ML19294D003

Associate Director Findings & Determination That State Plans & Preparedness Including Local Plans Are Adequate to Protect Health & Safety of Public.Related FEMA Correspondence & Rept Encl

ML19294D003
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	08/07/1980
From:	Camm F Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
Shared Package
ML19294D004	List: ML19294D003 ML19294D005 ML19337A414
References
NUDOCS 8009250329
Download: ML19294D003 (65)

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! Y r FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY f) /

Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 L JUN 2 51930 .

M r. Eugene P. Tanne r Director of Civil Defense Military Department of Tennessee Tennessee Emergency Operations Center Sidco D rive Na shville, Tennessee 37204 Dea r M r. Tanne r:

I have enclosed observer and participant reports on the State /Sequoyah exercise conducted June 16-17, 1980.

It is my understanding State and local participants and observers did an excellent job of critiquing the exercise and have, in fact, identified most of the problem areas discus. sed in our reports. While I am aware you have made a number of corrections in your Plan as a result of the exercise c ritique, I must ask special attention be given to critique items which specifically address off-site radiological mc nitoring team procedures and ca pability. We must assure ourselves, prior to submitting the Plan to FEMA National for review, these problem areas are resolved.

Your State has done much in a short period of time to accomplish what you have on the REP Plan. I compliment you for the excellent effort and assure you that RAC IV members and FEMA IV staff look forward to supporting future REP activities in your State.

Sincerely yours, Harris M. Pope Chairman, RAC IV Enclosure 8009250 -

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4 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 JUN 2 51960 .

hiEh10RANDUM FOR: Harris M. Pope Dire cto r Plans and Preparedness Division gA ,f.$ 01 -

FROhi: Jack D. 'chardson Plans and Preparedness Division

SUBJECT:

Tennessee REP Exercise (Sequoyah)

I have attached copies of subject exercise observer and participant reports for your review. In my opinion these should be forwarded to the State as w ritte n.

The State and local exercise participants did an excellent job of critiquing themselves and , in fact, pinpointed the items discussed in our reports.

In an effort to avoid repetition, I have only three areas to recommend for plans improvement:

(1) State should plan to notify FEhiA Region of situation when " Alert" emergene.y clas sification is reached.

(2) Adjacent state notificttions should be handled by FEhiA Region rathe r than State.

(3) State should reconsider and better define the functions and responsibilities of the State Command Center (forward) located in Chattanooga.

Exercise Observer and Participant Assignments were as follows:

Observers TVA CECC Dick Van Neil State EOC (Nashville) Jack Richardson State CC (Chattanooga) Ra . Boyett Bob Trojanowski Ha .lilton Co. EOC Vernon Darley Frank Vogel Bradley Co. EOC Don Hammonds State Rad Health (hiobile Team) Ed Williams

z Pa rticipants State EOC (Nahsville) Bob Gantt State CC (Chattanooga) Martin Bevans A tta chme nt

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,.,, FEDER AL. EMERGENCY M ANAGEMENT AGENCY i Plans and Preparedness Office Radiological Test Facility h

Bldg. 22, Washington Navy Yard I Washin8 con, D.C. 20374 June 20, 1980 l MEMORANDUM POR: Frank Vogel, Director. S6L Operational Systems i

Division FROM: ward F. Williams Jr. Chief, Radiological Test Facility

SUBJECT:

Comments on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Ezercise

( I served as an observer at the State Command Center th Chattanooga,

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{ Tennessee on June- 16, 1980. I also traveled with one of evo radi~-

logical nouitoring teams deployed from Nashville to Chattanooga after they arrived on the scene. During- this observation the following defi-ciencies were noted in the Tennessee response and in particular in the radiological nonitoring program:

[ 1. Dera appeared to be no plan by the Tennessee Department I of Radiological Health (TDRH) personnel. fo,r mobila monitoring

( sad deployinent of the ra=== appeared to be without purpose.

The team with which I traveled was only assignad to make the h measurements .during the entire deployment of y 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

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2. Connunications were grossly inadequate in thatthe TDRM Director of the radiological monitorihg was not in direct contact by radio with him teama.and had to relay 'ais in structions through a communicator who was not familiar with the rr.diological jargon or technical tarus., ,

3. Were was no direct communicat, ion between the .TDRH radio-i logical monitoring program and the radinligical apaitoring-program of the TVA at the State .Co=vnd Cac.ter in Chattanooga.

l These two elements appeared to be operating independently b of each other. -

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! 4. The map system and the technique used for deploying IDRH I nonitoring teams to a particular location was inadequate.

I Preplanned monitoring points should be employed. This I deficiency caused the team which I. observed to be lost on a number of occasir,ns

5. The total number of monitoring n=== deployed for this appli-cation (two) is not adequate and the deployment time for the State teams was too long S 3 houra.

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. 2 l 6. He team did not report monitoring information back to l

the C-anand Center. However, Mr. West of TDRH says that he instructed the team not to report monitoring data -

during the exercise.

I i 7.. The air sample instrumentation essential for this kind of j monitoring appears to be quite limited requiring the use of an AC generator. It is recomended that air severs that i can be operated directly off the automobile electrical system be procured.

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8 De team turned in their ID badges to the State Cr==and l Center when they deployed to Comand Post West and there-i fore had no maans of identification. Once identification I is issued to emergency persounsi it should be carried by

them throughout the exercise or accident.

! 9. Communications 'o State &===nd Centar in Chattanooga were j extremely poor Their knowladge of what was happening in d

the field and st the site were limited and often ran from 30 minutes to 1 1/2 hours behind the time of the actual events.

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!, 10. The TDRH nonitoring team did not use good monitoring or t measuring techniques. Most of the measurements were made inside the vehicle which is not acceptable. However, Mr.

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rj West stated that he had not asked the teams to- take and transmit readings or to actually go through their tenitoring procedures. This was dons because he. falt that they were well versed of what they would be required to do.

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Summ.ary of Observations at bCC and Hamilton County EOC - June 16, 1980 - Frank Vogel e Most of the comments I would have submitted were covered by others in the critiques. Therefore, only a few points which I feel needed ,

repetition.

e For a no-notice exercise there were alot of people on station prior to the start.

e The scenario adequately exercised the plans of the participants.

e The SCC was behind the scenario some 11/2 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the middle of '

tha morning. State must either develop proceduras to keep the SCC up to ff date or decide whether SCC is needed in the early period of an incident since control is exercised from Nashville.

e Rad Health taust develop procedures for closer liaison with TVA tnonitor-hN ing activities, i e The Hamilton County EOC was very adequately manned by local government agencies and voluntary agencies operated efficiently and procedures appeared to be adequate. -

e Voice connounications need to be revi~s wed and reports mars closely monitored for correctness; for example, at 1523 the following sessage was circulated in the Hamilton County EOC: Puff released 1200 Rims at pfi 1 mile and 37 Rims at 10 miles." This message was not questioned, yet

/ it had to. be incorrect for two reasons; there is no such ~ thing as Rim and 1200 Rems at 1 mile plus 37 Rems at 10 miles would be a tsajor event.

e NOAA Weather Radio and EBS were effectively used.

e The Lovell Field flight pattern places aircraf t la potential danger from a release at the Sequoyah Plant. Hm11 ton County kept the "M 0h. intarmed concernins exercise releases. This is an action which could

/ be overlooked and should be atrassed in all local plans.

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Summary of observations, . Emergency operatione Facility (EOP) of TVA j at Chestnut Tower, Chattanooga, Tennessee,. June 16, 1980 - C. R. Van Niel ,

1. TVA personnel performed is a professional manner

2. There van some delay and difficulty with the dissemination- of  !

information within the EOF. I

3. EOF is on Eastern time stila all nf the TVA plants, including Sequoyah, f are on Central time. Some coofusion might result, t

4. NOAA Weather Radio alert reported status of esercise at 1100 and 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br />. Good use of system.

5. Sir.e and General Emergencies confused because cf different numbering

/ M system (IP-4 & IP-5) for Division of Nuclear Power (DNP) and Sequoyah procedures.

6. Some confusion on part of 30F personnel as to when to terminata exarcise on Monday af tornoon.

7. Some question if EOF received last acenario messaga (change of wind to 030*).

8. Status board not utilfzed effectively.

9. Good telephone communications systaa with ring down capability to States, counties and reactor planta.

p3 10. There may be some delay in coordinating plant daca with ksele Shoals and Nashville.

NOTE: Copy of log being sent separately.

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 June 24,1980 ,

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, PLANS AND PREPAPEDNESS DIVISION FROM: Rayford H. Boyett, Health Physicist '

SUBJECT:

Tennessee REP Exercise (Sequoyah)

The Tennessee Sequoyah exercise held on June 16-17 was applauded as a success-ful exercise by local, State and Federal observers. The Regional Health Phy-sicist observed the exercise from the State forward commnnd center at Lovell Field in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

It is the opinion of this observer that the State and local officials have exercised the major parts of the Tennessee REP plan (i.e., Warning, Protective Response , Communications, Public Information, Notification, Accident Assessment ,

Radiological Exposure Control, and Medical Support). Due to time constraints, recovery and reentry was not exercised.

Two minor criticisms were observed from the forward command center:

1. The lag of information flowing to the decision makers at Lovell Field, and

2. Slowness of response of State agency personnel to the facility.

6 These entirely real are in classified an a.:tual as minor by this observer emergency. ,' if in fact;, may be because they,'r4

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY I

Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 June 20, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: ACK D [' SON Uche-FROM: Martin .7 evans Rober J. Gantt

SUBJECT:

Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Exercise Based upon our participation in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise at the Emergency Control Center (ECZ) in Chattanooga, and in the State EOC in Nashville on the 16 and 17 of June 1980, t'ae following reccmmendations are provided.

1. An initial briefing should be conducted by the responsible individual p'g outlining how the situation developed. Thereafter periodic updates should be given indicating whether the situation is improving or deteriorating at the plant.

2. One of the functions of the FEMA position in the ECC in a real emergency would be to prepare periodic SITREPS to be forwarded through the State EOC in Nashville to the National Office. The information that was available

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/I was not current. In discussing this with my counterpart at. the State EOC he had most information well in advance of the time we received it in Chattanooga. If the ECC is to be c.,f value in an emergency then some system has to be devised to obtain current information for more timely decisions.

3. The configuration of the ECC was not set up properly for an efficient c ' [') operation. Better separation of elements would be needed in an actual operation.

4. The display system in the State EOC needs revision to provide a better

't visual descriptica of the developing emergency situation. Maps were the lI only displays used and could not adequately present all information in a clear manner that could be seen by all participants.

5. The tripartite system worked very well but they were too involved with operations in the State EOC. A location away from t.he operations tables

[ should be selected for their use which provides some degree of privacy.

. 6. The FEMA representative needs a position from which to operate in the IO State EOC that includes access to the FTS system.

7. The front table arrangement in the State EOC needs some thought. A

,fs i better information display system would have reduced this problem by allowing participants to keep up without moving to the front of the room.

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OBSERyl.R WORK Sill! T for a State and Local exercise 'n conjunction wi th SEOUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT On 16-17 June 1980 , _ _ _

T eotti Leader is Id cff _hj4Med s os, FG M/f (Please do not divulge the Exercise date, since a number of participants wish to be uninformed on this paint in the interest of realism).

POST LtERCISE EVALUATION SESSION WILL 35 HELD on 6-17-80; 1:30 p.m. at tovell Field, Tennessee (Date/ Time) (Location)

1. OBSERVER DATA:

a. Name VERNON 0. DARLEY -

t, . Organization U.S. DOT /FAA ,

,, c. Title _, Regional Emergency Transportation Representative

d. Business Address P. O. Box 20636

_ _ _ _246-7595 FTS Atlanta, Georgia 30320 Phone: 404 763-7595 (Comm.)

2. GENERAL ASSIGt. MENT. You are requested to participate as a Federal Observer in the above listed exercise and attend the Post Exercise Eval 2ation.

I' lease he present at Hamilton County EOC, Chatta,nooga,_ _ .,

(Loca tiori)

FOR DUTY.

ty 0800 o' clock, on June 16, 1980 -~4W u,-4 *-4 w--

(tim. F (date)

3. SPECIFIC ASSIGNMETE. (To be completed by Team Leader)

Your specific location /arted of interest during the exercise will t>e See_above. .

Return these original worksheets (or readable copy) directly to H. W. Gatit -

USNRC not later ;han for compilation into a final report. (Please arite in complete statements since, in the interest of prompt response, editing of sections b and 6 will be almost non-existant.)

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,n an observer you should be prepared to:

a. Observe the operational response activities of the Organization / '

Area to whicn you are assigned and record your observations and evaluations and recommendations on the attached forms during or inanediately af ter the Exercise.

h. Pruvidt; a copy of the cosiipleted sections 4, 5 and 6 to the State Exercise Coordinator (or his designee) after the Exercise (if requested).

c. Report orally on Exercise activities during the Critique if ca' led upon tu do 50.

Attached - Section 4 - Factual observation sheets Section 5 - Evaluation sneets Section 6 - General comment sheets mm m 9 9 9 3-o o Ju o Ju S. .kh

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Observer V. O. DARLEY

()o t.v. 6-19-80 4 ACIUld., ,00][L g AJ 10J45. To the extent feasible, reconi your observation, ori the f ollowiriq subject areas in the spoi.es provided- Plea.e be as concrete, detailed and objective as possible. (Pref ace all conenent',

with an ef fective time if relevant). -

Warnin3 (Indicate times received and dissemitiated, f roni whom, warning means, warning format, etc.)

Notice of unusual event received by telecon f rom state EOC at 0826.

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b. fmergency Consaunications. (Inditate inethods o' coniinunical s uns ,

et f cc t iveness of equipment, control inedsures cr.iployed, etc , J Telephone and radio--both effective.

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c. Emergent / Medical Actions. (What occurred and when; now handled and byw'rioiti; hos F t W ,Tmbulances and medical personnel i riv o l v*:d ,

etc.) .

Well directed from the EOC by a Dr. Clark, local orthopedic surgeon serving as a volunteer. He and a volunteer assistant did an outstanding job in that they kept on top of the situation by maintaining a running account of available hospital beds and other medical services. Incidentally, during the simulation of responding to an emergency call there occurred an actual emergency in which medical services people actually picked up a heart attack victim who was DOA at hospital.

/ d. Public Information. (Indicate what public information was disseminatec when, by what means, by whom, on whose authority, etc. )

Excellent cooperation from the press. County CD Director used them effectively to keep public informed. Local emergency b roadcast stations carried the simulated emergency six or eight times th ro ughou t the day.

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Obseryt:r V. O. DARLEY

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Date 6-19-80

e. TEchnica l Advice. (Indica te what technica l advice, witen, by v4hoia, to whom, means of coranunica tion, etc. )

Not obse rved . _

f. Team Resoonse.

(Indicate what Team; how organized; w,en notified, when responded; how transported; equipment; communications; actions upon noti fication, en route, at site, etc. )

All county teams were being competently directed from the county EOC; either employees from the respective response organizations or volunteers with skills in those areas were present to effect coordination of each required effort or response.

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V. O. DARI.EY Date 6-19-80

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4 Action:, i ri ihreatened Area',_

(1) Road blocking activities. (Indicate when, where, on what advice, by wnom, how simulated, etc.) '

Not observed directly but it was apparent from telephone reports from the " field" that roadblocks were established at the proper places on a timely basis.

s (2) lyptection Actions. (Indicate when, what, where, on wnat a Kice, by whom, how simulated, etc.)

Not observed directly but it was apparent f rom cont rol room status reports that all protective actions were taken on a timely basis-including simulated evacuation.

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Date 6-19-80 9 ,Ac t i on,s,, ( Con t i n ued )

(3) Reception Centers. (Indicate when, where, by whom

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Torganization), procedures employed, how simulated, etc.) -

Not observed directly but it was apparent that all county c en t e rs Jesignated in the plan were established in a timely manner.

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(4) Other. (Area Control, protective actions other than evacua tion, etc. )

Apparently adequate.

Observer V.O. DARLEY Date 6-19-80

n. Coordination of Support Effort. (Who coordinated whdt ar.t iv i t ies',,

how, wng , etc.)

Very ef f ective. Coordination was effected by E0C director, his staf f, assigned departmental representatives and volunteers.

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1. Other actions.

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Observer V. O. DARLEY l)u ! o 6-19-80

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b. EVALUATION. w ording t > your best judgnient, please provide a ,uinn.o r i ted account and eva lua t ion of the response activit.ies observed:

a. Sunana ry . ('2urninarize the response actions noted in orie or two paragraphs.)

All required er appropriate actions were taken. No further elaboration is needed.

b. ,hSerence to Plan. (Did the organization observed adhere to t*e plan? If not, in what respect? Should the plan be

.. l.v:ged ? i The ecunty adhered to the plan. An excellent job.

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. Date 6-19-80

c. Fjag_Strengtns ;1nd Weaknesses. Bearing in mind the interided participation of the organization, what were the major strerigths and weaknesses noted?

(1) Major Strengths.

(a) Professionally directed.

(b) Adhered to the plan.

(c) Exce llent cooperation on the part of all participants, s

( .' ) Major Weaknesses.

(a) None noted in the county.

(b) Positive and timely direction from the state Control Center at Lovell Field was not apparent in the county EOC.

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.' ,' Oli'> er ve r V. O. DARLEY

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d. Suggesteq ter_ rec _tive Measures. The following means for iiuprov i n ; tre organization's response capabilities are sugge.ted:

No specific recommendations.

e. Exercise Objectives. (Indicate degree of accomplishment of Exercist Obj ectives ) .

I think that all objectives were met at the county level.

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Ove rall, I would grade the exercis e play at the county level as very effective. In my opinion, all objectives were met at the county level.

However, I got the distinct impression that some of the participants had advance knowledge of the scenario--estacially the timing.

e. M. 3 VERNON 0. DARLEY Regional Emergency Transportation Representativ.

D0T Region IV

y , FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Q Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE June 25,1980 MEMORANDUM FCR: Directo r, Plans & Preparedness Division FROM:

4v Donough' C.dHammonds Plans and T'reparedness Division

SUBJECT:

Bradley Co. , Tennessee, Sequoyah Exercise Report ACC OMPLISHMENTS The county response was complete and timely. All key city and county organizations and volunteer service groups were represented in the Emergency Ope rations Center (EOC). These representatives had evidently been thoroughly briefed on their emergency roles and responsibilities and performed enthusiastically and effectively. The Mayor of Cleveland was present in the EOC throughout the exercise. The County Judge was present during the crucial s ta g e s .

All response organizations were activated to the degree necessary to determine that a viable capabinty exists. Two of the planned five evacuee centers were activated and staffed by red cross, public health, civil preparedness and school board pe rsonnel. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) ambulances were coordinated by the service supervisor and were positioned at forward duty lo ca tion s. Bus .uns we re actually conducted to simulate evacuation of persons who have no private means of transportation. Monitoring instruments were distributed to emergency workers. Police, sheriffs and fire units pa rticipated by deploying and sub-sector command posts were established.

Bradley County is obviously capable of initiating and controlling an evacuation on relatively short notice.

SHORTC OMINGS KI is to be pre-distributed to all families within the 10 mile EPZ with instructions

1. to bring the drug with them when they evacuate. It is obvious that in the haste l[ and anxiety of an evacuation many families will fail to do this. There are no provisions for coping with this situation.

Evacuee shelters are to be linked by amateur radio operators. This system was not exercised. County emergency management officials should examine I[a alternatives in the event the system cannot be activated during an actual e me rg e ncy. County officials should also investigate phone company "line load control" provisions to determine whether they would benefit emergency com-munica tions.

2 The county evacuation plan makes the director of each participating organization responsible for maintaining radiation exposure records for their g(O wo rke r s. During the exercise, however, the county RADEF officer explained that he would maintain all exposure records. This conniet should be re-conciled. It is recommended that the planned procedure be adhered to.

There is no provision for handling contaminated evacuees except segregation within the evacuee centers. Neither are there provisions for decontaminating g

jtf emergency workers and vehicles. The county is relying upon State personnel and other resources to cope with contamination. In at least one evacuee center (Oak Grove School) there are no showers. It is unrealistic to expect the State to unde rtake all decontamination. Local resources must be employed, possibly under state guidance / supervision.

The county EOC is not well suited to support emergency operations. The area (parking garage under courthouse) is poorly ventilated and smalL This is y pa rticularly true of the communications equipment area. Arrangement of tables and chairs does not leave wall space available for good information dis play. During the exercise there was little information display and no easily visible posting of wind directions on operations maps.

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k Departnient of Energy Oak Ridge Operations P.O. Box E Oak Ridge Tennessee 37830 JUN 2 0,1980 E. P. Tanner, Director Division of Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness State of Tennessee 3041 Sideo Drive Nashville, TN 37204 DOE COMMENTS ON JUNE 16-17, 1980 SEQUOYAH EXERCISE The June 16-17 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant emergency exercise required relatively little actual and/or simulated response by Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan, IRAP, signatories. Emphasis appeared to be heavily weighted toward evacuation decisions and related actions. We were pleased to hear the positive comments during the June 17 critt.que held in the SCC at Lovell Field relative to the successful demonstration of this highly important activity. On the other hand, we were disappointed with the communications problems that once again arose and the lack of a clear understanding as to the role of the SCC.

Focusing more directly on IRAP ccncerns, three needs were particu-larly evident. The first need is space. During an actual emer-gency, we can easily envision directing the monitoring activities of four mobile laboratories, one field laboratory,10-20 monitoring tea ms , and aerial surveillance. Sufficient space must be provided for this effort.

The second need is for a clearly defined goal and local (SCC)

State direction for these monitoring activities. Additional preplann-ing would reduce *.he associated uncertainties evident during this exercise.

The third need is for direct communication between counterparts.

(This point was addressed at the critique by Bill Graham.) With the various operating centers, this could be a formidable problem; L

E. P. Tanner jgN 2 0 880 however, good decision making demands an interchange of data and insights. The ability to accomplish this goal may rest with

he participants rather than with the system; nevertheless , the plan should reflect the desirability of this type of communication and, where possible, facilities should be oriented toward this goal.

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H. W. Hibbitts Health Physicist MS-331:HWH Environmental Protection Branch CC:

Bill Graham, TN/ Rad. Health V. J . D ' Amico, MS-30 W. H. Travis , MS-33 W. L. Smalley, MS-30

MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY OPERATONS CENT 2R 3041 SIDCo DRIVE ,

NASHVILLE 37204 PHONE (615) 7415181 07 July 1980 Mdjor General Carl D. WallaCe The Adjutant General ,

Mtittary Department of Tennessee Stoco Drive, National Guard Armory Nashville, Tennessee 37204

Dear General Wallace:

Attached hereto is the Exercise Report for the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Facir ty.

The exercise was conducted successfully on June 16-17, 1980. Minor changes have been made to the plan, and it has been forwarded to FEMA by Region IV with their

- recommendation that it be accepted.

I have designated Gilbert Smith as the individual in civil defense to follow-up on actions which are necessary as a result of the observer and participant comments on the Exercise.

We have a fine working relationship with the utility operator - TVA, and I am confident that if an emergency arises, Tennessee will handle it expertly to protect all of the citizens.

Si erely,

/

GENE P. TANNER tate Director

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY EXERCISE 16-17 JUNE 1980 REPORT PREPARED BY DIVISION OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS e

o BACKGROUND The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan which was tested by this Exercise was written during the past three (3) months. When new criteria were published in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, the plan which was tested by Tennessee /TVA last October (October 1979) was no longer adequate. Approval and exercising of the plan was required prior to TVA receiving an Operating License from NRC for the Sequoyah Facility.

Although this was the first Exercise of the Tennessee Plan for Sequoyah uncer the criteria specified in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, three (3) previous test exercises had been conducted involving the Sequoyah Facility. They were.

on March 30,1977, July 6,1978, and October 28-29, 1979.

Planning sessions between the State and TVA officials were held to prepare the Scenario and the plan for conducting the Sequoyah "80" Exercise.

The details of the Scenario and Exercise were discussed on May 6, in Chattanooga and May 15, at Watts Bar. On June 6 in Nashville, the Exercise Plan was finalized. An observer's briefing was conducted in Chattanooga on June 10,1980. Observers from the Tennessee Valley Authority, State Civil Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission attended the briefing.

I

SCENARIO ABSTRACT The exercise was initiated from the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Facility at 0715 CDT, June 16, 1980, by simulating severe weather damage to the SQH switchyard which caused loss of off-site A-C power supply. On-site A-C power was lost due to diesel generator malfunction. At 0920 a leak developed in a subsystem of a reactor coolant system loop. An obstruction in the !r.,op caused reduced coolant flow and elevated fuel rod tainperatures. The temperature increase caused fuel cladding damage and release of the fuel element gap radioactivity into the primary coolant and subsequently into the containment building. Containment radiation continued to increase and by 133'$ EDT, *.ne projected dose rates were 1 Rem /Hr (whole body) and 5 Rem /Hr (thyroid) based on containment activity. Declaration of a General Emergency was indicated. At 1400 EDT a earth-moving pan was pulled away from the reactor contairment revealing a containment building crack. A Health Physics survey indicated a gamma radiation level of 100 R/Hr. at 200 meters from the containment building.

Containment activity was released in a short time. The exercise continued until 1630 EDT when evacuation of the risk counties was completed.

The exercise was halted until 0800 EDT/17 June when sampling in the Ingestion Pathway was resumed until 1200 EDT, when the Exercise was terminated.

2

OBSECTIVF3 The cbjectives of the Exercise are covered in the Scenario and are listed as functions of the Scenario. Each response organizetion had pre-planned specific objectives which they wanted to achieve. The following objectives were provided in accordance with Para N.3.a of NUREG-0654.

1. Ensure activation of State of Tennessee Emergency Operations Center (EOC), local EOC's, State Control Center and TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).

2. Activate alerting, notification and warning procedures for State, TVA, Hamilton, and Bradley Counties.

3. Include events that will activate the site Radiological Emergency Plan (R EP).

4. Ensure that cori n inication links are exercised. These include TVA i

ECC's, State EOC, Hamilton ar'd Bradley County EOCs', and all Command Posts.

5. Test the emergency response capabilities of TVA, State Organizations, local support agencies, and appropriate Federal Agencies.

6. Require certain protective actions be taken for the plume exposure and ingestior pathways. This includes evacuation (simulated or actual) of off-site areas.

7. Ensure periodic public information releases.

3. Acquire the use of designated off-site emergency medical facilities and ambulance services.

v. Test recovery procedures.

3

OBSERVER PROCEDURES Staff planners from the Division of Civil Defense, Tennessee Department of Agriculture, and Tennessee Department of Public Health were designated as Exercise Observers with the following general responsibilities.

Observers planned to be in-place at their designated locations prior to declaration of the unusual event. They were instructed to keep a record of directions given, when and by whom, so that operation and control of the emergency could be evaluated. Observers were also furnished situations and problems which were pre-numbered to be introduced at a specific time. These situations were intended to " add to the problems", which would occur in an emergency. Evaluation of the adequacy of Planning, Manning, Training, Communications, Facilities, Operations, and Logistics were to be provided by the observers.

Observers were also instructed to evaluate the planning which was done to provide coverage over an extended period of time if that became necessary.

Since the Exercise was planned to be no-notice, observers were directed to keep the date and time confidential and not let participants know when the exercise would be conducted.

Self-evaluation is an important part of any Exercise, and participants were requested to provide comments on the exercise. Written comments from participants and State Observers are available at the Tennessee Civil Defense Division. Specific Findings and Recommendations are included in this report.

An oral critique was conducted at 1330 on 17 June 1980 at the State Control Center, Lovell Field, Chattanooga. Tennessee. A transcript of the oral critique is avaliable at the Tennessee Civil Defense Division. Highlights of the critique are included in Findings and Recommendations.

4

PARTICIPATING STATE AGENCIES OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TENNESSEE WILDLIFE RESOURCES AGENCY DIVISION OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS HAMILTON AND BRADLEY COUNTIES PARTICIPATING FEDERAL AGENCIES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY U. 5. CO AST GU ARD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N ATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE PARTICIPATING PRIVATE / SEMI-PRIVATE AGENC'ES AMERICAN RED CROSS TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ADVISORS S AMUEL E. BEALL, JR.

Consultant to the Governor 5

SEQUOY AH "30" CRITIQUE Tuesday,17 June 1930 1330 State Control Center AGENDA Invocation H. H. Bixler Opening Remarks Gilbert Smith Acknowledgements Scenario Preparation Team State Observers FEMA Support TVA Cooperation State Emergency Operations Center Lacy Suiter/

David Inman State Control Center John Keese Hamilton County Bill DeBrocke Bradley County Don Gardner TVA John Lobdell/

Ed Webb State Observer Comments Ray Bird - BC EOC Harold Fugue - HC EOC Jake Brooks - BC CP Don Dallenbach - SEOC Charles Edwards - Mobile Charles West -Rad. Health Gil Smith - SCC Jimmy Cagle - Agr.-SCC Radiological Health Bill Graham FEMA Jack Richardson /

Bob Trojanowski NRC John Sears /

Don Cameron /

Jce Neudecker Tripartite Comments Samuel Beall

~

Closing Remarks Col. Eugene P. Tanner NOTE: Complete tape of Critique available at Tennessee State Division of Civil Defense.

6

LISTING OF COMMENTS FROM SEQUOY AH "30" EXERCISE Tannessee valley Authority -

U. 5 Department of Energy State cf Georgia State Emergency Operatior;s Center Operations Public Information Department of Public Health Water Quality Contro Department of Agriculture Hamilton County EOC Bradley County EOC State Liaison Officer (Hamilton, Bradley, TVA)

Department of Transportation Department of Military State Control Center (2)

Information Department of Safety Communications State EO C State Control Center State Observers State EOC (CD, R AD Health, AGR.)

State Control Center (CD, AGR.)

Hamilton County EOC Bradley County EOC Command Post Mobile Transcript of Critique Federal Emergency Managemeat Agency NOTE: Findings and recommendations are included in this Report. Complete file of comments is available at Tennessee Division of Civil Defense.

7 >

FINDINGS BY SUBJECT ARF./.

1. Arrangement and Procedures in EOC's _

2 Standardize Display Boards

3. Message Handling within EOC's

4. "Get Ready" Warning Messages

5. Upute Briefings in EOC

6. Requirements for State Control Center

7. Recommended EOC Layout for Counties

3. Keeping all Informed

9. TVA Representation at SEOC & SCC

10. Adequacy of Warning System

11. Hard Copy Information on Facility Status

52. Requirement for "as of" Time of Events

13. Timing of Meteorological Data

14. Using Assistance Available

15. Timely Dose Proiections

16. Control of Radiological Monitoring Teams

17. Sample Size Information in Plan

13. Public Information

19. Agriculture Extension Agent & TDA Agents

20. Chattanooga Water Storage Capacity

21. Communications Equipment Requirements

22. Training Radio Communicators

23. Requirement for No-Notice

24. Planning for FAA Support

25. Risk Counties Coordinating Assistance

26. Test Recovery and Restoration Procedures 3

FINDING No.1 '

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) arrangements did not provide optimurn conditions for utilization of personnel.

DISCUSSION Congestion around status maps, tables, and controller's telephones caused some problems because of interference from noise and the crowded conditions.

EOC staff personnel were not located adjacent to other personnel with whom they needed to coordinate various actions. For example, Rad Health, Air Pollution Centrol (Metro), Agriculture, TVA Radiation Spe' dists, and Water Quality Control all are involved in the same kinds of activit They snould be physically located near each other. Other agencies have ti._ .ame require,nent.

RECOMMENDATION Review the job to be done by each member of the EOC staff and locate those within a specific area of responsibility adjacent to one another insofar as possible. Review EOC arrangement and procedures and change to increase ef ficiency.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Otficial: Lacy Suiter Completion Date: 1 October 1980 9

FINDING NO. 2 ,

Visual display boards did not provide sufficient information in some of the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's).

DISCUE.SION As much of the area situation, both static and active, as can be displayed, needs to be shown on situation rhaps and status display boards. This information is absolutely essential in a real emergency because personnel must be able to grasp the status changes readily especially when a personnel change takes piace. Such information as location of Traffic Assist Teams, Command Posts, Shelter Information Points, Road Blocks, Mass Care Shelters, and Radiological Laboratories should be displayed for all to see. Sector designa-tions and the status of evacuation from each area, plume location, weather information (wind direction and velocity, and atmospheric stability), and current Emergency Classification are essential items of information for several agencies in the EOC to have available to them. A tone alert system may be necessary to indicate that a change in status is being posted. Status of some items may be indicuted by a magnetic miniature of one (1) color for the planned location and another color when it is activated. Eacn Department can provide information on status boards affecting them.

RECOMMENDATION Require input from all personnel who have any EOC responsibility and determine what dispiay informa' ion will be available in each Operations and Control Center. Standardize displayed information.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.

Action Official: John White Completion Date: 1 October 1980 10

FINDING NO. 3 Message handling and distribution within the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's) were not entirely satisfactory. A n.essage-haridling system which will keep all people in the EOC informed is required.

DISCUSSION Message traffic involved many agencies. Some were operaticnal and others were of a technical nature. Personnel who are unfamiliar with technical terms have difficulty copying the information if it is given over telephone circuits. Accuracy of technical information can be very critical in the decision process. Hamilten County Civil Defense has developed a message-handling system which worked extremely well during the Exercise.

Well informed participants are better prepared to handle problems effectively.

RECOMMENDAT ON Review the Hamilton County Civil Defense EOC message-handlMg system, and adapt it as necessary for use in all EOC's.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: Gilbe.t Smith Completion Date: 1 September 1980 11

FINDING NO. 4 Get-ready warnings were provided by the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to subordinate units. This helped them be prepared to execute directions more expeditiously.

DISCUSSION The Plan does not require that "get ready" messages be sent to the State Control Center (SCC) and County EOC's prior to a change in Emergency Classification. When the system provides hara copy information to all EOC's and the SCC, they will be aware of a stable, improving, or deteriorating condition at the facility and can prepare accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION Discuss the advantages as well as the problems in providing "get ready f or" messages, and if it is determined they are helpful, establish procedures.

Action Agency: Tennessee Division of Civil Defense Action Official: Lacy Suiter Completion Date: 1 October 1980 12

FINDING NO. 5 -

Procedures for providing ir. formation to be included in up-date briefings should be reviewed.

t DISCUSSION Various procedures were used at the Emergency Operations Centers / State Control Center (EOC's/ SCC) to keep personnel informed of status changes periodically. In some cases, the person in charge attempted to bring everyone up to date while in others, a microphone was passed around for each agency to report updated information.

RECOMMENDATION A standard method of receiving and giving updated information to all personnel in the EOC/ SCC should be developed. Develop a Standard Format.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.

Action Official: Gilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 Sectember 1980 13

FINDING NO. 6 The f unctions of the State Control Center (SCC) as currently planned at Lovell Field was questioned by a number of observers.

DISCUSSION Personnel at the SCC were highly motivated. The SCC is envisioned as a command and control agency near the site. De current facility cannot provide such capability due to physical layout and communications limitations. It is generally agreed that there is a requirement for media handling in the Sequoyah area. The SCC, as currently set up, cannot perform that function. A near-site facility to coordinate utilization of various State resources is considered necessary. Plant information available to the SCC was late and inaccurate which made it impossible to be in a position to control activity.

RECOMMENDATION Determine the requirements for a State near-site f acility and its func-tions. Consider a location adjacent to the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) where media information can be provided and essential functions in tne near-site area can be coordinated.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and TVA Actiors Of ficial: Elgan Usrey Completion Date: 1 October 1980 14

FINDING NO.7 Some counties have inadequate facilities to manage an emergency which can occur from a Nuclear Power Facility.

DISCUSSION It was reported that some facilities lacked water, sanitation, adequate room and comf ort for extended operations.

RECOMMENDATION Prepare a document which lists the recommended Emergency Operations Center (EOC) layout and requirements for those counties involved in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of Nuclear Power Facilities.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and Risk Counties Action Official: John Keese Completion Date: 1 April 1981 15

FINDING NO. 8 The Bradley County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not kept fully informed of plans conditions until late in the Exercise.

DISCUSSION Since information on a radiation release from Sequoyah was slow arriving at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), wind information f rom Muscle Shoals did not arrive when it should to coincide with the radiation release information. This caused a problem in plotting the direction in which the plume traveled initially. Since the plume was not plotted to travel toward Bradley County, they were not involved. Subsequent action in the form of a "puf f" did get them involved. Radiological Monitoring crews did not send information which verified where the simulated radiation was located.

RECOMMENDATION All EOC's should receive a hard copy of whet's happening at the f acility.

R AD Health should provide simulated radiation readings for monitoring-crews to send to the SEOC.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense, TVA, and RAD Health Action Official: Elgan Usrey Completion Date: 1 October 1930 16

FINDING NO.9 -

Validity of need for TVA representation at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and State Control Center requires review.

DISCUSSION A TVA representative was not assigned to the State Control Center when specified in the Plan. Although TVA stated that a representative would be assigned in an actual emergency, it is important to have one during an Exercise to work out procedures which will be used during an actual emergency. The State needs to know the significance of problems which are reported concerning the facility. Decision makers should also be advised whether the problem is stable, deteriorating, or improving.

RECOMMENDATION State Civil Defense and TVA discuss the need for TVA representation at the SEOC and SCC. If the need is valid, a representative knowledgeable with the plant operation should be in place at Site Emergency or General Emergency.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and TVA Action Official: John Keese Completion Date: 1 October 1980 17

FINDING NO.10 The warning system is not adequate to alert a!! people within the ten-mile .

(10) Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) within fif teen (15) minutes.

DISCUSSION The primary warning system is the use of emergency vehicle sirens. If the counties a.re given adequate werning so that the vehici7s can be prepositioned at the start of their warning route, they can cover the area within fif teen (15) minutes. Without prior notification, it will take 30-45 minutes to alert the population-at-risk. This does not meet the warning criteria.

The design objective in NUREG 0654 specifies notification of all people within f..ve (5) miles of the facility and ninety percent (90%) of these located betweer five and ten miles (5-10) within fif teen (15) minutes. The remaining ten percent (10%) must be notified within 45 minutes.

The expected f requency of incidents / accidents at a nuclear power facility are as follows according to NUREG-0610.

Unusual event -- Once or twice per year per unit.

Alert -- Once in 10 to 100 years per unit.

Site Emergency - Once in 100 to once in 5,000 years per unit.

General Emergency - Less than once in about 5,000 years per unit.

Life-threatening doses off-site (within 10 miles) once in about 100,000 years per unit.

RECOMMENDATION Question the validity of the requirement for all people living within five (5) miles and ninety percent (90%) of those within 5 - 10 miles to be notified 18

within 15 minutes. When the cost of notification within 15 minutes, cornpared to the cost in 30-45 minutes is considered, according to the risk, the shorter tirne appears unjustif table.

Action Agencies: Tennessee State Civil Defense, Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action Official: Truett Frazier Completion Date: Open 19

._ ~ _

FINDING NO.11 -

A report of the conditions at the Sequoyah Facili:y was not forwarded to all activities who needed the information on a timely basis.

DISCUSSION If timely decisions are to be made to handle an emergency situation and to protect the public, decision makers must have information accurately and as soon af ter the condition occurs as possible. Dedicated telephone circuits were available to provide this information. Simulated conditions were introduced by a TVA Observer at the Sequoyah Facility starting at 0715 EDT on 16 June 1980. Delays from several minutes to over an hour were common in getting the information to some Emergency Operations Centers. Although the plant information may not be essential for decision making at the county level, it does help keep the county officials informed so that they are more nearly ready to respond when directed by the State EOC.

RECOMMENDATION A system should be provided which will transmit plant condition informa-tion and other critical data to the State EOC, County EOC's, and State Control Center simultaneously with the flow of data to TVA. This information should be in "hard copy" form so that the chance for error is minimum.

Action Agency: Tennessee Division of Civil Defense and Tennessee Valley Authority.

Action Official: Elgan Usrey/ David Inman Completion Date: 1 October 1980 20

FINDING -

No.12 The "as of" time of events at the factitty could not be determined.

DISCUSSION in the Exercise, simulated conditions and events were introduced at the Sequoyah Facility at times specified by the Scenario. His information was passed by voice over a dedicated circuit to the TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) in Chattanooga where it was th-n passed to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It was not possible to determine when the event took place at the facilty. In a real emergency, this information would be critical.

RECOMMENDATION Include message number and time of event in a hard copy of information concerning f acility conditions.

Action Agency: TVA and Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Officia': Elgan IJsrey/ David inman Completion Date: 1 October 1980 21

FINDING No.13 Meteorological data did not arrive at the Agencies where it was needed in a timely manner.

DISCUSSION The Metro Tower near the facility normally sends weather information directly to Muscle Shoals. This weather information is furnished to Health Physics personnel for them tr calculate projected dose rates to be forwarded to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Since the Exercise Plan called for weather data to be introduced as specified (not current actual weather) it was important that the timing of weather condition coincide with reported conditions at the plant for that same time. Delays in furnishing plant information to the State EOC caused decisions to be made from out-of-phase weather data. In some cases, the weather data was introduced from the TVA-Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) at Chattanooga, further compli-cating the problem.

RECOMMENDATION TVA Metro at Muscle Shoals should use the simulated weather data for their report to State Rad Health and to TVA Health Physics in an exercise. In an actual emergency, use the weather data f rom the Metro Tower at Sequoyah to Metro-Muscle Shoals, then to all concerned agencies.

Action Agency: TVA.

Action Official: Elgan Usrey Completion Date 1 October 1980 22

FINDING NO.14 Some Agencies coordinated extremely well with their counterparts, while others tried to handle every problem themselves and failed in some cases.

DISCUSSION The Division of Water Quality Control personnel at the State Control Center (SCC) worked closely with their counterparts at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and recommended timely action to prevent simulated radiation of the water systems downstream from Sequoyah. A situation was given to the Hamilton County EOC and the SCC requesting information on the extent of radiation five (5) miles from Sequoyah. Hamilton County contacted the SCC. This question was never answered. In an actual emergency situation, many people can call requesting information on the emergency. Timely response to queries is necessary. If the answer is not available at one level, it snould be pas:;ed on to the next Agency for reply.

RECOMMENDATION Each response organization indoctrinate its personnel to handle problems expeditiously and not hesitate to contact other individuals for assistance.

Action Agency: All participating agencies Action Of ficial: David inman/ Anne Stringham Completion Date: 1 September 1930 23

FINDING No.15 Accurate and rapid calculation of projected dose exposure was not providea.

DISCUSSION in order for the Tripartite Com.aittee and other decision makers to make accurate, timely decisions, they must have accurate, timely information on the radiation dose projection involving the population-at-risk. TVA has the capability at the f acility and at Muscle Shoals to make these calculations. The dose rates can be validated by Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (TDRH). If an emergency develops at Sequoyah, and the problem deteriorates to a General Emergency Emergency Classification - 4 (EC-4), prompt action must be taken to protect the people. There may not be time to discuss the calculations when the public is endangered. Action is necessary.

RECOMMENDATION TVA provides the State EOC projected dose information. The TDRH should calculate dose projections to confirm the TVA figures. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and TDRH should present the information to the Tripartite for their recommendations to the Governor concerning evacuation.

Action Agencies: TVA, TDRH, Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: Anne Stringham - TDPH Completion Date: 1 September 1980 24

- ~ _

FINDING NO.16 Coordination of Radiological Monitoring Team Activities was not conducted by Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (TDRH) personnel.

DISCUSSION Some Divisions of Public Health were not aware of support available from TVA, Department of Energy (DOE), Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan (SMRAP), and other State Agencies in monitoring teams and laboratories. Control of teams available was not coordinated so that Rad Monitoring Team location in the field was known at all times or so that sample collectors could be directed to the nearest laboratory with field samples.

Location of laboratories is necessary so that any agency which collects samples can be directed quickly and safely to the lab. The primary responsibility of Radiological Monitoring Teams is to provide radiation information from various pre-selected locations to verif y projected dose calculations.

RECOMMENDATION The appropriate Division of Public Health should establish a grid system with easily located landmarks or crossroads for Rad monitoring teams to be directed to for sampling, primarily within the ten-mile (10) Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Rad Health predetermines where rr abile and fixed laboratories should be located for expedited analysis of sarapies. Identify these locations on a map for ease in locating them. Several suitable locations for mobile labs should be selected so that the safest can be utilized depending upon the wind conditions.

Action Agency: TDRH.

Completion Date: 1 September Action Official: Anne Stringham-TDPH 1930 25

_ ~ _

FINDING NO.17 Sample size requirements were not provided Tennessee Department of Agriculture (TDA) personnel by R AD Health.

DISCUSSION Agriculture Department personnel were ordered to the Ingestion Pathway area to collect samples to be checked for radiation. When they returneo with tne samples of milk, produce, and grain; they were told that the samples should have been larger.

RECOMMENDATION Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (TDRH) provide the TDA specific information to be included in Part 111 of the Plan on sample require-ments.

Action Agency: TDRH and TDA Action Official: Anne Stringham - TDPH Completion Date: 1 September 1980 26

FINDING NO.13 -

Release of Public Information appeared to be handled very effectively.

DISCUSSION The Plan does not require a Public Information representative at the State Control Center (SCC) in Chattanooga. One was assigned there during the Exercise. News Media will arrive at various places to obt-i information on the emergency. The Plan is specific in the guidance on who may release off-site information. The release of off-site information by the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) (WDOD) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Radio was very effective for Hamilton County. However, Bradley County was not covered with evacuation announcements by their EBS Radio Station (W B AC). A primary function of the State near-site location is to handle news media repre.sentatives in the area. Most of this function was assumed by Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It was handled very effectively. However, the Plan does not specify that method.

RECOMMENDATION The Emergency Information. Officer should review the procedures specified in the Plan, the procedures used during the Exercise, and in coordina-tion with other information personnel determine what changes to the Plan are appropriate.

Action Agency: Emergency Information Officer Action Of ficial: Keel Hunt Completion Date: 1 September 1980 27

FINDING NO.19 Responsibilities of the University of Tennessee Agriculture Extension Service personnel is not generally understood by Non-Agriculture Department personnel. Tennessee Department of Agriculture (TDA) agents are difficult to contact in the field.

DISCUSSION Extension Service personnel are not employees of the Tennessee Department of Agriculture. They have, however, been very helpful in surveying farrns to obtain information which is included in the Plan. With prior coordination, they would be available to assist, if required, during an emergency. The TDA agent in the area could not be contacted until over five (5) hours af ter the Exercise started. Although this was soon enough to handle Ingestion Pathway matters, it did not satisfy coordination requirements for Adriculture sampling in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Overall, the responsibilities of the TDA were carried out exceptionally well.

RECOMMENDA TION TDA provide information to all county Civi! Defense Directors in the 50-mile radius around the Nuclear Power Facilities concerning the functions and responsibilities of Extension Agents. Also, that TDA take ution to establish a system to get in touch with TDA personnel in the EPZ within a reasonable period of time.

Action Agency: Tennessee Department of Agriculture Action Official: Jim Thomas Completion Date: 1 September 1980 28

FINDING NO.20 Water storage capacity for the City of Chattanooga is sufficient for less h:n one (1) day at normal consumption rate.

DISCUSSION Downtown Chattanooga is supp!ied with finished water directly from the high service punips operated by Tennessee Water Company without benefit of storage capacity in addition to the clear well which supplies the high service pumps. If a radiation release from Sequoyah made it necessary to close the intakes from the Tennessee River, the water supply to the city would be critical.

RECOMMENDATION Determine whether the risk is so great that additional water storage capacity for the City or Chattanooga is essential for the safety and well being of its citizens.

Action Agency: Tennessee Department of Public Health.

Action Of ficial: Terry Cothern Completion Date: 1 September 1980 29

FINDING -

No.21 Telephone lines failed and were not immediately repaire.d.

Communications requirements should be reviewed.

DISCUSSION The person who normally expedites resolution of telephen : problems for the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) was on vacation when the Exercise started. Two (2) critical (TVA Chairman and RAD Health) ringdown circuits failed at the SEOC. The circuit to Signal Mountain from the State Control Center (SCC) was also inoperative. Some of these circuits were out tor over six (6) hours. One (1) member of the Tripartite Committee was located at the TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC). He utilized the dedicated circuit to SEOC to discuss Tripartite matters with the committee members there. This was necessary and important for the job, but it prevented the State Liaison official at the CECC from talking over the line to his counterpart at the SEOC.

RECOMMENDATION Analyze total communications requirements. Schedule system and line cnanges based upon the analysis. Indoctrinate all concerned personnel with changes and publish change to Annex G of the Plan.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and TVA.

Action of ficial: Truett Frazier Completion Date: 1 September 1980 30

FINDING NO. 22

~

Some personnel who needed to receive and transmit information via radio had little or no training in radio procedures.

DISCUSSION The Civil Defense radio net was set up with network control at the State Control Center. The individual who handled the base station was well qualified and maintained control of radio traffic. The two (2) channels planned for the exercise were inoperative until about six (6) hours af ter the exercise started.

The THP radio net was used during this time. RAD Health should have had a person near the radio net controller to talk to the Radiological Monitoring Teams and to guide and coordinate their efforts. Any personnel who operate radio equipment need some training in proper procedures.

RECOMMENDATION All response organizations should arrange to receive training in radio procedures from Civil Defense personnel unless they have qualified radio operators to provide their own training.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: David Inman Completion Date: 1 June 1931 e

3L

FINDING NO. 23 Some participants were aware of the date of the Exercise although it was no-notice.

DISCUSSION When many Agencies take part in an Exercise of this nature and the public needs to be notified, it is difficult to conduct it on a no-notice basis.

Although every effort was made by the Exercise Planners to keep the date confidential, some participants knew ahead of time when it would occur. It is understandable that all response organizations want to do an outstanding job.

In an exercise, several individuals who would take an active part in an emergency are not available because they are observers of the exercise.

Several agencies had to be ready if they were to participate. These included the Governor's Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as well as State and local organiza-tions, TVA, and the news media. The period of 7-21 June was published as the liability period for the Exercise. Although the State was not criticized for some people knowing ahead of time and being " set on go" when the Exercise started, realistical'y in an actual emergency, there would be no advance warning.

RECOMMENDATION All agencies which "need to know", select a person to be contacted by the Exercise Planner. This person will be given the specific date, time, and scope of the Exercise. FEMA, NRC, and TVA appoint a " trusted agent" who will be contacted by the State Exercise Planner. The liability period should cover a thirty (30) day time span.

Action Agencies: All participating organizations Action Official: Gilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 September 1930 32

1 FINDING NO.24 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) support was not pre-planned although it was handled effectively when the requirement was presented.

DISCUSSION If an emergency occurred at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Facility, general aviation aircraf t could be a problem if not restricted from the area.

Passengers of commercial aircraf t landing at Lovell Field could also be endangered if flown through the Plume Exposure Pathway. A simulated problem was introduced at the SCC and was handled well by local FAA control personnel when contacted.

RECOMMENDATION Include appropriate FAA Agencies as Task Organizations to handle air traffic matters during an emergency at Sequoyah.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.

Action Official: Gilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 September 1930 e

33

FINDING

, NO. 25 The plan requires various State Agencies to provide support to the counties. It does not specify how the counties and State Agencies will coordinate requirements.

DISCUSSION Departments of Safety, Transportation (TDOT), Agriculture (TDA),

Military, etc., will be required to furnish some resources to the risk counties, especially if the emergency is prolonged. All requirements may not be known until the actual emergency arises. Some Departments have coordinated with the counties, and specific requirements have been identified. Others expect to provide assistance but contact was not made with them during the exercise.

For example, TDOT was never contacted to help the counties block roads af ter the evacuation was ordered.

RECOMMENDATION Risk counties determine, so far as possible, what various departments will be called on to furnish. Appropriate parts of the county procedures should be coordinated with the applicable department.

Action Agency: Risk Counties and State Departments as c.pplicable.

Action Official: Lacy Suiter Completion Date: 1 October 1930 34

FINDING

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NO. 26 4

Recovery and restoration procedures were not exercised.

DISCUSSION Af ter an area has been evacuated, the emergency terminated and radiation release stopped, the evacuated area must be checked so that people may return to their homes safely. Procedures for recovery and restoration are included in Part IV of the Sequoyah Plan. However, no recovery actions were exercised.

RECOMMENDATION Revtew procedures outlined in Part IV of the Sequoyah Plan and determine their adequacy. Insure that recovery procedures are tested in all future exercises.

Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and Tennessee Divtsion of Radiological Health Action Otficial: Gilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 December 1980 9

35

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MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS '

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 3041 $40Co ORtVE NASHvtLLE 37204 PHONE (615) 141-5141 0 t August 1980 TO: See Distribution Below litt: Eugene P. Tanner Director, Civil Defense dJ: Follow-Up Action on Sequoyan Exercise The Exercise Report for Sequoyah dated 7 July 1930 nas been forwarded to your Department. In order to correct those deficiencies which were identitied in the exercise, I appointed Col. Gilbert Smith to follow up with the responsible agency.

As a part of the follow-up action, a schedule has been prepared which indicates tne indtvidual, by name, responsible for the follow-up action and a seneduled completion date when the deficiency should be resolved. Attached hereto is a copy of the schedule and a Report Form on which progress in correcting each deficiency may be recorded.

Please keep Col. 5mith informed of the status of the finding for which you are responsible. His phone number is 741-5121.

/ luc xpc: Mr. Iacy Suiter Mr. John White Mr. Elgan Usrey Mr. John Keese Mr. Truett I'razier Mr. David inman

/ Mr. Gilbert Smith Ms. Anne Stringham, Tenn. De,... of Public Health Mr. Terry Cothern , "

Mr. Jim Thomas, Tenn. Dept. of Agriculture

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ACTION OFFICIAL Folt COMPLETION OF DEFICIENCIES COMPLETION DATE5 FINDlNG ACTION COMPLETION DATE N O. OFFICIAL I Lacy duiter i October 1980 2 John White i October 1980 3 Gilbert Smith 1 September 1980 4 Lacy Suiter 1 October 1980 5 Gilbert Smith i September 1980 5 Elgan Usrey i October 1980 7 John Neese i April 1981 8 Elgon Usrey i October 1980 9 John Keese i October 1980 10 Truett Frazier Open 11 Elgan Usrey/ David Inman I October 1980 12 Elgan Usrey/ David Inanan 1 October 1980 t3 Elgan Usrey i October 1980 L4 David inman/ Anne Stringham i September 1980 l5 Anne Stringham - TDPH t September 1980 l6 Anne btringham - TDPH I 5eptember 1980 l7 Anne Strmgham - TDPH t September 1980 L3 Keel Hunt t September 1980 19 Jim Thornas i September 1980 20 Terry Cothern L September 1980 21 Truett Frazter 1 September 1980 22 David Ininan L June 1981 23 Gilbert bmith L 5epteinber 1980 2e Gilbert Snuth i sept aber 1980

2) Lacy butter i Octobs 1980 26 Gilbert bmith l December 1980

TENNESSEE MULTI-JURISCICTIONAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PL DEFICIENCY CORRECTION REPORT ,

FINDING NO. FIXED NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

SUBJECT:

ACTION AGENCY:

ACTION OFFICER:

TELEPHONE NO.

COORDINATING AGENCY:

PLANNED COMPLETION DATE:

}TATUS OF PROGRESS

APPENDIX 22, ANNEX F RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAM UTILIZATION

1. PURPOSE '

This Appendix provides the procedures to be used to control and direct the efforts of all radiological monitoring teams (RADMONT) to be used in off-site monitoring.

II. SCOPE The Radiological Monitoring Teams are the mobile sensors for the asacies which determine the radiation risk to people located in the Emergency Piuining Zone. Control of the teams assigned and made available to the State is a responsibility of the TDRH.

III. EX ECUTION When an Unusual Event occurs at a nuclear power facility, RADMONT control personnel from TDRH will prepare to proceed to the TVA Environmental Data Station (EDS). When the Alert Emergency Classification (EC-2) is declared, the personnel will proceed to the EDS.

The EDS is located at the TVA Met Tower near the Sequoyah NPF.

Facilities are available at the EDS for team control personnel from TDRH to wcrk alongside TVA personnel during an exercise or an emergency. The EDS is equipped with radio equipment to maintain contact with and control each team's movements. The EDS also has ringdown telephones for contact with the MSECC and the SEOC.

RADMON teams will be provided by Agencies listed in Tab A. With the exception of TVA teams who are dispatched from the Nuclear Powr Facility, all RADMON teams will report to the Field Team Control Center (FTCC) at Lovell Field. The teams will be issued maps of the area which shows the specific monitoring points, radio procedures and frequencies, data forms, and anyother materials needed for them to function in that area. Equipment and training for the field teams is a responsibility of their parent organization.

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IV. DATA TRANSMISSION Radiation data will be sent by radio from each field team to the EDS.

From the EDS, it will be passed to the nuclear power facility and to Muscle Shoals. Field data will be consolidated with data generated at -

the facility and dose projections calculated at Muscle Shoals. Tbt TDRH will validate TVA calculations and advise the Tripartite Committee of their concurrence in the TVA findings.

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. s TAB A, APPENDIX 22, ANNEX F SOURCE OF RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS

1. PURPOSE ,

This Tab lists the Radiological Monitoring Teams to be provided by all Agencies to support Tennessee in case of an accident at a Nuclear Power Facility.

11. R ADIOLOGIC AL MONITORING TEAMS (R ADMONT)

SOURCE RESPONSE TIME TVA (Facility) .5 HR.

State 4.0 HR.

TVA (Muscle Shoals) 4.0 HR.

IR AP (DOE) 2 - 24 HR.

SMRAP 8 - 24 HR.

Universities 12 - 24 HR.

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MILJTARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER .

3041 s!DCo DRIVE NASHVILLE 37204 PHONE (615) 7416181 01 August 1980 Mr. Frank Newton Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1373 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Mr. Newton:

We in the State of Tennessee have reviewed the findings of the RAC and the coservations which they have made on the Sequoyah Exercise which we conducted with TVA on June 16-17, 1980. In addition to the RAC observations (inclosure No. 1) we have reviewed the comments of the State observers and the observations made by participants in the exercise.

Observations of the exercise from all sources have been analyzed and specific action taken to correct deficiencies. The Exercise Report (Inclosure No. 2) contains background information on the exercise, a Scenario Abstract, Objectives, Summary of Observer Procedures, a list of participating agencies, the Critique Agenda, a listing of comment sources and twenty-six (26) specific findings. Each finding includes brief discussion of the problem and a recommendation for resolving the deficiency. Responsibility and a completion date have been assigned to each one, and we will follow up on these until they have been resolved. (Inclosure No. 3)

The deficiency in the Tennessee procedures for utilization of Radiological Monitoring Teams which was identified by Mr. Ed Williams and others has been given special attention. We have concluded that an additional Appendix to Annex F of the Plan is necessary to establish and maintain direction and control of these teams. I have attached a craf t copy of the Radiological Monitoring Team Utilization Appendix for your information. (Inclosure No. 4) This outlijnes the procedures which we will use in any future exercise or emergency.

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Mr. Frank Newton Page 2 01 August 1980 Let me assure you that we will follow up on all deficiencies which the RAC and we identified in the Exercise. I will keep you advised of progress in their resolution.

Sincerely, c

M ne P. Tanner te Director

/ luc inclosures (4)

RAC Observations Exercise Report Completion Date and responsibility Draf t of Radiological Monitoring Team Utilization Appendix