ML20203K373

Insp Rept 70-1257/98-01 on 980126-30.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Mgt Organization & Controls, Operational Event Review & Feedback,Operator Training & Qualification & Selected Aspects of Operational Safety

ML20203K373
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	02/24/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203K362	List: ML20203K358 ML20203K373
References
70-1257-98-01, 70-1257-98-1, NUDOCS 9803050067
Download: ML20203K373 (16)

Text

. - - _ - . . - . .

ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- REGION IV ,

Docket No.: 70 1257 License No.: SNM-1227 Report No.: 70-1257/98-01 Licensee: Siemens Powe' Corporation

- Facility: Siemens Powe.r Corporation Location: Richland, Washington Dates: January 26-S0,1998 Inspector: C. A. iiooker, Senior Fuel Facility inspector Approved By: Frank A. Wenslawski, Chief Materials Branch

Attachment:

Supplemental inspection Information l

9903050067 990224 PDR ADOCK 07001257 C PDR ,

l.

2 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Siemens Power Corporation NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/98-01 This routine, announced inspection included a review of management organization and controls, operational event review and feedback, operator training and qualification, selected aspects of operational safety, and followup on open items from previous inspections.

Manaaement Oraanization and Controls

• The licensee's management controls and staffing appeared adequate for current licensed activities (Section 1.1).

• The licenses was adequately implementing its procedure control progmm and pracecares effectively communicated managemont's expectations of conducting operations safe;y (Section 1.2).

• Trie li: ensee's internal audit program appeared efisctive in identifying and correcting deficiencies (Soction 1.3).

Qp.eImignal Event Review and Feedback

- The twensuo maintained adequate procedures for review of abnormal events. Abnormal events reviewed were adequately evaluated prior to continued operations. NRC operational notifications were adequately reviewed for applicabit;ty to the licensee's facility. Including the year 2000 effect on computer software (Section 2.1).

• There was a negative trend in the licensee's closure of corrective actions for Criticality Safety Corrective Action Reports (CSCARs) (Section 2.1)

• A 250 gallon hydrofluoric (HF) acid spill was due, in part, to operators, engineers, and supervisors not adequately reviewing problem indicators, making assumptions regarding instrument failures, and not mplementing effective compensatory measures for assumed instrument failures (Section 2.2).

Qp3fator Trainina and Qualification

• The licensee was adequately implementing its training programs. Operators and supervisors appeared qualified for their job assignments and sufficiently knowledgeable of the respective safety requirements (Section 3).

i Ooerational Safety Review

• The licensee had taken appropriate actions toward achieving compliance with its I requirement for temporary storage locations, and the storage of special nuclear I

3-mMerial(SNM) in the new storage warehouse was consistent with the respective

• 4 criticality safety analysis (CSA) and criticality safety specification (CSS) (Section 4.1).

I

• A lack of coordination between engineering, maintenance, and operations during a malntenance task involving a pyrohydrolysis vessel in the dry conversion facility (DCF) 4 was recognized and corrected by the operations supervisor (Section 4.2).

. Housekeeping appeared adequate (Section 4.2).

+

4 4

i i

d a

s

( -

-4 Reoort Details

.G.!LTJai;;v of Plaqt Status The plant was operating both of its wet chemical conversion lines and Line 1 in the new DCF.

Fuel peHet production, fuel rod, and fuel bundle assembly operations were also in progress, i Management Organization and Controls 1.1 Orcaniza. ion and Staffino

a. insoection Scone (88005)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization, defined responsibilities, and staffing.

b. QMs l mi and FindiQga By le ter dated August 28,1997, the licensee submitted a license amendment request to reflect irmninent organizational changes. By letter datei August 29,1997, the NRC amended (Amendment No. 5) the license to authorize in0 organizational changes.

These changes became effective during September and October 1997 and involved the codtion of Vice President (VP), Engineering and Manufacturin), being split into bvo positionx VP. Manufacturing, and VP, Engineering. The VP of Sales and Projects was appointeo as a now Senior VP and General Manager, Nuclear Division. This function was'previously located in Bellevue, Washington, and was relocated to the Richland facility. The previous SeniorVP and General Manager, Nuclear Division, assumed responsibdity for a Siemens foreign component. The VP, Manufacturin0, is responsible for overa'i uranium fuel and component manufacturing activities and reports directly to Senior VF and General Manager, Nuclear Division, who is the senior site representative and has fall authority and responsibility for all site activities. The position of VP, Engirnermg, was assumed by an individual acting in this position who is responsible for Siemens fuel engineering activities. Other lower-tier management changes were also noted due to the new changes and retirement of pt.rsonnel.

No concems were ider tified with the organization changes or qualifications of individuals appointed to their new positions. Defined responsibilities and qualifications of management and other staffed positions were consistent witn those described in ~

Chapter 2, Part I of the license. Responsibilities and authority for plant safety viere also adequately described in the licensee's safety standards,

c. Conclusions The licensee's managemeni controls and staffing appeared adequate for current licensed activities.

'p .

' . 5-

' 1.2 - Procedura Control 1

4 Insoedion Scow (88005) a.

i~ The inspector reviewed and discussed procedural controls with the safety and operations i

personnel. Selected safety standards and operating procedures were reviewed relative to the licensee's review and approval process, i' b. Observations and Findinos Safety standards and licenses procedures were prepared, reviewed, and approved in 4

accordance with Figure 12.3," Approval and Responsibility Matrix," Part I of the license,

- Procedures were periodically reviesed and revisions to incorporate changes in

operations appeared timely. Temporary document revisions (TDRs) were made to

operating procedures when circumstances warranted immediate chanL - The inspector noted that TDRs were issued in accordance with Quh!;ty Assurance Prowure No. 5.

" Temporary Document Revisions and Interim Procedures," until the applicable p ocedure could be revisec and appropriately approved. Operator training was appropriately incorporated in the TDR process. The inspector also noted that revisk 1s to operating procedures were provided to senior operators for review and comment, j During the past few months, the licensee has been in the process of transferring all of i

the stifety standards, operating procedures, engineering procedures, criticality safety

- spe:ifications, and other contro!!cd documents / procedures to a comput.rized program and had eliminated mini-lit,raries located thrcughout the site. The it,4pector noted that i

the primary work stations la the operating areas had been equipped with computer consoles to provide operators immediate access (read / print only) to operating procedures. No concerns were identified during a cursory review of the new Lystem.

L i

c. fanc'usions The licensee was adequately implementing its procedure control piogram. The

- licensee's safety standards and procedures also effectively communicated management's expectations of conducting operations safely, a -

1.32 L intemal Reviews and Audits F a. - Insoection Scone (88005)

I ,

e The inspector reviewed licensee Health and Safety Council (H&SC) reports, and intemal

'. audits and inspections for_ the past 3 months. The audits and inspections reviewed

_ included monthly H&SC committee safety inspections of housekeeping 8.id industrial 4 - safety, monthly criticality safety audits by the Criticality Safety Compone.nt, monthly radiological safety audits, and quarterly inspections of the environmental program, i

4 4

v. w -

m e 9 g r+ ,- m , - - . g cw -em- ,,., ara m-., ,, en -- -- - - - . ~ . - w- ,

b. 9bSefYations and Findinas The inspector noted that the licensee's internal audit and inspection programs were consistent with Section 2, Part I of the license. Membership of the H&SC and items reviewed by the committee were con ,istent with that described in Section 2.3.1, Part I of the license. Monthly H&SC meetings adequately included the review of investigations, Gtartus Council meetings, all routine safety audit reports and issues, abnormal events, and sahty data trending.

Audits defined ' cction 2, Part I of the license were performed in accordance with

,dures and checklists. The audits appeared effective in identifying estabbshed r deficiencies at, corrective actions appeared appropriate. The licensee's biennial management appraisal of its criticality safety program was in progress.

9.ggn1.Vi!29 1

The licrisers Ludit program appeared effective in identifying deficiencies and corrective "ctions appeart J cppropriate.

. Opeational Event Review and Feedback P.1 Omgram EfenJconc WOO? a,d 030V 1 he inspector reviewed licenste procedures for reviewing and reporting of off-normal coerating conditions or events associated with licensed activities. The inspection also neludea a review of selected CSCARs and Shift Supervisor's Abnormal Event Logs (SSAEL :) inkiated for the past 3 months, the licensee's management and tracking of CSCARr and S3AEls, and its review of NRC Information Notices (ins) and other NRC ceneric publicauons.

h. phervations and Findings Chapter 2, " Radiation Protection Standards"; Chapter 3, Criticality Safety Standards';

and Chapter 4, " Environmental Standards" of the licensee's Safety Manual (EMF-30) adequately delineated the responsibilities for reporting of violations, incidents or off standard conditions for each respective area. Chapter 4 included both radiological effluents and chemicalincidents.

Standard Operating Procedure No. P66,923," Plant Operations Abnormal Event Reporting," .:.dequately delineated abnormal event reporting within Plant Operations for

• non-contained spills or releases of radioactive material, spills of hazardous materials outside of buildings, tank or container overflows, safety equipment failures, criticality safety violations, leaking pipes or roofs in controlled zones, fires or localized floods, and any work-related personnelinjuries requiring off site treatment. The operational aonormal event review process included a determination of the cause, and justification ,

l

L.

7 for continued operation or resta t of operations. The procedure adequately defined abnormal events that required shutting down the affected operation, and the authority and re.;poncibilities for restart. For certain defined conditions the Manager, Plant Operstion. must authorize restart of the affected operation. With any uncertainty as to the safc!y for plant operations, the VP, Manufacturing, and the safety department must provide approval for any restert of operations. Whether an event occurs or not, SSAELs are filled out for each shift and distributed daily to the general supervisor of the renpectivo area; the Manager, Plant Operations; VP, Manufactur' 1; and the safety department or engineering, as appropriate.

CSCARs were initiated by the criticality safety staff or operations personnel for licensee identified infractions and abnormal events related to criticality safety. The CSCARs include a description of the problem, the results of reviews performed to determine reportability to the NRC, immediate actions taken to :orrect the problem, identification of who performed these actions, and recommended long term corrective actions to prevent recurrenco. The criticality safety group maintained a tracking system of allinfractions which neladed the types of violations, activities involved, causes responsible group, and how th >y were identified. The system also provided a graphical comparison for the past 3 yeara. T he inspector noted that a majority of the infractions involved moderation contro;, fol' owed by mass control, labeling, and improper storage. According to the licensee's data, about 90 percent of allinfractions were identified by operators. The livensr a had 40 CSCARs in 1995,60 in 1996, and 55 in 1997, with a goal of 40 or less fx 1M7. The 1:censeo attributed mest cf the CSCARs to the addition of administrative anNb v.h;ch constituted approximately 35 percent of the 1997 CSCARS. Tne licensee's 1990 goal was to have less than 40 CSCARs.

Related to CSCARs, the inspector noted an increasing trend in overdue corrective acbons which ranged from approximately 6 percent in March 1997 to approximately 6 ' pm ent (75 open actions and 38 overdue)in December 1997. The inspector noted Mt sc me of the overdue corrective actions were associated with old CSCARs which ha mocevably been closed, but the licensee lacked the formal paper work for closure. The increa e in overdue corrective actions appeared to indicate that the licensee had not taken an tggressi/e approach to ensure all corrective actions for CSCARs were closed in a timely manner. The inspector noted that immediate corrective act!ons had been effectisely implemented. The inspector did not identify any uncompleted long-term corrective actions that would affect the safety of current operations.

Regarding abnormal operational events, the Manager, Plant Operations, tracked abnormal events and their causes. The causes were broken down into categories of operator error, maintenance error, process problems, equipment failure, design, and other. The licensee's data indicated no appreciable difference in the trend of causes and number of events between 1996 and 1997. .

The licensee's commitment trackirig system was defined in Administrative Precedure AP-1," Manufacturing Regulatory Commitment Tracking." This system tracks licensing matters that required licensee responses or other actions, incident Review Board actions items, Corrective Action Requests from Quality Assurance or cus'omer d

i _

s t

l audits, responses / commitments to NRC Confirmatory Action Letters, responses / action .

i llems required by regulatory agencies, CSCARs, and Health Physics Corrective Action '

' ;Ruquest action items. The licensee's commitment tracking system appeared to. be an i

effective management tool for tracking and closure of regulatory or licensee identiSed action items, However, as noted above, there was a negative trend in timely closure of

- corrective actions for CSCARs.

4 The inspector did not identify any concoms relative to the licensee's timely review of

abnormal events or bases for continued / restart of operations. Immediate corrective actions were effectively implemented prior to restart of operations and outstanding long - '

term corrective actions appeared not to effect the bases for continued operations. The l-inspector did not identify any concems relative to the licensee's determinations on the reportability of events to the NRC, Rogarding NRC ins, Bulletins, and Generic Letters, the inspector verified that the ionsee had received and reviewed IN Nos. 96 70,97-01,03,04,20,23,24,30,34,36,

12,47,50,56, 57,66,72,75,80, and NRC Bulletin 97-02 for applicability to their facility. >

Pegarding IN No. 96 70, " Year 2000 Effect on Computer Software," the licensee had I Men working on the potential problems relative to this matter for more than a year. The licensee's preventative mair.tenance, instrument calibration, work scheduling, supply 1

Inventory, supply purchasing and other related tasks have been conve ted to a new i

year 2000 compliant program, The SNM and accountability system was being converted cver to s yent 2003 compliant proyam, and the healt'1 physics programs and site .

l twining data base were scheduled for review to evaluate their susceptibility to the potential problem The licensle's computer staff felt comfortable that Siemens would not experience any signifbant problems ard were actively reviewing the matter, l

c. ,kudmihen

. iha licensee mabtained adequate procedures for review of abnormal events, Abnormal eventa reviewed were adequately evaluated prior to continued operations. NRC cperational notifications were adequately reviewed for applicability to the licensee's

facility, including tne year 2000 effect on computer software. There was a negative trend

• - in the timely closure of corrective actions for CSCARs.

2.2 pperational Event Review i ,

[C_ l osed) Insoection Followuo item (IFI) 70-1257/9707-01: Review licensee's investigation of HF acid spill.- NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/97-07 dated January 16, 1998, described the details of the subject 250 gallon acid spill which occurred from Tank 501 on December _10,1997. . As documented in the report, there were no pers:nnel

- injuries or measureble release to the environment.' The licensee's incident investigation Report, "HF Overflow investigation," dated 'Janua_r y 6,1998, was reviewed and J discussed with cognizant licerisee personnel. The licensee's investigation addressed root causes, findings related to the causes, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

- J The licensee determined that causes of the event were due to:

M'

,e v. e w e r-sa + .- m-- . e-- . . - r. -==s _ s . , - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9

. Lei,s than adequate review of problem indicators in that operators, engineers, and supervisors did not thoroughly investigate the safety significance of the Tank 501 level sensor not working and whether the independent levelindicator was operable, as well as not verifying that the level sensor for Tank 500 was malfunctioning.

• Less than adequate functiona' testing in that a complete test of the 3-way valve was not performed.

- The 3-way valve was installed incorrectly.

'T he licensee identified 13 corrective actions relative to the event. The inspector noted tnat immediate corrective actions had been adequately implemented prior to the restart of operations. Long term corrective actions appeared appropriate and all but one had Mn completed. Aside from repositioning the 3-way valve and installing a new level consor in Tank 501, some of the corrective actions involved: (1) verifying on the control satera thrt Icvei readings in the tanks increased when filling and recording the levels in u i or eratar log, (2) standardizing levelindicator alarm configuration (completed),

p) checking allinstruments prior to startup and use of the tanks, (4) revising the support g,vup's daily check sheet tn include daily checks of the HF sump, (5) conducting a

• lemons learned" training class with all of the dry conversion operators regarding conde:t of operations, (6) conducting a

• lessons teamed

• training class with all engineers in Mauheturing Engineering (h progress but not comp!cted), and (7) fabricating tmndr, to di;, play hourly HF tank levels on the contrei syraem.

The inspector discussed with the licensee the bases for the decision made, prior to the event to cor.tinue operations L.. der the assumption that both tank level indicators were ret functioning properly. The decision was based on the licensee's knowledge that T nk 500 (capacity 12,000 gallons) was empty when the HF flow was directed to it and wth a norainal fill rate of approximately 370 gallons per day, the licensee believed that t ce was ample tank capacity until the level sensing problems could be corrected when new sensors arrived onsite.

The inspector considered the failure of the operating and enoineering staff to implement adequate and rigorous compensatory measures when it was first assumed that both tank level sensors were not functioning a factor that contributed to the event. The spill occurred over an approximate 12-hour period before it was detected. This matter was discussed during the inspection and at the exit meeting. The inspector's observation was acknowledged by licensee representatives.

3 Operator Training and Qualification

a. Insoection Scoce (88010)

The in pector reviewed the licensee's general employee training (GET) program and the training and qualification program for operators and superviscrs in the new DCF. The inspector also reviewed ongoing work activities during facility tours and held discussions

-10 l.

With operators to view their understanding of the safety requirements of their job astJgnment.

D. Observations and Findinos The inspector noted that new employees, contractors, and office personnel continued to recolve training (video or classroom) that included tho bas;cs of radiation protection, criticality safetv, hazardous chemical safety, fire protection, emergency requirements, and security. Personnel assigned to work with radioactive materials received a more comprt.hensive formal classroom GET in each of these topic areas prior to working without an escort. Upon completion of the formal classroom training, each individualis tested as to their knowledge of the material presented. In 1996, the licensee implemented a new computerized interactive laser video training program for portions of the annual refresher GET. The interactive program covered training in the areas of crireality safety, radiation safety, and respiratory protection with test questions for each soument. The licensee was in the process of changing the interactive refresher tiaining to a computer CD system and making the contents more specific to the site. Personnel '

hr I been provided arinual refresher training consistent with their work assignment.

Cperator training continued to be formalized through work station training and qualification guides. The training and qualification guides define specific job at.Lignments and associated procedures an individual must be knowledgeable of before bring qualMed for an assigned tssk. The licensee's records showed that new or e %gned opcrators nad comp',att/ ,3cessary tests on applicable procedures for their

' monstration

of skills for their respective job ad. aigned tasks, on-the-job-training, awignment.

During the equipment installation phase in the new DCF, operators and the General Superviser, Chemical Operatiorn ',3SCO), were assigned to the facility to become knowledgeable of the facility and assist in the development of operating procedures.

Prior to startup, each operator was tested on applicable operating procedures, including demonstration of skills. During normal day shift hours, the GSCO has been providing supervisory oversight of operatior.s associated with the DCF. On back-shift hours, senior onerators were assigned as lead operators who provide supervisory oversight of the process, and the chemical conversion shift supervisors in the "UQ Building" were assigned responsibility for oversight of site-wide operaticas. When the UF, chemical conversion processes are shut down, the respective shift supervisors are to be physically located to the DCF Through rotational assignments, the chemical conversion shift supervisors have been qualifying on the station operating precedures and computerized control system. Part of the supervisors' qualification included having to pass the same written examinations required of operators. The inspector noted that the tests adequately incorporated safety controls and interlocks for normal process operations and criticality safety controls. l In addition to the above training, ecch supervisor for plant operations and supervisors for other groups where SNM is used provided quarterly training and review of criticality safety specifications and postings relative to their respective areas of responsibility.

l

l-i -

l. .

Also, the criticality safety component conducted biennial criticality safety training a;1d work shops for managers, supervisors, lead operators, and the engineering staff. The last biennial training was conducted in December 1997. The inspector noted that some of the agenda items included a review of criticality safety violations, CSCARs and corrective actions, NRC's requirement concerning willful misconduct, criticality safety analyses and specifications, conduct of quarterly inspections and reviews of CSSs, and the engineering change notice process relative to change control and analysis.

The inspector noted that the licensee's training programs were consistent with Section 2.4, Part 11 of the license; EMF 30; and department procedures. No concerns were identified Based on discussions held with operators, the inspector did not identify any concerns relating to qualification of personnel for their assigned tasks or their level of knowledge of plant safety requirements.

c. o Qonclusions The 14ensee was adequately implementing its training programs. Operators and super visors appeared adequately qualified for their assigned jobs and sufficiently knowicdgeable of the respective safety requirements.

4 Operational Safety Review A1 TemparcLeMT20JJ9.0

a. lasoection Scoce Section 2.3 of Inspection Report 70-1257/97-07 described a cited violation and details relatirig to the licensee's identification of a violation of its requirements for temporary storage facilities. In addition, communication between the NRC Region IV office and the Fuel Cycle Operations and Licensing Branches regarding this issue was summarized in the report. The violation involved storing safe batch uranium oxide powder in sealed containers in temporary storage facilities (sea land containers), although the licer.se only authorized storage of uranium oxide pellets in such facilities. By letter dated January 15, 1998, the NRC approved Siemens' license amendment request (amendment No. 9) for full utilization of its new Operations Scrap Warehouse (OSW).

L Although the licensee's written response to this issue was not yet due, the inspector reviewed the current status of the licensee's actions relative to this issue. The inspector, reviewed selected inventory logs, the applicable CSA and CSS for the new OSW, toured the new facility with the lead criticality safety specialist, and discussed the matter with operations personnel,

b. Observations and Findinas On January 23,1997, the licensee began to move the unauthorized stored uranium powder from the sea-land containers to the new OSW and other authorized locations.

As of January 25,1998, of the 732 safe batch containers of uranium powder

- __m

(approximately 14,000 kg of low enriched uranium) stored in sea land containers,119 containers had been relocated to the new OSW and 197 containers had been relocated to another authorized location. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was awaiting the arrival of newly ordered pallets to facilitate relocating the remaining 416 containers, which was expected to occur with the next 2 weeks.

During a tour of the new OSW, the inspector noted that the existing storage of uranium powder was consistent with the licensees's new CSA, W776, " Warehouse #7,"

Revision 0, dated January 12,1998, and the respective CSS (P97,776). Current storage consisted of uranium oxide powder stored in single tier planer array floor storage areas. The storage racks were currently not used as the licensee was confirming the contracted seismic analysis which limited the mass of a single paliet to 100 kg. The inspector verified that there were no water sources to the facility. The public address system, criticality accident warning system, and fire alarm system had been inidalled and tested in accordance with the licensee's procedures. Fire extinguishers were conveniently located within the faciiity, Operators working in the facility were cognizant of the criticality safety limits and controls. No concems were identified by the inspector, c Conclusions The licensee had taken appropriate actions to achieve compliance v'ith license requirements for temporary storage locations, and the storage of SNM in the new rSrage warehouse war cor.sittent with the respective CSA and CSS.

4.k Conduct of Ooerations e Insoection Scoce (Tl 2600/003)

The inspector toured selected areas of the DCF, UO, buildir H Engineering laboratory Operations building to observe ongoing activ* .,ng storage of SNM, criGcality safety postings, and housekeeping practices.

I. Ot;servations and Findincs During a tour of the DCF, ti e inspector observed the initial phase in the preparations for the removal of the Line 1 VI-303 pyrohydrolysis vessel (called a reactor) top filter plenum for inspection and replacement of the off-gas filters. Since the process had been shut down and the reactor vessel had been cleaned out, the primary concem was the potential radiological aspects for breaking containment of a process system. Although there had been some initial discussions between operations, the DCF engineering staff, and maintenance personnel relating to the task, the inspector noted that once the job started there appeared tc be a lack of coord' nation and full understanding as to the +

sequence of operations to be performed. Some of the observations involved: (1) a misunderstanding as to the sequence for removal of the bolts from the top head; (2) some confusion as to when to install the juroper to maintain a vacuum on the bottom of the vessel; (3) although the maintenance workers had purportedly reviewed the posted rWiation job permit, they had not signed their name acknowledging the conditions of the 1

I 1 ,

permit; and (4) some confusion as to when and what blower was to be used to maintain n negative pressure on the upper portion of tiie reactor vessel when removing the filter r!enum.

The inspector noted that the GSCO made similar observations and he discontinued the task. The following day the inspector partially observed a formalized group meeting i etween operations, the applicable engineering groups, and others involved. The r eeting was to review and discuss a work sequence plan that had been generated for the remainder of the task. Due to time restraints and time involved to complete the job, the in ,pector was unable to observe the remaining sequence of operations in the DCF.

However, the GSCO informed the inspector that the task was completed in an orderly manner without any upsets or negative radiological consequences.

The inspector discussed the value of formal preplanning and outlining a work sequence

1an for involved and lengthy tasks with licensee personnel during the insp6ction and at

he e >.it meeting. Licensee representatives present acknowledged the benefits of preplanning and utilization of work sequence plans.

vuring facility tours, the inspector noted that pressure differential readings on filtering

,,fstums were within the required limits, SNM storage containers were properly labeled, and the use of SNM was consistent with the applicable critica!ity safety posting.

NPC 'nmaction Fmpod 701257/97-07 described less than adequate housekeeping in enn areas of the plant related to storage of combustible materials in the DCF HF rerubber room, bags of used rags lying on the floor in the chemical conversion areas, cnd control of waste collection drums, Other observations included poor control of used danger / lockout tags that were no longer in use. During this inspection, the inspector did not identify any similar observations. The inspector also noted a significant

nprovement in the segregation of waste containers and clarification of storage posting and handling practices.

c. . onclusions Operations adequately recognized and corrected a lack of coordination between engineering, maintenance, and operations during a maintenance task involvng a pyrohydrolysis vesselin the DCF. Housekeeping was generally good.

4.3 M!Edaneous issues (92J_Qjj

a. (Closed) IFl 70-1257/9707-02: Review of the licensee's evaluation of the lagoon uranium recovery precipitation tank flexing. The two precipitation tanks are open-top 6,000 gallon plastic tanks with a 1-inch wall thickness. The inspector noted that the licensee had contacted the vendor relative to this issue. The manufacturer conveyed that it was normal to have a 3.0 percent out-of-round condition due to the rotational molding process in f abrication of the tank. The licensee's measurement of the flexing indicated a 1.8 percent movement at the area of concern. The manufacturer also recommended an annualinspection for tanks greater than 5 years old for grain structure

R

. cracks and color changes that could indicats stress points.- The licensee's tanks are L approxima'ely.10 years old. The licensee's inspeca,. did not reveal any potential weaknesses in the tanks, and the lict:,ndee had iderdfied all of the larger tanks in the f system in the preventative maintenance system for semiannual inside and outside - i

. inspections. The inspector had no further questions related to this issue. l q

b. Qantaminated Shoe Covers (Tl 2800/003)

On October 30,1997, a subcontractor who provides radiological services for the ,

i

Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site contractor found sa unlabeled clear plastic bag containing 28 yellow shoe covers while performing a routine survey of the Richland city landfill. The subcontractor's direct reading survey results on one shoe cover

{ indicated a maximum of 56,000 dpm/100 cnf for alpha activity,60,000 dpm/100 cnf for bota-gamma activiti and 6,000 dpm/100 cnf removable beta gamma activity. A L - laboratory analysis indicated that the radioactive material was uranium with an enrichment of 3.3 wt. percent U 235. On December 16,1997, the subcontractor notified Siemens and other nearby facilities where radioactive materials are used of its findings.

The tabcontractor believed that its analysis indicated that the shoe covers did not come irom the I-lanford site and was sending its report and analysis to DOE for further

investigation. Based on the licensee's conversations with a DOE representative, DOE's 4 final investigation report was to be completed in the near future and provided to the City of Richland for review. The licensee's actions consisted of initiating an investigation to

Atain mxo facts about the shoe covers and activities at nearby facilities. The licensee wid tei.ew DOE's investigation report, when finalized, to make a determination whether lhe shoe covers originated from Siemens. At this time there are insufficient facts to p

determine the source of the shoe covers. . This matter will be reviewed during a subseouent inspection and is considered an inspection followup item j

f FI 7012'i7/980101).

Exit Meeting Summary l The in ipectc, presented the impection results to members of licensee manrgement at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on January 30,1998. The licensee @t#ledged the findings presented. Although proprietary information was reviewed durug % inspection, such information is not knowingly described in this report.

~

i s

J 1

I l

- ~ - - -- . . -

.- -. w

l .

j. ATTACHMENT

~

l SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. F. Fentley, Manager, Plant Operations J. M. Delst, Criticality Safety Analyst J. H. Ed0ar, Senior Engineer, Licensing U N. Femreite, Vice President, Manufacturing E. L. Foster, Supervisor, Radiological Safety D. C. Kilian, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering L J. Maas, Manager, Regulatory Compliance C. D. Manning, Lead Criticality Safety Specialist

n. A. McGeheo, Criticality Safety Specialist J.11. Phillips, General Supervisor, Chemical Operations T. C. Probasco, Manager, Safety i J. Urza, Manager, Manufacturing Technology

• 11 Vau,1 hon, Manager, Safety, Security and Licensing INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED if ' 86002: Operational Event Review and Feedback Programs at Fuel Facilities I? 80005. Manayment Crpanization and Controls Tl 2LC0/0L Operational Saiety Review

P G2701: Followup ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED n ocepj 70 1257/9801-01 IFl Contaminated shoe covers from landfill Closed 70-1257/0707-01 IFl Review licensee's investigation of HF acid spill 70-1257/9707-02 IFl Review licensee's evaluation of the lagoon uranium recovery precipitation tank flexing.

s

^ - - - - -- - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

\:

i.

• 2 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CSA criticality safety analysis CSCAR Criticality Safety Corrective Action Report CSS criticality safety specification DCF Dry Conversion Facility DOE Department of Energy GET general employee training GSCO General Supervisor, Chemical Operations HF hydrofluoric H&SC Health and Safety Council IN Information Notices OSW Operations Scrap Warehouse SNM special nuclear material SSAEL Shift Supervisor Abnormal Event Log TOR temporary document revisions VP Vice President

. . . _ _ __ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -