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| {{#Wiki_filter:April 29, 2021 | | {{#Wiki_filter: |
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2021001
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| ==Dear Ms. Maza:==
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| On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On April 21, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
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| One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
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| Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
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| Sincerely,
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| /RA/
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| Stewart N. Bailey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
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| ===Enclosure:===
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| As stated
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| ==Inspection Report==
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| Docket Number: 05000400 License Number: NPF-63 Report Number: 05000400/2021001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0074 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, LLC Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Location: New Hill, NC 27562 Inspection Dates: January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021 Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Stewart N. Bailey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
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| =SUMMARY=
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| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
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| ===List of Findings and Violations===
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| Failure to Adequately Resolve Fire Safety Hazards Involving Recalled Surge Protectors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71111.05 NCV 05000400/2021001-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of the Shearon Harris Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.F, Fire Protection Program, for the licensees failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions to address fire safety hazards involving the use of defective surge protectors that were recalled by the United States (U.S.) Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2013 resulting in many surge protectors affected by the recall remaining in operation throughout the plant.
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| ===Additional Tracking Items===
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| None.
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| =PLANT STATUS=
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| Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
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| ==INSPECTION SCOPES==
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| Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
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| Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
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| ==REACTOR SAFETY==
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| ==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection==
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| ===Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather for severe thunderstorms with high winds and chance of hail and tornadoes on March 18, 2021.
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| ==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment==
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| ===Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
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| : (1) 'A' essential services chilled water (ESCW) system while 'B' ESCW system was out of service for emergent repairs on January 11, 2021
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| : (2) 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) while 'A' EDG was out of service for scheduled maintenance on January 13-14, 2021
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| : (3) 'A' emergency safeguards sequencer while 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer was out of service for scheduled maintenance on February 2, 2021
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| : (4) 'A' emergency service water (ESW) pump while 'B' ESW pump was out of service for scheduled maintenance on March 2, 2021
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| ==71111.05 - Fire Protection==
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| ===Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
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| : (1) 'A' EDG room and support equipment areas (fire zones 1-D-1-DGA-RM, 1-D-3-DGA-ES, 1-D-DTA, 1-D-1-DGA-ASU, 1-D-1-DGA-ER, and 1-D-2-DGA-HVD)on January 13, 2021
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| : (2) Reactor auxiliary building (RAB) 286' elevation 'A' train essential switchgear room, ventilation room, and battery rooms (fire zones 1-A-SWGRA, 1-A-5-HVA, 1-A-BATA, and 1-A-5-BATN) on January 21, 2021
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| : (3) RAB 305' elevation main control room, termination cabinet room, rod control cabinet room, auxiliary relay panel room, and process instrument cabinet room (fire zones 12-A-6-CR1, 12-A-6-RT1, 12-A-6-RCC1, 12-A-6-ARP1, and 12-A-6-PICR1) on February 3, 2021
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| : (4) RAB 236' elevation component cooling water (CCW), auxiliary feedwater (AFW),charging and safety injection pump (CSIP), and residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger areas (fire zones 1-A-3-PB, 1-A-3-TA, 1-A-BAL-H, 1-A-34-RHXA, and 1-A-34-RHXB) on February 15, 2021
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| : (5) Fuel handling building (FHB) 261' elevation areas (fire zones 5-F-CHF, 5-F-3-CHFB, 5-F-3-CHF-BAL, and 5-F-3-DMNZ1) on March 1, 2021
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| ==71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
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| Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
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| : (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during end of life (EOL) moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) surveillance testing on February 8, 2021
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| ===Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario for operator training involving a steam generator tube leak followed by a steam generator tube rupture on March 4, 2021
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| ==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness==
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| ===Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
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| : (1) Failure of 6900 volt unit auxiliary transformer 1B x-winding due to electrical fault in non-segregated bus duct on December 16, 2020
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| : (2) Failed Agastat relay in 'B' train emergency safeguards sequencer on February 2, 2021
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| ==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
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| ===Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
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| : (1) Elevated (Green) risk during emergent repair of 'B' ESCW chiller service water condenser pump discharge check valve on January 11-12, 2021
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| : (2) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' train emergency safeguards sequencer outage to calibrate relays on February 2, 2021
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| : (3) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'A' EDG and 'A' ESW maintenance outage on January 13-14, 2021
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| : (4) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' ESW screen wash pump maintenance activities on March 2, 2021
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| : (5) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' RHR valve maintenance activities on March 9, 2021
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| ==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
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| ===Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
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| : (1) 'A' ESW pump room exhaust fan did not secure automatically on low temperature following shutdown of the 'A' ESW pump (NCR 02363802) on January 6, 2021
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| : (2) 'B' ESCW chiller service water condenser recirculation pump discharge check valve failed to stroke closed during ESCW chiller surveillance testing (NCR 02364510) on January 11, 2021
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| : (3) Valve 1SW-124 failed to stroke shut following successfully opening during surveillance testing (NCR 02365709) on January 16, 2021
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| : (4) Failed contact identified in Agastat time relay for 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer (NCR 02368286) on February 2, 2021
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| ==71111.18 - Plant Modifications==
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| Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
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| The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
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| : (1) Permanent modification engineering change (EC) 418926, Seal seismic gap between turbine building and RAB at 286' elevation
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| : (2) Permanent modification EC 418427, ESW screen wash pump oiler reconfiguration
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| ==71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing==
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| ===Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
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| : (1) Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST)-M0076, Check Valve Non-Intrusive Testing, and Operation Surveillance Test (OST)-1040, Essential Services Chilled Water System Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6, on 'B' ESCW chiller following emergent repairs on January 12, 2021
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| : (2) OST-1013, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-6, on the 'A' EDG following maintenance outage on January 14, 2021
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| : (3) Operations Periodic Test (OPT)-1538, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test - Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6, on 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer following replacement of drifting relays on February 2, 2021
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| : (4) Operating Procedure (OP)-139, Service Water System, on 'B' ESW screen wash pump following maintenance on March 2, 2021
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| : (5) OST-1092, 1B-SB RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3, on 'B' RHR valves 1SI-301, 1SI-323, and 1RH-63, following scheduled maintenance on March 9, 2021
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| : (6) OST-1316, Component Cooling Water System Operability (Pump 1C0SAB In Service) Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, Section 7.6, for stroke testing of motor operated valve (MOV) 1CC-147, CCW from RHR Heat Exchanger A-SB, following scheduled MOV Diagnostic Testing on March 24, 2021
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| ==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing==
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| The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
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| ===Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)===
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| {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=2}}
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| : (1) Technical Procedure (Maintenance) TE-NF-PWR-0810, Moderator Temperature Coefficient - End of Life (EOL), on February 8, 2021
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| : (2) OST-1823, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 18 Month Interval Modes 1 Through 6 and Defueled, on March 16-17, 2021
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| ===Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) OST-1211, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, on February 15, 2021
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| ===RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Computer Calculation, Daily Interval, Modes 1-4, on January 10, 2021
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| ==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation==
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| Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)
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| (1 Sample)
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| The inspectors evaluated:
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| : (1) A licensee quarterly emergency preparedness drill involving fuel failure, a loss-of-coolant accident, and subsequent loss of containment integrity on February 11,
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| ==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
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| ===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
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| IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) ===
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| {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=1}}
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| : (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
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| IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
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| : (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
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| ===IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
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| ==71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution==
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| ===Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)===
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| The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
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| : (1) 'A' ESCW chiller declared inoperable due to hot gas bypass valve not functioning properly on November 3, 2020 (NCR 02356217)
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| ==INSPECTION RESULTS==
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| Failure to Adequately Resolve Fire Safety Hazards Involving Recalled Surge Protectors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71111.05 NCV 05000400/2021001-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of the Shearon Harris Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.F, Fire Protection Program, for the licensees failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions to address fire safety hazards involving the use of defective surge protectors that were recalled by the United States (U.S.) Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2013 resulting in numerous surge protectors affected by the recall, remaining in operation throughout the plant.
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| =====Description:=====
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| On February 26, 2021, during investigation into the licensees practice of using surge protectors to protect electronic equipment in the plant, the inspectors noted that most of the devices currently in operation included Schneider Electric IT Corporation APC 7 Series SurgeArrest models. The inspectors discovered that these protectors, as well as APC 8 Series SurgeArrest model surge protectors, were the subject of an October 3, 2013, recall notice issued by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission due to a fire hazard concern. This APC recall notice (No. 14-001) described numerous model APC 7 and 8 Series SurgeArrest surge protectors manufactured between 1993 through 2002 that were being recalled as a result of overheating, melting, and smoking, posing a fire hazard that had already resulted in 700 incident reports, 55 claims of property damage from smoke and fire, as well as multiple reports of personnel injuries. The recall notice directed consumers to immediately unplug and stop using the affected surge protectors due to the fire hazard concerns.
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| During a subsequent check of several surge protectors in operation in the plant, the inspectors identified that many were included in the 2013 APC recall notice. The majority of these were found in the licensees Administration building and were being used to protect personnel computer equipment. However, several recalled surge protectors were found inside the power block where important plant safety equipment is located. This included one that was near the A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump located in the RAB, that was powering radiological survey equipment. Subsequently, the licensee conducted a complete plant inspection and identified over 100 surge protectors that were part of the recall notice and were still in operation. While the majority of these were found outside the power block areas, nine more in addition to those identified by the inspectors were found in operation inside the power block, including one in the RAB, six in the waste processing building, and two in the turbine building.
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| The inspectors reviewed fire protection program procedure FPP-001, Fire Protection Program Manual, which requires conditions adverse to quality associated with fire protection to be addressed via the licensees corrective action program implemented under administrative procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program. Procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100 required issues that are identified as conditions adverse to quality to be corrected. The inspectors noted that on October 8, 2013, in accordance with AD-PI-ALL-0100, nuclear condition report (NCR) 00633715 was initiated to address the fire safety hazard associated with APC Recall Notice 14-001. The purpose of this NCR was to identify all APC surge protectors in the plant affected by the recall and to remove them from operation.
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| Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and conducted site-wide inspections of all areas of the plant to identify and remove any remaining surge protectors that were affected by the 2013 APC recall notice.
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| Corrective Action References: NCRs 02371670, 02371966, and 02374856
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| =====Performance Assessment:=====
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| Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to implement adequate corrective actions to address the fire safety hazard posed by the degraded recalled APC surge protectors under NCR 00633715 was a performance deficiency (PD).
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| Screening: The inspectors determined the PD was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern.
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| Specifically, the failure to remove degraded surge protectors would allow unnecessary fire hazards to exist increasing the likelihood of a fire, which could cause a plant transient or adversely affect important plant equipment.
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| Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the finding involved a failure to adequately implement fire prevention and administrative controls for transient ignition sources. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Worksheet, the issue screened as Green in Step 1.4.7 for post-fire safe shutdown because it did not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown, hot standby, or safe and stable conditions using the credited safe shutdown success path. Specifically, none of the recalled surge protectors were found in areas of the power block where if a fire had occurred, it would have resulted in adversely affecting important safe shutdown equipment.
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| Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. The failure to implement adequate corrective actions to address the fire safety hazard associated with the recalled surge protectors occurred in 2013.
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| =====Enforcement:=====
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| Violation: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-63, Condition 2.F, Fire Protection Program, states, in part, that Duke Energy Progress, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Associated Standard NFPA 805, as specified in the revised license amendment request dated October 9, 2009. Attachment A of the licensee's NFPA 805 Transition Report, which is enclosed with the revised license amendment request, states, in part, that procedure FPP-001, "Fire Protection Program Manual," provides the site-wide fire protection plan and establishes the criteria for implementing all fire protection activities. The licensees fire protection quality assurance program is described in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of procedure FPP-001, and states, in part, that (fire protection) conditions adverse to quality are documented in accordance with procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, to provide an effective process for identifying, evaluating, and correcting adverse conditions. In accordance with procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, on October 8, 2013, the licensee initiated nuclear condition report 00633715 to address the fire protection condition adverse to quality involving the fire safety hazard associated with recalled APC surge protectors. Contrary to the above, since October 2013, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program because it failed to adequately correct the fire safety hazards associated with the recalled APC surge protectors by identifying and removing from operation all the affected devices from the power block.
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| Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| ==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
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| The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
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| * On April 21, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Kim Maza and other members of the licensee staff.
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| =DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
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| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
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| Procedure Date
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| 71111.01 Procedures AP-300 Severe Weather Response Rev. 35
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| 71111.04 Procedures OP-139 Service Water System Rev. 138
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| OP-148 Essential Services Chilled Water System Rev. 80
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| OP-155 Diesel Generator Emergency Power System Rev. 91
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| 71111.05 Fire Plans CSD-HNP-PFP- Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Plan Rev. 1
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| DGB
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| CSD-HNP-PFP- Fuel Handling Building Pre-Fire Plan Rev. 1
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| FHB
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| CSD-HNP-PFP- Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 236 Pre-Fire Plan Rev. 2
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| RAB-236
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| CSD-HNP-PFP- Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 Pre-Fire Plan Rev. 1
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| RAB-286
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| CSD-HNP-PFP- Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevations 305 and 324 Pre-Fire Rev. 4
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| RAB-305-324 Plan
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| Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1520 Transient Combustible Control Rev. 13
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| FPP-001 Fire Protection Program Manual Rev. 44
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| FPP-013 Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions Revs. 106
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| and Surveillance Requirements and 107
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| 71111.11Q Engineering Reactor Engineering Reactivity Management Plan for H1C23 Rev. 0
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| Evaluations EOL MTC Testing
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| Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0106 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions Rev. 4
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| AD-OP-ALL-0203 Reactivity Management Rev. 13
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| AD-OP-ALL-1000 Conduct of Operations Rev. 17
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| AD-OP-ALL-1001 Conduct of Abnormal Operations Rev. 3
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| OMM-001 Operations Administrative Requirements Rev. 121
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| TE-NF-PWR- Moderator Temperature Coefficient - End of Life (EOL) Rev. 0
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| 0810
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| 71111.12 Corrective Action NCR 02362309 Reactor trip due to ground fault on 1B Unit Auxiliary 12/16/2020
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| Documents Transformer
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| NCR 02368286 Replace bad Agastat relay PIA3/1183 in B emergency 2/02/2021
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| safeguards sequencer
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| Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1210 Maintenance Rule Program Rev. 2
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| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
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| Procedure Date
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| 71111.13 Procedures AD-NF-ALL-0501 Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT) Rev. 5
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| AD-OP-ALL-0201 Protected Equipment Rev. 7
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| AD-OP-ALL-0210 Operational Risk Management Rev. 1
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| AD-WC-ALL- On-Line Work Management Rev. 18
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| 200
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| AD-WC-ALL- On-Line Risk Management Process Rev. 2
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| 240
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| AD-WC-ALL- Work Activity Integrated Risk Management Rev. 10
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| 0410
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| 71111.15 Miscellaneous Nuclear Energy Operability Determinations Rev. 0
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| Institute (NEI) 18-
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| Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0105 Operability Determinations Rev. 6
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| 71111.18 Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1110 Design Review Requirements Rev. 9
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| AD-EG-ALL-1132 Preparation and Control of Design Change Engineering Rev. 18
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| Changes
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| AD-EG-ALL-1155 Post Modification Testing Rev. 4
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| Work Orders WO 20419169 Reposition oiler on 'B' ESW screen wash pump bearing 3/2/2021
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| housing
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| WO 20448191 Install sealant for seismic gap at turbine building to reactor 3/1/2021
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| auxiliary building 286 elevation per EC 418926
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| 71111.19 Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1155 Post Modification Testing Rev. 4
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| Work Orders WO 20379573 MOV Diagnostic Testing of Valve 1CC-147 3/24/2021
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| WO 20445789 Troubleshoot/repair seat leakage identified past 'B' ESCW 1/12/2021
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| chiller condenser pump service water discharge check valve
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| 1SW-1232
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| WOs 12018383, 'A' EDG maintenance to replace relays, overspeed trip 1/12-13/2021
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| 290676, pressure regulator, fuel oil strainer cleaning, and jacket
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| 20350745, and water heat exchanger cleaning
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| 20394609
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| WOs 20333404, Valve 1SI-323, 1RH-63, and SI-301 maintenance activities 3/09/2021
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| 20345510, and
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| 20352737
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| WOs 20416860, Calibration of four relays in 'B' train emergency safeguards 2/02/2021
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| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
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| Procedure Date
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| 20416861, sequencer
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| 20416862, and
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| 20416866
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| 71111.22 Miscellaneous HNEI-0400-0016 Harris Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) Rev. 2
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| Procedures OP-155 Diesel Generator Emergency Power System Rev. 92
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| 71114.06 Procedures AD-EP-ALL-0105 Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center Rev. 5
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| AD-EP-ALL-0109 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Rev. 5
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| AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment Rev. 8
| |
| AD-EP-ALL-0304 State and County Notifications Rev. 3
| |
| AD-EP-ALL-0802 Conducting Drills and Exercises Rev. 6
| |
| AD-EP-HNP- HNP Site Specific TSC Support Rev. 0
| |
| 0105
| |
| CSD-EP-ALL- Drill and Exercise Templates Rev. 0
| |
| 0800-01
| |
| CSD-EP-HNP- EAL Technical Basis Document Rev. 2
| |
| 0101-01
| |
| CSD-EP-HNP- EAL Wallchart Rev. 1
| |
| 0101-02
| |
| EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Rev. 5
| |
| PLP-201 Emergency Plan Rev. 73
| |
| 71151 Procedures AD-PI-ALL-0700 Performance Indicators Rev. 4
| |
| 71152 Procedures AD-PI-ALL-0100 Corrective Action Program Rev. 23
| |
| AD-PI-ALL-0101 Root Cause Evaluation Rev. 7
| |
| AD-PI-ALL-0106 Cause Investigation Checklists Rev. 4
| |
| 13
| |
| }} | | }} |
