IR 05000461/1997001: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20149D523
| number = ML20211P201
| issue date = 06/23/1997
| issue date = 10/11/1997
| title = SALP Rept 50-461/97-01 for Period of 950625-970405
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/97-01
| author name =  
| author name = Grobe J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Cook J
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = ILLINOIS POWER CO.
| docket = 05000461
| docket = 05000461
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-461-97-01, 50-461-97-1, NUDOCS 9707170166
| document report number = 50-461-97-01, 50-461-97-1, NUDOCS 9710200094
| package number = ML20149D520
| title reference date = 09-24-1997
| document type = SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 7
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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October 11.-1997 Vr, John G, Cook      '
Sent;r Vice Preedsat Clinton Power Station Illinois Power Company Mail Code V-275 P.O. Box 678 Clinton,IL 61727
 
==Dear Mr. Cook:==
j  SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-461/97017(DRS))
 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 24,1997, in response to our letter dated August 25,1997, transmitting a Notice of Violation associated with the failure to perform an adequate radiological survey and the failure to adequately implement radiation
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protection and chemistry procedures at your Clinton Nuclear Power Station. In your letter, you
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acknowledged that personnel knowledge and procedure deficiencies, non-conservative decision-making, and personnel errors contributed to the violations. You also indicated that you
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planned to revise applicable procedures, to provide additional training to radiation protection and control and instrumentation personnel, and to revise the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
 
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We have reviewed your corrective actions and have no further questions at this time. These
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corrective actions will be examined during future inspections.
 
Sincerely, Original Signed by John A. Grobe
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9710200094 971011  John A. Grobe, Acting Director-PDR ADOCK 05000461  Division of Reactor Safety O  POR    ,
i Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62      h- g ,i Enclosure: Lir 09/24/97, W.D. Romberg, Illinois Power, to US NRC See attached distribution
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J. October 11.-1997 Distribution:
Clinton Power Station SALP 14 (Report No. 50-461/97001)   i L INTRODUCTION The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process is used to develop the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) conclusions regarding a licensee's safety j performance. Four functional areas are assessed: Plant Operations, Maintenance,
cc w/o encl:- W. D. Romberg, Assistart Vice President    *
P Yocum, Plant Manager, Clinton Power Station R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Assessment J. Sipek, Director - Licensing a
cc w/ encl: Nathan Schloss, Economist,
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Office of the Attomey General G. Stramback, Regulatory Services Project Manager, General Elactric Company Chairman, DeWitt County Board
;-  State Liaison Officer
!  Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission Distribution:
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Docket File w/ercl  SRis, Clinton,  Rlli Enf. Coordinator w/enci PUBLIC IE-01 w/enct  Dresden, LaSalle,  TSS w/ encl OC/LFDCB w/enci  Quad Cities w/enci  DOCDESK w/enci DRP w/enci  LPM, NRR w/enci  CAA1 w/enci DRS w/ encl  A. B. Beach, Rill w/enct Rlli PRR w/enci  J. L. Caldwell, Rlll w/ enc!
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DOCUMENT NAME:G:\DRS\CLl97107.TY rece e copy of this document. Indcate in the bout *C* = Copy without attachment / enclosure 'E' = (.opy with attachment / enclosure OFFICE RIII. c RIII-  C RIII  s
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RIII ,,, A  l NAME S0rth:ml ske  GShear646  GWright/Att/  JGrob HG DATE 10/.3 /97  10/ 6 /97  10/(p 197  10/ \\ / 97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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  ~    Tel 21 v33 GN ILLIN91S    "' '""""
P@ R    ***"' " -''' a Assistant Vice Prescer' - N,oe r e -. a ,.e,
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U 602839 .
4F.190 September 24, 1997 Docket No. 50-461 Document Control Desk Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject: Reply to Notices of Violation Contained in lasP14tiaD3ecort 50-461/97017 mRS)
 
==Dear Madam or Sir:==
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The purpose of this letter is to provide the Illinois Power (IP) response to the two Notices of Violation documented in NRC inspection report 50-461/97017 (DRS).
 
IP admits that the violations occurred.
 
The first Notice of Violation identifies the failure to perform surnys to assure compliance with 10CFP.20.1201(a). The response to this Notice of Violation is contained in Attachment A of this letter. The second Notice of Violation identifies three examples of failure to implemer.t procedural requirements. These requirements were contained in procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)," Appendix A, " Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Beiiing Water Reactors." Attachment B to this letter contains the response to the failure to perform a " Gamma 10 Portal Calibration Test."
 
Attachment C contains the response to the failure to perform a " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM IB) Functional Calibration Test." Attachment D to this letter contains the response to the failure to perform the annual comparison of gaseous effluent grab samples to continuous air monitors.
 
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This response to the above Notices of Violation contains the following commitments:
e IP will perform a comprehensive review ofpreventive maintenance tasksto ensure that the overrun in the Power Plant Maintenance and Planning System (PPMPS) is correct.


Engineering, and Plarl Support. The SALP report documents the NRC's observations and '
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insights on a licensee s performance and communicates the results to the licensee and the public. It provides a vehicle for clear communication with licensee management that focuses on plant performance relative to safety risk perspectives. The NRC utilizes SALP results when allocating NRC inspection resources at licensee facilities This report is the NRC's assessment of the safety performance at Illinois Power's Clinton Power Station for the SALP 14 period from June 25,1995 through April 5,199 An NRC SALP Board, composed of the individuals listed below, met on April 30,1997, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess performance in  i accordance with the guidance in NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment I of Licensee Performance" Board Chairman -


'J. L.'Caldwell, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region ill Board Members G.-H. Marcus,' Director, Projects Directorate 1113, NRR M. N. Leach, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety  l G. L. Shear, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Nuclear Meterial Safety  1 Jh PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS    )
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A. Plant Ooerations    >
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U402839
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Performance in this functional area was adequate, a decline from performance in the previous period. Areas of decline included procedure use and adherence, quality of
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' procedures, control room conduct of operations, and personnel errors. Management was unable to provide satisfactory guidance and oversight to the plant staff to address these problems, especially the procedure related issues, until after significant NRC interventio Further, management fostered an environment which placed excessive emphasis on minimizing equipment and unit outage ' time. The September 5,1996, reactor' recirculation (RR) pump seal failure and follow up to that event revealc<i the extent of decline in these areas. In March through May 1997, the licensee made improvements in_the areas noted above'as part of a recovery program, and NRC inspectors noted improvement _
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9707170166 970623  Y PDR ADOCK 05000461 G  -POR
The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) will be revised by December 15,1997 to include annual comparison ofgrab sample data to the gaseous effluent monitors.


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'  Additionally, a surveillance procedure will be developed to implement this new ODCM
Management failed to provide appropriate control over procedures, and was unable to  l
  < requirement by December 15,1997,
   - provide-adequate guidance on procedure use until after significant NRC involvement. This
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!-  deficiency resulted in a pervasive problem with procedural adherence, with some instances
IP believ2s IMt the actions described in the attached responses address the 1   concerns identif.d i . these Notices of Violation.
. amounting to careless disregard for NRC regulations. During the September 5,1996, RR
 
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Sincerely yours, 4) y is 0
{      Wayne D. Romber
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   - pump seal failure event, operators improperly used procedures which led to a failure of the
Assistant Vice President i-   JRF/krk i
,1  RR pump seal and other complications. The NRC identified the procedural adherence
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:  -issues shortly after the September 5 event. The administrative procedure guiding procedural adherence allowed staff to modify procedures without observing important
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;  procedural change controls. Licensee management did not articulate to plant staff the
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proper level of procedural adherence control and procedure change requirements until April
Attachments
:  .1997, after NRC inspection activities continued to identify numerous procedural adherence
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problems. Appropriate procedural adherence and procedure change policies and programs
;  were implemented at the end of the period.


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cc: NRC Clinton Project Manager
Some operating procedures were not appropriate for the intended evolution. The
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3 ranch Chief, Region III, USNRC haC Resident Office, V-690 L    Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC    -
surveillance procedure for high pressure core spray (HPCS) valve operability allowed the I
Illinois Department ofNuclear Safety
 
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   . test to be performed under plant conditions which prevented the operators from obtaining
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  ~ accurate test results. A reactor water cleanup pump failed upon loss of suction flow j during a bus restoration. The pump did not trip because the procedure in use allowed j  system operation when pump trip protective features were inoperable. Improper 3 procedural instructions for defeating the reactor core isolation cooling suction transfer logic  ;
 
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were identified during procedure use in a plant transient. Recovery of the main condenser l
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l :following a scram was significantly delayed due, in part, to system restoration procedure
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{- problems. 'At the end of the period, the licensee was involved in significant procedure  i
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reviews and upgrades, especially in the areas of operations surveillance, instrument surveillance, and system operating precedure ]
Attachment A
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to U 602839
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Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-1-  *
The violation states in part:    .
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j  "1. ~ 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that
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may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and
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'  - that are reasonable under the circumstances to eva:uate the extent ofradiation levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential '
j_  radiological hazards that could be present.


At times management and staff placed excessive emphasis on minimizing equipment and  j
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unit outage time. A plan to support an outage schedule by intentionally defeatin'g the  ]
j  - primary containment hatch interlock while the reactor was critical was developed by plant  j
,  staff and was approved by plant management early in the SALP period. NRC intervention  '
:  was required to prevent this inappropriate action. Plant management's decision to reduce  ;
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outage time by maintaining.the plant in hot stand-by following a complicated reactor trip  1
;. resulted in cycling the safety relief valves approximately 85 times. This decision increased  l r  the likelihood of a relief valve sticking open, causing an uncontrolled cooldown. In an  !
;. effort to maintain the reactor at power on September 5,1996, plant management
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responded to a degraded seal on the "B" RR pump in a manner which led to seal failure of the pump, a preventable entry into emergency operating procedures, and the declaration of an Unusual Event. After the RR pump seal failure, the unit was shut down in a protracted manner allowing maximum time for the leakage rate to decrease below the Technical
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Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, surwy means an evaluation of the radiological
Specification limit, which would have allowed continued unit operations. Individual  ,
:  conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release,
' operators manipulated the.feedwater system in a manner outside of the approved    i procedural guidance to reduce outage time and expedite unit restart following the   l September 1996 even l l
;  - disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation.
   ' Although conduct of operations in the control room was adequate, a number of errors were identified. Failure to track identified leakage during the RR pump seal failure event complicated the operating crew's ability to evaluate the proper emergency action level Y      2
 
t L  Contrary to the above, on June 18,1997, the licensee did not make surveys to L  assure compliance with 10 CFR 20,1291(a), which limits radiation exposure to the
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skin. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately identify or quantify licensed radioactive material on the arm of an individual who alarmed a personnel
;  contamination monitor and was released from the restricted area."
 
l  Backaround and Reason for the Violation
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On June 18,1997, at approximately 1030 hours, an individual became contaminated with radioactive material on the right thigh area of his shons and the inside right forearm. The
[  contamination on the forearm was near the elbow, This event occurred as the individual L  was moving air hoses inside the Radiological Control Area (RCA) from a non-
 
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  - contaminated area to a contaminated area. The individual handed the hoses to a co-worker already inside the contamination area and then donned protective clothing and -
;. entered the area to help lay out and tape down the hoses. ARer completing this task, the
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individual processed through a whole body personnel radioactive contamination monitor
! (PCM-1B) and received contamination alarms on the right thigh area of his shorts and
:  right palm. The worker contacted the Radiation Protection office and a Radiation
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Protection Technician (RPT) was dispatched to assess the contamination alarm.
 
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;  The RPT surveyed the right thigh and right hand of the individual with a hand held frisker.  :
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No detectable radioactive contamination was found. The RPT then attempted to remove any minimal contamination from the individual's shorts using a tape press and directed the i  individual to go wash his hands while he responded to other workers who were alarming a~
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   . the PCM-1Bs in the area. The worker was inexperienced and mistakenly understood this direction to mean to exit the RCA and wash his hands in the maintenance shop men's
;_  bathroom. The RPT who directed the individual to wash his hands subsequently  !
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discovered that the individual had len the RCA and a search was initiated. The worker
<  was located aner a short period of time and was escorted back inside the RCA.' Travel -
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  - path surveys of the areas he had traversed while outside the RCA detected no radioactive  1 contamination. Condition Report 1-97-06-211 was initiated to investigate and track this
:  issue.


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Attachment A to U-602839
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classification. An incorrectly performed valve line-up resulted in a large spill of feedwater '
Page 2 of 4
which was not identified for two shifts despite repeated control room annunciator indications of high emergency core cooling system sump levels. NRC inspectors identified some instances of inadequate short term relief turnovers, incomplete operator logs and rounds sheets, and informal control room communications. Further, the inspectors identifieil one example of an operator leaving the "at the controls" area without proper relie In addition, there were a number of personnel errors in activities conducted outside the control room area. Multiple errors in preparing, implementing, and clearing a tagout resulted in racking in a high voltage circulating water pump motor breaker contrary to the i requirements of a tagout. An inadvertent reactor protection system trip was initiated when an operator removed intermediate range rnonitor "E" from service with IRM "F"
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The individual was again directed to process through the PCM-1B. The PCM-1B alarmed indicating contamination on the right thigh area and right palm. The RPT directed the individual to remove his shorts and don a pair of surgical scrub pants. This action resulted'
already deenergized. An operator incorrectly positioned the division 11 emergency diesel l generator maintenance switch while performing a tagout, and the second operator failed to j perform an adequate independent verification of the tagou j I
in no further PCM-1B thigh area alarms although alarms were still received on the right palm detector. Several attempts were made to remove the contamination from the worker's right hand even though no contamination was detected in this area using a hand held frisker. The RPT then summoned the Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor (RPSS)
Management implemented two partial work stand-downs in February 1997 to address the i excessive number of personnel errors. Following the second February 1997 stand-down, notable improvements in performance were observed by the NRC. Following an NRC inspection debrief involving a March 9,1997, procedure adherence incident, the licensee l made critical changes to procedures governing procedural adherence and the temporary procedure change process, in concert with these actions, other operating, surveillance,
for help in assessing the situation.
 
The RPSS evaluated the situation and was also unable to detect any radioactive comamination using a hand held frisker. Additional attempts were made to remove any radioactive contamination that could not be detected with a frisker from the person's hand; however, the PCM-1B right palm zone alarms continued. It was assumed that the radioactive contamination level was too low to be detected by hand frisking, but enough to be detected by the more sensitive PCM-1B. At this point the RPSS contacted the acting Supervisor-Radiological Operations (SRO) and the decision was made to release the individual from the RCA even though he was still alarming the PCM-1B on the right palm. The Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) was informed of this decision and concurred that the individual should be allowed to exit the RCA. The indisidual's dosimetry was obtained by the RPSS and he was directed to report to Radiation Protection personnel the next day for follow up surveys and evaluation.  *
The contaminated individual was released from the RCA in accordance with Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 7200.03," Personnel Contamination." CPS procedure 7200.03 required that if after decontamination efforts, radioactive contamination is still detectable, the SRO shall determine release requirements for levels up to 1000 corrected counts per minute (ccpm). The release requirements for radioactive contamination levels greater than 1000 cepm were to be made by the RPM.
 
On June 19,1997, at aoproximately 1915 hours, the affected individual reported to Radiation Protection as directed. He was instructed to process through a PCM-1B which alarmed on the right palm on the first count evolution. He was then asked to process through a PCM-2, a new type of whole body radioactive contamination monitor recently purchased by CPS in which alarming areas are more precisely displayed. The individual alarmed on the right hand and forearm in the PCM-2. A contamination survey with a hand held frisker detected 800 ccpm ofradioactive contamination on the right inside forearm near the elbow. The radioactive contamination was removed using a tape press and the individual then successfully passed through the PCM-2. The radioactive contamination captured on the tape press was kept for analysis and the individual was allowed to return to work inside the RCA.
 
This event was a violation of 10CFR20.1501. Surveys were not made to ensure  ,
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201(a).
 
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Anachment A
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to U.602839 Page 3 of 4 The cause for this violation was lack of knowledge and false assumptions that resulted in numerous attempts to, remove radioactive contamination in a location where none existed.
 
Although rigor was demonstrated in using multiple PCM-1Bs, performing multiple hand , _
frisks. and performing multiple decontamination efforts, a lack of understanding for the detectan capability of the PCM-1B and false assumptions made during the assessment process resulted in the failure to detect the radioactive contamination. The RPT was not aware of the PCM-1B palm detector geometry. He did not know that the palm detector was seven inches wide and seventeen inches long and can detect radioactive contamination on the inside of the forearm as well as in the palm area. The RPT thought the palm detector was smaller and only monitored the palm area. The RPSS was aware of the palm
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detector size, but his previous ex erience with palm alarms on the PCM-1Bs resulted from radioactive contamination on the nand. Therefore, the RPSS assumed that the radioactive comamination must have been on the hand and only surveyed the hand and a portion of the individual's wrist.
 
A contributing cause for this event was a lack of a questioning attitude that resulted in the failure to resolve the numerous PCM-1B alarms when no radioactive contamination was -
found. This resulted in the non-conservative decision to release the individual from the RCA after persistent PCM-1B alarms. Also, numerous PCM-1B alarms had been received yet the acting SRO and the RPM allowed the individual to exit the RCA and leave the site.
 
The acting SRO and RPM placed an over reliance on the skill and judgment of the RPSS and as a result, a proper review of the incident was not performed.  '
Additionally, comprehensive follow-up actions to identify any potential spread of radioactive contamination was not performed in a timely manner. The worker's hotel room and vehicle were surveyed in the following two days, but the hotel room survey was performed after the hotel staffhad cleaned the room and linens. The individual's clothing, permanent residence, and a laundry facility used by the affected individual were not surveyed until the NRC had expressed concern regarding the follow up actions that had been performed.
 
Corrective Steos Taken and Results' Achieved Follow-up surveys were performed to ensure that radioactive contamination had not spread to areas outside the RCA as a result of this incident. The individual's work area outside the RCA, vehicle, motel room, permanent residence, T-shirt worn the day of the event, and a laundry facility used by the individual were surveyed. No radioactive contamination was detected.
 
A skin dose evaluation for the affected individual was performed in accordance with CPS procedure 7003.02, " Skin Dose Calculation." The results of this evaluation resulted in a skin dose assignment of 256 mrad averaged over an 11.4 centimeter squared area to the individual's arm. This dose is significantly below regulatory limits. '
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Anachment A to U-602839
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: The RP Operations Group performed a stand down briefing to ensure that RP personnel were aware of this event. This briefing consisted of a review of the incident, the apparent -
cause and contributing factors, and changes being planned to prevent a future incident of
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and maintenance procedures were revised to support the emphasis on strict procedural adherence. Late in the period, inspectors observed operators making detailed changes to procedures when surveillance such as diesel generator operability runs could not be performed as written, then proceeding in a controlled deliberate manner to complete the task. Management monitoring and industry peer reviews performed from March through June 1997 resulted in improvement in control room formality and communications near the end of the perio l The Plant Operations area is rated Category '
this type.
B. Maintenance      j l
Performance in this functional area declined during this assessment period, but remained j good overall. With notable exceptions, safety related plant equipment was well maintained. The licensee's maintenance program appropriately identified a number of systems requiring additional monitoring, and ensured those systems were receiving j additional attention. However, problems with procedure adherence, procedure and work i package quality, work control, and timely resolution of equipment concerns were evident j throughout the perio Timely resolution of known material condition concerns was lacking in sorra instance While the Clinton facility has historically performed wellin maintaining safaty systems, some long term deGcient conditions have been allowed to exist with respect to balance-of- ;
plant equipment. Examoles included the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system, "B" !
circulating water purnp starting problems, and control room deficiencies. Extensive NRC l
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Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation CPS Procedure 7200.03, _" Personnel Contamination," was revised to include the limitations of PCM alarm displays in that the detector positions in relationship to each
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, individual's body size may provide misleading information. The procedure also requires that when investigating PCM alarms. adjacent areas in addition to the affected areas
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identified in the PCM display are to be surveyed. Finally, if after decontamination efforts,
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radioactive contamination is still detectable, the procedure requires the RPM to generate a release plan with appropiiate controls and follow up actions.
 
A comprehensive review of procedurally allowed decision making authority under -
abnormal conditions was performed. This review was to ensure that proceduces adequately capture expectations for conservative decision making under abnormal conditions.-
RPTs and RPSSs attended a training seminar to ensure understanding of PCM operations including detector coverage limitations, relationship between PCM and portable  *
monitoring instrument sensitivity, and the lessons learned from this event.
 
The ' Monitor and Decontaminate Personnel' on thejob training and evaluation measure was revised to discuss PCM detector geometry differences due to individual body  1 structures and the need to survey adjacent areas when performing manual frisking following a PCM alarm.
 
A training seminar for RFSSs was given to emphasize thoroughness ofinitial problem assessments and appropriate follow-up. This seminar included responsibilities of the RPSS, proble,n assessment, prioritization, follow-up, and data collection techniques.
 
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved Clinton Power Station is currently in full compliance with 10CFR20.1501(a).
 
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Attachment B -
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Page 1 of 2 l
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Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03b i


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j-  The Notice of Violation states in part:    *
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  "2. Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures  .
L  reconunended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, Revision 2 (February .
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;  RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be  l
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!. a. Step 2.1.1 of procedure no. CPS 8801.60 (revision (rev. 23) " Gamma 10,
;  Portal Calibration Test," which provides the instructions for the calibration i
;  ofpersonnel contamination monitors, states that the monitors be calibrated
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A intervention was required to ensure adequate resolution of some material condition deficiencies including control room correctives, feedwater check valves and safety related breaker problem A number of long-standing material condition issues were pursued during the extended refueling outage. Significant reductions were made in the number of control room deficiencies, a problem identified in the previous SALP period, with over 400 items resolved. Near the end of the period, operators and staff were aggressively identifying additional items, and maintenance staff was actively working to correct them. A concentrated effort on the outboard feedwater isolation check valves resulted in dramatically reduced as left leakage rates. In May and June 1997, the licensee expended considerable resources to ensure operational readiness for safety related breaker Although most routine maintenance activities were conducted safely, maintenance i procedures did not always provide sufficient control of activities in some important area l inadequate procedures resulted in diesel generator preconditioning during performance of I monthly surveillance, damage to the reactor recirculation piping due to the implementation of freeze seals, and failure to meet procedural requirements regarding Use History Analyses, in addition, the Division 111 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for almost a year, in part due to maintenance personnel not questioning a large discrepancy between as-found and as-left relay calibration data, in response to the problems, the !
Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that:
licensee initiated an extensive review and revision of existing maintenance procedure l Deficiencies in work packages and work planning complicated some maintenance task j Work planning deficiencies included lack of contingency planning, inadequate tagouts, and l J
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failure to provide parts required to complete activities. The reactor trip of April 1996 was l
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'due, in part, to the work package for switchyard work which was deficient in that it failed l to differentiate design differences in switchyard breakers and to provide an impact matrix l to discuss the risk of this maintenance on losing a reserve auxiliary transformer at powe l A second reactor trip in June 1996 was attributed to personnel error while performing l maintenance in a difficult environnien At the end of the period, the licensee was working on improving the maintenance work control process, improving surveillance procedures, and in ensuring proper procedure adherence. NRC observed improved procedure adherence and that procedures were being changed when problems were identifie The Maintenance area is rated Category C,, Enaineerina Overall performance in engineering was adequate. Strengths noted during the previous SALP in self-assessment, design, and response to high-priority issues were absent from the current SALP period. Problems with resolution of long-term issues, corrective actions, and inconsistent management oversight that existed in the last period continued. In addition, weaknesses in root cause investigation and corrective action, design control, operability evaluations,10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and procedure compliance surfaced during the SALP perio ,
-
_
a. On July 16,1997, a gamma 10 portal monitor (serial number 854%E) had -
not been calibrated since February 26,1996."
 
Background and Reason for the Violation On July 16,1997, NRC inspectors discovered that a portal monitor, Gamma-10 serial number 85496E, had not been calibrated within its required 12 month frequency but was .
still in service. The calibration had last been performed on February 26,1996. During the .
time the monitor was past its calibration due date, weekly response checks in accordance with CPS procedure 7410.32, " Operation of Gamma-10 Portal Monitor," continued to be performed. These response checks are in place to ensure proper continued operation of in-service monitors. A prerequisite in this procedure requires that the monitor has been calibrated within the last 12 months. Failure to perform this verification is a violation of a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements
        *
  - (Operations)," Appendix A, " Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors."
 
The cause for this event was human error. Specifically, committed actions in a procedure were not performed.-
      '
        .


. ~ . - . - . ~ - - . - . . _ - . - - . - - ~ . _ . ~ _ . - . - - . . - . - . - . .
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  . .
l Root cause investigations and corrective action for equipment problems were often not appropriate or timely.'' In particular, a long term common mode failure problem associated with hardened grease in electrical breakers and difficulties with drywall sump leakage monitoring instrumentation noted in the last SALP were neither aggressively pursued nor
  . .. . ..
  ' corrected. Most notably, the licensee failed to properly evaluate the condition of 480V, 4160V, and 6.9Kv breakers even after hardened grease had been identified in the breakers. There were examples late in the period where aggressive actions were take For example, the licensee's identification and response to instrument inaccuracies in surveillance and degraded voltage associated with the 345Kv supply through the reserve auxiliary transformer were considered positiv Some design activities resulted in inadequate designs and design errors resulting in significant problems in a number of areas. Several design changes were unsuccessful and had to be modified for important plant equipment to operate satisfactorily, including the drywell leakage monitoring system and a regulating transformer installation in the auxiliary power system to address degraded voltage concern I The operability evaluation program lacked appropriate guidance for engineers and I operators, the program could not easily retrieve previous evaluations, and actions i recommended by the operability evaluations were not always complete nor were they tracked. Some operability evaluations appeared to focus on justifying system operability rather than objectively evaluating the situation against system operability and consistency with the USAR. Specific examples included incorrect motor operator valve weights used ,
.. .
in seismic analyses and control room chiller auto-start load on the diesel. generato Safety evaluations conducted per 10 CFR 50.59 were not always performed as required and when' performed the' evaluations were at times inadequate. Of greatest concern was the use of engineering generated " Action Plans" which.were used to direct operators to  )
'.
perform special tests on' reactor systems without appropriate safety evaluations'or required ]
Attachment B
reviews. Examples of 10 CFR 50.59 deficiencies included: a special test which isolated  j the cycled condensate system from the residual heat removal (RHR) system resulting in  l RHR inoperability; disabled annunciators for demineralizer differential pressure; and the l removal of emergency diesel generator air start system dryer check valve springs. An
*      to U402839 Page 2 of 2
  . improved safety evaluation program was developed as corrective action for these problems. The improved program included training for all engineering and operations personnel on the purpose of 10 CFR 50.59, designation of specially trained and selected ]
  .
individuals to review all safety evaluations, and increased emphasis on safety evaluation !
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved
A number of examples of failure to follow procedures were noted during several  l inspections. One of the most significant contributed to the RHR inoperability example noted previously, which involved engineers indicating it was acceptable to combine steps from disparate procedures without further review. The problem appeared to be the cause or a significant contributor to a variety of engineering weaknesses identified during the SALP period.
' The Gamma-10 was taken out of service, calibrated and placed back in service. A review ,
of other insenice PCMs and Gamma-los was performed to ensure that they were in !
calibration. No other unidentified out of calibration monitors were found in senice.
 
.
Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation
        ..
CPS procedure 7410.32, " Operation of Gamma.10 Portal Monitor," was revised to include technician initials on the Gamma-10 Daily Source Response Check Data Sheet to verify the monitor has a current calibration and to ensure that the monitor's calibration due date will not expire prior to the next response check.
 
CPS procedure 7410.33, " Operation of the PCM-1B and PCM-2," was revised to include technician initials on the Source Response Checklist to verify the monitor has a current calibration and to ensure that the monitor's calibration will not expire prior to the next response check.
 
The Calibration procedures for PCMs and Gamma-los were revised to require that a calibration sticker be placed on the monitor after a successful calibration. The calibration sticker provides local indication of a monitor's calibration due date. The calibration -
        <
stickers are to be used when performing response checks to verify the monitor has not gone past its calibration date.
 
Control and Instmmentation (C&I) Group Leaders and technicians qualified to work on PCM and Gamma 10 monitors were briefed on the prerequisites for CPS procedures -
7410.33 and 7410.32. This briefing included verifying that the PCM and Gamma-10 monitors have a current calibration and the changes to CPS procedures 7410.32 and 7410.33.
 
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, related to Gamma-10 operation.
 
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Attachment C'
to U-602839
..     Page I of 3
  '
  - Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03a The Notice of Violation atates in part:    .
  "2. Technical Specification _5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RO) 1.33, Appendix A, Revition 2 (February 1978).
 
RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be implemented which address personnel monitoring and that chemistry procedures be developed which address sample collection and analysis, and instrument performance, b. Step 2.1.1 of procedure no. CPS 8801.62 (rev. 37), " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCMIB) Functional Calibretion Test," which provides the instructions for the calibration of personnel contamination monitors, states that the monitors be calibrated at least once every 12 months.
 
Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that: '
b. On July 16,1997, a personnel contamination monitor IE (serial number 1203) had not been calibrated since January 3,1996."
 
Background and Re' ason for the Violation On July 16,1997, NRC inspectors discovered that a Personnel Contamination Monitor, PCM-1B serial number 1203, had not been calibrated since January 3,1996. Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 8801.62, " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM IB)
Functional / Calibration Test," requires a PCM-1B to be calibrated at least once every 12 months. PCM-1B serial number 1203's calibration due date is tracked by Preventive Maintenance (PM) task PCIPRM203 in the Power Plant Maintenance and Planning System ( PPMPS). PPMPS is a computer data base used at CPS for tracking and ,
scheduling maintenance tasks. PPMPS tracks the due date and a late date of a PM according to its frequency. The duc date is determined by adding the prescribed frequency '
to the date the task was last performed. The late date is calculated by adding an additional 25 percent of the task's frequency to the due date. This would have made the due date for calibrating the affected PCM-1B January 3,1997, with a late date of April 3,1997.
 
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Attachment C to U 603839 -
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      - Page 2 of 3 Prior to exceeding the l' ate date for calibration of the affected PCM, a deferral request was submitted to engineering in accordance with CPS procedure 1029.01, " Preparation and Routing ofMaintenance Work Documents," to extend PM PCIPRM203's due date for 6 months because of manpower restraints. This deferral was approved by the system  '
engineer on March 26,1997, and inputted into PPMPS on April 2,1997. PPMPS calculated the new due date for the PCM-1B to be June 2,1997, with a late date of September 2,- 1997.


. Late in the assessment period, the licensee took a number of steps to identify additional i  problems and correct known deficiencies. Shortly after the Operational Safety Team Inspeiction results were published, the licensee's Engineering Department contracted for an b         l L    5 l
During the investigation into this event the system engineer discovered _ that the American National Standards N323 1978, " Radiation Protedion Instrumentation Test and Calibration," requires that portable radation protection instruments be calibrated annually.
 
Not performing the calibration ofPCM-1B serial number 1203 witida 12 months is a violation of a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33 Appendix A.'
Also discovered during this investigation was that PM deferrals are automatically given a 25 percent ovenun in PPMPS. The engineers approving PM deferrals assume that the deferral date would be considered the late date when inputted into PPMPS. Maintenance Planning, the group responsible for the PM program, was not aware that deferrals should not have a 25 percent ovenun.
 
The cause for this event was a failure to identify that PCM calibrations are required annually with no overrun when the Preventive Maintenance task was created in PPMPS.    -
Based on this event and other occurrences involving the preventive maintenance program, a thorough evaluation of the PM program is currently in progress. Corrective actions applicable to the balance of the program will be determined based on the results of that evaluation.
 
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved The PCM-1B was taken out of service, calibrated, and returned to service. A resiew of other inservica PCMs and Gamma 10s was performed to ensure that they were in calibration. No other out of calibration monitors were found in service.
 
Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation All PCM and Gamma-10 PMs were revised to allow for no overrun (the due date and the late date are the same).
 
The PPMPS scheduling program has been changed to allow for no overrun on future PM deferrals.
 
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Attachment C
.'      to U 602839 Page 3 of 3
  .
IP will perform a comprehensive review of preventive maintenance tasks to ensure that the ovenun in PPMPS is correct.
 
*
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, related to PCM 1B operation.
 
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Attachment D
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to U402839
_.'      Page 1 of 2 -
  : Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03c The Not4ce of Violation states in part:    .
        ..
"2. Technical Speci6 cation 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, Revision 2 (February -
1978).
 
RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be implemented which address personnel monitoring and that chemistry procedures be developed which address sample collection and anrlysis, and instrument performance.


  .   - - -  . --
c. Step 8.4.3 cfprocedure no. CPS 1024.35," Control or Radioactive EfBuents" and step 8.13 of procedure no. CPS 7410.75, " Operation of AR/PR Monitors" states that at least annually, data from grab samples shall -
.      .
be checked against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify accuracy of the monitor and need for special calibration.


outside organization to review all engineering activities. In addition, third party focused reviewswere conducted for areas where program improvements had been implemented, including operability and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. The changes in these two specific programs were viewed as significant improvements in the Engineering Department's methods for conducting busines ,
Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that:  -
The Engineering area is rated Category E Plant Suocort Plant Support performance, although adequate, declined during this assessment period primarily due to a significant performance decline in radiation protection (RP). Deficiencies identified in RP mirrored those identified in other areas. Specifically, problems were identified in licensee workers' sensitivity towards and understanding of radiological controls and alarms, and procedural adequacy and adherence. While the problems did not result in any overexposures to licensee personnel or its contractors, the issues were indicative of management controls not being effectively implemented in the radiation protection area which led to a programmatic breakdown. Similar problems with procedural adherence and understanding requirements were also evident in the Security functional area. These problems impacted effective irnp;cmentation of several access cortrol programs, a response activity, and some barrier control activities. Emergency preparedness performance was good, but afsc declined. Several examples were noted where emergency plan requirements were neither implemented in a timely manner nor well understood by plant staf Radiation protection program management failed to recognize that a lack of sensitivity towards and understanding of radiological controls and alarms existed among the work force. This was exemplified by a number of staff actiens including: two occasions where a worker or workers secured the supply gas to a porta! contamination monitor, rendering the monitor inoperable; an apparent deliberate contamination of an RP technician; and worker (s) identified to be sleeping and smoking in the radiologically controlled area, in adoition, procedural adherence and adequacy problems contributed to several radiological events. The events included, contamination of three workers during resin sluicing, pressurization of a radiological waste transfer line prior to having performed an adequate radiological survey, and inadvertent entry of three workers into the drywell in violation of a Radiation Safety Work Plan (RSWP). Although none of the events resulted in worker overexposures, the inadvertent entry into the drywall put the workers at risk of a potentially lethat exposure had fuel handling resumed and a mishap occurred while they were in the upper levels of the drywell. Some aspects of the radiation protection program remained good, such as ALARA planning and controls, and reactor water chemistry; however, the above problems indicated that most of the radiation protection program is in need of significant improvemen Security and Emergency preparedness (EP) performance declined but were considered good. In addition to a lack of understanding of security and EP plan requirements, these areas exhibited weaknesses similar to those in the other areas with regard to procedural adherence and adequacy. In the security area, these problems impacted effective
c. Since 1988, the licensee had not at least annually been checking data from grab samples against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify the accuracy of the monitor and the need for special calibration."
; implementation of several access control programs, a response activity, and some barrier l l
 
!
Backaround and Reason for the ViolatiQD'
V
On July 17,1997, NRC inspectors identified that step 8.4.3 of CPS administrative procedure 1024.35," Con:rol of Radioactive EfDuents,".was not being performed. Step -
8.4.3 states that at least annually, data from grab samples shall be checked against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify accuracy of the monitor and the need for special calibration. This requirement is implemented via CPS procedure 7410.75, >
" Operation of AR/PR Monitors." Investigation into this event identified that completion of this requirement is not in an auditable form and probably was never performed. This is a violation of a procedure required ty RQulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A.
 
The cause for this violation was a failure to include an annual requirement outlined in an administrative procedure in an appropriate scheduling program.
 
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Mtachment D -
      ' to U 602839
    ,   Page 2 o(2 Corrective Actions Taken artlResults Achieved Illinois Power perfomed tie comparison orgueous effluent continuous air monitors with '
_
vab samples in accordancn with step 8.4.3 of CPS procedure 7410.75 on July 18,1997.
 
Osseous emuent activity levels were too low to provide statistically valid comparisons between the monitors and grab samples. Therefore, special calibration of the continuous air monitors was not warr Anted. Proceu Radiation Monitor accuracy is not in question since they are calibrated e n a routine basis with National Institute of Standards and
- Testing (NIST) traceable wurces.
 
Chemistry adrhistrativc procedures were sampled and CPS administrative procedurt 1024.35 was reviewed ir. its entirety to ensure other recurring requirements vare included in an appropriate scheduling program. No discrepancies were found as all recurring
        ~
requirements were appropriately scheduled and tracked either through surveillance procedures, Preventive Maintenance schedules, or laboratory checklists.
 
Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation s
The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) will be revised by December 15,1997 to include annual compariton of grab sample data to the gaseous emuent monitors.


_  .. __  _ _ _ _ -._
Additionally, a surveillance procedure will be developed to implement this new ODCM rec,uirement by December 15,1997. These actions will ensure annual tracking and  *
    .
completion of this requirement.
      ._ . _ _
.
O-controls activities. In the EP area, the lack of staff unde.rstanding of the EP plan was I evidenced by a lack of classification conservatism during the September 5,1996 even Additionally, the EP staff was not aggressive in evaluating actual events, in updating the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and in completing timely corrective action for identified backup Meteorological tower instrumentation failures. How3ver, these problems did not affect the overall excellent performance during the 1996 annual exercis Following the end of this SALP period a follow up inspection into the radiation protection f area identified the beginnings of improvements in the area. Some improvement was )
observed in the awareness among licensee staff of radiation protection requirements and practices. Some improvements were also observed in planning and execution of work, with an emphasis on applying lessons learned. Management expectations on procedure adherence and supervisory oversight of work activities had been emphasized during special training session The Plant Support area is rated Category I
      \


l l
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved i-CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33,  1
l i
- Appendix A on this issue.      l
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Revision as of 23:43, 5 May 2021

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/97-01
ML20211P201
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/1997
From: Grobe J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Jackie Cook
ILLINOIS POWER CO.
References
50-461-97-01, 50-461-97-1, NUDOCS 9710200094
Download: ML20211P201 (2)


Text

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October 11.-1997 Vr, John G, Cook ' Sent;r Vice Preedsat Clinton Power Station Illinois Power Company Mail Code V-275 P.O. Box 678 Clinton,IL 61727

Dear Mr. Cook:

j SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-461/97017(DRS))

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 24,1997, in response to our letter dated August 25,1997, transmitting a Notice of Violation associated with the failure to perform an adequate radiological survey and the failure to adequately implement radiation

protection and chemistry procedures at your Clinton Nuclear Power Station. In your letter, you ' acknowledged that personnel knowledge and procedure deficiencies, non-conservative decision-making, and personnel errors contributed to the violations. You also indicated that you ' planned to revise applicable procedures, to provide additional training to radiation protection and control and instrumentation personnel, and to revise the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

' We have reviewed your corrective actions and have no further questions at this time. These , corrective actions will be examined during future inspections.

Sincerely, Original Signed by John A. Grobe " 9710200094 971011 John A. Grobe, Acting Director-PDR ADOCK 05000461 Division of Reactor Safety O POR , i Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 h- g ,i Enclosure: Lir 09/24/97, W.D. Romberg, Illinois Power, to US NRC See attached distribution

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. , J. October 11.-1997 Distribution: cc w/o encl:- W. D. Romberg, Assistart Vice President * P Yocum, Plant Manager, Clinton Power Station R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Assessment J. Sipek, Director - Licensing a cc w/ encl: Nathan Schloss, Economist, , Office of the Attomey General G. Stramback, Regulatory Services Project Manager, General Elactric Company Chairman, DeWitt County Board

- State Liaison Officer

! Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission Distribution:

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Docket File w/ercl SRis, Clinton, Rlli Enf. Coordinator w/enci PUBLIC IE-01 w/enct Dresden, LaSalle, TSS w/ encl OC/LFDCB w/enci Quad Cities w/enci DOCDESK w/enci DRP w/enci LPM, NRR w/enci CAA1 w/enci DRS w/ encl A. B. Beach, Rill w/enct Rlli PRR w/enci J. L. Caldwell, Rlll w/ enc! i i

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4 o DOCUMENT NAME:G:\DRS\CLl97107.TY rece e copy of this document. Indcate in the bout *C* = Copy without attachment / enclosure 'E' = (.opy with attachment / enclosure OFFICE RIII. c RIII- C RIII s

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RIII ,,, A l NAME S0rth:ml ske GShear646 GWright/Att/ JGrob HG DATE 10/.3 /97 10/ 6 /97 10/(p 197 10/ \\ / 97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

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P@ R ***"' " - a Assistant Vice Prescer' - N,oe r e -. a ,.e,

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U 602839 . 4F.190 September 24, 1997 Docket No. 50-461 Document Control Desk Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject: Reply to Notices of Violation Contained in lasP14tiaD3ecort 50-461/97017 mRS)

Dear Madam or Sir:

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       .

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Illinois Power (IP) response to the two Notices of Violation documented in NRC inspection report 50-461/97017 (DRS).

IP admits that the violations occurred.

The first Notice of Violation identifies the failure to perform surnys to assure compliance with 10CFP.20.1201(a). The response to this Notice of Violation is contained in Attachment A of this letter. The second Notice of Violation identifies three examples of failure to implemer.t procedural requirements. These requirements were contained in procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)," Appendix A, " Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Beiiing Water Reactors." Attachment B to this letter contains the response to the failure to perform a " Gamma 10 Portal Calibration Test."

Attachment C contains the response to the failure to perform a " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM IB) Functional Calibration Test." Attachment D to this letter contains the response to the failure to perform the annual comparison of gaseous effluent grab samples to continuous air monitors.

. This response to the above Notices of Violation contains the following commitments: e IP will perform a comprehensive review ofpreventive maintenance tasksto ensure that the overrun in the Power Plant Maintenance and Planning System (PPMPS) is correct.

jyy g L/ N 6 f,0

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U402839

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, The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) will be revised by December 15,1997 to include annual comparison ofgrab sample data to the gaseous effluent monitors.

. ' Additionally, a surveillance procedure will be developed to implement this new ODCM

  < requirement by December 15,1997,
        .-

IP believ2s IMt the actions described in the attached responses address the 1 concerns identif.d i . these Notices of Violation.

j=

Sincerely yours, 4) y is 0 { Wayne D. Romber ! Assistant Vice President i- JRF/krk i i ' , Attachments

cc: NRC Clinton Project Manager ' 3 ranch Chief, Region III, USNRC haC Resident Office, V-690 L Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC - Illinois Department ofNuclear Safety

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' Attachment A

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to U 602839

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Page1ofi . . ,

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Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-1- * The violation states in part: . , + j "1. ~ 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that , may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and _ F ' - that are reasonable under the circumstances to eva:uate the extent ofradiation levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential ' j_ radiological hazards that could be present.

,

Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, surwy means an evaluation of the radiological

conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release,
- disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation.

t L Contrary to the above, on June 18,1997, the licensee did not make surveys to L assure compliance with 10 CFR 20,1291(a), which limits radiation exposure to the ! skin. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately identify or quantify licensed radioactive material on the arm of an individual who alarmed a personnel

contamination monitor and was released from the restricted area."

l Backaround and Reason for the Violation

       .
        .

' ' On June 18,1997, at approximately 1030 hours, an individual became contaminated with radioactive material on the right thigh area of his shons and the inside right forearm. The [ contamination on the forearm was near the elbow, This event occurred as the individual L was moving air hoses inside the Radiological Control Area (RCA) from a non-

'
 - contaminated area to a contaminated area. The individual handed the hoses to a co-worker already inside the contamination area and then donned protective clothing and -
. entered the area to help lay out and tape down the hoses. ARer completing this task, the
--

individual processed through a whole body personnel radioactive contamination monitor ! (PCM-1B) and received contamination alarms on the right thigh area of his shorts and

:  right palm. The worker contacted the Radiation Protection office and a Radiation

! Protection Technician (RPT) was dispatched to assess the contamination alarm.

The RPT surveyed the right thigh and right hand of the individual with a hand held frisker.
         !

No detectable radioactive contamination was found. The RPT then attempted to remove any minimal contamination from the individual's shorts using a tape press and directed the i individual to go wash his hands while he responded to other workers who were alarming a~ L '

 . the PCM-1Bs in the area. The worker was inexperienced and mistakenly understood this direction to mean to exit the RCA and wash his hands in the maintenance shop men's
_ bathroom. The RPT who directed the individual to wash his hands subsequently  !

discovered that the individual had len the RCA and a search was initiated. The worker

<  was located aner a short period of time and was escorted back inside the RCA.' Travel -

[ ^

 - path surveys of the areas he had traversed while outside the RCA detected no radioactive  1 contamination. Condition Report 1-97-06-211 was initiated to investigate and track this
issue.

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Attachment A to U-602839 . Page 2 of 4

  .

The individual was again directed to process through the PCM-1B. The PCM-1B alarmed indicating contamination on the right thigh area and right palm. The RPT directed the individual to remove his shorts and don a pair of surgical scrub pants. This action resulted' in no further PCM-1B thigh area alarms although alarms were still received on the right palm detector. Several attempts were made to remove the contamination from the worker's right hand even though no contamination was detected in this area using a hand held frisker. The RPT then summoned the Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor (RPSS) for help in assessing the situation.

The RPSS evaluated the situation and was also unable to detect any radioactive comamination using a hand held frisker. Additional attempts were made to remove any radioactive contamination that could not be detected with a frisker from the person's hand; however, the PCM-1B right palm zone alarms continued. It was assumed that the radioactive contamination level was too low to be detected by hand frisking, but enough to be detected by the more sensitive PCM-1B. At this point the RPSS contacted the acting Supervisor-Radiological Operations (SRO) and the decision was made to release the individual from the RCA even though he was still alarming the PCM-1B on the right palm. The Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) was informed of this decision and concurred that the individual should be allowed to exit the RCA. The indisidual's dosimetry was obtained by the RPSS and he was directed to report to Radiation Protection personnel the next day for follow up surveys and evaluation. * The contaminated individual was released from the RCA in accordance with Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 7200.03," Personnel Contamination." CPS procedure 7200.03 required that if after decontamination efforts, radioactive contamination is still detectable, the SRO shall determine release requirements for levels up to 1000 corrected counts per minute (ccpm). The release requirements for radioactive contamination levels greater than 1000 cepm were to be made by the RPM.

On June 19,1997, at aoproximately 1915 hours, the affected individual reported to Radiation Protection as directed. He was instructed to process through a PCM-1B which alarmed on the right palm on the first count evolution. He was then asked to process through a PCM-2, a new type of whole body radioactive contamination monitor recently purchased by CPS in which alarming areas are more precisely displayed. The individual alarmed on the right hand and forearm in the PCM-2. A contamination survey with a hand held frisker detected 800 ccpm ofradioactive contamination on the right inside forearm near the elbow. The radioactive contamination was removed using a tape press and the individual then successfully passed through the PCM-2. The radioactive contamination captured on the tape press was kept for analysis and the individual was allowed to return to work inside the RCA.

This event was a violation of 10CFR20.1501. Surveys were not made to ensure , compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201(a).

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Anachment A

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to U.602839 Page 3 of 4 The cause for this violation was lack of knowledge and false assumptions that resulted in numerous attempts to, remove radioactive contamination in a location where none existed.

Although rigor was demonstrated in using multiple PCM-1Bs, performing multiple hand , _ frisks. and performing multiple decontamination efforts, a lack of understanding for the detectan capability of the PCM-1B and false assumptions made during the assessment process resulted in the failure to detect the radioactive contamination. The RPT was not aware of the PCM-1B palm detector geometry. He did not know that the palm detector was seven inches wide and seventeen inches long and can detect radioactive contamination on the inside of the forearm as well as in the palm area. The RPT thought the palm detector was smaller and only monitored the palm area. The RPSS was aware of the palm ' detector size, but his previous ex erience with palm alarms on the PCM-1Bs resulted from radioactive contamination on the nand. Therefore, the RPSS assumed that the radioactive comamination must have been on the hand and only surveyed the hand and a portion of the individual's wrist.

A contributing cause for this event was a lack of a questioning attitude that resulted in the failure to resolve the numerous PCM-1B alarms when no radioactive contamination was - found. This resulted in the non-conservative decision to release the individual from the RCA after persistent PCM-1B alarms. Also, numerous PCM-1B alarms had been received yet the acting SRO and the RPM allowed the individual to exit the RCA and leave the site.

The acting SRO and RPM placed an over reliance on the skill and judgment of the RPSS and as a result, a proper review of the incident was not performed. ' Additionally, comprehensive follow-up actions to identify any potential spread of radioactive contamination was not performed in a timely manner. The worker's hotel room and vehicle were surveyed in the following two days, but the hotel room survey was performed after the hotel staffhad cleaned the room and linens. The individual's clothing, permanent residence, and a laundry facility used by the affected individual were not surveyed until the NRC had expressed concern regarding the follow up actions that had been performed.

Corrective Steos Taken and Results' Achieved Follow-up surveys were performed to ensure that radioactive contamination had not spread to areas outside the RCA as a result of this incident. The individual's work area outside the RCA, vehicle, motel room, permanent residence, T-shirt worn the day of the event, and a laundry facility used by the individual were surveyed. No radioactive contamination was detected.

A skin dose evaluation for the affected individual was performed in accordance with CPS procedure 7003.02, " Skin Dose Calculation." The results of this evaluation resulted in a skin dose assignment of 256 mrad averaged over an 11.4 centimeter squared area to the individual's arm. This dose is significantly below regulatory limits. '

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Anachment A to U-602839

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Page 4 of 4

: The RP Operations Group performed a stand down briefing to ensure that RP personnel were aware of this event. This briefing consisted of a review of the incident, the apparent -

cause and contributing factors, and changes being planned to prevent a future incident of

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this type.

Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation CPS Procedure 7200.03, _" Personnel Contamination," was revised to include the limitations of PCM alarm displays in that the detector positions in relationship to each

, individual's body size may provide misleading information. The procedure also requires that when investigating PCM alarms. adjacent areas in addition to the affected areas

, identified in the PCM display are to be surveyed. Finally, if after decontamination efforts,

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radioactive contamination is still detectable, the procedure requires the RPM to generate a release plan with appropiiate controls and follow up actions.

A comprehensive review of procedurally allowed decision making authority under - abnormal conditions was performed. This review was to ensure that proceduces adequately capture expectations for conservative decision making under abnormal conditions.- RPTs and RPSSs attended a training seminar to ensure understanding of PCM operations including detector coverage limitations, relationship between PCM and portable * monitoring instrument sensitivity, and the lessons learned from this event.

The ' Monitor and Decontaminate Personnel' on thejob training and evaluation measure was revised to discuss PCM detector geometry differences due to individual body 1 structures and the need to survey adjacent areas when performing manual frisking following a PCM alarm.

A training seminar for RFSSs was given to emphasize thoroughness ofinitial problem assessments and appropriate follow-up. This seminar included responsibilities of the RPSS, proble,n assessment, prioritization, follow-up, and data collection techniques.

Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved Clinton Power Station is currently in full compliance with 10CFR20.1501(a).

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Attachment B - E to U402839

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Page 1 of 2 l

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Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03b i

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j- The Notice of Violation states in part: * i

 "2. Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures  .

L reconunended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, Revision 2 (February .

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i 1978), 1

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RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be l
implemented which address personnel monitoring and that chemistry procedures be
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;  developed which address sample collection and analysis, and instrument performance.

l !. a. Step 2.1.1 of procedure no. CPS 8801.60 (revision (rev. 23) " Gamma 10,

Portal Calibration Test," which provides the instructions for the calibration i
ofpersonnel contamination monitors, states that the monitors be calibrated

! at least once every 12 months. i l , . i

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! . Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that: i

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a. On July 16,1997, a gamma 10 portal monitor (serial number 854%E) had - not been calibrated since February 26,1996."

Background and Reason for the Violation On July 16,1997, NRC inspectors discovered that a portal monitor, Gamma-10 serial number 85496E, had not been calibrated within its required 12 month frequency but was . still in service. The calibration had last been performed on February 26,1996. During the . time the monitor was past its calibration due date, weekly response checks in accordance with CPS procedure 7410.32, " Operation of Gamma-10 Portal Monitor," continued to be performed. These response checks are in place to ensure proper continued operation of in-service monitors. A prerequisite in this procedure requires that the monitor has been calibrated within the last 12 months. Failure to perform this verification is a violation of a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements

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 - (Operations)," Appendix A, " Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors."

The cause for this event was human error. Specifically, committed actions in a procedure were not performed.-

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Attachment B

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Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved

' The Gamma-10 was taken out of service, calibrated and placed back in service. A review ,

of other insenice PCMs and Gamma-los was performed to ensure that they were in  ! calibration. No other unidentified out of calibration monitors were found in senice.

. Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation

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CPS procedure 7410.32, " Operation of Gamma.10 Portal Monitor," was revised to include technician initials on the Gamma-10 Daily Source Response Check Data Sheet to verify the monitor has a current calibration and to ensure that the monitor's calibration due date will not expire prior to the next response check.

CPS procedure 7410.33, " Operation of the PCM-1B and PCM-2," was revised to include technician initials on the Source Response Checklist to verify the monitor has a current calibration and to ensure that the monitor's calibration will not expire prior to the next response check.

The Calibration procedures for PCMs and Gamma-los were revised to require that a calibration sticker be placed on the monitor after a successful calibration. The calibration sticker provides local indication of a monitor's calibration due date. The calibration -

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stickers are to be used when performing response checks to verify the monitor has not gone past its calibration date.

Control and Instmmentation (C&I) Group Leaders and technicians qualified to work on PCM and Gamma 10 monitors were briefed on the prerequisites for CPS procedures - 7410.33 and 7410.32. This briefing included verifying that the PCM and Gamma-10 monitors have a current calibration and the changes to CPS procedures 7410.32 and 7410.33.

Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, related to Gamma-10 operation.

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. Attachment C' to U-602839 .. Page I of 3

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  - Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03a The Notice of Violation atates in part:    .
"2. Technical Specification _5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RO) 1.33, Appendix A, Revition 2 (February 1978).

RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be implemented which address personnel monitoring and that chemistry procedures be developed which address sample collection and analysis, and instrument performance, b. Step 2.1.1 of procedure no. CPS 8801.62 (rev. 37), " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCMIB) Functional Calibretion Test," which provides the instructions for the calibration of personnel contamination monitors, states that the monitors be calibrated at least once every 12 months.

Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that: ' b. On July 16,1997, a personnel contamination monitor IE (serial number 1203) had not been calibrated since January 3,1996."

Background and Re' ason for the Violation On July 16,1997, NRC inspectors discovered that a Personnel Contamination Monitor, PCM-1B serial number 1203, had not been calibrated since January 3,1996. Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 8801.62, " Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM IB) Functional / Calibration Test," requires a PCM-1B to be calibrated at least once every 12 months. PCM-1B serial number 1203's calibration due date is tracked by Preventive Maintenance (PM) task PCIPRM203 in the Power Plant Maintenance and Planning System ( PPMPS). PPMPS is a computer data base used at CPS for tracking and , scheduling maintenance tasks. PPMPS tracks the due date and a late date of a PM according to its frequency. The duc date is determined by adding the prescribed frequency ' to the date the task was last performed. The late date is calculated by adding an additional 25 percent of the task's frequency to the due date. This would have made the due date for calibrating the affected PCM-1B January 3,1997, with a late date of April 3,1997.

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      - Page 2 of 3 Prior to exceeding the l' ate date for calibration of the affected PCM, a deferral request was submitted to engineering in accordance with CPS procedure 1029.01, " Preparation and Routing ofMaintenance Work Documents," to extend PM PCIPRM203's due date for 6 months because of manpower restraints. This deferral was approved by the system   '

engineer on March 26,1997, and inputted into PPMPS on April 2,1997. PPMPS calculated the new due date for the PCM-1B to be June 2,1997, with a late date of September 2,- 1997.

During the investigation into this event the system engineer discovered _ that the American National Standards N323 1978, " Radiation Protedion Instrumentation Test and Calibration," requires that portable radation protection instruments be calibrated annually.

Not performing the calibration ofPCM-1B serial number 1203 witida 12 months is a violation of a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33 Appendix A.' Also discovered during this investigation was that PM deferrals are automatically given a 25 percent ovenun in PPMPS. The engineers approving PM deferrals assume that the deferral date would be considered the late date when inputted into PPMPS. Maintenance Planning, the group responsible for the PM program, was not aware that deferrals should not have a 25 percent ovenun.

The cause for this event was a failure to identify that PCM calibrations are required annually with no overrun when the Preventive Maintenance task was created in PPMPS. - Based on this event and other occurrences involving the preventive maintenance program, a thorough evaluation of the PM program is currently in progress. Corrective actions applicable to the balance of the program will be determined based on the results of that evaluation.

Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved The PCM-1B was taken out of service, calibrated, and returned to service. A resiew of other inservica PCMs and Gamma 10s was performed to ensure that they were in calibration. No other out of calibration monitors were found in service.

Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation All PCM and Gamma-10 PMs were revised to allow for no overrun (the due date and the late date are the same).

The PPMPS scheduling program has been changed to allow for no overrun on future PM deferrals.

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Attachment C .' to U 602839 Page 3 of 3

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IP will perform a comprehensive review of preventive maintenance tasks to ensure that the ovenun in PPMPS is correct.

Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, related to PCM 1B operation.

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Attachment D

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to U402839 _.' Page 1 of 2 -

 : Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/97017-03c The Not4ce of Violation states in part:     .
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"2. Technical Speci6 cation 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, Revision 2 (February -

1978).

RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends that radiation protection procedures be implemented which address personnel monitoring and that chemistry procedures be developed which address sample collection and anrlysis, and instrument performance.

c. Step 8.4.3 cfprocedure no. CPS 1024.35," Control or Radioactive EfBuents" and step 8.13 of procedure no. CPS 7410.75, " Operation of AR/PR Monitors" states that at least annually, data from grab samples shall - be checked against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify accuracy of the monitor and need for special calibration.

Contrary to the above, the NRC inspection identified that: - c. Since 1988, the licensee had not at least annually been checking data from grab samples against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify the accuracy of the monitor and the need for special calibration."

Backaround and Reason for the ViolatiQD' On July 17,1997, NRC inspectors identified that step 8.4.3 of CPS administrative procedure 1024.35," Con:rol of Radioactive EfDuents,".was not being performed. Step - 8.4.3 states that at least annually, data from grab samples shall be checked against data obtained from continuous radiation monitors to verify accuracy of the monitor and the need for special calibration. This requirement is implemented via CPS procedure 7410.75, >

" Operation of AR/PR Monitors." Investigation into this event identified that completion of this requirement is not in an auditable form and probably was never performed. This is a violation of a procedure required ty RQulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A.

The cause for this violation was a failure to include an annual requirement outlined in an administrative procedure in an appropriate scheduling program.

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Mtachment D -

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   ,    Page 2 o(2 Corrective Actions Taken artlResults Achieved Illinois Power perfomed tie comparison orgueous effluent continuous air monitors with '

_ vab samples in accordancn with step 8.4.3 of CPS procedure 7410.75 on July 18,1997.

Osseous emuent activity levels were too low to provide statistically valid comparisons between the monitors and grab samples. Therefore, special calibration of the continuous air monitors was not warr Anted. Proceu Radiation Monitor accuracy is not in question since they are calibrated e n a routine basis with National Institute of Standards and

- Testing (NIST) traceable wurces.

Chemistry adrhistrativc procedures were sampled and CPS administrative procedurt 1024.35 was reviewed ir. its entirety to ensure other recurring requirements vare included in an appropriate scheduling program. No discrepancies were found as all recurring

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requirements were appropriately scheduled and tracked either through surveillance procedures, Preventive Maintenance schedules, or laboratory checklists.

Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation s The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) will be revised by December 15,1997 to include annual compariton of grab sample data to the gaseous emuent monitors.

Additionally, a surveillance procedure will be developed to implement this new ODCM rec,uirement by December 15,1997. These actions will ensure annual tracking and * completion of this requirement.

Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved i-CPS is currently in full compliance with procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, 1

- Appendix A on this issue.      l
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