IR 05000346/1986014

Intervenor Exhibit I-OHIO-H,consisting of Forwarding Safety Insp Rept 50-346/86-14 on 860501-0615.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers, Maint,Surveillance,Emergency Planning & Mgt Meetings

ML20236P613
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/07/1986
From:	Guldemond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Williams J TOLEDO EDISON CO.
References
ML-I-OHIO-H, NUDOCS 8708120442
Download: ML20236P613 (11)

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3 ~ 197 ROOSEVELT RO AD , O . SLEN ELLYN. ILLINOl5 60137

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k L_gA 3 . .v * ,; Docket No. 50-346 e nto Toledo Edison Company statt ATTH: Mr. Joe Williams, J ,,,,1 attmto_ __ ' - - - _mtcrco _

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Vice President m Nuclear Edison Plaza

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Gentlemen: This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. P. Byron and D. Kosloff of this office on May 1, 1986 through June 15, 1986, of activities at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station authorized by NRC Operating License No. NPF-3 and to the discussions of our findings with Mr. L. Storz at the conclusion of the inspectio O The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personne In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo The responses directed by this letter and the accompanying Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as  ; required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL-96-51 ! We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspectio i

Sincerely, . Ie @ i W. G. Guldemon , Chief Projects Branch 2 f f

Enclosure:

Inspection Report l n No.50-346/86014(DRP) \ U See Attached Distribution f

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B708120442 B60907 PDR ADOCK 05000346 U PDR ( _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _

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Distribution

REGION III== Report No. 50-346/86014(DRP) Docket No. 50-346

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License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza,'300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH p Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 15, 1986 . Inspectors: P. M. Byron D. C. Kosloff (~') Approved By:

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's  Reactor Pr cts Section 2B Inspection Summary Inspection on May 1 through June 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-346/86014 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, licensee event reports, maintenance, surveillance, emergency planning, performance enhancement program, strike activities and management meeting Results: No violations or deviations were identifie . O

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted Toledo Edison J. Williams, Jr. , Senior Vice President Nuclear i R. Crouse, Senior Vice President D. Amerine, Nuclear Mission Assistant Vice President T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Administration

 *L. Storz, Plant Manage T. Myers, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Director
 *P. Hildebrandt, Nuclear Engineering Group Director G. Grime, Nuclear Security Director
 *S. Smith, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance M. Schefers, Information Management Director W. O' Conner, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations . .

L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director J. Fay, Nuclear Engineering General Manager S. Jain, Nuclear Safety Manager J. Ligenfelter, Operations Engineering Manager M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager J. Wood, Nuclear Plant Systems Director n T. Bloom, Senior Licensing Specialist U R. Flood, Technical Support Manager  ; J. Stotz, Technical Support Group i

 *R. Cook, Senior Licensing Specialist       i B. Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director E. Salowitz, Planning Superintendent NRC
 *P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector       j
* Denotes those personnel attending the June 17, 1986, exit meetin i The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including     ;

members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, health physics and nuclear materials management department staf ; l 2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings j (0 pen) Unresolved Item (346/86012-02): Seismic Qualification of 1E Electrical Cabinets Not Maintained. The inspectors determined that, during j a November 1985 site visit, Cyberex personnel told the licensee that the i cabinet doors were probably required to be bolted to meet seismic require- l ments. On January 10, 1986, the licensee's engineering group issued n Surveillance Report No. 86-022, which identified the potential pro'olem on () the Cyberex cabinets and asked whether other electrical cabinets in the plant might have a similar proble l l 2 l l ~ l

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'On February 11, 1986, the vendor informed the licensee by telephone that   ;

i df- the bolts in the cabinet doors were required to maintain the seismic j qualification of the cabinets. The licensee received written confirmation 1 of this on February 24, 1986, and issued Deviation Report (DVR)'86-043 on February 28, 198 Licensee Event Reporf (LER) No. 86-11 was issued on { March 27,,198 l

'Later the licensee ciscovered that a 1974 Westinghouse seismic   l qualification report stated that, to maintain seismic qualification, the   '1 SCR balance potentiometers in the Cyberex rectifiers and battery chargers   I were required to have their settings fixed with locking compoun i Surveillance Report 86-170, dated April 22, 1986, documented this require-ment and stated that the locking compound was not present. The problem was brought to the attention of station operations personnel by DVR 86-102 on May 5, 1986, fourteen days after it had been originally documented. Plant personnel placed the required locking compound on the equipment within hours of receiving the DV At the May 1, 1986, exit meeting for inspection report 66012 the inspectors informed the licensee that their inspection of other electrical equipment for missing bolts or screws was inadequate. On May 12, 1986, the licensee found that required bolts were missing from Emergency Diesel Generator control cabinet The safety significance of this issue is mitigated by the fact that the plant has been in cold shutdown since June 9,1985. However, the untimely (,) communication between engineering and operations could have a serious impact on the operability of equipment. The licensee must make a concerted effort to improve interorganizational. communications. The new deficiency reporting system, Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) should assist the licensee in surfacing problems, as all PCAQ's must be reviewed by the shift supervisor and an overview committee. Timely issuance of PCAQ's will be required to prevent reoccurance of the above problems. The ingpectors will continue to follr, the licensee's timeliness of handling issue No violations or deviations were identifie . McenseeEventReportsFollowup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (0 pen) LER 86-17: Thermal Degradation of Fire Barrier Penetration Fill Materia The inspector visually inspected the penetration and verified that it had been filled with Kaowool. The licensee is performing the Fire Barrier Penetration Test, ST 5016.11, as part of the corrective action for this LER. So far, numerous fire barrier deficiencies have been identifie This LER will remain open until the licensee completes ST 5016.11 and the O corrective action for the deficient fire barrier _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _-_______-___a .
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(0 pen) LER 86-21: Inadequacies in Raychem Installation The licensee is
. b] inspecting or evaluating all existing class 1E electrical wire and cable <

terminations and splices. So far the licensee has inspected 21 installa- l tions in addition to the 71 reported in the LER. All 21 were unacceptabl The licensee is also evaluating 20 taped installations to determine if Raychem installations are required. The licensee is developing a program to have a testing laboratory environmentally test samples of unacceptable , installations. The testing program will attempt to qualify some types of . currently unacceptable -installations so that they can be used without j repair or replacement. This LER will remain open until all Raychem

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installations and taped connections are repaired or considered acceptabl No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of _

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May and June. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component ~ Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by

'O observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of May and June, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Fire Water and Essential 480 Volt AC Distribution systems to verify i operabilit On June 4, 1986, the licensee was testing valve DH 1518, the No. 2 Decay Heat (DH) Pump Suction Valve. Due to earlier maintenance work on the No. 2 '

DH Pump, the No. 2 DH loop had been drained and a pump vent valve opene When DH 1518 was opened from the control room, the control room operator observed pressurizer level decreasing and immediately shut DH 151 Pressurizer level stopped decreasing and the equipment operators shut the DH pump vent valve to stop reactor coolant leakage from the isolated DH loop. Pressurizer level was restored by adding 751 gallons of borated water to the reactor coolant system (RCS). Approximately 150 gallons had been discharged to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems room sump, the balance filling the DH loop. The licensee did not document the loss of RCS inventory as a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ). The inspector considers this to be an Unresolved Item (346/86014-01) and is reviewing the cause of the condition and whether it should have been documented as a PCA These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility Os operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure _ _ _ _----

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation . Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and compon'ents listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification ,' l The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

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activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;.and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assLre that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc * The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed: , Inspection of Raychem installation in 4160 volt AC electrical O distribution syste * Silt removal from intake area for the Service Water (SW) syste * Repair of SW pump 1- The inspector noted deficiencies in the storage of pump parts that had been removed for repair of the pump. The inspector notified the licensee and the deficiencies were correcte Deficiencies in the storage of SW pump 1-1 parts is an unresolved item (50-346/86014-02) pending review of the licensee's program for temperary storage of safety-related equipmen Following completion of maintenance on the 4160 volt AC distribution system and the Service Water system, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the ste s and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System, ST 5031.10,

   " Steam Feedwater Rupture Control Instrument Input Response Time", verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were  ,

l O accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and

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/l procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the V individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie N 7 Emergency Planning     _ Tornado A tornado passed within five miles of the station between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. on June 10, 1986. Several buildings were destroyed and other minor damage occurred. There was no damage near the site. At 9:03 p.m. site security personnel monitoring the Ottawa County Sheriff's radio frequency heard reports of possible sightings of funnel cloud The licensee contacted the sheriff's office by telephone and was informed that a " severe storm watch" was in effect but that no tornado sightings had been confirmed. At 9:13 p.nr. 'the sheriff's office formally notified the licensee that a tornado warning had been declared and the control room was notified. At 9:15 p.m. the licensee took the actions required by Administrative Procedure AD 1827.06, s " Tornado". The tornado warning was cancelled at 10:07 p.m. A check of the U.S. Weather Service logs indicates that a tornado warning was declared at 9:11 p.m. for Ottawa Count n U  Section 1 of AD 1827.06 requires that the Load Dispatcher notify the station that a tornado watch, or warning, exists for the vicinity of the station. A review of the load dispatcher and un't logs indicates that the load dispatcher did not notify the shift supervisor of the tornado warnin This is an unresolved item (50-346/86314-03).

Section 4.3.2 of AD 1827.06 lists actions which must be initiated when a tornado warning is issued. T Mse actions are necessary to prepare the station for the effects of a tornado and are based on the assump- , tion that the licensee will have sufficient warning to take the actions i before a tornado occurs. As shown above, it is possible that the

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warning may not come until after a tornado has occurred. This event demonstrates that the licensee should review their Emergency Plan Supporting Procedures to determine if there are other events requiring anticipatory actions where the event could precede the notificatio l The inspectors have informed both the licensee and Region III of this )

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 -need. This is an Open Item (50-346/86014-04). Flood Watch Lake Erie is at its highest recorded level for the season and continues

' to rise. The still level is approximately one foot above the still  ! level that existed just before the wind-driven floods of 1972 and 197 ' The licensee informed the inspectors that there is a high potential for flooding during November 1986. In the worst case water level hg3

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would remain two feet above site access road level for four day Although the station would be isolated from highway and railroad i 6 l l l l

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n traffic their would be no flooding of the statio Such flooding V- could impact area evacuation time contingency plans for this even The licensee is preparing No violations or deviations were identifie . Performance Enhancement Program (PEP)  ;

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The PEP has changed form since its inception. Many items are now included in the licencee's' Course of Action (COA) Program and many items have been completed. The following items were reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection perio .

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(Closed) Item (346/RP-88001): A-1, Guidelines For Use of Consultants. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's April 2, 1986, internal memo in budget and cost controls which provides guidelines for the use of consultant The memo details an implementation schedule and the inspectors have reviewed :

some of the detailed implementation schedules. The inspectors consider that the licensee's actions satisfy the PEP action item'.'

(Closed) Item (346/RP-99619): D/SM-3, Corporate Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) Meeting with Corporate Management. The CNRB met with corporate management in August 198 No violations or deviations were identifie O 9. strike     -

Local 245 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) contract with the licensee terminated April 30, 1986, and the 30 day cooling off period was invoked. The membership voted on June 1, 1986, not to ratify the licensee's proposed contract and a work stoppage was initiated at 12:01 AM, June 2, 1985. At Davis-Besse the work stoppage affected licensed and unlicensed operators, maintenance, station services, and chemistry and health physics personnel. Approximately 20% of Local 245 members are employed at Davis-Besse.

f The inspectors were on site prior to the work stoppage and observed preparations and the transition including control room turnover. The transition was smooth and orderly. The inspectors monitored post-transition activities and noted no operating problems; however, the picketers refused to allow a woman who had brought her husband to work to leave the site. Later in the day the licensee provided helicopter transportation for the woma The picketers blocked all entrances to the site with vehicles and would not allow access to or egress from the site. The Senior Resident Inspector was denied access most of the first day. Region III management contacted Local 245 officials and, subsequently, NRC personnel have not been denied acces _

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g Before the strike, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Pla The inspectors determined that the E0P staffing did not meet both security plan and technical specificati'on j requirements. The licensee was notified and the E0P was revised to l comply with all staffing requirements. The inspectors reviewed the qualifications and training of the individuals temporarily assigned to i fill positions which require specific training and determined that they had received training and maintained qualifications where required. The inspectors verified the adequacy of the size of the Contingency Guard Force (CGO and reviewed their training. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's backup communication systems were adequat The inspectors observed the licensee's implementation of their E0P and determined that the organization responded in accordance with the E0 Technical Specifications minimum staffing levels are being exceeded. In addition to onsite observations, the inspectors observed the operation at the corporate command center. The command center was staffed at the vice presidential level which ensured that decisions could b,e.readily obtaine The licensee sequestered essential personnel prior to the strike. By the second day access conditions had stabilized sufficiently to allow the licensee to relax the sequestering requirement In addition, contract building-trades personnel crossed the picket line after the first week of the strike. The building trades are performing non-represented work, such as facility change requests and construction G of the new maintenance building. The licensee is making progress in completing maintenance work orders and testin No violations or deviations were identifie . Management Tour The Regional Administrator and the Senior Vice President, Nuclear, with members of their staffs, met on June 4,1986, to discuss the licensee's progress in achieving plant startup. Significant technical issues were also discussed. A plant tour followed the discussion . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in l order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of NRC or licensee or both. An open items disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph ____ _ _ __ _

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Exit' Interview

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The inspector met with licensee'repre'sentativ.es (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout.the month and at the conclusion of the~ inspection and

  .sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee; the' inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection repor .
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