cations and determined that the security measures in place are satisfactory and continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c).
Illumination of 0.2 foot-candles is maintained for the isolation zones, protected area' barriers, and external portions of the protected area.
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4.0 Identification of Vital Areas
. The Appendix contains a discussion of the applicant's vital area program and identifies those areas and items'of equipment determined to be vital for protection purposes. Vital equipment is located within vital areas which are located within the
, protected area and which require passage through at least two i
barriers, as ' defined in 10 C FR 73.2(f)(1) and (2), to gain access to the vital equipment. Vital area barriers are separated from the protected area barrier.
The control room and central alarn station are provided with bullet-resistant walls, doors', ceilings, floors, and windows.
Based.on these findings and the analysis set forth in
. paragraph C of the Apoendix (except as noted therein), the staff has concluded that the applicant's program for i.dentification and protection of vital equipment satisfies the regulatory intent. However, this program is subject to onsite validation by the staff in the future, and to subsequent changes if found to be necessary.
5.0 Access Requirements In~accor' dance with 10 CFR 73.55(d) all points of personnel and vehicle access to the protected-area are controlled. The individual responsible for controlling the final point of access into the protected area is located in a bullet-resistant structure. As part of the access control program, vehicles (except under emergency conditions), personnel, packages, and materials entering the protected area are searched for
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explosives, firearms and incendiary devices by' electronic search equipment and/or physical search.
' Vehicles admitted to the protected area, except Licensee designated vehicles, are controlled by escorts when in operation.
Licensee designated vehicles are limited to on-site station functions and remain in the protected area except for operational maiptenance, repair, security and emergency purposes.
Positive con *rol over the vehicles is maintained by personnel authorized to use the vehicles or by the escort personnel. A picture badge / key card systen, utin 'ng encoded information, identifies individuals that are authorized unescorted access to protected and vital areas,
. and is.used to control acces: to these areas. Individuals not authorized unescorted acc^ess are i ssued non picture badges that indicate an escort is required. Access authorizations are limited to those individuals who have a need for access to perform their duties.
Unoccupied vital areas are locked and' alarmed. During periods of refueling.or major maintenance, access to the reactor
-containment (s) is positively controlled by a member of the security organization to assure that only authorized .
individuals and materials are' permitted to enter. In addition, all1 doors ~and pers,onnet/ equipment hatches into the reactor containment (s) are locked and alarmed. Keys, Locks, t
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combinations and related equipment are changed on an annual basis. In addition, when an individual,'s access authorization has been terminated due to the lack of reliability or trustworthiness, or for poor work performance, the keys, Locks, combinations and related equipment to which that person had access are changed.
-6.0 Detection Aids In satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) the applicant has installed intrusion detection systems at the - -
protected area barrier, at entrances to vital areas, and at a L L emergency exit's. Alarms from the intrusion detection system annunciate within the continuously manned central alarm' station and a secondary alarm station located within
, 2, the protected area. The central alarm station is located such that the interior of the station is not visible from cutside the perimeter of the protected area. In addition, the central. station is constructed so that walls, floors, ceilings, doors, and windows are bullet-resistant. The alarm stations are located and desig'ned in such a ma'nner so a single act cannot interdict the capability of calling for assistance or responding to alarms. The central alarm station contains no other functions or duties that would interfere with its alarm response function. The intrusion detection system transmission Lines and associated alarm I
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annunciation hardware are self-checking and tamper-indicating.
Alarm annunciators indicate the type of, alarm and its location when activated. An automatic indication of when the alarm system is on standby power is provided in the central alarm s'tation.
7.0 Communications As required in 10 CFR 73.55(f) the applicant has provided for the capability of continuous communications between the central and secondary alarm station operators, guards, watchmen, and -
- armed response personnel throu'gh the use of a conventional telephone system, and a security radio system. In addition, direct communication with the local Law-enforcement authorities
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is maintained through the use of a conventional telephone
.., system and two-way VHF radio links. AlL non portable communication Links, except the conventional telephone system, are provided with an uninterruptable emergency power source.
8.0 Test and Maintenance Requirements In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(g) the applicant
.has established a program for the testing and maintenance of all intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communication equipment, physical barriers and other security related devices an'd equipment. Equipment or devices that do not meet the design performance criteria or have failed to otherwise operate wiLL i
be compensated for by appropriate compensatory measures as defined in the " Beaver Valley Power Station Physical Security Plan" and in site procedures. The compensatory measures 1
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- defined in these plans wiLL assure that the effectiveness of
. . the security system is not reduced by f ailures or other contingencies affect'ing the operation of th,e security related equipment or structures. Intrusion detection systems are tested for proper performance at the beginning and end of any period that they are used for security. Such testing wiLL be conducted at least once-every seven days.
Communication systems.for onsite communications are tested at the beginning of each security shift. Offsite communications - -
are tested at least once each' day.
Audits of the security program are conducted once every 12 months by personnel independent of site security manag'ement and supervision. The audits, focusing on the e2 - effectiveness of the physical protection provided by the onsite security organization implementing the approved security I program plans, include, but are not limited to: a review of the security procedures and practices; system testing and maintenance programs; and local Law enforcement assistance agreements. . A report is prepared documenting audit findings and recommendations'and is submitted to the plant management.
9.0 Responte' Requirements -
In meeting the requirements of 10 C FR 73.55(h) the applicant has provided for armed responders immediately available for response duties on aLL shifts consistent with the requirements of:the regulations. Considerations used in support of this 4
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. .e . number are attached (see Appendix). In addition, liaison with local Law enforcement authorities to provide additional response support in the event of security events has been established and documented.
The applicant's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with thefts, threats and radiolbgical sabotage events. satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C. The plan identifies appropriate security events which could initiate .. . -
a radiological sabotage event and identifies the app li cant 's preplanning, response resources, safeguards contingency participants and coordination activities for each identified event.' Through this plan, upon the detection of abnormal presence or activities within the protected or vital areas, response activities using the available resources would be initiated. The response activities and objectives include the neut ralization of the existing threat by requiring the response force members to interpose themselves between the adversary and their objective, instructions to use force commensurate with that used by the adversary, and authority to request sufficient assistance from the local Law enforcenant autho.rities to maintain control over the situation. )
l To assist in the assessment / response activities a closed i
circuit television system, providing the capability to !
l observe the entire protected area perimeter, isolatien
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zones and a majority cf the protected area, is provided to the security organization. .
10.0 Employee Screening Program -
In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect against the design basis threat as stated in 10 CFR 73.1 (a ) (1) (i i), the Duquesne Light Company has provided an emp loye e screening program. Personnel who successfulLy complete- the employee screening program or its equivalent' .
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may be granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas at the Beaver Valley site. All other personnel requiring access to the site are escorted by persons authorized and trained for escort duties and who ha've successfulLy
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completed the employee screening program. The employee
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screening program is based upon accepted industry standards and includes a background investigation, a psychological e va lu a t i on, and a continuing observation program. In addition, the applicant may recognize the screening program of other nuclear util'ities or contractors based upon.a comparability r.eview conducted by the Duquesne Light Company. The plan also provides for a " grandfather clause" exclusion which atLows recognition of a certain period of trustworthy service with the Otility or contractor, as being equivalent to the overalL employee screening program. The staff has reviewed the applicant's screening program against the accepted industry standards (ANSI N18.17 1973) and has determined that the program is acceptable. -
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, 50-412 RESP 0liSE FORCE ArtALYSIS SATEGUARDS INFOR'?.ATION
' ect to Unect*T5FGid disclosttro AC-inistr inal se.uctions.
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SALP INPUT EVALUATION BEAVERVALLEYNUCLEARPOWERhTATIOS .
~
SAFEGUARDS REVIEW -
- Q.:
#icategory Criteria
- 1. Manaaement Involvement and : Control in Assurind Quality 2
. Licensee has provided evidence of prior planni.ng and proper prioritization of safeguards matters, Safeguards issues '
are decided by Duquesne managem,ent.
- 2. Acorcach to Resolution of Technical Issues frcm a Safety 2
Stancocint
~ Licensee has demonstrated an understanding of safeguards issues. Approaches to safet9/safecuards matters are usually soun.d, thorough and conservative. ..
i
.3. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives 1 Licensee provided technically sour.d responses in a timely ,
manner.
- 4. Enforcement History ,
', , N/A .
Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events N/A
- 5. ,
2
- 6. Steffino (Includino Manaoement) '
The authority and responsibilities associated with security organization positions are identified for management plant levels. The staff occup ing these positions show professionalism and expertise.
Training and Oualification Effectiveness
~
1
- 7. ,
The safeguards training and qualification plan and procedures contribute to a well defined security program.
' *Although the management struct0re for Unit 1 and 2 will be the same, the contents for this SALP reflect interactions mostly involving Unit 1.
Uhen Unit 2 is licensed, a combined SALP will be written for both units.
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ANUS G4CORATON "N d* 3 ?n"il s M 1E?oa<
(81L 7GS 22f54 December 14, 1984 CD-LIS-84-929 Project 1816 Director FREEDOM OF INFORMATKJN Division of Rules and Records ACT. REQUES U.S. N.R.C. cgA =#4 Washington, D.C. 20555 {ga e if Q. f7 -f (,
Dear Sir:
This is a Freedom of Informatm Act ret; est for the following document to be placed in the Public Document Room: 1 All NRC internal memos to Division of Licensing on Beaver Valley Unit 2 from May through November 1984 which provided draft SER, SER sections, and NRC questions / request for additional information for transmittal to Division of Licensing.
If clarification is neec':6 please call me at (813) 796-2264. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely, Lyle Graber Licensing Engineer ,
Licensing Information Service I ks l
l o neisee,1ce cemneev