ML20117N877

Forwards Late Breaking Backup Re Startup Feedwater Sys to Be Distributed Before Thurdsay Phone Call

ML20117N877
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	05/08/1996
From:	Winters J WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Kenyon T NRC
Shared Package
ML20117N226	List: ML20117N840 ML20117N848 ML20117N854 ML20117N857 ML20117N877 ML20117N882
References
NUDOCS 9606250039
Download: ML20117N877 (8)

Text

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DATE: og g 9 (, NAME: L Q),a TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER -

Y M6444 EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Office:d/2- 774/-sz9o COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284-4887 dJ Afg outside: (412)374-4887 LOCATION:

Cover + Pages 1,6 The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call:

WIN: 284-5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374-5125.

COMMENTS:

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ULUllVil J. LIV.J Ul litt UUllll lllLillllt! JJ llllL1 lilll liitu u;Iis11tt WI plutM 18F EMil5M) 1(llem parameters.

Essential system parameters are monitored in the main control room via information taken from the hot wate system through the plant data display and processing system. What are the essential system parameters related to thepihot the inpwater heating system. The instruments for the heat exchanger and pumps were initially designed loca stem. Do these instruments orovide indication in the c^armt ma= fa 'ka b~ --*- '--*:-- -- -- ' --

1111[IlllYllijU filllllIlllll.I.ll l III 11l115 ll1111 E l Ill, Bj)lh[Q[ l, Ej @ [L k{ ,,uu lLaJu3 sisteii, seises no uuety.reistea misetiert iu therefore has no nuc1 car safety design basis. The information provided in the subsection is sufficient for review of the system's potential for impact on the safety of the plant. The subsection also states that instruments are pr for monitoring system parameters and that essential system pammeters are monitored in the main control room. 'Ihe current

. IL .l.1.. design Lt .L ...of the WI' integrated il J data display and control systems have instruments in the hot water heating 1 ll ll ll SfifMiQ adplay ul slem parametric data will be devel6 ped as part of the man. machine interface, human factors l

engineering process ribed in Chapter 18 of the SSAR.

SSAR Revision: NOh ML ggg 410.290-1 PRELIMINARY I

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STARTUP FEEDWA'IER SYSTEM FWS, WATER HAMMER) Westinghouse should address the issue of plant damage due to water hammer during startup.

Response: DSER OI 10.4.9 2 Information contained in SSAR, section 10.4, Revision 6, and in SSAR Appendix 3B, Revision 7, addresses the potential for water hammer in feedwater lines. The " Main Feedwater Line" portion of SSAR subsection 3B.2.3 addresses a number of design features included in the main and startup feedwater system, piping, components and control that minimize the potential for water hammer. De potential for water hammer during startup is minimized by having a startup feedwater system separate from the main feedwater system. His startup system can not add cold water to the hot main feedwater system, is sized appropriately for startup, has control valves and other features designed for stanup service, is routed to minimize geometric sources of water harnmer, and feeds a steam generator nozzle and feed spmy system separate from the main feed ring. His item is closed.

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i PREllMINARY NRC REQUEST FOR ADDmONAl. INFORMATION Question 410.287 Section 9.2.10 3 of the SSAR (Revision 3) states that the hot water heating system (VYS) is a high energy system and has no safety-related function. Provide information regarding the system pressure and ternperature and v:rify that any failure of the VYS piping er equipment will not directly or indirectly result in lose of required redundancy in any pomon of the systems or equipment in the safety-related areas. Also, explain why the system was changed

@. to a high-enere,y system from a moderate-energy system.

Response

SSAR subsecoon 9.2.10.3, Revision 6, provides the basis for hot water system not requiring a nuclear safety h evaluation. The subsection also provides a description of the design response to the fact that the hot water heating system is a high energy system. The specification change from moderate-energy to high<nergy was as a result of a natural design progression. The system design parameters were respecified to ensure its ability to proside hot water under all design conditions.

SSAR Revision: NONE S

410.287-1 W-Westinghouse i--

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Y NRC REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL INFORMATION

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Question 410.284 Section 9.2.7.2.1 of the SSAR (Revision 3) states that the high capacity subsystem consists of two chilled water pumps, two water-cooled chillers, a chemical feed tank, and an exparsion tank. An air separator was climinated hom the previous SSAR revision. However, each of the two loops of the low c2pacity subsystem still contains of an air separator and other components that are similar to the high capacity subsystem. Explain why the air separator is not required in the high capacity subsystem.

Response

SSAR subsection 9.2.7.2.1, Revision 6, Properly describe the low capacity subsystem without an air separator. Air separators are not required since the expansion tank is sized and located to serve this function.

SSAR Revision: NOST l

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Les isolasten c.a rantral Valvo$

3.7.f 19, w6sancAL spSCRCATION Revision: 1 i Effective: 01/13/84

, PRELIMINARY i 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

) 3.7.7 Startuo Feedwater Isolation and Control Valves t

LC0 3.y.7 Both Startup Feedwater Isolation Valves and Control Valves )

shall be OPERABLE.

i 1

NODES 1. 2, and 3.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION _ _ _

- CONDITION v

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Only one valve A.1 Restore both a control A. and an isolation valve OPERABLE in a single in each flow path to flow path.

OPERABLE status.

0,3 Isolate the flow path. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> A.2 .

I Immediately 8.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 B. Two valves in the same flow path inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE O i;r Verify both startup feedwater isolation L m oeb. u c. e K SR 3.7.7.1 and control valves are OPERABLE. +kIw~u LL,

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~ Startup Feedwater Isolaticn and Centros vaive>

If, Tscesi specsRCAtt0N B 3.7.7 stevision: 1 Effaceve: 01/13/94

{ PRELIMINARY 8 3.7.7 Startuo Feedwater Isolation and Control Valves BASES The startup feedwaLve Systcm sueeliet #Mwatur to the stcan BACKdROUND Iggeratprg IM IN Lift Elullduring Il WI' plant stutup, hot standby and s

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• M1 H v liff JLUI sep ri * ~'-- - d-= uaa 66 Edfulverelet(d function and his no safety-rel@.aaed 3MlfR 5HIL 51L8U isolate feedwater in the event of a feedwater or steam line break inside centainoant. ve,lm

.L 54NA Ince fu a senaiata af tAusrtup reedwater mek.- d.-Mn Dumps, each taking sudian from the doaeteter AA andalterndLv discharging into tHE~aaln fecdwater piping. The suction feed is provided from the condensate tank.

combined capacity of both pumps is equivalent to 7% of the normal feedwater flow. Each startup feedwater line contains  % w^

nab controlkrvalve wtyL and an isolation valve -

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The basis for the requirement to isolate the startup APPLICA8tE feedwater systes is established by the analysis for large SAFETY ANALYSES It is also Steam Line Break (SL8) inside containment.

influenced by the analysis for a large Feedline Break (FLB).

" Failure to isolate the startup feeonater system following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being O delivered to the steam anerators. resulting ease in excessive 6 in cooidown and &dditiona mass and energy re Q Wp L containment.

O oc L 9% skua (cad C T-cold--Low signals closef the startup feedwater control and j isolation valves and trips the startup feedwater pumps.

The startup feedwater isolation and control valves are f

/

components which actuate to mitigate a Design Basis /

Accident, and as such meet Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

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18. TECHfW:AL SpectRCAT10N Startup Fcedwater Isolation and Centrol vaives i

B 3.7.7

! Revisioni 1 EMeseve: 01/13/94

(

l BASES (continued) - . . . .

i I This LCO ensures that the startup feedwater isolation and LCO control valves will actuate on command, following a SLB or i

FLB, and isolate startup feedwater flow to the steam l

generators.

l The startup feedwater isolation and control valves are l coM1dered OPERABLE when they closa an an isolation actuation signal, and their isolation times are within the required limits.

l APPLICADILITY The star +'t feadwater isolation and control valves must be OPERABLE whenever there Is signitidHT EHE and ungtyf lu i

' the Reactor Coolant System and the steam generators, This ensures that, in the event of a high energy line break, a single failure will not result in the blowdown of more than one steam generator. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the startup fccdwater isth+ 4in OPERABLE aaorder and control valves to limit areamount the re 26 Dnet1y of mas! quired t that could be added to containment in the event of a SLS or FLB. When the valves are closed, they are already performing their safety function.

In N0DE5 4, S, and 6, the energy in the steam generators are low, and isolation of the startup feedwater system is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 and A 2 W'th only one valve (isolation or control) OPERABLE in a lesnple flowMpata, tnere is nu ndandens empakili+y +ap this s

ate th+ m path.

a control valve in each { flow path must 64 restorea Lu OPERABLE status with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, ne the flow path must be isolated. A Completion' Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is acceptable cinea, with' one valve in a flow path inoperable. thara is a second valve available in the finw path to isolate the line.

If both the Isolation and sentral valves in a single flow path cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the required Complation time, then the flow path must .3 isolated by closing the OPERAlllf vtlve.

(continued)

I PREl IMINARY 16,1 579 800*390d O~..... Odh 01 M

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18. TECHNICAL SPtGmca Huru -...--r ..--...... ._.

• ' 8 3.7.7 nm: 1 Effective: 01/13/94 l PREiJMINARY BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

The allowed Completion Time assures expeditious action will be taken, and is based on the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring during this time.

B.1 If both isolation and control valves in a single flow path are inoperable, this constitutes a loss of function and the plant must enter LCO 3.0.3 inmediately. .

Mb SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 l' "A cc" b'-Tyr Me REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires verification s;g O! kI thathd both startup feedwater isolation and control valves are OPERABLE.Thefrequency 4 % i.,; is adequate considering the low probability of a SLB or FLB during this time.

REFERENCES None. -

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